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History of Shah 'Abbas the Great
(Tārīḵ-e 'Ālamārā-ye 'Abbāsī)

by

Eskandar Beg Monshi

Volume I

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Transcription

The transcription system used here for Persian and Arabic elements in Persian, aims for simplicity and accuracy, and has been jointly adopted by Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum, Encyclopaedia Persica, The Persian Heritage Series, The Persian Studies Series, Bibliothèque Persane, and Meisterwerke der persischen Literature.

	Persian	Arabic		Persian	Arabic		Persian	Arabic
ء	'		ض	ż	ḍ	Vowels		
ب	b		ط	ṭ		ا آ	ā	
پ	p		ظ	ẓ		ىٰ	à	
ت	t		ع	ʿ		و	ū	
ث	s̱	ṯ	غ	ḡ		ی	ī	
ج	j		ف	f		ـَ	a	
چ	č		ق	q		ـُ	o	
ح	ḥ		ک	k		ـِ	e	(but iy)
خ	ḵ		گ	g		ه	e, a	a
خو	ḵ̌		ل	l		وَ	ow	aw
د	d		م	m		یَ	ey, ay	ay
ذ	ẕ	ḏ	ن	n				
ر	r		و	v	w			
ز	z		ه	h				
ژ	ž		ی	y				
س	s							
ش	š							
ص	ṣ							

Note:
The more familiar and commonly used place names, titles when not an integral part of the name, and other commonly known words have been anglicized without diacritics for the sake of simplicity (e.g., shah, Isfahan, Turkman, khān, etc.).

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Roger M. Savory
Trinity College, University of Toronto

Foreword

None of the kings who ruled Persia in Islamic times has achieved the fame and glory enjoyed by Shah 'Abbas the Great (1571-1629). An outstanding monarch of extraordinary ability and drive, he must be considered the chief architect of the modern Iranian state. Shah 'Abbas is the most celebrated figure of the Safavid dynasty (1502-1722) founded by Shah Esma'il. Shah Esma'il was a passionate religious leader of poetic verve and military genius, devoutly served by a number of Shi'ite militant tribes. Basing his power on their unwavering allegiance, he made Shi'ism—a minority faith of Islam—the official religion of his kingdom and forced its spread by the authority of his sword. Persia, which had suffered long centuries of divided rule after the fall of the Sasanians in 651, was finally unified under the Safavid banner. The Safavid state, however, still lacked sufficient institutional support for this newly fashioned unity. For some three generations it remained vulnerable to the ambitions and power-plays of the tribal chiefs who had helped found it.

Shah 'Abbas turned this kingdom, held together primarily by the ardent faith of a number of militant tribes, into a cohesive and stable monarchy. He consolidated the state by securing its borders, strengthening its economy, giving it a centralized administration, and forming a regular army responsible not to the tribal heads but to the king as the head of the state. His economic and commercial acumen brought the country wealth and prosperity. Internal security and steady regulation encouraged farming. Roads and public buildings were constructed on an unprecedented scale; crafts and industry prospered. A skillful diplomat of broad views, Shah 'Abbas encouraged political and economic relations with the West; and foreign envoys found a ready welcome at his court.

As a military commander and strategist Shah 'Abbas proved a formidable foe to the Safavids' chief rival, the Ottoman Empire. During his long reign of forty-one years he successfully defended the integrity of Persian borders, drove out the Portuguese from Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, and established the identity of Persia as a national state.

Shah 'Abbas was not, however, without his shortcomings. A ruthless autocrat of suspicious nature and complex personality, he meted out harsh punishments, eliminating or disabling many of his own kin. His keen interest in wealth and luxury often led to avarice. Yet Shah 'Abbas's inspired leadership, administrative and military skills, economic insight, broad vision, and inexhaustible energy made him an exceptional leader of men and shaper of destinies. His life soon passed into legend and tales of his sagacity and justice enriched the fund of Persian folklore. The many graceful caravanserais and public cisterns that a modern traveler can still see at old Persian road stations remain as monuments to his sometimes harsh yet on the whole beneficent rule.

The most comprehensive biography of Shah 'Abbas was recorded by a chief secretary of his court in a major work of Persian historiography, the *'Ālam-ārā* ("Embellisher of the World"). This compendious history, written in a highly literary and sometimes bombastic style, treats not only Shah 'Abbas's reign, but also provides valuable information about the earlier Safavid kings, the course of events in the Ottoman Empire and other neighboring countries, and the state of the arts and sciences. It also contains biographies of many poets, artists, calligraphers, and men of learning. The *'Ālam-ārā* is the most important source of Safavid history and is perhaps the last in the chain of great Persian medieval histories.

The translation of *'Ālam-ārā* presented considerable problems. Not only is its sheer formidable bulk (1116 pages of closely printed text in the latest edition), but also its style would make an exact translation tedious reading. A tendency prevailed in Persian historiography from about the twelfth century for historians to write in a highly stylized fashion. They used many rhetorical devices, couching their statements in figurative speech with an abundance of hyperbole and metaphor. They also often adorned their writing with quotations from various poets and Koranic verses, drawing on the terminologies of various disciplines to exhibit their knowledge of different fields of learning, as if to impress their peers and amaze the reader. Although the *'Ālam-ārā* does not rank among the most ornate Persian histories, it shares with them the general penchant for florid prose, particularly in its introductory sections.

Dr. Roger Savory, Professor of Persian and Islamic history at the University of Toronto and a leading authority on Safavid history has tackled this formidable task of translation with admirable good sense. By paring away the verbal superfluities of the original he has furnished the reader with a fluent and attractive translation. All students of Persian and Middle Eastern history should be grateful for his patient effort.

Ehsan Yarshater
Columbia University

Introduction

The importance of the Safavid period (1501–1736) in the history of Iran has been increasingly recognized in recent years by scholars both in Iran and in the West. In 1501, the Safavids established the first native dynasty to rule over the whole of Iran since the overthrow of the Sasanid empire by the Arabs in the seventh century. For eight and a half centuries Iran had been little more than a geographical abstraction, with no independent existence but subject to a succession of foreign rulers—Arab, Turk, Mongol, and Tartar. The Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century constitute a watershed in the history of Iran and, indeed, of Islam. The Mongols destroyed the historical caliphate which for six hundred years had been the visible symbol of the unity of the Islamic world. The Iranians, who had preserved their distinctive culture and their sense of national identity throughout the long period of foreign domination, seized this opportunity to reassert their political independence.

The process took two centuries. It began in 1301, when Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn Esḥāq, who gave his name to the dynasty founded by his descendant, Shah Esma'il I, in 1501, assumed the position of head and spiritual director of a local Sufi Order in Gilan. The origins of the Safavid family are still obscure, but it may be said with some certainty that Ṣafī al-Dīn's ancestors moved to Azerbaijan, probably from Kurdistan, during the eleventh century and settled in the Ardabil district. Though of native Iranian stock, the Safavids spoke Āẕarī, the form of Turkish used in Azerbaijan.

When Ṣafī al-Dīn became head of the Order henceforth named the Ṣafavīya Order after him, he adopted a policy of active proselytism that transformed a Sufi Order of purely local significance into a religious movement with numerous adherents throughout Iran, Syria, and Anatolia. Regular contact was maintained with the disciples of the Safavid shaikhs in those regions through a network of agents termed *ḵalīfas,* who periodically visited the headquarters of the movement at Ardabil. The most important converts were made among the pastoral Turkman tribes living in eastern Anatolia, the Armenian highlands, and northern Syria and Iraq. Converts to the Safavid cause adopted a distinctive form of headgear which led them to be dubbed *qezelbāš* or "redheads." This whole propaganda network was controlled by the office of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā,* which Minorsky has felicitously termed the "special secretariat for Sufi affairs," and the presence of large numbers of Safavid supporters in eastern Anatolia was recognized by the Ottomans as a serious threat to their own authority in that area.

From the beginning of the fourteenth century, the leaders of the Safavid movement gave clear signs of an ambition to achieve temporal power as well as religious authority, and this ambition aroused first the apprehension and then the active hostility of the contemporary rulers of western Iran and Iraq. Despite the fact that three successive Safavid leaders were killed in battle (Joneyd, 1460; Ḥeydar, 1488; and ʿAlī, 1494), the momentum of the movement was still sufficient to bring the revolution to a successful conclusion and establish the Safavid dynasty in 1501. The power of the Safavid shahs rested on three distinct bases: the divine right of the kings of Iran; the claim of the Safavid rulers to be the representative on earth of the Mahdī, the Twelfth Imam of the Eṣnā ʿAšarī Shiʿites, a messianic figure whose emergence from occultation is expected to usher in an era of universal peace and justice; and their position as *moršed-e kāmel,* or "perfect spiritual director" of the Safavid Order of Sufis. In the period immediately before the establishment of the Safavid state, however, there is no doubt that Safavid religious propaganda *(daʿva)* went far beyond even these sweeping claims, and asserted that the Safavid leader was not merely the representative of the Mahdī but the Mahdī himself, or even God incarnate.

On their assumption of political power in Iran in 1501, the most important action of the Safavids was the establishment of Eṣnā ʿAšarī (or Twelver) Shiʿism as the official religion of the new state, an action that had far-reaching results. It to some extent set Iran apart from the mainstream of Islam and it was a major factor in enabling Iran to resist absorption into the Ottoman empire. The imposition of Shiʿism also had the effect of strengthening the central government and of producing a greater awareness of national (as opposed to ethnic) identity. To the extent that the Safavids bequeathed to their successors a centralized administrative system, a standing army, and a state with well-defined boundaries, they may be said to have laid the foundations of the modern Iranian state.

In other respects, too, the Safavid period was of great significance. There was, for one thing, a remarkable flowering of the arts: carpets and textiles of unparalleled richness of color and design; manuscripts distinguished by the quality of their calligraphy and illustrations; and ceramic tiles of astonishing intricacy and beauty. The latter adorned such masterpieces of architecture as the Masjed-e Shah and the Masjed-e Shaikh Loṭfollāh at Isfahan, both of which date from the reign of Shah 'Abbas. The period as a whole and the reign of Shah 'Abbas in particular were also a time of dramatic increase in diplomatic and commercial contacts with the West. The Portuguese, Dutch, and English tried to establish trading posts in the Persian Gulf with a view to gaining control of trade with India and Southeast Asia, and the English explored the possibilities of overland trade. The tolerant climate of Iran under Shah 'Abbas led foreign merchants to establish colonies in various parts of the country, and foreign religious orders (Carmelites, Augustinians, and Capuchins) to found convents in Isfahan and elsewhere.

In many ways, the reign of Shah 'Abbas I marks the highest point of Safavid achievement. Under Shah Soleymān (1666–1694) and Shah Sultan Ḥoseyn (1694–1722), the progressive breakdown of the central administration was marked by increasing inefficiency and corruption at all levels of government. The degeneration of the dynasty was due in large part to the practice, initiated by Shah 'Abbas I, of confining the royal princes to the harem and never allowing them to receive the training for future kingship that earlier Safavid shahs had received. The military machine was allowed to run down to such an extent that the Safavid state was unable to repel an Afghan attack in 1722, and for seven years the Safavid capital, Isfahan, was occupied by the invaders. The economic prosperity of the country was undermined by a departure from 'Abbas I's policies of state capitalism, and by bringing too many provinces under the direct control of the crown. The weakness of the Safavid shahs during the second half of the seventeenth century allowed the Shi'ite *'olamā* to increase their power to a marked extent, and their militant concern with the rooting out of heresy militated against the atmosphere of religious tolerance for non-Muslim minorities that had been responsible for economic prosperity in the time of 'Abbas I. Nāder Khan, who at first posed as the restorer of the Safavid state, ended it in 1736 by having himself crowned as Nāder Shah. His assassination in 1747 inaugurated half a century of civil war between the Zands and Qājārs that ended in the victory of the latter.

If one wishes to estimate the Safavid achievement, one has only to contrast the two and a quarter centuries of Safavid rule with the century of struggle between rival dynasties which preceded it, or with the more than fifty years of anarchy and strife which followed it. Despite all the internal stresses and external pressures to which the Safavids were subject, they succeeded in converting Iran into a strong and prosperous state, and the fact that Iran exists as an independent nation today is due in no small measure to them. In view of the importance of this period in the history of Iran, the decision to include a history of the Safavids in the Persian Heritage Series is a source of much satisfaction. The choice of the *Tārīḵ-e 'Ālam-ārā-ye 'Abbāšī* of Eskandar Beg Monšī to represent the extensive corpus of Safavid historiography was made at the suggestion of the translator. It is necessary, therefore, for me to say a few words in justification of this choice.

Eskandar Beg's chronicle deals mainly with the reign of Shah 'Abbas I. Shah 'Abbas, despite his weaknesses of character and errors of policy, was without question the greatest of the Safavid shahs; he was unequaled in ability, breadth of vision, knowledge of the world, and the successful application of a pragmatic approach to politics and commerce. He was also a brilliant strategist and field commander. It is therefore appropriate that the Safavid chronicle selected for publication in the Persian Heritage Series should concern itself primarily with an account of the life and times of this remarkable ruler.

The author, Eskandar Beg, known as Monšī (secretary) because of his employment in the Safavid bureaucracy, was born about the year 1560 and probably died about 1632. His work is divided into three books: Book I consists of a history, in summarized form, of the origins of the Safavids and of the reigns of the predecessors of Shah 'Abbas. Although based in the main on earlier histories, such as the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar*, the *Nosaḵ-e Jahān-ārā*, and the *Fotūḥāt-e Amīnī* (the last-named is not extant), this section of the work contains a considerable amount of material not available elsewhere, and is presented moreover with admirable clarity and accuracy. Books II and III, which consitute the greater part of the history, cover the reign of Shah 'Abbas. Books I and II were completed in 1616, and Book III in 1629, the year of Shah 'Abbas's death. Eskandar Beg's history is therefore a strictly contemporary account; it is also remarkably detailed and accurate, for the author, by virtue of his position as one of the chief secretaries *(monšī-ye 'aẓīm)* of the court, was a member of the Shah's entourage and an eye witness to many of the events he describes. This fact not only imparts freshness and vividness to his writing, but enables him to give a wealth of detail that materially increases our understanding of the "inwardness" of the history of the period.

The *Tārīḵ-e 'Ālam-ārā-ye 'Abbāsī* is not only important as history—that is, for the information it contains—but is an outstanding work of historiography. Despite the vast scope of the work, the author never loses sight of its shape and proportion and, after a digression, returns unerringly to pick up loose ends. He is unusually accurate in matters of fact and meticulous in giving dates. He is careful to give the essential background of events in the Ottoman and Mogul empires so that the reader may understand their impact on Iran. But it is above all the quality of his writing that sets Eskandar Monšī apart from his contemporaries. As examples of dramatic historical writing, it would be hard to beat the author's description of the buildup of tension before the murder of the queen Mahd-e 'Olyā in 1579; the excitement of the royal army's march on Herat in 1583; the drama of the manhunt for 'Alī Khan in Gīlān or for Šāhverdī Khan in Lorestān, or his portrayal of the assassination of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. There are the absorbing descriptions of the siege of Erīvān in 1604 and of Baghdad in 1623, and the compelling accounts of such "set piece" battles as Ṣūfīān, at which the author was present; his depiction of the confusion in the Ottoman camp after the Safavid victory is extraordinarily vivid.

But Eskandar Beg is much more than just a writer of dramatic narrative. His work is full of touches of humor (often self-deprecatory), irony, and pathos. As an example, one may cite his statement that Shah 'Abbas decided to overlook the Uzbegs' committing the crime of carrying off Muslims as prisoners and selling them as slaves because (1) vengeance could safely be left to the Lord and (2) the Shah was not in a position to do anything about it at the time. In another place, the author states that Shah 'Abbas knew what was in the mind of one of his emirs, either "by virtue of his divinely-inspired acumen, or from information supplied by his intelligence agents." Eskandar Beg's work is full of comments on human foibles, as when one Darvīš Ḵosrow conceives the cunning idea of attending classes in jurisprudence in order to allay the suspicions of the *'olamā* that he is a heretic. One likes, too, the story of the royal astrologer who offered to prove the accuracy of his prediction that the Ottomans would not capture Baghdad by volunteering to join the Safavid garrison there.

As for pathos, the picture of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, sitting alone in their tent in a deserted camp after the action has moved elsewhere, is unforgettable. There is pathos, too, in Ḥamza Mīrzā's hope that, at the eleventh hour, the impending tragedy of civil war between the *qezelbāš* may be averted.

No assessment of Eskandar Beg, however brief, would be complete without a reference to his moral courage and honesty. He does not merely give plain, unvarnished facts (although that in itself would be an achievement), but is ready to add his own comments and opinions. For instance, he dismisses as improbable the view that the Takkalū-Torkman faction was not party to the plot to abduct Tahmasp Mīrzā. He gives praise to Shah 'Abbas where he feels it is due, and in terms which convince one of the genuineness of his words. Commenting on 'Abbas's outstanding generalship at the battle of Ṣūfīān in 1605, for instance, he says he is "setting aside for a moment the historian's usual rhetoric and conventional phrases, which are devoid of the reality that lies at the heart of the matter." On the other hand, he is not afraid to make comments that cannot have been pleasing to his royal master: he expresses doubts as to the genuineness of Shah Tahmasp's bones (even though Shah 'Abbas has proclaimed them to be genuine); he criticizes the Shah, by implication, for the loss of life in the aborted assault on Šamāḵī in 1607; he admits that the Safavids were no more sincere in their negotiations over Baghdad than were the Ottomans. His honesty leads him to make fair assessments of the abilities of Ottoman pashas and other officers, and although he expresses the conventional *odium theologicum* toward the Turks, he shows no real animosity toward them. His generally tolerant attitude makes all the more remarkable his outburst against the Gīlānīs.

Eskandar Beg emerges from the pages of his own writing as a humble man and a very human being. Although he was in Qazvin on the day of Sultan Moḥammad Shah's entry into the city, he says he may be mistaken as to the date because Ḥasan-e Rūmlū in his history gives a different one. He admits he gave way to fear at the battle of Ṣā'en Qal'a. He repeatedly pulls himself up short for indulging in whimsy, and I am particularly fond of the picture of the author staying up all night trying to improve on the vizier's chronogram and finally being forced to admit that he is unable to do so. Nothing could be more revealing of the personality and character of the man than his agonizing over his decision to go to Ordūbād in 1607 at the request of the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, at a time when he had just returned from five years in the field with the Shah and was longing to see his wife and family.

Eskandar Beg repeatedly assures the reader that if he has not been an eye witness himself of the events he describes, he has endeavored to obtain reports from reliable sources. He tells us on numerous occasions that, in order to obtain a reliable account of a battle, he has elicited reports from soldiers who actually fought in that particular engagement, and his accounts of events in India and other places outside the empire are often derived from merchants and travelers. Admittedly, soldiers and travelers are not always paragons of veracity, but we are left in no doubt that the author has done his best to verify his facts, and we are confident that the reports he receives have been weighed against other evidence. When Eskandar Beg himself is dubious about the authenticity of a report, he tells us so by using the formula "God knoweth best [the truth]!" No one can fail to be impressed by his statement that he will not embroider the facts to impress someone in authority or to further his career.

Finally, I should say a few words of a technical nature. As the basis for the translation, I used the Tehran printed edition of the *Tārīḵ-e 'Ālam-ārā-ye 'Abbāsī* edited by Īraj Afšār, filling in the numerous *lacunae* in this text by reference to Cambridge University Oriental MSS. H13 and H14, one of the few extant copies of the complete work (but not without its own defects), and to BM MS. Add. 17,927, which is an incomplete MS. but of early date and contains the eulogy to Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā which is omitted from most later copies of the manuscript.

I adopted the following guidelines in making the translation of Eskandar Beg's history: Since one of the main aims of the Persian Heritage Series is to publish *readable* translations, I made readability my primary concern. To achieve this, I necessarily had to simplify and abridge the Persian original, but I trust that I have omitted nothing of substance. I have, for example, drastically condensed or omitted entirely the conventional invocations to spring which occur at the beginning of the narrative of events for each year. Where the Persian text is racy or vivid, I have tried to reproduce the same tone in the English translation. I decided arbitrarily to omit all the quotations from the poets (including those of the author), which are embedded in the text, in the interests of preventing an already long translation from becoming longer. I have broken this rule in only a few places where the quotation seemed to be inseparable from the context. Now I can only hope, with Eskandar Beg, "that my readers will correct any slips and errors which they come across, and not censure me for them."

Roger M. Savory
Toronto

In memory of my teacher,
Vladimir Minorsky,
whose pioneering work laid
the foundations of our
knowledge of Safavid history

Preface

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

Since a description of the qualities of the divine majesty, which lie beyond the realm of human reason and conjecture, is not compatible with the rank and status of mankind, or with the comprehension of human beings, and since praise of the seat of divine unity, which is beyond imagination and surmise, does not lie within the power of written expression and communication, therefore those who have had the temerity to set foot on this path have lost their way in a trackless desert and have wandered around in confusion, and have foundered at their very first attempts at thanksgiving. They are distinguished by their ignorance, and are far removed from the world of intelligence and wisdom. Those who, in an effort to understand the eternal nature of God, have lit the candle of certain truth at the shrine of knowledge, have become entangled in arguments about creation and preexistence. Demonstrating the truth of the following utterance,

> My intellect does not have the capacity for arriving at
> certain knowledge of You
> He who understands Your essential nature is himself
> identical with that nature

they have remained fettered by vain ideas.

It therefore seemed more appropriate, in view of inadequate intellect and general ignorance, not to let my thoughts run wildly to and fro, but to keep silent about these matters, and to keep quiet about things which cannot be contained within the narrow confines of human capacity—particularly the capacity of those who do not possess too great a stock of knowledge. So I determined, with a heart imbued with reverence, and asking forgiveness with deep humility, to give tongue to the following words of praise:

> Wherever Your glory exists in full perfection,
> There is a fresh world from the ocean of Your grace;
> What limit can be set to our praising You,
> Since whatever praises we sing are but Your desert?

Again, praises of the dignity of the Prophet, and of the virtues and illustrious acts of 'Alī and the immaculate Imams, who adorn the throne of God[1] and guide men on the path of salvation, constitute part of the divine attributes. Therefore it is better and more fitting, and more reverent, not to wander in the desert of perplexity and ignorance without the proper provisions and mount—namely, knowledge—but to turn back from such travels, and to make a start toward one's intended goal.

My motive for drafting these discourses is as follows. This least of God's servants, Eskandar known as Monšī, in my early youth, allowed myself to be diverted from the study of the customary sciences, with which I was familiar and toward which I was attracted by temperament, and, led astray by some short-sighted, materialistic persons, I conceived a desire to learn bookkeeping. For some time I busied myself with this unproductive and futile task. When, in my own inadequate estimation, I had achieved the highest degree of perfection in this science, and had devoted some of my valuable time to the affairs of government officials, my far-sighted intellect finally awoke me from the drunken stupor of imprudence. I said to myself, "this sordid job which you have chosen is keeping you a million miles away from the attainment of learning and excellence. Why should you, who have swum in the turbulent ocean of ideas, worship external forms like a fairground entertainer who gulls the public?" When I had pondered on this well, I realized that my precious time had been spent in vain, and that my very nature had become allied to despair and regret. After I had spent some time in the beneficent company of a number of eminent men, who were endowed both with ability and talent, and were masters of the secretarial art *(enšā')*, my suppliant nature conceived a desire for this respected profession. During my association with them, I observed with admiration how they set down on the page of exposition, with the golden pen of thought, sweet and profitable words, and many-colored and alluring conceits, bejeweled with gems of both prose and poetry.

"That desire was conceived in my heart. . . ."

I gave up my employment, planted the seed of this desire in the fertile soil of my heart, and with enthusiasm attached myself to these masters. By this means, I entered the service of His Majesty Shah

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[1] Lit.: "the throne of choosing and approving." There is a nice word play between *eṣṭefā'* (choosing), and *erteżā'* (approving), and the sobriquets of Moḥammad (Moṣṭafā, Chosen One), and 'Alī (Mortażā, the Approved One), respectively.

'Abbas the Great, and my principal motive in writing these pages is to publish an account of the life and times of that monarch. I was enrolled as one of the secretaries of the court. Unfortunately, I was not able to labor at this worthy task night and day, as such an important occupation demanded, so that I did not succeed in making progress commensurate with my aspirations and compatible with my knowledge and innate sagacity. Greatly chastened, I descended from the lofty heights of my ambition, and busied myself with my job. At the same time, I lost no opportunity of studying biographical and historical works, because I wanted to achieve success in that noble branch of learning.

In short, I weighed on the scales of intellectual judgment the past history of this great king ('Abbas I), and his praiseworthy deeds, which I have observed with my own eyes during the time I have spent in his service, and I compared these with the achievements of former rulers.

Learned scholars and eloquent historians have devoted their best endeavors to describing the virtues of these rulers, and to setting forth in detail the events and circumstances of their reigns, and they have compiled many voluminous works filled with strange metaphors and astonishing similes. Nevertheless, I did not find any renowned conqueror to be his equal. I reflected, "You have now entered the service of this eminent king. Do you want to be distinguished among other men of talent by the excellence of your learning? If so, why do you not put your talents to work, and write the history of this unequaled ruler of exalted lineage? Why do you not expend all your eloquence on this project? Even if you do not succeed in joining the ranks of the most eloquent and talented men of learning, at least, by completing this project, you will acquire distinction among your peers, and will have stolen a march on your contemporaries."

From time to time, my far-sighted intellect would deliver an admonitory slap to the precocious child of my ambition, saying:

"You are still at the stage of learning the alphabet in the primary school of knowledge. How can you have the temerity to emulate the learned men of the age, and why do you vainly make yourself the laughingstock of those who possess real talent? The highest flights of speech are not to be attained by every unaspiring, luckless fellow, and admittance to the inner sanctum of the finest writers is not granted to every unknown ignoramus."

Alas! Alas! How could one as lowly as I hope to compete with the greatest luminaries of the world of letters? "Just contrast," I said to myself, "your humble status with this half-baked ambition!" Since the voice of reason was right in trying to prevent me from pursuing this plan, I gave up this line of thought. At other times, however, the voice of ambition would proclaim to me loud and clear, "Even though you are lacking in ability and experience in writing eulogies, nevertheless the subject of your eulogy is a most worthy one; your attitude smacks of small-mindedness and lack of ambition. Why yield to this narrow vision and humble way of thinking? Why not give your nimble pen full rein? Many gentle souls are extremely keen on studying works of biography and history, the benefit of which is apparent to all—especially the study of recent history. The arena for writers is a wide one. Do not delay! Follow the dictates of your ambition, set your foot on the path of the search for knowledge, seek divine guidance, and be ready to receive it!"

I spent some time mulling it over in this fashion, torn between that side of my nature which was seeking an excuse to back out, and the ambitious side of my nature. Finally, I decided to set down in writing the events and circumstances of the reign of this monarch, without being restricted by any considerations such as smoothness of syntax, the choice of appropriate words, and embellishments of language and meaning. All this, of course, if I live long enough, and if I can obtain some relief from the chores of everyday life (which cannot be avoided by all who are inexorably bound to this world), in order to find the opportunity of writing.

If, therefore, my beneficent patron should encourage me to complete this work, with God's help and the driving force of my own enthusiasm, the work will progress. Just as the achievements of this mighty king are the exemplar for the princes of the age, so the work of this humble author may become the model for accomplished and talented men.

Having received guidance, then, both from my rational intelligence and from my own aspirations, I began to write the history of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I, from the date of his birth until today, which is the year 1025/1616-17, the king being in his forty-seventh year and still enjoying youth, good fortune, and prosperity. Whatever information I had of my own knowledge, I have set down without adding or subtracting anything. In matters on which I had no personal information, I was obliged to consult reputable authorities, and I have reported what they have said without wrapping it up, as secretaries do, in obscure and unfamiliar phrases which are tedious and wearisome. In short, I have endeavored to present history and events in their simplest garb.

This has not been a hard and fast rule, however, because it is right that lyrical expression should be given its opportunity from time to time. To sum up, I have made do with whatever phrase came to hand, whether it were succulent or dry, and I have not felt bound to add appropriate poetical quotations. If you come across two or three lines of poetry here and there (and this is extremely rare), in most cases these are original verses which have sprung unbidden to mind as I was describing some particular historical event.

Although my basic intention has been to write a history of the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I, from his birth until the present, when he is at the height of his power, I have also briefly described the terrible events connected with the death of Shah Tahmasp, and the accession of Shah Esmaʿil II and Sultan Mohammad Shah, together with some account of the other princes of the royal family. I have also given information on the Uzbegs and the Ottomans. My object in all this was to slake the thirst of those who are avid for history, and also to preserve the unbroken thread of the narrative by including those matters which are relevant to the central theme.

I dare to hope that my royal patron will find the opportunity to go through this draft, episode by episode, and that, if he finds any error of fact, he will expunge it. Moreover, if he finds the treatment inadequate at any point, may I hope that he will bring it to my notice so that I may make the necessary amendments.

First of all, as a mark of piety, I shall give the genealogy of Shah ʿAbbas, which can be traced back to the Prophet and to ʿAlī. Then, having given a brief account, in the foreword to the book, of those praiseworthy traits and characteristics which distinguish him from the other princes of the world and rulers of the age, I shall begin the detailed history. My position as a servant of the Safavid royal house, and my natural inclination, and the debt of gratitude which I owe to the royal house for my material support, demand that I should follow the precedent set by eloquent panegyrists and historians, and heap hyperbole upon hyperbole and exaggerate the virtues of my patron one hundred percent, so as to leave an immortal record on the pages of time. However, since the ingenuous and disinterested nature of the Shah does not look with favor on matters which are devoid of essential truth and contaminated by the embellishments of foolish scribes, I shall avoid that displeasing practice and restrain my pen from indulging in elaboration and ornament, or from recording anything which does not have the appearance of truth.

This royal chronicle consists of a foreword, two books *(ṣaḥīfa)*, and a conclusion, and will be completed, God willing, in two or three volumes.

BOOK I

Discourse 1: The genealogy of Shah 'Abbas I, together with an account of his ancestors, and of the *shaikhs* who sat on the throne of spiritual governance and guidance;[2] a description of the establishment of the Safavid state; and an account of the birth of Shah 'Abbas I, together with a brief account of his outstanding virtues. On the rulers and events of the age of 'Abbas; events connected with the death of Shah Tahmasp; an account of the reign of Shah Esma'il II and Sultan Moḥammad Shah; the accession of Shah 'Abbas I.

Discourse 2: On the piety of Shah 'Abbas, and the qualities which he inherited from his ancestors.

Discourse 3: On his judgment, his divinely given wisdom, and on the excellence of his policies, which are in conformity with the divine will.

Discourse 4: On his good fortune.

Discourse 5: On his justice, concern for the welfare of his subjects, and concern for the security of the roads, which is the key to the prosperity of the country.

Discourse 6: On his authority, despotic behavior, and fiery temper, which are divine mysteries.

Discourse 7: On his policy-making and administration.

Discourse 8: On his simplicity of life, lack of ceremony, and some contrary qualities.

Discourse 9: On his concern for the rights of his servants, and his avoiding laying hands on possessions to which people have rightful claim, for the dispensation of justice is tantamount to *fotovva* and *morovva*.

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[2] I.e., the leaders of the Ṣafavīya Order of Sufis.

Discourse 10: On his knowledge of the circumstances of the rulers of the world, and of the classes of society, and of details of countries and highways throughout the seven climes.

Discourse 11: On his public works, and the buildings he erected throughout the empire.

Discourse 12: On his battles, victories and conquests.

BOOK II

An account of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I from his accession to the time of writing, which is the year 1025/1616–17.

CONCLUSION

Containing strange tales, wondrous stories and uncommon happenings of the age—either culled from the books of the ancients, or things seen with my own eyes. If God wills that I live long enough, these will constitute a third volume.

Since criticisms of my work are inevitable, I entreat my readers to regard it, both its good and bad points, with understanding and fair-mindedness; I beg them not to cavil; but if some shortcoming in this history come to their notice, to attribute it to the existence of contradictory accounts, and to turn a blind eye to its faults.

Book I

Discourse I

The Genealogy of Shah 'Abbas I, together with an Account of His Ancestors, and of the Shaikhs Who Sat on the Throne of Spiritual Governance and Guidance; a Description of the Establishment of the Safavid State; and an Account of the Birth of Shah 'Abbas I, together with a Brief Account of His Outstanding Virtues; on the Rulers and Events of the Age of 'Abbas; Events Connected with the Death of Shah Tahmasp; an Account of the Reign of Shah Esma'il and Sultan Moḥammad Shah; the Accession of Shah 'Abbas I.

On the Genealogy of Shah ‘Abbas I, and the Lofty Station of His Exalted Ancestors, Who Are Descended from the Family of the Prophet and ‘Alī

It will not have remained concealed from the shrewd minds of perspicacious people that the lineage of this exalted family is derived from no less a person than the "Seal of the Prophets," Moḥammad, and from ‘Alī the "Approved" (of God), as follows:

Abu’l-Moẓaffar Šāh ‘Abbās b. Solṭān Moḥammad Pādešāh b. Šāh Ṭahmāsp b. Šāh Esmā‘īl b. Solṭān Ḥeydar b. Solṭān Joneyd b. Solṭān Ebrāhīm, known as Šeyḵ Šāh, b. Solṭān Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā b. Šeyḵ Ṣafī al-Dīn Esḥāq b. Amīn al-Dīn Jebrā‘īl b. Ṣāleḥ b. Qoṭb al-Dīn b. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Rašīd b. Moḥammad al-Ḥāfeẓ b. ‘Evaż al-Ḵavāṣṣ b. Fīrūzšāh b. Moḥammad b. Šaraf b. Moḥammad b. Ḥasan b. Moḥammad b. Ebrāhīm b. Ja‘far b. Moḥammad b. Esmā‘īl b. Moḥammad b. Aḥmad al-A‘rābī b. Abū Moḥammad al-Qāsem b. Abu’l-Qāsem Ḥamza b. the Emām Abū Ebrāhīm Mūsā al-Kāẓem b. the Emām Ja‘far al-Ṣādeq b. the Emām Moḥammad al-Bāqer b. the Emām ‘Alī Zeyn al-‘Ābedīn b. the Emām Abū ‘Abdollāh al-Ḥoseyn b. the Commander of the Faithful, the Emām of the God-fearing, the Victorious Lion of God, ‘Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb, upon him be peace!

Genealogists and historians are in agreement that ‘Alī and the Prophet Moḥammad are descended from Esma‘il. Moreover, there is no disagreement in regard to their descent from ‘Adnān, but there are differences of opinion in regard to the chain of descent from ‘Adnān to Adam. Expert genealogists, and those skilled in dynastic traditions, have constructed elaborate family trees showing the descent of the ancestors of the Safavids from the Prophet, have written treatises on their merits and virtues, and have described various strange events and wondrous signs and acts emanating from them and indicative of the fact that the Prophet's light shone upon them. The humble author of this history, in support and imitation of the practice of the master of this science, will content himself with a brief summary of these matters.

The Noble Ancestors of the Prophet

It is related on the authority of ‘Abdollāh b. ‘Abbās that the Prophet, when he was giving the details of his own genealogy and came to ‘Adnān, stated as follows: "The genealogists have lied regarding the generations after 'Adnān. 'Adnān had two sons." Therefore the Prophet and 'Alī, by virtue of the "sound" tradition: "I and 'Alī are from the same light," have shone forth and emitted their radiance from the same niche, and trace their descent from 'Adnān's younger son. According to the author of the *Rowżat al-Aḥbāb,* Ma'add had eight sons, one of whom was Nezār, whose patronymic was Abū Rabī'a and Abū Eyād. When Nezār was born, his father, in thanksgiving for that light which shone forth from his son's forehead, made a sacrifice and gave a feast. This same light was transmitted to Nezār's son Możar. Możar continued to obey God according to the faith of Abraham the Ḥanīf and the religion of Esma'il, and that world-adorning light which shone forth from his auspicious brow transfigured him, and repulsed the darkness day and night. He possessed perfection of beauty. Among the Arabs, a large number of camels is attributed to him. That sunlike beauty was likewise visible in his son Elyās. Elyās was a believer in the unity of God, a pious and sober man. He was born when his father had reached an advanced age, and had despaired of having a son. Consequently, he was named Elyās, and he became the leader of his family and tribe, the most honored of the children of Abraham, and the most eminent of the descendants of Esma'il. It is related that whenever Elyās walked around the Kaaba, he heard the sound of the words, "Here am I, at Your command" issuing from his loins, and he used to be astonished at this circumstance.

After him, the rays of that [divine] light were reflected in the perceptive[1] beauty of his son 'Āmer, and after him in 'Āmer's son Ḵozeyma, and after him in Ḵozeyma's son Kenāna, whose patronymic was Abū Nażr. From Kenāna's son, Nażr, all the tribes of the Qoreyš are descended. After Nażr, his son Mālek inherited the divine light, and after him Fehr, and Fehr's son Ḡāleb, by whom it was transmitted to Lo'eyy, and thence to Ka'b. Of the many sons of Ka'b, Morra was selected from among his brothers to be its repository, and by him it was transmitted to Kelāb, a powerful chieftain of the Banī Qoreyš. From Kelāb it was handed down to his son Qoṣeyy, from among whose sons 'Abd Manāf was distinguished by being its recipient. 'Abd Manāf's successor was his son Hāšem (his name was 'Amr, and Hāšem was his sobriquet). Hāšem became a powerful chief of the Qoreyš, and under his leadership the Banū Hāšem acquired a position of influence among the Qoreyš. After Hāšem, 'Abd al-Moṭṭaleb, whose personal name was Šeyba, became the bearer of the [divine] light, and under his leadership the Banū Hāšem maintained their power and influence among the

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[1] A play on the word *modreka.* 'Āmer, the son of Elyās, was known as Modreka.

Qoreyš. He became known as ʻAbd al-Moṭṭaleb for the reason given in the histories[2]. The key of the house of the Kaaba was held by him, and the office of Keeper of the Veil (of the Kaaba) devolved upon him. The digging of the well Zamzam took place in his time. By virtue of the good fortune inherent in the nature of the Light of Moḥammad, every prayer which was offered to the throne of the Almighty was answered.

ʻAbd al-Moṭṭaleb had ten sons. According to the author of the *Rowżat al-Ṣafā va Ḵolāṣat al-Aḵbār,* his eighth son,[3] ʻAbdollāh, was the father of the Prophet. Now ʻAbdollāh had vowed that, if he should be blessed with ten sons, he would sacrifice his favorite son to God.[4] When God blessed him with this number, he prepared to fulfill his vow. Lots were drawn by his sons, and the lot fell upon ʻAbdollāh. ʻAbdollāh was overjoyed at this sign [of God's favor], and submitted his neck to the divine decree. ʻAbd al-Moṭṭaleb rejoiced at his son's submission to God's will, and went with his son to the place of sacrifice. The Qoreyš, hearing the news, followed them, and prevented ʻAbd al-Moṭṭaleb from carrying out his intention. They consulted a soothsayer, who was the most eminent of her kind at that time. The soothsayer opted for the payment of blood money, and instructed them to prepare a ransom of ten camels, one for each of the sons of ʻAbd al-Moṭṭaleb. They should then cast lots between the camels and ʻAbdollāh. If the lot fell on ʻAbdollāh, they should add ten camels, and again cast lots, until such time as the lot should fall on the camels. ʻAbd al-Moṭṭaleb did as instructed, and the lot fell upon ʻAbdollāh. When the number of camels had reached a hundred, Almighty God accepted the blood money, and the lot fell upon the camels. This was repeated several times, until ʻAbdollāh was satisfied. Then the hundred camels were sacrificed. This is the reason why the Muslim community fixed the perfect sacrifice at one hundred camels, and the Prophet's remark, "I am the son of two sacrificial victims," refers to ʻAbdollāh and Esmaʻil.

As is recorded in the chronicles, the Light of Moḥammad shone forth from ʻAbdollāh's brow, and the learned men of the Jews, out of rancor and envy, several times made an attempt on his life. Each time, he was aided by unseen forces, and his enemies were frustrated. All the women of Qoreyš were enamored of his beauty, which was the result of the radiance of the Light of Moḥammad, and desired to marry him. That good fortune fell to the lot of Āmena, daughter of Wahb, and her hopes were fulfilled. In the Year of the Elephant, she gave birth to Moḥammad the "Seal of the Prophets," and the world of darkness was illumined by his world-adorning beauty.

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[2] See A. Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad,* 2nd ed., Oxford University Press (Pakistan Branch), 1968, p. 59 (hereinafter quoted as Guillaume).

[3] According to Ebn Hešām, ʻAbdollāh was the youngest son.

[4] See story in Guillaume, pp. 66ff.

Many wondrous events, secret signs, and supernatural occurrences took place during his mother's pregnancy, his birth, suckling, and growth, until the announcement of his prophetic mission. Such events, relating to the Prophet and his mother, are recorded in compilations of legends and traditions. In brief, 'Abdollāh died at Medina, at the age of twenty-five, before the birth of Moḥammad; he was buried on that holy soil. Moḥammad's mother, Āmena, died when Moḥammad was seven years old, and 'Abd al-Moṭṭaleb was charged with the upbringing of Moḥammad at Ṭoḥā and Medina. The following year, 'Abd al-Moṭṭaleb died, and the orphan was placed in the care of one of his uncles, Abū Ṭāleb.

Abū Ṭāleb was the seventh son of 'Abd al-Moṭṭaleb. His name was 'Omrān, and he possessed rank and station among the Qoreyš. The Prophet Moḥammad was brought up under the loving care of his uncle, Abū Ṭāleb, who did not die until the tenth year of Moḥammad's prophetic mission. While he lived, Abū Ṭāleb devoted all his efforts to helping Moḥammad. Ḵadīja died in the same year as Abū Ṭāleb, and for this reason, Moḥammad called the tenth year of his mission "the year of grief."

Abū Ṭāleb was the father of 'Alī, whose praises are sung by friend and foe alike, and who, after the Prophet himself, is the most noble of the sons of Adam. By virtue of the tradition, "My flesh is thy flesh, and my blood is thy blood," 'Alī is inextricably linked with the Prophet. 'Alī married the daughter of the Prophet, and the offspring of this union were the "two stars of prophethood," Ḥasan and Ḥoseyn. Springing from this same fount, in line of descent, were ten others like them—twelve imams in all, the first of them 'Alī, the last the Mahdī.

The object of this genealogical discursus is to show the descent of Shah 'Abbas the Great, and so I shall give some details of his noble ancestors. In brief, from Moḥammad and 'Alī the chain of descent of this king, who is descended from Mūsā and is of the lineage of Ḥoseyn, is forged, noble link by noble link, until, as I indicated above, it is connected with the seventh of the twelve imams, Mūsā al-Kāẓem.

I pass then from the imams to the ancestors of His Majesty. All genealogists are agreed that His Majesty's family tree goes back to the Imam Mūsā al-Kāẓem's son, Abu'l-Qāsem Ḥamza, who, according to the most accurate report, is buried at Sū Safīd in the district of Toršīz, and his tomb is a place of pilgrimage for the local people. Darvīš Tavakkol b. Esmā'īl, known as Ebn Bazzāz, during the lifetime of Shaikh Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā, composed a work entitled *Ṣafvat al-Ṣafā*, in which he described the ancestors of His Majesty, and gave an account of the mystical states and miraculous powers of the Safavid shaikhs, and the spiritual stations of the saints. Ebn Bazzāz began his account with Fīrūzšāh Zarrīnkolāh, and so I shall do the same.

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Fīrūzšāh Zarrīnkolāh

The author of the *Ṣafvat al-Ṣafā* says that one of the sons of the prince of the mystical path in this world, Ebrāhīm b. Adham,[1] who was constantly engaged in holy war against the infidel, overthrew the forces of darkness and unbelief and brought the light of Islam to the people of Moḡān and Arrān[2]—regions which up to that time had been strangers to Islam. This ruler appointed Emir Fīrūzšāh, who was admirably qualified to assume a position of either spiritual or temporal authority, governor and emir of the province of Ardabīl and its dependencies. Fīrūzšāh possessed power and riches, and immense quantities of horses, cattle, and booty. Since the Ardabīl district could not contain all his livestock, he moved to a place called Rāngīn, in the forests on the borders of Gīlān. In that province, he began to give instruction on religious problems, and to expound the certain truths of mystical knowledge. His hospitality was lavished on those near and far. When Fīrūzšāh died, his son ʿEvaż al-Ḵavāṣṣ assumed the leadership of that religious group. ʿEvaż moved back to the Ardabīl district, to the village of Esfaranjān, and settled there with his horses, his servants, and his followers. He too became famous for his hospitality.

After the death of ʿEvaż, his son Moḥammad al-Ḥāfeẓ took his place. An astonishing event then occurred. At the age of seven, Moḥammad disappeared from his father's house, and no one had any information as to his whereabouts. A search was made for him, but in vain. As men despaired of his being alive, mourning was begun for him. After seven years had elapsed, when the broad face of the full moon entered the station of the Gemini, Moḥammad suddenly appeared at the door of his father's house. The servants and devoted supporters of the family who had given themselves over to tears and lamentation during his absence, had their mourning and grief changed to joy and rejoicing at the sight of his beloved face, and they hastened to question him about what had happened to him.

Moḥammad declared that he had been carried off by a group of Moslem *jenn*[3] who were following the path of righteousness and salvation. The *jenn* had treated him with great kindness, and had given him instruction in religious precepts and in the memorization of the Koran. "During the seven years that I was with them, I busied myself with acquiring knowledge in various branches of learning, up to the present time when I have returned to my own abode."

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[1] Ebrahim b. Adham (died 161/777-78), one of the most prominent ascetics of the 2nd/8th century. He is widely known in legend as the prince of Balḵ who gave up his position as ruler to live a life of piety and asceticism, but there seems to be no historical basis for this [see article IBRĀHĪM B. ADHAM in *EI²*, iii, 1971, pp. 985-86].

[2] Arrān, region lying north of Lake Reżāʾīya in Azerbaijan, and bounded by the Kor and Aras rivers. Moḡān (Moqān), the plain lying north of Ardabīl between the Aras River and the Caspian Sea.

A group of sincere devotees considered that his arrival augmented both spiritual and worldly bliss, and they placed him on the seat of spiritual guidance occupied by his forefathers. He, following the example of his exalted forefathers, devoted his attention to living a life of perfect piety and uprightness, and he busied himself with giving religious guidance and spiritual direction to the community.

When his life came to an end, his place was taken by his son Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Rašīd, who fed the poor and needy by way of following the path of righteousness. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn elected to reside at a place called Kalḵorān near Ardabīl. He no longer looked [for support] to votive offerings and gifts, but aspired to be an agriculturalist, and he encouraged his disciples and followers to cultivate the land. In addition to possessing perfect piety and chastity, he was endowed with physical beauty too, and he was beloved by all. When he reached the age of seventy he died, and his place was taken by his son Qoṭb al-Dīn.

Qoṭb al-Dīn extended his kindness and favor to all those connected with this exalted family, and following the practice of his ancestors, devoted himself to giving spiritual guidance to those seeking the right path. A number of devotees pledged themselves to serve him. During Qoṭb al-Dīn's lifetime, the governor of part of Georgia, with a force of Georgian infidels, flung himself without warning against the province of Ardabīl, and the Islamic community suffered heavily at the hands of the invaders.[4] For their safety, Qoṭb al-Dīn moved his womenfolk to Ardabīl, and concealed them in a secure place. One day, they had emerged from their hiding place to see what the Georgians were doing, when a Georgian entered and struck Qoṭb al-Dīn a terrible blow; wounded and groaning, he sank down among the slain. After the Georgian danger was over, surgeons attended to him, his wound healed, and he recovered.[5]

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[3] Spirits; genii.

[4] This attack took place in 600/1203-04.

[5] Additional details of this incident are given by other sources. See R. M. Savory, "The Development of the Early Safavid State under Isma'īl and Ṭahmāsp, as Studied in the 16th Century Persian Sources," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1958 (hereinafter quoted as Savory, Development), pp. 8-9.

In the fullness of time, Qoṭb al-Dīn's grandson, Ṣafī al-Ḥaqq va'l-Ḥaqīqa va'l-Dīn Esḥāq, was born, and for several years the eyes of the aged Qoṭb al-Dīn were gladdened by the sight of his grandson. When Qoṭb al-Dīn died, the mystical knowledge and function of spiritual guide which he had inherited from his forefathers was transmitted to his son Ṣāleḥ. Ṣāleḥ ("upright") lived up to his name. He was an outstanding example of sainthood and spiritual guidance, and a gateway to the path of righteousness, probity, and salvation. Even more than his predecessors, he devoted himself to the needs of the indigent, and he won golden opinions among the people. The poor and needy were never absent from his gate, and he never showed weariness at the number of beggars who frequented his dwelling. When he died, he was buried at Kalḵorān by his son Jebrā'īl.

Sultan Seyyed Jebrā'īl, that model for the watchful and vigilant, the most favored of those who sit upon the prayer mat, was a man who knew God. In piety, chastity, fear of and obedience to God, and worship, he excelled. In accordance with the custom established by his father, he lived at Kalḵorān in the Ardabīl district, which was where he was born and brought up. In the end, his yearning for mystical knowledge of God and his antipathy toward worldly people were an obstacle to his associating with others. He gave precedence to the struggle against the carnal soul and to self-denial. Giving himself up entirely to mystical contemplation, he adopted a regime of silence, and rarely spoke to other men; the mystical stations[6] which he attained gained wide renown. He married Dowlatī, who bore him Ṣafī al-Ḥaqq va'l-Ḥaqīqa va'l-Dīn Esḥāq.

Ebn Bazzāz, in his work *Ṣafvat al-Ṣafā,* has related, on the authority of Mowlānā Moḥyī al-Dīn, who was a scholar of the time of Sultan Ṣadr al-Dīn, so many wondrous signs, indications, and strange events which had been related to him by Dowlatī in connection with the gestation, birth, and suckling of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn, that it is impossible to include them all in this abridged version. When Ṣafī al-Dīn was six years old, his father, Jebrā'īl, died, and was buried alongside the grave of his father, Ṣāleḥ. Shah 'Abbas the Great, who considered the existing building on the site to be too mean, had a beautiful dome constructed over the tombs.

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[6] In Sufi terminology, there is a fundamental distinction between *maqāmāt* (mystical stations) and *ḥālāt* (mystical states). The former may be reached by "spiritual exercises"—prayer, contemplation, fasting, etc. The state of *ḥāl,* "mystical ecstasy," however, is a gift of grace vouchsafed by God.

After his father's death, Shaikh Ṣafī al-Mella va'l-Dīn was brought up by his mother. From his early childhood, the marks of divine grace and favor were clearly visible in him, and he was constantly seeing marvelous happenings, such as the discovery of graves, the revelation of the circumstances of the dead, and the like. He used to relate these revelations to his mother, who assured him that they portended future greatness.

For a time, Ṣafī al-Dīn engaged in the pursuit of worldly skills and excellence. Then the desire to make excursions into the spiritual world, and to gain an insight into its problems, took possession of him, and he embarked on the course of warring against the carnal soul and of self-denial. He realized that he could not attain the heights of spiritual excellence without the guidance of a spiritual director who had had genuine mystical experience. He therefore took to performing his devotional acts at the shrine of Shaikh Farroḵ Ardabīlī, or at the tomb of Shaikh Abū Sa'īd, both of whom were disciples of Shaikh Joneyd Bağdādī.[7] Sometimes he frequented the mausoleum of the gnostic Shaikh Šehāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd Āmerī, seeking a spiritual director. He heard reports of the exalted mystical state and excellent accomplishments of Shaikh Najīb al-Dīn Bozğūš Šīrāzī, and he set off to Shiraz in search of him.

Ṣafī al-Dīn had an elder brother, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, who had acquired great wealth and dignity and worldly esteem at Shiraz, and had married a local woman. Ṣafī al-Dīn, on the pretext of visiting his brother, obtained permission from his mother to make the journey to Shiraz. When he reached Shiraz, however, he learned that Shaikh Najīb al-Dīn Bozğūš was dead. Ṣafī al-Dīn met the local shaikhs, but the communication of divine grace which he sought was not vouchsafed to him.

During this time, he made the acquaintance of Mowlānā Rażī al-Dīn, a theologian who possessed mystical insight, and studied Koranic commentary with him as far as Chapter 99 of the Koran, which begins, "When the earth is shaken."[8] Ṣafī al-Dīn obtained permission from the Mowlānā to continue his studies of commentaries on the Koran. He made the acquaintance of Shaikh Moṣleḥ al-Dīn Sa'dī Šīrāzī,[9] but did not find his society agreeable. When the Sufis

[7] One of the greatest of early Islamic mystics, died A.D. 910.

[8] As there are 114 in the Koran, this means that Ṣafī al-Dīn had studied the commentaries on almost the whole of the Koran.

[9] The famous author of the *Golestān* and the *Būstān*.

of that region realized that Ṣafī al-Dīn had progressed farther on the mystical path than they had themselves, they directed him to Emir ʿAbdollāh, a *seyyed* and exemplar for the local mystics. When Ṣafī al-Dīn visited him, he perceived that ʿAbdollāh was indeed a man of great personal sanctity and deep spiritual insight. Ṣafī al-Dīn related to him the visions he had experienced.

ʿAbdollāh remained for a while deep in thought. Then he raised his head and said: "O Turkish youth! The mystical experiences which have been vouchsafed to you as a result of your struggle with your carnal soul, your self-denial, and your exalted mystical state are more profound than those to which my spiritual insight has attained. You are destined for great things. You will not find what you want here. Today, the only person who can remove the veil from your eyes and guide you to your destination is Shaikh Zāhed Gīlānī, who has a retreat in Gīlān, not far from your own district, by the seashore." ʿAbdollāh then described Shaikh Zāhed's appearance, and Ṣafī al-Dīn said farewell to the shaikhs of Fārs. Asking for their spiritual help, he set out for his home. However much his brother offered him money and luxury items to take with him, Ṣafī al-Dīn refused them all. Ṣafī al-Dīn reached Ardabīl safely. His arrival was divined by Shaikh Zāhed in a revelation which came to him by virtue of his life of asceticism and esoteric knowledge. Shaikh Zāhed said to his disciples: "In Ardabīl there is a young man who wants to meet me, who is separated from the *owtād*[10] by no more than one veil."

Meanwhile, Ṣafī al-Dīn had made inquiries about where Zāhed lived, and had set out to find him. On arrival at Zāhed's *k̲āneqāh,*[11] Ṣafī al-Dīn entered the cloister and began to pray. It was the month of Ramaẓān, and it was Shaikh Zāhed's custom, as soon as the new moon of Ramaẓān appeared, to retire to his private apartments, where he would spend night and day at his devotions, and break his fast with his family. He would follow this regime until the ʿĪd al-Feṭr,[12] and would not meet any of his disciples. On the day of Ṣafī al-Dīn's arrival, Shaikh Zāhed emerged from his private apartments and said to one of his servants: "Today a guest has come to us from among the seekers after truth of this age. At present he is performing his prayers in the cloister. When he has finished, bring him to me." The servant did so. Shaikh Zāhed addressed his visitor as Ṣafī al-Dīn, and gave him the good news that he was destined for high spiritual rank and mystical stations. Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn found Shaikh Zāhed to be everything that he had been led to believe, and he pledged his allegiance to him. Through the performance of commendable services, he became one of Shaikh Zāhed's personal confidants.

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[10] The five *owtād,* "stakes" or "pillars," and the *abdāl,* "substitutes" (their number is variously given as 7, 40, and 300), take the third and fifth places respectively in the hierarchy of the *rejāl al-g̲eyb* or Sufi hierarchy of saints who, "unknown to the masses, participate by means of their powerful influence in the preservation of the order of the universe" (I. Goldziher, article ABDĀL in *EI*², 1954, pp. 94-95).

[11] Sufi convent.

[12] The festival celebrating the end of the month of Ramaẓān.

The purification of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn's soul, and his ascetic regimen, reached such a degree that he used to break his fast only once a week. On the advice of Shaikh Zāhed, he changed this to once every three days. Finally, when Zāhed found that even this was undermining his constitution, he instructed him to break his fast daily. Many supernatural acts and miracles are attributed to Ṣafī al-Dīn, and these are set forth in detail in the *Ṣafvat al-Ṣafā* and the *Fotūḥāt-e Amīnī* of Haravī. In short, Ṣafī al-Dīn used to open the eye of spiritual insight to the world of spirits and images, and he saw genuine visions.

In one of his visions, he was standing with a sword at his belt and a sable hat on his head. When he removed the hat, a brilliant light shone forth from the top of his head and illuminated all the surrounding area. He related this vision to Shaikh Zāhed, and asked him what it meant. Shaikh Zāhed's interpretation was as follows: "The sword and the sunlike radiance are the signs of the appearance and coming forth of a powerful king from your stock. The reflection of his sunlike felicity will shine upon the people of the earth, and the flashing blade of his sword will obliterate and utterly destroy the dark evil of innovators and those in error."

In brief, Ṣafī al-Dīn made great progress in his war against his carnal nature and in his ascetic regimen, and he began to give evidence of knowledge of divine mysteries. Shaikh Zāhed bound him even more closely to him by a marriage alliance by giving his daughter Fāṭema to him in marriage. Although Shaikh Zāhed, during his own lifetime, gave his permission for Ṣafī al-Dīn to give spiritual direction, Ṣafī al-Dīn refused. On his deathbed, however, Shaikh Zāhed entrusted him with the function of spiritual guidance, and made him his heir.

Certain self-interested persons protested to Shaikh Zāhed, saying, "in view of the excellent qualifications of Jamāl al-Dīn 'Alī, who is your own natural son and heir, and endowed with mystical insight, why have you not given him permission to act as spiritual director, instead of placing Ṣafī al-Dīn in that exalted position?" Shaikh Zāhed, in order to remove doubts and to pacify and soothe his disciples, determined to test the two of them. He said, "Where is my son's cell?" The disciples replied, "Within the sacred enclosure of the *ḵāneqāh.*" "And where is Ṣafī's cell?" he asked. They replied, "About a mile and three-quarters[13] from your own cell." Shaikh Zāhed said, "I will call them both, so that you may determine their comparative rank and station." He then called his son three times, but his son made no reply. When he called Ṣafī Ṣafī replied, "Here I am, ready to help you, O my Shaikh and my *Moršed* (spiritual master)," and he set off for Zāhed's house. Zāhed asked him where he had been. He replied, "I was in my cell, when I heard my Shaikh calling me, and here I am, at your service." Zāhed turned toward those present and said, "That on which my gaze is fixed, has been granted by God (may He be glorified and exalted!) to Ṣafī, and not to Jamāl al-Dīn. I have not betrayed God's trust, but conferred it on its rightful owner."

In the year 700/1301, Shaikh Zāhed died at Sīāhrūd in Gīlān, and was buried there. From him Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn inherited the chain of discipleship, the Sufi mantle *(ḵerqa),* and the function of spiritual director. Shaikh Zāhed had inherited these by the following chain of transmission: Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn; Shaikh Šehāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd Āmerī; thence by seven links to Shaikh Joneyd Bağdādī; Sarī Saqaṭī; and Ma'rūf Karḵī, the servant of the eighth Shi'ite Imam, Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Mūsā al-Režā. By virtue of the testamentory disposition of Shaikh Zāhed, therefore, Ṣafī al-Dīn took his place as spiritual director, and guided men on the straight path of the religious law, and on the right way of the mystical path and of truth. Zāhed's daughter bore him a son, Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā. Toward the end of his life, the excessive rigors of a regimen of self-denial, and the resulting physical weakness, caused Ṣafī al-Dīn to be afflicted by bladder trouble. For a while, viewing his complaint from the mystical viewpoint, he succeeded in considering it as a sort of vicarious spiritual cure, and he derived happiness from that thought. But when his weakness increased, he took to his bed. During his illness, whenever he was restless because of the pain, he used to go to the spot where his tomb now is, and rest there awhile. His wife would take him back to their house. Sometimes, when in the grip of severe pain, he would ask, "Are you taking me to my house?" She would reply, "You are in your own house." He would reply, "That is my real home," and they would take him back there. This occurred several times.

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[13] "Half a *farsaḵ.*" A *farsaḵ* (Greek *parasang)* was approximately 3.5 miles.

When he was near death, Ṣafī al-Dīn called together the Safavid[14] disciples, and enjoined his companions and family to stand fast on the religious law, and on the mystical path of the Sufi shaikhs. He further enjoined them to continue giving hospitality and bounty to the poor. He declared that he conferred the function of spiritual director of that community on his son, Ṣadr al-Dīn (Mūsā). He then began to utter various words of admonition and advice, until his voice failed him. His last words were, "Invoke blessings on him [the Prophet], and salute him with the salutation of peace!"[15] He died after the morning prayer, on Monday, 12 Moḥarram 735/12 September 1334. Seventeen days later, his wife, in answer to her prayers, was released from this life and followed him to paradise. In the *Fotūḥāt-e Amīnī* it is related that Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Eṣfahānī, in obedience to a testamentory disposition by Ṣafī al-Dīn, washed his body and prepared it for burial, since Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā was away at the time on a trip to Solṭānīya. Persons connected with the Safavid family buried Ṣafī al-Dīn at the place he had chosen, and his tomb is now a place of pilgrimage.

The light of continence and piety was visible on the brow of Sultan Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā from an early age, and the signs of probity and righteousness were apparent in his face. He was an outstanding saint and spiritual master, and uniquely distinguished among the great men of the age by virtue of his exalted lineage. For on his father's side, generation after generation, he was a *seyyed*[16] and had the power to work miracles; on his mother's side, he inherited his function as spiritual director; and on his grandfather's side he was the seventh incumbent on the throne of spiritual guidance, asceticism, and rectitude. It is recorded in the *Fotūḥāt-e Amīnī* that, on the day on which the marriage contract was signed between Fāṭema, Shaikh Zāhed's daughter, and Ṣafī al-Dīn, Shaikh Zāhed suddenly got up in the middle of the wedding reception and greeted ceremoniously, and with humble deference, a total stranger. Those present inquired the meaning of this. The Shaikh replied: "the sons of Ṣafī al-Dīn, who are my grandsons, have been revealed to me. Just now I caught sight of that blessed person who will succeed Ṣafī and myself. I intuitively perceived the sublime nature of his mystical station, and therefore showed him the respect due to him."

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[14] So called after Ṣafī.

[15] Koran: XXXIII/56.

[16] On the vexed question of the validity of the Ṣafavid claim to *sīāda* ("*seyyed*-ship"), see Savory, Development, p. 6.

When Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā was born, Ṣafī al-Dīn told his disciples that this was the son who was greeted by Shaikh Zāhed at the wedding reception. Ṣadr al-Dīn spent some years at his father's side, preparing himself to take on the office of spiritual director. The author of the *Nafaḥāt al-Ons,* in regard to Seyyed Qāsem-e Anvār, says that it is a matter for debate whether anyone after the immaculate Imams attained the eminence of Seyyed Qāsem, and he states that Qāsem-e Anvār was a disciple of Shaikh Ṣadr al-Dīn Ardabīlī.[17]

In short, after his father's death, Ṣadr al-Dīn assumed the function of spiritual director of the Safavid Order. When Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā returned from his visit to Solṭānīya, his spiritual beauty uplifted the adherents of the Safavid family. They came out of mourning and, in accordance with the last wishes of Ṣafī al-Dīn, invested him as *moršed,* and pledged themselves to be his obedient disciples. His gate became the rendezvous for princes and nobles. Many Mongol emirs and nobles placed their trust in his spiritual direction, which daily increased in strength. Ṣadr al-Dīn began the construction of the sacred enclosure of the Safavid family, which is now visited by numerous pilgrims. He constructed the dome over the tomb of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn, the residence for the Koran reciters, and various ancillary buildings, the cost being defrayed from his own pocket. He also appointed sweet-tongued Koran reciters, and from that day to this, the sound of the recitation of God's word has filled that abode of grace and divine mercy.

When Ṣadr al-Dīn died, his place was taken by his son Ḵāja 'Alī, who buried his father in the family mausoleum, at the side of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn, thus enhancing the distinction of that site. Sultan Ḵāja 'Alī had emulated his forefathers, and the shaikhs his ancestors, in warring against the carnal soul, in self-denial and in spiritual exercises. As a result, he had received spiritual enlightenment and had been admitted to divine mysteries. He took the Sufis of the Safavid Order under his care, and they observed him perform many miraculous acts.

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[17] In fact, the author of the *Nafaḥāt al-Ons,* Jāmī, tries to deny that Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā was the spiritual director of Qāsem-e Anvār. See R. M. Savory, "A 15th-Century Safavid Propagandist at Harāt," in *American Oriental Society (Middle West Branch) Semi-Centennial Volume,* Indiana University Press, 1969, pp. 189-97.

It is said that Ḵ̌āja ʿAlī met Tīmūr on three occasions, in the flesh and in the form of a likeness. The first occasion was when Tīmūr was crossing the river Oxus on his way to invade Transoxania, and his whip fell into the water. A dervish, dressed in rags, appeared before him, carrying the whip which he had retrieved from the river. Tīmūr took this to be a good omen, and questioned the dervish, who replied: "My home is Ardabīl, the place where I shall appear is Dezfūl, and the place where I shall be buried is Jerusalem." On this occasion, his form was definitely an apparition emanating from the visionary world. The second occasion was when Tīmūr was marching from Baghdad to Ḵūzestān. A dervish wearing a black Sufi robe appeared before him on the bridge over the river Dez. The dervish said, "I am that dervish who placed your whip in your hand on the banks of the Oxus," and he promised that there would be a third meeting at Ardabīl.

Several years later, when Tīmūr was returning from Asia Minor, bringing with him a large number of prisoners whom he had taken in that campaign, he stopped at Ardabīl. The fame of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn, and accounts of his high mystical station, had reached him, and he made the pilgrimage to the Safavid mausoleum. Afterward, he asked some questions of the dervishes sitting nearby, and they directed him to Ḵ̌āja ʿAlī. He went to the Shaikh's private quarters and found the Shaikh at prayer, offering praises to God. However much the servants importuned him, informing him of the arrival of the great conqueror, Ḵ̌āja ʿAlī paid no attention. When he had finished, he saw to it that Tīmūr was seated in a proper manner, and then began to offer him words of counsel and admonition. Emir Timur had secretly thought of three things. If Ḵ̌āja ʿAlī, he said, could reveal these three things, he would commit himself firmly to his spiritual direction. Ḵ̌āja ʿAlī revealed all three things exactly as the Emir had secretly conceived them. Emir Timur therefore declared himself a disciple of Ḵ̌āja ʿAlī, and told the latter to make any request he liked of him.[18] What need have the princes of the world of poverty and spirituality of any trappings of the world? What business do the kings who possess the tawdry baubles of this world have in the market where the priceless pearls of divine knowledge are sold?

Since Ḵ̌āja ʿAlī's mind was completely free from any wordly considerations, and his nature was devoid of any material attachments, he could not think of anything he needed. When Emir Timur insisted and pressed him to ask for something, the K̄āja, seeking always to please God, requested the release of the prisoners whom Emir Timur had taken in Asia Minor. Emir Timur accepted the request, and gave orders that all the captives should be released. In the town of Ardabīl and its environs, Timur bought, out of his lawful money, villages and excellent pastures, and made them into a *vaqf*[19] in favor of the Safavid sanctuary, which he declared to be a *bast*[20] and place of refuge. Further, he made over to the Safavid family the land taxes of that region. From that date, the descendants and posterity of those prisoners, who indeed owed their freedom to that saintly family, have been enrolled in the ranks of their disciples and Sufis.

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[18] A different version of the "miracle" is given in other sources. See Savory, Development, p. 23.

It is generally held that Emir Timur had a meeting with Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā, and that the arrangements mentioned above were made with him. But the more accurate account is that K̄āja ʿAlī was the person involved. Although I have not found this tradition in the historical chronicles, or in any other accounts of the circumstances of the Safavid family, either in prose or poetry, nevertheless it is widely rumored and disseminated by a succession of verbal reports, and so I have written it down. The actual *vaqf* document, written in an antique hand and embellished with the Mongol seal and with the personal seal of Emir Timur, fell into Safavid hands during a campaign in the region of Balk̄, while Safavid forces were laying siege to Andek̄ūd. It was brought to the notice of Shah ʿAbbas I. In alluding to the mystical stations and miracles wrought by K̄āja ʿAlī, it gives some details of the events described above.

K̄āja ʿAlī decided to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and set out in that direction, leaving his son Sultan Shaikh Ebrāhīm in Ardabīl as spiritual director and supervisor of the Safavid mausoleum. Ebrāhīm, however, could not bear the separation from his father, and so followed him to Mecca, where father and son performed the ritual ceremonies of the pilgrimage together. From Mecca, they went to Jerusalem, where K̄āja ʿAlī died and was buried by his son Ebrāhīm. Ebrāhīm then returned to Ardabīl with his disciples and companions.

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[19] *Vaqf*, plural *owqāf;* charitable endowments, in cash or in kind, made by a benefactor for the upkeep of mosques, shrines, and the like, and for the support of the staff, both lay and ecclesiastical, of such places.

[20] *Bast* is a technical Iranian term denoting "sanctuary." Various locations were declared to constitute *bast* at various times (EI², s.v.), and sanctuary at such places was sought especially by those who had incurred the wrath of the political or religious authorities of the day.

Sultan Shaikh Ebrāhīm was known, during the time of Shah ʿAbbas I, as Shaikh Shah. He took his place as spiritual leader of the Safavid Order and, following the practice of his predecessors, guided Sufi postulants on the straight path of the religious law and concern for the faith. Ebrāhīm sent out *ḵalīfas*[21] and his leading men to all parts, and within a short space of time Ardabīl became a rendezvous for people from both near and far. The throng of disciples circumambulating the Safavid sanctuary became so great that not all of them could be admitted into the presence of Shaikh Ebrāhīm. His authority increased daily, so that no one in the province of Ardabīl could oppose his orders, which had to be obeyed. Not only the poor and needy, but all the inhabitants of those parts derived benefit from his bounty and generosity. His well-stocked kitchens were full of dishes and vessels of gold and silver, and his munificence exceeded even that of his forefathers. His manners and customs were positively regal. Eventually, Ebrāhīm contracted a variety of different illnesses, and went into a prolonged decline. As he neared death, he commended to the assembled adherents of the Safavid family his son, Joneyd, as his heir and successor, and he earnestly recommended him to them. Then he died, and was buried by his son, Joneyd, alongside his ancestors.

When Joneyd became established as leader and defender of the faith, he gave them spiritual guidance in a way that gave clear evidence of his desire for temporal power and kingship. His disciples flocked to Ardabīl from all sides, and a cardinal point in his spiritual guidance was the incitement of his disciples to raid and carry on a holy war against the infidel.[22] Joneyd's power, and the number of his followers, increased day by day. Mīrzā Jahānšāh Torkmān, who at that time was ruler of the two Iraqs[23] and Azerbaijan, heard reports on the growing strength and following of Sultan Joneyd. He became suspicious of Joneyd's intentions, and apprehensive lest Joneyd's rising power cause his own to decline. Jahānšāh, reluctant to acquire a bad name by taking military action against Joneyd, repeatedly sent envoys to Joneyd, telling him both implicitly and explicitly to get out of Ardabīl and go wherever he thought fit. Joneyd decided that the best course of action was to go to Dīār Bakr,[24] and he set off in that direction with a large number of Sufis and partisans of the Safavid family, and camped near Ḥeṣn Keyf. At that time, the governor of half of Dīār Bakr was the powerful emir Abu'l-Naṣr Ḥasan Beg, the White Sheep Turkman chief, who did not recognize the suzerainty of Jahānšah, and whose relations with Jahānšāh were hostile.

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[21] *Ḵalīfat al-Ḵolafā* is a Safavid technical term meaning "commissar for Sufi affairs." See my article, "The Office of *Khalifat al-Khulafā* under the Safawids," in *JAOS*, 85/4, 1965, pp. 497-501. The *Ḵalīfat al-Ḵolafā* was responsible for maintaining close links with the growing number of groups of Safavid supporters in Asia Minor, etc. To achieve this, he sent out subordinate officers called *Ḵalīfas*.

[22] The "infidels" in this case were the Christian populations of Circassia.

[23] I.e., ʿErāq-e ʿArab (Mesopotamia), and ʿEraq-e ʿAjam (Central Persia).

Ḥasan Beg welcomed Joneyd enthusiastically, and allotted appropriate positions to the Safavid emirs and Sufi leaders. He considered Joneyd's arrival to be an augury of good fortune and prosperity. A close friendship and intimacy developed between the two men, and in the end their friendship was cemented by a marriage alliance. Ḥasan Beg gave his own sister, Ḵadīja Begom, in marriage to Joneyd, and thus conferred great blessings on his own dynasty.

After Joneyd had stayed in Dīār Bakr for a considerable time,[25] he became nostalgic for his own country and, after obtaining permission from Ḥasan Beg, returned to Ardabīl. The hostility and jealousy which Jahānšāh felt toward Joneyd before flared up again, and were powerfully reinforced by the marriage alliance Joneyd had contracted with Ḥasan Beg. Jahānšāh began to think unprofitable thoughts concerning Joneyd, and the latter, being informed of his plots and villainy, sent couriers posthaste to summon his disciples. Then, in a bid for temporal power, he encouraged his men with promises of booty and the rewards of holy war, and ten thousand Sufi *ḡāzīs*[26] marched toward Šīrvān with the intention of attacking the Circassians. According to the *Fotūḥāt-e Amīnī,* however, Joneyd's intention was to subjugate Šīrvān itself. However, the ruler of the province of Šīrvān, Sultan Ḵalīl, at the instigation of the refractory people of Ṭabarestān, moved to block his path, and a fierce battle took place in which Joneyd lost his life.

According to the *Fotūḥāt-e Amīnī,* Sufis of the Safavid house brought Joneyd's body to Ardabīl, and interred it in the family mausoleum. But according to what I have been able to ascertain, some men from Ṭabarestān who had long been supporters of the Safavid cause removed his body from the battlefield and buried it in a suitable spot; that place has now become a shrine which is visited by the inhabitants of that region. After Joneyd's death, his son Ḥeydar, who was the offspring of Ḵadīja Begom and hence the nephew of Abu'l-Naṣr Ḥasan Beg, took his father's place.

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[24] The seat of power of the White Sheep Turkman rūler "Ūzūn" Ḥasan Beg, who was a rival of Jahānšāh.

[25] He stayed for three years.

[26] "Fighters for the (Islamic) faith" against the (Christian) infidel.

Ḥeydar's immediate business was to revive the customary practice of his predecessors, but his secret aspiration was to have dominion over territories and subjects. Ḥasan Pādešāh, who had overthrown Jahānšāh,[27] wished to consolidate his connection with the Safavid family by a new alliance. He therefore gave his daughter, Ḥalīma Begom Āḡā, who was known as 'Alamšāh Begom, in marriage to Ḥeydar. Ḥeydar's affairs prospered, and his court was frequented by both high and low.

In a genuine dream experienced by Ḥeydar, messengers from the unseen world visited him and instructed him to fashion a hat with twelve gores, indicative of the twelve Eṣnā 'Ašarī Imams, from crimson cloth; this was to be the distinctive headgear worn by his followers. Ḥeydar, in joyful response to this dream, changed his ordinary Turkman hat, which was the customary wear in those days, for the twelve-gored Ḥeydarī hat. All those connected with the Safavid house followed his example. They thus distinguished themselves from other people, and acquired the sobriquet of *qezelbāš* or "redheads."

The number of Sufis who frequented Ḥeydar's court increased; as a result, Ḥeydar possessed both temporal and spiritual authority. Inwardly, following the example of shaikhs and men of God, he walked the path of spiritual guidance and defense of the faith; outwardly, he was a leader sitting on a throne in the manner of princes. Ḥasan Pādešāh, in all his dealings with the retainers at Ḥeydar's court, preserved an atmosphere of amity and concord, and never gave his consent to any action that might be distasteful to his nephew and son-in law, Ḥeydar.

As Abū Bakr Ṭehrānī, the author of the history of the Turkman rulers, has described in detail, when Ḥasan Pādešāh died, he was succeeded first by his son Ḵalīl, and then by Ya'qūb. Sultan Ḥeydar, whose thoughts were dominated by the desire for the rewards of raids against the infidel, did not consider the conduct of Sultan Ya'qūb, who was his cousin, to be all that he could wish for. Ḥeydar took counsel with his Sufi emirs and partisans of the Safavid house, and decided on an incursion in the direction of Dāḡestān, since the inhabitants of that region were strangers to the Muslim faith, and were following the path of ignorance and error. At the same time, he decided to make a raid against the infidels of Circassia. Accordingly, he dispatched couriers to mobilize his Sufis and retainers, and the warriors for the faith assembled, company upon company, around his tent. When a numerous, fully armed and equipped band had assembled, Ḥeydar marched north.

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[27] In 1467.

The size of his army struck consternation in the heart of the Šīrvānšāh, (Farroḵyasār) b. Solṭān Ḵalīl. Farroḵyasār, imagining that Ḥeydar was out to revenge his father's death, and that he would descend on the territory of Šīrvān, commenced hostilities against him. He soon realized that his forces were no match for the Safavid army, and sent couriers, quick as the wind, one after another, to Sultan Ya'qūb, who was his son-in-law. He informed Ya'qūb that, although Ḥeydar was ostensibly intent on conducting a raid against the Circassians, it was possible that, when he reached Darband and Ṭabarsarān, he would turn in the direction of Šīrvān, and aim at the conquest of a kingdom. "At the moment," said Farroḵyasār, "Ḥeydar owns no territory, but he has mobilized a warlike army, and his ambitions will not be contained within the confines of the district of Ardabīl. Nor, if he succeeds in acquiring a kingdom such as mine, will he for long be satisfied with such a meager empire. On the contrary, it will merely whet his appetite." Sultan Ya'qūb, who had already adopted a hostile attitude toward Ḥeydar, considered that he was justified in severing the bonds of kinship, and he was prepared to bring upon himself ill-repute in this world, and the risk of being forsaken by God in the next. He dispatched Soleymān Bījan-oḡlū, with four thousand Turkman troops, to the assistance of the Šīrvānšāh.

The Šīrvānšāh, drawing strength from this assistance sent by Sultan Ya'qūb, mobilized his forces and those of the Turkmans in the neighborhood of Šamāḵī. Ḥeydar and his *ḡāzīs* entered Šīrvān from the north, having marched by way of Šakkī, and reached Darband. Darband, also known as Bāb al-Abwāb, is a lofty fortress of legendary strength. The inhabitants of Darband obstructed the passage of Ḥeydar's troops, and Ḥeydar considered it necessary to chastise them. The *ḡāzīs* were dispatched to capture the city and the fort. They had nearly succeeded in their object when a supporter of the Ḥeydarī house, Qarā Pīrī Qājār,[28] who was in charge of the rearguard, brought the news that a force of Turkman troops had crossed the river, the Šīrvānšāh had joined them with the forces of Šīrvān, and that they were seeking to give battle to the Safavid army. As reports of the approach of the enemy came thick and fast, Ḥeydar raised the siege and prepared to meet their onslaught.

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[28] Qarā Pīrī Beg Qājār was one of the seven chosen companions, or *ahl-e eḵteṣāṣ*, who accompanied Esma'il from Lāhījān to Ardabīl in 905/1499 (See Savory, Development, p. 63).

The two armies met near Ṭabarsarān, and made their dispositions for battle. The battle raged with a ferocity rarely seen in former times. At the height of the battle, Soleymān[29] Bījan-oğlū led a small force of picked troops in an attack directly against Ḥeydar himself. Ḥeydar engaged him in personal combat, and unhorsed him with his spear. Ḥeydar recognized him as he lay on the ground and spared his life, and Soleymān remounted. Ḥeydar's companions inquired what the reason for this generosity was. Ḥeydar replied that Soleymān's alloted span had not yet come to an end, whereas "my life," he said, "is in decline. I shall be killed in this battle. One cannot avoid one's fate."

In short, since the rise of the fortunes of the Safavid house was as yet no more than a firm promise, later in the battle Ḥeydar received a mortal wound from an arrow. The *ğāzīs*, disheartened by his death, gave up the struggle. Many Sufis of the Safavid house were slain around him. The author of the *Fotūḥāt-e Amīnī* states that, at the command of Shah Esma'il, he verified the truth of the above account from a number of *ğāzīs* who were present at the battle of Ṭabarsarān, such as Ḥoseyn Beg Lala[30] and Farroḵ Āqā, and others. The Sufis of the Safavid house buried Ḥeydar's body in Ṭabarsarān. Twenty-two years later, when Esma'il was on his second campaign in Šīrvān, with the object of chastising Shaikh Shah, he exhumed Ḥeydar's remains and reinterred them at Ardabīl, alongside the tombs of his ancestors. The date of Ḥeydar's death is 893/1488.

According to the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar* and the *Tārīḵ-e Jahān-ārā*, there were three sons born of the union between Ḥeydar and the daughter of Ḥasan Pādešāh: Sultan ʿAlī Mīrzā, generally known as Sultan ʿAlī Pādešāh; Esmā'īl Mīrzā, and Seyyed Ebrāhīm Mīrzā. According to Ḥasan Beg, the author of the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, there were four other sons: Seyyed Maḥmūd Mīrzā, Seyyed Soleymān Mīrzā, Seyyed Ḥasan Mīrzā, and Seyyed Dā'ūd Mīrzā. Ḥeydar appointed Ebrahim Mīrzā to see that the brothers accompanied Esma'il on the journey to

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[29] The printed text has "Solṭān," wrongly.

[30] Another of the *ahl-e eḵteṣāṣ;* later appointed to the important office of *vakīl-e nafs-e nafīs-e homāyūn.*

Gīlān, but their subsequent history has not been recorded. As far as the author has been able to ascertain, Seyyed Maḥmūd Mīrzā died in the year in which Sultan Ḥeydar's sons were taken to Eṣṭaḵr and imprisoned there; he was buried at Owjān in the province of Fārs. Seyyed Soleymān Mīrzā, in the year in which Shah Esma'il marched to Khorasan, went to Tabriz and initiated a revolt, and a number of disloyal persons, merely on the basis of false reports emanating from Khorasan, gathered around him. However, the inhabitants of Tabriz and the devoted Sufis took no part in this. With the exception of Sultan 'Alī Pādešāh, the author has not been able to discover any information about the other brothers. After his victory Soleymān Bījan-oğlū returned to Tabriz, and the apprehension which Sultan Ya'qūb had felt at Ḥeydar's attack died down.

The Events Connected with Sultan ʿAlī Pādešāh, and His Martyrdom

When the Sufi supporters of the Safavid house heard that the sons of Ḥeydar were alive and well, they showed themselves to be devoted disciples; day by day new contingents assembled within the borders of Ardabīl, declared their faith in Sultan ʿAlī Pādešāh who, by virtue of his superior age, had been best fitted to assume the position of leader of the Safavid movement and spiritual director of the Safavid Order, renewed their oath of fealty, and made ready the munitions of war. Informers and slanderers took the news to Sultan Yaʿqūb that Ḥeydar's son was firmly ensconced as the successor of his father, and would soon be raising his standards.

Sultan Yaʿqūb ignored the claims of kinship, and the pain and sorrow that would be inflicted on his own sister, Ḥalīma Begom, the mother of the Safavid princes.[1] He dispatched one of his emirs, with a strong force of Turkman troops, to Ardabīl, to arrest the boys and take them to the fortress of Eṣṭaḵr in Fārs, and hand them over to the custody of Manṣūr Beg Pornāk, the governor of that province. Yaʿqūb's idea was that, with the boys incarcerated in this fortress, their disciples and Sufi followers would be deprived of access to them and thereby deprived of their support. Yaʿqūb overlooked the fact that the will and decrees of the Creator are superior to the intentions and abilities of men, and that the hidden mysteries of the world of the Unseen are revealed in this phenomenal world: "Say, O God, Lord of Sovereignty, Thou givest dominion to whom Thou pleasest, and Thou takest dominion away from whomsoever Thou pleasest. Thou exaltest whom Thou pleasest, and Thou humblest whom Thou pleasest."[2] This action on the part of Sultan Yaʿqūb was strongly disapproved, and constituted a blot on his escutcheon.

When the Turkman detachment reached Ardabīl, Sultan ʿAlī Pādešāh decided to accept his fate and bide his time. Therefore, placing his trust in God, he set off for Eṣṭaḵr, in the company of his mother and brothers. This event took place in the year 896/1490-91.[3]

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[1] It is interesting that the text uses the word *šāhzādagān* (princes), even though the Safavids had not yet come to power. Of course, *šāh* is also used as a title of eminent Sufis (cf. Šāh Neʿmatollāh Valī), etc. Nevertheless, its use here is interesting, and may represent an unconscious instance of prolepsis.

[2] Koran: 3:27.

[3] This is inaccurate. Their arrest took place in 894/1489, and their release in 898/1493.

That region of Fārs, by virtue of their presence, became a paradise on earth; and curiously enough, the word "paradise" constitutes the chronogram of this event: 894/1489.[4]

Until a drop of spring rain descends from the heavens and is imprisoned in the dark mansion of an oyster shell, it will not become a pearl in a crown gracing the head of one of the monarchs of the universe; and no rose, without the tormenting stimulus of the thorn, would be worthy of being tucked into a fold of the turban of some powerful king. The history of Abu'l-Baqā Šāh Esmāʿīl Bahādor Ḵān is analogous to this, for in his infancy he was cast, like Joseph, into that wearisome prison, full of grief and anguish. But in the end he ascended the throne, and in a short time prosperity attended those in charge of his empire.

To return to my story: Manṣūr Beg Pornāk, following orders, gave the youthful members of the Safavid family quarters in the fortress, but he became a convert to their cause, put the service of his charges before obedience to his Āq Qoyūnlū masters, and sought to satisfy his prisoners' wishes in all things. When the Safavid princes had been imprisoned for some time, Sultan Yaʿqūb died,[5] at Solṭānbūd in Qarābāğ. As is recorded in the chronicles, the Turkman emirs assembled, but some thought his brother, Masīḥ Mīrzā, should succeed him, while others supported his son, Bāysonqor. The dispute between the two parties ended in war, and Bāysonqor succeeded to the throne. Rostam Mīrzā b. Maqṣūd Mīrzā b. Amīr Ḥasan Beg, who had supported the cause of his uncle, Masīḥ Mīrzā, after the latter's death was sent to the fortress of Alanjaq, and placed in the custody of Qereq Seyyedī ʿAlī, the commandant of the fort.

After Bāysonqor had been on the throne for a while,[6] Eyba Sultan went to the fortress of Alanjaq, and, deceiving Qereq ʿAlī by subtle stratagems, persuaded him to make common cause with him. They released Rostam Mīrzā, and made him their candidate for the throne. A large number of men from the army defeated in Qarābāğ,[7] and a number of other individuals, gathered round them. They determined to march on Tabriz and give battle to Bāysonqor. When they reached the banks of the Aras River, they encamped. Bāysonqor Mīrzā marched out from Tabriz to put down the revolt of Rostam Mīrzā; when he reached Marand,[8] every forward patrol he sent out deserted and went over to Rostam Mīrzā. The rank and file of Bāysonqor's army began to disperse, and his forces eventually reached such a state of disarray that he could no longer keep control of them. Bāysonqor was forced to abandon his baggage and royal paraphernalia, and to flee with a number of his retainers; he made his way to Šīrvān by way of Ahar in Qarāja-dāḡ, and joined the Šīrvānšāh, who was his maternal uncle.

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[4] Curiously enough, this chronogram, *ḵold-e barīn*, gives the *correct* date, 894/1489!

[5] He died on 11 Ṣafar 896/24 December 1490. The Safavid princes had then been in prison for about 21 months.

[6] Bāysonqor had reigned for about 17 months, from December 1490 to May 1492, when he was overthrown by Eyba Sultan. See R. M. Savory, "The Struggle for Supremacy in Persia after the death of Tīmūr," in *Der Islam*, 40/1 (1964), pp. 57-58 (hereinafter referred to as Savory, Supremacy.)

[7] I do not know to which battle this refers—probably to one of the innumerable battles of the civil war between rival Aq Qoyūnlū princes which followed the death of Sultan Yaʿqūb in 1490 (see Savory, Supremacy, *loc. cit.*).

Rostam Mīrzā entered Tabriz in triumph, and sat on the throne. The Turkman emirs pledged their fealty to him, and he attended to the affairs of the army and his subjects in a proper manner. But the Šīrvānšāh exerted himself to assist his nephew and son-in-law, Bāysonqor Mīrzā, and to restore him to the throne. Rostam Mīrzā, for his part, was very conscious of the proximity of Bāysonqor, and took counsel with the Bāyandorī emirs and his chief officers of state as to the best means of warding off this danger. Ultimately, on the advice of his counselors, it was decided to release Sultan 'Alī Pādešāh from imprisonment at Eṣṭaḵr, to permit him to raise his standards (for he was certainly capable of leadership and military command) under the auspices of Rostam Mīrzā, and to send him in the direction of Šīrvān to seek revenge for the death of both his father and his grandfather.[9] Whether Sultan 'Alī was victorious or not, in either event Rostam, they said, would achieve both his ostensible and his secret purposes.[10]

Having reached this decision, Rostam Mīrzā made much of the bonds of kinship between them, and of his desire to seek the satisfaction of his most revered paternal uncle. He then issued orders for the princes to be brought to court. In the year 898/1493, after they had spent four and a half years in the fortress of Eṣṭaḵr, Sultan 'Alī entered Tabriz with great pomp. Rostam Mīrzā embraced him warmly, and exerted himself to elevate his rank and station. The dependents and single-minded partisans of the Safavid house, who in their despair had hidden themselves in various obscure corners, set out for Tabriz, and every day their numbers increased.

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[8] A city lying north of Lake Režā'īya (formerly Orūmīya).

[9] Both his father Ḥeydar and his grandfather Joneyd had lost their lives fighting against the Šīrvānšāh.

[10] If Sultan 'Alī were victorious, Rostam would be rid of Bāysonqor; if he were defeated, Rostam had lost nothing, and had rid himself of a dangerous political prisoner.

At this juncture, Rostam Mīrzā received the news that Bāysonqor Mīrzā, with the army of Šīrvān, was approaching the borders of Azerbaijan. Rostam sent Sultan 'Alī Pādešāh, with Eyba Sultan and a large army of Turkman troops, to repulse Bāysonqor and the Šīrvānīs. The latter reached the banks of the Aras River and pitched their tents there. The bridge was barricaded at both ends, and no means of communication between the two armies was open except by means of a whistling arrow shaft. Neither side appeared to have any hope of victory. Eventually, both sides became wearied by their long stay there, and Bāysonqor returned to Šīrvān. Sultan 'Alī Pādešāh and Eyba Sultan returned to Tabriz.

In the meantime, Kūsa Ḥājjī Bāyandor, the governor of Isfahan, came out in revolt against Rostam. Once again, Rostam called on Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā, whom he sent with a detachment of Sufis and Turkman troops against him. The two armies met in the region of Ahar and Meškīn, and a fierce battle took place. Due to the happy augury of Sultan 'Alī's presence, the supporters of Bāysonqor were defeated, and Bāysonqor himself was killed. Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā returned to Tabriz victorious and in triumph. Rostam eulogized him, gave him the most friendly reception, and sent him, loaded with honors, in the direction of Ardabīl.

At Ardabīl, Sultan 'Alī began to follow the practice of his forefathers, namely, to guide men on the path of salvation, and to give spiritual direction. His devoted and faithful followers began to go to and fro to Ardabīl. The gathering of the Sufi clans, and the great throng of disciples, aroused Rostam's rancor and envy, and he brought the brothers to Tabriz.

Although outwardly he treated them with great respect, he set guards over them with orders not to allow Sufis to frequent them. Despite this, their Sufis and faithful followers continued to visit them secretly, to take their vows, and to put the sincerity of their devotion to the test. Rostam, being informed of these developments, pondered on his course of action in regard to the children of Sultan Ḥeydar. Finally, he decided to suppress[11] Sultan 'Alī, but a member of Rostam's court warned Sultan 'Alī of the king's treacherous plot. Sultan 'Alī, deciding to flee from what he did not have the ability to resist, one night secretly mounted his horse and rode off from Tabriz in the direction of Ardabīl. Rostam Mīrzā sent Eyba Sultan, with four thousand horsemen, in pursuit. They caught up with Sultan 'Alī at a place called Šāmasbī near Ardabīl.

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[11] A euphemism for putting him to death.

It is said that Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā had no more than seven hundred retainers with him. He pondered the problem of confronting that large force with such a small troop. A number of his partisans tried to dissuade him from giving battle, and asked him what course they should adopt. Since Sultan 'Alī, by virtue of his saintly insight, had seen the fact of his own martyrdom written on the pages of the book of fate, he gathered together all the Sufis and partisans of the Safavid family, and told them that he would lose his life in the coming battle. He nominated his brother Esma'il his heir and successor, and imparted to him the secret of those mysteries which constituted an integral part of the customs and practices of the spiritual directors of the Safavid house, and which he had inherited from his father and his ancestors. Then he placed his own *tāj*[12] on Esma'il's head, and placed him in the charge of his trusted companions, and addressed him at length regarding his mission. Speaking with divine inspiration, he declared that the light of the house of 'Alī would shine forth through Esma'il, and that his speartips would be raised to the skies in triumph, and that the rays of his justice would illumine the faces of mankind. When he had concluded his testamentary dispositions, he marched forth to battle. Just as he had predicted, his enemies were victorious, and he himself drained the cup of martyrdom. After his death, his men scattered in all directions in utter confusion. Ḥoseyn Beg Lala, and the *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*,[13] known as Ḵādem Beg, and Dada Beg, brought his body to Ardabīl and interred it in the Safavid family mausoleum. The death of Sultan 'Alī occurred in the year 898/1492-93, five years after the death of Sultan Ḥeydar, but the historian Ḥasan Beg (Rūmlū) gives the date of his death as 900/1494-95, i.e., eight years after the death of Sultan Ḥeydar. The truth lies with God!

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[12] This was the distinctive red hat, with twelve pleats or gores denoting the twelve Shi'ite Imams, which had been devised by his father Ḥeydar as a distinguishing badge of the followers of the Safavid house. The wearing of this hat gained them the sobriquet of *qezelbāš*, "redheads."

[13] The office of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*, or "special secretariat for Sufi affairs," was an integral part of the early organization of the Safavid Order. See R. M. Savory, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safawids," in *JAOS*, 85/4, (Oct.-Dec. 1965), pp. 497-502 (hereinafter cited as Savory, Khalīfat).

The Circumstances Connected with Shah Esma'il, His Conquests, and His Coming Out in Revolt against the Āq Qoyūnlū Ruler

Those who have sung the praises and narrated the exploits of Shah Esma'il have recorded that, after the death of his brother, Esma'il, who had been nominated as his brother's heir, was secretly smuggled into Ardabīl, and hidden in a different place every day. After forty days, the band of devoted followers who were looking after him decided that it was unsafe to remain in Ardabīl because of the stratagems of their enemies. They took counsel with his mother, and decided that the most prudent and expedient course was to move to Gīlān. His mother reconciled herself to being separated from her sons, and some of the Sufi nobles, such as Ḥoseyn Beg Lala Šāmlū, Ḵādem Beg Ṭāleš, who had recently been given the title of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*, Abdāl Beg Dada Ẕu'l-Qadar,[1] and others, removed the two brothers and set off for Gīlān accompanied by about two hundred retainers. As is recorded in more detailed histories, such as the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar*, Esma'il, when he reached Gīlān, stayed for a few days in Rašt. The governor of Rašt, Emir Esḥāq, offered his services to him. From there, Esma'il went to Lāhījān, where he and his brother Ebrāhīm were received with enthusiasm by the governor of Lāhījān, Kār Kīā Mīrzā 'Alī, who was himself of *seyyed* descent, and who was distinguished from and superior to the other governors of Gīlān by virtue of his rank and station, his noble lineage, the excellence of his character, and the sagacity of his conduct.

Esma'il's brother Ebrāhīm had an overwhelming desire to see his mother; since he was a dervish both in character and in his mode of life, he placed a Turkman *ṭāqīya*[2] on his head and returned to Ardabīl.

Esma'il, however, remained in Gīlān with that small band of followers, awaiting a sign from the unseen world. At that time he was not more than seven years of age, but he was already remarkable for his intellectual capacity and shrewdness of insight, and notable for his wisdom and knowledge. Even at this early age, the ornament of im-

[1] See Savory, Khalīfat, p. 497, *n*.2.

[2] *Ṭāqīya:* a tall, round hat which could be used either in its own right or as a base around which to wind a turban (see R. P. A. Dozy, *Dictionnaire détaillé des Noms des Vêtements chez les Arabes*, Amsterdam, 1843, pp. 280ff).

perial rule was visible on his auspicious brow, and the divine glory[3] shone forth from his face. His followers nurtured this tender plant with loyal devotion. They were moved by divine inspiration to address him as king, despite his youth, and to call him, with firm faith and perfect devotion, both spiritual director *(moršed-e kāmel)* and king *(pādešāh)*.[4]

According to the usual account, Esma'il stayed in Gīlān for six and a half years.[5] He spent some of the time in Bīya Pas,[6] and some of the time at Lāhījān. He was instructed in the recitation of the Koran by Mowlānā Šams al-Dīn Lāhījī, and Kār Kīā Mīrzā 'Alī and his brother Kār Kīā Solṭān Ḥasan made themselves responsible for supplying his needs. It is generally known, and recorded in the *Jahān-ārā*, that during the early days of Esma'il's stay in Gīlān, Rostam Pādešāh Torkmān sent men to Gīlān to search for him, but Kār Kīā Mīrzā 'Alī, taking refuge in various clever excuses, sent the envoys back again. Ultimately, the empire of the Turkman rulers declined, and the descendants of Ḥasan Pādešāh set upon each other. They were so distracted by strife and factionalism that they had no time for hostile action against any outsider.

Esma'il's place of residence was frequented by Sufis, and devotees were never absent from his threshold. As he grew up, he used to indulge in the pleasures of the chase, and visited Somām[7] and Eškavar[8] and other pleasant parts of the province. At no time, however, did he lose sight of his ambition to rule an empire.

When the news of the tumult and disarray of the Āq Qoyūnlū empire reached Esma'il, he determined to come forth from Gīlān. Kār

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[3] *farr-e īzadī*. The *farr* (old Persian *hvarnah;* Avestan *khvarenah;* Middle Persian *khvarrah*), meaning "kingly or imperial glory," has been a symbol of the charisma of kingship from the time of Zoroaster, and has contributed materially to the stability of the institution of the monarchy.

[4] In other words, Esma'il's followers accepted him as both a religious leader and as a temporal ruler.

[5] This is an exaggeration; Esma'il moved to Gīlān at the end of 899 or beginning of 900/1494, and made his bid for power in 905/1499 (See Savory, Development, pp. 58ff). As will be seen below, Eskandar Monšī gives 906 A.H. as the date of Esma'il's emergence from Gīlān.

[6] Bīya Pas, i.e., the western part of the province of Gīlān, in which lies Rašt, the capital of the province. Lāhījān is the chief town of Bīya Pīš, the eastern part of the province.

[7] Mt. Somām, near Rānekūh in Gīlān; see H. L. Rabino, *Māzandarān and Astarābād*, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, Vol. VII, p. 150 (hereinafter referred to as Rabino).

[8] In the district of Tonakābon (Rabino, p. 105).

Kīā Mīrzā ʿAlī, exhibiting the concern of a host toward his guest, and prudence and caution of a well-wisher, tried to dissuade him from his intention. "The time is not ripe," he said, "for this bud to blossom." In other words, he was advising Esma'il, in view of his extreme youth, the multitude of his foes, and the paucity of his supporters and companions, that the time had not yet come to reveal himself and to come out against the Turkman régime. "Be patient yet a while," he said, "so that your lofty purpose may be better achieved with the assistance of a larger number of supporters."

Esma'il remained at Lāhījān a while longer, out of consideration for Kār Kīā. But in the year 906/1500-01, when hostilities broke out between Sultan Morād b. Ya'qūb and Mīrzā Alvand b. Yūsof Mīrzā, the grandson of Ḥasan Pādešāh, a truce was finally concluded on the basis of a division of Iran between these two cousins. Esma'il had by then lived in Gīlān for six and a half years. Not wanting to stay there any longer, and inspired by a revelation from Him who gives guidance from the unseen world, he took the decision to leave Gīlān. He said farewell to Kār Kīā and, with a small band of his most devoted and dedicated followers—at a moment in time of which history is proud—set out toward his goal. Kār Kīā Mīrzā ʿAlī loaded him with gifts to the utmost of his ability, and proffered his good offices, and escorted him several leagues on the road. He uttered some final words of excellent counsel to the senior officers who were in attendance on Esma'il, and wished them Godspeed.

With the onset of the bitter cold of winter, Esma'il made his winter quarters at the village of Arjovān in the Āstārā district,[9] and the people of Ṭavāleš hastened to serve him. At the beginning of spring in 1500, when the partisans of the Safavid house were filled with hope, Esma'il left his winter camp and returned to Ardabīl. First, he visited the tomb of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn and the tombs of the rest of his ancestors. In that holy place, where men's prayers are answered and divine grace descends upon them, he prayed for God's help in achieving those lofty purposes which were firmly rooted in his heart. After completing the ceremonies of this pilgrimage, and receiving a revelation that his prayers would be answered, he was joyously reunited with his mother and brother.

To describe in detail the events which attended Esma'il's rise to

[9] Āstārā is on the present border between Iran and the USSR.

power, and the mighty battles which he fought during the early days of his reign and during the consolidation of his power, and the conquests which his officers accomplished with God's aid, would be beyond the ability of this broken reed, and even beyond the literary capacity of eloquent historians. The accounts which are given in the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar,* and the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ* of Ḥasan-e Rūmlū, and in the *Lobb al-Tavārīḵ* of Mīr Yaḥyā Seyfī Qazvīnī, constitute only a tenth, nay, a thousandth part, of the story. Since this trifling work does not purport to give a detailed history of the reign of Shah Esma'il, in order to avoid being prolix I shall, with God's blessing and benediction, make do with this abridged version. In this way, I shall not fall short of my fundamental purpose, namely, to write a history of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I.

In brief, then, Esma'il, having asked the assistance of the spirits of his ancestors and of the noble shaikhs, left Ardabīl and moved to Qarābāḡ. Day by day, his disciples gathered at his camp. In Qarābāḡ he met Sultan Ḥoseyn Bārānī, a grandson of Mīrzā Jahānšāh, who was nursing rebellious and ambitious ideas. Since Esma'il suspected him of treacherous intentions, he dissociated himself from him, and went by way of Gökča Deñiz to Arzenjān. There he was joined by three or four thousand Sufis and trusted followers from Syria, Dīār Bakr, Sīvās, Bāybord, and those regions. Khan Moḥammad Ostājlū joined him with a large force, and was well received by Esma'il and treated with great favor.

At Arzenjān, after taking counsel, Esma'il decided to invade Šīrvān, and to exact revenge on the people of Šīrvān. With eight thousand devoted Sufis, he set out for Šīrvān, and fought a pitched battle in the region of the Golestān fortress with Farroḵyasār, the ruler of Šīrvān, who had twenty thousand horsemen and several thousand infantry. Farroḵyasār fell in the battle, together with many of the nobility of Šīrvān and members of the rank-and-file, both cavalry and infantry, and the news of Esma'il's victory soon spread throughout those regions. Esma'il spent the winter at Maḥmūdābād in Šīrvān. Shaikh Ebrāhīm, known as Shaikh Shah, the elder son of the Šīrvānšāh, took ship and crossed the Caspian Sea to Gīlān.

Most of the inhabitants of Šīrvān submitted to Esma'il, and all the treasure of the Šīrvānšāh fell into his hands. The garrisons of some of the forts, especially of the fortress at Bākū, put up some resistance, but were eventually subjugated. The fortress at Bākū was surrounded on three sides by the sea, and no conqueror, however powerful, could succeed in reaching the walls on those sides. The fourth side, which faces the land, was protected by a very wide and deep ditch. After the capture of the fort at Bākū, Esma'il returned to Golestān, another fortress famed for its strength, which was still held by a garrison of Šīrvānīs.

While Esma'il was laying siege to Golestān, the angelic messenger from the unseen world brought him the glad tidings that he would possess the throne of Azerbaijan. Esma'il summoned his great emirs and said, "You can either have the Golestān fort, or the throne of Azerbaijan." Since the trusted followers of the Safavid house believed implicitly in the truth of whatever divinely inspired words he uttered, because of their spiritual relationship with Esma'il, no shadow of doubt crossed their minds. At the prospect of the throne of Azerbaijan, a joyful roar burst from their throats and ascended to the heavens.

At that moment, the news arrived that Alvand, with a Turkman army, had reached Nak̲čevān, and had dispatched another Turkman force so that he could advance into Šīrvān from two directions and give battle to Esma'il. Esma'il, his zeal fanned by the approach of his rival, at once abandoned the siege of Golestān and, at the instance of the messengers of the unseen world, marched toward Azerbaijan.

The Battle between Esma'il and Mīrzā Alvand Turkman, and Esma'il's Victory

At Nak̲čevān, Alvand, hearing that Esma'il was marching toward Azerbaijan, hastened to give battle with his army of thirty thousand men. But the great bravery and valor of Esma'il, and the self-sacrifice of the *qezelbāš* who used to hurl themselves like moths against the flame, and consider this the way to everlasting life, had struck fear and terror into the hearts of the Turkmans. The two armies confronted each other at Šarūr, near Nak̲čevān, in 907/1500, and the *qezelbāš* troops, numbering only seven thousand, attacked with great élan. The Turkmans resisted stoutly, but the *qezelbāš*, with God's help, won the victory, and Alvand was overcome. He suffered heavy casualties, including many Turkman nobles and great emirs. A large amount of booty fell into the hands of the victors. Mīrzā Alvand was unable to hold Azerbaijan, and fled to Arzenjān.

Esma'il reached Tabriz in triumph, and ascended the royal throne.

The practice of the Twelver rite of Shi‘ism was made public.[10] The pulpits in the mosques resounded with sermons in which the exalted names of the Shi‘ite Imams were commemorated. The *dīnārs* were stamped with the inscription: "There is no god but God; Moḥammad is the Prophet of God, and ‘Ali is the favorite friend of God," and with the name of that chosen One of his descendants (Esma‘il himself). The innovating practices of the people in error[11] were suppressed, and Shi‘ites, who hitherto had lived by dissimulation,[12] now practiced the Imams' religion openly, and their opponents crept into corners to conceal themselves.

Reports of Esma‘il's majesty and power spread far and wide, but Alvand, moving like a victim to the slaughter, marched back from Arzenjān toward Azerbaijan. While Esma‘il was advancing on Arzenjān by way of Terjān, Alvand entered Tabriz and began to extort money forcibly from the populace, especially the wealthy. From Tabriz, Alvand moved to Owjān,[13] and from there, hearing of Esma‘il's return, to Hamadan, and thence to Baghdad. Since his fortunes were now on the wane, Qāsem Beg Pornāk showed hostility toward him, and he could not remain in Baghdad either, but moved on to Dīār Bakr. There he fought a battle at Mārdīn[14] with Qāsem Beg, the son of Jahāngīr Mīrzā, the brother of Ḥasan Pādešāh. Although Alvand was victorious, the charisma had departed from the Āq Qoyūnlū dynasty, and Alvand died in Dīār Bakr in 910/1504.

The War between Shah Esma‘il and Sultan Morād, and Esma‘il's Conquest of Persian Iraq, Fārs and Kerman

Sultan Morād, who was dubbed "the unsuccessful"[15] by Esma‘il, was the son of Ya‘qūb Pādešāh, and was the ruler of Fārs, Persian Iraq (‘Erāq-e ‘Ajam), Kerman, and Ḵūzestān. When he heard of Esma‘il's victories, he mobilized his forces, with the idea of achieving independent sovereignty.[16] When Esma'il heard that Sultan Morād was on the march, he sent to him an envoy named Qanbar Āqā, who had been a trusted servant of Sultan Ḥeydar, and was a man of intelligence and good judgment. This ambassador offered Sultan Morād Esma'il's friendship in return for his submission. Sultan Morād replied in terms which showed he had taken leave of his senses, and marched north from the town of Delījān to give battle.[17] He reached the region of Hamadan, and disposed his forces, which consisted of seventy thousand men from the Turkman regiments, together with three hundred gun carriages, on which were mounted cannon and mortars and all the munitions of war. Esma'il, on the other hand, had with him only twelve thousand men of the *qezelbāš* tribes, and he relied on the hand of Providence.

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[10] With this bald statement, Eskandar Monšī records a turning point in the history of Iran. The imposition of Shi‘ism by the Safavids was a mainly political move designed to harness to their cause latent Iranian nationalism; it enabled them to weld Persians into a nation for the first time since the Arab conquest in the 7th century A.D. Eṣnā ‘Ašarī Shi‘ism is still the official religion of Iran today.

[11] Referring, of course, to orthodox Sunnis!

[12] *taqīya*, "dissimulation," was permitted to Shī‘īs as a means of avoiding persecution by Sunnis.

[13] Southeast of Tabriz.

[14] MS. has Bārdīn, but I suspect Mārdīn is the correct reading.

[15] There is a word-play in the Persian. The word *Morād* means "wish, desire." Shah Esma‘il dubbed Sultan Morād *nāmorād*, meaning "one who fails to achieve his desire."

On Saturday, 24, Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 908/21 June 1503, at Ālma Bolāğī[18] near Hamadan, a great battle took place between the two armies. Shah Esma'il, by virtue of Ḥeydar's strong right arm, and strengthened by the promise that Shī'a fortunes would soon shine forth in all their splendor, triumphed over the vastly superior army, and on that dreadful field shattered the Turkman forces. Sultan Morād, whom Esma'il always used to call "the unsuccessful," just as Esma'il, moved by divine inspiration, had predicted, fled in confusion and despair to Shirāz. On the battlefield, untold booty fell into the hands of the Safavids: swift Arabian horses, and other goods and commodities from far and wide, in limitless profusion. Shah Esma'il sent a proclamation of victory to all parts. In return, the rulers of neighboring regions and the nobles of other kingdoms, now convinced that the fortunes of the Āq Qoyūnlū house were in decline and those of the Safavid house in the ascendant, sent ambassadors to Esma'il's court to congratulate him on his victory, which was indeed a notable one among the victories won by the princes of the world. With the ambassadors came presents and gifts.

Shah Esma'il spent the spring on the slopes of Mount Alvand,[19] taking his ease in that pleasant spot. While he was thus engaged, he received news that Sultan Morād was consolidating his control of Fārs, and was busily engaged in regrouping his forces with the intention of avenging his defeat. Esma'il at once marched south toward Taḵt-e Soleymān, reached Isfahan, and pressed on toward Shiraz.

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[16] Since 905/1500 Alvand and Morād had divided the Aq Qoyūnlū empire between them.

[17] The whole passage from: "There he fought a battle at Mārdīn" to "Delījān" is omitted in the printed text.

[18] The name is variously given.

[19] Mt. Alvand rises to a height of 11,800 feet behind Hamadan.

When he heard of Esma'il's approach, Sultan Morād did not stay to contest the issue, but fled to Šūštar, and Esma'il entered Shiraz unopposed. The inhabitants and nobles of Fārs flocked to meet him, bringing suitable gifts, and the whole of Fārs found refuge from the buffetings of fate under the shelter of Esma'il's banners. Sultan Morād, "the unsuccessful," found no resting place at Šūštar, but continued his flight to Baghdad. Circumstances there, owing to the seizure of power by Bārīk Beg Pornāk, were not to his liking either. When rumors arose that Esma'il was pursuing him into Iraq, he and Bārīk Beg left Baghdad and went to Aleppo, where they remained for a time under the protection of the Mameluke ruler of Egypt and Syria, Sultan Qānṣūḥ. Later, he decided to return to Dīār Bakr and Rostamdār. Achieving a reconciliation with 'Alā al-Dowla Ẕu'l-Qadar, the ruler of Mar'aš, he joined him. The further history of 'Alā al-Dowla will be given later. After settling the affairs of Fārs, Esma'il returned to Persian Iraq.

The Chastising of the Stubborn Rebels of Persian Iraq, the Capture of Various Forts, and the Triumph of His Majesty

Emir Ḥoseyn Kīā Čolāvī, who had made himself master of the whole of Rostamdār, the mountainous regions of Fīrūzkūh, Damāvand, Halī-rūd, and those parts, had at his command twelve thousand cavalry and large numbers of infantry. Trusting in the strength of his fortresses and the mountainous terrain, he adopted a rebellious and intransigent attitude, and began to encroach on the territory of Persian Iraq. A number of Āq Qoyūnlū Turkman nobles, the chief of whom was Morād Beg, feeling their position in Persian Iraq to be insecure,[20] took refuge in the mountains of Rostamdār and found sanctuary at the court of Emir Ḥoseyn Kīā Čolāvī. This encouraged the latter to adopt an even more arrogant and haughty attitude, and he showed discourtesy toward the retainers of Shah Esma'il.

When Esma'il was advancing on Fārs, he sent a detachment of men under Elyās Beg Eyḡūṣ-oḡlū against Ḥoseyn Kīā. On receipt of this news, Emir Ḥoseyn Kīā, before the *qezelbāš* had mustered, marched rapidly against Elyās Beg. The latter took refuge in the fortress of Varāmīn, and the Čolāvī[21] forces arrived before its walls. For a while, they besieged the fort. Finally, they arranged a parley, secured by solemn and sworn oaths. But, acting with treacherous deceit, they put to death that simple-hearted Turk and a group of his retainers, at Kabūd Gonbad near Rayy. The facts concerning the arrogant and insolent behavior of Emir Ḥoseyn Kīā Čolāvī reached the ears of Shah Esma'il, and he determined to crush this insurrection, and to punish those evildoers from the mountains of Rostamdār.

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[20] I.e., as a result of Esma'il's victory over Sultan Morād.

[21] The text has *j.l.ā.d.l.ī.ā.n; j.l.ā.d.ī.ā.n;* etc., but I suspect the correct reading should be *čōlāvīān*.

At the beginning of spring, 909/1504, Esma'il left his winter quarters at Qom, and marched in the direction of Rostamdār. First, he laid siege to the fortress of Gol-e Ḵandān, which was renowned for its strength. He stormed the fort, and put its garrison to the sword. From there, he went on to the fort of Fīrūzkūh, which he also captured. The commandant of the fort, Emir 'Alī Kīā, after heavy fighting, tendered his submission, and he and a group of his men who also surrendered were spared. The rest were put to death. Emir Ḥoseyn Kīā himself, with twelve thousand men, lay in ambush across Esma'il's line of march, hoping to win a victory by taking him unaware. When he heard of the fall of the two fortresses, however, and of the massacre of their garrisons, his heart was filled with terror, and he felt a measure of remorse for his evil deeds. With the men he had with him, he shut himself up in the fortress of Ostā, which was the strongest castle in those parts, and had strong city walls and fortifications. Esma'il besieged the fort, and the air resounded with the sound of arrows and musket shots.

A river flowed by the walls of the castle, and the defenders drew their water from this river by means of a hole cut in the rock. When this was reported to Esma'il, he gave orders that the river be diverted from its course. Although this seemed to be a far-fetched idea, in view of the volume of water and the strength of the current, the Safavid troops set to work with a will, and within a few days had cut a new channel and diverted the river into it. For a few days the Čolāvī troops floundered around like fish out of water; in the end, thirst compelled them to cry for quarter. In this manner, a fort of such formidable strength fell into the hands of the Safavids after thirty-three days, despite the valor of its defenders. The whole garrison fell victim to the wrath of Esma'il, and apart from a few "men of the pen," no one was spared. Morād Beg Jahānšāhī was roasted, and his flesh eaten by the vengeful Safavid soldiers. Emir Ḥoseyn was placed in an iron cage, like an owl, but he managed to distract the attention of his guards and inflict on himself a wound from which he died a few days later in the

Safavid camp at Kabūd Gonbad near Rayy. It was strange that he should depart this life at the very same spot at which he had put to death Elyās Beg Eyḡūş-oḡlū and his *qezelbāš* retainers. Emir Ḥoseyn's corpse was burned.

While all this was going on, news arrived of the revolt of Moḥammad Karra, who had been *dārūḡa* of Abarqūh under Āq Qoyūnlū rule, and who had been appointed governor of Abarqūh by Esma'il. While Esma'il was preoccupied with his campaign in Rostamdār, the news reached him that Moḥammad Karra had made a sudden descent upon Yazd, had seized the city, and had put the governor of the city to death. Esma'il marched to Yazd and laid siege to it for two months. At the end of that time, Moḥammad Karra could no longer hold the city and was driven back into the citadel. In the end, the Safavid troops stormed the citadel and overpowered Moḥammad Karra in one of the towers which housed the military band. He too was imprisoned in an iron cage; all the rest were put to death. Moḥammad Karra was executed in the Naqš-e Jahān *meydān* at Isfahan, and his corpse was burned in the iron cage, in the same way that the corpse of Emir Ḥoseyn Kīā Čolāvī had been treated. This campaign consolidated Esma'il's power in Persian Iraq, destroyed all his foes, and swept the province clean of all rebellion and sedition.

Various uncivil acts had been committed by the Čaḡatāy army, at the instigation of a number of Āq Qoyūnlū Turkmans who had gone to Khorasan. The late ruler[22] Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā sent his *ṣadr*, Emir Kamāl al-Dīn, to congratulate Shah Esma'il on his victories, and to apologize to him for the excessive acts committed by the Čaḡatāys. The message the *ṣadr* brought did not mollify Esma'il; on the contrary, it enraged him. He made a sudden strike from Yazd against Ṭabas. His men poured into the town and slew large numbers of the Čaḡatāys who were living in the town. Ultimately, Esma'il's rage was appeased by this bloodletting, and after a week he marched back. The *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ* says that seven thousand people were killed in this affair.

In the spring of the next year (911/1505–6), Esma'il moved to summer quarters near Hamadan. He spent the winter in the region of Ḵoy and Salmās, where operations against Šīr Ṣārem the Kurd, who had been harassing the province of Orūmīya, were carried out by Beyrām Khan Qarāmānlū and Ḵādem Beg, the *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*. Šīr Ṣārem's son and brother fell into Safavid hands, and were executed

[22] He died in 911/1505.

with dire tortures, and Ṣārem's tribal area was plundered. 'Abdī Beg Šāmlū, the father of Dūrmīš Khan,[23] and Sārū 'Alī *mohrdār,* were killed in this campaign.

Esma'il had also been displeased by the activities of Emir Ḥosām al-Dīn, the governor of Rašt, and in 911/1505–6 Esma'il sent a punitive expedition against him. He himself with the main army moved from Ṭārom to Rašt. Emir Ḥosām al-Dīn hastened to tender his submission, and sent numerous gifts and presents as compensation for his behavior; he was pardoned through the intercession of Emir Najm al-Dīn Mas'ūd Raštī, and returned to his post. In the same year, Esma'il issued an order that all those who had sided with the enemy and had fought against Sultan Ḥeydar were to be put to death. Abdāl Beg Dada, who was at that time the *qūrčībāšī,* was charged with this task, and considerable numbers from among the Turkman tribes and others were executed.

Shah Esma'il's Campaign against 'Alā al-Dowla Ẕu'l Qadar, Events in Dīār Bakr, and His Conquest of That Province

It will be recalled that Sultan Morād Āq Qoyūnlū had taken refuge with 'Alā al-Dowla Ẕu'l-Qadar, the ruler of the regions of Mar'aš and Albestān. The following year (912/1506–7), it was reported to Esma'il that Sultan Morād, now 'Alā al-Dowla's son-in-law, had assembled an army of Ẕu'l-Qadar troops and Turkmans from the region of Mosul who had rallied round him, and was busy taking possession of various castles in Dīār Bakr, with a view to making himself the independent ruler of that province. Esma'il considered it imperative to take the field against him, and to rid the empire of this rebel. He sent *qūrčīs* to levy troops in the provinces, and in 913/1507–8 Esma'il marched in the direction of Azerbaijan.

When 'Alā al-Dowla heard of the approach of the *qezelbāš,* he retreated to Albestān, took refuge in a castle located on a high mountain called Mount Dornā, and waited there, ready to repel any attack. According to the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar,* and the *Fotūḥāt-e Amīnī* of Haravī, the battle between the Ẕu'l-Qadars and Esma'il's forces was long and bloody. For two days the battle raged, from dawn until nightfall. At the end of the second day, the armies withdrew at dusk to their own camp, and spent the night in patrol activity and mounting guard. On the third day, Esma'il donned his armor and *kaftān*,[24] and led his men into the battle, which raged more furiously than before. Finally, the Ẕu'l-Qadars broke and ran. The Safavids subjugated the forts in Dīār Bakr which had been seized by the Ẕu'l-Qadars, and Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū was made governor of the province. About the same time, Emir Khan, son of Golābī Beg Mowṣellū Torkmān, tendered his submission to Esma'il and was well received. After completing the pacification of the province, Esma'il began his homeward march.

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[23] 'Abdī Beg Šāmlū was Esma'il's brother-in-law, and one of the inner circle of his companions.

Ḥasan Beg, the author of the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, has stated that no battle took place between Shah Esma'il and 'Alā al-Dowla Ẕu'l-Qadar. His account is as follows: When Esma'il reached Albestān, 'Alā al-Dowla did not oppose him, but fled to Mount Dornā, a high and inaccessible place. Esma'il sent Ḥoseyn Beg Lala with a detachment of Safavid troops to find a ford across a river which had to be crossed. The *ḡāzīs* crossed the river and pitched camp, and most of the men went in search of barley and straw. Suddenly, Sārū Qaplān, the son of 'Alā al-Dowla, fell on them with a large force, and a fierce battle was fought between him and Lala Beg. Lala Beg was thrown from his horse, but a retainer named Ḵalīl Āqā brought forward his own horse and remounted him, giving his own life for his master, while Lala Beg got away safely. When Shah Esma'il heard that 'Alā al-Dowla had taken refuge in those high, inaccessible mountains, he plundered and laid waste 'Alā al-Dowla's territory and dominions, and returned. Ḥasan Beg, the historian,[25] has criticized the author of the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar* who, he says, although alive at the time of these events, gave an account which was at variance with the facts. I have set forth both versions, and God knoweth best which is true.[26]

After this incident, when Khan Moḥammad[27] arrived in Dīār Bakr, Qāytmas Beg, the son of Golābī Beg Mowṣellū, who was in the town of Ḥamīd, opposed him, shut up the fortress, and denied him entry. Khan Moḥammad was forced to camp outside in the desert, and the Kurds of those parts harassed the *qezelbāš* camp. Khan Moḥammad attacked the Kurds, and in a major engagement, seven thousand of the Kurds were killed. Khan Moḥammad returned victorious from this affray, and Qāytmas Beg, unable to resist him any longer, sent a courier to 'Alā al-Dowla to ask for help, and made a pact with him that he would surrender the town to him.

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[24] A quilted vest worn under armor.

[25] Author of the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ* mentioned above.

[26] The greater part of this paragraph is omitted in the printed text.

[27] See R. M. Savory, "The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia," in *Der Islam* 41 (October 1965) p. 76 (hereinafter referred to as Savory, Consolidation).

Although 'Alā al-Dowla's affairs were in considerable disarray, the temptation of acquiring Ḥamīd was too great for him, and he listened to Qāytmas Beg's appeal for help. That winter, he again mobilized an army and sent two thousand men, under the command of his sons, Qāsem Beg, known as Sārū Qaplān (the Yellow Panther), and Ordūvāna Beg, to Dīār Bakr against Khan Moḥammad. The Khan, despite the paucity of his forces, put his trust in the unfailing good fortune of the Shah, led his Ostājlūs into battle, and emerged victorious. Sārū Qaplān, who was distinguished among the other sons of 'Alā al-Dowla by his bravery and valor, and his brother Ordūvāna Beg, together with a considerable number of other men, were taken prisoner and put to death.

After this victory, Khan Moḥammad marched against Qāytmas Beg Torkmān.[28] Qāytmas Beg barricaded the gates of the city and prepared to hold the citadel. Before he had completed his preparations, however, the townspeople of Ḥamīd turned against him and admitted the *ḡāzīs* to the city. Qāytmas Beg was seized and put to death. Khan Moḥammad achieved full independence in the government of the province of Dīār Bakr, and reports of his power spread throughout the region.

'Alā al-Dowla, dismayed by the fate of his sons, again mobilized his scattered forces and dispatched about fifteen thousand men against Khan Moḥammad under the command of two of his other sons, Kūr Šāhroḵ and Aḥmad Beg, to seek vengeance for the death of their brothers. Khan Moḥammad went valiantly to meet them, and engaged the Ẓu'l-Qadar army within sight of the town of Āmeda.[29] Khan Moḥammad had only three thousand men. The story goes that, when the two armies were drawn up for battle, a number of greyhounds and their puppies came out from the Ẓu'l-Qadar lines and attacked the dogs that accompanied the Ostājlū army. Khan Moḥammad sought an omen from this dogfight. As it happened, the Ostājlū dogs gained the upper hand, and put the Ẕu'l-Qadar dogs to flight. Khan Moḥammad's morale was raised by this sight, and he gave the good news to the *ḡāzīs*. A great battle took place between the two armies, and on this occasion too Khan Moḥammad won a victory over that mighty host by virtue of the unfailing good fortune of the Shah. Kūr Šāhroḵ and Aḥmad Beg, the sons of ʿAlā al-Dowla, were taken prisoner and slain on that battlefield, together with many of their kinsmen, followers, and emirs.

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[28] The Turkman tribe was one of the major *qezelbāš* tribes (see V. Minorsky, *Takhkirat al-Mulūk*, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, New Series XVI, London 1943, p. 16 (hereinafter referred to as Minorsky, *TM*). Qāytmas Beg belonged to the Mowṣellū clan which, although not listed by Minorsky, was one of the clans of the Turkman tribe.

[29] Āmeda or Āmed, also known as Ḥāmīd and Qarā Ḥāmīd (the *TAAA* has the form Ḥamīd), was the chief town of the province of Dīār Bakr. It was situated on the west bank of the upper reaches of the Tigris. The name Qarā (Black) Ḥāmīd derived from the color of the stone quarried there (see G. Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, Cambridge, 1930, pp. 108ff).

A strange and curious incident occurred in this connection. In the Ostājlū army there was a blind man, who had come prepared to fight. When his friends taunted him about this, he replied: "I have besought Almighty God that the good fortune of the Shah may give that blind one (i.e., Kūr Šāhroḵ) into the hand of this blind one." By divine decree, Kūr Šāhroḵ fell into his hands.

Those of the Ẕu'l-Qadar army who escaped the sword turned and fled. After this defeat, ʿAlā al-Dowla donned a black felt cloak in mourning for his sons and his kinsmen, and his emirs too threw black sackcloth around their necks and went into mourning of unparallelled intensity. ʿAlā al-Dowla's ambition to annex Dīār Bakr was now finally shattered, and he abandoned this vain aspiration. His fortunes had lost all their luster and sparkle.

When the Ottoman emperor[30] heard of the repeated defeats suffered by ʿAlā al-Dowla, the death of his sons, and the humbling of his emirs and troops, he decided the time was ripe for him to satisfy his long-standing desire for revenge, and he led an army against him. In the ensuing battle, ʿAlā al-Dowla was killed, and the empire of the Ẕu'l-Qadar dynasty came to an end. Some of the vanquished elected to join the Ottomans; others entered the service of Shah Esmaʿil. ʿAlā al-Dowla had ruled Marʿaš and Albestān, and had been the overlord of eighty thousand households.

The dynasty had consisted of four rulers: Malek Aṣlān, Soleymān,[31] Nāṣer al-Dīn, and ʿAlā al-Dowla; but ʿAlā al-Dowla possessed greater power and independence than his predecessors. He conducted his diplomatic relations with the Ottoman emperor and with the ruler of Egypt[32] on the basis of trickery and deceit. Whenever ambassadors arrived from the Ottoman empire, he would dress a number of his retainers in Egyptian-style clothes, and would tell the Ottoman ambassadors that these men had been sent by the Mameluke sultan to seek an alliance against the Ottomans. "But of course," he could say, "I shall not give them any help, because of my friendship with the Ottoman emperor." He used the same tactics when dealing with the Mameluke sultan, and as a result derived benefit from both parties. The story goes that 'Alā al-Dowla used to say: "I have two golden hens; one lays silver eggs, the other golden eggs."

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[30] Bāyazīd II (regn. 886/918) 1481/1512)

[31] Omitted in printed text.

[32] The Mameluke sultan al-Ašraf Qānṣūḥ al-Ḡowrī (regn. 906–922/1501–17).

In the battle which 'Alā al-Dowla fought against the Ottomans, Sultan Morād Āq Qoyūnlū, who had acquired a special position close to 'Alā al-Dowla by virtue of being his son-in-law, was captured by the Ottomans. The Ottoman emperor, Selīm I,[33] treated him well, and Sultan Morād remained in his company for some time. In the year in which Selīm invaded Iran (920/1514), Sultan Morād did not consider it expedient to accompany him, and he dissociated himself from the Ottomans. He gathered round himself a band of evil men, and marched against Eje Sultan Qājār, the governor of Orfa. The latter hastened to meet him with eight hundred men, and overcame Sultan Morād's eight thousand in a battle in which Sultan Morād was killed. Eje Sultan sent his head and his ring, for the purpose of identification, to Shah Esma'il's court, and gained the sobriquet of Qodormoš ("the mad dog") Sultan. With the death of Sultan Morād, the dynasty of the Āq Qoyūnlū sultans also came to an end. Although these events occurred after the Safavid conquest of Arab Iraq, I included them here because of their connection with what had preceded.

Shah Esma'il's Expedition to Arab Iraq and His Conquest of that Province, together with Related Events

The true account of the conquest of that province is as follows: When the nobles of the province of Arab Iraq ('Erāq-e 'Arab) received the news that the foundations of Sultan Morād's power had been shaken, one of the Turkman emirs, called Bārīk Beg, assumed control of the province, and aimed to retain possession of it. However, Shah Esma'il determined to annex Arab Iraq. First of all, he sent Bārīk Beg a gold-embroidered hat, a sword belt, and a special robe of honor, and called on him to submit to him and to acknowledge his suzerainty. At first, Bārīk Beg hastened to accept the royal robe of honor, and he took his Turkman *ṭāqīya* from his head, and took pride in wearing the royal hat[34] and robe. Further, he sent suitable gifts to the Shah, and petitioned that he be confirmed in the governorship of that province. Shah Esma'il, however, did not look with favor on his gifts, and sent a message to Bārīk to say that he had made a firm resolve to visit the holy shrines of Karbala and Najaf, and that this vow could not be broken. If Bārīk was genuine in his protestations of fealty, said the Shah, let him hasten to court and take his place among the other emirs. One could not gain access to his court, said Esma'il, by guile and deceit. For a short time, Bārīk made an outward show of fealty, but when the approach of the royal army was confirmed, he busied himself with collecting munitions and the equipment necessary for conducting the defense of the fortress. He then openly beat the drum of defiance, and hurled away his *qezelbāš* hat.

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[33] Selim did not become emperor until 1512.

As a result, Shah Esma'il decided to march on Baghdad, and sent Ḥoseyn Beg Lala on ahead as the advance guard. When Ḥoseyn Beg was only two days march from Baghdad, Bārīk's courage failed him, and most of the nobles of Arab Iraq tendered their submission to the Shah. Bārīk, considering himself incapable of withstanding the Safavids, or of holding the fort, slipped across the Tigris at night, and joined Sultan Morād Āq Qoyūnlū in headlong flight toward Aleppo. From there, as I have already recorded, they joined up with members of the Ẕu'l-Qadar dynasty.

The following day, the inhabitants and nobles of Baghdad brought forth from the dungeon Seyyed Beg Kamūna, one of the eminent seyyeds of Najaf, who had great authority in that province. Bārīk had arrested him on suspicion of being a partisan of the Safavid cause, and had imprisoned him in a dungeon known as the Black Hole. The people released him from captivity, and declared their love for the Shah.[35] On Friday, Seyyed Moḥammad Kamūna went to the Masjed-e Jāme' and included in his address *(ḵoṭba)* the names of the Twelve Imams and the titles of Shah Esma'il. Then he went outside the city to welcome Ḥoseyn Beg, who camped in the gardens of Mīrzā Pīr Būdāq.

Ḥoseyn Beg sent a report on the capture of Baghdad to Shah Esma'il, and the Shah, hunting as he came, proceeded in a leisurely fashion toward Baghdad. On his arrival, the populace joyfully went out to meet him, and presented their prayers and supplication to him. The Shah uttered praise and thanksgiving to God for the conquest of Baghdad, and entered the city on 20 Jomādā II 914/16 October 1508.[36] Seyyed Kamūna was received with great honor and respect by the Shah. Ḵādem Beg was made governor of the province of Arab Iraq, and was granted the titles of Abu'l-Manṣūr and *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*.[37]

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[34] The word is *tāj*, which denotes the special Sufi headgear devised by Ḥeydar as the distinctive mark of the *qezelbāš*. The *ṭāqīya* was a tall, round hat.

[35] *Šāhī-sevanī*: see V. Minorsky in *EI*^{1}, *s.v.*

From Baghdad, Esma'il went as a suppliant to Karbala, where he visited the tomb of Abū 'Abdollāh al-Ḥoseyn and the martyrs of the plain of Karbala.[38] Esma'il devoted his attention to the maintenance and beautification of the shrine. From Karbala, Esma'il made the pilgrimage to the tomb of 'Alī at Najaf, going by way of Ḥella. The attendants of that holy shrine became the recipients of his liberality and beneficence, and Seyyed Moḥammad Kamūna was appointed *motavallī* of the shrine at Najaf and of several other places in Arab Iraq. Returning to Baghdad, Esma'il visited the blessed resting places of the Imams Abū Ebrāhīm Mūsā al-Kāẓem and Moḥammad Taqī.[39] From there, Esma'il visited Samarra,[40] where he made the pilgrimage to the holy places and performed the traditional ceremonies.[41]

After he had dealt with the affairs of Arab Iraq, fixing the salaries of the shrine officials, and had enhanced the splendor of the holy places, Esma'il marched on Ḵūzestān, with the object of subjugating that province. On the borders of Lorestān, he detached a force of ten thousand men, under Ḥoseyn Beg Lala and Beyrām Beg Qarāmānlū, and dispatched them against Malek Rostam, the ruler of Lorestān. Esma'il, with the main army, proceeded to Ḥavīza. The Mošaʿšaʿ Arabs who lived in that district had fallen into error, and professed the divinity of 'Alī. A strange phenomenon, which is widely held to be true, is that the Mošaʿšaʿ, when they are engaged in the devotional practices which are their customary form of worship, fall into a trance, and that while they are in this state, knives and swords have no effect on them.

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[36] Other sources give 25 Jomādā II/21 October.

[37] See Savory, Khalīfat.

[38] Al-Ḥoseyn, the younger son of 'Alī, was slain, together with his small band of followers, by the troops of the Omeyyad Caliph Yazid I on the plain of Karbala, 10 October A.D. 680. His death is commemorated by Shi'ites every year during the month of Moḥarram with public demonstrations of grief, the performance of passion plays, and the like.

[39] The 7th and 9th Shi'ite Imams, respectively. The shrine which marks the burial place of these two imams is known as al-Kāẓemeyn. The present building is largely the work of Shah Esma'il.

[40] 60 m. north of Baghdad. Capital of the 'Abbasid empire, A.D. 836–94.

[41] 'Alī Naqī and Ḥasan al-'Askarī, the 10th and 11th Shi'ite imams, are buried at Samarra, and it was in Samarra that the 12th Imam, al-Mahdī, disappeared from earth in A.D. 873.

They place the point of their sword against their stomach, and chant phrases such as *'Alī Elāhī* and other vain expressions; they lean on the sword until it is bent like a bow, without incurring the slightest injury. The governor of that tribe was always a *seyyed.*

At that time, Sultan Fayyāż, the son of Sultan Moḥsen, was the ruler and successor of his father. The ordinances of the religious law of Islam were in abeyance among that tribe. They had sunk even further into error, to the point where they professed a belief in the divinity of Sultan Fayyāż himself. When Esma'il's standards reached the vicinity of Ḥavīza, according to the author of the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar,* Sultan Fayyāż drew up the Moša'ša' in battle array and prepared to engage the Safavid forces. A great battle was fought within sight of Ḥavīza, and the soil of Ḥavīza was stained ruby-red with the blood of the Moša'ša'. The *ğāzīs* despatched the malignant Fayyāż and many of his companions in error on the road to perdition.

In Lorestān, Malek Rostam had fled before the Safavid forces and taken refuge in a mountainous area which was difficult of access. The great emirs who had been sent in pursuit of him surrounded the mountain, and his situation became desperate. He approached the emirs, on the promise of quarter affirmed by pledges and sworn oaths, and in their company went to the royal court. He uttered honeyed words in the Lorī dialect, pledging his loyalty to the Shah, and was received with favor by Esma'il. Since his meritorious actions were many, the Shah adorned his handsome person with pearls.[42] Malek Rostam spent some time among the emirs at court, and was then reinstated as governor of Lorestān. Having attained his object, he returned to his own territory.

After the subjugation of the Moša'ša', the post of governor of Ḥavīza was granted to one of the great emirs, and the Shah marched toward Šūštar and Dezfūl. The governor of Dezfūl tendered his submission to the Shah, came to court, and surrendered the keys of the city and the citadel. Thus those regions, together with the fortress of Salāsel, were annexed to the Safavid empire. The Shah appointed one of his trusted followers as commandant of the fortress, proceeded in the direction of Fārs, and, hunting as he went, arrived at Shiraz. This was the second royal visit to Shiraz, and again the Shah devoted himself to the affairs of the people. While he was at Shiraz, envoys came to him from the governors of Hormoz and Lār, bringing suitable presents, and in those districts the name and titles of Shah Esma'il were included in the Friday sermon (*ḵoṭba*) and stamped on the coinage.

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[42] A word-play in the Persian; the word *maḥāsen* means both "good deeds" and "good looks."

Shah Esma'il spent the winter at Shiraz,[43] with full pomp and circumstance. Spring found him in the upland pastures of Hamadan, and he encamped for a while at the foot of Mount Alvand.[44] From Hamadan, he returned to his capital, Tabriz, which rejoiced at his safe return.

On his arrival, Shah Esma'il learned that Shaikh Shah[45] had again seized power in Šīrvān, and was withholding payment of tribute and taxes. Esma'il's rage was such that, despite the severity of the winter, he marched toward Šīrvān. At Javād he busied himself with the construction of a bridge of boats, and he crossed the river Kor in safety. The Šīrvānšāh did not dispute his advance, but fled to the fortress of Bīqord. Shah Esma'il marched into Šīrvān in triumph, and bestowed the governorship of that province on Ḥoseyn Lala Beg, who took up residence at Šamāḵī.[46] The commandants of the forts at Bākū and Šābarān submitted to Esma'il, and surrendered the keys of their forts. The inhabitants of Darband, on the other hand, relying on the strength of their walls and earthworks, procrastinated for a few days, but eventually sued for quarter and pledged their allegiance to the Shah. Esma'il then returned from Šīrvān the same winter, and went to Qarābāḡ. At the beginning of spring, he moved to Solṭānīya, and began to make preparations for the invasion of Khorasan.

The Beginning of the Account of the Conquest of Khorasan

The writers of historical narratives and the chroniclers have described the events associated with Shah Esma'il's conquest of Khorasan as follows. When the drums of war began to sound, rulers from near and far, fearful of Esma'il's power, hastened to admit his claim and title, and to assert their loyalty and sincere devotion to him; they demonstrated the sincerity of their support for him by sending gifts, presents, envoys, and letters. Abu'l-Ǧāzī Solṭān Ḥoseyn Mīrzā Bāyarā, the former ruler of Khorasan, Marv-e Šāhījān,[47] Ḵārazm, Ṭoḵārestān, Zābolestān, and Kandahar up to the borders of Kabul and Badakšān, whose reign had lasted for a considerable number of years,[48] and who had numerous sons,[49] had been sufficiently far-sighted to enter into and maintain friendly relations with Shah Esma'il.

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[43] The winter of 1508-09.

[44] The 11,800-foot mountain that rises behind Hamadan.

[45] The son of the Šīrvānšāh Farroḵyasār who had been defeated and killed by Esma'il in 1500.

[46] The capital of Šīrvān.

[47] Or Great Marv; so called to distinguish it from Marv al-Rūd, or Little Marv, situated 160 miles higher up the Morḡāb River.

The Shah, for his part, as he had always looked upon Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā as a father, had displayed respect toward the Timurid dynasty, and had taken care to preserve the amicable relations both of the past and of more recent times.[50] In the early period of his conquest of Persia, Esma'il had not meddled with the provinces which were under the control of the Timurid ruler, and there was constant diplomatic correspondence between the two. After the death of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā,[51] dissension and schism rent that dynasty, as is recorded in the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar,* as a result of the lack of agreement between the sons of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and the pretensions to independent rule on the part of two or three of them, especially Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and Köpek Mīrzā.

Moḥammad Kān Šībānī Özbeg b. Būdāq Solṭān b. Abu'l-Keyr Kān b. Dowlat Šeyk-oğlū, a descendant of Šībān b. Jočī b. Čīngīz, had progressed from being a retainer of Sulṭān Aḥmad Mīrzā b. Solṭān Abū Sa'īd Gūrakān, the ruler of Transoxania, to being a ruler in his own right, and he made himself the sovereign of that area. Hearing something of the dissension and disagreement between the Timurid princes, he laid covetous eyes on Khorasan, and resolved to destroy the descendants of Timur. In 913/1507 he invaded Khorasan, gave battle to those feckless princes, and having defeated them, put them to death. In brief, he destroyed the Timurid dynasty, as is recorded in more detailed histories, and annexed their territory. Thus Moḥammad Khan Šībānī, commonly known as Šāhī Beg Khan, brought under his sway all the land from the farthest reaches of Turkestan to the borders of Persian Iraq. As his power increased, so did his arrogance and ambition, and he held any other powerful prince in low esteem. He began to show hostility toward Shah Esma'il, and in the year that the Shah led his second expedition to Šīrvān (915/1509–10), Moḥammad Khan Šībānī sent a detachment of troops across the desert to Kerman, plundering, killing, and destroying.

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[48] For thirty-five years, in fact (1470–1505).

[49] Seven of his fourteen sons survived him. See Savory, Consolidation, p. 78.

[50] This was not quite as magnanimous as it sounds. Shah Esma'il, because of his preoccupations elsewhere, had been in no position to do anything else.

[51] May 5, 1505.

Shah Esma'il several times sent ambassadors to Moḥammad Khan Šībānī, ambassadors such as Šeyḵzāda Lāhījī, one of the most eminent and able men of his day, to call on the Uzbeg leader to abandon sedition and strife. Moḥammad Khan, by virtue of his ill-starred nature, sent back harsh replies containing empty boasts. "I have a strong desire to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca," he said. "Where shall our rendezvous be?" Shah Esma'il sent an amiable reply: "I too have a firm resolve to visit the tomb of the Imam of *jenn* and men;[52] I hope that we will meet in the holy city of Mašhad."[53]

In the year 916/1510, in his summer quarters at Ḵorqān,[54] Esma'il issued orders for the general mobilization of his forces, and he marched toward Khorasan with a stout heart and with high hopes. Passing Semnān, the army marched boldly into Khorasan. The Uzbeg governors of the various districts of Khorasan did not stay to oppose him, but abandoned their seats of government and fell back on Herat. Šāhī Beg Khan, who had recently returned from an expedition against the Hazāra, and who was in Herat, was frightened by the boldness and audacity of Shah Esma'il, and by the fearless way in which he was advancing into Khorasan, thus making them both nervous and anxious. Every day his fear of Shah Esma'il increased. When he heard the news that the Safavid army had reached the neighborhood of Mašhad, he decided that he did not have the strength to withstand Esma'il, and he withdrew to Marv-e Šāhījān, leaving Jān Vafā Mīrzā, a kinsman of his, in the citadel at Herat. However, Jān Vafā Mīrzā also abandoned his post and fled to Marv.

Shah Esma'il, his morale high and his heart fearless, entered Mašhad, and on visiting the holy shrine of the Imam 'Alī al-Reżā as a suppliant, performed the obligatory rituals of prayer and pilgrimage. The *seyyeds* and employees of the shrine were made the recipients of special royal favor. Then, having invoked the aid of the holy spirit of the Imam 'Alī al-Reżā, Shah Esma'il set off toward Marv in pursuit of Šāhī Beg Khan. The *ġāzīs* who were in the Safavid van reached Marv, and Jān Vafā Mīrzā, with a strong force of illustrious warriors, came out to meet them. Hard fighting took place between the two forces, and although the Safavid commander, Dāna Moḥammad, was killed in the battle, Jān Vafā Mīrzā was routed and retreated in disorder to the city. The *qezelbāš* pursued the Uzbegs up to the walls of the citadel, and slew many of them.

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[52] 'Alī al-Reżā, the 8th Imam.

[53] Esma'il's invitation to a Sunni ruler to visit one of the most holy Shi'i shrines was, of course, a deliberate insult.

[54] In the province of Kūmeš about 15 m. northwest of Besṭām.

At this juncture, Shah Esma'il arrived with the main Safavid army. He pitched his tents near the citadel, and Šāhī Beg Khan, filled with even greater terror than before, walled himself up in the citadel and devoted strenuous efforts to putting the defenses of the city in order. In addition, he sent couriers to Transoxania to summon the Uzbeg tribes. Every day skirmishes took place beneath the walls of the citadel, and casualties were incurred by both sides. When this pattern of events had been repeated for a number of days and no clear prospect of capturing the city appeared, Shah Esma'il, who always preferred pitched battles in the open field to siege warfare, devised a plan for luring forth Šāhī Beg Khan, who had crept into his hole like a fox fleeing from a lion. Esma'il ordered the drums to sound for breaking camp, and he marched away from the foot of the citadel. He sent a letter to Moḥammad Khan, saying "You promised to meet me in Persian Iraq or Azerbaijan. You have not kept your promise. I, however, have kept my promise, and have come to Khorasan. Despite this, you have not come out to fight me. Various events have now occurred in Azerbaijan which make it necessary for me to return. For this reason I have broken camp and am leaving. Whenever you are ready to fight, and God shall decree it, we shall meet in battle." Šāhī Beg Khan attributed Esma'il's departure to weakness and feebleness, and wishing to bring off at least a minor triumph and so free himself from the ignominy of having fled before the might of the *qezelbāš* army, thus allowing himself to be besieged in the citadel at Marv, decided to pursue Esma'il. He marched forth from Marv with about thirty thousand men, consisting of Uzbegs and the troops of the renowned emirs and commanders who at that time were serving under his colors.

Emir Khan Mowṣellū, who in obedience to the Shah's orders, was covering the Safavid rear with three hundred men, withdrew according to plan when he saw the Uzbeg army approaching and rejoined the royal army. Moḥammad Khan concluded from the retreat of Emir Khan Mowṣellū that the *qezelbāš* army was in dire straits, and pressed his pursuit more boldly. When Shah Esma'il received news of his approach, he paused only to cross a stream some twelve miles from the city and send a detachment of men to destroy the bridge across the stream. He himself drew up his forces, seventeen thousand in number, near the village of Maḥmūdābād in the district of Marv, facing the Uzbeg army. Šāhī Beg Khan was forced to commit himself to a pitched battle. Such a terrible conflict took place between the *qezelbāš* and the Uzbegs that Mars himself wept at the number of the slain.

Jān Vafā Mīrzā, Qanbar Beg, and the majority of the Uzbegs' emirs were killed on that field. Šāhī Beg Khan and a group of Uzbegs, in their precipitate flight, entered an enclosed area which had no escape route. There they piled one upon the other in a bog, only to perish miserably. The corpse of Šāhī Beg Khan was discovered beneath a pile of dead bodies by one of the Bozčalū *ğāzīs*, 'Azīz Āqā by name, known as Ādī Bahādor. The head of Šāhī Beg Khan, which in its arrogance had not considered any other head worthy of wearing a crown, was separated from his body and flung down beneath the dragon standard, under the hooves of Esma'il's steed. Shah Esma'il prostrated himself in thanksgiving to God, and dispatched each of the limbs of the slain Uzbeg leader to a different province. The skin of the head, stuffed with straw, was sent to Solṭān Bāyazīd b. Solṭān Moḥammad Ğāzī, the Ottoman sultan. The skull, as we are told by the author of the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, was encased in gold and fashioned into a chalice that was circulated as a wine cup at banquets and festive occasions.

Ḵāja Maḥmūd Sāğarčī, the renowned vizier of Šāhī Beg Khan, who had emerged from the citadel at Marv, was standing among the ranks of the prisoners at the moment when Shah Esma'il took the gold-encrusted skull in his hand and proceeded to drink deeply from that cup of joy and prosperity. Shah Esma'il addressed him as follows: "Oh Ḵ̌āja, do you recognize this cup? It is the head of your king." The Ḵ̌āja replied, "Glory be to God! What a fortunate man my master was! For his good fortune is still with him, in that he is now in the hands of such an auspicious ruler as yourself, who every moment drinks from that cup of joy!" This witticism greatly pleased Shah Esma'il, who looked upon the Ḵ̌āja with favor and raised him to the position of vizier of Khorasan.

Aqa Rostam Rūz-Afzūn, who had subjugated and seized control of the province of Māzandarān, had consistently acted in a hostile manner toward officers of the Safavid court, and constantly used to say, "the power is mine, under the protection of Šāhī Beg Khan." Shah Esma'il now sent him the severed hand of Šāhī Beg Khan, which was carried to Māzandarān by an *aide-de-camp*,[55] who was instructed to toss it into the lap of Aqa Rostam with the words, "his protection has availed you nothing; now his hand lies in your lap."[56] The *aide-de-camp* entered the assembly at a moment when Aqa Rostam was in council with the high officers of Ṭabarestān,[57] discharged his commission fearlessly, and left immediately. Not a soul had a chance to speak.[58] Aqa Rostam, terrified by that menacing message, was petrified with fear,[59] and his heart failed him. Day by day he became weaker and eventually he died.

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[55] *Yasāvol*; for the various categories of *yasāvol*, see *TM*, p. 133.

To return to the main narrative. After his famous victory at Marv, Shah Esma'il sent *fatḥnāmas* (letters announcing his victory) to all the provinces of the empire. In all the districts of Khorasan, the names of the immaculate Twelve Imams (the blessings of God the Omnipotent be upon them!) were included in the *ḵoṭba* and struck on the coinage, together with the auspicious name of Shah Esma'il. All the land up to the banks of the Oxus River was brought under the control of *qezelbāš* emirs, and the practices and rituals of the Imami creed came to be used throughout all the regions of Khorasan. The city of Herat, which had been the capital of the Tīmūrīd sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā Bayqarā, was honored by the arrival of the Shah. The chronogram for the date of this amazing event is: "The victory of the Shah, Defender of the Faith."[60]

That winter (1510-11), Esma'il made his headquarters at Herat, and from all sides rulers and governors flocked there to congratulate him on his conquest of Khorasan. Among these was Sultan Oveys Mīrzā, known as Ḵān Mīrzā b. Solṭān Maḥmūd Mīrzā b. Solṭān Abū Sa'īd Gūrakān, who came from Badaḵšān to present himself to the Shah. He was received with special favor, and a private banquet was given in his honor. He was granted a letter of appointment (*nešān*) to the governorship of Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān and Badaḵšān, and returned having succeeded in his objective. Similarly, Moḥammad Yār Mīrzā b. 'Omar Šeyḵ Mīrzā b. Solṭān Abū Sa'īd Gūrakān in Kabul sent eloquent ambassadors and assured the Shah of the sincerity of his friendship.

At the beginning of spring (1511), Esma'il marched forth from Herat to subjugate Transoxania. When he reached Meymand[61] and Fāryāb, the

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[56] The force of this grim jest in the Persian depends on word-plays on *dast* and *dāman*, and is impossible to reproduce in English.

[57] The old name for Māzandarān.

[58] Lit.: to draw breath.

[59] Lit.: his gall-bladder was turned to water.

[60] This chronogram gives the correct date, 916/1510. The title Defender of the Faith, incidentally, is usually reserved for Shah Tahmasp.

[61] Meymana. Meymana and Fāryāb lay northeast of Herat, between that city and Balḵ.

Uzbeg sultans, including Moḥammad Tīmūr, who after the death of his father had taken over the reins of government in Samarkand, ʿAbdollāh Khan, who ruled in Bokhara, and Jānī Beg Sultan and the other sultans of Transoxania assembled on the banks of the Oxus. Envoys were sent to the Shah to declare the sincerity of their attachment to him, and to offer him suitable gifts. A treaty was concluded on the following basis: Transoxania was to be left in Uzbeg hands; in return, the Uzbeg sultans promised not to deviate from the path of fealty for the rest of their lives. Shah Esma'il responded favorably to their overtures, and prepared to march back to Persian Iraq. En route, he received ambassadors from Egypt, Syria, and the Ottoman empire, who had come to congratulate him on his victory in Khorasan. On their heels came the local rulers of Māzandarān. Esma'il allotted half of Māzandarān to Mīr ʿAbd al-Karīm, one of the sons of Mīr Bozorg, and half to Aqa Moḥammad Rūz-Afzūn. Each made requests appropriate to his position, and these were granted. The two rulers departed satisfied at having obtained what they wanted. The local rulers of the various districts of Gīlān, and Shaikh Shah the ruler of Šīrvān, undertook to pay tribute and taxes and to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Shah.

The Uzbeg sultans, however, did not remain loyal to the treaty and to their sworn oaths; as soon as the Shah's back was turned, they began to raid the periphery of the Safavid empire. At the request of Ẓahīr al-Salṭana Moḥammad Bābor Mīrzā,[62] Shah Esma'il issued a decree that Bābor Mīrzā should be confirmed in the possession of whatever areas of Transoxania he might conquer by his own efforts. Bābor Mīrzā marched north from Kabul toward his ancestral dominions.[63] In Badaḵšān, he was joined by Khan Mīrzā, and together they advanced on Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān.[64] Jamšīd Sultan and Mahdī Sultan Özbeg, the governors of the province of Ḥeṣār and Badaḵšān, hastened to give battle to the Čağatāy army, but were defeated by Moḥammad Bābor Mīrzā. Both the Uzbeg commanders were killed on the battlefield. The province of Ḥeṣār and Badaḵšān, in accordance with Shah Esma'il's decree, was granted to Khan Mīrzā. Bābor reported this event to Shah Esma'il and said that, if he should receive some reinforcement from the Shah, there was every hope he could conquer the rest of Transoxania too. Shah Esma'il dispatched Aḥmad Sultan Ṣūfī-oğlū and

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[62] Correctly, Ẓahīr al-Dīn.

[63] He had been expelled from Transoxania in 906/1500–01 by Moḥammad Khan Šībānī.

[64] The ancient Šūmān, lying north of the Oxus, between the Zāmel and the Qobāẓīān rivers, which are tributaries of the Oxus.

Sāhroḳ Sultan *mohrdār* Afšār with a detachment of seasoned troops to his assistance. Moḥammad Bābor Mīrzā linked up with these great emirs, and together they advanced on Samarkand.

When the Uzbeg sultans got word of the approach of Moḥammad Bābor Mīrzā with the support of *qezelbāš* forces, they evacuated the capital, Samarkand, and retreated in the direction of Turkestan. Bābor entered Samarkand and took his place on the throne of his victorious ancestors. He had the *ḳoṭba* used by the Twelver Shi'ites recited in the name of Shah Esma'il, and he dismissed the *qezelbāš* emirs, giving them permission to return with suitable presents for the Shah.

After the *qezelbāš* emirs had left, however, the Uzbeg sultans returned to Transoxania with a great army. Bābor Mīrzā went out to meet them with the small force that was available to him. In the ensuing battle, many of Bābor's men were killed, and the rest fled. Bābor, unable to maintain his position in Transoxania, retreated to Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, where the Uzbeg sultans pursued him and laid siege to the fortress. Bābor fortified himself in the citadel and sent a courtier to Beyrām Khan Qarāmānlū to seek assistance. Beyrām Khan sent a detachment of *qezelbāš* troops to his aid, and when the Uzbegs heard of their approach, they abandoned the siege and returned to Transoxania.[65]

An account of these events and of the Uzbeg insurrection was transmitted to those close to the Shah. Emir Najm-e Ṣānī, the *vakīl-e dīvān-e a'lā,*[66] whose power and influence at court are well known (some further details of this are given in the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar),* was appointed to set in order the affairs of Khorasan and to deal with the Uzbeg menace. Without orders or instructions from the Shah, Najm-e Ṣānī resolved on the subjugation of Transoxania. With Ḥoseyn Beg Lala, the governor of Herat, and the great emirs of Khorasan, including Beyrām Khan the governor of Balḳ, he crossed the Oxus. Moḥammad Bābor Mīrzā marched from Ḥeṣār and joined the *qezelbāš* army. First they captured the fort of Ḳozār, and then the fort of Qaršī.[67] At Qaršī, Emir

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[65] Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān is actually *in* Transoxania. The meaning, however, is clear: the Uzbegs returned to the Samarkand and Bokhara region.

[66] See Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the Reign of Shāh Ismā'il," in *BSOAS,* xxiii, part 1(1960), pp. 91-105 (hereinafter referred to as Savory, Offices I).

[67] The ancient town of Nasaf or Naḳšab, famous as the birthplace of al-Moqanna', the Veiled Prophet of Khorasan, in the 8th century A.D.

Najm gave orders for a general massacre, in which Šeyḵ Mīrzā-ye Özbeg and about fifteen thousand people, both military and civilians, were put to death. Mīrzā Bābor interceded with Emir Najm in an attempt to save the life of a number of the inhabitants of Qaršī who were members of Čaḡatay tribes, but in vain. This incident became a cause of dissension between Emir Najm and Bābor. Again, the *ṣadr* Emir Moḥammad b. Yūsof[68] put in a plea for the life of a number of *seyyeds* who had taken refuge in the Masjed-e Jāme', but this request too was refused, and a large number of *seyyeds* were put to death. This action proved to be unlucky for Emir Najm.

After the massacre at Qaršī, he marched against the fortress of Ḡojdovān, which was held by Moḥammad Tīmūr Sultan and Abū Sa'īd Sultan. The siege dragged on for four months, and food supplies in the *qezelbāš* camp began to run short. The troops were subjected to short rations of food and of fodder for their animals. When 'Abdollāh Khan and Jānī Beg Sultan, who were at Bokhara, heard of the plight of the *qezelbāš*, they assembled an army and marched against Emir Najm. Moḥammad Tīmūr Sultan left the fort of Ḡojdovān and joined them. Battle was joined on Sunday, 3 Ramażān 918/12 November 1512,[69] within sight of Ḡojdovān. Beyrām Khan Qarāmānlū who was the commander and led the vanguard of the *qezelbāš* army, was fatally wounded by an arrow and fell from his horse. This blow caused the vanguard to turn and flee, and the Uzbegs, correspondingly encouraged, made a concerted charge. The *qezelbāš* emirs were scattered, and the Safavid center was thrown into confusion. Moḥammad Bābor Mīrzā abandoned his position on the wing, and withdrew with his men to Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān. The *qezelbāš* emirs, who were heartily sick of the haughty airs and arrogance of Emir Najm, made no effort to defend him, and he was taken prisoner and put to death. Some of the nobles of Khorasan, crossing the Oxus at Karkī, reached Khorasan.

This disaster occurred in 918/1512. The Uzbeg sultans, flushed with victory, resolved to subjugate Khorasan. They crossed the Oxus, and for a while the land of Khorasan was ravaged by the Uzbegs. When the news reached the Shah, who was in winter quarters at Qom, he decided on a second expedition to Khorasan. When the royal army reached Kālpūš, the Shah sent a number of emirs and a detachment of men in the direction of Ṭūs. The Uzbeg sultans, filled with alarm by the news of the Shah's approach, withdrew hastily across the Oxus. Once again, the provinces of Khorasan came under the sway of the officers of the Shah, who stayed there for some time. He severely punished a number of emirs who had been guilty of treason and cowardice at the battle of Ğojdovān; he vented his wrath particularly on Dada Beg Ṭāleš, the governor of Marv, who was forced to wear a woman's veil. A number of seditious persons, who during the Shah's absence from Khorasan had shown signs of being partisans of the Uzbegs and had persecuted and inflicted harm on Shi'ites,[70] were consumed in the fire of the Shah's wrath. The whole province was swept clean of the dross and rubbish of contumacious people, and the Shah, having placed the government of the province of Khorasan in the capable hands of Zeynal Khan Šāmlū, returned home.

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[68] See Savory, "Some Notes on the Provincial Administration of the Early Safavid Empire," in *BSOAS*, xxvii/1 (1964), pp. 114–29.

[69] The third of Ramażān was actually on a Friday.

The Battle of Čālderān[71] between Shah Esma'il and the Ottoman Sultan, Selīm

In the year 920/1514, when Shah Esma'il was enjoying himself in his summer quarters at Hamadan and in the pleasant retreats in that district, a report was spread abroad that Selīm, the Ottoman sultan, was advancing on Iran. We must go back briefly to explain the background to this invasion.

Sultan Bāyazīd, who was ruler of the Ottoman empire at the time when Esma'il emerged from Gīlān to make his bid for power, had always observed the protocol necessary for a policy of close friendship and alliance, and the two powers had followed the path of entente. In 917/1511, however, Sultan Selīm rebelled against his father and civil war broke out. The army leaders, and particularly the Janissary corps, banded together and put Sultan Selīm on the throne and deprived Bāyazīd of all power. Bāyazīd, falling sick through grief at this turn of events, died in 918/1512, and Sultan Selīm inherited the throne and the crown.

Sultan Aḥmad b. Sultan Bāyazīd, who was in Anatolia at the time of his father's death, had the *ḵoṭba* pronounced in his own name, but the emirs and the viziers lured him by means of a ruse to Istanbul, where they put him to death. They then dispatched an army against his son Sultan Morād who, fearful of the troops of his paternal uncle, fled to

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[70] Many Shi'ites had been put to death at Herat by Tīmūr Sultan (See Savory, Consolidation, p. 81).

[71] In the province of Azerbaijan, northwest of Ḵoy.

Esma'il and entered his service at Isfahan, where he was received with favor. Shortly afterwards, however, Sultan Morād died. Sultan Selīm suspected Shah Esma'il of supporting Sultan Morād. Furthermore, he was angered by the activities of Nūr 'Alī Ḵalīfa Rūmlū, the governor of Arzenjān. Nūr 'Alī, fighting side by side with Sultan Morād, had defeated Senān Pasha with heavy losses, the Pasha himself being killed. Sultan Selīm therefore bore a grudge against Shah Esma'il which blossomed into open hostility. Disputes over various forts in Dīār Bakr added fuel to the flames, and gradually, for a variety of reasons, the causes of war between the two sides increased.

Finally, in 920/1514, Selīm marched on Azerbaijan with a huge army. He sent a letter to Shah Esma'il, telling him of his approach. Esma'il had moved from Isfahan to his summer quarters at Hamadan without any thought of war and conflict with the Ottomans. Informed of the Ottoman sultan's inopportune arrival, he did not pause to mobilize the armies of Iran; impetuously, with such troops as he had with him, he hastened to meet the enemy. On Wednesday, 2 Rajab 920/23 August 1514, in the plain of Čālderān, a district of Ḵoy, he drew up his twenty thousand men in their battle stations, facing the overwhelmingly superior forces of the Ottomans.[72]

The Ottomans, as was their usual practice, constructed a barricade of gun carriages and chains in front and behind their forces. Twelve thousand Janissaries, armed with muskets, were stationed under the cover of the gun carriages. Sultan Selīm, having constructed this strong center of firepower as his main defense, saw to the disposition of the center and the wings. On the Safavid side, Khan Moḥammad Ostājlū, who had just arrived from Dīār Bakr with his seasoned troops, counseled against a frontal attack because of the strength of the Ottoman artillery. "We must," he said, "give battle to them when they are on the move." Dūrmīš Khan, however, with arrogant pride in his own bravery, did not accept this advice, and the Shah said: "I am not a caravan-thief. Whatever is decreed by God, will occur." And Khan Moḥammad fell silent.

Shah Esma'il stationed Khan Moḥammad in the van of the Safavid army, supported by Sārū Pīra *qūrčībāšī* Ostājlū, the brother of Mantašā Sultan. On the right wing, he stationed several of the great emirs, including Dūrmīš Ḵan Šāmlū, Nūr 'Alī Ḵalīfa Rūmlū, Ḵolafā Beg, Ḥoseyn Beg Lala, and Ḵalīl Solṭān Ẕu'l-Qadar. On the left, he placed the Ostājlū khans and sultans, the sons of Bābā Elyās Čāūšlū, and others. Esma'il himself was in command of the Safavid center. Seyyed Moḥammad Kamūna, who was enrolled in the ranks of the emirs, Mīr 'Abd al-Bāqī the vizier,[73] and Mīr Seyyed Šarīf the *ṣadr*, were stationed in the center with the Shah. The warriors on both sides leapt to the attack, and the battle was soon raging furiously.

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[72] See Savory, Consolidation, p. 87.

According to the *Jahān-ārā*, and this is confirmed by general report, Shah Esma'il, while his troops were taking up their stations for battle, went off to hunt quail, and returned to the battlefield after the fighting had started. A certain Malqoč-oğlū,[74] a renowned Ottoman warrior and one of the champions of the age, was stationed in the Ottoman van. He was constantly boasting to the other Ottoman nobles that there was no one in the enemy ranks worthy of giving battle to him except the Shah himself. In the course of the battle, that vile, evil man girded himself to engage in combat with the Shah. With a group of intrepid Ottoman warriors, he reached the Safavid center and challenged the Shah to single combat. Although that base fellow, whose life was forfeit, was not an opponent of sufficient caliber to merit the attention of such a powerful monarch, or to justify his going out to meet him in combat, nevertheless Shah Esma'il, impelled by his sense of honor, galloped out to meet him, against the advice of the loyal emirs and without the assistance of any of his men. Armed with his Ḥeydarī sword, which resembled the famous blade Ẕu'l-Faqār,[75] he charged at that ill-fated fellow with such fury and hostility that the latter was bereft of his senses by the violence of the Shah's assault. He remained paralyzed with fear, incapable of movement, and the Shah struck him a blow that cleft both chain mail and steel breastplate, and hurled his vile corpse to the ground. A shout went up from both armies, and the cherubim sang their praises of the Shah's strength and power.

Then the two armies hurled themselves at each other, and the air was darkened by the clouds of dust. Shah Esma'il entered that frightful field in person, supervising the course of the battle and performing deeds of valor surpassing those of Sām and Esfandīār.[76] It is a matter of record among the Ottomans that the Shah several times forced his

[73] This is a mistake. Mīr 'Abd al-Baqī was not the vizier, but the *ṣadr*, and Mīr Seyyed Šarīf was a former *ṣadr*.

[74] The Malqoč-oğlū family was descended from a Greek renegade named Malco. By about 1537 there was only one representative of the family left, and he was a *sanjaq-bey* in Greece (information courtesy of G. M. Meredith-Owens).

[75] The sword of 'Alī.

[76] Two heroes of the Iranian national epic, the *Šāh-nāma*. Sām was the grandfather of the renowned Rostam, and Esfandīār was a legendary king of Iran.

horse right up to the gun carriages and the barricade, and with blows of his sword severed the chains linking the gun carriages. When the *qezelbāš* warriors reached the gun carriages, they hacked to pieces with their swords about three hundred Janissaries who were stationed behind the carriages. However, the Janissaries and artillerymen bent themselves to their task, and the volume of fire from the heavy artillery, light cannon (*żarbzan*), and muskets was such that smoke blotted out the brightness of the day. Large numbers of *qezelbāš* who had flung themselves fearlessly into that maelstrom were cut down by musket fire. Khan Moḥammad Ostājlū, who was in the forefront of the Safavid army, was struck by a cannonball and killed, along with a considerable number of the Ostājlū contingent.

When the Ottomans realized that the Shah was no longer present in the Safavid center, they directed their fiercest attacks and their heaviest fire against the center, which was thrown into confusion by the Ottoman artillery and light cannon. Seyyed Moḥammad Kamūna, Mīr 'Abd al-Bāqī, and Mīr Seyyed Šarīf the *ṣadr*,[77] who were in the Safavid center, were all killed. Of the great emirs, the following lost their lives: Sārū Pīra *qūrčībāšī* Ostājlū; Ḥoseyn Beg Lala; Khan Moḥammad Ostājlū; the sons of Bābā Elyās Čāūšlū; and a number of others. In addition, Sultan 'Alī Afšār, mistaken for the Shah, was taken prisoner and led before Sultan Selīm. When he revealed his real name, he was put to death on the spot.

When Shah Esma'il recognized the Ottoman superiority in numbers and saw the confusion in the Safavid ranks and the destruction of the center, he commanded that the war trumpets be sounded. Three hundred men rallied to his standard. At the pressing insistence and urgent entreaty of his loyal companions, the Shah was forced to abandon the field. As he did so, he and his companions clashed with the troop of Ottomans which had shattered the Safavid center and was returning to its own lines. The Shah broke through their ranks and continued on his way. En route, his horse sank into a bog, whereupon Ḵeżr Aqa Ostājlū brought up his own horse and mounted the Shah on it. He then extracted the Shah's horse from the bog and followed on behind, later to be received by the Shah at Darjozīn.[78]

Thus the Shah, with a small band of his close companions, retreated from the field of Čālderān, and reached Darjozīn. His intention was to mobilize his forces and to give battle to the Ottomans, this time from a position of strength. Sultan Selīm, in order to glory in his triumph, entered Tabriz,[79] but did not occupy the city for more than five or six days. As he had a healthy respect for the fighting qualities of the *qezelbāš* and for the Shah's impetuosity and personal bravery, he regretted his boldness and audacity in advancing as far as Tabriz, and decided that it would be more prudent to withdraw and retire to Ottoman territory.

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[77] See above, note 73.

[78] *Persice* Dargozīn, situated north of Hamadan.

According to verbal reports and popular accounts, the casualties at Čālderān were heavy. But Ḥasan Beg Rūmlū[80], the historian, states that according to most reliable accounts, five thousand men were killed, of whom three thousand were Ottomans and two thousand *qezelbāš*, and that the total casualties did not exceed this number.[81] When the news of the Ottoman withdrawal reached Darjozīn, the Shah marched jauntily back to his capital, Tabriz, and devoted himself to repairing the damage caused by the passage of the Ottoman army in that area.

After his victory at Čālderān, Sultan Selīm marched to Arzenjān and laid siege to the fortress of Kāḵ, which had been entrusted to Dīv Solṭān Varsāq. Dīv Sultan had gone to join the Shah and had left the fort in the charge of his brother, Yūsof Sultan, and three hundred Varsāq *ḡāzīs*. Sultan Selīm sent a message to the garrison, offering them quarter and calling on them to join his colors. The *ḡāzīs* replied, "Just because our spiritual director and master has suffered a slight setback in battle, we are not prepared to renounce our obligation to support him and to exchange disloyalty for fidelity. As long as there is breath in our bodies, we shall fight the enemies of the Shah." The Ottomans then assaulted the castle, and stormed it. The *ḡāzīs* retreated to the Masjed-e Jāme'. Since the situation was desperate, they drew their swords and, holding their shields above their heads, made a sally into the Ottoman ranks. All died fighting. Sultan Selīm occupied the fort, and then marched against 'Alā al-Dowla. He then annexed the province of Dīār Bakr, as will be described below. After that, no further hostile act was committed by Sultan Selīm against the Safavids.

Without doubt God, in His most excellent wisdom, had decreed that

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[79] The chief city of the province of Azerbaijan and at that time the capital of Iran.

[80] Author of the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, an important 16th-century Safavid chronicle. The author was himself a *qezelbāš* officer.

[81] Ḥasan-e Rūmlū's figures seem low; for other sets of figures, see Savory, Consolidation, p. 90.

Shah Esma'il should suffer a reverse at the battle of Čālderān, for had he been victorious in this battle too, there would have been a danger that the belief and faith of the unsophisticated *qezelbāš* in the authority of the Shah would have reached such heights that their feet might have strayed from the straight path of religious faith and belief, and they might have fallen into serious error.[82]

After the battle of Čālderān, the governorship of Dīār Bakr was given to Qarā Khan, the brother of Khan Moḥammad Ostājlū, and Qarā Khan took up residence at Mārdīn. But the inhabitants of the city of Āmed, also known as Qarā Ḥamīd, broke their allegiance to the Safavids, called in the Ottomans, and handed over the city to them. Qarā Khan, marching from Mārdīn, gave battle to an Ottoman army of five thousand men and defeated them, with most of the Ottoman force being wiped out. When Qarā Khan reached Āmed, he found the inhabitants in league with the Ottomans, and despaired of capturing the fort there. The city therefore remained in Ottoman hands, while the Safavids retained control of the rest of the province.

However, in 922/1516–17, the second year of Qarā Khan's governorship, the Ottomans sent twenty thousand infantry and cavalry to Dīār Bakr. Qarā Khan, together with Dūrmīš Khan Qājār, engaged the Ottoman army at Olang-e Qorūq near Mārdīn, and again defeated the Ottomans. But, while pursuing the enemy, he was struck by a stray bullet and fell dead from his horse. At this mischance, the *qezelbāš* scattered in all directions, and the Ottomans were able to convert total defeat into victory. Reinforcements arrived from Turkey, the Ottomans annexed the province of Dīār Bakr, and *qezelbāš* influence disappeared from that region. When the Shah received the news of the first Ottoman incursion, he delegated a force to go to the assistance of Qarā Khan, but on receiving the report of the latter's death, he canceled the order.[83]

After Čālderān, the Shah, despite his preoccupation with essential matters of state, devoted himself night and day to making plans for a blockade and an invasion of Ottoman territory. In the year 926/1520, however, Sultan Selīm died, and his son Sultan Sülaymān succeeded him. Since no signs of hostility were observed on the part of the new sultan, the *'olamā* did not consider it legitimate to launch an expedition against territory forming part of the Islamic world *(dār al-eslām)* in the absence of some hostile move on the part of the enemy.[84] On the contrary, Sultan Sülaymān, in the early years of his reign, led his armies against Russia and Europe, and was engaged in plundering raids and holy war against the infidel. This aroused in the Shah also a desire to plunder infidel lands, and accordingly, for several years, he sent his forces against the Georgians, seeking the rewards of pillage, while he himself devoted his time to merrymaking and life at court.[85]

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[82] For details of the extent to which the *qezelbāš* already worshipped Shah Esma'il as a semi-divine being, see Savory, Consolidation, pp. 91ff. (N.B.: At this point we return to the printed text after a lengthy lacuna.)

[83] The first indication of the change wrought in Shah Esma'il by his defeat at Čālderān (see Savory, Consolidation, pp. 91ff).

About this time, Shah Esma'il decided to appoint one of the royal princes to the governorship of Khorasan, and to dispatch him to that province. Initially, he selected his eldest son, Ṭahmāsp Mīrzā,[86] who was already showing signs of ability to rule, and sent him to Khorasan with Emir Khan Mowṣellū as his *lala*[87]—the latter having actual administrative authority in his hands. After a while, Ṭahmāsp Mīrzā was recalled by the Shah and replaced by Sām Mīrzā, with Dūrmīš Khan as his *lala*.[88] During the remaining years of Shah Esma'il's reign, the province of Khorasan was peaceful and secure.

In 926/1519-20, Shaikh Shah, the ruler of Šīrvān, came to court and made a present to the Shah of all he possessed, and wished to be considered as one of the Shah's loyal servants. In addition, his daughter, who had been chastely reared in the royal house of Šīrvān, became one of the virtuous inmates of Shah Esma'il's harem. In consideration of these services to the Shah, the position of ruler of Šīrvān was again granted to him.

In the year 930/1524, death, the destroyer of earthly delights, visited Shah Esma'il, as he entered upon his thirty-eighth year of life.[89]

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[84] Surely Eskandar Monšī does not expect us to believe this! The argument is entirely specious. In the first place, there is no evidence that Shah Esma'il was planning a retaliatory expedition against Ottoman territory; indeed, all the evidence points in the opposition direction (see Savory, Consolidation, pp. 93ff). Secondly, the *'olamā* had never before been so scrupulous about the turning of Safavid arms against fellow Muslims. Third, one must remember that, at this early period in the history of the Safavid state, the religious institution was still subordinate to the political institution, the head of which was the Shah, and it is highly improbable that Shah Esma'il, had he really intended to invade the Ottoman Empire, would have been deflected from his purpose by the opinions of the *'olamā*.

[85] After Čālderān, Shah Esma'il never again led his troops into action in person.

[86] Born in 919/1520. He was sent to Khorasan in 922/1516.

[87] Guardian, mentor.

[88] In 927/1521.

[89] This is, of course, according to the lunar calendar. Shah Esma'il was born in 892/1487.

He died at a place called Mānqūṭāy, near Sarāb,[90] and was buried in the holy mausoleum of Shaikh Ṣafī at Ardabīl. Various chronograms give the date of his death. These include: "May his resting place be peaceful!"; "Defender of the Faith"; and "the Shadow of God upon earth."[91]

Shah Esma'il left four sons, all of them infants; Ṭahmāsp Mīrzā; Bahrām Mīrzā (the mother of both of these princes was the daughter of one of the Mowṣellū Turkman emirs); Alqās Mīrzā; and Sām Mīrzā (born of different mothers). There is no point in listing the names of the daughters of Shah Esma'il. The Shah had an excellent natural talent for poetry, but most of his poems were composed in Turkish,[92] under the pen name of Ḵaṭā'ī. Because he was a contemporary of Sultan Selīm, Mowlānā Omīdī composed the following occasional verse, which alludes to this:

> Destiny, in the celestial workshop,
> Fashioned both Selīm and Ḵaṭā'ī.

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[90] Sarāb is a district near Tabriz.
[91] All three chronograms give the correct date: 930/1524.
[92] In the Āẕarī dialect of Turkish.

The Life and Times of Shah Tahmasp (God's Mercy and Benediction Be upon Him!)

Of the sons of Shah Esma'il, Tahmasp, his eldest son, was most fit to succeed him on the throne of Ḵosrow and Key-Qobād. Tahmasp was born on Wednesday, 26 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 919/22 February 1514, in the borough of Šāhābād, in the district of Isfahan. Those whose business it was to forecast events considered the fact that Tahmasp was born in a place called Šāhābād, "the king's abode," a happy augury, foretelling his kingship and imperial rule. The astrologers, who understood the subtleties of the astrolabe, predicted on the basis of his horoscope that he would soon grace the throne of Ḵosrow, and that his reign would illumine the earth. The divinely inspired chronogram of his birth is "The world-illumining sun."[1]

During the reign of Shah Esma'il, Tahmasp, while still an infant, was elevated above his other brothers by being appointed governor of Khorasan, and he grew up in the city of Herat.[2] When his *lala*, Emir Khan Mowṣellū, was guilty of conduct displeasing to the Shah and was dismissed from his post, Tahmasp returned to court and remained at his father's side. From an early age his conduct portended his future kingship and imperial rule, and his brow shone with the light of his future status as the Shadow of God upon Earth.[3] After his father's death, Tahmasp was invested with the authority and attributes of kingship. In his eleventh year[4] he ascended the throne in accordance with the Koranic prescription: "God commands you to make over what is held in trust to those who are entitled to it."[5]

Tahmasp ascended the throne on Monday, 19 Rajab in the Year of the Monkey, corresponding to the year 930 of the Muslim calendar (1524), and the divinely inspired chronogram for this event is "He took the place of his father." Because of his deep faith and sincere belief in 'Alī, Tahmasp used to call himself "the servant of 'Alī"; and by a happy coincidence, the words "Tahmasp, the servant of 'Alī," also constitute a chronogram of the date of his accession.[6] Tahmasp was a pious king and a just ruler, intent on preserving the canon law.

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[1] This chronogram gives the correct date, 919/1514.

[2] Herat, now in Afghanistan, was formerly Persian territory. In 1856 Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah, by the terms of the Treaty of Paris, was forced to renounce all claim to it. In Safavid times, Herat was the capital of the province of Khorasan.

[3] The Shah was the living emanation of the godhead, the Shadow of God upon earth. Since he had divine sanction for his authority, his rule was necessarily absolute.

[4] He was 10 1/2 years old.

[5] Koran: 4:59.

Helped by divine assistance and favored by divine grace, the young Tahmasp sat at the feet of the finest scholars of the age and studied the essential consequences of the seven planets and the four elements. In philosophy and science he outdid Aristotle and Alexander, and in the arts of government he surpassed Jamšīd and Ḵosrow.

At the beginning of his reign, the affairs of state, for a variety of reasons, were in confusion. The ill-starred foes of the Safavid state, who were waiting for just such an opportunity, cast covetous eyes on the realm of Iran, which is the choicest part of the inhabited world and the seat of the throne of the Keyānian monarchs.[7] Consequently, they began to cause disturbances. Among the emirs and the principal officers of state, disputes occurred in regard to the office of *vakīl,*[8] and these disputes, fanned by tribal rivalries, ended in civil war.[9] Every few minutes, another great emir or elder of the state took charge of the office of *vakīl,* and administered the affairs of state with full authority. During the early part of his reign, Tahmasp, because of his tender years, for a while neglected the affairs of state.

Part of his time he spent in observing the world around him and the situation in which God had placed him. Part of his time, partly through natural inclination, and partly at the behest of his spiritual director, he spent in assaying his physical nature, in which he acknowledged a weakness, against the pure substance of the devotion of men possessed of true insight and fidelity to God. For a while too, he protected his person from the violence of ambitious men of impure metal. Armed with felicity and guided by his youthful fortune, Tahmasp succeeded, despite the profusion of his enemies and the paucity of his helpers, not only in preserving his own person, but also in protecting the state.

When the stripling grew tall and flourished, and reached the age of maturity and discretion, with God's help, and through the strength of his own sure judgment and by virtue of his abundant knowledge and perfect wisdom, he removed from the scene, by means of skillful policies, ambitious emirs and proud and arrogant men, and himself took charge of the business of government and the administration of the state.[10] The enemies of the state, who lurked in ambush, were destroyed by the flashing stroke of his flaming sword, and his aspiration to rule and to govern was brought to fruition, as was right and proper. He achieved such authority and independence of rule that no one had the opportunity to oppose his commands, to which obedience was obligatory.

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[6] Both these chronograms give the correct date, 930/1524.

[7] The second of the legendary dynasties of rulers of Iran.

[8] In the early Safavid period, the office of *vakīl* was the most important of the principal offices of state, because the *vakīl* was the vicegerent and alter ego of the Shah, and represented him in both his temporal and spiritual capacities.

[9] For details, see R. M. Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Tahmasp I (930-984/1524-76)," in *BSOAS,* XXIV, part 1 (1961), pp. 65-85 (hereinafter referred to as Savory, Offices II).

The praiseworthy qualities of Shah Tahmasp, the ruler chosen by God, are beyond enumeration, and it is beyond the power of the pens of the secretaries of the secretariat to describe them. A detailed description of the events of Tahmasp's reign, the battles he fought, his conquests, and other important incidents which occurred during his reign, has been given by the late Ḥasan Beg Rūmlū, the historian, in his work entitled *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*,[11] which was written during the reign of Shah Tahmasp. The author of the present history is not qualified to go over this ground again. My most heartfelt wish is to record the events of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I; nevertheless, in order that this history, the *Tārīḵ-e 'Ālam-ārā*, may not be devoid of all mention of the life and times of Shah Tahmasp, I have decided to allow my pen license to do its best in this regard, and I make due apology for thus protracting and extending my history.

Shah Tahmasp ascended the throne with due ceremony. The office of *vakīl* was in the powerful hands of Dīv Sultan Rūmlū,[12] who had come from Balḵ, and who had become *amīr al-omarā* after the death of Čāyān Sultan Ostājlū.[13] A year later (931/1524-25), Köpek Sultan Ostājlū, since he was the most senior of the emirs of the court, and commander in chief of the cavalry, entered into negotiations with Dīv Sultan regarding the office of *vakīl* and the administering of state affairs in general, and a quarrel soon developed between them.

At this juncture, news reached the royal camp of the invasion of

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[10] This must refer to the year 940/1533-34, when Tahmasp asserted his royal authority and brought to an end the ten-year interregnum during which the *qezelbāš* had been de facto rulers of the state (see Savory, Offices II, p. 70). The MS. has a variant text at this point, but the printed text makes better sense.

[11] The *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ* is a chronological history of the early Safavids which concludes with the year 985/1577-78.

[12] See Savory, Offices II, pp. 77ff.

[13] The printed text has Ḵānān Sultan; the MS. has both Ḵānān and Jānān. The correct form appears to be Čāyān.

Khorasan by Küčüm Khan and 'Obeyd Khan. Dīv Sultan judged it expedient in the circumstances to grant the office of *vakīl* to Köpek Sultan[14] as a favor and in order to satisfy the latter's ambition. Then, giving as his excuse the necessity of marching to Khorasan to repulse the Uzbegs, he set off in that direction. Dīv Sultan sent orders to the great emirs of Fārs and Persian Iraq to mobilize, rendezvous with him, and together march against the enemy; he himself set up his camp in summer quarters at Lār. Within a short time, leading emirs such as Čūha Sultan Takkalū, the governor of Isfahan; Qarāja Sultan Takkalū; 'Alī Sultan the governor of Shiraz; and others, assembled at Lār with large forces. Dīv Sultan won over the great emirs to his side, to an even greater extent than previously, by his generosity and beneficence, his gifts and his flattering attentions. As a result, he asked for their assistance in wresting the office of *vakīl* from Köpek Sultan, to which they pledged their oath.

Since the Safavid forces already in Khorasan had proved adequate to deal with the situation there, Dīv Sultan, with the large army now at his disposal, began to advance on the royal camp at Tabriz. However much the Ostājlū emirs and nobles, particularly Qārenja Sultan, incited Köpek Sultan to resist their enemies by force and urged him to take up arms against them, Köpek Sultan refused. He said: "It would be a matter for regret if, for the sake of the transitory affairs of this world, fighting should break out between two valiant armies which are the servants of the same court, both faithful subjects of the Shah." Köpek Sultan determined to seek a settlement with Dīv Sultan, and marched from Tabriz to Torkmānkandī to meet him. The two emirs greeted each other warmly, and set off together for the royal court. In Čarandāb, a district of Tabriz, they were received by the Shah, who conferred the office of *vakīl* on Dīv Sultan. The latter then put to death Qārenja Sultan and a number of others whom he considered to be the authors of this discord, and sent Köpek Sultan, with the entire Ostājlū tribe, on a plundering expedition to Georgia. In this way, he kept him at a distance from his goal.[15] Not satisfied with this, however, Dīv Sultan, during the absence of Köpek Sultan, and in order to win over the Takkalū emirs, canceled the *teyūls*[16] of the Ostājlūs, and began to despoil them of their lands.

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[14] On this extremely complicated question, see Savory, Offices II, pp. 65-67 and 77-78.

[15] The metaphor is from backgammon.

[16] The *teyūl (toyūl)* was an assignment on the revenue of a stated district. The *teyūldār*, or grantee, was armed with an official document which entitled him to collect various dues from the lands thus assigned to him. In many cases, the actual revenue was in excess of the official evaluation. The assignment of *teyūls* was, in Safavid times, one of the principal methods of paying the *qezelbāš* troops.

This action was both infelicitous and unwise. It led to hostility and enmity on the part of the Ostājlūs, and closed the door of harmony and unity. In the year 932/1526, Köpek Sultan came to Solṭānīya, and there the rest of the Ostājlū emirs and nobles rallied round him—men like Mantašā Sultan, Fārūq Sultan, Qelīj Sultan, and others, and they girded themselves for action against Dīv Sultan. In the opposing camp, Dīv Sultan and Čūha Sultan talked of peace and expediency. They sent Qāsem Ḵalīfa Varsāq to admonish the Ostājlūs, in the hope of preventing them from confronting those who reposed in the shade of royal protection. Qāsem Ḵalīfa put forth all his efforts to dampen the fire of discord and to extinguish the flames of war. But the Ostājlūs had no faith in the word of Dīv Sultan; they had determined to fight it out, and consequently Qāsem Ḵalīfa's mission achieved nothing.

Both sides prepared for battle. With hearts full of sorrow, men sincerely devoted to the Safavid cause wept to see these two armies drawn up for battle, and asked sadly why both armies, in attendance on the Shah, could not band together in defense of the realm. In the event, however, a great battle was fought, and the Takkalū emirs were routed by the Ostājlūs. Būrūn Sultan and Qarāja Sultan Takkalū were killed. When Köpek Sultan and Mantašā Sultan reached the royal center, they caught sight of the gilded ball on top of the royal standard; at once they abandoned the fight, and wheeled their horses round. The emirs and *qūrčīs*[17] of the royal bodyguard who were in attendance on the Shah were sent, on the orders of Dīv Sultan, in pursuit of the Ostājlūs. A great number of the latter were slain, both men of note and otherwise. The Ostājlūs, stricken by misfortune and defeated, reached Abhar, and from there went to Gīlān, where they were given sanctuary by Moẓaffar Sultan, the governor of Rašt. The latter reinforced the Ostājlūs with seven thousand men.

For a second time, the Ostājlūs set out for the royal camp with warlike intentions. On this occasion, the Shah took great exception to their action. Blazing with anger, he took the field against the Ostājlūs in person, and sent on ahead a detachment under Dīv Sultan, Čūha Sultan, and Moḥammad Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū. When the advance guard of the royal army reached Manjīl and Ḳarzavīl, the Ostājlū emirs emerged from the forests of Gīlān, and a second battle was fought. In the end, the royal army was victorious and large numbers of Gīlānis were slain. Köpek Sultan, Mantašā Sultan, and Qazāq Sultan, utterly defeated, fled back to Gīlān. Köpek Sultan spent his days and nights wondering how he could get his revenge on Dīv Sultan and Čūha Sultan, and get his hands on the office of *vakīl.*

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[17] The term *qūrčī* (from Mongolian *qorchi*, an archer) was originally used in a sense more or less equivalent to *qezelbāš*—i.e., the Turkman tribal cavalry which formed the basis of Safavid military power. The commander in chief of the *qūrčīs* was called the *qūrčībāšī*, and *TM*, pp. 116–17, incorrectly states that in early Safavid times "his usual title seems to have been *amīr al-umarā*." In fact, however, the office of *qūrčībāšī* was, from the inception of the Safavid state, distinct from that of the *amīr al-omarā* (see Savory, Offices I), although the relationship between the two is not clear. By the time of Shah Tahmasp, if not before, the *qūrčīs* had become an élite corps of the *qezelbāš* and formed the royal bodyguard. As a consequence, the power of the *qūrčībāšī* steadily increased during the latter half of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and under Shah Esma'il II and Sultan Moḥammad Shah he was the most influential officer in the state (see Savory, Offices II, p. 79).

The following year, in 933/1526–27, Köpek Sultan again emerged from Gīlān and marched toward Ardabīl. Bādenjān Sultan Rūmlū, who was ninety years of age and in his dotage, was at that time governor of Ardabīl. With three or four thousand men drawn from the Rūmlū, Čeganī,[18] and Ṭavāleš tribes, he marched out against the Ostājlū emirs. A battle was fought at Qarā Darra. Bādenjān Sultan was put to flight by the small Ostājlū force, and as he fled was overtaken and killed. The Ostājlū emirs entered Ardabīl in triumph and visited the tombs of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn and the other exalted Safavid shaikhs (may God sanctify their graves!). From Ardabīl they marched on Tabriz. When Shah Tahmasp heard of their coming, he ordered Dīv Sultan, Čūha Sultan, and Moḥammad Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū, with seven thousand men plus one thousand men from the royal bodyguard, to move against them. Köpek Sultan and his companions, hearing of their approach, moved off toward Čoḳūr-e Sa'd.[19] The other emirs and the *qūrčīs* from the royal *qūrčīs* overtook them at Šarūr[20] and gave battle. The Ostājlū emirs, on that day of decision, shouted that Zāl,[21] the son of Sām, was giving them his blessing.

In the course of the battle, Moḥammad Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū worked his way round to the rear of the Ostājlū force, and attacked from that quarter. Köpek Sultan received a mortal wound and died. Čūha Sultan and the Takkalū detachments kept up their attacks from the front. The death of Köpek Sultan caused the Ostājlūs to break and flee. Mantašā Sultan and Fārūq Sultan hacked their way through the enemy ranks and, fighting valiantly, succeeded, though with great difficulty, in getting back to Gīlān. Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū, thirsting for revenge against the Ostājlūs, who during the Safavid campaigns in Dīār Bakr had put to death his father Kūr Šāhroḵ and his brothers,[22] spared no effort on this battlefield.

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[18] A Kurdish tribe.

[19] The area lying west of Gökča (Sevan) Lake, comprising the lowlands on both banks of the Aras River (see *TM*, p. 165).

[20] The site of the decisive battle between Shah Esma'il and the Aq Qoyūnlū Sultan Alvand, in 907/1501.

[21] The father of the legendary Iranian hero Rostam.

Those Ostājlūs who survived the sword remained for a while in Gīlān. The following year, 934/1527-28, Dīv Sultan was slain at the instigation of Čūha Sultan, and the office of *vakīl* devolved upon the latter. In 936/1529-30, when the Ostājlūs had been in Gīlān for about three years,[23] the royal standards were again raised, and the Shah marched against 'Obeyd Khan Uzbeg for the second time.[24] Mantašā Sultan, Fārūq Sultan, Qazāq Sultan, and the rest of the Ostājlū emirs who were in Gīlān returned to court, pledging their sincere devotion to the Shah. Carrying swords and winding sheets, they hastened to the court of the Lord of the World.[25] They were received by Shah Tahmasp at Šarafābād, a suburb of Qazvīn, where the Shah greeted them favorably and with conciliatory words and accepted them back into his service. Although Čūha Sultan did not show them any favor or give them much attention, nevertheless he did not demonstrate any actual hostility or enmity toward them, and the Ostājlū emirs treated him with a feigned respect.

Čūha Sultan constantly sought to ingratiate himself with the Shah, and to outward appearances his actions were pleasing, and day by day his power and influence grew. However, the excesses and arrogant behavior of the Takkalū tribe passed all reasonable bounds, and inwardly the Shah began to nurse a grudge against them. In 937/1530-31, when Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū came from Shiraz and was received at Gandomān near Isfahan by the Shah, who displayed great favor toward him, Čūha Sultan resented this turn of events and planned to kill Ḥoseyn Khan. Ḥoseyn Khan got wind of the Takkalū plot, and one night made his way to Čūha Sultan's tent with a body of fully armed Šāmlūs. Čūha Sultan, in desperation, took refuge in the tent which served as the royal *dīvānḵāna* (court of justice). Within the confines of the *dowlatḵāna* (royal residence),[26] a skirmish took place between the Šāmlūs and the Takkalūs. One of the Ẕu'l-Qadar *qūrčīs* who were on guard duty, a certain Qeyṣar Qorūḡlū, inflicted a mortal wound on Čūha Sultan, who then died. The Takkalūs, however, concealed the fact of his death, and continued the struggle. Ḥoseyn Khan fought on manfully throughout the night, but in the morning Takkalū reinforcements arrived, company after company, and he was overcome and forced to fly. Frustrated by not achieving his goal, he retreated to Isfahan.

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[22] This event occurred in 913/1507. See above.

[23] If the period of three years is dated from the time the Ostājlūs first took refuge in Gīlān (932/1526), this would give a date here of 935 and not 936. Three years from their *second* retreat fo Gīlān would, however, give 936. It is probable that, because of the fact that the Muslim and Christian years overlap, and since we do not have any indication of the *month* of the Muslim year involved, these events occurred in the Christian year 1529, either at the end of the Muslim year 935 or at the beginning of 936.

[24] The previous occasion had been in 931/1524-25, but the royal army had not, in fact, marched to Khorasan (see above).

[25] Lacuna in printed text at this point.

A large number of Šāmlū youths were slain in this encounter. The Takkalū emirs made Čūha Sultan's eldest son, Shah Qobād, *vakīl* in his father's place. They remained in a rebellious mood and sought revenge on all the other tribes—Šāmlūs, Ostājlūs, Ẕū'l-Qadars and Afšārs. In consequence, the latter tribes were forced to take up arms against them, and a battle was fought between them and the Takkalūs near the *emāmzāda*[27] of Sahl 'Alī near Hamadan. The Takkalū emirs, whose ambition was to regain the power and independence they had enjoyed during the time of Čūha Sultan, rushed in a group to the *dowlatḵāna* with the intention of seizing possession of the Shah and then carrying on the fight against their enemies. Shah Tahmasp, who was much displeased with the actions of the Takkalū tribe, gave orders—and this was the first true indication of his determination to rule—that those headstrong and arrogant men should be repulsed. The *qūrčīs* of the royal bodyguard who were stationed in the *dowlatḵāna* loosed a hail of arrows at them, and the Takkalūs, despairing of securing the compliance of the Shah, fled. Misfortune and humiliation were to be their lot, and many of them met their death.

"The Takkalū disaster" is the chronogram for this event (937/1530-31).[28] After the event, the Takkalūs, now stricken by remorse, set off toward Baghdad. On their arrival there, Moḥammad Ḵān Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū Takkalū, the governor of Baghdad, put to death Qondūz Sultan, Ḥoseyn Sultan, and a number of other Takkalū troublemakers who had been guilty of improper conduct, and sent their heads to court. The

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[26] *Dowlatḵāna* normally means "royal palace." When the king was in the field, the term applied to the large tent or marquee in which the king resided.

[27] *Emāmzādas* are a common sight in Iran. They consist of a shrine or mausoleum erected over the grave of some local shaikh or holy man. They are the object of veneration and, in some cases, of pilgrimage.

[28] The correct chronogram is *āfat-e takkalū*, not *āfat-e takkalūyān*, as given by Eskandar Monšī.

Shah then issued a letter of appointment, indicative of royal favor, in the name of Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū. Ḥoseyn Khan was summoned from Isfahan, and the office of *amīr al-omarā*[29] of the exalted *qezelbāš* tribes was conferred on him and on 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājlū, both of whom were nephews of Shah Esma'il.

The dissension and quarreling among the tribes died down. Men of integrity subordinated their own interests to obeying the will of the *moršed-e kāmel,* and they reverted to more seemly conduct. The Shah began to take the affairs of state into his own hands and to demonstrate his independence and autocratic power. Nevertheless, Olāma Takkalū, who had risen from a humble position to high rank and was at that time *amīr al-omarā*[30] of Azerbaijan, refused to be warned and aspired to become *vakīl* and *moḵtār al-salṭana* in place of Čūha Sultan. Obsessed by this vain idea, he moved on the royal camp with a force of cavalry.

When Shah Tahmasp heard the news of his seditious intent, he marched against him. Filled with terror, Olāma fled back to Azerbaijan like the wind and shut himself up in the fortress of Vān. Subsequently, he withdrew his allegiance from the Safavid house and, being flattered with fair words by the Ottoman Sultan Sülaymān, he departed for Istanbul. Once there, he busied himself with stirring up trouble for the Safavids. Sultan Sülaymān invaded Iran on four occasions, with very large forces.[31] On each occasion Shah Tahmasp, seeking assistance from the forces of the Unseen and from the infallible grace of God, succeeded in repelling this threat, by virtue of the steadfastness and sureness of his judgment, and because of the excellence of his strategy. The first invasion was instigated by Olāma; the second resulted from the evil suggestion of Ġāzī Khan Takkalū and Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū; the third was instigated by the lying words of Alqāṣ Mīrzā;[32] and the fourth was caused by the villainy of Eskandar Pasha, the governor of Erzerum. A brief narrative of these events will be given after we have given an account of happenings in Khorasan.

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[29] Lit.: commander in chief. During this decade of *qezelbāš* supremacy, this office was frequently confused with that of *vakīl*; see Savory, Offices II, pp. 71ff.

[30] I.e., military governor. This title is not to be confused with that of the *amīr ol-omarā,* the commander in chief of the *qezelbāš* forces, who was an officer of the central administration.

[31] In 940/1533-34; 941/1534-35; 955/1548; and 961/1553.

[32] Shah Tahmasp's brother, who hoped to overthrow the Shah with Ottoman support.

A Narrative of Events in Khorasan, and of the Incursions by the Uzbeg Khans into Those Pleasant Regions after the Death of Shah Esma'il

'Obeyd Ḵān b. Maḥmūd Solṭān b. Abu'l-Ḵeyr Ḵān b. Dowlat Šeyḵ-oğlān, who was of the line of Šībān b. Jočī b. Čengīz Ḵān, and was the undoubted nephew of the above-mentioned Šeybak Ḵān b. Būdāğ Solṭān b. Abu'l-Ḵeyr Ḵān, had always cast covetous eyes on the land of Khorasan, and in particular wanted the city of Herat. Through fear of the might of Esma'il's sword, and as a result of the disaster which overtook Šeybak Khan,[33] 'Obeyd had crawled back to Bokhara and held his peace. After the death of Shah Esma'il, he took advantage of the youthfulness of Shah Tahmasp and of the dissension among the willful *qezelbāš* emirs; in view of the fact that the land of Iran was without a master and had fallen into the hands of a number of powerful usurpers, he sharpened his ambition to conquer Khorasan. He invaded that province six times, but never achieved a permanent occupation. Every time Shah Tahmasp mobilized the royal army and moved against him, he retreated. Although he had repeated this maneuver many times with the same result, nevertheless, whenever the Shah was absent, he returned to Khorasan, capturing castles and ravaging the countryside. In short, for a period of twelve years, the people of Khorasan knew no respite from the attacks, ravages, and tyrannical acts of 'Obeyd Khan.

The First Invasion of Khorasan by 'Obeyd Khan

In the same year that the news of the death of Shah Esma'il reached Transoxania, 'Obeyd Khan summoned to his aid the Čengīzīd khans and sultans, and crossed the Oxus to invade Khorasan. In his army was Küčüm Khan b. Abu'l-Ḵeyr Khan, who had raised the banners of sovereignty in Samarkand, and who had had his name stamped on the coinage and mentioned in the *ḵoṭba* in use throughout Transoxania and Turkestan, all done with the authority of the law and custom of Genghis Khan.[34] Also in his army were Abū Sa'īd Sultan and Sevīnjük Moḥammad Sultan, the governor of Tashkent. Dūrmīš Khan Šāmlū, the guardian (*lala*) of Sām Mīrzā, and governor-general of Khorasan, strengthened the citadel and fortifications of Herat, and prepared to withstand a siege. He stationed seasoned troops to guard the gates, and laid in the necessary provisions. The Uzbeg sultans arrived before Herat with a powerful army and encircled the city, each leader camping on a different side. Every day the Uzbegs attacked the city, and for several months bitter fighting went on. The Šāmlū *gāzīs* put up a stout resistance and prevented anyone from getting near the citadel.

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[33] He was defeated and killed by Shah Esma'il at the battle of Marv in 1510.

[34] For the *yāsā*, or law of Genghis Khan, see W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, London, 1928, pp. 41–42.

One day, in the Bāğ-e Morād, 'Obeyd Khan and Sevīnjük Moḥammad Sultan had arranged a banquet and were enjoying the social occasion. The Uzbeg troops were on guard in the Bāğ-e Safīd. Dūrmīš Khan sent a detachment of Šāmlū troops in that direction, and a fierce engagement took place in the Bāğ-e Safīd. The Uzbeg troops were defeated, and the news reached 'Obeyd Khan that the *gāzīs* had penetrated into the Bāğ-e Morād. The Uzbeg leaders terminated their festivities in such a panic that Sevīnjük Moḥammad Sultan fell into the river. 'Obeyd Khan, with extreme difficulty, succeeded in getting hold of a packhorse and fleeing back to his own camp. Eventually, wearying of the siege and despairing of capturing the citadel, the Uzbegs struck camp and went back to their own lands.

The Second Invasion of Khorasan by 'Obeyd Khan

The following year (931/1524-25), Dūrmīš Khan died. Furthermore, Būrūn Sultan Takkalū, the governor of Mašhad, was killed in the civil war between the Takkalūs and the Ostājlūs, and the news of his death eventually reached Mašhad. In consequence, the administration of Khorasan fell into some disorder, and there was no commander left in the province of sufficient presence to withstand the Uzbegs. At the same time, the emirs at the royal camp were at loggerheads with one another—a situation which led to civil war. When this news reached 'Obeyd Khan, who was still infatuated by his ambition to conquer Khorasan and had no intention of giving up his claim to it, he took advantage of the situation.

In 932/1525-26, 'Obeyd Khan crossed the Oxus at Čahār Jū,[35] and reached Marv. From there, accompanied by the Uzbeg sultans and warriors, he pressed on to surround Mašhad, where Būrūn Sultan's family was staying. The *qezelbāš gāzīs* who had assembled in the city from distant parts defended the city valiantly for a time, but eventually they were reduced to extremities by lack of provisions and widespread starvation. Since no hope of relief appeared from any quarter, 'Obeyd Khan finally occupied the city and, leaving one of his trusted emirs in charge, marched on Astarābād. When he neared Astarābād, Zeynal Khan Šāmlū, the governor of the city, sent out a reconnaissance party

[35] Situated on the left bank of the Oxus, 120 miles northeast of Marv, Čahār Jū was one of the principal crossing places. Its earlier name was Āmol or Āmūya.

consisting of a detachment of seasoned and experienced men. The Safavid scouts clashed with the Uzbeg advance guard, who were at least double their number; the Safavids, seeing the numerical superiority of the enemy, decided to retreat and fell back, fighting all the way to the city, sixteen miles away.

Zeynal Khan and the *ḡāzīs* removed their families from Astarābād and retired to Rayy. 'Obeyd Khan conferred Astarābād on his son, 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan, and returned to Balḵ. When the news of the Uzbeg insurgence and their annexation of the province of Astarābād reached the royal camp, Aḵī Sultan Takkalū, Demīrī Sultan Šāmlū, the father of Aḡzīvār Khan, and Shah 'Alī Sultan Ostājlū were dispatched to the assistance of Zeynal Khan with a detachment of *qezelbāš* troops. They met at Rayy and marched together on Astarābād. 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan did not contest the matter, but abandoned the city and rejoined his father. The Safavid emirs entered the city; 'Obeyd Khan, still fired by envious rivalry, marched back toward Besṭām. Aḵī Sultan, Demīrī Sultan, and Shah 'Alī Sultan, who had marched out from Astarābād as the Safavid vanguard, met 'Obeyd Khan on the grassy plain of Besṭām. The Safavid vanguard did not number more than three thousand men, whereas the Uzbeg force was in excess of twenty thousand. Although common sense dictated that the small Safavid force should not give battle, the Uzbegs were upon them and the Safavid emirs had no choice but to fight. They therefore had to draw themselves up for battle, and a bitter struggle ensued. The Safavid soldiers acquitted themselves so valiantly that day that the very heavens stood amazed, and among the Uzbegs the battle of Besṭām is still a byword for courage among high and low. Aḵī Sultan repeatedly hurled his men against 'Obeyd Khan's center and came within an ace of overthrowing it. But the warriors in the Uzbeg center matched them in valor. Aḵī Sultan fell, struck by an arrow, and many Takkalūs died with him. 'Obeyd Khan gained a victory, and Demīrī Sultan was taken prisoner and put to death.

Zeynal Khan, on hearing this news, evacuated the city and went to Fīrūzkūh. This time, 'Obeyd Khan left Astarābād in the hands of a renowned Uzbeg emir named Zeyneš Bahādor, while he marched toward Herat. He sent scouts out in all directions and wintered at Ḡūrīān.

The following year (934/1526–28), 'Obeyd Khan attacked the citadel at Herat.[36] Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, who after the death of his brother

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[36] He had been repulsed from Herat on his first invasion of Khorasan, and had bypassed it on his second.

Dūrmīš Khan had become governor of Herat, busied himself with provisioning the citadel and strengthening the walls and battlements, and made all the preparations for a siege. Both sides renewed the struggle, and the siege dragged on for seven months. When the stock of provisions in the citadel was exhausted, Ḥoseyn Khan sent out from the citadel all peasants, townspeople, and people from outlying districts. By distributing their rations among the *ḡāzīs*, he managed to provision his troops for a few more days.

At this juncture, a report was spread abroad that Zeynal Khan had met his death at the hands of the Uzbegs. Zeynal Khan, together with Čekīrge Sultan, the governor of Sabzavār, had marched against Zeyneš Bahādor. Zeyneš, initially overwhelmed, had emerged the victor, and both Zeynal Khan and Čekīrge Sultan had been killed. Overjoyed at this news, the same day that he received it, 'Obeyd Khan ordered a general assault on the citadel, urged on by Yārī Bī, the son of Jān Vafā Mīrzā, who was his commander in chief. The Uzbegs launched their attack from all sides, and the Šāmlūs, putting up a stout defense, left many Uzbegs dead around the walls of the citadel. Yārī Bī was struck by a musketball, and an unidentified musketeer cut off his head and took it to Ḥoseyn Khan. Dismayed by his death, 'Obeyd Khan's joy was turned into mourning. He realized that, despite his best efforts, the capture of Herat remained a remote possibility. At this moment, he received the news that the royal army was advancing on Khorasan, and that in a clash with the Safavid advance guard, Zeyneš Bahādor had been killed. In grief and despair, he marched across the Pol-e Mālān and took the road to Bokhara, intending to enlist the aid of the other Čengīzid emirs and return and invade Khorasan yet again.

The Third Invasion of Khorasan by 'Obeyd Khan, the Advance of the Royal Army, the Battle at Ḳosrowjerd, Near Jām, and the Victory won by Shah Tahmasp, with God's Help

Since Shah Tahmasp, throughout his reign, committed to the will of God all matters pertaining both to religion and the state and put his trust in divine grace and favor, he was blessed by the Munificent Lord in regard to the attainment of his objects and goals, and on the battlefield he was victorious over his enemies. Among the battles that took place during his reign was the battle of Jām, which Shah Tahmasp fought against 'Obeyd Khan and the Uzbeg khans, and in which he was victorious. This famous victory is still talked about and a brief account of it follows.

Couriers were coming one after the other from Khorasan to the royal court, begging for assistance. In that province, they said, a calamitous storm had arisen, and the inhabitants of that region had been overwhelmed by the Uzbeg flood. Accordingly, Shah Tahmasp consulted his emirs and principal officers of state, and the unanimous decision was made to march to Khorasan and drive out the Uzbegs.

The Safavid forces were mobilized, and the royal standards moved off in the direction of Khorasan. Čūha Sultan the *vakīl*, Olāma Sultan Takkalū, and Moḥammad Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū, with a detachment of *ğāzīs*, left first as the Safavid advance guard. They laid siege to Damghan which was held by the Uzbeg commander Zeyneš Bahādor. They surrounded the citadel, constructed palisades, and pinned the Uzbegs down by musket fire. Every day a group of Uzbegs would make a sally and skirmish with the *ğāzīs*. After several days of this sort of fighting, many of the Uzbeg warriors were slain either by musket fire or by the sword, and the situation became serious for the defenders. At this point, the news of the approach of the main Safavid army threw them into a panic; finding their escape routes blocked in every direction, they looked desperately for a way out. One night, Zeyneš Bahādor and a small band of companions tied ropes round their waists and attempted to lower themselves down the walls of the citadel. The *ğāzīs* and the guards on duty spotted them, captured the lot and put them to death on the spot. The next day, the citadel yielded to a concerted assault, and the whole garrison was slain by the swords of the *ğāzīs*.

Meanwhile the Shah, with the main army, had reached Mašhad by way of Kālpūš. On his arrival there, the Shah made the pilgrimage to the shrine of Imam Reżā to ask for his aid. Then, intending to march on Herat, he moved off in the direction of Jām. As has already been mentioned, 'Obeyd Khan had abandoned the siege of Herat, and had returned to Bokhara to enlist the support of Küčüm Khan and the other Čengīzid sultans. From the furthest reaches of Transoxania and Turkestan, from Aḵsī,[37] Andījān and Otrār,[38] from Qalmāq, Kāšğar, Qerqez, and Qazāq as far as the Qepčāq steppe,[39] a mighty host assembled. Its leaders were Küčüm Khan, Yarāq Khan, Fūlād Sultan, 'Abd al-'Azīz Sultan, 'Abd al-Laṭīf Sultan, Jānī Beg Sultan, Geldī Moḥammad Sultan, Abū Sa'īd Sultan, Sevīnjük Moḥammad Sultan, Kesken Qarā Sultan, and other Uzbeg chiefs and trusted emirs. Every tribe was as vast as the sea, and company after company, with hearts strong as steel, they marched toward Khorasan.

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[37] Aḵsī lay on the north bank of the Jaxartes River in the province of Farğāna. In the 13th century, it seems to have been superseded as capital of the province by Andījān.

[38] Otrār lay on the east bank of the Jaxartes in the province of Šāš (Tashkent). It was here that the famous border incident which precipitated the Mongol invasion of the Islamic world occurred in 1218.

[39] Kāšğar is in Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang); the Qalmāq (Kalmucks), Qerqez (Kirghiz; Kherkhiz), the Qazāq (Cossacks) and the Qepčāq (Polovtsi) were all branches of the huge family of Turkish tribes living in Turkestan and Central Asia. The Qerqez originally lived in the regions of the Upper Yenisei, north of the Sayan Mountains; the Qepchaq also originated in eastern Siberia, but both tribes subsequently migrated westward and inhabited the Qepčāq steppe, which lay east of the Aral Sea.

Since the time of the invasion of Genghis Khan, no army of such magnitude had crossed the Oxus. By the time Shah Tahmasp reached Ḵosrowjerd, near Jām, the Uzbegs, approaching from the other direction, had reached Zūrābād. *Qezelbāš* scouts captured several Uzbegs, so full details of the strength and composition of the Uzbeg army became known to the Shah. The numerical strength of the Uzbeg army has not come to the notice of the present author in any work in which he is able to place credence. Mīr Yaḥyā Seyfī, the author of the *Lobb al-Tavārīḵ*, has given the Uzbeg numbers as one hundred and twenty thousand, but popular estimation puts the size at eighty thousand seasoned warriors, not counting skirmishers and irregulars. A similar estimation puts the *qezelbāš* army, that is horsemen on full pay, at twenty-four thousand, not counting men in charge of the baggage.[40]

On the day of Tāsū'ā, the ninth day of Moḥarram 935/23 September 1528, the Uzbeg sultans pitched camp at Sārū Qomeš near Jām, close to the Safavid camp. That night, both armies stood guard, and on the next day, on 'Āšūrā, the 10th day of Moḥarram, drew up their ranks for battle.

The doyen of the *qezelbāš* emirs, Čūha Sultan Takkalū, the *vakīl*, together with Olāma Sultan Takkalū, Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, Ḥamza Sultan Ḵeneslū Ẕu'l-Qadar,[41] the governor of Shiraz, Moḥammad Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar-oḡlū, Aḥmad Sultan Ostājlū, Ya'qūb Sultan Qājār, Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū Takkalū, who at that date only held the rank of sultan, Ḥasan Sultan Rūmlū Aḥmad Sultan Afšār, and the rest of the emirs and the royal *qūrčīs*, fully armed with their helmets and chain mail over their quilted vests, were stationed with the *qūrčīs* in the center. On the right and left wings of the army were stationed other emirs and doughty warriors. In front of the army were placed wagons on which were mounted Frankish light cannon; these guns were under the command of Ostād Šeyḵī Beg the *tūpčī-bāšī* (commander in chief of artillery).[42]

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[40] A usually reliable Persian source gives the size of the Uzbeg army as 100,000 and that of the Persians as 30,000 (see Savory, Offices II, p. 68, *n.* 10).

[41] See *TM*, pp. 14, 17.

The two armies came face to face and on both sides the sound of drums, fifes, and trumpets could be heard. Banners were raised high, war cries were heard, and the two armies hurled themselves at each other. On the one side, the *qezelbāš* warriors, couching their long lances in the rests on their fiery, swift Arabian steeds, struck down the villainous Uzbegs. On the other side, the Uzbegs rained on the royal army a hail of arrows like shooting stars, which pierced the helmets of the *qezelbāš* warriors. Both sides displayed prodigies of valor, and the heaps of the slain leveled off mountain and plain. Mars, the Lord of War, viewing the scene with amazement and compassion, set aside his dripping blade. In the annals of the wars between Iran and Tūrān,[43] no battle equaled this in severity. Clouds of dust obscured the sun and the *qezelbāš* forces showed signs of breaking.

At this juncture the Uzbeg sultans assaulted the Safavid right wing, commanded by Čūha Sultan, who was in charge of Takkalū and Šāmlū emirs and others of note, and drove it back. Tremors were also felt among the emirs on the Safavid left which, unable to resist the sustained Uzbeg attacks, broke and fled. The Uzbegs, in hot pursuit, spread across the plain like ants or locusts, destroying all before them.

Shah Tahmasp, to whom the immaculate Imams in a vision had given the assurance of victory, fought on with confidence and firm faith in the outcome, and conducting himself with great bravery and valor, yielded not a yard of ground but held his station in the center with three thousand veteran troops. It was as though Almighty God was shielding that small band from the attention of the enemy. In a brief moment when the dust of battle cleared, the Shah caught sight of a white standard in the midst of a dense throng of men. The Shah realized that this must be the Uzbeg center, consisting of ʻObeyd Khan, Küčüm Khan and the specially chosen troops. The Uzbegs who had gone in pursuit of the Safavid wings congratulated their leaders on their victory as they returned company by company.

ʻObeyd Khan asked them what that black mass was in the distance; it had been in the same place for some time, he said, and was apparently the remnants of the *qezelbāš* army. He had detailed some men to go and find out, and this group had reported to him that the *qezelbāš* forces had suffered such a defeat and had been so scattered that no sign of them remained on the plain. That black mass, they said, was the transport and baggage animals of the Safavid camp, and the Uzbegs paid no further attention to it.

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[42] See R. M. Savory, "The Sherley Myth," in *Iran*, vol. V, 1967, pp. 78-79.

[43] In the Persian national epic, the Oxus is the boundary between Iran (the land of the Aryans), and Tūrān (the land of the Turks).

Shah Tahmasp then ordered the men of his own retinue, who had held their ground so steadfastly, to attack the Uzbeg center and not to draw rein until they had reached that white standard. He ordered them not to use any other weapon except their sword; if they wounded anyone, they should not pause to finish him off, but should at once turn their attention to the next man. "Flight," he said, "is shame and disgrace; but a valiant death brings eternal fame."

Of that faithful, sacrificial band, the Šāmlū and Ẕu'l-Qadar *qūrčīs* were the first to answer the call of their spiritual master. Drawing their Egyptian swords and holding their shields above their heads, they leapt forward from the right of the line with great determination, placing their trust in God. Those on the left of the center followed suit, and the whole company, ready to perish in the attempt and accompanied by unseen heavenly hosts, charged the Uzbegs. Three thousand blades flashed down as one; whenever they wounded one of the enemy they left him, as their spiritual master had ordered, and attacked another.

The Uzbegs, greatly superior in numbers, were thrown into disarray by the remorseless blows of the *ḡāzīs'* swords; the majority of them were wounded, and they were not given an opportunity to reorganize their defense. The Uzbeg center was shattered, and scattered in all directions. Küčüm Khan and 'Obeyd Khan were thrown into such a state of consternation that they saw no choice but flight. By their one heroic attack, those devoted Safavid followers had defeated the vast Uzbeg army. The remainder of the Safavid forces, which had been dispersed like the constellation of the Bear, regrouped like the constellation of the Pleiades, their despair turned into hope of victory.

The Uzbeg sultans, after such an intial victory, suffered ultimate defeat, and willy-nilly began their retreat. It is said that one of the *qūrčīs* actually reached 'Obeyd Khan and struck him such a blow on the back with his sword that 'Obeyd Khan became unconscious. Because of the slightness of 'Obeyd's body, however, the *qūrčī* did not bother to take him prisoner, but passed on in the hope of better prey. Others say the the *qūrčī* struck his helmet and faceguard so hard that his powers of hearing were affected, and he became known thereafter as "deaf 'Obeyd." 'Obeyd had brought with him forty representatives of the religious classes of Transoxania and Tashkent to take their place beneath his standard and offer prayers for victory and for divine assistance. Since right was not on their side, their prayers were rejected and they were all slain at the foot of 'Obeyd's standard.

With great hardship and toil, Küčüm Khan and 'Obeyd Khan succeeded in escaping from that bloody battle with their lives, but twenty thousand of the Uzbeg rank and file perished, and a sheet of paper inscribed with the words, "Kill them wherever ye shall find them,"[44] was attached to the collars of the remains of those miscreants. It is related on the authority of the Shah himself that, of the three thousand men who made the assault on the Uzbeg center, one thousand seven hundred were *qūrčīs* of the royal bodyguard, and the remainder belonged to units commanded by emirs.

Meanwhile, one of the Uzbeg sultans, Jānī Beg, accompanied by considerable numbers of his own men and other Uzbeg troops, returned at nightfall from his pursuit of the routed wings of the *qezelbāš* army. Seeing the lights of the *qezelbāš* camp, Jānī Beg thought it was the camp of 'Obeyd Khan, and pitched his tents behind those of the royal camp.

The next morning, the 11th of Moḥarram 935/25th September 1528, a black mass of men became visible and was identified as Uzbeg troops, all mounted and about to go in search of plunder. Shah Tahmasp prepared to seize his opportunity and move against them. But Čūha Sultan tried to prevent him, on the grounds that the *qezelbāš* forces were still scattered, and in the circumstances it would be better not to launch an attack lest they suffer some misfortune. The intrepid and valiant Shah paid no attention to this prudent counsel and charged the Uzbegs; with one determined charge, he settled the business, and many Uzbegs were slain by the swords of the *ğāzīs*. Jānī Beg and his men put up a spirited resistance, but in the end were forced to fly.

Thus the Safavid house had a triumphant victory such as had rarely been won in former times. The *qezelbāš* had routed an enemy army ten times the size of their own. The word of God: "If there be twenty of you who are steadfast, they shall overcome two hundred"[45] was revealed in the most eloquent manner. Having given thanks to Almighty God, Tahmasp sent *fatḥnāmas* (dispatches announcing the victory) to all parts of the empire, and set in order the affairs of Khorasan. Since Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū had displayed great valor in this battle, he was confirmed in his post as governor of Herat. The Shah then departed to Arab Iraq, as will be related.

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[44] This injunction occurs twice in the Koran: in 4:90, in regard to hypocrites who pretend to believe in God but later apostatise; and in 9:5, in regard to idolaters.

The Fourth Invasion of Khorasan by 'Obeyd Khan

When 'Obeyd Khan heard the news of the withdrawal of the royal army, he again, in that same year (935/1528–29), assembled his warriors from the area around Bokhara, and marched on Khorasan. He sent on ahead in the direction of Mašhad Sevīnjük Moḥammad Sultan and 'Abd al-'Azīz Sultan, his son. The *qezelbāš* emirs who were stationed at Mašhad included Āğzīvār Khan Šāmlū, at that time still a sultan,[46] Aḥmad Sultan Afšār, and Ya'qūb Sultan Qājār. Since the fortifications of Mašhad had not been completed, the emirs erected barricades in the streets and put themselves in a state of defense. For two months, sporadic fighting went on between the defenders and the Uzbegs, until eventually 'Obeyd Khan arrived with the main Uzbeg army from Transoxania. 'Obeyd Khan at once assaulted the city and fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place at the barricades. Eventually, the *qezelbāš* felt unable to continue the struggle and considered it inexpedient to give battle to the Uzbegs. They slipped quietly out of Mašhad at night; Aḥmad Sultan Afšār went to Farāh, which was his own tribal district, and having a fort there, sat down to await a siege; Āğzīvār Khan and Ya'qūb Sultan withdrew in the direction of Sabzavār and Mazīnān.

In the morning, the Uzbegs discovered that the *qezelbāš* had evacuated the city. They set off in pursuit, but failed to overtake the *qezelbāš* emirs. 'Obeyd Khan entrusted the city to one of his emirs and returned to Herat, which he besieged. On this occasion the city was held by Ḥoseyn Khan and the Šāmlū *ğāzīs*, who once again devoted their efforts to the defense of the citadel and the repulse of the Uzbegs. For several months, fighting went on in the city; in the rural districts, wheat became scarce or nonexistent. Ḥoseyn Khan and the elders of the Šāmlū tribe saw that they would have to evacuate the city because of the shortage of provisions and lack of matériel with which to carry on the defense. Accordingly, they entered into negotiations with ʻObeyd Khan, and envoys went to and fro. It was agreed that ʻObeyd Khan should retire to a distance of several days' journey so that the *qezelbāš*, with their women and children and baggage, might leave the city unmolested; it was stipulated that no pursuit should be organized by any of the Uzbeg sultans.

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[45] Koran: 8:66

[46] The *qezelbāš* military ranks, in ascending order of importance, were Beg, Sultan, Khan.

ʻObeyd Khan was in favor of a peaceful settlement, and retired. Ḥoseyn Khan, after the armistice agreement had been ratified by sworn oaths, came out from the city with all the *ḡāzīs* and the Shiʻite elements in the population, and retreated unmolested in the direction of Sīstān. Malek Maḥmūd, the governor of Sīstān, accorded him a royal welcome, and Ḥoseyn Khan led his men[47] against the inhabitants of Pošt-e Zarah, who had rebelled and were engaged in banditry on the highways. Ḥoseyn Khan plundered their possessions and marched on toward the province of Makrān, where he ravaged the countryside, and eventually arrived at Shiraz. His subsequent adventures will be narrated later.

As a result of the capture of Herat, ʻObeyd Khan extended his dominion over the whole of the province of Khorasan and raised the banner of oppression and injustice throughout that area. The people of Khorasan suffered much at the hands of the Uzbeg soldiery. Many persons of undoubted Sunni beliefs were put to death on specious charges of heresy[48] and professing Shiʻism. One of the victims of this tyranny was the poet Mowlānā Helālī, who was put to death in the main bazaar at Herat. The pretext for his execution was that the poet had satirized ʻObeyd Khan. This charge was based on what had been reported to ʻObeyd Khan by informers, who had attributed to Mowlānā Helālī the following quatrain:

How long, ʻObeyd, are you going to go on seeking plunder?
How long are you going to ravage the land of Khorasan?
You plunder and loot and carry off the property of orphans;
If you are a Muslim, then I am an infidel.[49]

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[47] Obviously to repay Malek Maḥmūd's hospitality.

[48] *Rafż*; a blanket term of abuse (heresy) used by Sunnis in regard to Shiʻites.

[49] Martin B. Dickson, "Shah Tahmasp and the Ozbeks (The Duel for Khurasan with ʻUbaid Khān 930-946/1524-1540), Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as Dickson), p. 160, has further details on the false accusations laid against Sunnis who, like Helālī, were wealthy.

Although Helālī had written a splendid ode eulogizing 'Obeyd Khan, of which three[50] verses are given below, this availed him nothing, and he was put to death on account of the wealth and property which he possessed.

Khorasan is the heartland of the world, and it is
for this reason that he has come;
New life has come to it—I mean, 'Obeyd Khan has come;
His swift, golden-hooved steed resembles the sun,
Which traverses the world from east to west in a day
and a night;
I know my poetry contains errors; strike a line through
these errors,
for they are naught but a slip of the pen or of the
tongue.

When the news of the occupation of Khorasan by the Uzbegs came to the Shah's ears, since affairs at Baghdad had been satisfactorily completed in accordance with the wishes of that pious and just monarch, he set out for Khorasan, at the beginning of the year 936/1529-30, in order to drive out the victorious Uzbegs. Tahmasp sent *qūrčīs* posthaste to all parts of his realm, summoning the emirs to join the royal camp. Within a short time they assembled, company by company and troop by troop, eager to show their fealty and devotion to the Shah. Ḥoseyn Beg Šāmlū, the historian, has stated that on this expedition seventy thousand men assembled in the royal camp.

'Obeyd Khan, after the occupation of Herat, saw himself as the master of Khorasan. He decided to subjugate the fortress of Farāh and marched against Aḥmad Sultan Afšār. He laid siege to the citadel and strained every nerve to take it, but to no avail. He therefore abandoned the siege and returned to Herat, where he heard the news of the approach of the royal army. His resolution wavered and he retreated in the direction of Marv. He sent smooth-tongued couriers to the Čengīzid khans, imploring them to come rapidly to his assistance. From Marv, 'Obeyd Khan sent Tahmasp various unbecoming communications while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements.[51] The sultans of Turkestan[52] assembled at Marv. Repeated conferences were held among the wisest heads and elders (*atālīqān*)[53] of each family on the question of how to conduct the war against the Safavid monarch. The majority opinion was that they should not give battle to the enemy. Küčüm Sultan, who was the chief of the Uzbeg sultans and had his seat of government at Samarkand, had died that year and been succeeded by his son Abū Sa'īd. Abū Sa'īd was totally opposed to the views of 'Obeyd. "In recent years," he said, "every time we have invaded Khorasan, and given battle to the *qezelbāš*, we have sustained nothing but loss. If you are strong enough to stand and fight the Shah, you are free to do so. We are not, however, prepared to join you in fighting the *qezelbāš*. It is better and more appropriate that you content yourself with your own appanage and give up this pointless idea." The majority of the sultans of the line of Jočī[54] preferred Abū Sa'īd's views and decided not to assist 'Obeyd. Thus 'Obeyd Khan was disappointed in his hopes of getting assistance from the other Uzbeg sultans.

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[50] The text has "two."

[51] See Dickson, pp. 182ff.

[52] The author uses the term Tūrān, evocative of the legendary struggle between Iran and Tūrān, or the Iranians and the Turks, narrated in the Persian national epic.

At this juncture, 'Obeyd's messenger returned from his visit to Tahmasp, bringing reports of the size and magnitude of the Safavid army, and also a reply to 'Obeyd's letter, which had been written in the same insulting style. The following verse was included in it:

> You are deaf,[55] and your fortune is blind;
> How can a blind and deaf man possess a powerful arm?

The upshot of all this was that 'Obeyd, with sorrow and bitterness in his heart, abandoned his possessions in Khorasan and retired toward Bokhara. Shah Tahmasp, on the other hand, entered Khorasan in triumph; the plumes of his standards waved bravely over that province. On his arrival at Herat, he poured soothing balm on the sorely wounded hearts of the people of that region and conferred the post of governor-general of Khorasan on his own brother, Bahrām Mīrzā, with Ğāzī Khan Takkalū as his guardian and commander in chief of Khorasan. The Shah appointed emirs and governors to city after city, and once again brought law and order to the affairs of all the inhabitants. Since Khorasan had been severely devastated by the passage and presence of marauding Uzbeg troops, the prolonged stay of the royal army at Herat caused a serious shortage of foodstuffs for populace and army alike. As it became imperative for the army to return to Persian Iraq, the Shah retraced his steps in that direction.

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[53] *Atālīq* (*lala*), in Uzbeg usage, seems to have meant personal administrative advisor of a khan or sultan (Dickson, p. 219, *n* 1).

[54] The eldest son of Genghis Khan; d. 1227.

[55] A reference to the fact that 'Obeyd was said to have been rendered deaf by the blow on the head he received at the battle of Jām.

'Obeyd Khan's Fifth Invasion of Khorasan, and Subsequent Flight

When the news of the Shah's departure reached the ears of 'Obeyd Khan at Bokhara, the following year, 937/1530-31, he dispatched Qameš Oğlān and some other Uzbeg emirs to Khorasan for the purposes of reconnaissance and the collection of military intelligence. The Uzbeg emirs crossed the Oxus and made for Mašhad by way of Saraḵs. Mantašā Sultan Ostājlū, the governor of Mašhad, and Ağzīvār Sultan Šāmlū, the governor of Nishapur, joined forces and marched against Qameš Oğlān and his Uzbegs. Some skirmishing took place between the two forces and the *ğāzīs* killed several of the enemy. The Uzbegs were unable to continue the struggle and withdrew, each emir going to his own territory.

The following year, 938/1531-32, 'Obeyd Khan again mobilized a major Uzbeg army and marched on Khorasan. Once again he camped outside Herat, and once again he laid siege to that city. He dispatched his emirs throughout the length and breadth of Khorasan: 'Abd al-'Azīz Sultan, his son, was sent to Mašhad; Qameš Oğlān to Astarābād; Khan Geldī Bahādor to Sabzavār; and another group to the Besṭām district. Mantašā Sultan, Ağzīvār Sultan, and the other Savavid emirs in Khorasan deemed it imprudent to remain at their posts and evacuated the respective seats of government. Ẕu'l-Qadar Sultan, however, who was the governor of Damghan, as soon as he heard of the approach of the Uzbegs, sent a courier among the Gerāylī[56] to ask for assistance. Mīrzā 'Alī Khan Gerāylī joined him with a large force and they gave battle to the Uzbegs within sight of Besṭām. The *ğāzīs* were victorious, and the Uzbegs were routed; a considerable number were killed, and others taken prisoner.

Qameš Oğlān, however, who had been ordered to advance on Astarābād, with great daring and bravery led his troops as far west as the heart of Sāūj Bolāğ,[57] where he fell upon the camp of Moḥammad Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū and plundered it before returning.

Meanwhile 'Obeyd Khan, who had pitched his camp before the walls of Herat, continued the siege with a vigor against which the *ğāzīs* defended themselves to the best of their ability.

In Azerbaijan, Olāma Sultan Takkalū had rebelled and by defecting to the Ottomans had stirred up trouble there. On the border between the Safavid and the Ottoman empires, revolts had occurred and unrest was prevalent. Consequently, Shah Tahmasp had these serious problems on his hands, and had no opportunity to mount an expedition to Khorasan. In this situation, 'Obeyd Khan was free to proceed with the siege of Herat without interruption and so concentrated on tightening his blockade of the defenders.

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[56] A tribe living in the region of Astarābād.

[57] The plain west of modern Tehran.

Ultimately, the siege dragged on for a year and a half, and the plight of the defenders became desperate because of the shortage of supplies and bread. Ǧāzī Khan expelled the civilian population from the city. If the inhabitants had any food supplies, these were taken from them as they left, and so the *ǧāzīs* obtained enough to prevent the outbreak of famine. During this operation, the wretched civilian population suffered greatly from the maltreatment of the Takkalūs.[58] The latter stripped them of money and belongings and drove them out of the city. But they went beyond that; they also searched for hidden articles, and after the inhabitants had left the city, broke into their houses and residences looking for concealed property.

In the end, food supplies ran out for the military too, and the *ǧāzīs* were driven to eating the flesh of dogs and cats; then even that came to an end. The story is told that two trusted retainers of Ǧāzī Khan quarreled over the corpse of a dog and took their dispute to the Khan for arbitration. Each of them claimed that it was his blow which killed the dog and that the dog was therefore his. Finally Ǧāzī Khan cut the corpse of the dog in half, and gave half to each. Every day a platter of rice and horsemeat was brought in for Bahrām Mīrzā and the Khan; half of it they would distribute, spoonful by spoonful, among the trusted members of their staff, and the other half they shared with their servants. People became so weak from lack of food that they had to walk about with the aid of sticks.

At this point, 'Obeyd Khan sent a messenger to the citadel and opened peace negotiations. Ǧāzī Khan proposed that 'Obeyd Khan should retire for a distance of one or two days' journey, so that Bahrām Mīrzā and the *qezelbāš* garrison might leave in safety and hand the city over to the Uzbegs. 'Obeyd Khan, however, did not agree to these terms. "Let them first come," he said, "and humble themselves by passing underneath my tent ropes, and then go their way." Bahrām Mīrzā and Ǧāzī Khan refused to submit to this humiliation. A few days later, the personal adviser of Abū Sa'īd Ḵüčüm Ḵān, the ruler of Samarkand, reached Herat and attempted to conclude the peace negotiations, but without success. Ĉāzī Khan, despite his extreme weakness, continued the struggle against the enemies of the Safavid religion and state and strove to hold on in the citadel.

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[58] Dickson, pp. 215ff., has further details.

When the realities of the situation and the news of the domination of Khorasan by the Uzbegs were brought to the attention of the Shah in Azerbaijan, he decided, in view of the fact that the rebellion of Olāma had finally died down, to march to Khorasan.

In 939/1532-33, the royal army moved off toward Khorasan, and a courier was dispatched posthaste to bring this glad tidings to the Safavid garrison at Herat. This courier reached Herat at a time when famine had reduced the garrison to the most desperate straits. As soon as they heard the joyous news of the approach of the Shah, their spirits were raised and their hearts strengthened. Cries of joy and happiness rose to the heavens and drums were beaten to celebrate the news.

'Obeyd Khan was something of a poet, and during these events he had composed some verses and sent them to the celebrated Ḵ̌āja Emir Beg Mehr, the *vizier* of Ĉāzī Khan, who was in the city:

O breeze, if you pass by the people of Khorasan,
Take care to give this message of mine to them;
Tell those people, I pray you,
That we are seeking revenge on you all, both
great and small.
My pen has recorded both your pride and your
ignorance,
In a register which bears the imprint of my name;
O Ḵ̌āja, henceforth give up all hope of life,
Because the coinage of sovereignty is stamped
with my name.

The Ḵ̌āja, who was an able and eloquent man, one of the most talented of his day, wrote the following verses in reply:

O Pretender! Have you not heard that our Shah,
Who is like the stars in majesty and is revered
like Jamšīd, is approaching?

We are the servants of the Shah, and from the dawn
of eternity, our continued existence has been
recorded on God's scroll.
Let a verse from our sweet-tongued Ḥāfeẓ speak in
reply to the pretensions of the Khan:
"Other women, tall and slim as cypresses, make play
with amorous glance and words of love,
But pale into insignificance when our mistress comes
into sight, swaying like a fir tree as she walks."

Qarā Sultan and Jānī Beg Sultan, who had come from Balḵ to assist 'Obeyd Khan, secretly demonstrated their willingness to enter into negotiations with the *qezelbāš*, and they sent to Bahrām Mīrzā a fat lamb and a foal. The Uzbegs, secretly and at night, would bring scrawny nags to the edge of the defensive ditch and would sell them at an inflated price. So for some time the Heavenly Quartermaster provided the daily rations of the *ğāzīs* from the flesh of these animals.

When Shah Tahmasp decided to organize the expedition to Khorasan, he sent on ahead to Astarābād Alqāṣ Mīrzā and Badr Khan Ostājlū. When they reached Besṭām, Badr Khan held a council of war with his companions. In accordance with the saying "war consists in deceiving the enemy," the best plan seemed to be to march quickly on Astarābād and fall unexpectedly on Qameš Oğlān. The one thousand five hundred veterans in Alqāṣ Mīrzā's retinue made a dash from Besṭām and entered Astarābād early one morning, when the Uzbegs were all in the bathhouse. The Safavid troops joyfully sounded the kettledrums. Every Uzbeg they encountered was relieved of the burden of his head and every Uzbeg as he emerged naked from the bathhouse was destroyed. Qameš Oğlān, stunned by these unexpected events, rushed blindly around the city. Finally, with great difficulty, he succeeded in escaping from Besṭām with seven or eight companions and fled toward Marv. His four brothers, however, together with some five hundred other Uzbegs, lost their lives at Besṭām. Their heads were sent back to welcome Shah Tahmasp as he advanced.

Meanwhile, Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa Rūmlū, with three hundred Rūmlū *ğāzīs* and a detachment of Kūbīklū tribesmen, had been ordered to Sabzavār, where he made a night attack on Khan Geldī Bahādor, who was garrisoning Sabzavār with four thousand Uzbeg troops. A number of the Uzbegs were slain and the remainder retreated toward Nishapur.

Shah Tahmasp had been informed of the size of the Uzbeg army and had sent Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, Aḡzīvār Khan Šāmlū, and Emir Sultan Rūmlū to the assistance of Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa. In the vicinity of Nishapur the two detachments joined forces, gave battle to the Uzbegs, and after defeating them, marched toward Mašhad. 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan, who held Mašhad with seven thousand men, did not stay to fight but fled in the direction of Herat as soon as he heard of the approach of the royal army and the proximity of the emirs. 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan joined his father at Herat; the latter, when he heard the news in his turn, as usual decided to run rather than fight, and withdrew toward Bokhara. The other Uzbeg sultans also withdrew, each to his own seat of government.

On 22 Jomādā II, 939/19 January 1533,[59] Tahmasp encamped in the Bāḡ-e Šahr at Herat. The nobles and important dignitaries of Herat, who had been scattered in all directions by the winds of misfortune, reassembled in the reassuring shadow of the Shah's protection, in the hope of finding royal favor. Ḡāzī Khan was reprimanded by the Shah for appropriating the property of citizens of Herat during the siege of the city by the Uzbegs, and the poor and needy were fully recompensed from the royal treasury.

The Shah spent that winter (1533-34) at Herat. After a few months the Shah, with the intention of invading Transoxania[60] to chastise 'Obeyd Khan and discipline the Uzbegs, moved out of the city and encamped at Olang-e Nešīn. The rumor of the coming invasion of Transoxania spread quickly throughout Khorasan, and Ḥoseyn Khan and Mantašā Sultan, with a number of other emirs, were ordered to subjugate Ḡarjestān.[61] They successfully conquered this region[62] and returned. The other emirs set to work preparing for the expedition to Transoxania and generally busied themselves with the preparation of ordnance and arms. At this point, however, the Shah received the alarming news that Sultan Sülaymān had invaded Azerbaijan and Persian Iraq. The Shah was thus frustrated in his grand design to invade Transoxania and considered it expedient to return to Persian Iraq.

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[59] Dickson, p. 243, gives 22 Jomādā I, 940/19 December 1533.

[60] As Dickson, pp. 246ff, points out, this was the one and only time during the whole duel for Khorasan between Shah Tahmasp and the Uzbegs that the Shah considered going over to the offensive.

[61] An area in the northern foothills of the Hindu Kush, controlled by the Uzbegs from Balḵ.

[62] As Dickson, p. 250, points out, the success of this expedition was ephemeral. A year later, Ḡarjestān was again under Uzbeg control.

Since the Takkalūs were too exhausted to continue as garrison troops at Herat, and since the civilian population had lodged many complaints about the harsh treatment they had received at the hands of Ḡāzī Khan and his men, the government of the city was placed in the hands of Sām Mīrzā, with Aḡzīvār Sultan Šāmlū as his guardian and personal adviser, with the rank of commander in chief of Khorasan. The Shah, with God's aid, then went by forced marches toward Persian Iraq.

The Affairs of Khorasan, and the Sixth Invasion of That Province by 'Obeyd Khan; the Return of the Royal Army, and the Termination of the Career of 'Obeyd Khan, Together with some Miscellaneous Events

My researches among historical chronicles and biographical works have revealed that, after the departure of the Shah, Sām Mīrzā and Aḡzīvār Khan took up residence at Herat and devoted themselves to administering the affairs of the province of Khorasan and to repairing the shattered fortunes of the underprivileged and poorer classes of the population. 'Obeyd Khan meanwhile sat quietly at Bokhara, closely observing events in Khorasan.

When the news reached Herat of the execution of Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū,[63] and the consequent trepidation of the Šāmlūs, Sām Mīrzā and Aḡzīvār Sultan were filled with apprehension. Urged on by a number of evil men, they conceived the vain idea of opposition to the Shah and rebellion. They began to extort money from wealthy citizens, and raised large sums from their fellow Muslims by means of torture and the rack. Having raised this money, they marched in the direction of Kandahar, intending to capture it. At Farāh, they were joined by Morād Sultan Afšār. On their arrival at Kandahar, they laid siege to the citadel, which was held by Ḵ̌āja Kalān Čaḡatāy on behalf of Mīrzā Kāmrān, the brother of the Mogul emperor Homāyūn. Fighting between the besiegers and the besieged went on actively for several months, but the Safavid forces were unable to attain their object. Finally, Mīrzā Kāmrān, who had collected twenty thousand men at Lahore, arrived at Kandahar to relieve the garrison. Sām Mīrzā and Aḡzīvār Sultan abandoned the siege and withdrew for one or two stages.

When Kāmrān Mīrzā learnt that Sām Mīrzā had laid siege to Kandahar without authority from the Shah, he decided to give battle to the

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[63] In 940/1533-34; see Savory, Offices II, p. 70.

Safavid army. Although Sām Mīrzā and Aḡzīvār Sultan had no more than two to three thousand men, they drew them up in battle order. In the ensuing struggle, the *qezelbāš* forces fought with outstanding valor and drove back both wings of the enemy army in confusion. In the course of the battle, the foot of Aḡzīvār Sultan's horse caught in a hole; the horse fell, and Aḡzīvār rolled off. A Čaḡatāy soldier rushed upon him and took him prisoner. When he realized that his prisoner was Aḡzīvār Sultan, he at once put him to death. This encouraged the Čaḡatāy army and correspondingly lowered the morale of the *qezelbāš*, and Sām Mīrzā left the battlefield and retreated in the direction of Garmsīr.[64] There, he repented of his actions and put to death several evil persons who had incited him to sedition against the Shah. He sent their heads to court and begged forgiveness for his crimes.

Meanwhile, 'Obeyd Khan at Bokhara, hearing of the defection of Sām Mīrzā and the death of Aḡzīvār Sultan, first of all dispatched Seyyedom Mīrzā with a number of Uzbeg emirs and five or six thousand men to raid Khorasan. Seyyedom Mīrzā took four to five thousand men in the direction of Jām, and the remainder went in the direction of Ḵāf. Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa Rūmlū, the governor of Mašhad, led his small force against Seyyedom Mīrzā and defeated the Uzbegs at Jām. After this victory, Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa moved against the Uzbeg detachment at Ḵāf and defeated this force too in an engagement in which the Uzbegs suffered heavy casualties.

Beyrām Oḡlān, who was governor of Ḡarjestān on behalf of Kesken Qarā Solṭān b. Jānī Beg Solṭān, arrived to attack Herat. The man who had been left behind at Herat by Sām Mīrzā and Aḡzīvār Sultan was Ḵālīfa Sultan Šāmlū, a perplexed and confused commander of eighty years of age. He gathered together a force composed of city dwellers, men from the outlying districts, and soldiers who had become separated from their units. With this motley army he marched out from Herat and came up against the Uzbegs some forty miles from the city. In the ensuing battle, the Heratīs, since they were a scratch force, most of them Persians, and with little confidence in their commander, achieved nothing and were defeated. Ḵalīfa Sultan had no opportunity to withdraw safely from the battlefield—a course of action which is not held to be uncowardly at moments of extreme danger—but was slain. Those who escaped the sword fled back toward the city, and Beyram Oḡlān departed after acquiring much booty.

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[64] Ša'bān 942/January 1536 (see Dickson, p. 293).

The *qezelbāš* garrison at Herat was left without a leader by the death of Ḳalīfa Sultan, and they were afraid of further Uzbeg attacks. With the approval of the local population, therefore, they sent a courier to Ṣūfīān Ḳalīfa at Mašhad and summoned him to Herat. Ṣūfīān Ḳalīfa left his son in charge at Mašhad and came to Herat. He was a brave and intrepid man, and a dedicated Sufi who was unswerving in his loyalty to the Safavid house; but there was an element of madness in his nature, and he used to undertake many insane actions. Some intelligent men considered him unbalanced, a fool and an imposter. At all events, at Herat he listened to the words of some evil men and began to oppress and harass the people, refusing to listen to their requests that he intercede on their behalf. If he suspected anyone, either in the city or in one of the suburban districts, of having a certain amount of wealth, he extracted it from him by means of fines or punishments.

Either because he was completely mad or because he was a complete fraud and impostor, Ṣūfīān Ḳalīfa used to assert that during the night he had been instructed in a dream by one of the Twelve Imams to take a certain sum of money from a certain person and give it to the *ğāzīs* in order that they might repel the enemies of the Imams. "An order from an Imam," said Ṣūfīān Ḳalīfa, "has to be obeyed." In particular, he imposed heavy financial burdens, in obedience to the command of the Imams, upon friends who had been eager for him to take over the governorship of Herat and had brought him to the city from Mašhad. He would enter the assembly weeping bitterly, and speaking in a semi-delirious fashion, would say, "However much I implored the Holy Imams saying, 'this man is my friend, absolve me from this heavy duty,' the Imam refused to listen to me." "The commands of the Imams," said Ṣūfīān Ḳalīfa, "must be obeyed with scrupulous exactness."

By this stratagem or excessive madness, Ṣūfīān Ḳalīfa collected a large sum of gold, and the people were driven to desperation by his tyranny. At this point, 'Obeyd Khan crossed the Oxus. In the course of the year 942/1535-36, he reached Mašhad and commenced the siege of the city. Ṣūfīān Ḳalīfa's retainers, together with the inhabitants of Mašhad, strengthened the fortifications of the city and defended them bravely. The greater the effort expended by the Uzbegs in conducting the siege, the less progress they made. They found no way at all of subduing the city. As soon as Ṣūfīān Ḳalīfa heard that Mašhad was being besieged, he wrote a letter to his men there in the following terms:

"Be courageous! I am on my way! When I capture 'Obeyd Khan, I will stuff his skin with straw and send it to the Shah!"

Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa left in charge at Herat his deputy, Ḵeżr Čelebī, whose appetite for money was even greater than his own. Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa issued orders that a stipulated amount of money should be forcibly levied by means of fines and taxes and handed over to his agents. He then set off toward Mašhad like a madman, with three thousand men, to give battle to the Uzbeg ruler. En route, he saw in the distance a pile of straw. He went over to it himself and filled a sack with straw which he took with him, saying that he would need it to stuff the skin of 'Obeyd Khan, and that he would not be able to find any straw near Mašhad because of the depredations of the Uzbegs.

'Obeyd Khan, when he heard of the approach of Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa pondered deeply. On the one hand, he considered it beneath him to give battle to one of the emirs of the Shah; and on the other hand, he had heard that Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa, when he fought, was seized by a form of madness which made him completely indifferent to the superior numbers of the enemy. On numerous occasions he had insanely flung himself against a far superior Uzbeg force and had been victorious, with only a few *qezelbāš* troops. As a result, he had become quite intrepid in action against the Uzbegs, and there was a danger that something of the sort might happen again. None of the Uzbeg emirs was willing to engage Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa in battle unless their khan was present. 'Obeyd Khan was thus forced to prepare for battle. He sent a detachment on ahead as a patrol and ordered his own son, 'Abd al-'Azīz Sultan, to form the advance guard together with 'Alī Sultan, the governor of Ḵārazm, Aqeš Sultan, and Sevīnjük Moḥammad Sultan; he himself followed with the main force.

Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa came into contact with the leading troops of the Uzbeg army and routed them. The commander of the Uzbeg detachment, who had been taken prisoner, asked Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa what sense there was in marching with three thousand men against the Uzbeg monarch, who had an army numbering at least thirty thousand. "Be warned," he said, "turn back at once and take refuge in the citadel at Herat."Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa, however, impelled by his overweening arrogance and dominated by black madness, persisted in giving battle. That night he made his preparations for battle and in the morning, when the Uzbeg advance guard appeared, he drew up his men in battle order and fighting commenced.[65] The *qezelbāš ḡāzīs* hurled themselves against that sea of Uzbegs with such fury that the angelic hosts looked on in wonder. 'Obeyd Khan, fearing that the *qezelbāš* might win the day, set the Uzbeg center in motion and brought his main force into action. The *ğāzīs* resisted the onset of the Uzbegs to the best of their ability, but in the end were unable to continue the struggle and turned and fled.

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[65] The date of this battle was 20 Rajab 942/14 January 1536 (Dickson, 313).

Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa, however, gaining fresh strength from his madness, hurled himself with a few *ğāzīs* who were bound to him by close ties of companionship into a ruined fort which was on the edge of the battlefield, and there, without provisions or supplies, was surrounded by the enemy. 'Obeyd Khan encamped beneath the walls, and the *ğāzīs* held out for thirty-five days, living on horseflesh and saddles, which they broke in pieces and ate parboiled. The Uzbegs gradually pushed forward earthworks and palisades and finally stormed the fort. Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa was taken prisoner and executed. The *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ* records that during the short time he was governor of Khorasan, Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa killed on the battlefield some four thousand seven hundred Uzbegs.

When the news of the defeat of Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa reached Herat, Ḵeżr Čelebī, Ḵalīfa's deputy, with the assistance of the *qezelbāš* who were in the city, summoned the populace of the city and the suburban districts and made them help in preparing the defenses for a siege. The suburban dwellers refused because they had been reduced to extremities by the exactions and tyrannical behavior of Ḵeżr Čelebī and his financial officials. They adopted a hostile attitude toward the city dwellers and in secret sent couriers to 'Obeyd Khan, who appeared before the city and commenced the siege. The *ğāzīs* and inhabitants of the city, despite their total unpreparedness, resisted 'Obeyd Khan for five months. Finally, one of the nobles in the city, seduced by the false promises of 'Obeyd Khan, allowed a group of three hundred Uzbegs to climb up one night into the tower which was in his charge. The Uzbegs poured into the city and the *ğāzīs*, after a stout resistance, were overpowered and retreated into the citadel of Eḵtīār al-Dīn.

The Uzbegs occupied the rest of the city and the people's situation was calamitous. The Uzbegs laid their hands on the property of Muslims and began to exact money and hidden treasure by means of foul play and torture. 'Obeyd Khan sent a messenger to the citadel and proposed the following conditions for its surrender: Ḵeżr Čelebī was to hand over the citadel, together with all the money and property which Ṣūfīān Ḵalīfa had taken from wealthy burgers and from poor citizens alike; in return, both the lives and property of Ḵeżr Čelebī and his companions were to be spared. A formal treaty, with binding oaths, was concluded on these terms. The Uzbegs, however, turned the *qezelbāš* loose on the road to Bokhara, naked and stripped of their possessions, and slaughtered them en route.[66]

After the damage had been done, 'Obeyd Khan stopped the Uzbegs from plundering and killing and devoted his attention to the business of governing, and for fourteen months he ruled at Herat. But every day several people were put to death at his order in the main bazaar on a charge of heresy (*rafż*) or of being a Shi'ite, solely on the evidence of a couple of ignoramuses. The tyranny and injustice of that bloodthirsty ruler increased daily. The heartrending sighs and laments of the afflicted, and the cries and appeals of the heirs of those unjustly slain, rose to the heavens. Eventually, they reached the ears of the Shah in Azerbaijan, and he determined to put an end to this Uzbeg evil. During the course of 943/1536-37, the royal army set out for Khorasan. Advancing stage by stage, it did not reach Khorasan until 'Obeyd Khan had left Herat and marched to subdue Mašhad, which had remained in *qezelbāš* hands.

At Bāḵarz, 'Obeyd Khan received confirmed reports that the Shah had reached Nesā and Abīvard, and that his standards would shortly appear on the horizon within sight of Herat. The same day, 'Obeyd Khan left Bāḵarz for Herat, he called together all the Čengīzid sultans, both senior and junior, and convened a formal council of war. The question was, he said, whether they should retreat or stand and fight. The *qezelbāš*, he said, had endured the hardships of a winter march to Khorasan; they had covered great distances, and had suffered much. "Moreoever," he said, "we are superior in numbers and in a greater state of preparedness than ever before. If we stay and fight, the chances are that this time we will win." However, the Uzbeg sultans and the senior men of the tribes all felt that they did not have the strength to oppose the Shah, and nothing 'Obeyd Khan said on the subject had any effect.

In the depths of winter, therefore, when the sun was in the station of Aquarius, 'Obeyd Khan was forced, under protest and deeply chagrined, to cross the Mālān Bridge and head for Bokhara by the Balḵ road,[67] and the Shah's protective shadow was cast over the people of Herat. The Shah camped at Herat, with great pomp and circumstance, and those who were afflicted and distressed as a result of the Uzbeg occupation found rest and repose beneath the shadow of the royal banners.

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[66] For additional background to these events, see Dickson, pp. 315ff.

[67] On January 29, 1537; see Dickson, p. 337.

Since Sām Mīrzā had gone to Ṭabas[68] and was there in the citadel, Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa *mohrdār*[69] Ẕu'l-Qadar was ordered by the Shah to proceed to Ṭabas with a number of other emirs and bring Sām Mīrzā back to court. Sām Mīrzā hung his head in shame in the presence of the Shah, and wept tears of remorse. The Shah pardoned his offenses, but put to death some of his retainers who were the authors of the seditions and cause of the mischief.

The Shah then conferred the governorship of Khorasan on Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā,[70] and Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū Takkalū was appointed his guardian, and also commander in chief of Khorasan. Winter came to an end and the exhilarating season of spring came again. Although Sām Mīrzā had disobeyed orders in going off to Kandahar and had failed to achieve anything, nevertheless the Shah's sense of honor was stirred, and his fraternal feelings moved him to take his revenge on the Čaḡatāy forces which had acted so audaciously in attacking the *qezelbāš* by marching to subdue Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar.[71] When he reached the river Hīrmand, the Shah sent on ahead the Emir Sultan Rūmlū with a large force. Ḵāja Kalān, the Mogul governor of Kandahar, withdrew hastily toward Send when he heard of the Shah's advance, and left Ganjī Ḵāja, one of his relatives, in the citadel at Kandahar. When the royal army reached Kandahar, Ganjī Ḵāja saw no course but to tender his submission to the Shah. Accordingly, he hastened to the royal court and handed over the keys of the city and the citadel to officials of the court.

The Shah awarded the position of governor of the province of Kandahar to Būdāq Khan Qājār, and returned in triumph to Herat. When 'Obeyd Khan and the Uzbeg sultans heard of the Shah's return from his Kandahar expedition, they were filled with alarm and sent ambassadors with gifts and presents from Balḵ, from Samarkand, and from Bokhara to the Safavid court to congratulate the Shah on the capture of Kandahar. The Shah spent a few days at Herat, settling problems and dealing with the affairs of petitioners. Then, having put the affairs of Herat in satisfactory order, he departed for Persian Iraq in the course of 944/1537.[72]

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[68] After his act of disobedience to the Shah in 1536.

[69] I.e., keeper of the seal.

[70] His eldest son; born in 938/1531-32. Moḥammad Mīrzā was thus five years of age at the time of his appointment to the governorship of Khorasan.

[71] The broad valley, west of Kandahar, through which the river Hīrmand (or Helmand) flows down from the Hindu Kush to the city of Bost.

At Herat, Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū and the young prince Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā devoted themselves to setting to rights the affairs of those in distressed circumstances throughout Khorasan,[73] and made great efforts to improve the lot of the peasants and the people in general. From this time on, 'Obeyd Khan behaved in a more civilized manner and desisted from his fruitless attacks on Khorasan, and for a year or two no movement was observed on his part. In 946/1540,[74] 'Obeyd Khan, overcome by the sighs of the oppressed people of his realm, fell sick, and after a severe illness died at Bokhara, having sacrificed his life to his ambition of annexing Herat and crossing the Mālān Bridge. The people of Khorasan were thus freed from the tyranny and oppression of this irreligious and bloodthirsty man.

As a result of having devoted considerable space to describing events in Khorasan, and because of a desire to preserve the continuity of the discourse, I have neglected to give an account of various affairs which were happening during this period in other parts of the country. Now the moment has come to narrate the astonishing events which occurred on the borders of Azerbaijan, and to describe the Shah's expedition against the Ottomans in that area. After doing this, I shall go back and complete my account of events in Khorasan.

The Invasion of Iran by Sultan Sülaymān, the Ottoman Emperor, and His Contest with Him who Graced the Throne of Ḵosrow and Jamšīd

Reference was made previously to the fact that during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, Sultan Sülaymān, the Ottoman emperor, instigated by the machinations of evil and villainous men, invaded Iran on four occasions and commenced hostilities against the Shah.

The first occasion was when Sülaymān invaded Iran as a result of the intrigues of Olāma Takkalū. A brief account of the circumstances follows: During the reign of Shah Esma'il, Olāma was enrolled in the ranks of the gentlemen-in-waiting.[75] He gradually rose through the ranks in the royal service and eventually, as a reward for his excellent military services, was made an emir. At the time when Čūha Sultan was the virtual ruler of the state,[76] Olāma was appointed commander in chief of Azerbaijan. After the death of Čūha Sultan, Olāma became puffed up by ambition and aspired to become *vakīl* and chief executive in matters of state, in place of Čūha Sultan. When he failed to attain his object, as has already been mentioned, he forgot the debt of loyalty he owed to the Safavid house for his upbringing, and defected and went to Anatolia. There, he set about fomenting mischief and aroused Sultan Sülaymān's enthusiasm about the idea of invading Iran.

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[72] Dickson, p. 364, gives the date of departure as 9 Rabī' II, 944/15 September 1537.

[73] Dickson, p. 364, mentions the placing of price controls on foodstuffs and grain, and the redistribution of lands devastated by the Uzbeg campaigns in order to bring them once again under cultivation, among the measures taken by the Safavid governor.

[74] Dickson, p. 387, gives the date of 'Obeyd Khan's death as March 18, 1540.

To begin with, the Ottoman emperor sent Fīl Pasha to Iran with fifty thousand men. Šaraf Khan Rudakī the Kurd, governor of Betlīs, was a vassal of the Safavid house and the first to face Fīl Pasha's advance. He drove him out of that region. Then, Fīl Pasha planned to move against Vān. But Shah Tahmasp led the royal army against him, and Fīl Pasha retreated, abandoning his cannon.

After the rout of Fīl Pasha, the royal army marched to Khorasan to put down the sedition of 'Obeyd Khan Uzbeg. At the time when the Shah had left Herat and was on his way to invade Transoxania, Olāma repeatedly sent envoys to the Ottoman Sultan informing him that the *qezelbāš* king[77] had led his army into Transoxania to engage the Uzbegs, and was preoccupied with his campaign against the Mongol and Tartar forces. "Meanwhile," said Olāma, "Azerbaijan and Persian Iraq lie undefended."

Sultan Sülaymān, at his suggestion, set out from Istanbul with a huge army, making for Azerbaijan. He sent ahead as the vanguard of this force Ebrahim Pasha the grand vizier, with eighty thousand men, and he himself followed with the main army. Ebrahim Pasha, having made contact with Olāma, dispatched him in the direction of Ardabīl and sent his pashas to various regions of Azerbaijan, most of which they brought under their control.

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[75] The text has simply *yasāvolān*, but I assume, in view of Olāma's rank and family connections, that the reference is to the *yasāvolān-e ṣoḥbat*, "gentlemen-in-waiting," and not to the *yasāvolān-e majles*, who were merely ushers and were not of noble birth (see *TM*, p. 133).

[76] 933-937/1527-31 (see Savory, Offices II, pp. 68 ff).

[77] An interesting title that perhaps indicates the extent to which the *qezelbāš* Turkman elements overshadowed the Tājīk (Persian) elements in the Safavid state at that time; or it may reflect a typically arrogant *qezelbāš* attitude, which ignores the existence of the Tājīks.

When this news reached Shah Tahmasp at Olang-e Nešīn, he abandoned his plans for the invasion of Transoxania and returned from Khorasan to Iraq by forced marches. In twenty-one days' march he reached Kabūd Gonbad, near Rayy. When Ebrahim Pasha heard the news, he became alarmed, despite the size of his army, and sent a message to Sultan Sülaymān to the effect that the Shah had returned from Khorasan to Rayy in twenty-one days, and was advancing against him by forced marches. "Servants," he said, "cannot withstand the full might of kings."

Sultan Sülaymān marched to Tabriz with all haste, and joined forces with Ebrahim Pasha. On the Safavid side, most of the horses of the *ḡāzīs* were jaded as a result of their punishing forced march since they had come back from the Khorasan campaign. The army was therefore not prepared. The *ḡāzīs* had dispersed to their homes to ready their gear for the Azerbaijan campaign, and put themselves in a state of readiness to engage the Ottomans. As a result, Shah Tahmasp had at his immediate disposal not more than seven thousand men. He sent on ahead to Tabriz Bahrām Mīrzā and Alqāṣ Mīrzā,[78] with Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū and some other emirs. The Shah himself followed later, and when he reached Abhar,[79] he received the news that Sultan Sülaymān had left Tabriz and was advancing on Iraq. The report further stated that Bahrām Mīrzā and the *qezelbāš* advance guard had come into conflict with Ebrahim Pasha and the Ottoman advance guard. A battle had been fought on this side of the Qezel Ūzen River,[80] and Bahrām Mīrzā and the emirs, fighting desperately, had been driven back to the mountains. Now a vast Ottoman army was advancing.

This news caused consternation in the Safavid camp. Those who were really devoted to the Safavid cause remained of stout heart, and their faith in the destiny of the Safavid house did not falter. But the waverers were of a different mind. At this point, Alvand Khan Afšār, the governor of Kūh Gīlūya, arrived with his forces and presented himself to the Shah, and groups of men began to arrive from every direc-

[78] His brothers.

[79] West of Qazvīn.

[80] The name of a section of the Safīd Rūd, which rises in the mountains of Kurdestan and flows along the borders of Azerbaijan and empties into the Caspian in the province of Gīlān.

tion and join the royal camp. Encouraged by this, the Shah planned to go by forced marches to the assistance of Bahrām Mīrzā and his emirs. Then the news arrived that Sultan Sülaymān had passed Mīyānej and had reached Solṭānīya.[81] Bahrām Mīrzā and his emirs had meanwhile made their way back to the royal camp.

At this juncture, Moḥammad Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū, the son of Kūr Šahrok̲, the son of 'Alā al-Dowla Ẕu'l-Qadar, who had been brought up and trained in the service of the Shah and was treated by the latter like a son, revealed the secret hostility he had nurtured against the *qezelbāš* because his father had met his death at their hands. He defected to the Ottomans, along with Ḥoseyn Khan the son of Būrūn Sultan Takkalū, and a group of others. Moreover, the Shah was uncertain of the loyalty of some of the other emirs, like Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, Ĝāzī Khan Takkalū, and Malek Beg Joveynī, who had repeatedly been guilty of acts of disloyalty. The Shah therefore postponed action for a few days until more of his men assembled at the rendezvous. Then was revealed the secret of the verse of Holy Scripture: "To God belong the hosts of the heavens and the earth,"[82] and unseen hosts took a hand in driving back the mighty Ottoman army. On the 13th day of Scorpio, heavy snow fell at Solṭānīya, as Kamāl-e Eṣfahānī has said:

> The forms of the mountains were hidden in snow,
> Like cotton-seeds set within cotton.

The outlines of the Ottoman tents disappeared under the snow, and many Ottoman soldiers were stranded and died from exposure because of the severity of the cold. A certain poet has composed the following verse concerning this event:

> When I went to Solṭānīya, that splendid pasturage,
> I saw two thousand corpses lying there without grave
> or burial shroud;
> I said, "Who slew all these Ottomans?"
> The morning breeze replied, "It was I."

Sultan Sülaymān was unable to remain longer in Iraq. To return by way of Azerbaijan was impossible because of the lack of foodstuffs en route, and so he set off by way of Šahrazūr,[83] where supplies were still to be had, intending to spend the winter in the vicinity of Mosul. Olāma and Ẕu'l-Qadar-oğlū were dispatched in the direction of Tabriz. The Shah marched rapidly against them, but Ġāzī Khan Takkalū, who had also defected from the royal camp, reached Tabriz and warned Olāma and his companions of the Shah's approach. The renegades fled toward Vān, where they shut themselves up in the fortress. The Shah executed Ḥoseyn Khan Šamlū, whom he suspected of friendship with Sām Mīrzā, and therefore distrusted, as the latter was thinking of defecting to the Ottomans.[84] The Shah then marched on Vān and laid siege to the renegades in the fort, encamping at the foot of the walls for the winter.

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[81] The former capital of the Mongol rulers of Iran; situated southeast of Zanjān, and only a short distance from Abhar, where the Shah was.
[82] Koran: 48, verses 5 and 8.
[83] In Kurdestan.

At the time when Sultan Sülaymān set off in the direction of Mosul, Ebrahim Pasha sent an envoy to Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū, the governor of Baghdad, and to the Takkalū garrison there, summoning them to allegiance to the Ottoman sultan, and calling on them to hand over the keys of the citadel at Baghdad. Moḥammad Khan refused, but the chiefs and elders of the Takkalū tribe, who were apprehensive about the Shah's attitude toward them because of the execution of Čūha Sultan and the defection of Olāma and Ġāzī Khan, both of them Takkalū emirs, all agreed to obey and show friendship toward the Ottoman sultan. They sent the key of the citadel to Sülaymān and invited him to occupy the city. The Sultan at once left his winter quarters at Mosul and marched to Baghdad. Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū, who was a genuine Sufi and a single-minded supporter of the Safavid house, on orders from the Shah abandoned the city and the citadel, cut the bridge, and with about three hundred followers who were loyal to the Shah (*šāhī-sevan*), went via Basra to Dezfūl and from there to Shiraz. The rest of the Takkalū garrison of Baghdad went out to welcome Sultan Sülaymān and escorted him into the city, where he spent the winter.

Sultan Sülaymān's Second Invasion of Iran

The following year, 941/1534–35, Sultan Sülaymān invaded Iran for the second time and led an army from Baghdad toward Iran. Entering the province of Iraq, he reached Dargozīn.[85] Shah Tahmasp abandoned the siege of Vān and marched toward Tabriz. There he put to death Malek Beg Joveynī, who was still enrolled in the ranks of the trusted emirs, and who was the only one of the seditious emirs still at court.

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[84] The execution of the powerful emir Ḥoseyn Khan Šamlū in 940/1533–34 signaled the Shah's determination henceforth to rule de facto as well as de jure (See Savory, Offices II, p. 70).

[85] North-northeast of Hamadan.

The Shah then marched in the direction of the Ottoman camp. The Safavid skirmishers made contact with the Ottoman advance guard near Dargozīn, gave battle to them, and overcame them. When Sultan Sülaymān saw the triumph of the *qezelbāš* troops, and the rout of his own forces, he flared up in rage, and upbraided his emirs: "If you are beaten by a small force of skirmishers and advance patrols," he said, "how can you hope to give battle to the *qezelbāš* monarch?"

In a towering passion, he abandoned all idea of confrontation with the Shah, and leaving Dargozīn, withdrew, or rather retreated in disorder, in the direction of Anatolia. Shah Tahmasp pursued him; when he reached Vān, he ordered Bahrām Mīrzā and a group of emirs to continue the pursuit while he himself encamped in the pastures around Vān. The Ottoman garrison, not equal to the struggle against the might of the royal army, fled. Before this happened, however, Sultan Sülaymān had dispatched Moḥammad Pasha, the commander in chief of Dīār Bakr, with Olāma and a group of other emirs and pashas and two thousand Janissaries, to the assistance of the garrison at Vān.

The Ottoman force had reached Vastān[86] before the Shah received news of their approach. On hearing, he moved against them by forced marches. By the time the black mass of the Ottoman army came in sight, the majority of the *qezelbāš* troops had fallen out to get some sleep because of the exhausting nature of the forced march, and thus no more than two thousand men had kept up with the Shah and were still with him. Olāma caught sight of the gilded globe that surmounted the Shah's own personal standard, which was distinguished from the other royal standards and was known as *"yükrük,"* meaning "swift courser." Olāma said to Moḥammad Pasha, "The Shah is here in person. It is wiser for us not to give battle, for we will not be able to withstand the fury of his assault." Moḥammad Pasha, however, made overconfident by the size of his own army and the smallness of the *qezelbāš* force, drew up his men in battle array. But the first attack by the Safavids, led by Ğāzī Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar,[87] the governor of Shiraz, and a number of men from the royal bodyguard, shattered the Ottoman ranks. In the twinkling of an eye, large numbers of them were killed and many trusted officers of the Ottoman sultan were taken captive.

The survivors fled toward the fortress of Arjīš[88] and sent a courier to the Sultan asking for assistance. In response, Sultan Sülaymān sent Senān Pasha with a large number of emirs and *sanjāq-beys*.[89] This relief force was intercepted by the *qezelbāš* commander Būdāq Khan Qājār, and a major engagement was fought in which Senān Pasha was killed and most of his men either killed or taken prisoner. On receiving this news, Sultan Sülaymān sent a second relief force under Ebrāhīm Pasha, with the cream of the Ottoman army, and this army marched against Bahrām Mīrzā and the *qezelbāš* emirs who were with him, moving toward Arjīš. The advance patrols of both armies clashed and the Ottomans were routed. After this setback, Ebrāhīm Pasha declined to give battle to the *qezelbāš*, but incorporated in his army all the Ottoman troops who had taken refuge at Arjīš, and marched to rejoin Sülaymān's camp. Thus the fortress at Arjīš fell into Safavid hands, and Aḥmad Sultan Ṣūfī-oğlū was appointed commandant.

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[86] On the southern shore of Lake Vān. The city of Vān was situated on the eastern shore of the lake.

[87] Not to be confused with the renegade, Ğāzī Khan Takkalū.

[88] On the north side of Lake Vān.

The Third Invasion of Iran by Sultan Sülaymān, the Ottoman Emperor, This Time at the Instigation of Alqāṣ Mīrzā[90]

The commanders of the battlefield of eloquence have marshaled the armies of history in the following manner and narrate as follows: Olāma Takkalū had represented Iran in such alluring and enticing terms to Sultan Sülaymān that the latter spent night and day considering how he might draw her into his embrace. The defection of the Shah's brother, Alqāṣ Mīrzā, gave him another opportunity. Alqāṣ, that ignoramus, that ingrate, seduced by the words of a number of persons even more ignorant than himself, shortsightedly ruined his chances of happiness either in this world or the next by deserting a brother who treated him so lovingly and going to Anatolia. Sultan Sülaymān regarded his presence as an invaluable piece of good fortune, as presenting him with the means of subjugating Iran. Lured onward by this vain idea and beguiled by the baseless arguments of Alqāš Mīrzā, Sultan Sülaymān launched another invasion of Iran. The background to this story is as follows:

Shah Tahmasp loved Alqāṣ Mīrzā more than his other brothers and always treated him with great kindness and tenderness. After the subjugation of Šīrvān,[91] the Shah elevated him above his other brothers and distinguished him by giving him the title Šīrvānšāh,[92] and placing the government and administration of that province in his hands, so that his brothers envied him because of these marks of royal favor and kindness. But the foolish prince, at the instigation of certain seditious persons, converted the debt he owed his brother to disobedience and rebellion. In Šīrvān he found ready a numerous army and all the necessities for temporal rule and sovereignty. He at once rebelled and committed certain acts which were displeasing to the Shah, whose attitude toward him changed radically. He therefore took steps to suppress the revolt. Alqāṣ Mīrzā, brought somewhat to his senses by a realization of what the loss of royal favor involved, displayed remorse and contrition for his unworthy behavior and sent his mother, together with his son Sultan Aḥmad Mīrzā, to intercede with the Shah. Shah Tahmasp laid down as a condition that Alqāṣ Mīrzā should never again rebel against him; on this understanding, the Shah forgave him and pardoned his offenses.

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[89] Governors-general of the provinces.
[90] The younger brother of Shah Tahmasp, born 921/1515–16.
[91] 945/1538–39.
[92] I.e., king of Šīrvān.

The Shah then sent a number of the great emirs and elders of the state, including Seyyed Moḥammad Kamūna, Sevendūk Beg the *qūrčībāšī*,[93] Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, Šāhqolī Beg Ḵalīfa *mohrdār*, and Badr Khan Ostājlū, together with Alqāṣ Mīrzā's mother, to exact a solemn oath from the prince that he would never again be guilty of rebellion. The emirs carried out their orders and returned to court. It was agreed that in the course of that winter, a two-pronged attack should be made on the territory of the infidels,[94] and that they should engage in plundering raids and holy war: the Shah would raid Georgia; and Alqāṣ Mīrzā, Circassia.

After the emirs had returned to court, however, Alqāṣ Mīrzā minted coinage in his own name and included his name in the *ḵoṭba*,[95] and displayed even more signs of hostility and rebellion than before. Shah Tahmasp, on his return from the Georgian expedition, learned that his fickle brother had broken his oath and shown disrespect for the Shah. The Shah decided that he had to be punished and chastised. While Alqāṣ Mīrzā was still in Circassia, Tahmasp dispatched an army by forced marches to Šīrvān to take possession of the province; this army, commanded by Ėbrahim Khan Ẓu'l-Qadar, Gökča Sultan Qājār, and Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oḡlū,[96] laid siege to the fortress of Golestān. When he heard this news, Alqāṣ Mīrzā marched back from Circassia and reached Darband. The loyal army launched two attacks on him, and on each occasion he was defeated. In these two engagements a considerable number of those seditious *qezelbāš* who had been responsible for corrupting the mind of the prince were killed. When these preliminaries were reported to the Shah, he sent additional emirs to reinforce the loyal army, and the great emirs again marched against the prince while the Shah himself marched against him from the other direction.

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[93] See Savory, Offices II, p. 79.

[94] I.e., Christians. The Georgians belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church.

[95] The *ḵoṭba* was the address delivered each Friday at the principal congregational mosques throughout the Islamic world. It was mandatory to include in this address mention of the name of the legitimate ruling authority of the region. Omission of the ruler's name was the classic sign of defiance, and was tantamount to rebellion.

[96] The Zīād-oḡlū were a clan of the Qājār tribe.

The news of the approach of the Shah and of the renowned emirs threw Alqāṣ Mīrzā into a panic, and he fled toward Ḵenālīq.[97] His men began to desert him, troop by troop, to join the royal camp. The emirs pursued him and caught up with him near the river Samūr. The prince lost his head completely; without even stopping to put on his riding boots, galloped off with forty or fifty companions toward Dāḡestān, where he took refuge with Qerem Šamḵāl.[98] From there he went by ship to Kaffa,[99] and from Kaffa to Istanbul, where he presented himself to the Ottoman sultan. The fortresses of Darband and Golestān, which were held by Alqāṣ Mīrzā's men, resisted for a time, but were eventually captured by the loyalist army. Mehtar Dowlatyār[100] and certain other ill-fated men were put to death. The government of the province of Šīrvān was entrusted by the Shah to Esma'il Mīrzā,[101] and he ordered Gökča Sultan to remain in Šīrvān in attendance on that prince. The Shah then returned to his capital.

When Alqāṣ Mīrzā had been in residence at Istanbul for a while, he succeeded in arousing Sultan Sülaymān's ambitions with lying words and false arguments. In 955/1548-49, the Sultan marched forth for Iran with a vast army recruited from Anatolia, Syria, Egypt, Qarāmān, Dīār Rabī'a,[102] and Arab Iraq, accompanied by large quantities of artillery, gun carriages, and light cannon, and countless Janissaries. Shah Tahmasp left Tabriz to face the threat and spent a month mobilizing his forces, which assembled at the rendezvous of Šanb-e Ḡāzān.

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[97] See V. Minorsky, *A History of Sharvān and Darband*, Cambridge 1958, p. 173 (map).

[98] The Šamḵāl was the local ruler of Tarkī (Tarqu; Ṭarqi), near modern Petrovsk. *TM*, p. 163, *n* 5, mentions an Īldīrīm-Ḵān Šamḵāl, whose grandson was *vazīr* to Shah Sultan Ḥoseyn (1694–1722).

[99] In the Crimea. Its former name was Theodosia.

[100] Lit.: friend of good fortune—an ironic name in the circumstances!

[101] The future Shah Esma'il II. He was the second son of Shah Tahmasp, and was born in 940/1533–34.

[102] The area of Upper Mesopotamia centered on Mosul.

There, he was joined by Esma'il Mīrzā with the army of Šīrvān, and by other emirs and governors from all parts of the Safavid empire.

Shah Tahmasp dispatched reliable men to lay waste the entire area between Tabriz and the Ottoman frontier so that no trace of grain or grass remained. The people of Tabriz blocked up the underground water channels so that no drinking water could be found. Similarly, measures were taken to deny the enemy all forms of food. The Safavid advance guard, consisting of the great emir 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājlū together with Badr Khan Ostājlū, Ḥoseyn Khan Sultan Rūmlū, Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oġlū and others, was dispatched in the direction of Marand. The Shah himself went to the summer quarters of Aškanbar and camped in the rich pastures there.

When the Ottoman sultan reached the Persian frontier, he sent Olāma Takkalū with a detachment of Ottoman troops to lay siege to the fortress of Vān, and from Ḳoy he dispatched Alqāṣ Mīrzā with some of the pashas and *sanjāq-beys,* about forty thousand men in all, against the Safavid advance guard at Marand. He himself, with the main force, marched on Tabriz. Meanwhile, the great emirs who had gone in the direction of Marand had sent Zīād-oġlū and his men ahead as scouts. They came up against the Ottoman advance guard and a stubborn engagement ensued in which Zīād-oġlū distinguished himself by his valor. The emirs who had remained at the pasture grounds at Marand thought it prudent to retire toward the mountains in the face of the overwhelmingly superior Ottoman force, which kept on arriving, company by company. However, they left a detachment at Marand for intelligence purposes.

When Alqāṣ Mīrzā and the Ottomans reached Marand, the *qezelbāš* who had been left behind to give warning to their fellows showed themselves to the enemy, and as though confident of victory, advanced with drawn rein and gave battle to the enemy in regular military fashion. The Ottomans, deceived into thinking that this small detachment must have a large supporting force lying in ambush, fought only half-heartedly. Nevertheless, a stubborn contest developed between the two sides and ultimately the *qezelbāš,* still fighting hard, succeeded in rejoining the emirs, leaving the Ottomans amazed at the determination and bravery of this small band.

Since 'Abdollāh Khan and the *qezelbāš* emirs had left the Marand pasture grounds, the Ottomans too considered it expedient to retire.

They rejoined Sultan Sülaymān at Čarandāb near Tabriz. ʿAbdollāh Khan and the other emirs rejoined the Shah in his summer quarters at Aškanbar. The Shah disposed his forces on all sides of the Ottoman encampment and achieved some notable successes. The enemy were not left in peace night or day, and every day they suffered a number of casualties. As a result, the Ottomans were not able to set foot outside their camp in search of food. Foodstuffs and fodder for the animals were as scarce as dragon's teeth, and rich and poor alike were afflicted by the lack of bread. Driven by starvation, the Ottomans took to plundering the city, but they could find nothing edible. During the four days that Sultan Sülaymān occupied Tabriz, several thousand horses and mules died from lack of food.

Sülaymān began to regret this expedition to Iran and sought only a means of retreat. On the night when the royal army struck camp at Aškanbar and a rumor spread among the Ottomans that it was approaching Tabriz, Sultan Sülaymān beat the retreat. Sending the baggage on ahead, he himself remained in the saddle until daybreak and then left. The Tabriz mob at once set to plundering and killing the Ottomans, and a considerable number of the latter fell victim to the knives of the mob. It is strange to relate that during the few days the Ottomans were encamped at Čarandāb, thunderstorms and high winds stirred up so much dust, and the sky became so dark, that it was difficult to distinguish night from day. After the Ottomans had left, the sky cleared and fair weather set in.

At the Shah's command, the royal army marched in pursuit of the Ottomans, and at every stage of their retreat, they achieved some success against them. Sultan Sülaymān himself marched to Vān and set up his heavy siege guns in preparation for laying siege to the fortress. Shah ʿAlī Sultan Čeganī,[103] the commandant, terrified by the size and strength of the Ottoman army, handed over the fort and marched away. The Ottoman sultan installed Rostam Pasha as commandant.

The Ottomans had previously restored the fortress at Qārṣ,[104] located between Čokūr-e Saʿd and Erzerum. This fort, connected on one side with the Meskhia district of Georgia, had been ruined by the constant passage of armies. The Ottomans had restored it and had settled there some four or five thousand people from the bazaars and officials of

[103] A Kurdish tribe.

[104] Qārṣ, in Georgia, was situated at a distance of two days' journey southwest of Tiflis.

various types from Amāsīya, Erzerum, Tūqāt, Sīvās, Āq Šahr and other foreign parts. Sultan Sülaymān now sent 'Oṣmān Čelebī, the *qollar-āqāsī,*[105] with four or five thousand cavalry, to guard the place while the Sultan himself proceeded toward Muš.[106]

Shah Tahmasp did not relax his pursuit; he sent Esma'il Mīrzā and Gökča Sultan Qājār against the Ottoman detachment at Qārṣ. The Safavid force arrived before the walls of Qārṣ with the speed of lightning, having come by forced marches, and gave battle to the *qollar-āqāsī* and his men in the vicinity of the fort. The Ottomans were defeated; some two or three thousand soldiers and some four or five thousand of the bazaar people, and people from other parts whom the Ottomans had brought to Qārṣ to restore its prosperity, were slain by the *ğāzīs*. The survivors, in fear of their lives, shut themselves up in the citadel, which was immediately besieged by the victorious Safavid troops. Within three days, the position of the defenders had become so desperate that they sued for quarter. Quarter was granted to 'Oṣmān Čelebī and the rest of the defenders, who numbered about six hundred men. As they left the fort, the *qollar-āqāsī* struck Ṭabğūn Beg Qājār on the shoulder with his sword—an insane action. The rest of the Ottomans drew their swords and charged at Esma'il Mīrzā and those who were present with him to receive the surrender of the garrison. A general massacre ensued, and not one of the Ottomans escaped with his life. The *ğāzīs,* on orders from the Shah, then dismantled the fort and rejoined the royal camp.

Meanwhile, Bahrām Mīrzā had arrived with his troops from his fief of Hamadan, and the Shah sent him, together with Esma'il Mīrzā, in the direction of Bāybord; another detachment was sent to Aḵlāṭ, and yet another to 'Ādeljavāz. The Shah himself, advancing victoriously through the districts of Ḵamīs and Māsīs, proceeded towards the region of Muš. When Sultan Sülaymān saw that the Shah did not call off the pursuit, but that on the contrary, the *qezelbāš* forces were being augmented daily by units which kept arriving from all directions, he remembered Alqāṣ Mīrzā's words. "The *qezelbāš* tribes," Alqāṣ had said, "in their hearts support me. I have only to set foot on Persian soil, and they will flock to me."

The Ottomans therefore devised the plan of sending Alqāṣ Mīrzā and Olāma in different directions; they hoped that the *qezelbāš* would pursue them in order to prevent any mischief which might ensue, and the Sultan and the main Ottoman army would thus be able to get out of Iran in safety. Accordingly, Alqāş was sent with five thousand men, by way of Karkūya and Šahrazūr, toward Persian Iraq; and Olāma, with twelve thousand men, was dispatched toward the same province, accompanied by the Pasha of Erzerum. Sultan Sülaymān, with all the tents and baggage, passed by Betlīs[107] and entered Dīār Bakr.[108]

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[105] Officer in charge of the *qollar,* or slaves, of the Sultan. These were men, at this time mainly of non-Turkish origin, recruited for service in the Ottoman army or imperial administration.

[106] West of Lake Vān; in Armenia.

Shah Tahmasp reached the region of Muš, which he ravaged and burned, leaving no sign of cultivation in that area. When the news reached him that Olāma had been detached from the main Ottoman army and was moving from Terjān toward Erzerum with a body of Ottoman troops, the Shah marched in that direction with the greatest possible speed, pitching and striking camp like the wind. The main body of his men followed, company after company. When Olāma and the Ottoman troops who were with him heard of the Shah's approach, the officers were panic-stricken and abandoned Terjān without a blow having been struck. They took to their heels, thus leaving Terjān vacant for the royal army to enter. The *ḡāzīs* pursued the fleeing Ottomans for several days and brought back booty from the enemy they slew.

From Terjān, the Shah turned toward Arzenjān, in which region he camped for a while. There, he was rejoined by groups of emirs whom he had dispatched on various missions: Šāhqolī Sultan Afšār and his companions returned from raiding the tribes in the Aḵlāṭ region; they brought back with them about five thousand horses, one hundred thousand sheep, and fifty thousand cattle. Maḥmūd Khan Afšār, the governor of Kūh Gīlūya, "Bald"[109] Šāhverdī Ostājlū, and others who had been out on patrol, had collided with a group of Ottoman household troops and scouts and a fierce engagement had been fought in which the Ottomans were defeated. 'Alī Sultan Tātī-oḡlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, who had been sent with ten thousand men from the royal army to ravage the 'Ādeljavāz district, had come up against a strong Ottoman force at Güzel Dere. This force, which had separated from the main Ottoman army, was led by a considerable number of pashas and high-ranking Ottoman officers. Here too, the Safavids were victorious. The two princes, Bahrām Mīrzā and Esma'il Mīrzā, who had been sent with a detachment toward Bāybord, had encountered Moḥammad Pasha

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[107] Southwest of Lake Vān.

[108] I.e., northern Mesopotamia.

[109] Lit.: scald-head.

Tebek-oḡlū, and the soil of Bāybord was stained with the blood of the Ottoman dead.

In short, all the *qezelbāš* commanders returned victorious to Erzerum and presented the Shah with numerous enemy heads, together with the booty and equipment they had acquired in their various battles. Each of them was rewarded by the Shah with appropriate marks of favor. The losses and damage Iran had suffered at the hands of Sultan Sülaymān in this campaign had been repaid tenfold. The Ottomans had lost twenty thousand men killed. The Shah began his return march, moving from Arzenjān to Erīvān, and thence toward Qarābāḡ. From Qarābāḡ, he dispatched Esma'il Mīrzā, 'Abdollāh Khan, and Gökča Sultan to Šīrvān, and Sevendūk Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, with a detachment of the royal bodyguard, to ravage Šakkī.[110] At this juncture, the Shah received the news that Alqāṣ Mīrzā, who had been sent to Arab Iraq by Sultan Sülaymān, had entered Iran via Šahrazūr on his way to Hamadan,[111] where he had captured Bahrām Mīrzā's sons. His arrival in Persian Iraq had fanned the flames of sedition and revolt. The Shah at once recalled Esma'il Mīrzā and the *qūrčībāšī*, and the royal army departed for Iraq to suppress the revolt of Alqāṣ Mīrzā.

The Coming of Alqāṣ Mīrzā to Iraq with Ottoman Support, His Return and the End of His Career

After Alqāṣ Mīrzā had descended on Hamadan and seized possession of Bahrām Mīrzā's household, he marched to Qom and extended his sway over that area. From Qom, he sent a band of rascally Kurds to raid Rayy, while he himself moved to Kashan, which he occupied. Then he developed the ambition to take Isfahan, whose people and nobles refused to extend recognition to him, and strengthening their towers and fortifications, prepared for battle. Shah Tahmasp, meanwhile, was marching south from Ḵalḵāl through Ṭārom to Qazvin. From Qazvin, he dispatched Bahrām Mīrzā and Ebrahim Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Shiraz, against Alqāṣ.

Alqāṣ Mīrzā, when he heard that the Shah was marching against him and that Bahrām Mīrzā and Ebrahim Khan were close on his heels, felt the ground quake beneath his feet. Despairing of winning over the Isfahanis, he headed south for Fārs. On the way, he took possession of the fort at Yazdīḵāst[112] and, so that the townspeople would not close the gates of other fortresses against him, carried out a general massacre there and put many poor wretches to death. Despite this, the gates of Band-e Amīr were closed in his face and he was denied access to Shiraz. Turning aside, he passed through Deh 'Alī in the district of Ardakān,[113] and arrived before the walls of Qal'a-e Safīd, the White Fort. This fort was held by Joneyd Beg, the brother of Ebrahim Khan, and in the fort were women and children of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe.

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[110] The region lying northwest of Šīrvān.

[111] I have supplied these words, which seem to be required by the sense.

[112] On the main route from Isfahan to Shiraz.

Since the task of capturing the fort presented great difficulties, Alqāṣ did not tarry there either but marched away via Šūlestān and Behbehān toward Šūštar. Here too he was foiled, for Mīr 'Abd al-Vahhāb Šūštarī and the people of Šūštar closed the gates of the city and the citadel and entered into bitter and acrimonious dispute with him. Despairing of winning over the people of Šūštar either, he went to Dezfūl, but could achieve nothing there. In utter despair, he set off back to Baghdad, where he remained for some time.

The following year, 956/1549-50, he received an order from Sultan Süläymān recalling him. Since his disloyalty had closed all avenues to him, his fortunes began to wane. He now began to indulge in devious schemes and crafty intrigues against the Ottoman sultan and declined to go to Anatolia. He sent back Bahrām Mīrzā's family, whom he had brought with him. The Ottoman authorities realized that Alqāṣ was not going to achieve anything and that his continued presence in the Baghdad region would lead to nothing but revolt and sedition, causing insecurity and instability in the province and general disturbance among the people. They therefore expressed their opposition to Alqāṣ and urged Sultan Süläymān to get rid of him. The Sultan thereupon sent a large force against him and launched an unexpected assault on his camp.

In desperation, Alqāṣ Mīrzā fled from Arab Iraq and with a small number of men reached the territory of the Ardalān tribe.[114] When Shah Tahmasp heard the true facts of the situation, he sent against Alqāṣ, Bahrām Mīrzā, Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa *mohrdār*, and Ebrahim Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, with twenty thousand men. This force overtook Alqāṣ near the fortress of Marīvān and routed him. At his wits end and full of remorse for his actions, Alqāṣ took refuge in the fortress of Marīvān with Sorḵāb Ardalān. The Shah at once issued an imperial order, in the name of Sorḵāb, demanding that he surrender Alqāṣ. Sorḵāb had no choice but to obey the Shah's order. Alqāṣ Mīrzā begged that Shah Ne'matollāh Yazdī, who was his brother-in-law, should be allowed to come and fetch him. At the Shah's order, Shah Ne'matollāh took possession of Alqāṣ from Sorḵāb and brought him to the Shah.

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[113] See *Nozhat al-Qolūb* (trans. G. Le Strange, Leyden and London 1919, p. 127, *n* 4).

[114] A Kurdish tribe.

When Shah Tahmasp laid eyes on Alqāṣ, he said: "O my unkind brother! What harm have I ever done you, that you should turn away from your allegiance to your father's house, and should cast yourself down from the zenith of honor to the nadir of baseness, and should make overtures to the enemy, and be responsible for so much sedition, rebellion, and bloodshed?" Alqāṣ had no answer except shame and regret, and hung his head in remorse. Fraternal feelings moved the Shah to have compassion on him, and he spared his life. However, since Alqāṣ had stirred up sedition among the *qezelbāš* tribes and was unworthy of trust, and since the elders of the exalted Sufi class were not willing that he should be released, Shah Tahmasp, trying to please everybody, sent him to the fortress-prison of Qahqaha. It was arranged that his son, Sultan Aḥmad Mīrzā, should be with him. Eventually, Sām Mīrzā and his son were also imprisoned in this fortress, and all four princes spent their days there.[115] Thus the great revolt which this foolish, disloyal brother stirred up was put down, and the flames of his rebellion subsided. God be praised!

Sultan Sülaymān's Fourth Invasion of Azerbaijan Contemporary Events and the Conclusion of Peace Between Those Two Imperial Monarchs

In the year 961/1553-34, five years after the suppression of Alqāṣ Mīrzā's rebellion, when all was peaceful and quiet in Iran, Eskandar Pasha, the governor-general of Erzerum, stirred up trouble, and once more Sultan Sülaymān, at his instigation, took the field against Iran.

When the Ottoman sultan retired from his third invasion of Iran, which had been inspired by Alqāṣ Mīrzā, as has already been related, Shah Tahmasp had pursued him to the borders of Dīār Bakr and Arzenjān, harassing him as he retreated, and inflicting the maximum possible damage on him. Sultan Sülaymān delayed his return to Iran for some time, being occupied with campaigning in Europe. The Shah too forebore to send his armies against the Islamic world, and occupied himself with raids against Georgia. Mankind enjoyed four or five years of undisturbed prosperity, and perfect peace prevailed on the frontiers. If some minor acts of insubordination were observed on the part of the Kurdish chiefs, they were overlooked and not treated as a major revolt or as a reason for breaking the peace. Indeed, the Shah, mindful of the welfare of God's servants, opened peace negotiations, and sent a friendly letter to Sultan Sülaymān by the hand of Mīr Šams Valīkānī, a *seyyed* who was known as Šams-e Falak-e davvār ("the sun of the revolving heaven").

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[115] According to Shah Tahmasp's own account, Alqāṣ Mīrzā was imprisoned at Alamut and killed a few days later, ostensibly as the result of a private feud.

Eskandar Pasha, however, was a seditious man and a troublemaker. Initially, he was governor of Vān, and had no great reputation for reliability. Without any warning, he marched from Vān to Ḵoy, and there put to death Ḥājjī Beg Donbolī, who was an ally of the Safavid royal house, together with a number of the people of Ḵoy. He received recognition for this action by his appointment as governor-general of Erzerūm. The same year, he spread abroad along the frontier the fame of his prowess and boldness, and marched against Ḥoseyn Khan Sultan Rūmlū, who was in command at Erīvān. Ḥoseyn Khan considered it prudent not to give battle; turning aside so as not to confront him, he waited for developments. Eskandar Pasha entered Erīvān, where he did a certain amount of damage and killed a number of people; then he returned. Merely on the strength of these two improper acts and because the Shah, mindful of the welfare of his people, did not want to break the peace, and thus no Safavids came to take punitive action against him, he began to behave in an unreasonable manner. Puffed up with pride, he addressed insolent communications to the Safavid frontier emirs and dared to commit acts which exceeded all bounds, thus stirring up trouble. In one instance, when the Shah sent a force of Qājār emirs to raid Georgia, in the direction of Dādīān, Eskandar Pasha took a large force and attacked the *qezelbāš* camp when the emirs were absent on a raid, and killed many Qājār *ġāzīs*. His unbridled and intemperate behavior exceeded all reasonable limits, and he became a disturber of the peace.

At this point, in reply to a letter from the Shah in which he made certain promises in return for a treaty of peace, Sultan Sülaymān, urged on by Eskandar Pasha, sent a threatening communication announcing his imminent invasion of Iran. This letter aroused the Shah's anger, and he gave orders for the mobilization of his army. In a short space of time, the *qezelbāš* tribes assembled from all parts of the empire at the Shah's summer quarters at Āq Meşqāl. The Shah decided on the following course of action: before the Ottoman army could set out, he would march to the frontier, and lay it waste. In addition, he would fittingly punish Eskandar Pasha, and give him a rude awakening from his arrogant fantasies.

The Shah therefore divided his army into four corps, each corps under the command of an emir of the highest rank, and dispatched each in a different direction. He himself marched on Aḵlāṭ and besieged the fort there. His emirs ravaged and burned the districts of Vān, Betlīs, Māsīs, 'Ādeljavāz, and as far as the plain of Muš. Wherever they met any groups of Ottomans or Kurds who offered resistance, they gave battle and defeated them, and many emirs and trusted leaders of the Ottomans and Kurds were killed or captured. Laden with booty, the *qezelbāš* emirs returned to the royal camp.

After their return, the Shah turned his attention to the punitive expedition against Eskandar Pasha. He dispatched to Erzerum, under the supreme command of Esmā'īl Mīrzā, an army of leading emirs such as Badr Ḵān Ostājlū, Šāhqolī Solṭān Ostājlū, who was now the governor of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, Moḥammad Ḵān Mowṣellū Torkmān, Šāhverdī Solṭan Zīād-oğlū, the governor of Qarābāğ, with other emirs, a group of the *qūrčīs* of the royal bodyguard, and other troops. Eskandar Pasha, on hearing of the approach of the *qezelbāš* army, took counsel with the Ottoman emirs and governors-general who had joined him from Arzenjān, Bāybord, Kāḵ, Mar'aš, Trebizond, Georgia, Dadīān, and Kūrbāl.

Eskandar Pasha asked his emirs whether they should go out and fight, or prepare for a siege. The Ottoman emirs considered it inexpedient to fight a pitched battle: "The prince," they said, "has come with an extremely large army, and we do not have the strength to oppose him." But Eskandar Pasha, who had a large army of Ottomans and Kurds, and whose own conceit and arrogance had been increased by the spreading of the tales of his exploits along the frontier, would not listen to the advice of prudent men of sound judgment. Determined to give battle, he sent on ahead a body of young veterans as an advance guard, while he himself drew up his forces in battle array some two miles outside the city of Erzerum. In front of his army he stationed five hundred Janissaries, armed with muskets, together with twenty gun carriages, light cannon, and Frankish[116] guns.

When the Safavid skirmishers caught sight of the Ottoman advance patrols, they charged them and dealt with them in a satisfactory manner; those who escaped the sword rejoined the Ottoman center. This caused considerable panic in the Ottoman ranks, and the *qezelbāš* skirmishers then launched an attack on the Ottoman center. The commanders of both the Safavid right and left wings then entered the fray, and a hot battle developed along the whole length of the Ottoman line. The *qezelbāš* forces began to gain the upper hand and to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. Eskandar Pasha, seeing the impetuosity and valor of the *qezelbāš* troops and not to be outdone, led a large force from the Ottoman center and attacked the Safavid skirmishers. At the height of the battle, the Safavid center, led by Prince Esma'il in person, came into view. The sight of this formidable new force, arriving at a time when his own men were beginning to waver, made Eskandar Pasha resolve to break off the engagement, and he retreated in disorder and took refuge in the citadel.

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[116] I.e., of European pattern.

The Safavid forces pursued the defeated Ottoman troops to the walls of Erzerum, and the losses of the Ottoman cavalry, the Kurds and the Janissaries, amounted to some three thousand men killed. Among those taken prisoner were Ramażān Beg, the brother of Eskandar Pasha; Moḥammad Beg, the *qollar-āqāsī*, or officer in command of the slaves of the Sultan; and a number of trusted emirs, such as the governor of Mar'aš, the governor of Malāṭīya, the governor of Trebizond, and a certain Maḥmūd Beg. The latter was the nephew of Ḳeybar Beg, who had been governor of Aleppo in the time of Sultan Qānṣūḥ, the ruler of Egypt and Syria.[117] Ḳeybar Beg had severed his ties of loyalty to that dynasty,[118] gone to Sultan Selīm, and incited him to subjugate Egypt, Syria and the Ḥejāz. Also among the prisoners were the emir of Māsīs and the emirs of the Kurdish provinces. After their victory, the *qezelbāš* plundered and burned the region and returned laden with booty. The command was then given to strike camp and rejoin the royal camp, which they found at Arjīš, which the Shah was besieging after his capture of Aḳlāṭ. The *qezelbāš* emirs were received by the Shah, and those who had distinguished themselves by their exploits, particularly Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oḡlū, were the recipients of his special favor. The prisoners were brought before the Shah, and the majority of them were put to death.

The circumstances of the capture of Aḳlāṭ are as follows: when the Shah arrived before the walls and laid siege to the fort, the defenders resisted for a few days, but then felt themselves unable to continue to defend the fort and the town. They found persons to intercede for them, and handed over the fort. The Shah gave orders for the fort to be dismantled, and despite its strength, it was razed to the ground within a short time.

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[117] Reigned 1501-17.

[118] I.e., the Mameluke sultans.

The Shah then marched to besiege the fort at Arjīš. Here the commandant, relying on the strength of the fortifications and on his plentiful stock of supplies, defied the Shah. Ottoman gunners and musketeers poured their fire on the Safavid camp, and both sides fought with great determination. Gradually the *ğāzīs* pushed their breastworks right up to the walls, thus allowing a huge siege gun which Darvīš Beg, a royal artilleryman, had placed beneath the walls, to play on the towers and battlements and to shake the foundations of the fort.

For three months the defenders put up a stout resistance, but in the fourth month they began to weaken. Among the defenders were a number of Kurds. It is a characteristic of the men of this tribe that, when they are in a crisis, they think only of their own interests; in this way they remain friends of fortune and are ready to deal with the vicissitudes of fate. These men were no exception; they killed the commandant of the fort and hoisted *qezelbāš* troops up over the walls. In this manner, the fort at Arjīš fell into the hands of the Safavids, and it too, at the Shah's command, was destroyed.

From Arjīš, the Shah marched to lay siege to the fort of Nārgīrī. The besieged defended the fort valiantly, and for a number of days there was hot fighting between the two sides. Finally, however, the defenders lost heart and sued for quarter, which was granted. The commandant of the fort left the fortress on promise of quarter, and his life was spared.

After the capture of Nārgīrī, the Shah sent Esma'il Mīrzā and Sevendūk Beg the *qūrčībāšī* to raid Kurdestan. He also sent a number of emirs on a punitive expedition against some rebellious Maḥmūdī tribesmen. Both forces, after killing and plundering the perfidious Kurds, returned to camp with abundant booty.

Sultan Sülaymān, who had planned to invade Azerbaijan and had advanced as far as Aleppo, was unable to advance farther that year because of the shortage of provisions. He therefore spent the winter at Aleppo, making his preparations for the invasion of Iran the following year. Since it was the season to go into winter quarters, the Shah, returning in triumph from his campaign in Armenia, wintered at Naḵčevān.

The following year (961/1553-54), Sultan Sülaymān marched from Aleppo with a large army. The Shah moved from Naḵčevān to his summer quarters at Bāzār-čāy and sent one group of men under the command of Esma'il Mīrzā, Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, *amīr-e dīvān,* and Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa *mohrdār* in the direction of Vān and Vastān. Another group, under the command of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, who relied on the experience of the veteran officer Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oğlū, was dispatched in another direction. Their object was to burn the land in the path of the Ottoman army and to leave no cultivation in that area. Both groups carried out their orders and rejoined the royal camp at Bāzār-čāy.

When Sultan Sülaymān reached the borders of Iran, the summer season had already passed. The Shah sent out scouts in every direction to obtain intelligence on the enemy; these scouts were under the command of his most experienced and brave officers, who had orders not to lose any opportunity of harrying the enemy. The crafty old soldiers in these *qezelbāš* detachments licked their lips in anticipation of Ottoman loot and, at every stage, they scored local successes against the Ottomans and inflicted casualties upon them. Not a day passed without their sending back to the Shah enemy heads, booty, and prisoners. By the time Sultan Sülaymān reached Naḵčevān, he had suffered not inconsiderable losses at their hands.

When the Ottoman sultan camped at Naḵčevān, Shah Tahmasp reviewed his troops. About forty thousand[119] cavalry, men who received regular salaries, passed in review before him, mounted on Arabian horses and fully equipped; they were followed by the rest of the men who were in the royal camp on a comparable basis. After reviewing his army, the Shah set out from his summer quarters at Bāzār-čāy with all the pomp of Ḵosrow and the majesty of the Keyānīd monarchs, to meet the enemy. Sultan Sülaymān had found it impossible to remain at Naḵčevān because of the shortage of provisions, so he burned the city and retired in the direction of Erzerum.

[119] Contrast his position in 940/1533-34, when he had only seven thousand loyal men with him.

The Shah's army pursued him, killing and taking prisoner a number of Ottomans at every stage of their retreat.

In the course of his retreat, Senān Beg, who was one of the Sultan's intimate companions and special favorites, while out on patrol, came into conflict with a group of Safavid scouts and was taken prisoner after a skirmish. Sultan Sülaymān was distressed by the capture of Senān Beg and regretted his fruitless expedition to Iran. As a result, he expressed his desire for peace to Moḥammad Pasha, the grand vizier, who was an upright, well-disposed man, and was constantly urging him to open peace negotiations. Accordingly, Moḥammad Pasha wrote letters to the frontier emirs informing them that peace negotiations were under way. At the same time, he entreated the Shah to release Senān Beg and to send him back with an envoy empowered to enter into negotiations. Shah Tahmasp, in response to the appeal of Moḥammad Pasha, and influenced by the intercession of well-disposed persons on the Safavid side, released Senān Beg.

Since on the one hand hostility and conflict between monarchs bring ruin to the realm, and on the other peaceful relations between just rulers bring security and stability in the affairs of both military and civilians alike, the Shah became disposed to make peace, with the specific object of improving the lot of the ordinary people who had suffered blows from both sides, being trampled underfoot by the passage of the armies. Accordingly, the Shah sent back with Senān Beg Šāhqolī Beg, an elder of the Qājār tribe, who was a member of the royal bodyguard. Sultan Sülaymān, now disposed to making peace, sent Šāhqolī Beg back laden with gifts and favors. The Shah thereupon called off the pursuit of the Ottoman army and led his forces in a raid against Georgia. An account of Shah Tahmasp's raids against Georgia and of his subjugation of that country will be given in an appendix to this section.

After the return of Šāhqolī Beg, the Shah, on the advice of Moḥammad Pasha, sent a friendly letter to Sultan Sülaymān with Farroḵzād Beg Qarādāğlū the *ešīk-āqāsī*[120] and entered into formal negotiations for a peace treaty. For his part, Sultan Sülaymān sent trusted ambassadors bearing cordial greetings to the Shah. An official treaty of peace was concluded, attested by sworn oaths and agreements and ratified by the exchange of documents and gifts. Of the disputed border areas, some were allocated to the Ottomans, some to the Safavids. The frontier was determined, and rules laid down in regard to it. Muslims who had been tormented by the constant passage of the armies of both sides were left in peace. Talented scholars in Iran have devised the following chronogram to mark the date of this peace treaty: "Peace is a boon."[121]

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[120] *Ešīk-āqāsī* was a blanket term denoting a variety of officials of widely differing rank (see *TM*, index).

Peace remained unbroken for the remainder of the lifetime of Shah Tahmasp. In 974/1566, Sultan Sülaymān died and was succeeded by his son Sultan Selīm II. Following his father's example, he pursued a policy of friendship toward Shah Tahmasp, with whom he maintained a father-son relationship. Communications and embassies were constantly going to and fro between them, and gifts and presents were exchanged. Selīm II reigned for eight years and died in 982/1574. He was succeeded by his son Sultan Morād who, during the lifetime of Shah Tahmasp and the reign of Esma'il Mīrzā,[122] did not deviate from the path of friendship and sworn peace. After the death of Esma'il Mīrzā and the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Pādešāh, he broke the covenants and pledges of his forefathers, threw the tranquil world into a tumult, and brought down calamity upon the heads of ordinary people. My account of these events will be given at the appropriate place. For the moment, I will direct my pen to describe the various campaigns conducted by Shah Tahmasp against the infidels of Georgia.

The Subjugation and Annexation of Šīrvān

The first of the kingdoms to be subjugated by Shah Tahmasp was that of Šīrvān.[123] The *vālīs*[124] of Šīrvān are descendants of Ḵosrow

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[121] This chronogram appears to give the year 969/1561, whereas the Treaty of Amasya was signed in 962-63/1555.

[122] This chronicle always refers to Shah Esma'il II as Esma'il Mīrzā (Prince Esma'il), possibly because his reign was of such short duration (15 months).

[123] Šīrvān had first been conquered by Shah Esma'il I in 915/1509-10, and since that time the rulers of Šīrvān had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Safavid shahs. In 945/1538, however, Shah Tahmasp brought Šīrvān under direct Safavid rule and gave the province to his brother Alqāṣ Mīrzā as a fief. The ancient dynasty of the Šīrvānshāhs was thus brought to an end, although various descendants of Shaikh Shah made attempts to regain their territory with Ottoman assistance. Šīrvān, the subject of dispute between Persians, Turks, and Russians during the 17th and 18th centuries, was finally incorporated into Russian territory in 1820.

[124] In Safavid usage, the term *vālī* (*lit.:* governor) denoted the ruler of a frontier province who acknowledged the suzerainty of the Safavid shah but enjoyed a large degree of independence. In many cases, these *vālīs* belonged to local minor dynasties of considerable antiquity, and it was sound Safavid policy to leave them as far as possible undisturbed. In later Safavid times, there were four *vālīs* ruling the provinces of 'Arabestān (Ḵūzestān), northern Lorestān, Georgia, and Kurdestan.

Anūšīrvān,[125] and are known as Šīrvānšāhs. Among the *vālīs* of Šīrvān who had ruled that country in unbroken line of descent was Farroḵ Yasār b. Farāmarz b. Goštāsb b. Farroḵzād b. Amīr Ḵalīlollāh b. Solṭān Ebrāhīm b. Solṭān Moḥammad b. Farroḵzād b. Manūčehr, styled Ḵāqān (the poet Ḵāqānī obtained his pen name by virtue of being his panegyrist). Farroḵ Yasār was hostile toward the Safavid dynasty, as has been already related, and fought against Sultan Joneyd and Sultan Ḥeydar,[126] who were both killed in battle. Finally, Farroḵ Yasār was killed by the avenging sword of Shah Esma'il, and the house of Šīrvān fell into disorder.

Sultan Ḵalīl b. Šeyḵ Šāh b. Farroḵ Yasār visited the court of Shah Esma'il and declared his submission and obedience to the Shah. He was well received and honored by a marriage alliance with the Safavid royal house.[127] Sultan Ḵalīl was also confirmed in his position as ruler of Šīrvān. After the death of Esma'il, he continued to be regarded with favor by Shah Tahmasp, and enjoyed prosperity until his death in 942/1535, in the twelfth year of his reign. Since he left no offspring, the emirs of Šīrvān placed his nephew, Šāhroḵ b. Solṭān Farroḵ b. Šeyḵ Šāh, who was still an infant, on the throne. Because of the ambition and egotism of the emirs, the administration of Šīrvān was thrown into confusion, the dynasty was rent by dissension, and the country lapsed into disorder.

At this point, a young man, a *qalandar*,[128] put forward the claim that he was Sultan Moḥammad b. Šeyḵ Šāh. A large army gathered around him, and he seized possession of Sālīān.[129] From there he marched on Šamāḵī,[130] where the supporters of Šāhroḵ, because the emirs were out of control and the army disunited, did not have sufficient strength to oppose him. They retired to the fortress of Bīqord,[131] allowing the

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[125] The validity of the claim of the Šīrvānshāhs to descent from the celebrated Sassanian monarch Anūšīrvān is open to doubt (see V. Minorsky, *A History of Sharvān and Darband*, Cambridge 1958, p. 129 hereinafter quoted as Minorsky, *Darband*).

[126] Eskandar Monšī is mistaken here: Sultan Ḥeydar fell in battle against a combined force of Āq Qoyūnlū and the troops of the Šīrvānshāh Farroḵ Yasār in 1488, but his father Joneyd was killed in 1456 fighting against the Šīrvānshāh Sultan Ḵalīl b. Šeyḵ Ebrāhīm.

[127] Sultan Ḵalīl b. Šeyḵ Šāh married Shah Esma'il's daughter, Parī Khan Ḵānom.

[128] *Qalandars* were wandering dervishes not belonging to any of the regular Sufi orders.

[129] In Šīrvān, "near the delta of the Kūr" (TM, p. 167).

[130] The capital of Šīrvān, located on a western headwater of the Pīr-Saqat River, some 40 kilometers to the east of Aḵ-Sū (Minorsky, *Darband*, p. 75).

[131] At the source of the Gök-čay (see Minorsky, *Darband*, p. 138).

qalandar to take possession of Šamāḵī, the Šīrvānšāh's capital. Since the *qalandar's* supporters were disorganized vagrants, with not an intelligent, experienced man among them, in their stupidity and because of their lack of planning, they evacuated Šamāḵī and returned in the direction of Sālīān. When the nobles of Šīrvān in the fortress of Bīqord heard that they had left, they accompanied Šāhroḵ in pursuit of the rebels. They caught up with them near Sālīān and fought an engagement in which Šāhroḵ's men were victorious. The *qalandar* was taken prisoner by the Šīrvānīs and Šeyḵ-e Pādār[132] put him to death.

The emirs of Šīrvān, however, resumed their excessive and immoderate behavior and carried it to even greater lengths than before. They began to lay hands on the property and damage the reputation of Muslims. Šāhroḵ, because of his tender years, was unable to check them. Eventually, the people came to the end of their tether in the face of this oppression, and appealed for assistance to the Safavid court. The *qūrčībāšī-ye pādār* and a number of ordinary soldiers also came and asked for help.

Shah Tahmasp considered it his kingly duty to subjugate Šīrvān and to suppress the authors of sedition and revolt who were oppressing the people. In 945/1538-39, the Shah dispatched an army of twenty thousand men to Šīrvān under the command of Alqāṣ Mīrzā, who was accompanied by Mantašā Solṭān Ostājlū, a number of Qājār and Tavāleš emirs and men of Qarābāğ, as well as the *qūrčībāšī-ye pādār*. The royal army crossed the river Kor by boat and invaded Šīrvān. The people of Šīrvān were in a refractory, hostile, and rebellious mood, and they strengthened their forts with garrisons of seasoned troops and prepared to fight. The Safavid assault troops first captured the fort of Sorḵāb Goldenglān,[133] then the fort of Qabala. The Shah's ambition was then directed toward the reduction of the fortress of Golestān, the strongest fort in Šīrvān, and he ordered a detachment to lay siege to it.

Since Šāhroḵ himself was in the fortress of Bīqord, the Shah led his main force in that direction. Ḥoseyn Beg, the lieutenant[134] of Šāhroḵ Mīrzā, came out to meet the *qezelbāš* army and an engagement was fought in the valley of Bīqord. The royal army soon filled the valley with the blood of the enemy; a defeated Ḥoseyn Beg retired to the castle, where he strengthened the fortifications and prepared to resist a siege. The *qezelbāš* commenced the siege, with fighting every day between the two sides. The Šīrvānīs persisted in their opposition and defiance, and the siege dragged on for four months. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Šakkī,[135] came to the aid of the Šīrvānīs. Approaching the *qezelbāš* camp with a view to making a night attack on it, he beat the war drums and sounded the horns. A group of Safavid warriors and *qūrčīs* rushed to meet the attackers and beat them off. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, having lost a lot of men, retired without having accomplished anything.

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[132] The meaning of *pādār* is obscure. See Savory, Development, p. 244 and *n* 7. I am now inclined to think that Pādār may be the proper name of a tribe: Olearius, ii, 37, refers to Pādār as "ein Räubervolke," and one of the tribes of Turkman stock living northwest of Šamāḵī in Soviet Azerbaijan is named Pādar.

[133] See B. Dorn, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kaukasischen Länder und Völker aus morgenländischen Quellen*, I, p. 598.

The Šīrvānīs, since there was no one else from whom they could solicit aid, gave up. They sent a message saying they were ready to surrender the fort to the Shah in person, whenever he should arrive. The emirs reported this faithfully to the Shah, who at once marched toward Šīrvān from Marand. The day after he camped before the walls of the fort at Bīqord, Ḥoseyn Beg the *vakīl* came forth with the other nobles, bringing Šāhroḵ, and they handed over to the officers of the court the key of the fort and the keys of the treasury and storehouses. The commandant of the fort of Golestān also came forth to surrender. Ḥoseyn Beg the *vakīl*, together with most of the Šīrvānī army chiefs, were put to death for their opposition, presumption, and rebellion. Shortly afterward, Šāhroḵ Mīrzā also died,[136] and Alqāṣ Mīrzā was appointed governor of Šīrvān by the Shah, who returned to Azerbaijan. The court poets devised the chronogram "the conquest of Šīrvān" to mark this event.[137]

For nine years, Alqāṣ Mīrzā governed Šīrvān with full independence. Then, led astray by the enjoyment of an abundance of kingly pomp and circumstance, and by the possession of increasing power and an expanding army, he rebelled against his benefactor the Shah, as has been recounted, and committed himself to everlasting apostasy. The Shah gave the province of Šīrvān to his son, Esma'il Mīrzā, and left Gökča Solṭān Qājār in attendance on the prince. After the prince had established himself in Šīrvān, someone called Borhān, the grandson of one of the sultans of Šīrvān,[138] who had been living among the people of Qeytāq,[139] entered Šīrvān in the year 954/1547-48[140] and took up residence at Qolhān.[141] A number of seditious persons and scattered groups of the Šīrvānī army rallied round him, and he felled trees and constructed palisades in the forests, in preparation for a fight.

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[134] I am not sure whether the word *vakīl* is used here in a specific or in a general sense. In Safavid usage, of course, it was a technical administrative term, and the precise meaning is determined by the context.

[135] A principality lying northwest of Šīrvān.

[136] Münejjem-bāšī, quoted in Minorsky, *Darband*, p. 133, states that Šāhroḵ Mīrzā was first imprisoned and then put to death by Shah Tahmasp.

[137] This ingenious chronogram involves the deduction of one hundred years from the numerical value of the phrase: *fatḥ-e Šīrvān*. This gives 1055 minus 100 equals 955. The correct date (945/1538) can only be obtained by reading *šarvān* instead of *šīrvān*, thus omitting the letter *yā'*, which has a numerical value of 10.

Esma'il Mīrzā and Gökča Sultan marched with a large force to suppress the rebels, and fierce fighting took place between the skirmishers on both sides. When Esma'il Mīrzā came up with the main force, the Šīrvānī forces were unable to continue their resistance and were defeated. Borhān Mīrzā escaped to Dāğestān after suffering much hardship and affliction, but many of his supporters were killed. When the news was confirmed that the Ottoman sultan was marching on Iran with the apostate Alqāṣ, Esma'il Mīrzā and Gökča Sultan, on orders from the Shah, left Šīrvān and joined the royal camp. Borhān Mīrzā, finding Šīrvān stripped of *qezelbāš* troops, came to Šamāḵī and took possession of Šīrvān. He reigned there for a while, but the fortunes of his dynasty were on the wane and he died not long afterward.[142]

In 956/1549-50, after Sultan Sülaymān had returned to Turkey and Alqāṣ Mīrzā had been captured, the governorship of Šīrvān was awarded to 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājlū, the son of Qarā Khan and a relation of Khan Moḥammad Ostājlū.[143] 'Abdollāh Khan was both the nephew and the son-in-law of Shah Esmaʿil.[144] The Šīrvānīs, because they had acquiesced in and supported the ephemeral reign of Borhān Mīrzā, were apprehensive of ʿAbdollāh Khan; they gathered at a rendezvous and agreed to put on the throne a youth named Meḥrāb, who was a relative of Borhān Mīrzā, and prepared to oppose ʿAbdollāh Khan. The latter marched against them, overcame the resistance of the Šīrvānīs, and defeated them. Meḥrāb Mīrzā escaped, but most of his men were killed.

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[138] Borhān 'Alī Sultan was the grandson of Shaikh Shah (see Minorsky, *Darband*, p. 133).

[139] Probably a region of southern Dāğestān; see Minorsky, *Darband*, index, *s.v.* Khaydāq.

[140] According to Münejjem-bašī (quoted in Minorsky, *Darband*, p. 133), Borhān had already made one attempt to establish himself in Šīrvān in 951/1544, when he had attacked the Safavid governor Alqāṣ Mīrzā.

[141] A dependency of Qūbta in southern Šīrvān.

[142] In 958/1551, after ruling Šīrvān for two years (Minorsky, *Darband*, p. 133, quoting Münejjem-bašī). According to this source, Borhān Mīrzā owed his success in seizing power in Šīrvān to the support of Ottoman troops.

[143] He was his brother.

The Šīrvānī survivors, because of their ill-starred destiny, made yet another attempt at revolt; they nominated Qorbān ʿAlī Mīrzā, a kinsman of Meḥrāb, as their ruler, and sought refuge on an offshore island in the Caspian Sea. ʿAbdollāh Khan made repeated attempts to win back their allegiance, but they rejected his overtures and persisted in their rebellious attitude. ʿAbdollāh Khan marched against them once again, and the *qezelbāš ḡāzīs* rode their horses into the water, crossed to the island, and came to grips with that seditious band. They slew most of them and returned laden with large quantities of loot. After this, ʿAbdollāh Khan established himself firmly as governor of Šīrvān, and his fame spread in those parts. For some years he enjoyed prosperity and good fortune.

In the year 961/1553-54, when Sultan Sülaymān invaded Azerbaijan for the fourth time, a man named Qāsem was sent to Šīrvān with an army, passing through Kaffa on his way. This man was descended from the former rulers of Šīrvān and had taken refuge at the Ottoman court. When he passed Darband and set foot in Šīrvān, the people again rebelled, withdrew their allegiance from ʿAbdollāh Khan, and rallied around Qāsem. ʿAbdollāh Khan led his forces against the rebels, and the two armies met at Tanga, a place of great strength. Because of its strength, ʿAbdollāh Khan was unable to achieve anything and returned to Šamāḵī. Qāsem then occupied the fortress of Bīqord and prepared for battle. When he was ready, he marched against ʿAbdollāh Khan with twelve thousand[145] Ottoman troops, Šīrvānīs, and Janissaries. The *qezelbāš* elders who were with

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[144]

Esmaʿil I
sister m. Qarā Khan Ostājlū
Tahmasp
daughter m. ʿAbdollāh Khan Ostājlū

ʿAbdollāh Khan Ostājlū was therefore the nephew of Shah Esmaʿil I, the son-in-law of Shah Esmaʿil I, and the brother-in-law of Shah Tahmasp.

[145] MS. has ten thousand.

the Khan, lost their nerve because of the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy and hesitated to give battle.

But ʻAbdollāh Khan, relying on the support of the celestial hosts and the good fortune of the Shah, prepared to meet the enemy with the two[146] thousand men he had with him. The armies met near the fort of Golestān, and heavy fighting went on all day. Toward nightfall, the rebels' star finally began to wane and the enemy broke. The *ḡāzīs* slew great numbers of the enemy, piling up their heads into pillars. The survivors fled in the direction of Ṭabarsarān.[147] The fate of Qāsem is unknown: he may have been killed in the battle, or he may have fled to some unknown spot. Qāżī Aḥmad Ḡaffārī states in the *Tārīḵ-e Jahān-ārā* that when his forces were finally routed, Qāsem left the battlefield, but his eventual fate is unknown.

After this victory, ʻAbdollāh Khan's rule was established more firmly than ever. Rebellious elements were chastised by his sharp sword, and the peasants and common people were protected by his justice and compassion. Stability characterized the affairs of the province; ʻAbdollāh Khan's presence inspired such awe and fear in the hearts of the people of Šīrvān, Ṭabarsarān, and Dāḡestān that no thought of rebellion entered the mind of anyone, great or small. In 974/1566-67, when he had been governor of Šīrvān for sixteen years, ʻAbdollāh Khan died, and Aras Khan Rūmlū was appointed to succeed him. The latter continued to hold this post during the remainder of Shah Tahmasp's lifetime.

The Conquest of the Province of Šakkī in 958/1551

Another province conquered by Shah Tahmasp was Šakkī.[148] This province is bounded on two sides by Šīrvān, on the third side by Georgia, and on the fourth side by Dāḡestān and the Alborz Mountains. Ḥasan Beg, who was descended from a long line of rulers of Šakkī, a dynasty forming one of the side branches of the dynasty of the Šīrvānšāhs, had been expelled from his country by the Georgians. In his flight he had sought refuge at the court of Shah Esmaʻil I, where he had been favorably received and granted assistance. In the same year as the death of Shah Esmaʻil (930/1524), Lavand Khan, the ruler of the Kakhetia district of Georgia, brought an army to Šakkī. In a battle fought between him and Ḥasan Beg, the latter was killed. The nobles of Šakkī made his son, Darvīš Moḥammad, their ruler, but he, reversing his father's policy, adopted a hostile attitude toward the officers of the Safavid empire. On numerous occasions he displayed signs of opposition, and in the year Shah Tahmasp dispatched an army to subjugate Šīrvān (945/1538-39), Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, as has already been related, made a night attack on the *qezelbāš* camp.

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[146] I follow the MS. here. The printed text has "twelve," which makes no sense in the context.

[147] See Minorsky, *Darband*, pp. 91-92.

[148] Lying west of Šīrvān and east of the Kakhetia district of Georgia.

In the year 958/1551, the royal army marched to subjugate Šakkī. News of the approach of the Shah cast terror into the hearts of the rulers of those regions, and Lavand Khan the Georgian visited the court with a view to offering his services to the Shah. Lavand Khan was received in audience by the Shah in the region of the Aras River, and was honored by marks of royal favor.

The Shah then sent letters, couched in winning terms and containing promises of royal favors, to Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, calling on him to submit and acknowledge the suzerainty of the Shah. That ill-starred man, however, turned his face away from the bliss which contains the assurance of everlasting happiness and, trusting in the strength of his fortresses, prepared to resist the Shah. Some of the Šakkī nobles prepared to defend the fort of Kīš, while Darvīš Moḥammad Khan himself went to the fort of Gelesen-göreṣen, which had hitherto been impregnable because of the immense strength and the height of its fortifications. There he busied himself with preparations for withstanding a siege. An additional group occupied another stronghold in the foothills of the Alborz Mountains, and stood ready to do battle.

The Shah's anger was inflamed by the obstinacy of the rebels, who were as insignificant as a speck of dust in the sunlight. He dispatched Sevendūk Beg, the *qūrčībāšī*, with Badr Khān and Šāhqolī Khan Ostājlū, to reduce the fortress of Kīš. 'Abdollāh Khān Ostājlū and Lavand Khan the Georgian were ordered to subdue the fort of Gelesen-göresen; Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa the *mohrdār*, with another detachment, was ordered against the Alborz stronghold.

The Safavid emirs applied themselves to their various tasks, and by bombarding the forts with cannon, light artillery, and heavy siege guns, they succeeded in breaching castle walls and toppling towers. The defenders of the castles saw their position deteriorating. The commandant of the fortress of Kīš tendered his submission to the Shah, bringing with him sword and shroud, and handed over the keys of the castle, for which he received a royal pardon. At the Shah's order, the castle was destroyed and the towers and battlements razed.

After the capture of Kīš, the royal army proceeded to the Alborz Mountains. The defenders of the stronghold there, overawed by the fall of Kīš and the approach of the Shah, hastened company by company to the royal court and surrendered. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, repenting of his actions, left the fort of Gelesen-göresen secretly at night, looking for some asylum to save himself from the dire calamity that threatened him. As ill luck would have it, the route chosen by Darvīš Moḥammad Khan and his four hundred companions took them close to the camp of 'Abdollāh Khan and Lavand Khan. The *ḡāzīs* raised the alarm and set off in pursuit. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan and his men were overtaken before they had gone far, and the majority of them fell victim to the swords and daggers of the *ḡāzīs*. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan himself was engaged in single combat by Kūsa Pīrqolī, a retainer of Čarandāb Sultan Šāmlū. Kūsa Pīrqolī, after overpowering and decapitating him took the head back to camp and cast it at the feet of the Shah's horse, for which he was suitably rewarded. After this, the whole of the province of Šakkī was occupied by the officers of the Shah and the province was annexed to the Safavid empire.

The Shah's Expeditions to Georgia, His Extirpation of Infidels, and the Subjugation of Georgia

The necessity of conducting a holy war against the infidel had always been in the back of the mind of Shah Tahmasp, the defender of the Faith and upholder of the canon law. Because of his more important preoccupations with his powerful enemies to the east and to the west, he had been forced to postpone such an operation. Nevertheless, when the opportunity arose, he turned his attention to raiding the Christian peoples of Georgia and to capturing castles and other installations there. During his reign, he led four expeditions to Georgia, and on several other occasions he sent armies there. The governors of all the seven districts of Georgia were appointed by the Shah and became his subjects, contracted to pay the poll tax and the land tax, and were instructed to have the name and exalted titles of the Shah included in the *ḵoṭba* and stamped on the coinage. Thus the infidels of those regions were reduced to submission by the sharp swords of the warriors of Islam.

The land of Georgia consists of Kakhetia, Kartlia,[149] and Meskhia. I will give here some brief background information to events in this region. The provinces closest to the Georgian provinces were Šakkī and Šīrvān. When the rulers of Šakkī and Šīrvān were weak, the Georgian infidels used to descend on those provinces and harass the Muslims there. The local rulers would do their best to repulse them and there was constant enmity and conflict between the two sides. When Shah Tahmasp subjugated Šakkī, Lavand Khan the Georgian, as has already been mentioned, sought sanctuary at the Shah's court, tendering his submission to the Shah and agreeing to pay taxes to his overlord. Another Georgian ruler, Key Ḵosrow the son of Qwarqwaré, entered Safavid service and was enrolled among the retainers at court. He was in constant attendance on the Shah and was warmed by royal favor. But Lūārsāb, the ruler of Kartlia, and Bagrāt, the ruler of Bāšī-Āčūq and Dādīān, adopted a hostile attitude and did not show satisfactory signs of submission.

They ravaged the territory of the above-mentioned Key Ḵosrow, who was the loyal and obedient servant of the Shah. On several occasions, the Shah had sent punitive expeditions against them, and the ruler of Bāšī-Āčūq and Dādīān was severely chastised and induced to show greater respect. Lūārsāb, too, had repeatedly forgotten his position and had ravaged the Muslim lands on his borders. Consequently, the Shah deemed it necessary to discipline these rebellious Georgians; the prospect of obtaining spiritual rewards for a campaign in defense of the faith reinforced the Shah's intention.

Shah Tahmasp's First Campaign in Georgia

In 947/1540-41, Shah Tahmasp first conceived the plan of conducting a foray and declaring a holy war against Georgia. He set out toward Qarābāḡ, ostensibly with only pleasurable pursuits and hunting in mind. From Qarābāḡ, he marched rapidly toward Georgia with a body of experienced men. On a night which was even darker than the hearts of men before the advent of Islam, they stormed into the city of Tiflis, which they subjected to fire, the sword, and plunder. The men were put to death and the women and children were taken

[149] Kakhetia is the eastern and Kartlia the western part of Georgia.

captive by the *ġāzīs*. Golbād the Georgian, who was governor of Tiflis on behalf of Lūārsāb, fled into the fort with a number of followers; later, he came out of the fort on a promise of quarter and embraced Islam. A number of Georgian emirs, in fear of the royal army, took refuge in an extremely strong and well-fortified castle named Bintrisi, where they were besieged by the Safavid forces and saw no alternative but to surrender the castle.

The *ġāzīs* subdued all the infidels living in those regions, and all those who were blessed by good fortune and divinely guided to make the twin professions of the Muslim faith[150] were spared; the rest packed their bags and took up their abode in hell. Lūārsāb withdrew to a mountain named Dīdgor, which vied with Mount Alborz in height and could be climbed only in the imagination. Tahmasp, the *ġāzī* king, was not to be deprived of his prey, however; he determined to net the leader of those wicked men. The Shah's soldiers scaled the heights and reached the peak of the mountain, which was like Mount Alvand[151] in altitude, and overpowered the Georgians. Many of the enemy were slain in the ravines and gullies on the mountainside. The survivors were scattered in defeat. Lūārsāb himself escaped into mountainous and thickly forested country and eluded the *ġāzīs*. Since Lūārsāb had been chastened to some extent at least, the Shah returned to Tiflis and cleansed that region of the impure presence of rebellious infidels. He then returned to Iran.

Shah Tahmasp's Second Campaign in Georgia

In 953/1546-47, when Alqāṣ Mīrzā displayed signs of revolt, the Shah dispatched a punitive expedition against him, as I have already recorded. Alqāṣ sent his mother to court to intercede for him, and he received a royal pardon. The Shah canceled his plans to march to Šīrvān, and instead led his army, in the depths of winter when the sun was in the station of Capricorn, on a raid against the infidel Georgians. Leaving Šūra Gel, the Shah marched to Āq Šahr, where he encamped. Lavand Khan, ruler of Zagam[152] and Gremi in Kakhetia, and Malek Baqrāt of Bāšī-Āčūq, generally known as Bagrāt, presented themselves to the Shah with gifts, tribute, and taxes. They joined the Shah's retinue and accompanied him on his campaign. At that season, the cold was so intense that the river Kor froze over; the ice became so thick that it was as hard as iron. Snow fell night and day in such quantities that, to the eye of the beholder, mountain and plain seemed as one.

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[150] I.e., "There is no god but God" and "Moḥammad is the Prophet of God."

[151] Mount Alvand, 11,800 ft, rises southwest of Hamadan.

[152] A district of northern Kakhetia.

In conditions like these, the armies of Islam marched against the wicked infidels. When they reached the Georgian centers of habitation, the swords of the *ḡāzīs* began lopping off heads, and they reddened the ground with the blood of infidels and priests. They destroyed by fire the houses of those impious people, and returned laden with booty to Tianeti. En route, the ruler of Bāšī-Āčūq sought permission to leave. He returned to his own territory after the Shah had conferred on him robes of honor and other marks of his favor. Lavand Khan remained in attendance on the Shah until the royal army reached the region of Ganja. There the Shah, having tested Lavand Khan's repeated assurances of loyalty and service and found them to be genuine, released him to return to his own province, laden with sumptuous robes of honor and numerous other gifts, such as gold-embroidered garments, Arabian horses, and articles studded with gems. And God knoweth best!

Shah Tahmasp's Third Expedition to Georgia

In 958/1551, when the province of Šakkī was brought under the control of officers of the Safavid state, the royal army was still stationed there when Key Ḵosrow, the son of Qwarqwaré, sent a petition to the Shah. The burden of his communication was that Lūārsāb, Vānjūš, and Šaramzān Gorjī had been making incursions on his territory and had in fact occupied part of it. Further, Eskandar Pasha had marched from Erzerum and had seized the fortress of Ardanuči. Since Key Ḵosrow was a vassal and tributary of his, the Shah enlisted his aid in conducting a holy war against the Georgians. He marched from Šakkī and reached Georgia by an extremely mountainous and difficult route. The infidels, steeped in error, adopted guerrilla tactics and retreated to the mountains and caves, every group taking refuge in some inaccessible mountain. The Georgian nobility, on the other hand, fortified their castles. The warriors of the army of Islam, who were fighting a holy war, demonstrated their valor by penetrating to the retreats of the polytheists,[153] slew thousands of wrongdoers with arrows and the sword, and dispatched them to an evil destination.[154] Several forts in the area were captured, and many

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[153] *Mošrekān,* literally, "those who attribute a partner to God," was a term frequently applied to Christians by Muslims, who alleged that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity made Christians guilty of this practice.

[154] I.e., hell. The phrase is taken from the Koran, 58:9, which reads: "Sufficient for them is Hell, wherein they will burn; and a most evil destination it is!"

Georgian women, beautiful as the maidens of paradise, and many youths, handsome as Joseph, of the breed of the youths of paradise, were taken prisoner; in addition, much booty fell into the hands of the victors.

A group of Georgian nobles took refuge in the fortress of Vardzia[155] and in the church there, which were situated on a mountainside and hewn out of the solid rock—a place of outstanding strength. Shah Tahmasp dispatched Badr Khan Ostājlū and Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oğlū, with a detachment of troops, against this fort. The *qezelbāš* surrounded the fort and, with leather[156] aprons round their waists and holding their broad shields over their heads, stormed the walls. With immense courage, and with God's help, they succeeded in securing a footing on top of the walls. By a clear miracle of the Islamic faith,[157] the defenders found every way barred to them; they had neither any means of escape nor the power to resist. The men were all put to the sword, and the women and children taken prisoner.

The church located within the fortress was one of God's great works of art. Even the most intelligent find it impossible to believe that such craftsmanship could be the work of man. Within the fortress, in a hollow of the mountainside, the solid rock had been hewn to a height of ten cubits, and a church had been constructed consisting of four long, spacious halls. Both the inner and outer walls were adorned with idols[158] of gold and lapis lazuli. A dais had been placed in the middle of the second chamber, and on this dais was set an idol fashioned out of red gold, adorned with lustrous jewels. Two flashing rubies of great price had been placed in the eyes of this lifeless statue—each ruby valued by expert jewelers at fifty *tomān*.[159] Outside the church, an extremely narrow passage about one-hundred-and-fifty cubits in length, hewn, like the halls of the church, out of the solid rock, led to two secret chambers designed as a hiding place in troubled and turbulent times. Steel doors had been erected at the entrance of the outer chambers of the church, and a single door of gold within.

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[155] "A few miles west of Khertvisi on the main road from Akhaltzikhé to Akhalkalaki" (see W.E.D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, London, 1932, p. 53; hereinafter referred to as Allen).

[156] Both printed text and MS. have *yalī*, which seems not to make sense. I have conjectured *yalabī*, "leather," and also "of steel." The assault troops are clearly wearing additional clothing to protect them from missiles, boiling liquids, etc., hurled down by the defenders.

[157] *Dīn-e mobīn*. An echo of the phrase used repeatedly in the Koran to describe the Muslim scriptures: *al-Ketābo'l-mobīno*, "the clear, perspicuous book."

[158] Presumably statues and ikons. The reader must remember that the author is a Muslim!

[159] The *tomān* in 1574 was worth twenty scudi.

Shah Tahmasp walked to inspect the church, and in that infidel place of worship, he put to death twenty irreligious priests and sent them to perdition. The church bell, which had been cast of the finest bronze, was smashed and destroyed like the lives of the Georgians. The steel doors and the gold door were torn down. Together with the rest of the luxury items, ornaments and untold wealth which had been amassed in the treasuries of those ill-starred evildoers, they were transported back to the royal treasury. The fortress was smashed and razed to the ground.

The Georgian emirs who had crawled into holes in the castle and into hiding places, men like Amān Beg and Levāy and Šaramzān and others, emerged one by one and came to prostrate themselves before the Shah. Key Ḵosrow the son of Qwarqwaré, who had been relieved of the threat of harassment by Eskandar Pasha as a result of the arrival of the royal army, came to court, bringing appropriate gifts, and was received by the Shah with kindness and favor. Vānjūš and Šaramzān-oḡlū, who were two hostile chiefs, were both executed, and the districts of Kūmak and Āq Šahr, which had belonged to them, were granted to Key Ḵosrow. The Shah then moved to the Kartlia region, which he ravaged, putting to death any follower of Lūārsāb who fell into his hands. From this region too, the *ḡāzīs* collected much wealth, countless prisoners, and flocks of sheep, goats, and other animals. From there, the Shah returned to Qarābāḡ, where he spent the winter.

The Shah's Fourth Expedition to Georgia

I will give a brief account of this, the Shah's fourth expedition to Georgia. In the year 961/1553-54, the year in which peace was concluded between Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Sülaymān, the ruler of Asia Minor, Egypt, and Syria,[160] the frontier between the Ottoman and Safavid empires was clearly demarcated, and regulations regarding the frontier areas were laid down. The provinces of Samtzkhé (Meskhia), Kartlia, and Kakhetia were allotted to Iran, and the provinces of Bāšī-Āčūq, Dādīān, and Gūrīān, as far as the borders of Trebizond and Tripoli, became part of the Ottoman empire.

Lūārsāb, the ruler of Kartlia who had retreated to the mountains out of fear of the *qezelbāš* warriors, took every opportunity to show disrespect toward his sovereign, acts which were noted and observed by the Shah. He repeatedly ravaged the region of Tiflis, and areas which had been occupied and subjugated by *qezelbāš* forces. The people of those regions too, because of their religious and ethnic affinities, returned to their allegiance to him. Consequently, Shah Tahmasp decided to take an army to Kartlia, subdue those impious, misguided men, and incorporate the whole province into the lands of Islam. In conformity with the injunction contained in the Koran: "Kill those who ascribe partners to God, one and all,"[161] they would slay any of those irreligious polytheists (the offspring of Gog and Magog who commit mischief on the earth)[162] who refused to accept the burden of the poll tax, and would sweep from the surface of that province those who were in error.

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[160] By this date, the Ottoman empire covered a very much larger area than this! But Eskandar Monšī is not concerned with events in Europe.

With this intent, the Shah set his army in motion and marched toward Kartlia. When the army of Islam reached Trialeti, the infidels of that region, terrified by the swords and spears of the *ḡāzīs*, fled to the woods and forests, through which progress was difficult both for infantry and cavalry. Some took refuge in the mountains, or in strong, impregnable fortresses. The Safavid warriors in this holy war, shielding themselves with their trust in God and with their own courage, plunged into the woods and forests and, as they came upon group after group of the enemy, put them to the sword. The women and children were taken prisoner and innumerable sheep and goats were taken as booty. Lūārsāb himself, by many different stratagems, escaped from that death trap and found a refuge somewhere.

When the province of Trialeti had been cleansed of the presence of those who ascribe partners to God, Shah Tahmasp marched toward Gori, which was Lūārsāb's capital. After marching over difficult routes and through densely wooded defiles, he cleared that province too of the presence of vile infidels.

Since the Georgian nobility had fortified a number of castles and taken up stations there, each fort garrisoned by a detachment of determined men, the Shah next turned his attention to these. First, he laid siege to the fortress of Mardānqūb (Martqopi). Its defenders, confident in the strength of the fort, resisted stoutly, but the *ḡāzīs*, keeping up patrol activity all around, reduced the garrison to serious straits. The Georgians, recognizing their plight, sued for quarter; the commandant of the fort, Pārsīdān Beg, came forth and surrendered the castle.

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[161] Koran, 9:36 reads: *"wa qātelū'l-mošrekīna kāffatan,"* "but *fight* those who attribute partners to God one and all." Eskandar Monšī not only makes the significant change from *qātelū* (fight) to *oqtolū* (kill), but he omits the restrictive clause which follows in Koran 9:36, "as they fight you one and all."

[162] Koran, 18:95. The legendary Ẕu'l-Qarneyn, traditionally but erroneously identified with Alexander the Great, is said to have built a great wall of iron covered with copper or brass between two mountains, to keep out Gog and Magog. The location of the wall was probably in the Caucasus. The Abbasid caliph al-Wāṯeq (A.D. 842-847), is said to have sent an envoy to inspect this wall.

After the capture of this fort, the Shah marched against the fortress of Āmedīn,[163] the strongest of the forts in those parts; Lūārsāb's mother was in this fort. You would say that the Eternal Architect had placed this fort on the circular vault of the heavens, because the bird of the imagination, soar as it might, could not reach the top of its lofty battlements, and the hand of fate, though it extend itself ever so much, could not touch its earthworks. The garrison of the fort prepared to repulse the *ḡāzīs* and heavy fighting ensued. The *ḡāzīs*, blessed by good fortune, stormed the fort with little effort, and the mother of Lūārsāb was captured, together with the majority of the Georgian nobles. These irreligious men were dispatched to hell, the evil abode, by the sword of holy war.

Several other forts and strongholds were also captured through the valiant efforts of Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oḡlū, and fell into the hands of Safavid officers. In this campaign, more than thirty thousand prisoners were taken by the Safavids. The wives, daughters, and sons of the Georgian nobility were set aside for Shah Tahmasp in lieu of his one-fifth share of the booty.[164] On this occasion, Lūārsāb covered his tracks so effectively that no sign of his whereabouts could be discovered. The Shah therefore returned to Qarābāḡ and, after enjoying some hunting along the way, reached his capital, Qazvin.

The Death of Lūārsāb, through the Good Fortune of the Shah and the Will and Decree of God

Among the rulers of Georgia, Lūārsāb was distinguished by his personal bravery and by the number of his supporters and men experienced in war. For this reason, he was in a constant state of revolt, and continually refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Shah and pay tribute to him. Although the Shah made great efforts to crush him and conducted several campaigns in Georgia, as has been narrated, Lūārsāb, since his time had not yet come, eluded his grasp.

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[163] The reading is uncertain. Dorn, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kaukasischen Länder und Völker*, III, 339, n 2, tentatively identifies this place with Ateni, in Kremo-Kartlia.

[164] After the battle of Badr (January 623), Moḥammad received a revelation (see Koran, 8:42) in regard to the division of the spoils of war: one-fifth (*ḵoms*) was allotted to "God and the Prophet, the Kindred of the Prophet, orphans, the needy and wayfarers." Presumably this principle had been transferred to the Shah in his capacity as the "Shadow of God upon earth."

After the Shah had returned from his fourth campaign in Georgia, Lūārsāb returned to Gori,[165] and the survivors of previous campaigns gathered round him. A year or two passed uneventfully. Then, since he had reached the end of his allotted span, he once again began to make plans to revolt, and he remained obdurate in his opposition to Shah Tahmasp. In 963/1555-56 he emerged from Gori, occupied the fortress of Kūs (Kaspi ?) and other places which fell within the area of the Safavid protectorate in Georgia and were administered directly by the central *dīvān*, and came out in open revolt. Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oḡlū Qājār, the *beglerbeg* (governor-general) of Qarābāḡ, who was entrusted with the security of the frontier, on hearing of Lūārsāb's rebellion, mobilized the Safavid forces in Qarābāḡ and marched against him.

Lūārsāb, partly as a ruse, partly as a prudent move since he lacked the strength to confront the Safavid army in a pitched battle, retreated shortly before the Persians reached him. The Georgians were pursued by the *qezelbāš*, who fanned out across the length and breadth of the province, plundering as they went. Meanwhile, Lūārsāb emerged from his ambush with a group of Georgian nobles and charged Šāhverdī Sultan's center. Most of the *qezelbāš* forces were dispersed in the pursuit, but the small force remaining with Zīād-oḡlū, despite stout resistance, was defeated. Zīād-oḡlū, following the normal practice of army commanders, extricated himself safely from the battlefield, but was hotly pursued by the Georgians, and some eight hundred *qezelbāš* were slain.

Lūārsāb himself, with a number of gospel-reciting priests, climbed a small hill nearby and was standing there when Moḥammad Sultan Mīr Čapnī and a group of *ḡāzīs* suddenly encountered him. Forced to give battle, Lūārsāb mounted his horse and attacked. Lūārsāb's horse stumbled, he fell, and one of the Čapnī *ḡāzīs*, Żāker by name, inflicted several mortal wounds. The Georgians then led a countercharge, but Moḥammad Sultan seized Lūārsāb's horse and escaped. Żāker, however, with a number of other Čapnī *ḡāzīs*, was killed by the Georgians.

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[165] A town in Kartlia, "at the junction of the Liakhvi with the Mtkvari" (Allen, index, p. 407).

Lūārsāb died on the battlefield, and the Georgians removed his corpse and laid it in their own burial place. His son Simon was appointed to succeed him, and on his accession made Gori his capital.

Affairs in Georgia after the Death of Lūārsāb, and the Capture of His Son Simon by Safavid Officials

When Simon succeeded his father as ruler of the Christians of Kartlia, he resided in Gori for four or five years. The scattered Georgian forces rallied round him, and ultimately a group of respectable size assembled. Simon followed his father's policy of hostility and opposition toward the Shah.

In the year 968/1560–61, he marched forth from his seat of government with the vain idea of subjugating Tiflis. He sought men and assistance from the other Christian rulers of the area, and large numbers of men came to his aid. From Kakhetia came Gorgīn Khan, the son of Levan,[166] with his father's permission[167] or on his own initiative, acting from motives of religious zeal and national solidarity.

In short, a large force assembled in the Georgian camp. When the news reached Zīād-oḡlū, he mobilized the emirs in Qarābāḡ and the *qezelbāš* forces in neighboring regions and marched against the heretics.[168] The *ḡāzīs* filled in a ditch the Georgians had dug across a narrow defile, and marched on. When they came upon the enemy, they drew themselves up for battle. Meanwhile, the skirmishers from the army of Islam flung themselves on the Georgians and engaged in hot fighting. On both sides, brave heroes performed prodigies of valor, and the infidels, standing their ground, resisted the *ḡāzīs'* attacks. Šāhverdī Sultan, observing the severity of the fighting and the stubborn resistance put up by the Georgians, ordered his center to charge. Clouds of dust arose from the battlefield and the Georgians, unable to resist the charge, broke in flight.

Levan's son Gorgīn and one thousand infidels were killed in battle, and the remainder scattered in all directions. Simon, with a small band, fled back to Gori, while Zīād-oḡlū returned to Ganja in triumph. Ḳajosta Beg, a trusted Georgian emir, was taken prisoner together with a number of other Georgian nobles, and sent to the

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[166] Levan I, ruler of Kakhetia, 1520–1574.

[167] According to Allen, p. 140, Levan I played a clever double game; he maintained good relations with Shah but was not averse to harassing him if this could be done without endangering these good relations.

[168] Lit.: those who ascribe partners to God.

Shah's court. Levan, in mourning for his son, put on a black robe of coarse cloth, and the nobles and trusted men of Kakhetia wore black in sympathy with him.

After these events, David, the son of Lūārsāb, together with a group of nobles, decided to go against his father's policies. Guided by his own intellect and divine inspiration, he took the nobles to the Safavid capital at Qazvin, where they prostrated themselves before the Shah and embraced Islam. The Shah received David warmly and appointed him governor of the province of Tiflis and its dependencies, which were under the administrative control of the central *dīvan*. One of the emirs of the Safavid court was appointed commandant of the fortress at Tiflis to act as guardian of David (now known as Dā'ūd Khan) and manager of all his affairs. Yet Simon and his followers still maintained their stance of revolt and hostility, and continued to try to capture the fortress at Tiflis and seize its dependencies, a vain enterprise they never abandoned. On several occasions they set out to seize Tiflis, but returned without accomplishing anything.

In 975/1567-68, Simon gathered another army of infidels and marched on Tiflis with a force of both infantry and cavalry. Dā'ūd Khan, with a group of Georgian nobles who supported him, and with the forces of Islam, marched out to give battle to his brother. When the two armies came face to face, the *qezelbāš* and the Georgian nobles were confronted with an enemy superior in numbers, and thus were of the opinion that they could not withstand them in the open field. Accordingly, they advised returning to the fort and preparing to withstand a siege. But Ebrāhīm Kalīfa Qarāmānlū, the commander of the *qezelbāš* detachment, in his folly and arrogance launched an attack on the enemy and was killed. Dā'ūd Khan's supporters, shouting "O David! We have no power today against Goliath and his forces,"[169] turned back, forcing Dā'ūd to flee to Tiflis.

Simon defeated his brother and his supporters on two occasions, and this naturally strengthened his rebellious attitude. Believing that the inhabitants of Tiflis were on his side and that consequently the fort at Tiflis would easily fall into his hands, he collected another Georgian army, marched on Tiflis in strength, and laid siege to the fortress. When a detachment of *qezelbāš* stood to arms and organized the defense and management of the fort, Simon saw that he was too weak to take it. Further disappointed in his hopes of support from the citizens, he beat the retreat and retired to Gori.

[169] Koran, 2:250.

When the news of Simon's insurrection and incursions against the frontiers of Islam were reported to the officials of the Safavid court, a royal decree was issued to the effect that Šamḵāl Sultan Čerkes, the governor of Ṣakkī, with Qājār and other emirs, should march to Georgia to the aid of Dā'ūd Khan and repulse Simon from these frontier regions. The great emirs, obeying their order's, led an army to Georgia in 976/1568-69. On hearing of their approach, Simon decided he was not strong enough to stand and fight, and retreated into the high mountain ranges of that region. The *ḡāzīs* marched toward those mountains, which were as high as Mount Alborz or Mount Qāf,[170] and occupied the surrounding regions. The irreligious infidels who had made this stronghold their refuge and retreat came out to give battle to the *ḡāzīs*, and fighting broke out between the two armies. Simon and a group of followers charged the *ḡāzīs* and slew several of them. One of the *ḡolāms* of Šamḵāl Sultan, Jamšīd by name, attacked Simon and unhorsed him with a thrust of his lance; another *ḡāzī* came to his assistance, and Simon was taken prisoner. When the Georgians saw that their leader had been captured, they fled the battlefield. Of the followers who had charged with Simon, some were slain, others captured. The great emirs returned in triumph from their expedition to Georgia and sent Simon and the other prisoners to the Shah.

Simon was brought before Shah Tahmasp at Qazvin and was kept at court for a while, in the hope that he would embrace Islam; but he remained steadfast in his Christian faith. Finally, he was sent to the fortress-prison of Alamūt, where he remained as long as Shah Tahmasp was alive.[171] He was released from prison by Shah Esma'il II, and during the reign of Moḥammad Ḵodābanda,[172] was finally converted to Islam. Moreover, the Shah, mindful of the Koranic text: "Believers are indeed brothers,"[173] exalted him by styling him "my brother," and by investing him as ruler of his ancestral lands in Georgia. Simon returned to Kartlia and demonstrated his gratitude for the Shah's favors by his loyalty to him. His subsequent career will be narrated in the appropriate place.

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[170] A fabulous mountain, said to encircle the whole earth (see the *Nozhat al-Qolūb* of Ḥamd Allāh Mostowfī, translated by G. le Strange, London and Leyden, 1919, p. 182).

[171] I.e., until 984/1576.

[172] 1578-1588.

[173] Koran, 49:11.

The Conquest of the Province of Kandahar, Zamīn Dāvar and the Lowlands along the Banks of the Hīrmand River,[174] *together with Some Details of the Earlier History of That Province*

Among the provinces conquered by Shah Tahmasp was Kandahar and its dependencies. During the reign of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bāyqarā,[175] Kandahar was governed by Emir Ẕu'l-Nūn Arḡūn and his son Šojā' Beg, under orders from Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and his son Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā. After the death of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and the extinction of the Tīmūrīd dynasty and the annexation of Khorasan by Šāhī Beg Khan Uzbeg, Šojā' Beg entered the service of the latter and was treated with favor. In the same year (1506), the late Emperor Moḥammad Bābor Mīrzā b. 'Omar Šeyḵ b. Solṭān Abū Sa'īd Mīrzā b. Solṭān Moḥammad b. Mīrzā Mīrānšāh b. Amīr Tīmūr Gūrkān, led an army from Kabul to Kandahar. Šojā' Beg and the sons of Emir Ẕu'l-Nūn, with men of the Arḡūn clan, marched out against him but were defeated, and the province of Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar, together with Emir Ẕu'l-Nūn's treasuries and secret hoards, fell into the hands of Bābor. The latter appointed his brother, Nāṣer Mīrzā, governor of the province, and then returned to Kabul.

When Šeybak Khan Uzbeg heard the news about Kandahar, he marched there with a huge army. The sons of Emir Ẕu'l-Nūn came out to welcome him and, making themselves the advance patrol of his army, they marched together on Kandahar. Nāṣer Mīrzā, after enduring a siege for a few days, abandoned the region and joined his brother at Kabul. Šeybak Khan formally placed the reins of government in the capable hands of the Arḡūnīds and returned to Khorasan.

After the accession of Shah Esma'il I, when Šeybānī Khan[176] met his death in battle with that monarch, the province of Khorasan was annexed to the Safavid empire.[177] Šojā' Beg sent gifts and a letter pledging his fealty, and for a while he was allowed to retain possession of Kandahar, subject to the jurisdiction of whichever Safavid prince and governor-general was in residence at Herat. Eventually, Ẕahīr al-Dīn Moḥammad Bābor again brought an army from Kabul and laid siege to Kandahar.[178] Šojā' Beg defended the city for a time, but, when the siege continued unabated, sought help from Dūrmīš Khan Šāmlū, who had come to Khorasan as governor-general in 926/1519-20, and who resided at Herat. Dūrmīš Khan asked the Mogul emperor not to meddle in affairs at Kandahar, since relations between the emperor and the Shah were regulated by treaties of friendship and alliance, and Shah Šojā' Beg had declared he was a loyal servant of the Shah. The emperor Bābor acceded to Dūrmīš Khan's request, raised the siege of Kandahar, and returned to Kabul.

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[174] Or Helmand.

[175] The Tīmūrīd ruler of Khorasan, 1470–1506.

[176] The Uzbeg leader is variously referred to as Šāhī Beg Uzbeg; Moḥammad Šeybānī (or Šībānī) Khan; Šeybānī Khan; Khan-e Šeybānī; Šeybak Khan (Uzbeg); etc.

[177] In 1510.

[178] In 1519.

Šojā' Beg left a trusted officer named Mollā Bāqī in charge at Kandahar, and went to Khorasan. During his absence, that trusted officer declared his fealty to and support of Emperor Bābor and handed Kandahar over to the latter's officers. Bābor appointed his son, Mīrzā Kāmrān, governor of Kandahar, and from that date[179] Kandahar remained in the hands of Mīrzā Kāmrān's officers.

After the accession of Shah Tahmasp, in the year 941/1534-35 (the eleventh year of his reign), when Sām Mīrzā conceived the desire to subjugate Kandahar and proceeded to invest the city, K̮āja Kalān, the governor of the city on behalf of Mīrzā Kāmrān, put the fortress in a state of defense and held out for eight months. At Lahore, Mīrzā Kāmrān mobilized a large force and came to his relief. He fought a fierce engagement against the Safavid forces. Because he had mounted this expedition against the wishes of his spiritual director,[180] Sām Mīrzā achieved no success, and Aḡzīvār Khan was killed in the battle. Sām Mīrzā therefore returned to Herat without having achieved his object, and Mīrzā Kāmrān, leaving K̮āja Kalān as governor at Kandahar on the same basis as before, returned to Lahore.

In 943/1536-37, when Shah Tahmasp led his sixth expedition to Khorasan against 'Obeyd Khan, he marched from Herat toward Kandahar, intending both to take the city and to wreak vengeance on the Čaḡatāy forces which had acted with such temerity in the previous action against the *qezelbāš*. K̮āja Kalān, as I mentioned in the section on Khorasan, did not have the ability to oppose the Shah, and retired to Sind. Ganjī K̮āja, whom he had left behind at Kandahar, went out to receive the Shah, and handed over to him the keys of the castle. The province of Kandahar was thus incorporated into the Safavid empire, and Būdāq Khan Qājār was appointed governor.

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[179] 1522.

[180] I.e., the Shah; for an explanation of this term, see Savory, Offices, I.

After the Shah had left for Iraq, Mīrzā Kāmrān collected yet another army and marched in great strength from Lahore to Kandahar. The Shah by that time was fully occupied with important matters in Iraq and Azerbaijan—namely, an Ottoman invasion and the rebellion of Alqāş Mīrzā—and hence was unable to mount an expedition to Khorasan. Būdāq Khan did not act as the rules of war demanded in such a situation. Instead of shutting himself up at Kandahar to withstand a siege, he evacuated the fortress and withdrew.

In 951/1544-45, when the Emperor Moḥammad Homāyūn b. Bābor was driven out of India by the Afghans and came to Iran, where he was received by Shah Tahmasp, he felt deeply sorry about the improper behavior of Mīrzā Kāmrān. It was agreed that, when Homāyūn regained control of Kandahar, he would hand it over to the Shah's officers. Homāyūn kept his promise. At the first opportunity after Kandahar had been retaken through the efforts of Safavid troops, and 'Askarī Mīrzā, who was governor of Kandahar on behalf of Mīrzā Kāmrān, had been taken prisoner, he handed over the city to Būdāq Khan, who commanded the Safavid army in that campaign and had been appointed guardian to Sultan Morād Mīrzā.

Shortly afterward, however, Sultan Morād died, before the affairs of Emperor Homāyūn had been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Homāyūn, in order to find a base for a group of Čağatāy troops who were his supporters, took Kandahar back from Būdāq Khan and gave it to Beyrām Khan Torkmān. Since the latter was a supporter of both sides,[181] he was to hold the city until such time as the affairs of Homāyūn should be settled and he should gain some elbow room in the management of his kingdom.[182] For several years, Homāyūn was engaged in the struggle against Mīrzā Kāmrān in Kabul and Badaḵšān, and during the period Beyrām Khan continued to hold Kandahar. Shah Tahmasp turned a blind eye toward the matter of Kandahar and did not press for its restitution, partly out of consideration for Homāyūn and partly because Beyrām Khan demonstrated his loyalty and desire to serve the Shah.

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[181] Presumably, of the Safavid shah and the Mogul emperor!

[182] The *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, a contemporary chronicle, states that the Safavid army under the command of Budāq Khan Qājār was under orders to proceed to Kabul after the capture of Kandahar, to expel Kamran Mīrza from Kabul and Ḡazna, and install Homāyūn there. The *qezelbāš* emirs did not carry out this latter part of their orders, and Homāyūn, no doubt angered by this, yielded to pressure from his nobles to seize control of Kandahar.

Finally, Homāyūn's efforts were crowned with success, and he became the independent ruler of Ġazna, Kabul, and Hindustan. But Kandahar had still not been handed back to the *qezelbāš* at the time of Homāyūn's death,[183] when he was succeeded by his son Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar. Meanwhile, Shah Moḥammad Qalātī governed Kandahar on behalf of Beyrām Khan. In 963/1556, Bahādor Khan Uzbeg, ruler of Zamīn Dāvar,[184] marched against Kandahar with the object of wresting it from the hands of Shah Moḥammad. The latter sent a courier to Shah Tahmasp with the request that, since Kandahar belonged to servants of the royal court,[185] the Shah mobilize a *qezelbāš* army against Bahādor Khan, who had conceived the ambition of occupying Kandahar and taking possession of the province himself.

In compliance with this request, Shah Tahmasp sent to the assistance of Shah Moḥammad Qalātī Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bahrām Mīrzā,[186] with 'Alī Yār Sultan Afšār, Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, and a number of other emirs. Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, the son of Valī Ḵalīfa, marched rapidly against Bahādor Khan with a detachment of Šāmlūs and fell upon him by surprise. After a sharp engagement, Bahādor Khan fled in the direction of India. Shah Moḥammad Qalātī, however, now showed his cunning and deceit; he denied the above-mentioned prince and the emirs access to the fortress of Kandahar and made preparations to withstand a siege. The great emirs occupied the province of Zamīn Dāvar and reported to the Shah the situation regarding Kandahar.

In 965/1557-58, Shah Tahmasp sent an army under the command of 'Alī Sultan Tātī-oğlū Ẕu'l-Qadar to subjugate Kandahar, and placed the government and administration of that province in the hands of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. The Safavid forces surrounded the city and commenced siege operations. Shah Moḥammad Qalātī fought back, and for six months arrows whistled to and fro and musket fire was exchanged. At last, Shah Moḥammad was forced to sue for quarter. After sworn documents had been exchanged, he handed over the fort and departed for India. Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā now ruled with full authority in the province of Kandahar; for nearly twenty years he continued to govern the province and to enjoy power and prosperity. He died a natural death during the reign of Shah Esma‘il II.[187] The career of his sons will, I hope, be given in Book II of this history, in the course of the narration of the reign of Shah ‘Abbas. I will now give an account of other related events in Khorasan, and then turn to a description of the remaining events of the reign of Shah Tahmasp.

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[183] In 1556.

[184] The broad valley through which the Helmand flows down from the Hindu Kush Mountains to Bost (see Le Strange, *Lands*, p. 345).

[185] Rather stretching a point! The argument, however, was calculated to appeal to the Shah.

[186] Shah Tahmasp's nephew.

A Supplementary Account of Events in Khorasan after the Death of ‘Obeyd Khan

As previously recorded, ‘Obeyd Ḵān b. Maḥmūd Solṭān b. Abu'l-Ḵeyr Ḵān, throughout his life, continued to encroach on Safavid territory in Khorasan, and this province suffered greatly from the constant passage of the Uzbeg armies. After his death, Khorasan enjoyed peace and security for a number of years under the just government of Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū Takkalū, who had Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā under his care. Moḥammad Khan led an army to Ḡarjestān[188] and fought several major battles there against Uzbeg leaders, especially Beyrām Oḡlān, the governor of Ḡarjestān. Moḥammad Khan was victorious in these campaigns, and for a long while the Uzbeg sultans did not dare to enter Khorasan. In 957/1550–51, eleven years after the death of ‘Obeyd Khan, his son ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Khan, who had succeeded his father as ruler at Bokhara, also died. Borāq Ḵān b. Sevīnjük Solṭān b. Abu'l-Ḵeyr Ḵān, together with ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Sultan and Shah Moḥammad Sultan, led armies from Tashkent and Samarkand and Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, invaded Khorasan, and arrived before Herat in great strength.

Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū had not placed his reliance solely on the strength of the citadel at Herat, but had barricaded all the streets in the outlying parts of the city. Behind every barricade he stationed seasoned officers, with gunners and musketeers. For a considerable time, battles raged at the barricades between the *qezelbāš* and the Uzbegs, but the Uzbegs failed to storm a single barricade. Shah Moḥammad Sultan, who was the most courageous of the Uzbeg leaders, departed to ravage the province of Sīstān and Farāh. When he returned, he began to taunt Borāq Khan for not having at least carried the barricades. "Tomorrow," he boasted, "I shall not dismount from my horse until I have razed those barricades."

The following day, Shah Moḥammad Sultan, determined to make good his boast, mounted with a group of renowned warriors, and made for the barricade near Mazār-e Šāh. Bravely he charged the defenders of the barricade who, unable to stand their ground, retreated behind the barricade. Shah Moḥammad Sultan and the Uzbegs had actually reached the opening in the barricade when a stone flung by fate struck the Sultan on the head, and he fell stunned from his horse. Simultaneously, one of the retainers of Moḥammad Khan reached him and struck off his head. Several Uzbeg warriors of note were taken prisoner. When Borāq Khan heard the news of the death of Shah Moḥammad Sultan, he was filled with fear and consternation; he beat the retreat and withdrew to Transoxania.

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[187] In 1576.

[188] The region lying east of Herat, around the headwaters of the Morḡāb River (see Le Strange, *Lands*, pp. 415–16).

After the death of Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū[189] and the arrest of his son Qazāq,[190] Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā[191] went to court, where his appointment as head of the Khorasan administration was renewed. Šāhqolī Sultan Yakān Ostājlū was appointed guardian to the prince, and they left for Khorasan together. 'Abdollāh Khan, the son of Eskandar Ḵān b. Jānī Beg Solṭān, together with Ḵosrow Sultan, who had crossed the Oxus and invaded Khorasan, fell upon the royal party as it was proceeding toward Herat. Since they were not accompanied by any large body of troops from the army of Khorasan, the prince and the Sultan were not in a position to put up a fight. They withdrew to the fort at Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya,[192] to which the Uzbegs laid siege. The Khorasan emirs mobilized and hastened, each from his own station, to meet the enemy. Before these troops had joined forces, however, the approach of the army of Iraq was announced, and the Uzbeg sultans began to retreat. First to leave was Ḵosrow Sultan; the following day, 'Abdollāh Khan beat the retreat and withdrew to Bokhara.

After their departure, none of the sultans of Transoxania aspired to invade Khorasan. On one occasion, Pīr Moḥammad Ḵān b. Jānī Beg Solṭān advanced from Balḵ to the neighborhood of Mašhad, but then returned. He sent his paternal uncle, Tülek Bahādor, to the Persian court with gifts and presents to ask the Shah's forgiveness. Tülek Bahādor was received in a conciliatory manner by the Shah, and returned to Balḵ.

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[189] In 1556.
[190] In 1564. He had been guilty of rebellion.
[191] Shah Tahmasp's eldest son.
[192] A city lying to the south of Mašhad.

On another occasion, Uzbeg Ḵān b. Rostam Solṭān b. Jānī Beg Solṭān, in the year 967/1559-60, marched from Andeḵūd and Šoborḡān[193] with eight thousand men,[194] reached the area of Saraḵs, Zūrābād and Jām, and returned after ravaging that area. Zeynal Khan, the son of Ebrāhīm Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Jām, summoned Mīr Ḥoseyn Solṭān Fīrūz-jang, and consulted with him about how best to deal with the Uzbegs. Mīr Ḥoseyn and the celebrated Ḥājjī Sultan Kūtvāl, who was a Čaḡatāy emir, joined Zeynal Khan with their forces. Encouraged by the arrival of these reinforcements, Zeynal Khan was keen to pursue the Uzbegs, but the other two emirs considered pursuit unwise. Zeynal Khan, despite the fact that a detachment he had already sent in pursuit of the Uzbegs had not met with success, in his inexperience and arrogance set off in pursuit with two thousand five hundred *qezelbāš* and Čaḡatāy troops, and caught up with the enemy at Pol-e Ḵātūn.

Uzbeg Khan left two or three thousand men to face the *qezelbāš* and placed his main force of some seven thousand men in ambush. The smaller force was routed by the first *qezelbāš* charge, and Zeynal Khan's men turned to plunder. At that moment, Uzbeg Khan emerged from ambush; his charge shattered the *qezelbāš* ranks and threw them into confusion. Nevertheless, the *qezelbāš* fought on with great courage, and about one thousand men, *qezelbāš* and Čaḡatāys, were slain, together with their leaders Zeynal Khan and Mīr Ḥoseyn Sultan. Ḥājjī Sultan and the remaining men fought their way out with great difficulty. This misfortune befell the *qezelbāš* because of the inexperience and arrogance of Zeynal Khan. After his victory, Uzbeg Khan returned to his own territories.

Shah Tahmasp's Expedition to Baghdad and Ḵūzestān and His Subjugation of Various Rebels, by the Grace of God

Earlier in these pages, in the course of describing the events of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, I mentioned that, at the beginning of his reign, many of the rebellious and seditious individuals who had slunk into a corner because of their fear of Shah Esma'il I renewed their rebellious activities. Shah Tahmasp, as has already been briefly recorded, was for a time kept fully extended in putting down his enemies, punishing rebels, and ordering the affairs of the kingdom. These tasks necessitated his traveling constantly from place to place, and involved him in continual military operations.

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[193] Two towns situated west of Balḵ, between Marv al-Rūd and the Oxus River.

[194] This appears to come to nine or ten thousand men, whereas we were told that Uzbeg Khan had crossed the Oxus with eight thousand men.

Among the major expeditions he was forced to undertake was the expedition to Baghdad to suppress the revolts of the governors of Baghdad, Dezfūl, and ʿArabestān.[195] At the beginning of Tahmasp's reign, Ebrāhīm Sultan Mowṣellū, grandson of Ṣūfī Ḵalīl Torkmān, was governor of Baghdad, and Ẕu'l-Faqār, the son of Noḵūd Sultan, his cousin, was governor of Kalhor. The latter conspired to rebel and seize control of the government and administration of Baghdad. At a time when Ebrāhīm Sultan was in his summer quarters in the plain of Māhīdašt,[196] Ẕu'l-Faqār made a rapid dash with two hundred fully-armed men and reached Ebrāhīm's camp. Ẕu'l-Faqār's intemperate arrival caused Ebrāhīm Sultan's retainers to smell treachery: "His arriving in such haste, unheralded and unannounced, bodes no good," they said.

Ebrāhīm paid no heed to their forebodings, and was sitting at his ease in his audience hall when Ẕu'l-Faqār appeared on the outskirts of the camp and rushed at him. Ebrāhīm Sultan, thrown into a panic, had no chance to gather his men together or defend himself. Fearing for his life, he dashed into the women's quarters. Ẕu'l-Faqār pursued him on foot with a number of his men, cut the ropes of the harem tent so that the tent enveloped him, and cut to pieces the Sultan and a few people who were inside. The camp broke into an uproar. Most of Ebrāhīm's retainers, who had assembled in the meanwhile, on seeing that the Sultan was dead, decided to enter the service of Ẕu'l-Faqār. Seyyed Beg Kamūna, the son of Seyyed Soleymān, who was one of the Arab emirs, arrived with four hundred men. He too was obliged to join Ẕu'l-Faqār.

After this incident, Ẕu'l-Faqār entered Baghdad with full pomp and assumed control of the city. He put to death a large number of his own relatives and kinsmen, and issued a writ of exclusive ownership embracing the whole of Arab Iraq. When Shah Tahmasp heard the news, in 935/1528-29 he sent the royal army toward Arab Iraq and soon reached Baghdad. When he arrived, the sun was in the station of Cancer and the weather excessively hot. Ẕu'l-Faqār, relying on the assistance of a group of evil men, closed the city gates and prepared to defend the city. The Safavid troops therefore surrounded Baghdad, and every day there was skirmishing between the two sides.

[195] I.e., Ḵūzestān.
[196] Near Kermānšāh.

Ẕu'l-Faqār's brothers, 'Alī Beg and Aḥmad Beg, looking to the future, decided to put an end to him. Awaiting their opportunity, they fell upon him and cut off his head, which they sent to the Shah. Thus, more through divine providence than anything else, the fortress at Baghdad was taken. Ẕu'l-Faqār's retainers, fearing the royal wrath, dived into the Tigris in the hope of reaching the other bank unharmed; but most of them drowned.

The Shah entered Baghdad with full pomp and circumstance, and the rays of his justice shone on all. He decreed that no one should suffer the harassment of being questioned about his actions during the regime of the usurper Ẕu'l-Faqār. The common people prayed for the continuance of the Safavid dynasty, and the chiefs of the Arab tribes sent envoys with gifts to congratulate the Shah on his capture of Baghdad. The Shah did not linger in the region because of the excessive heat and the onset of a bout of fever. He placed the government and administration of Baghdad in the hands of Moḥammad Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū, whom he promoted from the rank of sultan to that of khan. The Shah then returned from Arab to Persian Iraq, and reached his capital, Tabriz.

The reason for the expedition to Ḵūzestān was as follows: 'Alā al-Dowla Ra'nāšī, the ruler of Dezfūl (Ra'nāš is a village in that area), rebelled, and a punitive expedition against him became necessary. In 948/1541-42, in the eighteenth year of Tahmasp's reign, the Shah led his armies to Ḵūzestān. When he reached Ḵorramābād in Lorestān, he graciously received Emir Jahāngīr 'Abbāsī of Lor-e Kuček.[197] The news of the Shah's approach aroused trepidation in the hearts of the rebels in the Dezfūl area, and 'Alā al-Dowla fled like the wind to Baghdad. When the Shah reached Dezfūl, Seyyed Šojā' al-Dīn Badrān Moša'ša'ī, the ruler of Ḥavīza,[198] visited him and was received with favor and confirmed in his position as governor of that province. Ebrāhīm Khan Ẕu'l-Qadār, the governor of Shiraz, was dispatched with a detachment of emirs and *qezelbāš* troops on a raid against a group of rebels in the fortress of Bayāt.[199] When he had settled the affairs of that region to his satisfaction, the Shah returned to Iraq.

After Shah Tahmasp had been dealing successfully with the problems of state for some thirty years, he selected Qazvin as his capital city in place of Tabriz; the latter was too close to Vān, which had recently been occupied by the Ottomans. At Qazvin, the Shah laid out the plan for the palace and the Bāḡ-e 'Ālī. After some three or four years, the buildings were completed, and for the last twenty years of his life, Tahmasp did not stir far from his palace at Qazvin. The splendor of his reign daily increased, and rulers from all parts had recourse to his court.

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[197] That part of Lorestān lying north of the Kārūn River.

[198] The rulers of Ḥavīza were independent governors (*vālī*) in Safavid times. They belonged to the Moša'ša' dynasty, which established itself in the area about 1436.

[199] West of the river Karḵa.

Visits by Foreign Princes to Tahmasp's Court, Especially That of the Mogul Emperor Moḥammad Homāyūn

Since the genealogy of the Safavid family, which possesses both temporal and spiritual authority, is traced back to the house of 'Alī, the rulers and powerful princes of the world have had recourse to the strong support of the Safavid house. From the farthest reaches of India and Europe, rulers have demonstrated their homage and devotion by sending embassies and gifts, seeking to renew ties of friendship and alliance. All those who approached the Safavid house with sincerity of intent and purity of purpose were rewarded by the granting of their wishes, and through the material favors and spiritual support of rulers of the phenomenal and spiritual worlds, they gained success in important affairs and consequent high rank and status. But those who were influenced solely by corrupt material motives did not inspire credibility, and their hopes did not materialize.

Good examples of what I mean are to be found in the auspicious visit of the Mogul emperor, Moḥammad Homāyūn b. the Emperor Bābor b. 'Omar Šeyḵ Mīrzā b. Solṭān Abū Sa'īd Gūrkān, and in the calamitous visit of the faithless Solṭān Bāyazīd b. Solṭān Sülaymān b. Solṭān Selīm the Ottoman emperor. Both these princes sought refuge from the vicissitudes of fortune at the court of the Shah. The Mogul emperor, who was a man of integrity and loyal in all his dealings, succeeded in obtaining all he desired. Sultan Bāyazīd, on the other hand, who was insincere in his negotiations with the Shah, did not receive what he sought and his affairs ended in disaster.

The emperor Homāyūn, who was the ruler of northern India, from Kandahar and Kabul and Badaḵšān to Bengal, but had to contend with the disaffection of his disloyal brothers, was severely defeated on the banks of the Ganges by Šīr Khan Afḡān, who was not one of his vassals. In their confusion, the Mogul forces spurred their horses into the river. Moḥammad Zamān Mīrzā, the grandson of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā Bāyqarā, who was fighting at the Emperor's side, was drowned, along with a number of Čağatāy emirs and men. The Emperor himself was swept off his horse by the current. He was saved by a water carrier who plunged into the water and dragged him out. Homāyūn retreated headlong to his capital, Āgra, where he regrouped his forces to continue the struggle. His brother, Mīrzā Kāmrān, feigned illness and went to Lahore, and many of Homāyūn's men proved disloyal and disbanded.

Nevertheless, Homāyūn fought another engagement with Šīr Khan on the banks of the Ganges. But, because of the enemy's superiority in numbers, Homāyūn suffered a worse defeat than before, and fell back on Āgra in a parlous state. With the realm in disorder, revolts occurred on all sides, and the Emperor, unable to remain in Āgra, went to Lahore. For a variety of reasons, he could find no resting place there either and fled to the province of Sind. The sons of Emir Ẕu'l-Nūn Arğūn, who had usurped the ruling authority there, gave him a hostile reception. Yādegār Nāṣer Mīrzā, Homāyūn's cousin, who was accompanying the Emperor, deserted him and joined forces with the Arğūnids. Homāyūn was forced to proceed toward Kandahar.

When he reached the district of Šāl (Quetta) and Mastang, 'Askarī Mīrzā, his younger brother, who was governor of Kandahar, hearing of the weakness of Homāyūn's position and of his friendship for Mīrzā Kāmrān (who was the elder brother and patron of both himself and Homāyūn), also acted in a hostile manner. Moreover, he resorted to treachery and deceit and conspired to seize Homāyūn and render him powerless. With this object in view, he left Kandahar with a strong detachment of men and made for Homāyūn's camp. His plan, however, was given away by someone loyal to Homāyūn. The latter, thus buffeted by fate, had no alternative but to go to Iran and have recourse to the Safavid family.

Homāyūn left his baggage at his camp. Because of the difficulty of transporting him, he also left behind his infant son, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, in the care of nurses and servants. The boy had been born while Homāyūn was in the province of Sind and was still not weaned. But he took along with him Akbar's mother and a number of servants of the harem, together with some sixty or seventy emirs and personal retainers who had proved their loyalty to him. The most senior of the emirs was Beyrām Khan Bahādor, the grandson of 'Alī Šakar Beg Torkmān,[200] whose father and grandfather had left Iran during the

[200] Alī Šakar was originally a Qara Qoyūnlū name.

decline of the Turkman regime and had accompanied Bābor to Kabul. His excellent services to the Mogul dynasty had led to his rapid promotion, and it was he who at this time directed Homāyūn's affairs. Homāyūn's party arrived in Sīstān by way of Čūl, and from there he wrote a letter in his own hand to Shah Tahmasp. The text of this letter follows:

> After the obligatory expressions of goodwill and devotion, which constitute an agreeable custom between intimate friends, although I regard myself as merely an insignificant mote in the sunbeams of your Majesty's splendor, I will proceed.
>
> Although I have never enrolled myself formally among your Majesty's servants, nevertheless strong ties of love and devotion have always drawn me to you. Now, through the caprice of fate, my realm has been reduced from the broad lands of India to the narrow confines of Sind, and you are familiar with the misfortunes which have befallen me.
>
> Now, my hopes are directed toward a meeting with Your Majesty, which in itself will fulfill many of my desires. And I trust that, when we meet, I may be able to explain my situation to you.

When Homāyūn neared Sīstān, the governor of the province, Aḥmad Sultan Šāmlū, sent his brother, with an appropriate baggage train, to welcome him. Aḥmad Sultan himself also went with his fellow nobles to meet the Emperor and placed himself at his service. Aḥmad Sultan then sent a full report concerning the circumstances of the Emperor's arrival to the governor-general of Khorasan, Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū. The latter sent a swift courier to court, announcing Homāyūn's arrival and presenting his letter of friendship to the Shah. Such was Shah Tahmasp's joy at the news that he wrote a reply in his own hand. The kindness Shah Tahmasp displayed toward Emperor Homāyūn is illustrated by a *farmān* regarding that scion of the house of Tīmūr which the Shah issued to Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū; this *farmān* has been preserved in its entirety by Shaikh Abu'l Fażl, the son of Shaikh Mobārak, in the text of his *Tārīḵ-e Akbarī*.

In the course of 951/1544-45, Homāyūn proceeded by easy stages to Herat, where he indulged in hunting to drive away the melancholy induced by his bad fortune. Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū, in accordance with the Shah's *farmān*, paraded his troops and marched out of Herat with full pomp and circumstance to meet the Emperor at Pol-e Mālān. On the day the Emperor reached the Bāḡ-e Šahr, Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā received him in the manner in which he had been instructed. When the prince neared the Emperor, he dismounted and saluted him. The Emperor then dismounted and embraced the prince warmly, and displayed gentlemanly diffidence regarding the order of precedence in the cavalcade. The prince, however, adopting a filial role, maintained his humble and courteous attitude.

The Emperor spent some time refreshing himself in the pleasant gardens of Herat, especially the Bāḡ-e Morād, the Bāḡ-e Zāḡān, and the Bāḡ-e Jahān-ārā. Moḥammad Khan made the Shah's *farmān* his daily rulebook, and presented fitting gifts to the Emperor. When he was fully rested, Homāyūn began his journey toward Iraq to meet the Shah. In every city through which he passed, the local governors and nobility offered their services and greeted him with gifts. In the capital, Qazvīn,[201] the residences of Ḵāja ʿAbd al-Ḡanī, the *kalāntar* of the region,[202] were reserved for the use of the Emperor. Once installed there, Homāyūn sent Beyrām Khan to request an audience with the Shah. The request was accompanied by a number of verses alluding to the story of the miraculous rescue of Salmān by ʿAlī from the grip of the lion, and the aptness of this allusion will not be lost upon intelligent persons.

After the arrival of Beyrām Khan, the Shah moved to the summer pastures of Sūrloq, where the historic meeting between the two monarchs took place. When Homāyūn was only a *farsaḵ*[203] from the royal camp, the Shah sent a party to meet him. This party consisted of the Shah's brothers, Bahrām Mīrzā and Sām Mīrzā; Qāżī Jahān the *vizier*; Sevendūk Beg Afšār the *qūrčībāšī*;[204] Badr Khan Ostājlū; Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa Żu'l-Qadar the *mohrdār*;[205] and other emirs and principal officers of the state. Behind them, troop after troop, came the centurions and *qūrčīs*, followed by the different categories of servants and retainers, all fully armed and equipped, to carry out the ceremony of greeting and salutation.

When Homāyūn reached the place of audience, he dismounted and walked between the ranks of the royal bodyguard. The Shah emerged from his private tent, entered the royal audience pavilion, and welcomed Homāyūn with all the ritual and ceremonial of the ancient kings of Iran and embraced him warmly. The Shah led the Emperor into his private tent, where the two monarchs conversed together in a friendly and frank manner. Among Homāyūn's gifts to the Shah were several rubies from Badaḵšān, and a diamond the weight of which Ḥasan Beg Rūmlū, the historian, who was in the Shah's entourage on this occasion, and Qāżī Aḥmad Ġaffārī, the author of the *Tārīḵ-e Jahān-ārā*, give as four and two-thirds *meṣqāls*.[206]

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[201] An anachronism! Qazvin did not become the capital of Iran until 960/1552-53.

[202] On the functions of the *kalāntar*, see *TM*, index, *s.v.*

[203] About 3 1/2 miles.

[204] I.e., commander of the *qūrčīs* or royal bodyguard.

[205] I.e., the keeper of the seal.

For several days, Shah Tahmasp held private conversations every day with Homāyūn, and royal banquets and feasts were arranged. The Shah's friendly and sympathetic attitude gradually alleviated the Emperor's melancholy. At Sūrloq, a *battue* was organized for which beaters rounded up the game from miles around. The Emperor Homāyūn, at a word from the Shah, opened fire with arrows, together with Bahrām Mīrzā and Sām Mīrzā, and each strove to the utmost to display his prowess. Then the Shah took his bow in his hand and, before the Emperor Homāyūn and those young Čaġatāy warriors who were in attendance on him, who boasted that they were unexcelled in their skill at archery, he bagged no less than thirty gazelles. When they tired of archery, they slaughtered many fat-rumped deer and other animals.

When they had had enough of hunting and target practice,[207] they set a day for the banquet. At the conclusion of the feast, the Shah showered the Emperor with gifts fit for such a guest and such a host, including money, jewels, crowns, and bejeweled belts; Iraqi, Turkish, European, and Chinese brocades; weapons and equipment, including armor, Dā'ūdī coats of chain mail, and muskets decorated with jewels; Arabian horses; Barda'ī riding mules; camels in abundance; numerous tents suitable for harem and audience pavilions; canopies of satin and velvet and silk, both plain and embroidered; workshops and factories complete with the appropriate tools and equipment; drums, banners, and military band equipment. Homāyūn's emirs and close companions were given splendid robes of honor and gifts of money, as was appropriate to their station. Beyrām Khan received a standard and a military band and was promoted to the rank of *ḵān-e ḵānān* in the Mogul hierarchy.

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[206] One *meṣqāl* equals 71 grams.

[207] *Qabaq-andāzī*; the well-known pastime of shooting at a ring or other target placed on top of a pole.

Shah Tahmasp then detailed the following to accompany Homāyūn: Sultan Morād Mīrzā, who was younger than Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā and Esma'il Mīrzā, but older than the other princes, and twelve thousand *qezelbāš* under the command of Būdāq Khan Qājār, who was his guardian; Šāhqolī Sultan Afšār, the governor of Kerman; Aḥmad Sultan Šāmlū, the governor of Sīstān, and his brother, Ḥoseynqolī Sultan; together with other emirs, and three hundred men from the *qūrčīs* of the royal bodyguard and court retainers, under the command of Kačal Šāhverdī Ostājlū. The Shah decreed that as long as these men were attached to Homāyūn, they should consider the latter's orders and commands second only in importance to the orders of their own spiritual director and benefactor (i.e., the Shah himself), and they should not disobey any of his orders, but discharge with their lives if necessary any task he commanded them to carry out; until they were dismissed by Homāyūn, they were not to return.

Ḥeydar Sultan, one of the Šeybānīd princes of the line of Jočī, who had taken part in the battle of Jām with Kūčūm Khan and 'Obeyd Khan, had joined Tahmasp with his two sons after the Safavid victory. Ḥeydar wished to acquire high rank among the *qezelbāš*, and even take precedence over the Shah's own brothers, Bahrām Mīrzā and Sām Mīrzā. During the hunt at Sūrloq, he had forgotten his place as a servant of the Shah and had tried to take part in the *battue* with the princes, contrary to the Shah's order. Ḥoseyn Beg Ostājlū had lashed his horse back with his whip, thus making Ḥeydar extremely angry. Consequently, when on this occasion Ḥeydar expressed the wish to accompany the Emperor Homāyūn, the Shah placed no obstacle in his way, and Ḥeydar, with his two sons 'Alīqolī and Bahādor, set off with the Emperor. Later, through the help of Beyrām Khan, they rose to high office in India. After the death of Homāyūn, however, his sons were guilty of acts of disloyalty and improper conduct toward the Mogul dynasty. But this is not the right place to go into detail about this.

Since Homāyūn had expressed the desire to visit Tabriz, and to circumambulate the tomb of Shaikh Ṣafī,[208] he obtained permission from the Shah and set off. The inhabitants of Tabriz, in accordance with the Shah's order, decorated the city with flags and bunting, and the market buildings were decorated as gaily as a bridal chamber. They welcomed Homāyūn with due ceremony and proffered their services. For the delectation of the Emperor, they arranged polo games and other

[208] The first leader of the Ṣafavīya Order of Sufis, and the ancestor of the Safavid dynasty. Shaikh Ṣafī's tomb is at Ardabīl.

forms of sport in the Ṣāḥebābād Square, and they set up amusement and refreshment booths, as is the custom of Tabrizis. From Tabriz, Homāyūn traveled to Ardabīl to visit the tombs of the ancestors of the Safavids. There the Šeyḵāvand[209] *seyyeds* offered him their services and escorted him for several stages on his return journey.

From Ardabīl, Homāyūn rejoined the royal camp, which was in the meadows of Mīānej.[210] Here, he took his leave of the Shah and departed with high hopes and firm resolve. As long as he was on Safavid territory, he was received in a fitting manner at every stage. When he reached Khorasan, he was joined by the prince[211] and the Safavid expeditionary force, to whom he expressed his gratitude for the friendly help given to him by the Safavid house and the military support it had provided. According to the detailed accounts of the Indian historians, within a short time Homāyūn had brought his rebellious brothers to heel, had crushed the revolts in the provinces of Kabul, Ghazna, and Badaḵšān, and had established his rule in northern India. Since his subsequent history does not properly form part of the history of Iran, I will conclude at this point.

The Arrival of Sultan Bāyazīd b. Sultan Sülaymān, the Ottoman Emperor, at the Court of Shah Tahmasp

Sultan Bāyazīd had been appointed by his father governor of Kūtāhīya.[212] In 961/1553-54, Sultan Sülaymān dismissed him from the governorship of this province, replacing him with his elder brother Selīm, who was at Konya, so making the latter his heir-apparent. Bāyazīd's envy (because he wanted to become emperor) caused him to forget his fraternal feelings; in his rage, he paid out large sums of gold and collected a motley army. He refused to obey his father's order dismissing him, and marched against Sultan Selīm. Selīm reported his brother's rebellion to the Emperor. The latter, angered by Sultan Bāyazīd's temerity and disobedience, sent trusted pashas with a large army against him. They were to eliminate a man who, although his son, was a source of insurrection and revolution and a threat to the security of the state.

Sultan Selīm, following his father's orders, marched against his brother with a large army, and a fierce battle raged between them for two days. On the first day, the fighting went on from dawn to dusk; eight thousand infantry on both sides were slain. On the second day, Sultan Bāyazīd determined to break the enemy lines. Leading a group of intrepid men in a charge, he shattered both wings of Selīm's army in such devastating fashion that the troops did not check their flight until they reached Istanbul. On that day, Sultan Bāyazīd performed such prodigies of valor that even now, fifty years after the event,[213] his exploits are still talked of with awe. At this point, however, Sultan Selīm, with the troops remaining to him in the center, led a countercharge that overthrew Bāyazīd. Since Bāyazīd's position was a false one, he fled in panic to Amasya. There, he came to his senses and repented of his actions. Putting to death three of four of his retainers who had incited him to revolt, he sent their heads to Istanbul and sued for pardon.

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[209] The Šeyḵāvand were descendants of a side branch of the Safavid royal house.
[210] Modern Mīāna, southeast of Tabriz.
[211] Sultan Morād Mīrzā.
[212] Southeast of Borsā.

The blood of these few men, however, was not enough to assuage the wrath of Sultan Sülaymān, and he sent another army against him, this time under the command of Eskandar Pasha. Sultan Bāyazīd, unable to confront this large force, abandoned his baggage train and retreated, taking with him his four sons and about ten thousand supporters, including pashas, Janissaries, and other retainers. The Emperor's forces pursued him for several days, and a running fight ensued at every stop. Qodūz Farhād and Aqsāq Seyf al-Dīn, together with a group of devoted retainers, got Sultan Bāyazīd and his sons safely away from the battlefield, fighting all the way, and brought them to the Persian frontier. They entered Persian territory and sent a courier to the Shah to inform him of their situation. The Shah dispatched Ḥasan Beg Ostājlū, an officer attached to the court,[214] to receive him with arms and equipment worthy of a king.

The Shah ordered Ḥasan Beg, together with the frontier emirs and the nobility of the neighboring provinces, to place himself at the service of Bāyazīd and to provide him, at every stage of his journey, with appropriate hospitality. Mīrzā 'Aṭā Allāh Eṣfahānī, the *vizier* of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, was authorized to draw government funds for his essential daily expenses as long as the court officials were with him. These two officers carried out their orders faithfully. The leading citizens of Tabriz decorated the city and the markets, and organized a reception on a scale rarely seen. When the cavalcade left Tabriz and neared the royal camp, the *vakīl* Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī,[215] with a regal retinue, was sent to meet Bāyazīd. The Shah organized a magnificent reception in Sa'ādatābād Square at Qazvīn: gaily-colored carpets, tents of brocade, and embroidered canopies, contributed to an unforgettable spectacle.

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[213] If this is to be taken literally, it means that Eskandar Monšī was writing this portion of his history in 1011/1602-03.

[214] The *moqarrabs* were divided into two categories: *moqarrab al-ḵāqān* and *moqarrab al-hażrat*. Ḥasan Beg clearly belonged to the second category, which comprised *aides-de-camp*, couriers, and officers charged with special duties of all kinds, who were attached to the court and subject to the personal orders of the Shah.

On the day when the royal cavalcade entered the city, the great emirs, various army contingents, a great throng of people from the markets, and residents from within and outside the city flocked to welcome Bāyazīd, covering the plain with people. Bāyazīd, however, was an arrogant, reticent, and cold-natured man; it has reached me from a variety of sources that, at the official receptions at Tabriz and Qazvin, despite all the special displays put on by skilled craftsmen, despite all the performances put on by entertainers, despite the festive crowds and the lavish hospitality, he looked neither to right nor to left as he rode, but gazed straight ahead between his horse's ears.

So Sultan Bāyazīd arrived at the Sa'ādat Square in Qazvin, with ten thousand men—infantry, Janissaries, and cavalry—all fully armed and equipped in the Ottoman fashion. When he reached the place of audience, he dismounted; Shah Tahmasp advanced a few paces and shook hands with him, greeted him with warmth and affection, and displayed the utmost friendliness. But Bāyazīd maintained his haughty and arrogant demeanor: he spoke not a word, and did not join in that cultured dialogue which every occasion of this sort demands. After the official ceremonies were over, Bāyazīd was taken to pleasant quarters and provided with everything he needed.

A few days later, when he had rested from the fatigue of the journey, a feast was arranged in this same Sa'ādat Square. The entire surface of the square was carpeted with rugs of gold and silver, and presented a scene which surpassed the gardens of paradise. Sultan Bāyazīd, his sons, his emirs, his personal staff, and his retainers, were invited to the banquet. To divert him, all sorts of astonishing entertainments were provided. Hour after hour, people demonstrated the warmth of their friendship and their desire to please him. Waiters dashed to and fro bringing drinks, preserves, fruits, and food fit for such an occasion. Gold coin, bejeweled weapons, precious stuffs, and equipment of all kinds, to the value of ten thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*, were lavished on him; his followers, according to their rank, were made the guests of the great emirs and governors, who were charged with seeing to their needs and acting as their hosts.

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[215] On the precise status of this official, see Savory, Offices II.

While Bāyazīd was the guest of the Shah, apart from the cost of the daily supply of fodder, the cost of the items given to him at several advance receptions accorded him before he reached Qazvin, and the cost of the gifts given to him on this occasion at Qazvin, at the various other meetings with the Shah and festive occasions which took place, another fifteen thousand *tomān* worth of coins, jewels, bejeweled weapons, gold and silver plate, and other choice gifts, such as rare books, carpets from Kerman and Jowšaqān woven with gold thread, pieces of felt in various colors, precious stuffs from many regions, were lavished on him. In short, the Shah exceeded what was appropriate in his treatment of the son of the Ottoman Sultan and was prodigal with his royal favors. Bāyazīd, however, had a deceitful and obstinate nature and was possessed of an overweening pride, and so his affairs ended in disaster.

Bāyazīd tried to persuade Shah Tahmasp to lead an army against Ottoman territory in his support, and thus to disturb the existing state of peace. The Shah was opposed to this plan on several grounds, but especially because the Safavid and Ottoman empires, after so much warfare and bloodshed and devastation of territory, were now at peace. Covenants and guarantees of peace had been exchanged. With the cessation of hostilities, the running sore of constant warfare was healed, and peace and prosperity prevailed.

Shah Tahmasp, mindful of the Koranic passage: "Those who fulfill God's covenant and break not the compact,"[216] did not consider it right to break his covenant. He did not wish to be responsible for breaking the peace presently enjoyed by Muslims, an action for which he would surely incur the blame for not following the Koranic injunction: "Do not break your oaths after you have made them firm."[217] In the second place, the Shah was of the opinion that hostility toward and rebellion against one's parents is a mark of ingratitude, and results in misfortune both in this world and the next. Bāyazīd had been guilty of disloyalty to and rebellion against his father. It would therefore ill become the Shah, who was descended from a line of shaikhs endowed with miraculous powers, and was himself the repository of spiritual guidance, to lend assistance in such a false cause.

[216] Koran, 13:20. Such persons are assured of entry into paradise.
[217] Koran, 16:93.

Since Bāyazīd had sought sanctuary with the Safavid house, however, the Shah decided to devote his efforts to effecting a reconciliation between father and son, and to placate the wrath of the Ottoman sultan by exhortation and expectations of friendship. Accordingly, he sent trusted envoys to Istanbul to ask the Sultan to pardon the sins of his son. But Sultan Sülaymān was so filled with resentment against his son that he could not be persuaded to spare his life; as long as Bāyazīd was alive, the Sultan considered him a potential danger to the fabric of the Ottoman state. Sultan Sülaymān sent a return embassy, led by Senān Beg, who had been instrumental in negotiating the peace, to speak to the Shah. Senān Beg presented the Sultan's letter, which after the exchange of mutual expressions of friendship, and confirming the binding nature of the peace treaty, went on to make a detailed statement of the charges against Bāyazīd, supported by proofs and decisive evidence.

Written legibly in the margin, in the Sultan's own hand, was the request that Bāyazīd be handed over to his officers. If the Shah hesitated to hand him over alive and unharmed, he should first deprive him of his sight. Shah Tahmasp, who considered this suggestion contrary to the laws of chivalry, put Senān Beg off. Sülaymān then sent a second embassy, which pressed the Shah strongly to yield. This time, the ambassadors suggested that the Shah allot Bāyazīd a fief somewhere or other; then, if he committed any further act of rebellion, no scruple need deter the Shah from removing him from the scene.

At this juncture, Sultan Bāyazīd revealed his secret self. With his confidants, he contemplated an act of treachery against the Shah, in violation of the bonds of friendship, and conspired to inflict injury on the Shah's person. If the conspirators were successful in this vain scheme, they would fortify themselves in Qazvin, seek reinforcements from the Ottoman Sultan, and Bāyazīd would become ruler of Iran. If matters went awry, they would go in the direction of Aḡrīča, among the Ṣā'en-Ḳānī Turkmans.[218] From there they would take ship to Kaffa. Two of Bāyazīd's confidants, Qarā Oḡūrlū and Maḥmūd Čerkes, disclosed the plot to the Shah, but the latter, in his innocence, thought it nothing but the idle chatter of mischievous persons who were trying to curry favor with him, and gave no credence to the story. Bāyazīd, hearing of the secret meeting between his confidants and the Shah, seized them both, and placed them in confinement.

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[218] The Ṣā'en-Ḳānī Turkmans were a tribe belonging to the Čaḡatāy group and lived in northeast Iran (see *TM*, p. 17).

The Shah, in order to allay any suspicions Bāyazīd might have, arranged a meeting with the latter in the Sa'ādatābād Garden at Qazvin. The Shah himself, with a group of his personal officers, was standing in one corner of the garden. All were wearing cook's aprons, made of brocade, and before the eyes of Bāyazīd they proceeded to enjoy themselves by doing the cooking, while chatting to Bāyazīd in a friendly and informal manner. 'Arab Moḥammad Ṭarābozūnī, one of Bāyazīd's personal staff, went up to the Shah and, speaking in a whisper, said: "I would like to say a few words to you—words I feel I must utter in return for all the favors and benefits I have received from you. I would like to speak to you in private." Sultan Bāyazīd noticed this, and put 'Arab Moḥammad to death, together with the two prisoners. The Shah, alarmed by this vile act, inquired the reason for it and indicated his displeasure. The common people of Qazvin, upon learning of what had happened and of the Shah's indignation, stormed the entrance to Bāyazīd's quarters, and reviled and abused him as an ingrate. Although the Shah was not displeased at their action, he had not authorized it.

After this, the Shah placed no further trust in Bāyazīd. He began to seek ways to rid himself of this embarrassment, and on the advice of the elders of the state and those loyal to the crown, made plans to seize him. On the day arranged, the Shah summoned Bāyazīd. When he entered the audience hall, the Shah rose and left. At once the great emirs seized Bāyazīd and rendered him powerless, and put to death Lala Pasha, Farrok̲ Beg, 'Alī Beg *Čāšnīgīr-bāšī*,[219] Senān Beg *Mīr-āk̲or*,[220] and so on. Bāyazīd's sons were handed over to the emirs. The remainder of his supporters, both those at court and elsewhere, were put to the sword by the Sufis, exception for a few who, with the help of their friends, succeeded in escaping and making their way back to Turkey.

One of the principal conditions governing the peace between Iran and the Ottoman empire was that anyone from either side who might seek sanctuary with the other side should be returned and not given any support. In the year 969/1561-62[221] Sultan Sülaymān therefore sent 'Alī Pasha, the governor of Mar'aš, with Ḥasan Āqā, his own chief taster, and two hundred men drawn from the *āqās*[222] and *čāvošes*,[223] to fetch Bāyazīd. The Shah, despite the evidence of Bāyazīd's hostility toward him, did not trust the intentions of those envoys, who appeared to be tough and vengeful men, and postponed handing over Bāyazīd until a deputation of more senior and God-fearing men, possessed of greater authority, should arrive. Accordingly the Sultan sent a second embassy, consisting of Ḵosrow Pasha, who was an intendant[224] of integrity and an old servant of the Ottoman house, with a number of reliable graybeards. This embassy brought a brief message from Sultan Sülaymān, written in his own hand, in which he declared his readiness to renew the treaty of peace and make it binding on posterity, and to cement it by the most solemn oaths. He reminded the Shah in a friendly but firm manner that the surrender of Sultan Bāyazīd was a condition of this peace.

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[219] The chief taster, whose duty it was to taste the sultan's food before it went to the table to ensure that the sultan was not poisoned. The risks attendant on this office were mitigated by the existence of numbers of subordinate tasters.

[220] Master of the Stable.

[221] The *Aḥsan al-Tavārīk̲*, p. 415, gives the date of the arrival of this embassy as 22 Rajab 968/8 April 1561.

Since the alternatives open to the Shah were to break his sworn oath and destroy the peace and prosperity currently enjoyed by Muslims, or accede to the request made by the Ottoman Sultan, and thus perpetuate the peace and tranquillity of the common people and the servants of God, he decided not to depart from the conditions of the treaty. He handed over Bāyazīd and his four sons, safe and unharmed, to Ḵosrow Pasha. Thus, by the renewal of reciprocal covenants, a genuine treaty of peace was concluded between Shah Tahmasp and the Ottoman Emperor in this year, 969/1562. The chronogram for it, by a happy coincidence, is "Reconciliation is best."[225]

It never entered the Shah's head that the Ottoman envoys would do physical harm to Bāyazīd while he was on Persian territory, but as soon as he was handed over, he and his four sons were immediately put to death on instructions from Sultan Sülaymān, and their bodies were taken back to Istanbul. The chronogram of this event is "Five fewer Ottomans."[226] Thus the threat of further insurrection and war

[222] The term *āqā*, in Ottoman usage, was applied to a wide variety of both civil and military officials; (see H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, London, 1950-57, I/1, index, *s.v.*, hereinafter cited as Gibb and Bowen).

[223] *Čāvoš* means courier, messenger. The *čāvošes* were used by the sultan to convey his orders both in the capital and to the provinces (see Gibb and Bowen, p. 349).

[224] The Persian word *kadḵodā* (lit.: master of the house), corrupted by the Turks to *kahyā*, again designated a wide variety of officials in the Ottoman administration (see Gibb and Bowen, I/1 index, *s.v.*). The Kahyā Bey became a deputy of the grand vizier, with great authority in home and military affairs.

[225] Koran, 4:129. The MS. gives *ṣolḥ ḵeyr*, which yields 938; to get the correct date, one has to add the definite article contained in the Koranic quotation: *al-solḥo ḵeyron*.

[226] This chronogram again yields 969/1562, by the ingenious device of subtracting 5 from the value of the words: *zomra-ye 'oṣmānīān* (974). According to the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, p. 417, the prisoners were handed over on 23 July, and executed immediately in Qazvin.

was removed, and the common people on both sides looked forward to an even more secure peace.

The Visit of the Čengīzid Sultans to the Safavid Court

Among the Čengīzid sultans who visited the Safavid court were Dīn Moḥammad Ḵān b. Olūs Ḵān, and his brother ʿAlī Solṭān, who were descendants of Šeybān b. Jočī b. Čengīz Ḵān. In 943/1536-37, when Shah Tahmasp conducted his fourth campaign in Khorasan against ‘Obeyd Khan, these two sultans visited the Shah's camp and tendered their allegiance to him. In return, Dīn Moḥammad Khan was granted as a fief the districts of Nesā and Abīvard,[227] with their dependencies, and he and his brother established themselves firmly in those regions by virtue of royal favor. Their power steadily increased, and ʿAlī Sultan gradually brought under his sway the whole province of Ūrganj.[228] At first he remained loyal to the Shah, and rendered useful service to him.

In 945/1538-39, when ‘Obeyd Khan took possession of the province of Ḵārazm, he allotted the province to his son, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Khan, and to various other sultans who were kinsmen of his. ‘Obeyd Khan was still at Šahr-e Vazīr[229] when Dīn Moḥammad Khan, with a group of Uzbegs and Yaqqa Turkmans[230] from the Ūrganj district, fell on ‘Obeyd Khan's emirs and sultans, plundering and looting. Dīn Moḥammad made his Uzbegs wear the Safavid *tāj*,[231] and spread it around that *qezelbāš* reinforcements had arrived. After a number of engagements, ‘Obeyd Khan's emirs were defeated. A number of his trusted emirs were taken prisoner, and many more were killed. ‘Obeyd Khan was so stunned by this reverse that he mounted a camel and fled from Šahr-e Vazīr to Bokhara. He died the same year and was succeeded by his son ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Khan, whose seat was Bokhara. Dīn Moḥammad Khan sent the prisoners, along with the heads of the slain, to court, and was rewarded by the Shah with a sumptuous robe of honor. Moreover, every year gifts to the value of three hundred *tomān* were sent to him from Khorasan. For a number of years, both brothers remained steadfast in their allegiance to the Shah, and ambassadors were continually traveling to and fro between them and the royal court, where they were received with kindness.

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[227] Both these cities lie west of Marv.

[228] I.e., the delta region of the Oxus.

[229] Formerly Jīs or Gīt; it lay on the left bank of the Oxus, some 35 miles west of Jorjānīya.

[230] A clan of the Čağatāy tribe of Turkmans allied to the Safavids.

[231] The distinctive crimson headgear of the Safavid supporters, from which they derived the sobriquet of *qezelbāš* or "redheads."

Another Čengīzid visitor to the Safavid court was Ḥeydar Sultan, who was descended from the sultans of Ḵārazm, and who for a time was allied to 'Obeyd Khan. As has already been mentioned in the section on the Emperor Homāyūn, he joined the Safavid camp at Esfarā'īn in Khorasan, was received with favor by the Shah, and remained at court for a considerable time. In the year when the Emperor Homāyun came to Iran, at a *battue* at Sūrloq, Ḥeydar was a member of Sām Mīrzā's and Bahrām Mīrzā's party. Before the Shah had given permission for the emirs and nobles to take part in the hunt, Ḥeydar Sultan had tried to move forward, and Ḥoseyn Beg Ostājlū had forced his horse back into line with his whip.

The royal princes had ignored the incident, but Ḥeydar Sultan had taken umbrage at what he regarded as a slight and petitioned the Shah to be allowed to accompany Homāyūn when the latter returned to India. The Shah, as a favor to the Emperor, had allowed him to go. Ḥeydar Sultan departed, along with his two sons, 'Alīqolī and Bahādor. Ḥeydar fought valiantly at the siege of Kandahar and died on the way to Kabul. His sons remained in the service of the Emperor, and both rose to high rank in India. An account of their subsequent revolt against the Emperor Akbar is contained in the *Tārīḵ-e Akbarī*, and does not merit inclusion in a history of Iran.

Other Čengīzid visitors to the Safavid court were Yūnes Khan, the ruler of Ḵārazm, and his brother Pahlavānqolī Sultan, who had been ousted from their territory by Dūst Khan. Yūnes Khan and his brother took refuge at the Safavid court, and were received by the Shah at Qazvin in 964/1556-57. The date is given by the chronogram: "The coming of the Ḵārazmians."

Ultimately, both brothers, Dīn Moḥammad Khan and 'Alī Sultan, were disloyal to their royal patron and displayed ingratitude for the favors they had received from him. In their stubborn pride, they began to ravage the borders of Khorasan and Astarābād, as opportunity afforded. On one occasion, in 950/1543-44, when Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan Ostājlū was governor of Astarābād, Dīn Moḥammad Khan led an army into that province. Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan, deeming it unwise to commit himself to a battle in the open plain, stayed in the city and the fortress. Dīn Moḥammad Khan laid siege to these for a while, but eventually retired. On another occasion, Dīn Moḥammad Khan advanced as far as Mašhad, and again withdrew. However, he sent ambassadors to court, and begged forgiveness for his actions.

As a result, after his death, his son Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan was granted the same fief and allowances as had been enjoyed by his father. But he too on several occasions showed hostile and rebellious tendencies, and Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī and a number of other emirs, together with Sultan Ebrāhīm the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, on orders from the Shah led a punitive expedition against him, and blockaded him in the fort of Abīvard. Finally, he threw himself on the Shah's mercy, and swore solemn oaths to the effect that he would behave in the future. The prince and the emirs reported this to the Shah, and were ordered to return.

'Alī Sultan, the brother of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, was a fundamentally treacherous man. Driven by his ambition and overweening pride, he made an incursion against the province of Khorasan, and on several occasions stirred up sedition and revolt in the province of Astarābād, with the help of the Sīāhpuš and the rebellious Ūḵlū tribe, but these insurrections were suppressed without difficulty by the Shah. Ultimately, he failed to achieve anything, as will be made clear later. At this point, I am obliged to say something about affairs in the province of Astarābād.

Affairs at Astarābād, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Betekčī, and the Revolt of the Uḵlū Tribe with the Assistance of the Uzbegs of Ḵ̌ārazm

In former times, the province of Astarābād was ruled by the independent governors of Jorjān and Ṭabarestān. The people of the province, although for the most part upright, God-fearing men, are not entirely immune from diabolical suggestions, original sin, and temporary derangement of the brain, and there is no doubt that the exhilarating climate of the forests and mountains of Jorjān is conducive to rebellion. A group of men, calling themselves "the black-robed ones," had allowed their minds to be corrupted by the desire for revolt. Another group of malignant men, of the Ṣa'en-ḵānī tribe, commonly known as the Yaqqa Turkmans, were subjects of the sultans of Ḵ̌ārazm, but because they refused to brook any sort of control, they had taken themselves off into the limitless plains of Astarābād. They lived between the Jorjān and Atrek rivers, where they molested the local inhabitants. For this reason, the province was never free from insurrection, and its governors were constantly obliged to conduct military operations. Thanks be to God that during the reign of the present Shah ('Abbas I), the province has finally been pacified, and both groups of insurgents suppressed.

In 944/1537–38, when Shah Tahmasp was returning to Iraq after his fourth campaign in Khorasan against the Uzbegs, as a result of which a definitive end had been put to 'Obeyd Khan's invasions of that province, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, the nephew[232] of Ḵ̌āja Moẓaffar Betekčī, in whose turbulent heart ignorance and ambition were raging, turned away from his allegiance to the Safavid house. In the vain hope of achieving a position of power, he gathered round him a group of the "black-robed ones" of Astarābād and rebelled. He made himself master of a number of small towns, and sent envoys to seek assistance from 'Omar Ǧāzī Sultan, nephew of Borāq Khan, the governor of Tashkent and the region of Farḡāna, who had just seized possession of Ḵ̌ārazm with the help of his maternal uncle.

'Omar Ǧāzī Sultan, at the request of Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, marched toward Astarābād with a large force. Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ emerged from the forests of Jorjān with his force of "black-robed ones" and joined him. Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan Ostājlū, who at that time was governor of Astarābād, received the news that the Uzbegs and the "black-robed ones" had joined forces; since he knew he could not resist such a large army, he prudently retired to Besṭām and sent a report to the Shah. Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, finding the countryside deserted, took possession of Astarābād and established himself as governor of the province with Uzbeg support. He sent fitting presents to the governor of Ḵ̌ārazm and his chief officers, and 'Omar Ǧāzī Sultan left him as governor of Astarābād and returned to Ḵ̌ārazm.

After his departure, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ conceived the mad idea of extending the territory under his control and of becoming an independent ruler, but he spent his nights and days in carousing and merrymaking. When he was intoxicated by music and wine, and in a state of euphoria, he would allot the regions of the inhabited world to his drinking companions, nominating one of his retainers to every province. As each stupid fellow was appointed he would, in a manner even crazier than that of his master, prostrate himself before him and go through the whole ritual of prayers for his welfare and supplication. The story goes that one day a general altercation occurred among his retainers concerning the division of these provinces, since every man wanted to get the province he had set his heart on.

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[232] *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ* says "son"; *Jahān-ārā* says "grandson."

When all this was reported to the Shah, he sent Emir Sultan Rūmlū, Shah ʻAlī Sultan Ostājlū, and Ḥasan Sultan Šāmlū, with a detachment of *qezelbāš*, to the aid of Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan. Before these reinforcements reached him, however, Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan, learning that ʻOmar Ǧāzī Sultan had returned to Ḵ̌ārazm, and hearing of Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ's negligence and folly, made a sudden dash to Astarābād from Besṭām with a group of veteran warriors. It was the month of Ramażān,[233] and during those holy days, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ and his wicked[234] companions, in their folly and pride, were so out of touch with what was going on that, when they heard the sound of the Khan's drums and fifes and the war cry of the *ḡāzīs*, they thought the main *qezelbāš* army had arrived and fled panic-stricken into the forests.

A certain young man of the Kangarlū clan,[235] Šāhverdī Beg, one of Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan's retainers, captured Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ and brought him before the Khan, and was rewarded with gifts. Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan sent Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ to Tabriz, where he was taken before the Shah. At the Shah's order, he was placed in a large wine jar, carried to the top of the Baṣrīya minaret, and hurled down.

When he was at the height of his power, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ was guilty of many crimes, and he affronted the honor and dignity of Muslims. His aspirations were extremely foolish, and he made the mistake of making all sorts of novel appointments. He showed the greatest favor toward wits and poets. Ḥeyratī Astarābādī composed an ode for him, the first verse of which goes as follows:

> O thou whose wisdom is a mirror which reveals in this
>   world the mysteries of the unseen world,
> What is hidden in our hearts is manifest to you.

When Ḥeyratī, who was reciting the poem, reached the following verse:

> Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ is the lord of the kingdom of good
>   fortune,
> because he is clothed from head to foot in the favor
>   of God[236]

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[233] 945; January-February 1539.

[234] There is a nice word-play with Ṣāleḥ, meaning "man of integrity," and *ṭāleḥ*, "wicked."

[235] A clan of the Ostājlū tribe.

[236] Because he bore the name of the Prophet, Moḥammad, and of the Prophet's servant, Ṣāleḥ.

Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ knocked his royal hat askew[237] and gave Ḥeyratī seven *ḵarvār*[238] of silk as a reward. Unfortunately for Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, however, he did not consider the significance of the following verse:

Not everyone who, in the insolence of his pride,[239]
rushes to sit on the throne,
knows how to manage an army and behave like a ruler.

The next event in the history of Astarābād which should be recorded is the coming of ʿAlī Sultan Uzbeg. In 955/1548–49, he suddenly seized possession of various places in Ḵārazm and marched on Astarābād with about six thousand Uzbeg troops. Shah ʿAlī Sultan Ostājlū, who had succeeded Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan as governor of that city, marched out to meet him, and a fierce battle was fought within sight of Astarābād. The Ostājlū *ğāzīs* were victorious and pursued the enemy as far as Gonbad-e Qābūs.[240] Many of the enemy were slain, and their heads sent to the Shah.

The next event of note is the revolt of the Yaqqa Turkmans in 957/1550–51, when Shah ʿAlī Sultan died and was succeeded as governor of Astarābād by Kačal Šāhverdī Ostājlū. When Kačal Šāhverdī was appointed, a group of Yaqqa Turkman chiefs visited him to offer their congratulations and good wishes, and to bring presents for the Sultan. The chief of the Ūḵlū clan was an extremely handsome youth named Obā, and Kačal Sultan asked him to stay behind. He then declared his love for him. The story got around among the Turkmans and Obā, fearing for his reputation, slipped away one night and rode back to his tribe. In order to allay the suspicions of his peers, he put to death a certain Šāṭer Beg, a relative of the Sultan, who was the *dārūğa*[241] of the Turkmans. This constituted an act of rebellion.

Kačal Sultan led a punitive expedition against him, and when he reached the territory of the Ūḵlū tribe, sent his men to plunder and ravage the area. The Sultan himself, with a few of his personal staff, happened to be standing on a low hill directing operations when Obā appeared from nowhere with a detachment of Turkmans, fell on the Sultan, and killed him. The Ostājlū *ḡāzīs*, seeing their leader slain, fled back to the city. Emir Ǧeyb Sultan Ostājlū, the governor of Damghan and Besṭām, when he heard the news, marched rapidly to Astarābād to protect the city, and sent a report to the Shah.

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[237] A gesture of astonishment.

[238] Equals 100 *man-e Tabrīzī*, or about 625 pounds.

[239] The beauty of the word-play on the phrase *kolāh kaj nehādan*, which means (1) to set one's hat awry, and (2) to be puffed up by pride, is lost in translation.

[240] The tomb, still extant, of the Zīārīd ruler Qābūs, who died in 403/1012.

[241] The *dārūğa* was (1) a town governor (2) a police officer (3) an official whose functions overlapped those of the *moḥtaseb*, particularly as superintendent of weights and measures and as guardian of public morals. As A. K. S. Lambton points out, however (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, *s.v.* *Dārūgha*), "There are several instances of the appointment of a *dārūgha* over a tribal group, whose functions were clearly rather different from those of the *dārūgha* of a town or the *dārūgha* of the bazaar." Professor Lambton suggests that the *dārūğa* of a tribal group probably assisted in the collection of taxes.

In 962/1554-55, the Shah ordered Gökča Sultan Qājār, 'Alī Sultan Tātī-oḡlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, Čarandāb Sultan Šāmlū, and Moṣṭafā Sultan Varsāq to lead a punitive expedition against Obā. With the approach of the emirs, Obā fled to Ḵ̌ārazm and sent for help to 'Alī Sultan Uzbeg. The latter, eager for plunder, marched toward Jorjān with a large army. When he neared the camp of the great *qezelbāš* emirs and received accurate information on the size and quality of the *qezelbāš* force, he began to regret that he had come. He opened negotiations with the *qezelbāš* emirs and, after an exchange of gifts, it was agreed that Obā should return to the *status quo ante* and not commit any further acts of rebellion. It was further agreed that the emirs should take no punitive action against him.

After this agreement had been confirmed by a sworn treaty, 'Alī Sultan returned to Ḵ̌ārazm. Gökča Sultan died on this expedition, but the other emirs returned to their own fiefs. Obā had acquired considerable prestige as a result of his revolt; he aspired to a position of superiority among his contemporaries and became even more ambitious. In 965/1557-58, when Ebrahim Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar was appointed governor of Astarābād, Obā descended again with a group of Turkmans. Ebrahim, unable to deal with the situation, reported Obā's renewed rebellion to the Shah, who was at Qazvin.

The Shah placed Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa the *mohrdār* in command of an army which included Badr Khan Ostājlū, Yādegār Moḥammad Sultan Tarḵān Torkmān, Rostam Khan Afšār, and others, and sent this force to assist Ebrahim Khan, with orders to eliminate Obā. These emirs joined forces with Ebrahim Khan in the plain of Astarābād, and together they marched against Obā. The latter abandoned his family and household belongings, and fled. The *ḡāzīs* then ravaged his tribal territory and camped in the area. In the course of these operations, Obā appeared on the scene with his Turkmans, and prepared to give battle. The *qezelbāš* also drew up their forces for battle, but their horses, as a result of the severe forced marches they had undergone and the extreme heat in the plain, were as lifeless as the knights in a game of chess. The battle went on until nightfall, when both sides desisted from the struggle and mounted guard. The following day, Obā returned to the attack with his Ūḵlū tribesmen.

After repeated attacks and counterattacks, Obā perceived his relative weakness vis-à-vis the *qezelbāš* and realized that he could achieve nothing on his own. He therefore set off for Ḵārazm, pursued as far as the Atrek River by the emirs. In the burning heat of the desert, Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa, the army commander, was seized by an attack of colic and died. The remaining emirs refused to accept Badr Khan as commander of the army and proceeded to operate independently, exhausting their horses still further by aimless forays in search of plunder.

At this point, the Safavid scouts reported the approach of ʿAlī Sultan Uzbeg, and Badr Khan at once rode out to meet him. ʿAlī Sultan, made cautious by his previous experience with the valor of the *qezelbāš*, dug a ditch around his camp. Behind the ditch he erected various fortifications, so that his camp took on the appearance of a stockade. The *ğāzīs* assaulted the trench and were met with arrows and musket fire. While this was going on, Obā led two hundred Uzbegs behind the *qezelbāš*. Although the emirs warned Badr Khan about this stratagem and urged him to send a detachment to protect the rear, Badr Khan ignored the report and underestimated his enemy.

While Badr Khan continued the frontal attack on the Uzbegs, Obā worked his way around behind where the grooms and footmen were stationed and brought the camp servants under fire. The camp servants fell back in disorder upon the cavalry who were fighting along the ditch. Some had crossed the ditch and were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Uzbegs. The latter gained courage from this turn of events and redoubled their fire, which caused the *qezelbāš* ranks to disintegrate in disorder. Thus, because the *qezelbāš* emirs had not proceeded according to the recognized rules of warfare and had shown complete lack of caution, they suffered a heavy defeat. They were forced to retreat into the Jorjān River, which was not fordable,[242] and many men were drowned. The *qezelbāš* lost nearly one thousand men killed and captured in this battle. Of the emirs, Ebrāhīm Khan and Rostam Khan were killed, and Badr Khan, Yādegār Moḥammad Khan, and others were taken prisoner; the remaining emirs returned safely to Damghan.

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[242] Le Strange, *Lands*, pp. 376–77, confirms this: "Throughout its course the stream was deep, almost unfordable, so that travellers were often drowned in crossing it."

'Alī Sultan did not follow up his victory, but withdrew with enormous quantities of booty, including horses with saddles of gold and silver which had been set free by the grooms to graze on the plain. Obā, his prestige increased still further by this victory, demanded in marriage the daughter of Ḵāja Moḥammad, the son of Ḵāja Moẓaffar Betekčī. At first she refused to marry Obā; but was eventually forced against her will to acquiesce. After the marriage, a number of retainers of the Betekčī house entered Obā's service, but his wife devoted all her time to planning how she could escape from his clutches. Obā with sufficient insight to perceive she was plotting some treachery, threatened her retainers that he would put her to death. The terrified retainers informed his wife and said that if they did not do something that night, they would all be dead in the morning.

Obā's wife arranged with her retainers that they should bring a number of horses to the door of her tent at midnight and hold them ready until she gave the signal. At midnight, when Obā was fast asleep and the guards were all sheltering under their heavy felt capes because of the heavy rain, oblivious to what was going on, one of her retainers, Moḥebb 'Alī, guided by her, entered her husband's tent and struck off his head with a single blow. His wife, holding her husband's head, reached her waiting companions, and they rode like the wind to Astarābād. Moḥebb 'Alī took the rebel's head to court, presented it to Shah Tahmasp at Qazvin, and was handsomely rewarded. At Astarābād, the flames of revolt died down, and 'Alī Sultan, greedy for gold, opened negotiations for the ransom of the *qezelbāš* prisoners. The Shah attached not the least importance to this, but the relatives and kinfolk of the prisoners collected the money and the men were set free. They did not, however, regain the respect of the Shah; deprived of his favor, they soon disappeared from the scene.

A few years later, in 973/1565-66, 'Alī Sultan died. The Turkmans returned to their allegiance to the Shah, and for the remainder of Tahmasp's reign Astarābād was quiet and peaceful. Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, known as Ḥājem Khan, the son of 'Aṭā Sultan, assumed power in Ḵārazm. He sent ambassadors to the Safavid court declaring his friendship and did not deviate from this path. In 983/1575-76, he sent his son Moḥammadqolī Sultan, who was still a minor, to the Safavid court, and at the Shah's order the Safavid princes, with the exception of Ḥeydar Mīrzā, went out with the emirs and nobles to meet him and bring him into the city. Moḥammadqolī Sultan was brought up among the *qezelbāš* and remained at court until the accession of Shah 'Abbas I. In the year of the Dragon, 1001/1592-93, he left the royal camp in the pastures of Besṭām without permission and returned to K̲ārazm. At the present time, his son Olog̃ Sultan is at court.

Now that I have given some account of events at Astarābād, it is time to return to events at the center, and the most important of these is the conquest of Gīlān.

The Conquest of Gīlān, the Expedition against Sork̲āb Aḥmad, Ruler of Bīya Pīš,[243] *and the Capture of that Miscreant*

One of the provinces annexed to the Safavid empire during the reign of Shah Tahmasp was Gīlān. Eastern Gīlān was in the hands of Kān Aḥmad b. Solṭān Ḥasan b. Kār Kīā Solṭān Moḥammad b. Nāṣer Kīā b. Mīr Seyyed Moḥammad b. Mahdī Kīā b. Reżā Kīā b. Seyyed 'Alī Kīā. The Safavid dynasty owes its rise to this house. Western Gīlān was ruled by Emir Dobbāj, called Moẓaffar Solṭān b. Amīra Ḥosām al-Dīn, who counted himself a descendant of the prophet Esḥāq (Isaac) (upon him and upon our Prophet be peace!), and for this reason this dynasty is known as the Esḥāqīya. When the future Shah Esma'il took refuge in Gīlān after the death of his brother Sultan 'Alī Pādešāh, he resided in Gīlān for a number of years, where he was well served by Kār Kīā Mīrzā 'Alī, the paternal uncle of the late Khan Aḥmad, by Seyyed Hāšem, and by his brother Sultan Ḥasan. Because of its distinguished services to the Safavid family, Shah Tahmasp continued to show the members of this dynasty proper respect and consideration.

At the time of the death of his father, Sultan Ḥasan, which occurred in 943/1536-37, Khan Aḥmad was still only a year old and not yet weaned. Since he was so young, there was a possibility that some of the foes of the dynasty, or one of the ambitious emirs of Gīlān, might plot some treachery against him. So Bahrām Mīrzā[244] was sent, at the request of Kīā Ḵor Kīā-ye Ṭāleqānī, a Gīlānī emir and the *vakīl* of Sultan Ḥasan, and for some years the province was under his protection. Eventually, acting on the basis of false witness, Bahrām Mīrzā arrested Kīā Ḵor Kīā; as a result, the people of Gīlān shunned Bahrām Mīrzā and he left Gīlān. When Khan Aḥmad reached the age of discretion, Shah Tahmasp continued his training and education. Khan Aḥmad had a son by Tītī, daughter of Sultan Čapak, whom the Shah named Sultan Ḥasan and called his son. Eventually he bound him to the Safavid house by a marriage alliance.

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[243] Eastern Gīlān, with its capital at Lāhījān.

[244] The Shah's brother.

Moẓaffar Sultan, the ruler of western Gīlān, although he too was bound by marriage ties to the Safavid house, showed hostility and rebelliousness. In the year in which the Ottoman sultan, Sülaymān, invaded Iran for the first time,[245] Moẓaffar Sultan turned away from his allegiance to the Safavids, went to welcome Sülaymān at Owjan near Tabriz, and pledged his allegiance to him. After Sultan Sülaymān's return, Moẓaffar Sultan went back to Gīlān. But one of his retainers, Amīra Ḵānom Raštī, refused to allow him to enter Rašt. A battle was fought in which Moẓaffar Sultan was defeated, and he took ship to Šīrvān, since he saw no hope of remaining in Gīlān. The Šīrvānšāh, who at that time was Ḵalīl, gave him sanctuary and planned to intercede for him with Shah Tahmasp if he could, but if not, to do whatever was the Shah's will. However, Ḵalīl died, and Moẓaffar Sultan was seized by the Shah's agents and brought before the Shah at Tabriz. At the Shah's order, he was suspended between the two minarets of the Ḥasan Pādešāh Mosque and burned. His son, Sultan Maḥmūd Khan, although he was the nephew of the Shah and innocent of any complicity in his father's rebellion, was deprived of his patrimony; his territory was allotted to Sultan Ḥasan.

Thus Khan Aḥmad, with the support and patronage of the Shah, became the effective governor of the whole of Gīlān. He forcibly expelled Amīra Sāsān, the governor of Gaskar, and Mīrzā Kāmrān, the governor of Kūhdom,[246] who had encroached on his ancestral territory, and built up a kingdom of a size never dreamt of by his forefathers. Eventually, however, at the instigation of a number of shortsighted flatterers and persons who wished to curry favor with him, he committed certain acts displeasing to the Shah. In the first place, Amīra Sāsān had gone to the Safavid court, and the Shah had had compassion on him and reinstated him as governor of Gaskar.[247]

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[245] 940/1533-34.

[246] Or Kūtom; located southeast of Rašt. See *Ḥodūd al-ʿĀlam*, p. 390, for a lengthy discussion on its exact location.

[247] Apparently Khan Aḥmad's authority was not quite as great as suggested above!

But Sepāhsālār Sa'īd, Khan Aḥmad's governor of Gaskar, acting on instructions from the latter, refused to recognize the Shah's order and engaged Amīra Sāsān in battle. Amīra was victorious, and the Sepāhsālār and many of his men were killed. Khan Aḥmad, in the excessive heat of midsummer, sent his son Sultan Ḥasan to Gaskar, but he died en route as a result of the miasma prevailing in those parts. Khan Aḥmad, however, did not abandon his scheme, but continued to assert his authority over Gaskar, ignoring all communications from the Shah summoning him to return to the path of obedience.

In the end, Shah Tahmasp gave up the attempt to discipline Khan Aḥmad, and instead gave his patronage to Jamšīd Khan, the grandson of Moẓaffar Sultan, who was related to Shah Tahmasp on his grandmother's side. He took away from Khan Aḥmad the fief of western Gīlān, allotted it to Jamšīd Khan, and sent Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan, the son of Ma'ṣūm Beg, and a group of Ṭavāleš emirs to install him. On orders from Khan Aḥmad, Kīā Rostam, governor of Rašt on behalf of Khan Aḥmad, led an army against Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan. Kīā Rostam was taken prisoner, and Khan Aḥmad was finally obliged to relinquish western Gīlān, although he refused to surrender Kūčesfahān,[248] which is part of western Gīlān.

Jamšīd Khan, having taken possession of his ancestral lands, marched against Khan Aḥmad, and fighting broke out. The Shah sent Yolqolī Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, a wise and experienced counselor, to Gīlān with letters of appointment to tell Khan Aḥmad that the Shah was prepared to confirm him, despite all his sins and insolence, as ruler of his ancestral lands in eastern Gīlān, on condition that he did not intervene in western Gīlān. These letters urged Khan Aḥmad to look upon Jamšīd Khan as his son. But Khan Aḥmad, urged on by evil counselors and trusting in the strength of his position and the impenetrability of his forests, sent one of his emirs, Shah Manṣūr, who fell upon the unsuspecting Yolqolī Beg and killed him and the small number of *ġāzīs* who accompanied him.

The Shah, enraged by this dastardly act, resolved on a punitive expedition. In 975/1567-68, he launched a two-pronged attack on Gīlān. His commanders had orders to encircle eastern Gīlān, find Khan Aḥmad, and take him prisoner. One prong of this force consisted of the prince Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā, with Emir Khan Torkmān, Qūč Ḵalīfa the *mohrdār*, Naẓar Sultan Ostājlū, the prince's guardian, and other emirs; the second prong comprised Ebrāhīm Sultan Zīād-oğlū,[249] the governor of Gaskar, Mīrzā Kāmrān Kūhdomī, and Aḥmad Sultan Bīya-Pasī, the *vakīl* of Jamšīd Khan. In command of the whole expedition was Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī.

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[248] More correctly, Kūčesfān or Kūčespān; see *Ḥodūd al-'Ālam*, p. 390.

At this juncture, Khan Aḥmad was at his summer quarters in Deylamān.[250] Emir Khan and Naẓar Khan marched against him, and he retreated hastily fo Lāhījān. From there he dispatched Emir Jahāngīr, commander of the forces at Lāhījān, and Shah Manṣūr, commander of the forces at Lešta Nešā, with twelve thousand men, against the royal army. The Gīlānī army blocked the road through a narrow valley, in a manner called *bona-bor* in the Gīlānī idiom, and behind this barricade they stationed musketeers and skilled archers. When Ma'ṣūm Beg and his emirs reached this spot, they stormed the barricade with one determined charge, scattering the enemy in all directions with heavy casualties. Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan, Bāyandor Khan, the emirs from Ṭavāleš and Gaskar, and the men from western Gīlān had meanwhile engaged a force brought against them from Gaskar district by Emir Bahādor. The latter was defeated, and he and several other emirs and commanders were killed.

Khan Aḥmad now sent Mowlānā 'Abd al-Razzāq, his *ṣadr*, with a number of his nobles, to the Safavid court to express his remorse and contrition. But the fires of the Shah's anger were not to be extinguished by mere words. Khan Aḥmad then fled toward the Aškavar Mountains, and the nobles of Gīlān each took refuge in some corner of the province, like jackals in the forest. The Safavid emirs entered Lāhījān, took possession of the province, and set about winning the confidence of the people.

When they heard that Khan Aḥmad had taken refuge in the Aškavar Mountains, the Safavid emirs led a force there by way of the Tonākābon road—a road so narrow that, if a horseman deviates from it in the least, man and horse will certainly be lost. They captured Malek Oveys Rostamdārī, the brother-in-law of Khan Aḥmad. For three or four months, Khan Aḥmad himself, moving every day to a new hiding place, eluded capture in the dense forests. Winter came, and the mountains and plains were blanketed in snow. Shah Tahmasp then sent Allāhqolī Sultan Enjek-oḡlū Ostājlū and Mīrzā 'Alī Sultan Qājār, with a company of *qūrčīs*[251] and other warriors, to Aškavar. They scoured the forests and inquired diligently as to Khan Aḥmad's whereabouts. In the end, Ḥosām Beg, the son of Beyrām Khan Qarāmānlū, with twenty *qūrčīs*, surprised Khan Aḥmad near daybreak. Since there was no means of escape, he hid in the privy, but the *ḡāzīs* found him and took him to Allāhqolī Sultan, who sent him to Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī.

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[249] The Zīād-oğlū were a clan of the Qājār tribe; it is interesting to find a *qezelbāš* officer as governor in part of western Gīlān. This is a clear indication of Jamšīd Khan's satellite status.

[250] See *Ḥodūd al-'Ālam*, map p. 389.

Ma'ṣūm Beg brought before the Shah at Qazvin Khan Aḥmad and all his household and dependents, and Khan Aḥmad expressed his shame and remorse. The Shah displayed such mercy toward him that, ignoring the course of action dictated by the interests of the state, he spared his life, despite all his transgressions and disobedience, and imprisoned him in the castle of Qahqaha.[252] The governorship of Lāhījān was given to Allāhqolī Sultan Enjek-oḡlū. Ḥosām Beg Qarāmānlū was promoted to the rank of emir and allotted the district of Aškavar. District by district, just governors who eradicated the numerous improper practices which had been carried on by the governors of Gīlān were appointed, and the peasants and common folk were shielded by the Shah's protection and justice.

Khan Aḥmad, after he had been at Qahqaha for a while, since he was unused to the hardships of prison life, sent a complaining note to the Shah, and the Shah, solicitous of his welfare, transferred him to Eṣṭaḵr near Shiraz, a more spacious place with agreeable dwellings.[253] He was allowed to take several servants with him, and instructions were issued that suitable supplies of food, drink, and clothing should be provided. And so he lived there for some years without any of the material worries which are the normal lot of mankind. After he had been imprisoned at Qahqaha and Eṣṭaḵr for a total period of ten years,[254] he was released at the beginning of the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, in consideration of his kinship with Mahd-e 'Olyā the Shah's wife,[255] reappointed governor of his ancestral lands, and granted the signal honor of a marriage alliance with the Safavid royal house. The details of these events will be given in the appropriate place.

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[251] Probably from the royal bodyguard.

[252] The famous Safavid state prison near the river Aras.

[253] The *Šarafnāma* gives a much more likely reason for this transfer, namely, that there was a danger of conspiracy between Khan Aḥmad and the Shah's son, Esma'il, who had been incarcerated at Qahqaha since 1556.

[254] This brings us to 985/1577-78. Moḥammad Ḵodābanda was proclaimed Shah on 5 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 985/13 February 1578.

[255] She was the daughter of a local ruler in Māzandarān.

In 979/1571-72, a number of Gīlānī soldiers and knaves, who had crept into hiding, decided to bring things to a boil again. At a time when Allāhqolī Sultan, because of the heat, had left Lāhījān and retired to summer quarters, these seditious men nominated a certain Seyyed Ḥoseyn, who was related to Khan Aḥmad's family, as their governor. A certain Amīra Dobbāj was appointed army commander. Men flocked to them from all sides, and they marched to Lāhījān and laid siege to the Sufi garrison in the citadel. Since the fortifications were not strong they stormed it and slew the Sufis, even putting to death the women and children. They then fell on Bektāš Beg, the son of Allāhqolī Sultan, who managed with great difficulty to escape with his life. Most of his men, however, were killed. Amīra Sāsān marched from Gaskar to try and restore the situation, but since Dobbāj's army now numbered more than twenty thousand men, Amīra Sāsān was heavily defeated.

When Shah Tahmasp heard the news, he dispatched Qūč Ḵalīfa the *mohrdār* and Emir Ġeyb Beg Ostājlū, with other emirs and commanders, against the rebels. Three hundred Ostājlū and Ġarīblū *qūrčīs*[256] were sent with them. On the march, the *qūrčīs* fell to telling tales of the legendary prowess of their corps, and a hundred and thirty men, without permission from their officers, slipped away and went on ahead. When they reached Gūka and Kīsom, one day's march from Lāhījān, the Gīlānīs came out to meet them, thinking they could easily take such a small band prisoner and thus strike fear into the hearts of the remaining *qezelbāš*. But the *qūrčīs*, trusting in God's word: "How many a small group has triumphed over a large group by God's will!"[257] launched an intrepid charge at the enemy.

The Gīlānī contingents kept arriving on the battlefield, one behind the other, but the *qūrčīs*, taking no heed of the numbers of their foes, stood back to back and fought a battle the fame of which still resounds. At the height of the battle, a musket ball struck Amīra Dobbāj, the commander of the Gīlānī force, and he fell dead from his horse. His death caused a tremor of fear to run through the enemy ranks, and they were defeated, with more than one thousand dead.

[256] Men of the royal bodyguard; the cream of the *qezelbāš* troops.
[257] Koran, 2:250.

Those who escaped the sword turned and fled, and the *qūrčīs*, having collected much booty, entered Lāhījān.

This epic victory restored the prestige of the *qūrčīs*, but some of the great emirs were charged with dereliction of duty and were reprimanded. Allāhqolī Sultan was dismissed from the governorship of Gīlān and replaced by Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū, the guardian of the prince Emāmqolī Mīrzā, who continued to hold this post until the death of Shah Tahmasp. Although some of Allāhqolī's relatives and men had been killed in these incidents, his son Bektāš Beg was also judged to have been guilty of dereliction of duty, and he fell from the favor of his spiritual director (*moršed-e kāmel*). As a result, the Sufis endowed with pure faith did not allow him to cross the threshold of the palace gate.

The accused man did not go home; for three months he stayed outside the palace gates like any old beggar, in the bitter cold of winter, enduring rain and snow, imploring forgiveness for his sins. Finally, when the month of Ramażān[258] arrived, at the intercession of *seyyeds* and *'olamā*, the Shah forgave his sins and gave him leave to go to his house. On the feast of the Breaking of the Fast,[259] Bektāš Beg came, in accordance with prescribed Sufi ritual, to prostrate himself before his spiritual director. But the Shah still felt resentment against him, and he received no mark of favor. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, Bektāš Beg was put to death by the Takkalūs.

Other positive achievements of the Shah in regard to the salvation of the country include the chastisement of rebels in various outlying districts—in Kurdestan, Lorestān, Ṭāleš, and Rostamdār. If I were to describe all the local rebellions which were suppressed by officers of the Safavid state, I would become prolix. However, as a warning to others, so that no one, particularly those who owe a debt of gratitude to this dynasty, may be guilty of disloyalty to it, it will not be amiss to mention a few persons who were guilty of disloyalty and rebellion and to indicate how their affairs terminated in disaster.

The Rebels and Traitors Who Appeared during the Time of Shah Tahmasp, and Their Fate

The principal traitor was the ingrate Alqāṣ, whose story has already been given in the section on the relations between the Shah and Sultan Sülaymān. Another traitor was Moẓaffar Sultan Gīlānī, whose story is included in my account of the subjugation of Gīlān. Another was Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Betekčī, who is treated of in the section on events in Astarābād. There is no need to repeat these narratives. The history of Ẕu'l-Faqār Torkmān at Baghdad, which has also been narrated already, supports the thesis that all traitors sooner or later meet their just deserts. Then there was Emir Qobād Ṭāleš of Āstārā, the governor of that province, who rebelled in 946/1539-40. Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa the *mohrdār* was ordered to lead a punitive expedition against him, with the assistance of Soleymān, the commander in chief of the artillery,[260] and of Emir Ašraf, the warden of the shrine at Ardābīl. These two officers marched against Emir Qobād without waiting for the arrival of Ḵalīfa, and fought an engagement with him near Arjovān. The *ğāzīs* fought heroically, particularly Soleymān Beg, the commander in chief of artillery. Finally, Emir Qobād was defeated and fled into the forests; the *ğāzīs* slew some eight hundred men of Ṭavāleš and sent their heads to the Shah. Bāyandor Khan, a devoted Sufi, was appointed governor of the province of Āstārā, which is still in the hands of his descendants.

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[258] The month of Ramażān 979 began on 17 January 1572.
[259] 'Īd al-Feṭr; 1 Šavvāl 979/16 February 1572.

Another traitor was Ḵ̌āja Kalān, the son of Ḵ̌āja Malek Ḵ̌āfī, who was a protégé of the Shah and much indebted to the Safavid house. A rash, ill-starred young man seduced by satanic temptings, he fortified the castle at Ostā near Ḵ̌āf, the strongest in that area, and raised the standard of revolt. Shah Tahmasp sent Ğāzī Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, Šāhqolī Sultan Afšār, the governor of Kerman, and 'Alī Sultan Tātī-oğlū to lay siege to this castle. The great emirs sent Ostād-Šeyḵī, the master gunner, to reason with Ḵ̌āja Kalān, to try to persuade him to acknowledge his place, but Ḵ̌āja Kalān killed him with an arrow. The emirs besieged the fort for three months without success, but finally it fell into their hands in an amazing way.[261] Ḵ̌āja Kalān was brought out of the fort and sent to the Shah. The traitor was suspended by his testicles from the Qeyṣarīya minaret in Tabriz, thus suffering the cruel death that he deserved.

Another traitor was Qazāq Khan Takkalū, who destroyed himself by his folly in rebelling against the Shah. This man, in consideration of the loyal service of his father, Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū

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[260] *Tūpčībāšī*; this is the first mention of this office under the Safavids.

[261] According to the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, a renegade showed the *ğāzīs* a secret way into the fort.

Takkalū, had been appointed, upon the latter's death, to the governorship of Herat and to the position of guardian of the prince Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā. Qazāq, however, did not appreciate these marks of royal favor. He ruled oppressively and did not trouble to conceal his expropriation of money and property. In time, the excessive wealth he had accumulated led him to harbor ideas of independence, and he assembled large forces of men. When the Shah heard of his sedition, he gave orders that Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, with a number of the emirs of Iraq such as Emir Khan Mowṣellū, Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, Naẓar Sultan Ostājlū, Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan,[262] Šāhqolī Sultan Afšār, and Emir Ḡeyb Sultan Ostājlū, who had gone to Khorasan to recapture the fortress of Ḵabūshān occupied by 'Alī Sultan, should proceed to Herat, together with Sultan Ebrāhīm Mīrzā and his brother Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā.

At this point, Qazāq's brothers Moṣṭafā Beg and Dūst Beg[263] deserted him and joined Sāfī Valī Ḵalīfa Rūmlū at Ḡūrīān. Qazāq sent against them a force of several thousand men under the command of his brother, Ḥoseynqolī, and his son, Ja'far Beg. Ma'ṣūm Beg marched at full speed toward Ḡūrīān, which was reached first by the Safavid advance guard under Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū. Reinforcements reached the rebels from Herat, and a great battle was fought at Ḡūrīān.[264] The Takkalū rebels put up a stubborn resistance, but broke and fled when the dark mass of the army of Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā and Ma'ṣūm Beg appeared on the horizon. The rebels lost one thousand eight hundred men killed, and the emirs pursued the remnants toward Herat.

At Herat, all was confusion, and Ja'far Beg deserted his father and went off in the direction of Kabul and India. Qazāq, persuading Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā and his nephew[265] Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā to prepare for a siege, retired to the citadel of Eḵtīār al-Dīn. When the emirs entered the city, Ma'ṣūm Beg went to the citadel, upbraided Qazāq Khan severely, and brought the princes out of the citadel. The following day Qazāq himself, who was seriously ill with dropsy, emerged; he died a few days later from this disease.

From these various accounts, it has become abundantly clear that traitors and ingrates will receive their punishment both in this world and the next. Since my object is to write a history of the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I, the reader is referred for additional details to the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ* of Ḥasan Beg Rūmlū. I will conclude this section on the reign of Shah Tahmasp by giving a few notes on various foreign ambassadors who visited his court.

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[262] Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan Ṣafavī, son of Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, and a cousin of Shah Tahmasp.

[263] *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*, p. 424, gives Moṣīb Beg.

[264] The former Fūšanj—one day's march west of Herat.

[265] The MS. says."son," which is a mistake; Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, the Ṣhah's brother.

Visits by Foreign Ambassadors to the Court of Shah Tahmasp

After Shah Tahmasp had obtained a measure of relief from essential administrative duties and from ordering the affairs of conquered territories, he remained at Qazvin for a period of twenty years. During his reign his power gradually increased, and foreign rulers sent ambassadors bearing gifts and seeking to cement both material and physical ties with him to his court.

Among those who repeatedly sent envoys to his court was the Ottoman sultan, Sülaymān. After so many years of warfare and struggle between the two powers, Moḥammad Pasha, the Ottoman grand vizier, and members of the Ottoman house wrote letters to officers of the Safavid state proposing peace, and an envoy was dispatched to the Shah. In return, the Shah sent Mīr Šams Valīḵānī as ambassador, but received the following discouraging answer from Sultan Sülaymān: "From the inception of the Ottoman empire, foreign rulers have sent envoys and gifts to our court, but we have not sent them to a single foreign court, for such is not the Ottoman custom. As for my ministers, and their sending communications to the Shah, I know nothing of it." So matters rested until Senān Pasha, one of the Sultan's personal attendants, was taken prisoner at Qānlū Čaman and later released, as has already been related, and peace was concluded between the two powers.

The incident of Sultan Bāyazīd occurred after this, and Sultan Sülaymān first sent Senān Beg to Iran as an envoy. The latter was received by the Shah at Qazvin in 966/1558-59. In the course of his conversations with the envoy, the Shah remarked: "Sending ambassadors used to be contrary to Ottoman custom. How is that the Ottoman emperor has transgressed the law and sent a trusted officer like you as ambassador?" Senān Beg gave the following acceptable and witty reply: "It is true that it is against our law to send ambassadors to foreign countries. But between our two countries, peace, unity, and concord now exist, and there is nothing in the law which prevents two friends from visiting each other." The Shah applauded him.

After the embassy of Senān Beg, ʿAlī Pasha, the governor of Marʿaš, and Ḥasan Aqa, the chief taster to the Sultan, with an embassy of three hundred (which, together with servants and retainers numbered seven hundred and sixty persons), came to Qazvin. On the day after their arrival, they were received in audience in the Bāğ-e Saʿādatābād, and presented letters of friendship from Sülaymān. The following day, they were again received and offered the Shah lavish presents—bejeweled weapons, dagger belts, precious stuffs from Europe, rare items from all over the world. The ambassadors were rewarded with suitable gifts by the Shah and dismissed.

In 969/1561-62, Ḵosrow Pasha, a senior officer of the Ottoman empire and a wise and experienced statesman, came to Qazvin with ʿAlī Aqa, *qāpūčībāšī* (chief doorkeeper)[266] of the Ottoman sultan, as has already been narrated in the section on events connected with Sultan Bāyazīd, and presented letters of friendship. Following them came Elyās Beg, a confidant of the Ottoman sultan, bearing gifts from the emperor. Among these were forty Syrian and Arabian horses, unequaled for excellence and fleetness of foot, with bejeweled saddles of gold, and Ottoman horse blankets of brocade; in cash, about five hundred thousand gold *ašrafī* and florins, the equivalent of fifty thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*; precious stuffs; and other items on the same lavish scale. The Shah distributed these gifts to the various categories of his officers: to the royal princes; to the emirs of the court; to the governors of the marches; to the royal bodyguard; and to the leaders of the *qezelbāš* tribe, according to rank. He also allotted a portion to the great Uzbeg sultans Pīr Moḥammad Khan, the governor of Balḵ; ʿAbdollāh Khan, ruler of Bokhara; Abu'l-Saʿīd Sultan, the governor of Samarkand; and Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan and Ḥājem Khan, the rulers of Ūrganj.

After the death of Sultan Sülaymān, his son Sultan Selim became emperor.[267] In 975/1567-68, he sent an envoy named Moḥammad Khan to Qazvin bearing letters of friendship, and confirming the emperor's desire to continue the peace. In 976/1568-69, when the *vakīl al-*

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[266] Originally there was only one head doorkeeper, but ultimately they numbered some one hundred and fifty. They constituted an elite corps and were used by the sultan "for particularly important and secret missions to the provinces" (Gibb and Bowen, p. 347).

[267] Selīm II; reigned 1566-74.

salṭana Ma'ṣum Beg Ṣafavī went on the pilgrimage to Mecca and was slain en route, together with a number of companions and his son Ḳhan Mīrzā, the Ottomans attributed this foul deed to Arab brigands. Sultan Selim sent 'Alī Aqa as ambassador to the Shah to offer his apologies and to plead his innocence in this affair. The Shah, having in mind the welfare of Muslims, and the maintenance of a stable peace, accepted his apologies.

In 948/1541-42, the Uzbeg sultans, Kesken Qarā Sultan, the governor of Balḵ and its dependencies, sent Jān Čehra;[268] and 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan, the son of 'Obeyd Khan, the ruler of Bokhara, sent Ḵodāy-bīrdī Bahādor as ambassadors to the Shah. These envoys declared the genuine friendship of their masters toward the Shah and stated their desire to see former enmities removed. Ambassadors from the sultans of Ḵarazm and Ūrganj were constantly going to and fro.

From India, the sultans of the Deccan, especially Nezām Shah, the ruler of Aḥmadābād, and Qoṭb Shah the ruler of Golconda and Ḥeydarābād, declared their friendship, and reckoned themselves Shi'ites. 'Alī Ādel Shah, the ruler of Bījāpūr, repeatedly sent ambassadors to assure the Shah of his loyalty, and to inform him that in his kingdom, the Eṣnā 'Ašarī *ḵoṭba* was pronounced in the name of the Shah. His envoys brought gifts, and received in return personal robes of honor, and such items as jeweled crowns, horses with gold saddles, and dagger belts. In 971/1563-64, Sultan Maḥmūd Khan, the ruler of Bhakkar and Sind, sent Abu'l-Makārem as an envoy to the Persian court to express the traditional loyalty of his family to the Persian crown and his gratitude for past favors.

From Europe, King John of Portugal[269] sent an ambassador in 958/1551. Although the Portuguese are strangers to the true faith, through their acquaintance with the Persian court, their prestige was high among the princes of the world. A second Portuguese ambassador reached Iran in 982/1574-75, with an impressive mission of fifty retainers, not counting servants. This ambassador brought a number of rare items as presents for the Shah, the like of which had rarely been seen in the lands of Islam. However, the members of this mission were guilty of various acts that were contrary to the Muslim faith and of improper behavior in mosques, and consequently came to be regarded with disfavor by the Shah. He refused to allow them to depart, and they were not given permission to leave until after the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah.[270]

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[268] I cannot make out the personal name in the MS. His title is given as Jān Čehra in the MS., as Khan Čehra in the printed text, and as Jāhān Čara in *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*. The Cambridge MS. has "Adīna Bahādor known as Čehra."

[269] John III (1502-57).

Strange Happenings and Wondrous Events during the Reign of Shah Tahmasp

In the year 956/1549–50, there was an earthquake at Qā'en in Khorasan. Five villages were affected, and three thousand people were killed. Mowlānā Bāqī, the *qāżī* of the province, resided in one of the villages of the Ḵamsa. An astrologer, he warned the people of the village that the stars predicted a severe earthquake that night, and that the most sensible thing to do would be to evacuate their houses and move outside the village. But the people paid no heed. The Qāżī with his family left the village, and camped out in the desert. About midnight, however, his children complained of the cold, and he went back to the village. At that moment the earthquake occurred, and the Qāżī and all his family were buried.

In 980/1572–73, flames appeared in the sky in the direction of the North Pole and remained visible for nine months. It is said that during the reign of the Byzantine emperor who was a contemporary of Qobād, the father of Anūšīrvān, a similar phenomenon was observed in the direction of the North Pole and remained visible for seven months. After this, a layer of ash fell, followed by a severe pestilence in Asia Minor. Both these events were held to be connected with the flames in the sky. This is not improbable, because in 980/1572–73 there was also a heavy deposit of dust in the direction of the North Pole.

'Askarī Khan Tātār, conceiving an ambition to conquer Russia, invaded it with his son, Dowlat Gerāy. Feodor Ivanovich (Ivan IV, tsar of Russia, known as Olog̈ Khan), fought a great battle with him, and several thousand men were killed on both sides. Dowlat Gerāy was taken prisoner, and 'Askarī Khan retired in disorder. This bloodshed was of the same order as the pestilence which appeared in the north.

In the district of Qā'en in Khorasan there occurred the most extraordinary event of all. Grain, like grains of wheat, rained from the heavens, and people collected it and baked bread with it.

[270] 1578.

In 962/1554-55, a group of indigent *qalandars*[271] and rascals passing themselves off as *qalandars*, making use of some hashish-addicted vagabonds, presented themselves to the Shah in his summer quarters at Sūrloq near Solṭānīya. Clothing their perverted beliefs in the garments of true belief and wholesome faith, they attributed to the Shah the role of Mahdī.[272] However much the Shah tried to dissuade them from this corrupt belief, they refused to recant, but carried this heresy to the extreme. Ultimately the Shah, as the defender of the faith and the upholder of the canon law, was obliged to chastise these deluded men. His attendants began to knock them on the head with clubs, one by one. As fast as one man was dispatched, however, another would utter the same absurd words and would refuse to recant from his heretical beliefs, until some forty of these hashish-addicted *qalandars* had been dispatched.

Another incident which occurred toward the end of the reign of Shah Tahmasp was the chastisement of the mob at Tabriz. At that time, Allāhqolī Beg Ostājlū, the son of Šāhqolī Sultan the governor of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, was *dārūğa* of Tabriz. The ruffians of the Darb-e Darjūmak district seized one of his men and committed other insolent acts. The *dārūğa* arrested one of their number and put him to death. His relatives, without permission from the *dārūğa*, removed his body from the place of execution and, accompanied by a throng of scoundrels, bore it with due ceremony to the burial ground. The *dārūğa*, furious at their action, resolved to exhume the body and suspend it again from the gibbet, as a warning to others. The mob rose up to prevent him, and drove the *dārūğa* back. He persisted, and a regular battle broke out. The mob pressed him so hard that, in order to escape from their arrows and bullets, he fled for his life back to his house, which was promptly besieged. Some of his men were wounded, others killed.

The riot spread, as turbulent and seditious elements from every quarter joined in. That factionalism which had formerly existed among the citizens and had been suppressed again prevailed, as men drew their knives against one another. Trade and commerce came to a standstill in the principal bazaar of Tabriz and in the Čahār Bāzīr; the gates of the markets and the doors of shops were closed, and the ordinary flow of traffic ceased. Everyone, rich and poor, syndics of guilds and tradespeople, was at the mercy of the mob. Serious crimes were now committed by the mob, and the situation began to deteriorate.

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[271] Wandering dervishes, not attached to any Sufi order.

[272] The Twelfth and Hidden Imam of the Eṣnā 'Ašarī Shi'ites, whose return to earth will herald the end of the world.

When the facts were reported to Shah Tahmasp, he tried to create a situation in which the populace would not be subjected to punitive measures and slaughter. He therefore sent Yūsof Beg Čāūšlū, the son of Bābā Soleymān, who was an intelligent and experienced man, as *dārūġa* of the city, with orders to try and pacify the people and quench the fires of revolt with tact and prudent planning. Yūsof Beg mingled with the people; he reconciled sworn enemies, and took surety and sworn oaths from the guild syndics of each ward to the effect that they would cause no trouble in future.

All was quiet in the city for a month or two. Then a certain Pahlavān Bārī disturbed the peace by murdering two of Yūsof Beg's men, and rioting broke out again. Yūsof Beg sent in a report to the effect that the troublemakers did not number more than four hundred; if rapid action were not taken against these vicious men, he said, there would be a general breakdown of law and order. Accordingly, Sohrāb Beg, the son of Ḳalīfa-ye Anṣār, was deputed to cleanse Tabriz of these elements. When Sohrāb Beg arrived with a strong force, Yūsof Beg joined him with his men, and together they went in search of the ringleaders, who immediately went into hiding. In each ward, however, the *qezelbāš* officers went straight to the guild syndics, whom they had made guarantors for their districts, and forced them to produce the wanted men, who were promptly executed. Some forty or fifty noted champions[273] of that group were hanged, and eventually more than two hundred persons were executed before the riot was suppressed.

To conclude, in the year 965/1557-58, a great flood occurred in Qazvin, and some two thousand houses in the Darb-e Abhar district were destroyed. The householders suffered both the loss of their homes and of their household goods, which were swept away by the floodwaters. In 981/1573-74, about thirty thousand people died of plague at Ardabīl.

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[273] I prefer the reading *pahlavānān* of the MS. to the *javānān* of the printed text. The term *pahlavān* suggests wrestlers, gymnasts, and other members of the socioreligious groups in existence in the principal cities at the time.

The Death of Shah Tahmasp

Two years before his death, Shah Tahmasp was afflicted by a serious illness which lasted for two months. During the course of this illness, there were two crises during which the Shah was on the point of death, but he made a miraculous recovery.

While he was ill, the royal princes, the emirs, and the principal officers of state split into two factions; each faction aimed at securing the succession. Moḥammad Ḵodābanda, the eldest son of Tahmasp, was considered unfit to be heir-apparent, to rule the state, and to maintain unity among the turbulent *qezelbāš* tribes on account of his weak eyesight. Indeed, for the past several years, he had been completely blind. The majority of people, both military and civilians, supported Esma'il Mīrzā, who had for many years been imprisoned at Qahqaha at his father's order. They ignored the fact that the power of God is superior to what man proposes and that no one can bring low a person who is dear to God, and they were not aware that within a few years the succession would devolve upon Moḥammad Ḵodābanda and his house.

At this time, the Ostājlū emirs were the strong support of the state, and the most powerful of them at court were Morād Khan *sofračī*,[274] the grandson of Mantašā Sultan; the centurion (*yūzbašī*) Ḥoseyn Beg, the son of Ḥasan Beg; Pīrī Beg Qūčīlūy, a *qūrčī* of bow and arrow; Moḥammad Beg Tovāčī-oḡlū, *amīr-āḵorbāšī* (master of the royal stables); and Allāhqolī Sultan Enjīk-oḡlū. These men were afraid of Esma'il Mīrzā and consequently supported Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, the eldest son of the Shah after Esma'il Mīrzā. Sultan Ḥeydar was favored by his father, and had the advantage of being present at court. Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan Ṣafavī, the son of Ma'ṣūm Beg the *vakīl*, who was acting as Ḥeydar Mīrzā's guardian on behalf of his father, joined the pro-Ḥeydar faction with all the Šeyḵāvand tribe[275] and a group of Georgians who were related to Ḥeydar's mother. Oaths were sworn and covenants made.

Of the other royal princes, Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā joined the pro-Ḥeydar faction because he had been brought up among the Ostājlū tribe, and the office of being his guardian rested with the emirs of that tribe. There was also great friendship between him and Ḥeydar Mīrzā, so his attachment to Ḥeydar's cause was a genuine one. Sultan Ebrāhīm Mīrzā, the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, who was Shah Tahmasp's son-in-law, and extremely influential at court, also considered it expedient to lend his support to Ḥeydar Mīrzā.

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[274] Sewer; i.e., the officer who presided at table.

[275] The Šeyḵāvand constituted a special category of *qezelbāš*, in that members of this tribe were related to the Safavid royal house.

Supporters of Esma‘il Mīrzā included Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā Rūmlū, Emir Aṣlān Sultan Afšār, Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq Torkmān, and all the Afšār, Rūmlū, and Torkmān tribes. The Shah's daughter, Parī Khan Ḵānom, who was more intelligent than the other royal princesses and whose opinion and counsel were valued by her father, to the envy of her peers, had no love in her heart for Ḥeydar Mīrzā because of her dislike of and rivalry with his mother, and she was not willing to see him made heir-apparent. She therefore secretly worked to promote the succession of Esma‘il Mīrzā. Among her brothers, Sultan Soleymān Mīrzā, who had been born of the same mother;[276] Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā, who was with the Rūmlū tribe; and Sultan Aḥmad Mīrzā, who was with the Afšārs, declared their opposition to Ḥeydar Mīrzā, together with her maternal uncle, Šamḵāl Sultan Čerkes, and a number of other Circassians who were related to her mother.

They conspired to achieve the succession of Esma‘il Mīrzā and openly charged the supporters of Ḥeydar Mīrzā with treachery and disloyalty. They went around saying quite publicly that there was only one spiritual director (*moršed-e kāmel*) on the path of Ṣufi behavior and loyalty to the Safavid family; as long as the *moršed-e kāmel* was alive, it was a sign of disloyalty to ascribe spiritual leadership or kingship to another. After the spiritual leader was dead, that person should be deemed king who had been declared heir-apparent by the Shah's last will and testament. If the Shah should die before nominating any of his sons as heir-apparent, then the traditional practice and custom of the Sufi path should prevail: namely, the eldest son should be considered the heir-apparent. Since Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, the eldest son of Shah Tahmasp, was blind, after him Esma‘il Mīrzā was the eldest son. "We do not see any other course open to those who follow the Sufi path," they said. Calling themselves "those who love the Shah" (*šāhī-sevan*)[277] they dubbed Ḥeydar's supporters *īkī-bīrlū* ("pluralists") and poured abuse on them.

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[276] Their mother was the sister of a Circassian chief, which explains why the Circassians supported the pro-Esma‘il faction.

[277] See V. Minorsky, *Šāh-sevan*, in *EI*¹.

The uproar and controversy increased. The great emirs and elders of the *qezelbāš* tribes who were in attendance at court were divided in their allegiance, some supporting the one faction, some the other. On several occasions, angry words were spoken in the royal palace between supporters of the rival factions. Finally, however, the efforts of the doctors were crowned with success, and the Shah made steady progress toward recovery. Parī Khan Ḵānom's mother, at the instigation of her daughter and her daughter's brothers, reported these matters to the Shah, revealing Ḥeydar Mīrzā to his father as a traitor. In this way, she poisoned the Shah's mind against Ḥeydar and represented the pro-Esma'il faction as single-minded, loyal Sufis.

During the Shah's convalescence, the Companions of the Bedchamber were allowed to stand behind the lattice of the harem and to converse with the Shah. Among the *qezelbāš* nobility, Kūr Shah 'Alī Rūmlū, who was an aide-de-camp (*yasāvol-e soḥbat*), learned all these matters in detail, and he stated openly that from then on it was the duty of the Shah's servants to protect him from the plots and conspiracies of the pro-Ḥeydar group. As a result, Ḥeydar Mīrzā and his supporters were branded at court as traitors.

The Shah, however, was well aware of the ulterior motives of both parties; he kept his own counsel, repeating these stories to no one and even forbidding the pro-Esma'il faction to spread such rumors. Nevertheless, he considered it a possibility that some attempt might be made on Esma'il Mīrzā's life by the warden of the Qahqaha prison, Ḵalīfa Anṣār, who was a member of the Qarādāğlū tribe. Ḵalīfa Anṣār was related to, and always followed the instructions of, Farroḵzād Beg *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*,[278] chief of the Qarādāğlū tribe and a member of the pro-Ḥeydar faction. The Shah therefore detailed twelve men of the royal bodyguard, men of the Afšār tribe, to proceed to Qahqaha and guard the prince. This action strengthened the hand of the pro-Esma'il faction.

One of the most extreme supporters of Ḥeydar Mīrzā was Zāl Beg, a Georgian nobleman, whose sister was an inmate of the royal harem and the mother of several Safavid princes. Zāl Beg's duties included attendance on the Shah when the latter took a bath. One day, when the Shah had decided to take a bath, the pro-Esma'il faction said, "Zāl Beg is one of those disloyal to the Shah, and we loyal Sufis have no confidence in him; we refuse to allow him to be in attendance on a

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[278] See R. M. Savory, *Is̲h̲īk-āḳāsī*, in *EI*^{2}.

Shah who is still convalescent, because there is no security against treachery on his part." The Georgians, the Šeyḵāvand, and the Ostājlūs then discussed the situation. The Georgians said, "What have we done to be deprived of a duty which has been entrusted to us?"

On the day the Shah was due to take a bath, Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā Rūmlū, Emir Aṣlān Sultan, and the others who called themselves *šāhī-sevan,* took four or five thousand armed men and stationed themselves at the palace gate, with the object of preventing Zāl Beg from carrying out his duties. The opposing faction, Georgians, Šeyḵāvand, Ostājlūs, and their followers, assembled about the same number of men with the idea of supporting Zāl Beg. They proposed to enter the palace—an action that would have led to a general conflict and bloodshed.

On the night when the two factions were laying these plans, the writer of these words was in the neighborhood, at a party given by Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī.*[279] The latter was extremely disturbed by the turn of events, because he did not want the rivalry between the two factions to end in bloodshed. He pondered the matter all night long. In the morning, although there was a great throng around the palace gate, the men were not armed. They entered the palace in the customary manner, in attendance on Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā, whose guardian Naẓar Sultan had died, and who, as usual, was in the midst of the Ostājlū contingent. Outside, although mischief-making demagogues of both factions kept making oblique references to the situation, Ḥeydar Mīrzā's supporters paid no attention to Ḥoseyn Qolī Ḵolafā's men, but marched up to the Čehel Sotūn portico and began to protest the conduct of the pro-Esma'il faction.

Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī* addressed Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā as follows: "What mischief is this which you are creating among the *qezelbāš?* Why have you brought this armed band to the palace? Thanks be to God, our king and spiritual director and benefactor is saved. What business have we or you to harbor ambitions of this sort?" He concluded by branding Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā as a troublemaker and took his stand on loyalty to the Shah and conduct proper to a Sufi. Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā and his followers retaliated with some offensive and abusive remarks but, because Ḥeydar Mīrzā was present, the pro-Esma'il faction did not dare to do anything more. When the Shah heard about all this, he thought it prudent to turn a blind eye; he summoned Zāl

[279] Mentioned earlier as one of Ḥeydar's supporters.

Beg to the bathhouse to perform his usual duties, and the pro-Esma'il faction dispersed, feeling rather ashamed of themselves. The supporters of Sultan Ḥeydar, on the other hand, took on new life, and for a while they found some peace from their detractors.

When the Shah was restored to full health, he gave no further opening for this sort of talebearing, nor did he conduct any inquiry into the matter. On the other hand, as the opportunity came, he appointed some of the powerful Ostājlū emirs to a duty that necessitated absence from court. For instance, he charged Morād Khan with the capture of the fortress of Kojūr[280] and dispatched him in the direction of Rostamdār; Pīrī Beg Qūčīlū was appointed governor of Rayy, and left to take up his appointment. In addition, the Shah needed an intelligent and shrewd emir to send as an ambassador to Turkey, to offer condolences on the death of the Ottoman Sultan Selim II, and to offer congratulations to his son and successor, Morād III.

The Shah charged Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī* with this duty, but the pro-Ḥeydar faction now perceived that the Shah's purpose was to disperse the Ostājlū emirs, who were strong supporters of Ḥeydar. They urged Ḥoseyn Beg to think of some reason why he could not go to Turkey, and Ḥoseyn Beg produced the excuse that, during the Shah's illness, he had made a solemn vow that he would perform the pilgrimage to Mašhad should the Shah be restored to health. Since life is uncertain, he said, he hoped the Shah would release him so that he could fulfill his vow and excuse him from going to Turkey. The Shah granted his request, but sent another Ostājlū emir to Turkey in his place—Moḥammad Khan Toḵmāq, governor of Čokūr-e Sa'd.

Ḥoseyn Beg, fearful that something might happen in his absence to ruin his plans, put off going to Mašhad, but the Shah took no notice and said nothing on the subject. Ḥoseyn Beg continued in his role as trusted counselor, and gradually the respect and esteem in which he was held increased. Ultimately he was appointed guardian to Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā in place of Naẓar Sultan Ostājlū, who had recently died. At an auspicious hour, Ḥoseyn Beg brought the prince to his house for a party on a royal scale, and presented him with suitable gifts. The other royal princes, who at the Shah's command had gone to pay their respects to Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and to congratulate Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī* on his appointment, also received fitting presents.

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[280] According to Iraj Afšār's indices to the printed edition of the *TAAA*, Kojūr is identical with the fortress of Mārānkūh, which was situated in the Rāmīān district of the Fendaresk region, at the eastern extremity of the province of Astarābād (see Rabino, p. 128).

Gradually, the intertribal rivalry and the factionalism between the two parties at court died down, and two years passed. In the year of the Rat, equivalent to 984/1576, the Shah was afflicted by a minor indisposition. A depilatory applied to his lower limbs in the bath caused painful burns that gave rise to a fever. The doctors were called in to treat him, but without any of his intimates and close companions having the least suspicion that he might die, the Shah's condition deteriorated on the evening of Tuesday, 14 Ṣafar 984/13 May 1576. The Shah became very restless and began to grow weaker. The royal princes remained at their father's bedside until midnight, when he dismissed them to their homes, telling them there was no need to feel so uneasy about him. All the princes left except for Ḥeydar Mīrzā.

There are two versions of his reason for remaining behind. The first is that the Shah himself made an exception in his case and required him to remain behind. The second version is that Ḥeydar Mīrzā's mother, fearing that after the Shah's death some harm might come to him if he exposed himself outside the palace, whereas inside lay security,[281] therefore said to her son:

> Your father's condition is critical, and he may possibly die tonight. Now you aspire to rule and to succeed your father; what do you think you are doing, going off and leaving the seat of kingship? You should stay in the palace. The moment the Shah is dead, you should place the royal crown on your head and take your seat in the Čehel Sotūn hall upon the imperial rug. When you have got your hands on the keys to the treasuries, the arsenal, and the armories, since soldiers look only for the vain things of this world, you should hand out handsome gifts to the centurions, the royal bodyguard, and the army officers. Then let your supporters crowd into the palace, that all may see you have taken your place on the imperial throne. The hands of the pro-Esma'il faction will be tied by this *fait-accompli,* and they

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[281] Koran, 3:91.

> will have no alternative but to tender their allegiance. Anyone who shows hesitation in coming forward to tender his fealty should be put to death.

Ḥeydar found his mother's views to his taste and stayed behind.

About midnight, Shah Tahmasp went into a decline, and he died early in the morning, 15 Ṣafar 984/14 May 1576. The chronogram of his death is: "His tomb is full of light." The women of the harem rent their clothes and fell to wailing and lamenting, and the attendants donned mourning. Men were consumed with worry and anxiety, and understandably so.

During his reign, Shah Tahmasp spent whatever time he had free from affairs of state in seeing to the wants of the needy; in giving currency to the religious law and honoring the doctors of religion; in showing respect for ascetic and pious men; in giving luster to holy shrines, theological seminaries, and charitable institutions; and in the maintenance of mosques. Throughout his youth, he renounced sensual pleasures. In 939/1532-33, when he had been on the throne for nine years,[282] he paid heed to the word of God, "Turn to God in sincere repentance,"[283] and from the bottom of his heart, repented of all forbidden acts. This act of repentance was so firmly rooted in him that he never thought of breaking it. All revenue accruing from taverns, gambling dens, and brothels was removed from the ledgers. Gradually all the chiefs of the *qezelbāš* tribes followed his example and showed a desire to repent. In 963/1555-56, the great emirs and the court attendants made a public act of repentance; this was followed throughout the country by the population as a whole. The chronogram for this event is "Sincere repentance."

In Shah Tahmasp's time, people conducted themselves with piety and continence and attended to their devotions. The command to do what is good, and to eschew what is disapproved by God,[284] was observed so rigorously that professional storytellers and performers in the arena[285] were forbidden to indulge in anything frivolous. Five hundred *tomān* of the finest opium suspected of being illicit[286] was made licit by being washed in running water. On the birthday of each of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones,[287] a stipulated sum of money was dedicated to God; each year, the amount thus dedicated on the birthday of the Prophet was allotted to some group of eminent *seyyeds* about whose Shi‘ite faith there was no doubt.

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[282] And was therefore in his nineteenth year.

[283] Koran, 66:8.

[284] A persistent theme in the Koran, where believers are repeatedly characterized as "those who enjoin what is good, and forbid what is objectionable to God" (*ya'morūna be'l-ma'rūfe wa yanhowna 'an al-monkare*).

[285] Jugglers, conjurors, and the like.

In most of the large cities, alms in the form of bread were dispensed to the poor and needy, both men and women. In those cities where Shi‘ism was particularly strong (Mašhad, Sabzavār, Astarābād, Qom, Kashan, Yazd, Tabriz, Ardabīl), forty orphan boys and forty orphan girls were provided with clothes and other necessities. Male and female Shi‘ite teachers were appointed to instruct them, and servants to attend them, until they reached the age of puberty. Then they were married off to one another and their places taken by younger children.

The peasants and ordinary people received various forms of relief by way of remission of taxes and the giving of alms. For instance, highway taxes,[288] the levying of which was a practice continued from former times, were levied on merchants and wealthy travelers, and brought in about one thousand royal Iraqi *tomān* every year. As the result of a dream in which he was instructed to take this action, in 972/1564-65 the Shah remitted this tax to the merchants and travelers. Thereafter this tax was abolished and its collectors recalled from the provinces. The tax on crafts and trades,[289] on herds,[290] and on pastures, in the case of which the people had customarily been allowed some remission of tax, particularly in the Shi‘ite strongholds, were now expunged from the tax registers.

Shah Tahmasp's beneficence was rewarded by a long reign of fifty-two years.[291] During the whole of Islamic history, the only ruler who reigned longer was the Fatemid caliph al-Mostanṣer be'llāh.[292] During his reign, both civil and military arms of the administration flourished, and the affairs of the royal household were well ordered, with the result that his writ ran to an extraordinary extent throughout the whole of Iran. Tahmasp lived for sixty-four years, one month, and twenty-five days. For eight years, during the reign of his father Shah Esma'il I, he governed the province of Khorasan; he ruled Iran for fifty-three years, six months, and twenty-six days.[293] His death was lamented not only by the *seyyeds*, *'olamā*, and the nobles, but by the people as a whole. During his long reign, no one had observed any weakening in his resolve to rule. Among the princes of the world who had achieved some renown, none had seen a king like Tahmasp.

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[286] According to canon law.

[287] The Prophet Moḥammad, his daughter Fāṭema, and the Twelve Imams.

[288] *Tamḡā-e šavāre‘*. Possibly the same as the road tolls (*rāhdārī*); see *TM*, p. 180.

[289] Probably the *bonīča*, or tax on shops, etc.

[290] Presumably the tax known as *čopān-begī*.

[291] Text has 54 (lunar) years (930-984 A.H.).

[292] Ruler of Egypt, Syria, and North Africa 427-487/1036-1094.

After his death, representatives of the doctors of religion and the law, led by Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn Jabal 'Āmelī the *mojtahed*, at the request of the emirs went to the palace, washed the Shah's body according to the dictates of canon law, and buried it at Yort Šīrvānī, between the harem garden and the palace. Later, during the reign of Shah Esma'il II, as will be recorded, the body was transferred to Mašhad and buried in the grounds of the sacred shrine of the Imam Reżā.

Among his monuments and public works were the fortifications of the city of Tehran[294] and the city of Mašhad; the gilding of the dome of the shrine of the Imam Reżā[295] and of the pointed ornament on top of the dome; the construction of the palace buildings at Qazvin, together with the whole complex known as the Sa'ādatābād Garden, comprising numerous bathhouses, four markets, and the Eram Gardens; and a mosque in the Ṣāḥebābād district of Tabriz. May God have mercy on his soul! By virtue of his fidelity to the family of the Prophet, may he be raised with them on the Day of Reckoning, seated among the elect in God's house, and given a place in the gardens of paradise!

It is now incumbent upon the historian to enumerate the names of the Shah's sons and the other royal princes, those of the great emirs and principal officers of state, and those of eminent men in every walk of life who at the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp played an important role in the administration of the state. Since the name of each person will be discussed along with some attendant circumstances, the student of history may find some useful material herein.

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[293] Lunar reckoning, of course.
[294] Tehran, the present capital of Iran, began to come into prominence in Safavid times.
[295] The dome was not covered merely with gold leaf, but with plates of solid gold.

A Record of the Names of the Royal Princes, Shah Tahmasp's Sons and Nephews

The number of Shah Tahmasp's children, grandchildren, and nephews who were alive at the time of his death totaled thirty-five: twenty-three sons and twelve daughters. Twenty-two of these were the fruit of his own loins, not counting a few children who died during his lifetime (no purpose will be served by mentioning these). Of these twenty-two natural children, nine were sons.

Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā

I have been able to discover the date of birth of only those three princes who later came to the throne;[1] in regard to the others, I have gone no further into the matter, but contented myself with listing their names and giving a short account of their life and times.

Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, then, was born in the year 938/1531-32, when Shah Tahmasp had been on the throne for eight years. His mother was Solṭānom, the daughter of Mūsā Sultan Mowṣellū Torkmān, one of the great Bāyandorī emirs.[2] The chronogram of his birth is: "Shah Tahmasp's first son was Moḥammad," and he was given the sobriquet of Ḵodābanda. He was forty-six years of age[3] at the time of his father's death. In 943/1536-37, when he was six years old, he was appointed to the governorship of Khorasan. Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū Takkalū was made his guardian and *amīr al-omarā*[4] of Khorasan, and the prince took up residence at Herat. He remained in this office for some years[5] and became familiar with routine administrative matters. He developed wisdom, understanding, and a generous nature, and acquired such a lofty temperament that he despised the treasures of this world. He also developed a talent for composing

[1] His sons Shah Esma'il II and Sultan Moḥammad Shah, and his grandson Shah 'Abbas I.

[2] The Bāyandorī clan were an important constituent in the Aq Qoyūnlū confederacy; they had thrown in their lot with the Safavids after the disintegration of the Aq Qoyūnlū empire. The year after the birth of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, Mūsā Sultan was appointed governor of Azerbaijan (939/1532-33) (see *Šarafnāma*, ii, 181; *Javāher al-Aḵbār*, f. 304a).

[3] By lunar reckoning. By solar reckoning, his age was 45 or 46.

[4] On the function of the *amīr al-omarā* in the provinces, see Savory, *Some Notes on the Provincial Administration of the Early Safavid Empire*, *BSOAS*, xxvii/1, 1964, pp. 114-129.

[5] From 943-963/1536-37-1556, a period of twenty years.

poetry under the pen name of Fahmī. Given to jokes and witticisms, he had a happy disposition, being rarely of a melancholy turn of mind.

After some time had passed, Shah Tahmasp desired to see his son. He summoned him to court, sending Esma'il Mīrzā to Herat in his place. Not long afterwards,[6] however, the Shah, having in mind the best interests of the state, sent Esma'il Mīrzā to the prison-fortress of Qahqaha, because of certain improper actions on the part of the latter which had displeased him. Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā was reappointed to the governorship of Khorasan. After the Qazāq Takkalū incident, when Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī was sent to Khorasan with a large army to suppress that seditious officer and Qazāq met his end in the manner already described,[7] Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā visited the court with his son Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. He was appointed for the third time to the governorship of Khorasan, with Sultan Yakān Ostājlū as his guardian and *amīr al-omarā* of the province.[8]

During his third governorship, Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā's eyesight deteriorated, and the prince neglected to follow the prescribed course of treatment. The ophthalmic surgeons and oculists prescribed treatment, but the prince refused to submit himself to its rigors, and his eyesight got gradually weaker until he was virtually blind. The prince, for a variety of reasons, fell out with his guardian, Šāhqolī Sultan, and each accused the other of improper conduct. Shah Tahmasp, to placate his son, transferred him to Shiraz, brought one of his sons, Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā,[9] to court to gladden the eyes of the royal family,[10] and appointed another son, 'Abbas Mīrzā, governor-general of Khorasan. In obedience to the Shah's command, Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā left his son 'Abbas at Herat, and moved to Shiraz with the rest of his family.

At Shiraz, the administration was placed in the hands of Valī Sultan Qolkānčī-oḡlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, who became Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā's guardian. The latter remained at Shiraz for the rest of Shah Tahmasp's reign and during the reign of Shah Esma'il II, when his position was fraught with danger. After the death of Esma'il II, his innate good fortune brought him to the throne, as will be related in the appropriate place.

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[6] Esma'il had been at Herat only a few months (June-December 1556).

[7] In 972/1564.

[8] 974/1566.

[9] Bellan, *Chah Abbas*, p. 4, incorrectly states that Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā was the son of Shah Tahmasp.

[10] Actually, as a hostage for his father's good behavior!

The sons of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā are as follows:

Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā
His mother was the daughter of Mīr ʻAbd al-ʻAẓīm Seyfī Ḥoseynī, a respected Gīlānī emir and the son-in-law of Qāżī Jahān.[11] The date of his birth has not been recorded; but at the time of his grandfather's death he was eighteen years of age, which means he must have been born in 966/1558-59. After a time at court, he was appointed governor of half the province of Māzandarān, and he was living there at the time of Shah Tahmasp's death. Sultan Ḥasan was put to death by his uncle, Shah Esma'il II, as will be described at the proper place.

Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā
His mother was Mahd-e 'Olyā Ḵeyr al-Nesā Begom, the daughter of Mīr ʻAbdollāh Khan, ruler of Māzandarān. At that time,[12] he was ten years of age and was with his father at Shiraz. During his father's reign, he was appointed *vakīl* and made heir-apparent; and for nearly ten years of that reign, he was constantly at his father's side. He was the real architect of events until his untimely murder at the hands of his barber, as will be related under the events of Sultan Moḥammad Shah's reign.

ʻAbbas Mīrzā (the future Shah ʻAbbas I)
His mother also was Mahd-e 'Olyā Ḵeyr al-Nesā Begom. He was born at Herat on Sunday,[13] 1 Ramażān 978/27 January 1571, under the sign Virgo, at the beginning of the Year of the Horse, part of which fell within the Muslim year 978 and part within 979. One of the miraculous events associated with his birth was that the capable woman who had been appointed to nurse him discovered that her breasts were full of milk, even though she had not recently given birth to a child herself, and she was able to satisfy the needs of the infant prince. Since this was truly an extraordinary occurrence, I judged it worthy of note.

Learned men will not find it surprising that the hand of divine providence should be seen guiding the rearing of a prince destined to perform such mighty works in the realm of both religious and secular affairs. This prince was of distinguished and God-fearing stock on both his father's and his mother's side, and for this reason had a better claim to the throne than the other royal princes. His father was Sultan Moḥammad Shah, the eldest son of Shah Tahmasp, whose descent is from Shaikh Ṣafī al-Ḥaqq va'l-Ḥaqīqa va'l-Dīn,[14] and his descent is from the Prophet and from 'Alī, as was set forth in the introduction to this history. His mother, Mahd-e 'Olyā Ḵeyr al-Nesā Begom, was the revered daughter of the *seyyed* Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan, the ruler of Māzandarān, who is descended from Seyyed Qavām al-Dīn, known as Mīr Bozorg, as follows: Mīr 'Abdollāh Ḵān b. Solṭān Maḥmūd Ḵān b. Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm b. Seyyed Moḥammad b. Seyyed Mortażā b. Seyyed 'Alī b. Seyyed Kamāl al-Dīn, the contemporary of Tīmūr (who, as is recorded in the chronicles, was besieged by Tīmūr in the fortress of Māhāna-sar).[15] Seyyed Kamāl al-Dīn was the son of the above-mentioned Mīr Bozorg, whose lineage goes back to Seyyed 'Alī al-Mar'ašī, for which reason the *seyyeds* of this dynasty are known as Mar'ašī *seyyeds*.[16] The latter as is stated in the *Tārīḵ-e Jahān-ārā,* was a descendant of the Fourth Imam, Zeyn al-'Ābedīn.

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[11] The powerful official who became bureaucratic *vakīl* at the accession of Shah Tahmasp (see Savory, Offices II).

[12] If "at that time" means at the time of the death of Tahmasp, then Ḥamza must have been born in 1565 or 1566.

[13] 1 Ramażān 978 fell on a Saturday.

In short, Mīr Bozorg was descended from the distinguished line of Mar'ašī *seyyeds,* and embraced in his own person both spiritual and temporal authority. In his youth, he struggled to curb and discipline his carnal appetites. After his elevation to the highest mystical stations, lending his ear to the divine command, "It is We who distribute among them their livelihood in the present life,"[17] he undertook the ordering of affairs in Māzandarān and devoted his attention to the welfare of the people of that region. He took up residence in that province, and his convent was frequented by high and low. The ruler of Māzandarān at that time was Afrāsīāb, of the Čolāvī dynasty.

Afrāsīāb at first enrolled himself as a disciple of Mīr Bozorg, but then, made apprehensive by the extreme doctrines and the large numbers of Mīr Bozorg's disciples, he resolved to eliminate him and marched against the convent with a band of desperadoes. Mīr Bozorg considered himself justified in putting up a resistance, and an arrow chanced to inflict a mortal wound on Afrāsīāb. Mīr Bozorg conquered the rest of the province by the sword, thus adding temporal dominion to spiritual authority.[18] Seyyed Ẓahīr al-Dīn, the author of the *Tārīḵ-e Ṭabarestān*, gives full details of these events, and a summary of them is contained in the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar*. There is therefore no need for me to weary the reader with further details here, but I will return to my account of the birth of 'Abbas Mīrzā. In short, the ancestors of Mahd-e 'Olyā, the mother of 'Abbas Mīrzā, continued to rule Māzandarān, generation after generation.

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[14] The first *šeyḵ* of the Safavid Order, and the progenitor of the Safavid family.

[15] Near Āmol in Māzandarān. According to Rabino, p. 142, he was taken by Tīmūr to Kāšḡar, where he died in 801/1398-99.

[16] See Rabino, pp. 142-143, for further details of this dynasty.

[17] Koran, 43:33.

When 'Abbas Mīrzā was born at Herat, signs of his great destiny were visible upon his brow. Learned astrologers, especially Mowlānā 'Abd al-Ṣamad Haravī, worked out the horoscope of the new prince. They forecast that he would rise to a position of supreme power and would bring all men under the radiance of his justice and under the shadow of his mercy and favor. Poets devised the following chronogram for the date of his birth: Monarch of the Seven Climes (978/1571). When his mother told Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā of the birth of their son, he wrote to Shah Tahmasp to ascertain his wishes in regard to the naming of the child. The letter reached the Shah when he chanced to be reciting a verse in which the name of 'Abbas occurred, and so this was selected as the infant prince's name. It was the Shah's custom to present every royal baby with a carpet and all the trappings of a cradle. Shah Tahmasp sent for the infant 'Abbas the carpet which was spread beneath his own royal throne in the Čehel Sotūn hall of the palace at Qazvin, together with all necessary appurtenances for his cradle.

Shah Tahmasp had a premonition that the infant prince would one day succeed him on the throne. Indeed, from 'Abbas's infancy up to the time of his accession, there were many heavenly signs pointing to his future kingship. Among these were one or two supernatural events which, since they indicate the high spiritual station of Shah Tahmasp, I make no apology for including here; these events were related on the authority of Shah Tahmasp himself, and reached my ears via a line of reliable transmitters. The first of these events is as follows: Before the news of the birth of 'Abbas had reached the Shah, the Shah summoned 'Abbas's elder brother, Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who was at court, and said, "Today a courier will reach us from Herat, and will bring good news which will give us both great joy." Shortly after this, the courier arrived. The second event is as follows: A few years after the birth of 'Abbas, the Shah sent a member of the royal bodyguard to Herat on a mission. When he returned, the Shah questioned him about 'Abbas and asked him to describe his physical appearance. The soldier, however, either because of lack of intelligence or because he was unobservant, did not describe the prince as fully as he ought to have done. The Shah said heatedly, "You do not seem to know much about this prince. He will be the one who increases the brilliance of the light of this dynasty." And it was not long before this happened.

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[18] This occurred in 760/1359 (Rabino, p. 142).

'Abbas Mīrzā was selected for a position of responsibility and thus distinguished among the other royal princes, each of whom had the talent and ability to qualify him to govern. At the risk, therefore, of again unduly prolonging this discourse, I consider it necessary to say a few words about the way in which 'Abbas Mīrzā came to be entrusted with the administration of Khorāsan.

Men of discrimination and learning are well aware that once God has, by virtue of His word "Thou givest sovereignty to whomsoever Thou pleasest . . . Thou exaltest whomsoever Thou pleasest,"[19] destined a man to power and authority, that man will, with God's assistance and protection, overcome all obstacles in a manner which will astonish even persons of sound judgment. He will emerge triumphant from any trials initially placed in his path, which the more short-sighted consider to be an indication of lack of divine favor: For in this apparent withdrawal of divine favor are contained, by God's will, many practical lessons concerning the government of a kingdom, and God's protection is sufficient to preserve such a man from all the injuries of this world and the conspiracies of foolish men.

The purpose of these preliminary remarks was to set the stage for my account of the life of Shah 'Abbas I. Many powerful monarchs have been buffeted by fate at the beginning of their careers; later, however, fortune has smiled on them, and they have reached the zenith of dominion and power and achieved great things. Nevertheless, since the time of Creation, when man was singled out from among other created beings by God's assurance, "We have shown great regard to the sons of Adam,"[20] and distinguished by God's declaration, "We have made you a vicegerent in the earth,"[21] no great king has had to suffer such vicissitudes of fate, so many attempts on his life by his enemies, such intrigues and conspiracies on the part of treacherous and disloyal men, and such countless trials and tribulations, as Shah 'Abbas I, as will be narrated in detail below.

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[19] Koran, 3:27 (part).
[20] Koran, 17:71.
[21] Koran, 38:25. This was said to David.

The first hardship he had to endure was separation from his mother and father, which occurred when he was still an infant of eighteen months.[22] An estrangement had come about at Herat between his father, Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, and the latter's guardian, Šāhqolī Yakān Sultan, as a result of the machinations of evil men. Each repeatedly sent complaints to court about the other. Shah Tahmasp, realizing that no reconcilation between the two was possible, resolved to appoint as governor at Herat Ḥamza Mīrzā, the brother of 'Abbas Mīrzā, and to transfer his father, Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, to Shiraz. An order to this effect was issued by the Shah. But Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā and his wife, although they rejoiced in public when the Shah's edict reached Herat, could not bear to part from their favorite son. They sent a petition to court declaring that Ḥamza Mīrzā was particularly fond of and close to his parents, and that he might not be able to bear the separation, and might go into a physical decline. His mother further stated that she could not live without her darling Ḥamza. 'Abbas Mīrzā, on the other hand, since he was still being breast fed by the wet-nurse, had formed no such close attachment to his mother, and she therefore entreated the Shah to let her take Ḥamza to Shiraz with her and leave 'Abbas at Herat. Since the Shah wanted Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā to be happy, he agreed to this and issued fresh orders to this effect.

From the fact that 'Abbas Mīrzā had been appointed to the governorship of Khorasan, people deduced that he was destined to great things,. because Shah Tahmasp himself, while still an infant, had been made governor-general of Khorasan by Shah Esma'il I,[23] had grown up at Herat, and had eventually succeeded his father on the throne. Of Tahmasp's own sons, too, all those who held the governorship of Khorasan ultimately came to the throne.[24] 'Abbas Mīrzā, then, in his second year, succeeded his father as governor-general of Khorasan, with Šāhqolī Sultan Ostājlū as his guardian.[25] I will turn now to the other royal princes.

Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā

He was born in the year of the Shah Tahmasp's illness, 982/1574, his mother being Mahd-e 'Olyā, and he was thus two years of age when Shah Tahmasp died. He was brought up by his parents and, in the Year of the Dog, 994/1586, when Ḥamza Mīrzā was murdered (as will be narrated at the end of this section of my history), he was made *vakīl-e dīvān-e a'lā,* vicegerent of the Supreme Divan, and was proclaimed heir-apparent by the group of emirs who were in control at Qazvin, notably 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū Ostājlū and Esma'ilqolī Khan, commander-in-chief of the artillery, who was the son of Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū. At the end of the Year of the Pig, 995/1587, it was rumored in Iraq that 'Abbas Mīrzā was marching toward the capital from Khorasan; after the latter became Shah, Abū Ṭāleb and his younger brother Ṭahmāsp were held in detention for a time. In the Year of the Tiger (998/1589-90), they were transferred to the fortress of Ṭabarak near Isfahan. Ultimately, as the result of the intrigues of some of the emirs, both princes were blinded.

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[22] This means that Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā was transferred to Shiraz about July 1572.

[23] In 921/1515, when he was two years old.

[24] Viz., Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Shah Esma'il II.

[25] The reappointment of Šāhqolī Sultan Ostājlū as *lala* (guardian) was a vote of confidence in him and, by implication, a vote of no confidence in Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā.

Tahmasp Mīrzā

Tahmasp Mīrzā, the fifth son of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, whose mother was also Mahd-e 'Olyā, was born at Shiraz after the death of Shah Tahmasp in 984/1576, and received his grandfather's name. In the Year of the Fowl, 993/1585, when the Turkman and Takkalū tribes fell out with Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā because of his execution of Emir Khan Torkmān, as will be described in the proper place, Tahmasp Mīrzā was seized by the Turkman-Takkalū faction at Tabriz and carried off by them to Iraq, where they swore allegiance to him. This faction, however, was defeated by Ḥamza Mīrzā, who recaptured his brother Tahmasp and imprisoned him at Alamūt. He was later transferred to Ṭabarak near Isfahan and eventually blinded, as mentioned above. This completes the list of the sons of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, and I return now to listing the sons of Shah Tahmasp.

Esma'il Mīrzā

The second son of Shah Tahmasp; Esma'il Mīrzā's mother too was Solṭānom, the daughter of Mūsā Sultan Mowṣellū, and so he was the brother of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā. In 954/1547-48, when Alqāṣ Mīrzā rebelled against the Shah, was defeated, and fled to Ottoman territory, Esma'il Mīrzā was appointed governor of the province of Šīrvān, and Gökča Sultan Qājār was appointed his guardian. Esma'il won a great victory over Borhān Mīrzā, a descendant of the princes of Šīrvān, who had marched from Dāḡestān with the object of subjugating Šīrvān, and Borhān retreated to Dāḡestān. In 955/1548-49, the Ottoman emperor Sülaymān, at the instance of Alqāṣ Mīrzā, invaded Iran. Esma'il Mīrzā was recalled to court, and from time to time performed various commissions for the Shah. In 959/1551-52, he was appointed commander of a *qezelbāš* army sent to Anatolia, and won a victory over Eskandar Pasha at Erzerum.

In 962/1554-55 he married the daughter of Shah Ne'matollāh Yazdī and Ḵāneš Begom, a sister of Shah Tahmasp, and a splendid marriage feast was held in the Bāḡ-e Delgošā at Qazvin. Even though it was a royal occasion, the Shah's indulgence toward his son was such that he allowed him to rise to his feet and dance. All the guests scattered money among the crowds, in quantities appropriate to their station and the occasion, and the entertainers, musicians, and minstrels had all their financial worries removed by this largesse. But Esma'il displayed ingratitude toward the Shah's beneficence and committed certain acts displeasing to his father. The Shah considered it inadvisable to allow Esma'il Mīrzā to remain at court and in 963/1556 summoned Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā from Herat. He sent Esma'il Mīrzā to Herat in his place, with Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū as his guardian. 'Alī Sultan Takkalū escorted Esma'il to Herat and returned with Moḥammad Mīrzā. On reaching Sāūj Bolāḡ, 'Alī Sultan was dispatched by blows from the royal bodyguard. The only apparent reason for this was that, in the process of escorting Esma'il Mīrzā to Herat, he had entered into certain agreements and covenants with the prince incompatible with sincere devotion to the Shah and the proper conduct for a Sufi—but God alone knows the truth.

At all events, Esma'il's behavior at Herat did not please the Shah any more than had his conduct at court; consequently, in the best interests of the realm and to preserve and protect the state, Esma'il was dismissed from office after he had been at Herat for a few months. At the Shah's command, Sevendūk Beg Afšār, the *qūrčī-bāšī,* went to Herat and brought the prince back to Sāva via Ṭabaṣ and Yazd. At Sāva, he was met by the *vakīl al-salṭana,* Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, who conducted him to the prison at Qahqaha. Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, as already mentioned, was reappointed governor of Khorasan. Esma'il Mīrzā spent nineteen years, six months, and one day in that prison. Finally, after the death of Shah Tahmasp and of his brother Ḥeydar Mīrzā, he was raised to the throne, as will be described at the appropriate place.

Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā

The third son of Shah Tahmasp; Ḥeydar Mīrzā's mother was a Georgian, one of the Shah's legal wives. The date of Ḥeydar's birth is not recorded, but since he was twenty-two at the death of Shah Tahmasp, he must have been born in 962/1554-55. He was constantly at court until his father's death. His guardian (*lala*) was Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī until the latter went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, at which time he was replaced in this office by his son Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan, a trusted emir. Ḥeydar Mīrzā was the object of the Shah's special regard, and in return he tried to do his father's bidding. Toward the end of his life, Tahmasp, no longer able to attend to all the affairs of state in person, made use of Ḥeydar Mīrzā in this regard. He was singled out by the Shah from among his brothers for special favor, and his standing steadily increased in the eyes of the other royal princes and the emirs of the *qezelbāš* tribes.

With the arrogance of youth, and natural ambition, he considered himself the heir-apparent; the majority of the army officers, particularly those of the Šeyḵāvand and Ostājlū tribes, and of the Georgian party, supported his candidacy. During the Shah's illness in 982/1574, some of Ḥeydar's supporters became impatient and were guilty of actions contrary to good Sufi practice and loyalty to the Shah, as I have described in detail earlier. Ḥeydar was somewhat ashamed of these incidents, but the Shah, when he recovered his health, never gave the least sign, either through impatience or carelessness, that his regard for Ḥeydar had weakened. He continued to show favor toward him until his own death; the day following the death of Tahmasp, on 16 Ṣafar 984/15 May 1576, Ḥeydar Mīrzā met his end in the manner already described. He was a man of integrity, chaste, compassionate, kindly, and just in his dealings with men. He left a daughter—his only child.

Sultan Soleymān Mīrzā

The fourth son of Shah Tahmasp; Soleymān Mīrzā's mother was the sister of Šamḵāl Sultan Čerkes, and was one of the Shah's legal wives. Soleymān was twenty-one at the time of his father's death.[26] At an early age, the Shah sent him to Mašhad and appointed the governor of Mašhad to be his guardian. Teachers were appointed to instruct him in all branches of learning, and he was eventually given the post of comptroller of the attendants (*ḵādembāšī*) of the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad. In 978/1570-71, when Šāhvalī Sultan Tātī-oḡlū Ẕu'l-Qadar was dismissed from the governorship of Mašhad, Sultan Soleymān Mīrzā was recalled to court and received with great favor by his father. During the reign of Shah Esma'il II, who confined his energies to eliminating the royal princes, Soleymān Mīrzā was handed over to his uncle Šamḵāl Sultan Čerkes who, to curry favor with the Shah, put him to death. Further details will be given under the events of the reign of Shah Esma'il II.

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[26] He must therefore have been born in 963/1555-56.

Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā

The fifth son of Shah Tahmasp; Moṣṭafā Mīrzā's mother was a Georgian concubine. At the time of his father's death, he was twenty years of age.[27] The office of guardian of this prince was the prerogative of the great Ostājlū emirs, and he was brought up with the Ostājlū tribe. Extremely capable and talented, he had a pleasant disposition. He was sent to eastern Gīlān with a punitive expedition,[28] after the Gīlānīs had rebelled on several occasions, and as a result of his victories in this campaign, he was raised to the rank of governor and given an army command. After the death of Naẓar Sultan, his guardian, this function was taken over by Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī*, who also received the former's rank of governor. In all matters, he agreed with Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā.

After the death of Shah Tahmasp, when the Ostājlū emirs conspired to put Ḥeydar Mīrzā on the throne, Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā went with them to the palace. But the death of Ḥeydar Mīrzā scattered his supporters in all directions; Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā left Qazvin and took refuge among the Bayāt tribe, who were his retainers. Ḥājjī Oveys Sultan Bayāt arrested him and took him to Esma'il Mīrzā, who handed him over to Pīra Moḥammad Ostājlū. The Ostājlū emirs, imagining that their best interest lay in murdering the prince, put him to death in Pīra Moḥammad Ostājlū's house,[29] as will be described in more detail later.

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[27] Probable date of birth therefore 964/1556-57.

[28] The date of this expedition was 975/1567-67.

[29] This was one of a number of acts by which the Ostājlūs vainly hoped to atone for their support of Ḥeydar Mīrzā after the failure of their *coup d'état*.

Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā

The sixth son of Shah Tahmasp; Maḥmūd Mīrzā's mother was a slave girl. He was eighteen years old at the time of his father's death.[30] At one time, he was appointed governor of eastern Gīlān and resided at Lāhījān; because of the persistent rebelliousness of the Gīlānīs, he was instructed by the Shah to leave the province. At the end of Tahmasp's reign, he was appointed governor of Šīrvān, with Aras Sultan Rūmlū as his guardian. At the time of his father's death, however, he was still at court and had not left for Šīrvān: he remained with the Rūmlū tribe, and Aras Sultan's sons undertook the duty of being in attendance on the prince. As the Rūmlū emirs were supporters of Esma'il Mīrzā, Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā naturally followed their lead. Despite this, both the prince himself and his infant son Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā were murdered by Esma'il Mīrzā after he came to the throne.

Emāmqolī Mīrzā

Seventh son of Shah Tahmasp; Emāmqolī Mīrzā's mother was the sister of the Georgian nobleman Zāl Beg, and he was fourteen years old at the time of his father's death.[31] He was made governor of Lāhījān, which was the capital and seat of the governor of Bīya Pīš (eastern Gīlān), and resided there with Pīra Moḥammad Khan as his guardian. At the time of the accession of Shah Esma'il II, Pīra Moḥammad left Gīlān to welcome the new Shah and brought with him Emāmqolī Mīrzā. He was received by his brother in the Zanjān River pastures in Qarābāğ. For a time he was apparently regarded with favor by the Shah, but eventually he was put to death at Qazvin along with his other brothers.

Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā

Eighth son of Shah Tahmasp, and son of the mother of Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā, 'Alī Mīrzā was fourteen years old at the time of his father's death,[32] and resided in the city of Ganja. His guardian was Ebrāhīm Beg Zīād-oğlū Qājār, the governor-general of the Qarābāğ province. On the orders of Shah Esma'il II, the Qājār chiefs brought him to Qazvin after the other Safavid princes had been murdered, and he was blinded. He is still alive as I write these words,[33] and lives quietly under the protection of Shah 'Abbas I.

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[30] Probable date of birth was therefore 966/1558-59.
[31] Probable date of birth was therefore 970/1562-63.
[32] Probable date of birth was therefore 970/1562-63.

Sultan Aḥmad Mīrzā

The ninth son of Shah Tahmasp, Aḥmad Mīrzā, was dubbed Bağdādī Aḥmad by his father. His mother was a slave girl. At the time of his father's death, he was thirteen years old.[34] His guardian was Emir Aṣlān Sultan Arešlū Afšār, who looked after him for a number of years at Isfahan. He was instructed by the Shah to bring the prince to court, where he was honored by his father. Since the Afšār tribe, and especially the Arešlū clan, were supporters of Esma'il, Sultan Aḥmad Mīrzā also supported Esma'il. Despite this, he was murdered by his brother along with the other Safavid princes.

The daughters of Shah Tahmasp numbered eight,[35] as follows:

Gowhar Sultan Begom. Married to Sultan Ebrāhīm Mīrzā, the son of Bahrām Mīrzā.[36] After her husband was murdered by his cousin, Shah Esma'il II, she went into a decline and died. There was one daughter of the marriage.

Parī Khan Ḵānom. She was betrothed to Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā b. Bahrām Mīrzā, but the marriage was never solemnized. She was constantly in attendance on her father, who treated her with respect and esteem. People who had difficult problems asked her to intercede with the Shah, which she frequently did with success. I have already described her activities at the time of Shah Tahmasp's illness. After his death, she did everything she could to promote the cause of Esma'il Mīrzā, but her prestige declined. After the murder of Shah Esma'il II and the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, the latter grew suspicious of her and had her put out of the way; fuller details of this will be given later.

Ḵadīja Sultan Begom. The third daughter of Shah Tahmasp. She married first Jamšīd Khan, the governor of Bīya Pas (western Gīlān), and second, after Jamšīd's death, Shah Ne'matollāh, son of

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[33] Before 1025/1616, when the bulk of the *TAAA* was completed.

[34] Probable date of birth was therefore 971/1563-64.

[35] According to the author's earlier statement, Shah Tahmasp had thirteen surviving daughters.

[36] Bahrām Mīrzā was Shah Tahmasp's brother.

Mīr-Mīrān-e Yazdī. She is still alive. She had two sons by Jamšīd Khan, but both died in infancy.

Zeynab Begom. Her guardian was Shah ʿAlī Beg Šāmlū, a "*qūrčī* of the sword." Shah Tahmasp dubbed her Nām Ḵānom, and honored her by keeping her in attendance on him. Her mother, Ḥūrī Khan Ḵānom, was a Georgian woman of noble birth. Esmaʿil Mīrzā promised her to ʿAlīqolī Khan, the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan Šāmlū, who was governor of Herat, but the marriage was never solemnized. She was a highly intelligent woman, and as a member of the harem of Shah ʿAbbas I, acquired a position close to the Shah and great influence. She is still a member of his harem at the time of writing, and is known for many charitable works and benefactions. May she live out her natural span!

Maryam Sultan Begom. She was a sister of Zeynab Begom. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, she married Khan Aḥmad Sultan, the ruler of eastern Gīlān, but after Khan Aḥmad (as will be related) abandoned his allegiance to the Safavids and went to Anatolia, Maryam Sultan took the daughter she had had by Khan Aḥmad and rejoined her father's household. She died during the reign of Shah ʿAbbas, and her daughter lives in the harem with the other women of the royal household.

Fāṭema Sultan Ḵānom. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, she married Emir Khan Mowṣellū Torkmān, but died shortly afterward at his home.

Šohra Bānū Ḵānom. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, she married Salmān Khan, the son of Shah ʿAlī Mīrzā Ostājlū, who was the nephew of Shah Tahmasp. She too died shortly after her marriage. Her mother, the daughter of the governor of Dāğestān, was also the mother of Tahmasp's third daughter, Ḵadīja Begom, the wife of Jamšīd Khan.

Ḵāneš Begom. The sister of Emāmqolī Mīrzā. She married Shah Neʿmatollāh Yazdī, the son of Mīr-Mīrān, in whose house she died. There was one son of the marriage, Sanjar.

Of the children of Bahrām Mīrzā, the brother of Shah Tahmasp, thirteen (counting sons and daughters) were alive at the time of the death of Tahmasp; of these, three were his natural sons.

Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā

During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was appointed governor of Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar, in which post he continued for a number of years at the command of his uncle. He died a natural death at Kandahar during the reign of Shah Esma'il II. He had five sons: (1) Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who was eighteen years old at the time of his father's death. Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā sent him to court with his sister, Oğlān Pāšā Begom, and Shah Tahmasp treated them like his own children. Shah Esma'il II, however, murdered Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā along with the other royal princes; (2) Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who was fifteen years old at the time of the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. He was appointed governor of Kandahar after his father; (3) Rostam Mīrzā was twelve years old at the time of the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. He was allotted the governorship of Zamīn Dāvar; (4) Sanjar Mīrzā and (5) Abū Sa'īd Mīrzā, both infants. Later we shall describe in detail the fortunes of the four surviving brothers during the reign of Shah 'Abbas I. The daughter mentioned above, Oğlān Pāšā Begom, married Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā and later entered the harem of Shah 'Abbas I, where she eventually died.

Ebrahim Mīrzā

Ebrahim Mīrzā's mother was a noblewoman from Šīrvān. He was the son-in-law of Shah Tahmasp,[37] and at the time of the latter's death held the high office of *ešīk-āqāsī*. He was a most capable and talented young man, whose advice and counsel the Shah frequently sought. Ebrahim Mīrzā was murdered by Shah Esma'il II. There was one daughter of his marriage; during the reign of Shah 'Abbas I, this girl performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, where she married Emir Naṣīr al-Dīn Ḥoseyn Šīrāzī, an eminent Daštakī *seyyed* and a most learned man, and she settled in that city.

Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā

Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā was appointed by Shah Tahmasp as governor of the Nīmrūz district of Sīstān. His guardian was Tīmūr Khan Ostājlū. He had a young son, Bahrām; both father and son were put to death by Tīmūr Khan at the orders of Shah Esma'il II.

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[37] He married Tahmasp's eldest daughter, Gowhar Sultan Begom.

After this enumeration of the royal princes, I will give some details of the great *qezelbāš* emirs and principal khans who held high administrative offices and governorships in various parts of the Safavid empire at the death of Shah Tahmasp.

Emirs of Note, both Sultans and Khans, Who Were Serving Either at Court or in the Provinces

The total number of officers holding the title of emir at the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp, according to the registers of the supreme *dīvān,* was one hundred and fourteen; this includes officers of the rank of khan and of sultan (both major and minor). The majority of these officers were "possessors of drum, banner, and retinue." There is no point in listing them all, but I will mention a few in each class and tribe.

Officers of the Šāmlū Tribe

The Šāmlū tribe is the greatest of the *qezelbāš* tribes, superior to all others in length of service to the Safavid cause, and possessing an outstanding record of loyal service. During the reign of Shah Esma'il I, when the Safavid house and dynasty were established, and during the early part of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, many high-ranking emirs were drawn from this tribe. Among them were Ḥoseyn Beg, the guardian of Shah Esma'il I; 'Abdī Beg, who was honored by marriage ties with Shah Esma'il,[1] and his son Dūrmīš Khan; Ḥoseyn Khan, who was the nephew of Shah Tahmasp; Zeynal Khan; Aḡzīvār Khan. By the appointment of these and other emirs to high office, and the granting to them of excellent fiefs, the Šāmlū tribe attained preeminence among the *qezelbāš* tribes. Their influence has declined, however, and at the present time there are no more than five Šāmlūs who are possessors of military band and banner. The chief of these is Valī Ḵalīfa Evčī, the governor of Mašhad, who has held more military commands than the other emirs. Most of the sons of Šāmlū emirs are enrolled in his regiment. In addition, there are Fūlād Ḵalīfa, the governor of Hamadan, and Soleymān Ḵalīfa, who was dismissed from the governorship of Astarābād, and is at court.

Officers of the Ostājlū Tribe

Many members of the Ostājlū tribe were also powerful emirs during the reigns of Shah Esma'il I and Shah Tahmasp. For instance: Khan Moḥammad, the governor of Dīār Bakr, and his brother Qarā Khan; Qelič Khan; Čāyān Sultan; Köpek Sultan; Mantašā Sultan; Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan; Fārūq Sultan; 'Abdollāh Khan; Šāhqolī Sultan, governor of Čokūr-e Sa'd; and others. All these emirs possessed fiefs in various parts of the Safavid empire.

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[1] He was married to Shah Esma'il's sister.

At the beginning of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, as a result of the struggle for the office of *vakīl* between Dīv Sultan Rūmlū and Čūha Sultan Takkalū, which I have already described,[2] the Shah vented his anger on the Ostājlū emirs, who then spent some time in exile in Gīlān. After the fall of the Takkalūs from power, the Ostājlūs were received back into royal favor and confidence. By the time of Shah Tahmasp's death, a large number of Ostājlū emirs once more held the status of emir and were possessors of drum and banner, troops and fiefs. The chief of the Ostājlū emirs at court was Ḥoseyn Beg the centurion, son of Ḥasan Beg. Ḥoseyn Beg held the status of emir in place of his uncle, Naẓar Sultan; he was appointed guardian to Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā and acquired great power and political influence.

Other important Ostājlū emirs included Morād Khan *sofračī*, the son of Tīmūr Khan, who was one of the great emirs at court (at the time of Shah Tahmasp's death, however, he was absent on an expedition against the fortress of Kojūr); Allāhqolī Sultan Gerānpā (heavy-footed), who had been dismissed from the governorship of Gīlān and was at court; Pīrī Beg Qučlūy, another emir of the court (at the time of the Shah's death, he was absent at Varāmīn in the Rayy district, which was one of his fiefs). Of the emirs of the provinces, there were Pīra Moḥammad Khan Čāūšlū, the *amīr al-omarā* of Bīya Pīš (eastern Gīlān) and guardian of the prince Emāmqolī; and Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, the *amīr al-omarā* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd. The forces under his command were more numerous than those of his peers. At the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp, he had gone on a mission to Anatolia, from which he returned after the accession of Shah Esma'il II. Šāhqolī Sultan Yakān, governor of Herat, *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, and guardian of 'Abbas Mīrzā, acquired greater prestige after the latter came to the throne. Naẓar Sultan Āsāyeš-oğlū, who was the *yasāq-kaš*[3] at Herat, had tribal lands at Ğūrīān and Kūsūya.

There were also Ebrahim Sultan, the son of Šāhqolī Sultan Yakān and governor of Sarakhs; Valī Khan the *čarḵčībāšī* (commander of the skirmishers) of Khorasan, who was from the Šaraflū clan of the Ostājlū tribe and was governor of Ḵāf and Bāḵarz; Maḥmūd Khan Şūfī-oğlū, one of the emirs of Khorasan and at that time governor of Toršīz; Tīmūr Khan, the father of Morād Khan, who was governor of Sīstān and the guardian of Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā; Eyğūş Sultan Čāūšlū, governor of Šūštar and Dezfūl and a trustworthy emir; Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranča-oğlū, of the Māhī-Faqīhlū clan, governor of Tianeti (he was charged with assisting Dā'ūd Khan at Tiflis and in promoting his affairs); Moştafā Sultan, the son of Kačal Šāhverdī Khan, was stationed in Khorasan. It is not worth recording the names of the rest of the Ostājlū emirs.

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[2] See Savory, Offices II.

[3] I conjecture that this term means the officer in charge of recruiting local levies. For *yasāq*, see *TM*, p. 34.

Officers of the Turkman Tribe

The chief of the Turkman emirs was Emir Khan Mowşellū, the grandson of Golābī Khan. His ancestor, the former Emir Khan, left Dīār Bakr during the reign of Shah Esma'il I and joined Esma'il with all his troops. He fought gallantly at the battle of Marv against Šāhī Beg Uzbeg, and for a number of years he was *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan and guardian of Tahmasp Mīrzā. The present Emir Khan was also a trusted emir, and at the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp he was residing at Ḵār near Rayy. Under Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he became *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan and, as indicated above, was honored by a marriage alliance with the Safavid royal family. His relative, Moḥammad Khan Mowşellū, was for a while governor of Sīstān but was dismissed from this post after the death of Shah Tahmasp and retired to his tribal lands at Torbat in Khorasan. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he became one of the principal officers of state.

Other Turkman emirs included Šāhqolī Khan Pornāk, who resided at Isfahan. During the time of Shah Esma'il II, he was governor of Mašhad and *amīr al-omarā* of half of Khorasan. There were also Soleymān Ḵalīfa, the son of Sohrāb Ḵalīfa, the governor of Tūn and Ṭabas in Khorasan; Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq Tarḵān, governor of Qom and one of the great emirs of the court; Abu'l-Ma'şūm Sultan, son of Yādegār Moḥammad Tarḵān, also one of the great emirs of the court.

Officers of the Rūmlū Tribe

The chief of the Rūmlū emirs at that time was Aras Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Šīrvān. Other important emirs from this tribe included Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā, who held the office of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*[4] at court, and was an emir possessing military band and banner. He was greatly respected, and his counsel was much sought after. Men of the Sufi brotherhood who gathered at the Safavid court from Dīār Bakr and all parts of Anatolia were completely subject to his authority. Other Rūmlū emirs were Delī Būdāq, who had returned to court from the governorship of Ḵ̌oy; and Qorbān Sultan, also at court.

Officers of the Ẕu'l-Qadar Tribe

The chief of the Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs at court was Moḥammadqolī Ḵalīfa *mohrdār* (Keeper of the Seal), the son of Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa Qorūḡlū, who was one of the principal officers of state and commanded large numbers of troops. Other emirs of importance included Moḥammad Ḵalīfa, the cousin of Ebrahim Khan Ḥājjīlar, the governor of Astarābād; Valī Sultan Qalmānčī-oḡlū, governor of Shiraz and guardian of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā; Tabat Āqā, governor of Jām in Khorasan; Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa, one of the great emirs, and governor of Dārābjerd in Fārs; Manṣūr Beg, son of Ebrahim Khan Ḥājjīlar, who was at Ḵ̌oy.

Officers of the Afšār Tribe

The chief of the Afšār emirs at court was Emir Aṣlān Sultan Arešlū, who was in command of large forces and was the guardian of Sultan Aḥmad Mīrzā. Other notable Afšār emirs included Ḵalīl Khan, governor of Kūh Gīlūya, who was lord of ten thousand Afšār families; Maḥmūd Sultan, known as Mīr Bozorg, governor of Sāva; Yūsofqolī Sultan, the brother of Ya'qūb Sultan, on whose behalf he governed Kerman (although he had not yet left court, and in fact never did go to Kerman; during the reign of Shah Esma'il II, he became *qūrčībāšī* and one of the principal officers of state); Eskandar Khan, a relative[5] of Ḵalīl Khan, who was stationed in Hazārjarīb (under Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he became governor of Kūh Gīlūya); Yakān Sultan, governor of Farāh and Esfezār in Khorasan—a trusty emir; Ḵosrow Sultan Kūroḡlū, stationed in Khorasan. There were other Afšār emirs, but there is no need to record their names.

Officers of the Qājār Tribe

Yūsof Ḵalīfa, the son of Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oḡlū, had been appointed governor-general of Qarābāġ and guardian of Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā, but he was still at court. Other important Qājār emirs included Mīrzā 'Alī Sultan, one of the trusted emirs of the court and *dīvānbegī;* 'Alī Ḵalīfa Āqča-qoyūnlū,[6] governor of Damghan and Besṭām; Soleymān Beg Zīād-oġlū, the brother of Yūsof Ḵalīfa; and Soleymān Sultan Šekem-oġlū, who both had the status of emir.

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[4] See Savory, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Ṣafavids," *JAOS*, 85/4, 1965, pp. 497-502.

[5] Nephew.

Officers of the Takkalū Tribe

Sūlāġ Ḥoseyn, the chief emir of this tribe, had tribal fiefs in Gīlān. There were also Ordūġdī Ḵalīfa and Valī Sultan Šaraf al-Dīn-oġlū, a relative of Moḥammad Khan, who had a small fief in Khorasan. In general the members of this tribe, because of the rebellion and defection of Olāma Sultan, had been out of favor with Shah Tahmasp but were reinstated by Shah Esma'il II.

Officers of the Ṭāleš Tribe

Bāyandor Khan, who resided at Āstārā, was the principal emir of this tribe. Another notable emir was Ḥamza Sultan, one of the trusted emirs of the court.

Officers of the Bayāt Tribe

Ḥājjī Oveys Sultan and Qarā Khan, governor of Šūra-gel and Aleškert in Čoḵūr-e Sa'd.

Officers of the Alpā'ūt Tribe

Ebrahim Ḵalīfa, who had a fief in Čoḵūr-e Sa'd.

Officers of the Ḵeneslū Tribe[7]

Ḥoseyn Khan Sultan.

Officers of various Kurdish Tribes

Šaraf Khan Rūzakī, a descendant of the princes of Betlīs, had been brought up under the tutelage of Shah Tahmasp and was governor of

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[6] "Those of the off-white sheep."

[7] See *TM*, p. 14; according to *TAAA*, i, 54, the Ḵeneslū were a clan of the Ẕu'l-Qadars.

Tonakābon in Gīlān; Ḵalīl Sultan Sīāh-Manṣūr, governor of Sojās and Sūrloq; Oḡlān Būdāḡī Čeganī, governor of Ḵabūšān and Khorasan; Zangana,[8] one of the emirs of Fārs; Qelīj Ḵalīfa Pāzūkī, one of the emirs of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd; Tīmūr Khan Ardalān, governor of Ḥasanābād and Palangān; Shah Rostam 'Abbāsī and his brother Moḥammadī, both governors of Lor-e Kūček. Shah Tahmasp divided this region between the two brothers: Shah Rostam received Ḵāva and Aleštar, and Moḥammadī, Ḵorramābād and the remaining regions. Moḥammadī was guilty of an act of rebellion, but Shah Rostam was a loyal vassal.

Officers of the Čapnī Tribe

Maḥmūd Ḵalīfa and Moḥammad Sultan Jalāl-oḡlū, who were both stationed in Qarābāḡ, among the Zīād-oḡlū.

Officers of the Qazāqlū Tribe

Ẕū Namer Sultan, also stationed in Qarābāḡ.

Officers of the Čaḡatāy Tribe

Mīrzā 'Alī Ḵalīfa, chief of the Gerāylī tribe, was stationed in Khorasan; Ebn Ḥoseyn, son of Mīr Ḥoseyn Sultan Fīrūz-jang, was at Rādekān near Mašhad, and was later appointed governor of Saraḵs: Ḥājjī Moḥammad Sultan Kūtvāl, governor of Zāva and Moḥavvalāt in Khorasan, was an eminent *seyyed.*

Officers of the Šeyḵāvand Tribe

Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan, the son of Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, was one of the emirs of the court and was in the service of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. His brother Seyyed Beg was enrolled in the ranks of the great emirs and was governor of Astarābād, but was removed from office at the death of Shah Tahmasp: Seyyed Soleymān, known as Seyyed Beg Kamūna, was a *seyyed* and *naqīb* of Najaf, and a descendant of Seyyed Moḥammad Kamūna, who had rendered loyal service to Shah Esma'il I and had been enrolled in the ranks of the great emirs. He had been governor of Ḥella near Baghdad and had been killed at the battle of Čālderān. Seyyed Soleymān was regarded with great favor by Shah

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[8] The personal name is omitted in the text.

Tahmasp, who made him one of the trusted emirs of the court and custodian of the Great Seal.

Throughout the *mamālek*[9] provinces, there were governors and emirs drawn from every tribe and class, but there is no point in going into greater detail.

Centurions, Qūrčīs, Ešīk-āqāsīs, and Yasāvols

At the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp, the total number of centurions of senior rank, office holders, *qūrčīs*, and other officers in attendance at the court was six thousand. Of this number, four thousand five hundred were *qūrčīs* of the royal bodyguard, and one thousand five hundred other officials—namely, *qūrčīān-e dāš*,[10] *yasāvols* (aides-de camp), *bokāvols* (stewards), and so on. Among this group were *yasāvols*, trusted *qūrčīs*, *ešīk-āqāsīs*, *yasāvolbāšīs* of the arsenal and of the central administration, *mīr-šekārs*, (huntsmen), and *tūpčī-bāšīs* (artillery officers). In each category and lot there were many who deserved to be emirs, and though they were not honored with the rank of emir, yet in esteem they did not yield to the emirs.[11] Each officer had an appropriate number of efficient servants subordinate to him; this number varied from five to fifty, so that some six thousand of these servants were on the staff of the royal household. But if an accurate count were to be made of these servants and attendants, their number would probably be twenty thousand, if not more. The valor and bravery of the *qūrčīs* was so renowned that one hundred men of the household troops were a match for a thousand men drawn from other categories of soldiers.

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[9] *Mamālek*, "state" provinces governed by *qezelbāš* tribal chiefs who held their province as a sort of fief. See *TM*, pp. 24ff.

[10] The precise meaning of this term is not known.

[11] Minorsky's translation, *TM*, p. 15.

Eminent Seyyeds, Honored Divines, Viziers and Men of the Pen Generally, and Eloquent Poets

It occurred to the inadequate mind of the blackener of these pages that it would be a good idea to record the names of members of the exalted class of *seyyeds* and *ṣadrs*,[1] divines and wearers of the turban generally, and also of viziers, *mostowfīs*[2] and other capable men, together with poets of eloquent tongue, who flourished during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, either at court or in the provinces, and to give a few particulars about each.

Seyyeds, Shaikhs, and Divines

Although the names of persons in these noble classes should properly have been recorded immediately after the names of the princes of the blood royal in order to accord them honor and dignity proper to their station, it is undeniable that in the history of great events, it is the names of emirs and men of valor which receive most frequent mention, and for this reason I had the temerity to give them priority.

Eminent Seyyeds

Shah Tahmasp, from the time of his accession, showed great respect and reverence for *seyyeds* because of their descent from the immaculate Imams. Corroboration of this is to be found in his extraordinary veneration of the Oskūya *seyyeds* of Tabriz, about whom I should say a few words. These *seyyeds* are four in number: Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn Moḥammad, Emir Neẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad; Emir Qamar al-Dīn; and Emir Abu'l-Ḥāmed. Their grandfather, Mīr Abu'l-Qāsem, was an eminent *seyyed* and gained an honored position in the service of several princes. But the four mentioned above not only rose high in the service of Shah Tahmasp, but attained a degree of intimacy never before reached by anyone in the service of any prince. Any wish of theirs, whether within the realm of possibility or not, was translated into reality almost before it was uttered—they merely had to give a nod or make a sign. Although they were guilty of unlawful practices in regard to the affairs of state, and although every day of the week they received some kindness, gift, or benefaction, their insolence reached the point that, if anything took their fancy in the way of clothing or other gifts belonging to the departments concerned with the administration of the royal household, they immediately issued an order for the items to be delivered to them as though they were the Shah himself. As a result, they hardly ever needed to ask the Shah for anything. The Shah frequently visited their homes, which were in the Oskūya district of Tabriz, and they provided all kinds of entertainment to divert the Shah.

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[1] On the office of *ṣadr*, see Savory, Offices I and II.

[2] Accountants and finance officials in general.

These *seyyeds,* however, did not appreciate the full value of their rank and station, and were unable to maintain their good fortune. In their stupidity, they began to boast of their own importance. Because they were without experience in administrative matters and ignorant of the ways of the world, they began to have ambitions that were quite impractical and gradually their contradictory desires began to annoy the Shah. For example, they wanted to make changes of the highest importance in matters of state, such as the appointment of the *vakīl, viziers, ṣadrs,* and the like.

The *vizier,* Qāżī Jahān, who had started his career as one of their protégés but had changed his opinion when he realized their worthlessness, gradually undermined the Shah's confidence in them by producing incontrovertible evidence of their misdeeds. Finally, the Shah issued an order that the *seyyeds* should be confined to their homes and should not come to court unless summoned. However, the various tax immunities and other privileges that had been conferred upon them remained in force.

My object in narrating this story is to illustrate the remarkable degree of the Shah's confidence in the *seyyed* class. Under the Safavid dynasty, the office of *ṣadr,* whose function consists in promoting the affairs of *seyyeds* and wearers of the turban[3] generally, taking responsibility for their affairs, administering the *owqāf* (lands and tenements held in mortmain), and paying stipends to persons of standing among the religious classes, was never entrusted to anyone other than a *seyyed* of high repute, learning, and personal integrity.

During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, ten persons held the office of *ṣadr.* At his accession, Emir Qavām al-Dīn Ḥoseyn Eṣfahānī held the office jointly with Mīr Jamāl al-Dīn Astarābādī. After the death of the latter, he held the office jointly with Mīr Ne'matollāh Ḥellī, one of the learned men of Ḥella. After the death of Emir Qavām al-

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[3] The printed text has a rather amusing "Freudian slip," reading *arbāb-e ḡanāyem,* possessors of loot, instead of *arbāb-e 'amāyem,* possessors of turbans!

Dīn Ḥoseyn, that most learned scholar Emir Ḡīās̱ al-Dīn Manṣūr Šīrāzī became joint *ṣadr* with Emir Neʿmatollāh Ḥellī. Eventually Emir Neʿmatollāh was dismissed from office because of the hostility of the Seal of the *mojtaheds*,[4] Shaikh ʿAlī ʿAbd al-ʿĀlī, and because of his friendship with Shaikh Ebrahim Qaṭīfī, who was an enemy of Shaikh ʿAlī, and he retired to Ḥella.

Emir Ḡīās̱ al-Dīn Manṣūr then became sole *ṣadr*, but he too got off on the wrong foot with Shaikh ʿAlī. The *ṣadr* called the *mojtahed* an ignoramus, and the *mojtahed* charged the *ṣadr* with lack of self-control. On one occasion, a learned debate between the two in the presence of the Shah ended in a shouting match, and their mutual antipathy gradually turned into a feud. The Shah sided with the Seal of the *mojtaheds* and dismissed Emir Ḡīās̱ al-Dīn from office. Emir Ḡīās̱ al-Dīn returned to Shiraz without getting permission from the Shah to leave. The office of *ṣadr*, in accordance with the wishes of the Seal of the *mojtaheds*, was then conferred on Mīr Moʿezz al-Dīn Moḥammad Eṣfahānī, who was a paragon of scholarship and a practical man. He held the office alone for eight years, but was then dismissed through the machinations of Ḥakīm Kāzerūnī. He was succeeded by Mīr Asadollāh Marʿašī Šūštarī, who held the office until his death. Shah Taqī al-Dīn Moḥammad Eṣfahānī was appointed next, but the Shah was displeased by certain actions of his and dismissed him, appointing in his place joint *ṣadrs*, Mīr Moḥammad Yūsof Astarābādī and Mīr Seyyed ʿAlī, the son of Mīr Asadollāh.

Mīr Ḡīās̱ al-Dīn Moḥammad, known as Mīr-e Mīrān, the brother of Shah Taqī al-Dīn Moḥammad, who at that time was one of the most distinguished Ḥoseynī *seyyeds* of Isfahan and held the office of *naqīb al-noqabā*,[5] aspired to this hereditary office and eventually succeeded in getting himself appointed to the exalted office of *ṣadr*. By the time of the Shah's death, he had established himself firmly. Completely devoid of avarice, he was a man of great self-discipline; and as he had extensive private property and estates at Isfahan, he was able to live off his own private income. He had two sons: Mīrzā

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[4] A *mojtahed* is a theologian distinguished from his peers by his superior learning and piety, and chosen from among his peers by acclamation. There are never more than four or five Shiʿite *mojtaheds* at any given time; some reside in Iran, others at one of the major Shiʿite places of pilgrimage in Iraq (Karbala, Najaf, Kāẓemeyn). On the increasing political power of the *mojtaheds* during the reign of Tahmasp and the significance of their rivalry with the *ṣadrs*, see Savory, Offices II.

[5] The *naqīb* was the assistant of the *kalāntar;* one of his chief duties was to fix the tax assessment of the guilds (see *TM*, index, *s.v.*).

Moḥammad Maḵdūm, a most learned man, and Mīrzā Moḥammad Amīn, noted for his piety and integrity.

Another distinguished representative of the class of provincial *seyyeds* was Mīr-e Mīrān Yazdī, the son of Shah Ne'matollāh, who was honored by ties of marriage with the Safavid royal house. The disciples of the order founded by the late Shah Ne'matollāh Valī looked to him as their spiritual director. He himself basked in royal favor and was granted many benefices *(soyūrḡālāt)*.[6] The total income of the Ne'matollāhī Order, derived from private estates, assignments, and allowances of various kinds, amounted to nearly five thousand *tomān,* and Mīr-e Mīrān continued to reside at Yazd and to prosper. Two of his sons, Shah Ne'matollāh and Shah Ḵalīlollāh, were also accorded the honor of a marriage alliance with the Safavid royal house. But Mīr-e Mīrān did not pay sufficient attention to what he owed to Safavid patronage; during the period when Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā was the de facto ruler of the state, at the beginning of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I, he committed various acts incompatible with true devotion to his royal master: In particular, he lent support to the rebel Bektāš Khan Afšār, and his fortunes declined and ended in disaster. Consequently, as a loyal servant of the Shah, I am not able to describe the eminence of his position in terms that do justice to the reality.

Shah Qāsem Nūrbaḵš. Shah Qāsem is one of the descendants of Seyyed Moḥammad Nūrbaḵš who have for a considerable time lived in the small town of Ṭerešt in the Rayy district. Shah Qāsem himself was a recipient of royal favor and resided at court, where he was the focal point for all the disciples of the Nūrbaḵšī Order. He maintained his estates and farms in the Rayy and Šahryār districts, and he also received from the Shah assignments that set him above most other *seyyeds* in the Safavid empire.

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[6] *Soyūrḡāl,* plural *soyūrḡālāt:* grant of land or its revenue in lieu of salary or pension. *Soyūrḡāls* awarded to members of the religious classes tended to assume the character of hereditary grants or fiefs, and usually carried with them immunity from various forms of taxation; they were not restricted to *vaqf* lands (lands held in mortmain).

Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn al-Ḥoseynī Mojtahed Jabal ʿĀmelī. The grandson of the Seal of the *mojtaheds,* Shaikh ʿAlī ʿAbd al-ʿĀlī, Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn came from Jabal ʿĀmel[7] during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and for a time held the offices of *modarres* and *šeyḵ al-eslām*[8] at Ardabīl, where he was in charge of the religious institution. After that he went to court and laid claim to be considered a *mojtahed.* He soon attracted the attention of the Shah, since he was a man of noble soul and disposition who possessed an amazingly retentive memory. For a time he was charged with giving judgment in cases which were subject to the jurisdiction of canon law, and every day a throng of people frequented his court. At his orders, the court secretaries and assistants affixed his seal to legal documents with the following inscription: "The leader of the verifiers of the truth, the authority of those versed in the fine points of the law, the inheritor of the worlds of the Prophets and Messengers, the Seal of the *mojtaheds.*" Although the theologians muttered among themselves at this and in his absence disregarded his orders, not one of these noble doctors of religion dared to speak out openly about it. Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn was an eloquent and witty man; while he was in the service of Shah Tahmasp, all the knotty problems which no one could solve, not even the royal princes, were referred to him. The requests he made of the Shah were invariably granted. He rendered great assistance to God's people, particularly those hard hit by some accident of fate. He was the author of many works on jurisprudence and of works justifying the Es̱nā ʿAšarī faith and refuting various innovative creeds.

Mīr Faḵr al-Dīn Sammākī. One of the eminent *seyyeds* of Sammāk, in the Astarābād district, Mīr Faḵr was a pupil of Emir Ḡīās̱ al-Dīn Manṣūr Šīrāzī. He spent his time at court, where he came to the notice of the Shah. Large numbers of students came daily to sit at his feet and benefited from his instruction. He wrote a gloss on the *Elāhīyāt-e Tajrīd,* and thus bequeathed his learning to future generations of students.

Mīr Raḥmatollāh Pīšnamāz. Mīr Raḥmatollāh was a *seyyed* of Najaf. At the royal court, he performed the function of prayer leader

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[7] In Syria. When the Safavids came to power in Iran and made Es̱nā ʿAšarī Shiʿism the religion of the new state, they were faced by the problem of a shortage of Shiʿite divines and were forced to import some. Jabal ʿĀmel in Syria and Baḥreyn in the Persian Gulf were the two principal sources of supply.

[8] A *modarres* was a theologian who lectured and taught in a *madrasa,* or theological seminary. The functions of the *šeyḵ al-eslām* were largely juridical, and overlapped to a considerable extent with those of *qāżī,* or religious judge.

(pīšnamāz), and was much favored by the Shah. An extremely pious and chaste man, he wrote good poetry in Arabic and was an outstanding scholar in the fields of jurisprudence, interpretation of the Koran, and Muslim tradition. He was a pupil of the late *mojtahed,* Shaikh Zeyn al-Dīn, devoted most of his time to teaching and learned debate, and spared no time for anything which was without profit.

Mīr ʿAlā al-Molk. Mīr ʿAlā was a *seyyed* of Marʿaš. For a time he held the post of *qāżī-ye moʿaskar* (military chaplain)[9] at the capital, Qazvin, and at court. After the conquest of Gīlān, he was appointed *ṣadr* of that province. He was an excellent traditionist, as well as a witty conversationalist and congenial companion. In royal assemblies, he was engaged in conversation by the Shah to a greater extent than were other dignitaries. He was a pious, self-controlled man, very handsome in physical appearance. The informality and frankness of his discourse charmed those who shared his company.

Mīr Moḥammad Mo'men Astarābādī. Mīr Moḥammad was an eminent *seyyed* of Astarābād. He was the nephew of Mīr Faḵr al-Dīn Sammākī, and a learned and religious man. He composed poetry—odes, lyrics, and quatrains—of an agreeable kind. At the command of Shah Tahmasp, he acted as tutor to Ḥeydar Mīrzā. After the death of the latter and the accession of Shah Esmaʿil II, he felt it unsafe to remain in Iran and went to the Deccan in India. He entered the service of the Qoṭbšāhī ruler of the Deccan, Moḥammadqolī, choosing to serve this dynasty because of its Shiʿite proclivities. He rose to high office and was appointed *vakīl* and *pīšvā.* At the time of writing these lines, which is the year 1025/1616–17, he is still alive and deserving persons from many regions are able to derive benefit from the Qoṭbšāhī dynasty through his agency.

Mīr Moḥammad Bāqer-e Dāmād. Mīr Moḥammad is the son of the late Seyyed Moḥammad Dāmād Astarābādī and the grandson of the *mojtahed* Shaikh ʿAbd al-ʿĀlī. Because his father had married Shaikh ʿAbd al-ʿĀlī's daughter, he was known as Dāmād (son-in-law). He is distinguished by his intelligence and quickness of mind. During his childhood he lived at Mašhad, where he studied under the professors of theology and other scholars attached to the shrine of the Imam Reżā, and made rapid progress. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah he came to court, where he associated with scholars and divines and engaged in debate with Mīr Faḵr al-Dīn Sammākī

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[9] See also *TM*, p. 112.

Astarābādī and other learned men. He became an outstanding scholar in both the traditional and rational sciences, and is still at the height of his powers. From the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp up to now, which is the year 1025/1616, he has spent every moment in study and debate. He is a first-class scholar in the philosophical sciences, in the various branches of mathematics, in jurisprudence, interpretation of the Koran, and *ḥadīs̱* (the science of Muslim tradition),[10] and has reached the status of *mojtahed.* Contemporary jurists consider *fatvās* (juridical opinions on matters of religious law) to be reliable if they have been verified by Mīr Dāmād.

His published works span the whole range of the sciences. Those of which I have personal knowledge include *Ṣerāt al-Mostaqīm; Ofoq al-Mobīn,* a work packed with profound philosophical and metaphysical insights; *Ravāšeḥ-e Samavīya,* a work on the traditions of the Imams; *Ketāb-e Kāfī; Šarḥ-e Koleynī;* a commentary on the Koran entitled *Sedrat al-Montahā;* the treatise *Ḵalq-e Aʻmāl,* known as *Etteʻāżāt; Ketāb-e Ḥelya-e Malakūtīya; ʻOyūn al-Masā'el; Īmāżāt; Ẓavābeṭ al-Reżāʻ; Sabʻ Šedād;* a gloss on the *Šarḥ-e Moḵtaṣar-e Oṣūl va Qīāsāt; Ḥaqq al-Yaqīn fī Ḥodūs̱ al-ʻĀlam; Ketāb-e Taqdīsāt,* a refutation of the *Šobha* of Ebn Kamūna; a commentary on the *Ṣaḥīfa-e Kāmela;* and several other treatises and books which are in progress and which one hopes will eventually appear. From his early youth, Mīr Dāmād has possessed a phenomenal memory; he never forgets any fact once it has been memorized. He is an extremely devout man who spends most of his time in study, theological argument, and worship. He also writes poetry. Although this sort of occupation was rather beneath the dignity of someone in his high position, he bore in mind a verse of the well-known poet Shaikh Neẓāmī:

God ranked everyone in order of precedence;
First came the prophets, and behind them, the poets.

And so he continues to write poetry under the pen name of Ešrāq. He has achieved some distinction in the composition of lyrics, odes, and *mas̱navīs*—especially *mas̱navīs,*[11] a verse form used by Shaikh

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[10] *Ḥadīs̱,* or traditions about the Prophet Moḥammad, consist of actual sayings of the Prophet or of the acts of the Prophet as reported by his companions and others. A tradition, to be "sound," must be attested to and transmitted by a chain of reliable authorities. The collections of *ḥadīs̱* formed the raw material of much Islamic law. To this vast corpus of material, Shi'ites added traditions relating to the Shi'ite Imams. The study of *ḥadīs̱* constituted an important Muslim science.

[11] Rhymed couplets. This poetic form was used for heroic epics, romantic epics, and long didactic and mystical poems. The rhyme form, since it imposed no artificial restriction on the length of the poem, made the *mas̱navī* an ideal vehicle for these purposes.

Neẓāmī in his *Makzan al-Asrār* to express the most profound mystical truths.[12] The following quatrain in praise of the Prophet is an example of Mīr Dāmād's verse:

> O Seal of the prophets! The two worlds are your ornament!
> The heavens are your pulpit, not the first step on the ladder.
> If no one casts a shadow on you, it is no wonder,
> For you are Light, and the sun itself is but a shadow of you!

Mīr Dāmād is presently living in Isfahan where, it is to be hoped, he will be spared to bring illumination to future generations of students.

Mīr Maḥmūd Eṣfahānī. The son of Mīr Seyyed 'Alī, known as Kalīfa Sultan, Mīr Maḥmūd is one of the leading *seyyeds* of Isfahan, where the members of his family are known as the Kalīfa *seyyeds.* Their ancestors came from Māzandarān and go back to Mīr Bozorg, the Māzandarān ruler who, buffeted by fate, came to Isfahan. Kalīfa Sultan is an outgoing, witty man who attracted the attention of Shah Tahmasp. His son, the above-mentioned Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd, is an extremely learned and shrewd man, well versed in the customary sciences, especially the rational and philosophical sciences. He has never lacked for students, and the poor and needy, students and indigent relatives, have always been provided for out of his own income.

Shah Taqī al-Dīn Moḥammad. A Nassāba *seyyed* of Shiraz, Shah Taqī was a pupil of 'Allāmī Shah Faṭhollāh Šīrāzī and used to debate with Mowlānā Mīrzā Khan Šīrāzī. Making astonishing progress in the rational and philosophical sciences, he was given a teaching post at the Shiraz academy, where his lectures were attended by large numbers of scholars and students. He is one of the leading scholars of the age.

Mīr Maḥmūd Šūlestānī. Mīr Maḥmūd, a notable *seyyed* from Šūlestān,[13] was a pupil of Shaikh Zeyn al-Dīn. He studied the rational sciences under Sultan al-'Olamā Emir Ġīāṣ al-Dīn Manṣūr Daštakī Šīrāzī.

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[12] Neẓāmī of Ganja, the famous twelfth-century Persian poet, wrote the *Makzan al-Asrār* about 561/1165-66. It is the first of a series of five great *maṣnavī* poems known collectively as the *kamsa.*

[13] A district in northwestern Fārs.

Emir Abu'l-Valī and Mīr Abu'l-Moḥammad. Both these *seyyeds* were sons of Mīr Shah Maḥmūd Enjū-ye Šīrāzī. Mīr Abu'l-Valī was a fanatical Shi'ite who was superior to his brother in learning, and more frequently consulted on knotty points of jurisprudence than his fellow jurists. Initially, he was appointed warden of the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad, but was dismissed from this post as the result of a quarrel between him and Shah Valī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Mašhad. Mīr Abu'l-Valī came to court, and he and his brother were jointly placed in charge of the Ḡāzānī endowments. Toward the end of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, Mīr Abu'l-Valī was entrusted with the administration of the Safavid shrine at Ardabīl, and his brother was left in sole charge of the Ḡāzānī endowments. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, Mīr Abu'l-Valī was appointed military chaplain *(qāżi-ye mo'askar).* Finally on the accession of Shah 'Abbas I, he was appointed *ṣadr.* The rest of his career will be given at the appropriate point.

Shah Moẓaffar al-Dīn 'Alī, another brother of these two men, held the office of *šeyḵ al-eslām* at Shiraz, and was honored by being appointed to the stewardship of the funds belonging to the royal household administration (*vekālat-e ḥalālīyāt-e sarkār-e ḵāṣṣa-ye šarīfa).* During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he left Shiraz and went to the capital, where he was appointed military chaplain and became the object of the Shah's special favor.

Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī. Mīrzā Maḵdūm was the son of Mīr Šarīf Šīrāzī, the grandson of Qāżī Jahān Seyfī Ḥoseynī Qazvīnī, the well-known vizier of Tahmasp. He spent his time at court. He was an excellent traditionalist and commentator on the Koran; he was also a good conversationalist and preacher. For most of his life he preached in the Ḥeydarīya Mosque at Qazvin, near where he lived, and drew large crowds to listen to his sermons. Since he was accused of being a Sunni at heart, he was not regarded with much favor by Shah Tahmasp; but the princess Parī Khan Ḵānom thought well of him, and when Shah Esma'il II came to the throne, the office of *ṣadr* was divided and he received one half of it. However, since he exceeded reasonable bounds in regard to his Sunni beliefs and made no effort to conceal them, he was eventually unmasked as a Sunni and dismissed from office.

Shah 'Enāyatollāh Eṣfahānī. Shah 'Enāyatollāh came from a family of *seyyeds* and *naqībs* at Isfahan. He held the position of military chaplain at court, and discharged his duties in a fitting manner. He was also a man of great piety and orthodoxy; during the reign of Shah Esma'il II, he was appointed to half the divided office of *ṣadr*. He was dismissed during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and returned to his native land.

Mīr Seyyed 'Alī Šūštarī. Mīr Seyyed 'Alī was the distinguished son of the *ṣadr* Mīr Asadollāh. Under Shah Tahmasp, Mīr Asadollāh held the office of *ṣadr* with sole and independent authority for some years. Toward the end of his life, he resigned because of his great age and declining powers and entrusted the office to his son Mīr Seyyed 'Alī, who filled it for a time as his father's deputy, and later jointly with Mīr Moḥammad Yūsof Astarābādī. For a time too, he performed the duties of warden of the shrine of Imam Reżā at Mašhad. Seyyed 'Alī was a man of great integrity, and throughout his period of office was never guilty of greed. His ancestors in the Šūštar region were highly respected men to whom the people went in time of need. His brother, Mīr 'Abd al-Vahhāb, was rewarded for his loyal service by being raised to the rank of emir at Dezfūl, where he was charged with giving judgment in cases involving both canon and customary law.

Mīr Kamāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Astarābādī and Mīr Abu'l-Qāsem Eṣfahānī. Both these men were wardens of the shrine of Imam Reżā at Mašhad. Until the death of Shah Tahmasp, they performed the functions of *towlīyat-e sonnatī* and *towlīyat-e vājebī* as members of the staff of the shrine administration. Mīr Kamāl al-Dīn was a *seyyed* from Astarābād; Mīr Abu'l-Qāsem was one of the Ḵalīfa *seyyeds* of Isfahan, who are known as the Māzandarānī *seyyeds*. Both men were appointed to the administrative staff of the Mašhad shrine toward the end of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, Mīr Kamāl al-Dīn to the post of *towlīyat-e sonnatī* and Mīr Abu'l-Qāsem to the post of *towlīyat-e vājebī*. The term *sonnatī* is used to refer to benefices and all sums paid from the royal treasury for the administrative expenses of the shrine—for example, public banquets; the salaries of shrine attendants, professors, and officials of all kinds; stipends of the *seyyeds*, doctors of religion, scholars, and other meritorious persons. Since the funds for all these purposes are under the control of the Shah, they are called *sonnatī* (customary). The income from charitable endowments and votive offerings, which are allotted for a specific purpose and must be administered in accordance with the conditions laid down by the benefactor, is termed *vājebī* (mandatory).

Mīrzā Ebrahim Hamadānī. Mīrzā Ebrahim was a Ṭabāṭabā'ī Ḥoseynī *seyyed* whose father held the post of *qāżī* in Hamadan and administered canon law there. Mīrzā Ebrahim was a pupil of Mīrzā Maḵdūm Eṣfahānī; at Qazvin he studied the rational sciences with Mīr Faḵr al-Dīn Sammākī and made great progress in the philosophical sciences. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, he held the hereditary position of *qāżī* at Hamadan, but his deputies took care of most of the work in the law courts. Mīrzā Ebrahim was thus able to devote most of his time to study and research. Many students attended his lectures, and he produced a number of books and detailed glosses in the rational and philosophical sciences. For example, he wrote a treatise entitled *Eṣbāt-e vājeb-e qadīm va jadīd,* a commentary on the *Šafā* of Avicenna, a gloss on *Šarḥ-e Ešārāt,* and other works. During the reign of Shah 'Abbas I he repeatedly came to court, where he was received with favor and allotted benefices and excellent stipends, as well as generous grants. On one occasion, he was given an outright grant from the royal treasury of seven hundred Iraq *tomān* in place of a loan, and this grant paid off his outstanding debts. His discourses on the rational sciences have been praised by theologians and other scholars of the time. He died in the Year of the Serpent (1026/1617). He had obtained permission to go on leave on his return from Georgia and had set off for Hamadan, but died en route.

Mīr Ja'far Moḥtaseb al-Mamālek. Mīr Ja'far was the son of Mīr Rāstī and was a Ṭabāṭabā'ī Ḥoseynī *seyyed,* closely related to the 'Abd al-Vahhābī *seyyeds.* In the service of Shah Tahmasp he rose to the position of *moḥtaseb al-mamālek;*[14] he held this office with distinction until his death, which occurred early in the reign of Shah 'Abbas I. He was a good-natured *seyyed,* austere in his habits, but outgoing.

Mīrzā 'Abd al-Ḥoseyn Jahānšāhī. Mīrzā 'Abd al-Ḥoseyn was the son of Mīr Faṣīḥ and was also a Ḥoseynī *seyyed* and a cousin of Mīr Ja'far. Because his mother was related to the Jahānšāhī dynasty, he was known as 'Abd al-Ḥoseyn Jahānšāhī. He lived in Tabriz, near the Jahānšāhīya mausoleum. The post of warden of this mausoleum, which was generally known as the Moẓaffarīya, devolved upon him by virtue of his mother's connections. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and the governorship of Emir Khan Torkmān, he was appointed to the position of *kalāntar*[15] of Tabriz. He came to Iraq during the Ottoman troubles, and after the death of Mīr Ja'far was appointed *moḥtaseb al-mamālek,* but died shortly thereafter.

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[14] An official subordinate to the *nāẓer-e boyūtāt,* the superintendent of the royal workshops. One of the main duties of the *moḥtaseb al-mamālek* in Safavid times was to keep the *nāẓer au fait* with market prices of goods in the bazaar (see *TM,* p. 83 and index).

Shah 'Abd al-'Alī Yazdī. An eminent *seyyed* of Yazd, Shah 'Abd al-'Alī's forefathers came from Bam in the province of Kerman and later migrated to Yazd. There, Shah 'Abd al-'Alī gave judgments in lawsuits involving questions of canon law. He was an upright man, and ambitious; his sign and seal on legal documents were trusted by the people of that region. He was related to the shaikhs of the Nūrbaḵšī Order.

Mīr Kalān Astarābādī. A *seyyed* of Astarābād, Mīr Kalān was a relative of Mīr Faḵr al-Dīn Sammākī and was extremely proficient in jurisprudence. He was a jocular, jovial man, but orthodox and strict in his regimen. On behalf of Shah Tahmasp, he managed the property bequeathed in mortmain to the Fourteen Immaculate Ones by Tahmasp's sister Solṭānom:[16] The management of this property had been vested in Shah Tahmasp and those of his descendants who came to the throne.

Mīr Seyyed 'Alī Ḵaṭīb. Also a *seyyed* of Astarābād, Mīr Seyyed 'Alī held the office of *ḵaṭīb,*[17] and also for a while the office of *moḥtaseb al-mamālek.* But he went too far in enjoining believers to do what is right and forbidding them to do what is evil. The result was that he appeared to be either a hypocrite or to have some worldly motive for behaving in this way. Because of his fiery temper and imperious manner, divines and scholars were always on their guard when dealing with him; they failed to escape his heavy hand and sharp tongue.

Mīr Ṭāher Kāšī. A *seyyed* of Kashan, Mīr Ṭāher was the tool of Mīr Seyyed 'Alī *Ḵaṭīb* at court.

Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn Moḥtaseb Kāšī. Another *seyyed* of Kashan, Mīr Zeyn was known as Mīr Daḵla[18] and was the son-in-law of Mīr Yahya 'Alavī Qazvīnī. For a time he held the office of *qāżī-ye ahdāṣ*[19] at Tabriz, and toward the end of the reign of Shah Tahmasp was appointed *moḥtaseb* at Qazvin. He was number three in the Mīr Seyyed ʿAlī–Mīr Ṭāher group and always followed their lead. After the accession of Shah Esmaʿil II, the other two fell from favor, but Mīr Zeyn al-ʿĀbedīn was confirmed in his office of *moḥtaseb*.

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[15] See *TM*, p. 148. The *kalāntar* was the mayor, so to speak, of a city.

[16] Died 969/1562.

[17] The official charged with giving the *ḵoṭba,* or formal address on Fridays in the mosque.

[18] MS.: printed text has Mīra Kalla.

[19] The *aḥdāṣ* were police officers under the command of the *dārūğa* (see *TM*, 149). The *qażī-ye aḥdāṣ* (not listed in *TM*) must have been the magistrate who adjudicated in litigation arising from the activities of the *aḥdāṣ*.

Mīr Abū Ṭāleb. Mīr Abū Ṭāleb was one of the Imami group of *seyyeds* of Isfahan. The warden of the mausoleum of the Imam Zeyn al-ʿĀbedīn[20] there, he was, in his own opinion, a cut above his peers in knowledge of the rational and philosophical sciences.

Mīr Moḥammad Ašraf. Mīr Moḥammad was one of the "long-haired" *seyyeds* of Astarābād. By virtue of his great piety and integrity, he gained the confidence of the Shah. He always acted as legal deputy for the Shah on official visits to the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad and in all ceremonies connected therewith.

During Shah Tahmasp's lifetime, a number of the leading *seyyeds* of the Safavid empire died. Among them were Mīr Ḡīās̱ al-Dīn Daštakī Šīrāzī and his son Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn Moḥammad, who was also one of the leading scholars of the time; Mīr Ḥojjatollāh Dast-e Ḡeyb Šīrāzī, who attended court assemblies regularly; Mīr Seyyed Šarīf Šarīfī Šīrāzī, who reckoned himself to be a grandson of Mīr Šarīf ʿAllāma-ye Jorjānī; Shah Abū Torāb Enjū, the *vakīl-e ḥalālīyāt* of the *šeyḵ al-eslām* of Fārs. From among the *seyyeds* of Khorasan, such as Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī; his son, Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāsem; Mīr ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḵādem; Mīr Šams al-Dīn ʿAlī Sultan, of the Banī Moḵtār of Sabzavār, also died. From the other categories of *seyyeds*—the *seyyeds* of Nishapur; the *seyyeds* of Bam near Kerman, the ʿAbd al-Vahhābīya *seyyeds* of Tabriz, who trace their lineage through a daughter of Yūsof Mīrzā to Ḥasan Padešāh Torkmān himself; the Golestāna *seyyeds* and the Maʿmūrīya *seyyeds* of Isfahan, and so on—I will mention one or two who were still alive at the death of Shah Tahmasp.

Seyyeds of Mašhad. A considerable number of Reżavī and Mūsavī *seyyeds* were employed in the service of the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad. They included Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī and his son Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāsem, who were generally acknowledged to be among the leading *seyyeds* of Khorasan by virtue of their exalted rank and station, and on account of the amount of their property, private estates, and workshops. The other Reżavī *seyyeds* and their relations and

[20] The Fourth Imam of the Es̱nā ʿAšarī Shiʿites.

kinfolk lived apart from them, and were honored by their presence only on formal occasions. Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb had contracted a marriage alliance with Mīr Šams al-Dīn ʿAlī Sultan and had married his son, Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāsem, to the daughter of Mīr Šams al-Dīn. As fate would have it, nothing but trouble and loss flowed from that marriage. After the death of both father and son, two offspring of the marriage remained. Both were in their infancy at the accession of Shah ʿAbbas I, and today, in the year 1025/1616–17, they are so honored by Shah ʿAbbas that they are the envy of their contemporaries. They live like lords on the income from their benefices, private estates, and inherited lands.

Other Reżavī *seyyeds* of note are Mīr Mosīb the *naqīb,* Mīr Moḥammad Jaʿfar b. Mīr Moḥammad Saʿīd, and Mīrzā Oloḡ. Mīr Mosīb was promoted to the office of *naqīb;* Mīr Moḥammad Jaʿfar contented himself with his academic research and eventually became so well versed in jurisprudence and the rational sciences that he reached the status of *mojtahed.* But because of his excessive caution and natural modesty, he did not lay claim to this distinction. He was an excessively pious, venerable, and austere man, and he avoided like the plague any item of food or drink which carried the slightest suspicion of unlawfulness. Mīrzā Oloḡ was the cousin of Emir Abū Ṭāleb, and a man of simple habits and pure heart. He was the recipient of royal favor after the accession of Shah ʿAbbas I. Since it would take too long to mention all the notable *seyyeds* of Mašhad and the class of Mūsavī *seyyeds,* I will make do with this brief summary.

Seyyeds of Sabzavār. Mīrzā Maḥmūd, the son of Mīr Šams al-Dīn ʿAlī Sultan, is one of the eminent *seyyeds* of the Banū Moḵtār. His exalted grandfather, the late Mīr Šams al-Dīn ʿAlī, came to Persia from the Arab lands in the time of the Tīmūrīd sultans. With his retainers, his servants, and his horses, he settled in the Sabzavār region of Khorasan. There he amassed large private estates and properties, encouraged his bailiffs and dependents in agricultural development, and became very wealthy. According to the *Ḥabīb al-Sīar,* at no period of history has a *seyyed* come to Iran from the Ḥejāz or from Arabian Iraq who was the equal of Mīr Šams al-Dīn ʿAlī either in status or in wealth and number of servants. He won the favor of princes and was appointed to the office of *naqīb al-noqabā* of the whole of Iran in general and of Khorasan in particular.

When the Safavids came to power,[21] his family became the object of an even greater degree of royal favor. Mīr Šams al-Dīn, the son of Mīrzā Moḥammad, served the Safavids loyally during the period of Uzbeg supremacy in Khorasan, and during the period of the invasions by 'Obeyd Khan Uzbeg. As a reward for these services, Shah Tahmasp raised him to the status of emir, with the style of khan. In addition to his existing offices, he was designated the Shah's deputy, given precedence over all other *seyyeds* in Khorasan, and made senior in rank to all other officials in the province. Moreover, all the revenues accruing to that family from its estates, amounting to more than fifty royal Iraqi *tomān*, were granted as an assignment, free of tax, to the Mīr and his sons. Mīr Šams al-Dīn thus acquired great prestige in the eyes of Mīrzā Maḥmūd and the other members of the family. Upon the death of Mīrzā Maḥmūd, Mīr Šams al-Dīn was firmly established in a position of power and influence in that province. Mīr Moḥammad Gaskanī, the son of Mīr Seyyed 'Alī, was a *seyyed* from Gaskan, a district of Sabzavār, and owned extensive lands and estates in that region. He used to mix informally with poets, people in society, and intellectuals, and was himself no mean poet.

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[21] The Safavids conquered Khorasan, then ruled by the Šeybānī Uzbegs, in 1510.

Seyyeds of Astarābād. A number of eminent *seyyeds* from Astarābād were at court, and their names have already been given. In addition to them, a number of others, such as Mīr Ḥabībollāh Barmakī, Mīr Ġīāṣ al-Dīn Šamsakī, and Mīr Ḥoseyn (known as Pādešāh[22] Mīr Ḥoseyn), entered Safavid service and were enrolled among the members of the royal bodyguard and other retainers at court. Others were appointed to the staff of the shrine administration at Mašhad. Still others remained in their native district. Among the latter were Mīr Taqī al-Dīn Moḥammad b. Emir al-Dīn Ḥoseyn, the son of the late *ṣadr* Mīr Jamāl al-Dīn, who resided at Astarābād, where he lived like a lord. Because of the services rendered by his father, he came to the notice of Shah Tahmasp and was granted the sum of about forty *tomān* as a tax-free assignment from the revenues of his family's estates. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, when the province of Astarābād was left for a while without a strong, independent governor, Mīr Taqī al-Dīn's power and influence increased. His descendants, however, during the incidents connected with the "black-robed ones" and the *qezelbāš* disorders, did not render the Safavid family the loyal service which, in view of the favors and benefits they had received, was their duty.

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[22] *Pādešāh*, king, more usually in its abbreviated form Shah, was a common title of religious *shaikhs* and *seyyeds* during the Safavid period. In this context, the title denoted spiritual preeminence, and did not imply any temporal authority.

Another high-ranking *seyyed* of Astarābād was Mīr Żīā al-Dīn Fendereskī, a man of great influence in Fenderesk who owned lucrative estates in the area. At the time of the troubles in Gorgān he remained steadfast in his allegiance to the crown and did not join the leaders of the black-robed rebels: He remained quietly at Fenderesk and went to Astarābād, the center of the revolt, as little as possible. When Shah 'Abbas I led his expedition to Khorasan, Mīr Żīā al-Dīn presented himself at court. After his death his son, Mīrzā Beg, continued to serve the Shah loyally, and much of the time was in attendance on the Shah. He was honored by a place at royal assemblies, and was distinguished above his peers by the Shah's benefices and grants.

'Abd al-Vahhābīya Seyyeds of Tabriz. Most of the 'Abd al-Vahhābī *seyyeds* reside at Tabriz, but there are pockets of them at Yazd, Kashan, and Isfahan. Mīr 'Abd al-Vahhāb, the ancestor of these *seyyeds* from whom they all derive their descent, was highly regarded by the Aq Qoyūnlū sultans and was connected by marriage with Yūsof Mīrzā b. Ḥasan Pādešāh. Of his sons, Seyyed Ḥasan Beg is the offspring of the daughter of Yūsof Mīrzā. Under Shah Tahmasp, he for a long time held the office of warden of the mausoleum of Ḥasan Pādešāh, situated in the Ṣāḥebābād district of Tabriz and usually known as the Naṣrīya, and today this office has devolved upon his sons.

Another notable member of this branch of *seyyeds* is Mīr Ne'matollāh, who was connected with the Qara Qoyūnlū dynasty. At the time of the Ottoman troubles he came to Iraq and for a while was in charge of matters pertaining to canon law in Kashan. Ultimately, he was appointed *qāżī* of Isfahan, in which office his reputation was not sullied by any taint of dishonesty. He lived to be more than ninety. His brother, Mīr Abu'l-Qāsem, held the office of *qāżī* of Tabriz.

This completes my remarks on distinguished *seyyeds* and *naqībs*. I pass now to a consideration of notable shaikhs, theologians, and other scholars of the reign of Shah Tahmasp who were still alive at the time of the latter's death. I crave the indulgence of those who peruse these random remarks, and ask their forgiveness for their prolixity.

Shaikhs, Theologians, and Other Distinguished Scholars

The most learned man in this category is the *Mojtahed al-Ṣānī* Shaikh 'Abd al-'Āl, the son of the *mojtahed* of the Age, Shaikh 'Abd al-'Āl. He was the outstanding scholar of the age in the rational and philosophical sciences, a good conversationalist, and a man of presence. He was also the sole and undisputed *mojtahed* of his time, and most contemporary theologians deferred to him and acknowledged his supremacy. Shaikh 'Abd al-'Āl resided at Kashan, where he gave regular lectures and instruction. He deputized a number of his students to give judgments in cases of religious law and to settle people's problems. Sometimes he himself attended the court and gave judgment in person. Whenever he came to court, he was received by the Shah with great honor and respect. Whether he was at court or at Kashan, he was frequented by the leading theologians and scholars of the age, and most doctors of theology followed his precepts in the fundamentals and derivatives of Islamic law; his legal decisions were also accepted by most people.

Shaikh 'Alī Menšār. Shaikh 'Alī Menšār was a learned Arab, a jurist, and the pupil of the late *mojtahed* Shaikh 'Abd al-'Āl. In problems of law, his legal opinions and dicta were considered reliable and trustworthy, and he stood head and shoulders above his peers in matters pertaining to both canon and customary law. Highly favored by Shah Tahmasp, he eventually rose to the position of *šeyḵ al-eslām* and *vakīl-e ḥalālīyāt* at Isfahan.

Mowlānā 'Abdollāh Šūštarī. Born at Šūštar, Mowlānā 'Abdollāh went to Shiraz to study the rational sciences. Since these were his principal interest, he visited the Arab lands and studied under scholars there, particularly the jurists of Jabal 'Āmel. He achieved the highest grades in the fundamentals of religious law and spiritual guidance. When he returned to Iran he was received by Shah Tahmasp and granted permission to live at Mašhad in the vicinity of the shrine of the Imam Reżā. There he devoted his time to lecturing, giving spiritual guidance to God's servants, administering the canon law, and enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil. Sometimes he would preach a sermon, to the benefit of all who heard it. Through the blessed influence of his holy nature, he saved God's people from sin and error and guided them on the path of salvation and knowledge of God.

After the accession of Shah 'Abbas I, he was constantly advising the king, who regarded him with increasing favor. In 997/1588–89, when the Uzbegs occupied Mašhad, the Mowlānā was carried off by them to Transoxania, where he engaged in argument and debate with the theologians of that province, as will be related in its proper place in Book II of this history. Although he pretended to be descended from the family of the Prophet and declared himself to be a Šāfe'ī, the fact that he was a stranger in Transoxania, and the bigotry of the Ḥanafī school, caused him to be put to death: Not satisfied with this, his enemies had his corpse burned in the public square in Bokhara. May God have mercy on his soul!

Mowlānā Mīrzā Jān Šīrāzī. Mowlānā Mīrzā had a great reputation at Shiraz, where he studied under Ḵāja Kamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd Šīrāzī, who was the pupil of Mowlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Davānī.[23] In the rational and philosophical sciences he became the leading scholar of his age, but he paid less attention to the traditional sciences. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, he established himself firmly in a teaching position at Shiraz. Large numbers of students from all parts of the country who had come to Shiraz to study flocked to his lecture rooms; most of his pupils obtained the status of *modarres.*

The Mowlānā was the author of some excellent works in the field of the philosophical sciences, and he wrote meticulous glosses on the works of the ancients. During the reign of Shah Esma'il II he came to court, where he was accused by the theologians of having Sunni tendencies. The Mowlānā, relying on the support of Shah Esma'il, did not bother to deny these accusations, but admitted the truth of them. The result was that, after the death of the Shah, he was forced to leave Iran; he went to Transoxania and then to India, where he died.

Ḵāja Afżal al-Dīn Moḥammad Tarka. Ḵāja Afżal was one of the Tarka *qāżīs* of Isfahan. After pursuing the usual courses of study in the rational and philosophical studies and making remarkable progress in them, he went to the royal court at Isfahan, where he attracted the attention of Shah Tahmasp. For a time he held the office of military chaplain jointly with Mīr 'Alā al-Molk Mar'ašī; he was also appointed *modarres* at court, where his lectures were well attended. During the reign of Shah Esma'il II, unlike the majority of theologians, he succeeded in retaining the Shah's favor, and for most of his reign he was in regular attendance at royal assemblies. After the death of Shah Esma'il II he went to Isfahan and performed the functions of a *qāżī*—functions that had traditionally been vested in the Tarka family. Because of the rude and uncivil behavior of the governors and the Turkmans, however, he gave up this office and reverted to teaching and duties as an attendant at the shrine of the Imam Režā at Mašhad. In the Year of the Sheep (991/1583-84), when Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā were on their way back from a campaign in Khorasan, the Mowlānā accompanied the royal cavalcade from Mašhad to Iraq, but died in the neighborhood of Rayy.

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[23] The famous philosopher and political theorist (d. 908/1502-03); author of the *Aḵlāq-e Jalālī.*

'Emād al-Dīn 'Alī Qāderī. 'Emād al-Dīn, born at Astarābād, was an expert in the arts of Koran reading and chanting, and had written both detailed works and brief manuals on the subject. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, he was one of the theologians regarded with favor by the Shah. He was always ready to press the claims of academics, the poor, and the deserving, and he was respected by high and low alike. The class of Koran readers benefited particularly by his efforts.

Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn Moḥammad. The son of 'Abd al-Ṣamad, Shaikh Bahā was one of the shaikhs from Jabal 'Āmel, and profoundly learned in all branches of knowledge, particularly jurisprudence, Koran commentary, *ḥadīṣ*, and the Arabic language. In his youth his father, 'Abd al-Ṣamad, had studied under Shaikh Zeyn al-Dīn, with whom he worked in such areas as the verification of traditions, the authenticity of the transmitters of traditions, and the study of the fundamentals of the science of reaching legal decisions on the basis of precedents. After Shaikh Zeyn al-Dīn was put to death by the Ottomans because of his Shi'ite beliefs, 'Abd al-Ṣamad left his native land and emigrated to Iran, where he was welcomed by the Shah and received many royal favors. His outstanding qualifications in jurisprudence and the formulation of legal opinions were acknowledged by his fellow theologians. One of his achievements was the revival of the Friday prayer, which had been in abeyance for a considerable time because of differences of opinion among theologians regarding the conditions pertaining to it. Ultimately, he was promoted to the office of *šeyḵ al-eslām,* in full charge of all matters concerning the religious law and empowered to act as the governor's deputy, with authority in Khorasan in general and in the provincial capital, Herat, in particular.

He held these offices for a long period, during which he devoted himself to giving currency to the religious law and the proper management of pious foundations and to research into profound theological problems. Later, he conceived the desire to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and to the shrines of the Imams, and successfully fulfilled this wish. On the return journey he stopped for a few days at al-Ḥasā and Baḥreyn to meet the local theologians; and while he was at Baḥreyn, he died. His son, Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn Moḥammad, then still an infant, returned to Iran with his mother. Following his father's example, when he reached the appropriate age he devoted himself to study, achieving distinction in Koran commentary, *ḥadīṣ*, the Arabic language, jurisprudence, and the like. He studied scholastic philosophy and some of the rational sciences under Mowlānā 'Abdollāh Modarres Yazdī, and mathematics under Mowlānā 'Alī-maẕhab and Mowlānā Afżal Qā'enī, the *modarres* of the shrine at Mašhad, among others. He studied medicine and law under Ḥakīm 'Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd, whose career will be narrated in the section on physicians.

In a short time he made great progress in both the rational and the philosophical sciences, and excelled in every branch of science. His published works include: *'Orvat al-Voṣqā*, a work on Koran commentary; *Ḥabl al-Matīn*, on the criteria for establishing whether traditions *(ḥadīṣ)* are sound, approved, or reliable, and containing an explanation of each *ḥadīṣ*; *Mašraq al-Šamseyn; Tafsīr-e Āyāt-e Aḥkām va Aḥādīṣ-e Ṣaḥīḥa;* a gloss on the commentary of Qāżī; a gloss on the *Qavā'ed-e Šahīdī; Ḥadā'eq al-Ṣāleḥīn*, a commentary on the *Ṣaḥīfa-ye Kāmele; 'Eyn al-Ḥayāt fī Tafsīr al-Āyāt; Ketāb-e Čehel Ḥadīṣ;* a commentary on the *Šarḥ-e Čaḡmīnī*, a work on astronomy; a gloss on the *Šarḥ-e Moḵtaṣar-e Oṣūl;* a gloss on the *Motavval; Resāla-ye Tašrīḥ al-Aflāk*, also a work on astronomy; *Resāla-ye Ḵolāṣat al-Ḥesāb; Resāla-ye Ṣaḥīfa*, on the astrolabe; *Eṣnā 'Ašarīyāt Arba'*, on ritual purification, fasting, prayer, and the pilgrimage; *Zobdat al-Oṣūl; Meftāḥ al-Felāḥ dar Tavāfoq-e Marāyeż va Sonan;* and a number of other pamphlets and books, some of which, at the time of writing, 1025/1616–17, have been completed. Others, like the *Jāme'-e 'Abbāsī*, which Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn is writing at royal command on the subject of the religious sciences, so that the whole population of Iran may benefit from it, if God wills he will bring to completion.

After the death of Shaikh 'Alī Menšār, Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn was appointed to the offices of *šeykh al-eslām, vakīl-e ḥalālīyāt*, and supervisor of affairs pertaining to the religious law at Isfahan, and he discharged these functions with independent authority for a considerable time. Then he relinquished these offices in order to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca and on his return adopted an austere, ascetic way of life. He took to traveling on his own, dressed as a dervish, in Arabian Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and the Ḥejāz. He also visited Jerusalem. Wherever he went, he conversed with theologians, scholars, Sufi leaders, and hermits. As a result, he became the foremost scholar of his age. The Shah kept him constantly at his side; both when he was in the capital and when he was making a journey somewhere, the Shah would visit his dwelling to enjoy his company.

Although poetry and the poetic art were beneath the dignity of this great shaikh, he excelled his peers in the art of poetry; the verses he composed, in both Arabic and Persian, were at once elegant and profound. Shaikh Bahā specialized in *maṣnavīs* in the style of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī. He also compiled a seven-volume anthology of the choicest examples of poetry, both ancient and modern, and the most elegant specimens of prose on every branch of science (called *Kaškūl* (The Beggar's Bowl). He is frequented by both students and men of learning; may he be permitted to live out his natural span, so that all mankind may benefit from his learning and wisdom!

Shaikh Loṭfollāh Meysī. The grandson of Shaikh Ebrāhīm Meysī, a noted scholar and jurist of his time, Shaikh Loṭfollāh was born at a place called Meys in Jabal 'Āmel. At an early age he visited the shrine of the Eighth Shi'ite Imam at Mašhad and studied there under Mowlānā 'Abdollāh Šūštarī and other theologians. He became proficient in jurisprudence and was appointed a lecturer in theology on the staff of the shrine administration. Under Shah 'Abbas I, he also took on the office of *ḵādem* (attendant) and received a stipend from the shrine revenues.

During the Uzbeg troubles, he sought refuge at court and lectured for a while at Qazvin. From there, at royal command, he went to Isfahan and took up residence in the neighborhood of the mosque in Naqš-e Jahān Square, opposite the royal palace, one of the great architectural monuments of Shah 'Abbas I.[24] There he discharged the duties of an imam (prayer leader), gave lectures on jurisprudence and *ḥadīṣ*, and occupied himself with worship and obedience to God. His expenses were paid by a stipend from the revenues of the royal household. Many people took him as their exemplar in the performance of the obligatory prayers.

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[24] From its description, the mosque in question would appear to be the Masjed-e Šeyḵ Loṭfollāh, begun in 1603 and completed in 1618, erected by Shah 'Abbas I in honor of his father-in-law.

Shaikh Ḥasan Da’ūd Ḵādem Astarābādī. Shaikh Ḥasan is enrolled among the attendants on the staff of the Mašhad shrine. His father had held a distinguished position during the reign of Shah Tahmasp: At royal assemblies he gave advice more honestly and candidly than did the other theologians, and was never remiss in exhorting the Shah not to commit acts disapproved by God. Indeed, he was rather too zealous in this respect, but since he was entirely devoid of worldly ambition, Shah Tahmasp listened to his admonitions. During the Uzbeg troubles, his son succeeded in escaping to Iraq. He then spent several years at the Shah's side and accompanied him on most of his journeys.

After the repulse of the Uzbegs and the pacification of Khorasan, he was appointed officer of the watch (*sar-kešīk*) of the attendants at the Mašhad shrine; as the deputy of the Shah, he also held the office of head attendant and keeper of the keys of the tomb of the Imam. Night and day, as the Shah's deputy, he kept watch over the other officers (*kešīk-bāšīān*). At the time of writing, he is still leading an untroubled existence at that shrine.

Shaikh Fażlollāh ‘Arab. Shaikh Fażlollāh was an expert in jurisprudence from Mašhad, and drew a salary from the revenue of the shrine administration. By virtue of his extreme piety and asceticism, he considered himself to be a person of impeccable character.[25] He used to lead the people in prayer in the Masjed-e Jāme‘ at Mašhad, and many people followed his leadership. During the Uzbeg troubles he was martyred, along with many other pious men and scholars. At the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp, he held the office of prayer leader.

To list more names than this would be to weary the reader; therefore I have restricted myself to these few.

Mowlānā Moḥammad ‘Alī Tabrīzī. Mowlānā Moḥammad was the son of Mowlānā ‘Enayatollāh, and a man of great integrity. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, his father held the offices of *šeyḵ al-eslām* and *vakīl-e ḥalālīyāt* of the royal household administration. After his father's death, he himself inherited all this and more. During the troubles at Tabriz, he came to Iraq and settled in the province of Rayy, where he died. May God have mercy upon him!

[25] *‘Adl* (plural *‘odūl)* is a technical term in Islamic law and denotes a person of good morals and irreproachable character, whose evidence is accepted in the *šarī‘a* courts and who may be used by magistrates to certify documents, etc. (see *EI*^{2}, *s.v.* ‘ADL).

Viziers, Accountants, and Bureaucrats—The Class of People Universally Known as Tājīks[26]

At the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp, no one from among the "men of the pen" held the office of *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā.*[27] Prior to this, twelve men (as far as I have been able to make out) held the office of vizier during the reign of Shah Tahmasp. Ḵ̆āja Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad was vizier at the time of Tahmasp's accession. He had been appointed to this office by Shah Esma'il I after the assassination of Mīrzā Shah Ḥoseyn, who was a kinsman. It is said that, on the day he became vizier, Ḵ̆āja Jalāl al-Dīn recited a quatrain lamenting the decease of Mīrzā Shah Ḥoseyn:

O Light of my Eyes! You have gone, and my day has
become dark as night;
You might say that you and I were two candles together.
Fate has extinguished one of us, and I am consumed by
grief.

Many a true word is spoken in jest, as is evidenced by the fact that, after the death of Shah Esma'il I and the accession of Shah Tahmasp, Ḵ̆āja Jalāl al-Dīn was reappointed vizier. Less than a year elapsed, however, before he fell foul of Dīv Sultan Rūmlū, who had acquired great power in the state. The latter arrested him and condemned him to death by burning. They say that when they were piling reeds round him and were setting fire to them, Ḵ̆āja Jalāl al-Dīn recited this verse:

I took up my abode in this place of calamity, and fire
consumed me;
This is what happens to people who reside in this world.

Qāżī Jahān Seyfī Ḥoseynī. Qāżī Jahān was formerly the vizier of Mīrzā Shah Ḥoseyn. He was appointed *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā,* but because of the civil war between the Takkalūs and the Ostājlūs, from which he sought to remain aloof, he went to Gīlān. After his departure, Mīr Ja'far Sāvajī, who was the vizier of Čūha Sultan, was appointed *vazīr-e dīvān* through Čūha Sultan's influence. His period in office was brief because he too was caught in intertribal rivalry and was put to death by the emirs.

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[26] I.e., non-Turks, Persians. This term was usually used in a derogatory sense by the *qezelbāš* military aristocracy.

[27] See Savory, Offices II.

Aḥmad Beg Nūr Kamāl. Aḥmad Beg was a distinguished member of the Nūr Kamālīya family of Isfahan. He rose to the office of *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā*, and held this office with full and independent authority for six years.[28] After that, Qāżī Jahān, who had suffered all sorts of harassment[29] from Moẓaffar Soltan, the ruler of Bīya Pas (western Gīlān), but had escaped safely, was recalled to office because of his ability and the special regard the Shah had for him. Qāżī Jahān was appointed vizier jointly with Mīr 'Enāyatollāh Ḵūzānī Eṣfahānī, a relative of Najm-e Ṣānī; Aḥmad Beg Nūr Kamāl was dismissed. Mīr 'Enāyatollāh, however, was accused of carrying on a love affair with a young man named Bāselīq Beg, one of the Shah's servants, and thus incurred the Shah's wrath. Together with Moẓaffar Sultan, whose rebellions against the authority of the Safavid state have been related in the section on events in Gīlān, Mīr Enāyatollāh was suspended in an iron cage slung between the minarets of the mosque of Ḥasan Pādešāh, situated in the Ṣāḥebābād district of Tabriz, and was burned. Some wit coined the chronogram "For love of the youth Bāselīq" to give the date of his execution (942/1535).

After this, Qāżī Jahān held office as vizier with sole authority for fifteen years. Toward the end of this period, Shah Tahmasp evinced a desire to participate personally in administrative affairs. Prior to this, the business of the *dīvān* had been carried on by the Shah in accordance with the judgment of the vizier, and what the vizier proposed was usually put into effect by the Shah. In these changed circumstances, however, Shah Tahmasp frequently did not immediately put into effect the vizier's suggestions. Qāżī Jahān, perceiving this disinclination on the part of the Shah, handed in his resignation, making his advanced age his excuse. Since he importuned the Shah to accept his resignation, the Shah acquiesced. Qāżī Jahān died in 960/1552-53. No vizier of this dynasty has equaled him in ability, talent, wisdom, and learning. Despite the eminence of his position, he always maintained a humble demeanor in his dealings with men. When he intervened in debates between theologians, his arguments were cogent and conspicuous for their excellence. He was also noted for his literary style and the smoothness of his prose, and he was an excellent calligrapher. After Qāżī Jahān, the office of vizier was entrusted to four persons.[30]

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[28] This is quite wrong; he held office for only two years, 938-940/1531-32 to 1533-34: see Savory, Offices II.

[29] Qāżī Jahān had had a spell in prison at Rašt.

Ḵ̌āja Ǧīāṣ al-Dīn ʿAlī. Known as Ǧīāṣ Kahra, Ḵ̌āja Ǧīāṣ was the patron of Šarīf-e Tabrīzī, and was also an excellent accountant. For a time he held the office of *mostowfī al-mamālek*.[31]

Aqa Moḥammad Farāhānī. Aqa Moḥammad was a distinguished citizen of Farāhān.

Ḵ̌āja Emir Beg. Ḵ̌āja Emir was known as Emir Beg *mohrdār*, and was a relative of Mīr Zakarīā Kojojī. He began his career as the vizier of Qāżī Khan Takkalū, the keeper of the seal; later, he became vizier of Khorasan. He was skilled in the arts of divination, numerology, and black magic. Because he used to try and make the sun subservient to him, he was arrested and imprisoned at Alamūt. He was released after the accession of Shah Esmaʿil II, but died shortly afterward.

Mīrzā Beg Abharī. Mīrzā Beg came from the Sābeqīya group at Abhar. He began his career as the vizier of Sevendūk Beg Afšār the *qūrčībāšī*, and later on was for a time vizier of the central *dīvan*. After his death, Maʿsūm Beg Ṣafavī became vizier.

Maʿṣūm Beg Ṣafavī. Maʿsūm Beg, an emir of the *dīvān*, was raised to the high office of vizier, which he held in addition to those of provincial governor and army commander. He was a great favorite of Shah Tahmasp, who used to call him cousin. After peace had been concluded between Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Selīm b. Sultan Morād, the Ottoman emperor, the pilgrim traffic to Mecca from Iran was resumed. Maʿṣūm Beg Ṣafavī obtained permission from both monarchs to make the pilgrimage with his son Khan Mīrzā. But a group of Ottomans, disguised as Bedouins, treacherously attacked and murdered him and his son, and several of their companions, while they were actually with the pilgrim caravan and had donned the special pilgrims' robe. The Ottomans attributed this crime to Arab brigands.

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[30] Mīrzā Beg Abharī, Maʿṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn Farāhānī, Ḵ̌āja Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAlī. Emir Serāj al-Dīn ʿAlī Qomī, who was acting vizier during Maʿṣūm Beg's absence on pilgrimage, is apparently not counted.

[31] See *TM*, pp. 122ff, for an account of this office.

After Ma'ṣūm Beg had departed on the pilgrimage, his vizier, Emir Serāj al-Dīn 'Alī Qomī, acted as his substitute as vizier of the central *dīvān*. After the murder of Ma'ṣūm Beg, no vizier with independent authority was appointed for a number of years. Toward the end of Tahmasp's life, Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn Farāhānī and Ḵāja Jamāl al-Dīn 'Alī were appointed joint viziers. They held office for a year and then were dismissed by the Shah, who was dissatisfied with both of them. No one was appointed to replace them during Shah Tahmasp's lifetime.

Chief Accountants and Other Officials of the Central Secretariat

As far as I have been able to ascertain, ten officials held the position of accountant in the central *dīvān* during the reign of Shah Tahmasp: seven held the rank of *mostowfī al-mamālek,* and three the rank of *mostowfī al-baqāyā.*[32]

Those who held the rank of *mostowfī al-mamālek* were as follows: Mīr Mas'ūd Jorbādeqānī; Ḵāja Ḥoseyn Sārūqī; Ḵāja Ğīāṣ al-Dīn 'Alī (known as Ğīāṣ Kahra Šīrāzī); Ḵāja Qāsem Naṭanzī; Ğīāṣ Malek Eṣfahānī; Mīr Ğīāṣ al-Dīn Maḥmūd Šahrestānī Eṣfahānī; Mīrzā Šokrollāh Eṣfahānī, who is well known. These seven men stand out from among the accountants by virtue of their rank and authority, their length of service, their integrity, and their concern for the well-being of the people.

Ḵāja Qāsem Naṭanzī was an expert in accounting and bookkeeping, and received royal notice to a greater extent than his peers. In royal assemblies he would constantly urge the suit of some humble citizen and seek to alleviate the plight of some fellow Muslim. He would speak out without fear or favor, and since he was utterly without worldly motives, his pleas were usually heard. After his death his sons, in consideration of their father's services, were appointed to important offices.

After him, Mīr Ğīāṣ al-Dīn Maḥmūd became *mostowfī al-mamālek,* but was dismissed within a short time. For a while, the function of chief accountant was placed in the hands of the *avāraja-nevīsān*[33] (keepers of the *avāraja* books) of the royal secretariat, each *avāraja-nevīs* being placed in charge of a subdepartment of the chief accountant's department. Part of the time, two officials called deputy accountants were placed in charge. Eventually, Emir Ǧīāṣ al-Dīn was reappointed *mostowfī al-mamālek.* This time he held office for a long period and was dismissed only three years before the death of Shah Tahmasp.

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[32] *Mostowfī* of the arrears; for both these offices, see *TM,* index.

[33] See *TM,* esp. pp. 144-45. The *avāraja* were registers containing records of individual tax accounts.

Mīrzā Šokrollāh. The son of Ḵāja Ḥabībollāh Eṣfahānī, Mīrzā Šokrollāh was appointed to some office in the central administration every few years. He had to wait several years at court before being appointed to office, but eventually he was admitted to royal assemblies and took his place among the throng of officials and scribes. When Mīr Ǧīāṣ al-Dīn Šahrestānī was dismissed, his office was conferred on Mīrzā Šokrollāh, who held it with undivided authority until the death of Shah Tahmasp. After the accession of Shah Esma'il II, as will be recorded in due course, he became vizier and *e'temād al-dowla.*[34] Finally, under Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he was appointed to the offices of vizier and *momayyez* (auditor) of the province of Khorasan, and warden of the Mašhad shrine. Because of his arrogant nature, which was indeed apparent from his haughty demeanor, he was not popular. His relations with the governors of the province were bad, and as a result his affairs did not prosper as they should have done. Finally he moved to Damghan, where he died.

The *mostowfīs* of the arrears were as follows: Mīr Hedāyatollāh Ma'mūrī, one of the Ma'mūrī *seyyeds* of Isfahan, who died after a short time in office. His brother, Mīr Moḥammad Ma'mūrī, was appointed in his place, and held office for about ten years; then the Shah became dissatisfied with his work, and he was dismissed. The last official to be mentioned in this category is Mīr Shah Ǧāzī Eṣfahānī, also a *seyyed* from Isfahan, whose family was known as the 'Alāqaband *seyyeds.*

For a number of years during the reign of Shah Tahmasp he worked as an auditor and performed various other administrative tasks. Since his work was satisfactory, he held the office of *mostowfī* of the arrears until the death of Shah Tahmasp. After the accession of Shah Esma'il II, when Mīrzā Šokrollāh became vizier and *e'temād al-dowla,* he appointed Mīr Shah Ǧāzī *mostowfī al-mamālek.* He continued in this office under Sultan Moḥammad Shah, with full and independent authority. But when Mīrzā Salmān, who disliked Mīr Shah Ǧāzī, became vizier, he was dismissed. The job then went to Ḵ̌āja Moḥammad Bāqer Haravī, who had served Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā well in the past at Herat. After his dismissal Mīr Shah Ğāzī returned to his native Isfahan, and from there went on the pilgrimage to Mecca. He died on the journey.

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[34] *E'temād al-dowla:* lit., the trusted support of the state, was a *title,* not a rank. It was commonly used for viziers from this time onward.

Officials Who Held the Office of Nāẓer-e Boyūtāt[35]

According to the information I have been able to obtain, Qāżī 'Emād was *nāẓer* with independent authority. A quarrel developed between him and Mehtar Jamāl Eşfahānī in which the latter claimed the *nāẓer* owed certain taxes and accused him of embezzlement and misappropriation of *dīvān* funds. As a result, the *nāẓer* was dismissed and heavily fined. After securing his dismissal, however, Mehtar Jamāl acted as guarantor for the amount of the fine and dispatched the *nāẓer* to Isfahan with every mark of respect!

After him, Aqa Kamāl al-Dīn, the son of that Aqa Kamāl al-Dīn Zeyn al-'Ebād Kermānī who was vizier of Khorasan, was appointed *nāẓer*. He held office for a long time but was also undone by the accusations of his enemies and remained in prison at Alamūt until the death of Shah Tahmasp. He was released by Shah Esma'il II and restored to favor under Sultan Moḥammad Shah, but his health had been undermined by his imprisonment, and this, combined with advanced age and the disappointment of his hopes, brought his life to an end.

At the time of Shah Tahmasp's death, three men held the position of *nāẓer:* first, Mīrzā Salmān, who after the dismissal and imprisonment of Aqa Kamāl became supervisor *(nāẓer)* of most of the royal workshops. He was the son of Aqa Mīrzā 'Alī Jāberī Eşfahānī. His father for some years had been the vizier of Ebrahim Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Fārs, and Mīrzā Salmān was educated in Shiraz. He then went to court, and for a number of years acted as assistant to the vizier of Azerbaijan, Mīrzā 'Aṭā'ollah. After this he returned to court, having by now made his mark as a capable and efficient administrator. After the arrest and imprisonment of Aqa Kamāl Kermānī, Mīrzā Salmān, as mentioned above, was appointed *nāẓer* of most of the royal workshops and enrolled among the *moqarrabs*[36] at court. He held the post of *nāẓer* until the death of Shah Tahmasp.

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[35] Superintendent of the royal workshops; see *TM*, index, *s.v.*

[36] For the various categories of officials termed *moqarrab*, see *TM*, pp. 55ff.

During the reign of Shah Esma'il II, after the dismissal of Mīrzā Šokrollāh, Mīrzā Salmān was appointed *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā,* and Shah Esma'il II went to great lengths to extend his patronage to him and to increase his power still further. The Shah ordered that the vizier need not rise from his place to salute any emirs, no matter how eminent in rank. After the death of Shah Esma'il II and the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, Mīrzā Salmān was reappointed vizier and *e'temād al-dowla,* with independent authority. The rest of his career will be narrated under the events of the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah.

Ḵ̌āja Abu'l-Qāsem. From a noble family of Farāhān, Ḵ̌āja Abu'l-Qāsem held the post of vizier to the keeper of the seal of the *dīvān-e a'lā.* He was an honest, sincere soul, somewhat rustic in manner who caught the eye of the Shah and was promoted from the *vezārat-e mohr* to *nāẓer* of some of the royal workshops. He continued in this position after the death of Shah Tahmasp and the accession of Shah Esma'il II. Eventually he retired from public service and returned to his native town.

Mīrzā Abu'l-Fotūḥ. The brother of Mīr Fażlollāh Šahrestānī, Mīrzā Abu'l-Fotūḥ was *nāẓer* of buildings belonging to the royal household. He was a son of Mīr Seyyed Šarīf Šahrestānī, who was *mostowfī al-mamālek* in the time of Shah Esma'il I. The Šahrestānī family had a long tradition of public service, and many of its members had held high office under the Safavids. Mīr Fażlollāh was for a period vizier of Isfahan, in charge of the administration of *dīvān* affairs there. During his period in office, he came into possession of considerable private property and estates, which he converted into a *vaqf.* He had a son, Moḥammad by name, who was a most learned jurist and whose legal opinions were considered reliable by his fellow lawyers.

Aḥmadī Beg Laškar-Nevīs.[37] Aḥmadī Beg was the brother of Moḥammadī Beg, a former *laškar-nevīs.* In the early part of Shah Tahmasp's reign Ḵ̌āja Beg Šīrāzī, the *laškar-nevīs,* was so respected by the emirs and wielded such authority that his contemporaries considered him to be vizier material and, in fact, regarded him as being in line for the *vezārat.* After his death, Moḥammadī Beg, the brother of Aḥmadī Beg, who was the *avāraja-nevīs*[38] of Azerbaijan, was appointed *laškar-nevīs*. He too became so influential and rose so high in royal favor that Shah Tahmasp used to call him "little vizier." After the death of Moḥammadī, Aḥmadī Beg was appointed *laškar-nevīs* and held this post up to the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. This family are Šīrāzī in origin, and they are known at Shiraz as the Ḵākīya group. They left Shiraz a long time ago, and a number of the Ḵākīyas rose to high office in Iraq, Azerbaijan, and at court. Aḥmadī Beg died at the beginning of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I.

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[37] For the functions of this official, see *TM,* index, and especially pp. 75 and 141–42. As his name implies, the *laškar-nevīs* was concerned to a considerable extent with army records and administration.

[38] See *TM,* pp. 77–78.

'Alīqolī Beg. Of the 'Arabgīrlū clan of the Šāmlū tribe, 'Alīqolī held the office of vizier of the royal bodyguard. His father, Ḥasan 'Alī Beg, was a noted calligrapher who modeled his work on that of Mowlānā Bahā al-Dīn Ḥoseyn, the secretary of the shrine at Mašhad. From early Safavid times, the office of vizier of the *qūrčīs* had been vested in this family, and 'Alīqolī Beg was appointed to it in recognition of his services to the Safavid house. He too died early in the reign of Shah 'Abbas I.

Mīrzā Fatḥollāh. Mīrzā Fatḥollāh held the office of accountant *(mostowfī)* of the household troops. He was an Isfahani, and related to the Ḵāja Malek who first held the office of *mostowfī-e qūrčīān* and was later appointed *mostowfī al-mamālek* (comptroller of finances). Mīrzā Fatḥollāh was appointed to this office at an early age and actually had more influence among the household troops than the *vazīr-e qūrčīān*.

Staff of the Royal Secretariat

Mīr Abū Torāb Naṭanzī, the *mostowfī-e māl,* an office which is now also called *żābet-nevīs* and *mofrada-nevīs,*[39] was an Alūšīya *seyyed* from Naṭanz and the son-in-law of Ḵāja Qāsem Mostowfī. In the royal secretariat, his fellow civil servants considered him superior to the other accountants in the science of bookkeeping. Hedāyat Beg Šīrāzī held the office of *ṣāḥeb-towjīh*[40] of the *dīvān-e a'lā*. He was related to Ḵāja Ḥabībollah, the former *ṣāḥeb-towjīh*. Members of this family have held a variety of offices under the Safavids and were trusted by the Shah. Hedāyat Beg was a man of substance, perspicacity, and integrity.

Of the *avāraja-nevīsān,* Ḵāja Moḥammad Amīn, known as Khan

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[39] See *TM*, p. 142.
[40] See *TM*, p. 143.

Valad Qāsem Mostowfī, who emulated his father in his skill at bookkeeping and accounting, discharged the function of *avāraja-nevīs* in the provinces of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān. Ḵāja Rašīd Beg, a Šīrāzī by origin, was related to Hedāyatollāh Beg and performed the duties of *avāraja-nevīs* of Iraq; he was a pious man, simple in his habits. Aqa Seyyed Naṭanzī was *avāraja-nevīs* of Khorasan and Kerman. Mīr Ne'matollāh, the son of the famous Asad-e Sūḵta-e Šīrāzī, was *avāraja-nevīs* of Fārs. Aqa Seyf al-Molūk-e Ṭehrānī was the *mostowfī-ye arbāb-e taḥāvīl.*[41] Although he did not possess much ability, he was a colorful personality, a good conversationalist, and a congenial companion. These attributes secured him a place at royal assemblies and other marks of royal favor.

Viziers in the Provinces[42]

Two men stand out in this category by virtue of their rank and power: Mīrzā 'Aṭa'ollāh Eṣfahānī, who started his career as the vizier of the seal *(vazīr-e mohr)* and was later promoted to the position of auditor-in-chief for the province of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān; and Aqa Kamāl al-Dīn Zeyn al-'Ebād Kermānī. As indicated above, he was vizier and auditor-in-chief of Khorasan, but he predeceased Shah Tahmasp; Mīrzā 'Aṭa'ollāh had been overtaken by old age and removed from office. Both viziers were noted for their integrity and concern for the common people, and acquired a great reputation in Khorasan and Azerbaijan. The administrative practices they instituted are still the rule and model in those provinces.

Among those who held appointments as provincial viziers at the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp were Mīrzā Hedāyatollāh, the son of Ḵāja Shah Ḥoseyn Sārūqī, who was formerly *vazīr-e tarḵān* and was later appointed vizier of eastern Gīlān: He did not go to Gīlān, however, but remained at court. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah he became *mostowfī al-mamālek;* and after the assassination of Mīrzā Salmān, which occurred at Herat and will be described in the proper place, he became *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā* and *e'temād al-dowla.* But he did not intervene much in important *dīvān* affairs and had no great independence of action.

Ḵāja Qāsem 'Alī, formerly the vizier of Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī* Ostājlū, was raised to vizier of Azerbaijan and held this post for some years. He too remained at court, and up to the time of the death of Shah Tahmasp he had not taken up his post in Azerbaijan. He was a Tabrīzī by origin, but also had connections at Isfahan. His brother, too, Ḵāja ʿEnāyatollāh, who had succeeded him as vizier to Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī*, was one of the distinguished viziers of the time.

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[41] The official who kept the accounts of the "keepers" of the royal household (see *TM,* p. 140).

[42] For general background, see Savory, "Some Notes on the Provincial Administration of the Early Safavid Empire," *BSOAS,* XXXVI/I, 1964, pp. 114–129.

Ḵāja Moḥammad Šarīf Ṭehrānī, who had been dismissed from his post as vizier at Yazd, was appointed vizier of Isfahan. He was related to Aqa Mollā Qazvīnī, the *davātdār* (keeper of the royal inkhorn).

Mīrzā Badīʿ al-Zamān, the son of Aqa Mollā Qazvīnī, held the post of vizier of Kashan. He and his brothers acquired a reputation for just administration, and consequently were regarded with favor by the Shah. One of his brothers, Aqa Moḥammad Zamān, was appointed to various duties at Tabriz, and his other brother, Aḥmad Beg, was appointed vizier of certain districts of Khorasan.

Mīrzā ʿAbd al-Bāqī, known as Zāda-e Maḵdūm, was the son of Mīr Fażlollāh Šahrestānī. After the death of Mīr Seyyed ʿAlī Reżavī Qomī, who was the vizier of Qazvin, Mīrzā ʿAbd al-Bāqī was appointed to that office in his place. I stated above that Mīr Fażlollāh was the owner of extensive estates and private property, and that he constituted all his private property into a *vaqf,* and placed the management of this *vaqf* in the hands of his eldest son. Mīr ʿAbd al-Bāqī, partly through his own folly, and partly as the result of losses inflicted by fate, dissipated all these endowments. He himself, after the death of Shah Tahmasp, suffered all sorts of misfortunes as a result of pursuing fruitless ambitions and making inopportune requests and inconvenient demands.

Mīrzā Aḥmad. Mīrzā Aḥmad was the son of Mīrzā Nūrollāh Kofrānī Eṣfahānī, the vizier of the *ḵāṣṣa*[43] administration of Fārs. Shah Tahmasp showed particular favor to both Mīrzā Nūrollāh and his father. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, as a result of the services he had rendered to the Shah at Shiraz before his accession to the throne, Mīrzā Nūrollāh was appointed to the post of supervisor-in-chief *(neẓārat-e koll),* and discharged his duties with complete independence.

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[43] The provinces of the Safavid empire, by the time of Shah ʿAbbas I, were divided into *mamālek* (state) or *ḵāṣṣa* (crown) provinces (see *TM*, pp. 25-26). The latter were under the direct control of the Shah and were administered by royal intendants. The reckless conversion of *mamālek* provinces into *ḵāṣṣa* became one of the major causes of the decline of the Safavid empire.

Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn Ḵaṭīb Qāyenī. Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn was the vizier of some districts of Herat which fell under the jurisdiction of the crown and became extremely influential in that area.

Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī. Formerly the vizier of Aḥmad Beg Afšār the *qūrčībāšī,* Mīrzā Moḥammad held the post of vizier of Ardabīl.

I will conclude my list of junior viziers *(vozarā-ye jozv)*[44] at this point. There was another group of Persian civil servants *(tājīkīya)* whose appointment and dismissal were in the hands of the emirs, though they were servants of the Shah and were numbered among the officials present at royal assemblies. This group included men like Qarā Ḥasan Zīad-oḡlū the vizier, who was a Turko-Persian hybrid, an elegant conversationalist, and for this reason favored above his peers by the Shah, who singled him out to share his conversation and discourse. Other members of this group were Ḵāja Hedāyatollāh, the vizier of Emir Ğeyb Sultan, who was distinguished among his fellow Persians by the award of a black and white aigrette, of which he was inordinately proud; Ḵāja Żīa al-Dīn Salmānī Eṣfahānī, who was the vizier of 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājlū (after the latter's death he went to court and was enrolled among the court officials); Ḵāja Ḥasan Naḵčevānī, known as Āqsāq Mošref, who did not actually hold any office but was present at royal assemblies; Ḵāja Shah Manṣūr Farāhānī, the vizier of Ḥeydar Sultan Torkmān, who had permission to enter royal assemblies; Mīr Serāj al-Dīn 'Alī Qomī, the vizier of Ma'ṣūm Beg, who after the murder of Ma'ṣūm Beg (which I narrated above), was not appointed to any office in the central *dīvān* but continued to have access to the Shah, as before.

Overseers of the Royal Workshops (Mošrefān-e Boyūtāt)

A number of officials in this category also achieved distinction: Mīrzā Bābā'ī Šīrāzī, the overseer of the royal treasury, a man in whom the Shah placed full confidence; Mīrzā Qāsem Šīrāzī, the overseer of the royal stable, who spent most of his working hours in the stables or at the hippodrome; Mīrzā Moḥammad *pīškaš-nevīs,*[45] a relative of Mīrzā Bābā'ī; Mīrzā Ḥasan Eṣfahānī, the overseer of the royal wardrobe *(mošref-e rekābḵāna)* and of the tailoring department *(qeyčāčīḵāna);* Mīr Seyyed Seyfī, the brother of Mīr Šāhmīr, formerly overseer of the treasury, overseer of the camel stables. There were other overseers, but this list is sufficient.

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[44] This term is not listed in *TM,* index. I assume it means viziers of lower rank, as opposed to the viziers on the staff of the central *dīvān.*

[45] The official who made a list of all presents *(pīškaš)* given to the Shah (see *TM,* p. 47).

In addition to these officials, there were other categories of Persian civil servants at court—some employed, others waiting for employment. But whether employed or not, they were not without influence at court. I should mention particularly Mīr Hāšem Qomī, a Mūsavī *seyyed* from Qom, an eloquent and droll man. He was the owner of private estates and considerable wealth, and he had the Shah's ear and was able to press the suits of plaintiffs more successfully than others. Sometimes he felt that promotion to vizier was in the wind, but nothing came of this. The Shah was always cracking jokes with him, but despite the esteem in which he was held, he was constantly being called to account and fined; although he continued to hold an honored position until the death of Shah Tahmasp, he was not immune from demands and requests for money.

Another official in this category was Ḵāja 'Abd al-Qāder Kermānī, the son of Ḵāja 'Abd al-Rašīd, who was distinguished among the provincial nobility by the size of his estates and income. At royal command, he went to court and joined the throng of officials who attended royal assemblies; he was given reason to hope that he might be appointed *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā.* Like Mīr Hāšem, however, despite his respected position, he had no respite from the importunities of holders of drafts drawn on his revenues. Entirely voluntarily, he presented the Shah with a gift of twelve thousand *tomān* and asked permission to return to Kerman and devote himself to agricultural pursuits and the management of his estates. This request was not granted, and he was forced to remain at court.

Not until the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah did he obtain permission to return to Kerman, and even then he found himself unable to stay. Bektāš Khan Afšār had been guilty of improper conduct and was displaying an arrogantly independent attitude, and Bektāš Khan, unfortunately, was the official collector of the taxes[46] Ḵāja 'Abd al-Qāder Kermānī had contracted to remit to the government. Ḵāja 'Abd al-Qāder Kermānī therefore decided to visit the holy places; he spent the rest of his life in the Baghdad region, reluctant to return to Kerman for fear of being demoted and discredited.

[46] *Taqabbolāt;* see *TM,* p. 176.

In addition, there was always a large number of civic officials *(kalāntarān),*[47] landowners, and other citizens at court who had gained access to the Shah and had been appointed to some job or other, but it would be tedious to enumerate these people.

From among the secretaries *(monšīān),* I might mention Moḥammadī Beg Kojojī Tabrīzī, a relation of Mīr Zakarīā the *monšī al-mamālek* (state scribe),[48] who had had an excellent record of public service. After his death, no one was appointed to the office of *monšī al-mamālek.* There were also Mīrzā Moḥammad, the son of Ḵāja 'Alī Beg Sorḵ Kermānī, who was related to the above-mentioned Moḥammadī Beg; Qāżī 'Abdollāh Joveynī and Ḵāja 'Alā al-Dīn Karahrūdī, who both held the office of *monšī al-mamālek* and were officials in attendance at court; Mīrzā Moḥammad, who held the office of *monšī al-mamālek* under Shah Esma'il II and was reappointed to that office under Sultan Moḥammad Shah after the assassination of Mīrzā Salmān and was finally appointed vizier during the time of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. Fuller details of Mīrzā Moḥammad's career will be given in the history of the events of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I. All three men were extremely talented, but Qāżī 'Abdollāh's secretarial style was superior.

Physicians

The physician class was a numerous one in Iran, and I have already mentioned some of the physicians who treated the Shah, who were the more eminent members of the profession. Others worthy of note include the following.

Ḥakīm Ḡīāṣ al-Dīn 'Alī Kāšī. Hakīm Ḡīāṣ was an outstanding physician. After his death, his brother Ḥakīm Nūr al-Dīn was in attendance on the Shah and was enrolled among the court physicians. As a result of the successful treatment of one of the Shah's illnesses, he acquired great prestige and the Shah had great faith in him.

Ḥakīm Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥoseyn Šīrāzī. Hakīm Kamāl began his career as physician to Shah Ne'matollāh Yazdī. After the latter's death he was enrolled as a court physician. More often than not, he managed to avoid error in his diagnoses, and his treatments were extremely successful. He acquired a reputation as a heavy drinker and, unlike some hypocrites, he refused to pretend that he was abstemious. Because of the virtual certainty that he drank wine he fell out of favor with Shah Tahmasp, although physicians generally permit the drinking of wine for medicinal purposes.[49] In the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he decided to enter the service of Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of Gīlān. Ḥakīm Kamāl al-Dīn spent the rest of his life in Gīlān, and Khan Aḥmad used to discuss medicine with him.

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[47] See *TM,* pp. 81, 148.

[48] See *TM,* p. 132.

Ḥakīm Abū Naṣr Gīlānī. Ḥakīm Abū Naṣr was a handsome man, of great presence and geniality. Most of the treatments he prescribed at court were appropriate to the malady, and consequently he acquired a great reputation. During Shah Tahmasp's illness he was in attendance on him night and day; as a result of this great mark of royal esteem, he unwisely sought recognition of his superior status vis-à-vis the other doctors. As a result, when Shah Tahmasp died he was accused of treachery in the treatment he had prescribed, and he was put to death within the palace by members of the royal bodyguard.

Mīrzā Moḥammad Šīrāzī. Mīrzā Moḥammad was a relative of Ḥakīm Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥoseyn. He had a great reputation among doctors, who were impressed by his medical knowledge, and a number of physicians elected to study under him. Ultimately, like Ḥakīm Kamāl al-Dīn, he too acquired a reputation for drinking and was deprived of royal favor. He spent part of his life at court, and part at Yazd.

Ḥakīm 'Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd. Ḥakīm 'Emād was related to both the physicians listed above. He was the author of reliable articles and books on medicine, on the preparation of electuaries, on the treatment of chronic illnesses, on hot humors, and especially on the lesser and greater pox, generally known as gonorrhea. He began his career as the physician to 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājlū, the governor of Šīrvān, but for some reason they quarreled, and one night, in a blind rage, the Khan forced him to remain outside in the cold and snow. The physician kept himself alive by consuming excessive quantities of opium, but although his life was saved, for the rest of his days he was afflicted by a palsy. Since he himself was an opium addict, he naturally had great faith in the powers of this drug. Shah Tahmasp was passionately devoted to the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad and appointed the best available men to its administrative staff, and so he made Ḥakīm 'Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd staff physician to the shrine.

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[49] The author does not disguise where his sympathies lie!

Ḥakīm Abu'l-Fatḥ Tabrīzī. Since he was slight of frame Ḥakīm Abu'l-Fatḥ was known as Ḥakīm-e Kūček (the Little Physician), but he had the reputation of being the best doctor in Tabriz. If a patient suffering from apoplexy was brought before him, he would diagnose the trouble merely by feeling the patient's pulse. He would not need to ask any questions, and he would assert that this affliction was caused by eating so-and-so or drinking such-and-such; if the patient suffered a relapse, he could explain why. Most of the time he was right; in fact, he was right so often that it was miraculous. During the reign of Shah Esmaʿil II he became very close to the Shah, who made him one of his confidants, with the right to enter the harem. Under Sultan Moḥammad Shah, when Emir Khan Mowṣellū was governor of Tabriz and *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan, Ḥakīm-e Kūček entered the service of the Khan, who held him in great favor.

After the fall of Emir Khan,[50] Ḥakīm-e Kūček was regarded with disfavor by Ḥamza Mīrzā, since the physician had been one of the Khan's men. Under Shah ʿAbbas I, however, he returned to favor and became a confidant of the harem until his death.

Ḥakīm Yār ʿAlī Ṭehrānī. Known as Ḥakīm Ḵeyrī, Ḥakīm Yār was a genial, jovial extrovert, and a great favorite of Shah Tahmasp. He devoted himself to the treatment of the poor and indigent, and was in charge of the welfare dispensary—hence his nickname of Ḥakīm Ḵeyrī (Welfare Physician). He had two sons: Ḥakīm Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī and Ḥakīm Šaraf, who both assisted him in cases which were referred to him. He was a generous and hospitable man, and until the end of their days, he and his two sons used to provide, out of their own income, free refreshments for the poor and anyone else who happened to pass by.

Mīr Rūḥollāh Qāżī Jahānī. Mīr Rūḥollāh was a Seyfī Ḥoseynī *seyyed* of Qazvin. The wonderful qualities of his father and grandfather are too celebrated to require description. After studying the usual subjects, he became interested in medicine, in which science he acquired great skill. He did not devote much time to medical practice, but he had an unrivaled knowledge of the treatments required for various illnesses. Doctors' sons at Qazvin, even though they had engaged in medical debates with him, were proud to call themselves his assistants. He had a fine hand in the *šekasta* form of script.[51] During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he became indisposed and died at Qazvin.

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[50] Emir Khan Mowṣellū Torkmān dismissed by Ḥamza Mīrzā in 991/1583–84, imprisoned at Qahqaha, and later executed.

[51] *Lit.*, broken script, a cursive form of the traditional Persian *nastaʿlīq* script.

Other skillful physicians who practiced in the provinces included Ḥakīm Nūr al-Dīn[52] ʿAlī Yazdī; Mīr Abu'l-Qāsem Šīrāzī; Ḥakīm ʿAlā Tabrīzī;[53] and the doctors at Isfahan. But since my primary object was to list the physicians who were in attendance on the Shah or attached to the court, I will terminate this section at this point.

Calligraphers of the Time of Shah Tahmasp

Among the outstanding calligraphers of the *nastaʿlīq* script—now all dead—were Mowlānā ʿAbdī Nīšāpūrī; Mowlānā Shah Maḥmūd (the golden-penned); Mowlānā Dūst Harātī; Mowlānā Rostam ʿAlī, the nephew of Ostād Behzād Manṣūr; Ḥāfeẓ Bābā Jān Torbatī; and Mowlānā Malek Deylamī Qazvīnī.

Of these calligraphers who were still alive at the death of Shah Tahmasp, pride of place, in the opinion of the people not only of Herat but also of the whole of Khorasan and Iraq, goes to Mowlānā Maḥmūd Esḥāq Sīāvošānī. Second in popular estimation is Mīr Seyyed Aḥmad Mašhadī. Both men were pupils of Mowlānā Mīr ʿAlī. At that time, no one wrote *nastaʿlīq* with such elegant proportions as Mowlānā Maḥmūd, and the people of Herat consider his hand superior to that of Mīr Seyyed Aḥmad, and they are of the opinion that Mowlānā Mīr ʿAlī, the teacher of both these calligraphers, concurs in their evaluation. They base this opinion on the following verse written by Mowlānā Mīr ʿAlī:

> Ǩāja Maḥmūd was a pupil of mine for a while, so
> No slight is inflicted on him,
> Even though he himself is guilty of no shortcoming, if
> I say that
> Everything he writes, both good and bad,
> Is written in my name.

When Ǩāja Maḥmūd heard this verse, he commented: "Mowlānā Mīr ʿAlī was wrong to say that everything I write is written in his name, even if it is true. Even though he made the remark in jest, and in the form of a literary conceit, it is in extremely bad taste." The people of

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[52] BM MS. has Zeyn al-Dīn.

[53] BM MS. has Ḥakīm Rašīdī Šā'er Qomī, and omits the two preceding names.

Mašhad, on the other hand, consider Mīr Seyyed Aḥmad the better calligrapher. Indeed, he has a great reputation in Khorasan, Iraq, and beyond not only as a calligrapher, but as a writer of occasional verse, the fame of which has spread to India and Transoxania. He had numerous pupils, but toward the end of his life his style changed, and he acquired characteristics frowned on by men of discernment.

Another calligrapher of note is Mowlānā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Tabrīzī. He is the son of Mowlānā 'Enāyatollāh and the brother of Mowlānā Moḥammad 'Alī, who has already been mentioned in the list of theologians. Although the *nasta'līq* style of the calligraphers of Iraq and Azerbaijan is scorned by the people of Khorasan, who keep to their own style, Mowlānā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn made great progress in penmanship and wrote flawless *nasta'līq* in his exercise books. Had he lived longer, he would have taken precedence over some of our masters in this art. Even now, if one shows a page from one of his exercise books to students, they pass it from hand to hand, and even steal it from one another.

Mīr Mo'ezzī Kāšī. Mīr Mo'ezzī claimed to be a calligrapher, but he was not a professional copyist and only wrote short pieces. In short, the great esteem in which he was held by the people of Kashan and Iraq was unjustified, and he cannot be compared with the calligraphers of Khorasan whom I have mentioned.

Mowlānā Bābā Shah Eṣfahānī. Mowlānā Bābā was a specialist in *nasta'līq,* and the best copyist in Iraq—and even in Khorasan at that time there was no one who was his equal. He made his living from his profession as copyist and had distinguished men among his clientele. Examples of his calligraphy used to be readily available in Iraq but are now much less common because of the practice of exporting his work to other parts, where it fetches a high price.

Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn Moḥammad. Mīr Ṣadr was the son of Mīrzā Šaraf Qāżī Jahānī and a Seyfī Ḥoseynī *seyyed* of Qazvin. He and his brother Mīr Rūḥollāh were both eminent *seyyeds* of their day, and his father and grandfather are so celebrated that they need no introduction. The highly allegorical love lyrics of Mīrzā Šaraf, which were written in an individual style and caused a sensation among the poets of the day, are sufficient testimony to the accuracy of this claim. Both his sons were outstanding scholars in the customary sciences, and I ought really to have included them in my list of eminent *seyyeds.*

Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn was an excellent calligrapher, and the pupil of Mowlānā Malek Deylamī Qazvīnī, a calligrapher of Iraq with an unassailable reputation. Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn was also a master of oblique calligraphy; in his youth he did much elegant and tasteful work of this type, but failing eyesight eventually forced him to give it up. As regards his *nasta'līq* script, he followed closely the style of Mowlānā Sultan 'Alī, whose style he preferred to that of Mowlānā Mīr 'Alī.

A story is told about the rivalry between Mowlānā Sultan 'Alī and Mīr 'Alī. At the time when Mīr 'Alī had made great progress in the art of calligraphy and had acquired quite a reputation, he repeatedly asserted his equality with Sultan 'Alī, but the professional judges always took the side of the latter. One day, Mīr 'Alī went to Mowlānā Sultan 'Alī and asked him for a specimen of his hand to copy. Mīr 'Alī made two beautiful copies, brought back all three sheets, and challenged Mowlānā Sultan 'Alī to pick out his own. After much deliberation, Mowlānā Sultan 'Alī selected one of Mīr 'Alī's copies as being his own work.

Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn was not just a calligrapher; he studied history for many years, as well as poetry. He compiled an anthology of rare excellence. If a person anywhere in the world produced a hemistich in metrical form, the Mīr would do diligent research on its author with a view to incorporating it into his anthology. The result was that the work was never finished. He also did a lot of work on music and rounds, and with his skill at writing lyrics and composing unusual airs to set them to, he was the life and soul of any convivial gathering. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he was in attendance at royal assemblies and became the close companion of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas I, he remained high in royal favor, accompanying the Shah on his journeys. In the course of one of them, to Khorasan, he died.

Mīrzā Ebrahim Eṣfahānī. Mīrzā Ebrahim was the son of a vizier and a talented calligrapher who, like Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn, specialized in an oblique hand, but he was not in the same class as the latter. He was a man of generous nature, but simple habits. Whatever he had he placed at the disposal of his friends, and his house was always full of wits, poets, and cultivated persons. One week he would live like a lord, enjoying every luxury; the next he would make do with a crust of barley bread and, placing his trust in God, would be looked after adequately by men of rank and quality. He was a jocular man who loved company, and anyone was free in his presence to grind his own axe, make any malicious remark he liked, and speak of anyone, high or low. In his knowledge of poetry and in his research into the etymology of Persian words he was unrivaled, and he wrote a treatise on the latter which is still used in Iraq.

There were other calligraphers, in every class, men like ʿĪsā Beg, the son of Šāṭer Moḥammad and the grandson of Šāṭer ʿAlī, who was an unrivaled penman; and Pīr Būdāq Beg Qaplān-oḡlū Šāmlū, who had made great progress in *nastaʿlīq* and was highly thought of by the Turks.[54] The sons of Beglū Valī ʿArabgīrlū[55] were also calligraphers. If I were to list them all, it would take too long, but I must mention the man who stands head and shoulders above other calligraphers at that time—namely, Ḵᵛāja ʿAlā al-Dīn Manṣūr Monšī Karahrūdī, one of the Shah's private secretaries. Since he was a master calligrapher, I have no hesitation in mentioning him; he is descended from a family of *kalāntars* of Karahrūd. He followed the calligraphy of Mowlānā Darvīš extremely well, and his reputation was firmly established at that period. Some people got so excited by the beauty of his hand that they termed it perfection. But he has a large hand, and his circles are huge. Apparently this style looks better in books, official letters, and letters of appointment. He also wrote the *šekasta* type of *nastaʿlīq* very tastefully.

Mīrzā Aḥmad. The son of Mīrzā ʿAṭa'ollāh, Mīrzā Aḥmad was another calligrapher of note. To begin with, he was the pupil of Ḵᵛāja ʿAla al-Dīn Manṣūr; later, when he had made more progress, he followed the *šeḵasta* style of Mowlānā Darvīš, who developed a very nice style using a blunt pen. His circles, unlike those of Ḵᵛāja ʿAlā al-Dīn Manṣūr and others, are not filled in, but have no great charm. He was the son of a vizier of the time of Shah Tahmasp. When his father was vizier of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān and stood high in the Shah's favor, exciting the envy of the other *tājīks* by the gifts he received from the Shah, Mīrzā Aḥmad was at court. There he was put in charge of the Shah's ink holder and ink, and was responsible for keeping his pens sharp. Ultimately, he suffered loss of royal favor as a result of slander. Nevertheless, he was always called in when there were official dispatches to go to the Ottomans, and he participated in the drafting of these dispatches.

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[54] I.e., the *qezelbāš*, who were not expected to show proficiency in the cultivated arts.
[55] A clan of the Šāmlū tribe.

After Shah Tahmasp's illness, he was appointed vizier of Šūštar and Ḵūzestān. In the time of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he went to Khorasan to take up an appointment as vizier to Moršedqolī Khan. Since he was both well-known and ambitious, he was the instigator of certain events in Khorasan,[56] and he was put to death by his nephew in the castle of Torbat.

Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn. Mīrzā Moḥammad was the son of Mīrzā Šokrollāh, who was *mostowfī al-mamālek* under Shah Tahmasp and later became vizier. After Mīrzā Aḥmad, Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn made rapid progress and perfected his *nasta'līq*. He too followed the style of Mowlānā Darvīš, but in the view of this writer, although both he and Mīrzā Aḥmad were of the school of Mowlānā Darvīš, they each developed their own individual style—a style not inferior to that of Mowlānā Darvīš himself. Of the two, the style of Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Šīrāzī has the greater freshness and charm. During the reign of Shah 'Abbas I, he went to India and joined the ranks of the secretaries at the Mogul court. He died in India.

Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Monšī. Mīrzā Ḥoseyn was a good practitioner of *nasta'līq* and a pupil of Ḵāja 'Alā al-Dīn Manṣūr. He was on the staff of the royal secretariat and was an extremely rapid copyist. Following the style of his master's school, he did not fill in the circles in his script.

Among other calligraphers who deserve only brief mention is Mowlānā Moḥammad Amīn Monšī Qazvīnī; with his name I will end this list.

Outstanding Artists of the Period

It is reported that Shah Tahmasp himself was an excellent artist, presumptuous though it is of me to include his name in the list of the artists of the period. The Shah was the pupil of the celebrated artist Sultan Moḥammad. From his youth, he had shown great interest in painting, and artists like Behzād and Sultan Moḥammad, who were at the top of their profession, used to work in the royal library. Aqa Mīrak Eṣfahānī, an eminent *seyyed* and an outstanding artist, became the Shah's personal friend and intimate companion. Whenever the Shah could relax from the affairs of state, he spent his time

[56] I.e., those connected with the rise of 'Abbas I.

painting. Toward the end of his life he devoted less time to it, partly because the preoccupations of state gave him no opportunity, and partly because the artists mentioned above were no longer alive. Those of the staff of the royal library who were still alive were released so that they could work on their own. At the very end of his life, Shah Tahmasp appointed as librarian Mowlānā Yūsof, a *ḡolām-e ḵāṣṣa*[57] and protégé of the Shah who wrote a very fair *ṯolṯ*[58] hand, and committed to his charge the books contained in the royal library.

Of artists of note who flourished after the death of Shah Tahmasp, I should mention the following.

Mowlānā Moẓaffar ʿAlī. A relative of Behzād, with whom he did his training. Mowlānā Moẓaffar became a master of both line and form. The paintings of the royal palace, and of a royal assembly in the Čehel Sotūn hall, were drawn by him, and most of the painting was also his work.[59] He died not long after the Shah.

Mīr Zeyn al-ʿĀbedīn. Mīr Zeyn al-ʿĀbedīn was the nephew of Ostād Sultan Moḥammad Manṣūr, one of the teachers of Shah Tahmasp. He was a fine, upstanding man, beloved by all. His pupils formed a school of painting. He himself painted only for royal princes, emirs and the nobility. During the reign of Shah Esmaʿil II, when the royal library was reopened, he joined its staff.

Ṣādeqī Beg Afšār. Ṣādeqī Beg was a *qezelbāš* of the Afšār tribe, and a colorful personality. He had chosen the sobriquet Ṣādeqī, and in his early youth had studied painting night and day under the great master Moẓaffar ʿAlī. Moẓaffar ʿAlī, noticing that he had signs of real talent, took great trouble with his training. Ṣādeqī Beg proved an apt pupil. However, he had ambitions beyond what was proper in a painter; when things did not turn out the way he wanted them, he gave up painting and went around as a wandering dervish. Emir Khan Mowṣellū, when he was governor of Hamadan, heard about Ṣādeqī Beg. He made him leave aside his dervish robes and become one of his retainers. In this capacity, Ṣādeqī Beg discharged his duties manfully. Because he had the character sf a Turk and the background of a *qezelbāš*, he made much of his valor and bravery, and in his conceit poured scorn on the champions of the day. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he entered the service of Badr Khan and Eskandar Khan Afšār. In the battle with the Turkmans at Astarābād, he performed prodigies of insane valor. But he never forgot his early training in painting, and eventually became a fine draftsman and painter. He also dabbled in poetry, and wrote some agreeable odes, lyrics, and *maṣnavīs*. However, since he was primarily a painter, I did not include him in the list of poets.

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[57] This term almost certainly indicates that Mowlānā Yūsof was a convert to Islam from Christianity, and was either a Georgian, Circassian, or Armenian. Under Shah ʿAbbas I, the *ḡolāmān-e ḵāṣṣa* (*lit.*, personal slaves of the Shah), became a powerful "third force" in the state, designed to offset the influence of the *qezelbāš*.

[58] Large handwriting of the *nasḵ* type.

[59] It was (and is) common practice in Iran for the master to sketch the drawing, and perhaps do some of the painting, leaving the rest to be finished by his pupils.

In the reign of Shah Esma'il II, he was on the staff of the royal library; under Shah 'Abbas I, he was appointed librarian. However, his bad temper, arrogance, and impatience would not leave him in peace, and he used to treat friends and peers roughly. They tolerated his ill-bred behavior, but eventually he made himself so offensive to people that they shunned him, and he lost favor with the Shah. But he continued to hold office until his death, and went on drawing his librarian's salary from the central *dīvān*.

Mowlānā 'Abd al-Jabbār Astarābādī. Mowlānā 'Abd al-Jabbār was a calligrapher and a copyist of *nasta'līq*, but at an early age he became interested in art and developed this skill along with his professional skill as a copyist. He had personality, and his talents as a conversationalist and wit made him much sought after by high society—so much so that he had no time left for his work. For a while, he went to Gīlān, where he attended the court of Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of Gīlān. When Khan Aḥmad rebelled and was imprisoned, Mowlānā 'Abd al-Jabbār came to Qazvin. Although he ran an artists' workshop there, he spent most of his time at parties given by emirs and other members of the upper classes. His son, Ḵāja Naṣīr, used to look after the students. One of the people with whom the Mowlānā associated most frequently was Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī*, an officer in the service of the faction supporting Sultan Ḥeydar. As a result of this, the Mowlānā was dismissed from his post in the royal library by Shah Esma'il II, but his son was given a position there instead. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, when Khan Aḥmad was appointed governor of Gīlān, the Mowlānā returned there with him and spent the rest of his days in that province.

Sīāvoš Beg. Dubbed Naqqāšī because of his skill as a painter, Sīāvoš Beg was the pupil of Ostād 'Alī Manṣūr. The elegance of his pen attracted the attention of the Shah, who personally took a hand in teaching him. He developed into an excellent miniaturist, and was unequaled in pen and ink sketches *(sīāh-qalam)*[60] and in mountain scenes; the composition *(majles-sāzī)* of his paintings was flawless. In the reign of Shah Esma'il II he was appointed to the staff of the royal library; after the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, both he and his brother, Farrok̲ Beg, became the trusted companions of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. Under Shah 'Abbas I, he was constantly in attendance on the Shah, and died in his service.

Mowlānā Shaikh Moḥammad Sabzavārī. Mowlānā Shaikh Moḥammad was a handsome man and a witty speaker. In the painting of individual portraits, he claimed to be supreme—and with justification, since all his fellow artists agreed with him. He also wrote a fine *nasta'līq;* he used to copy the shorter pieces of the masters so well that his copies were virtually indistinguishable from the originals. It was he who introduced the European style of painting in Iran and popularized it, and no one equaled him in the delineation of faces and figures. In Sabzavār, he elected to enter the service of Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, and accompanied the latter to Iraq. In the reign of Shah Esma'il II, the Mowlānā joined the staff of the royal library, but he later returned to Khorasan. Later still, he entered the service of Shah 'Abbas I, and used to work in the new palace building.

Mowlānā 'Alī Asḡar Kāšī. Mowlānā Alī was very good on color, and unrivaled in painting mountain scenes and trees. He too was in the service of Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, and joined the staff of the royal library during the reign of Shah Esma'il II. His son, Aqa Reżā, was a skilled portrait painter, but it is well known that, in recent times, he stupidly abandoned this art in which he had so much skill and took up wrestling, forsaking his talented artist friends. Fortunately, he has now given up this nonsense, but he does not do much painting. Like Ṣādeqī Beg, he has a foul temper, is impatient and disagreeable, and has a very independent character. He was greatly favored by Shah 'Abbas I, but because of his temperament, he has never been fully trusted, and so he has remained poor.

Mīrzā Moḥammad Eṣfahānī. Mīrzā Moḥammad, a painter with a fine touch, was the pupil of K̲āja 'Abd al-'Azīz Kākā. The composition and finish of his pictures was unrivaled, and he was also a master of detail. Under Shah Esma'il II, he joined the staff of the royal library.

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[60] A drawing entirely in black—a pen-and-ink sketch.

Mowlānā Ḥasan Bağdādī. Mowlānā Ḥasan was an expert on the illumination of manuscripts; the work of the illuminator Mowlānā Yārī, who raised this art to a high pitch of perfection, cannot compare with that of Mowlānā Ḥasan in its fineness and detail. Toward the end of the reign of Shah Tahmasp he was accused of having made a copy of the royal seal, and indeed he had shown himself to be extemely proficient in that art. Shah Tahmasp arrested him and threatened to have his hands cut off; but in the end the Shah forgave him because he had worked on the decorations of the shrine of Abū 'Abdollāh al-Ḥoseyn. The Shah sent him away with a warning not to do it again. During the reign of Shah Esma'il II he joined the staff of the royal library, and his son followed in his footsteps as a manuscript illuminator and portrait painter.

Mowlānā 'Abdollāh Šīrāzī. Mowlānā 'Abdollāh was another excellent manuscript illuminator, but not in the same class as Mowlānā Ḥasan. A jovial, witty man, he was in the service of Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā. After the murder of that prince, he joined the staff of the royal library under Shah Esma‘il II.

There were other artists and portrait painters, such as Moḥammad Haravī, Naṣrī Beg Kūsa, and others, but I have mentioned the leading men in each category.

Poets Still Writing at the Death of Shah Tahmasp

The number of poets who flourished at that time, either at court or in the provinces, was legion. Early in his reign, Shah Tahmasp gave special consideration to the class of poets, and for a time Mīrzā Šaraf Jahān and Mowlānā Ḥeyratī were companions at the Shah's table and other social gatherings. During the latter part of his life, however, when the Shah took more seriously the Koranic prescription to "do what is right and eschew evil," he no longer counted poets pious and upright men because of the known addiction of many of them to the bottle. He ceased to regard them with favor, and refused to allow them to present him with occasional pieces and eulogistic odes.

On one occasion, Mowlānā Moḥtašam Kāšī had written an ode in praise of the Shah, and another eulogizing Parī Khan Ḵānom, and had sent them from Kashan. Parī Khan Ḵānom had presented the former to Tahmasp, who remarked: "I am not willing to allow poets to pollute their tongues with praises of me; let them write eulogies of ʿAlī and the other infallible Imams. Tell him to look first for his reward to the holy spirits of the Imams, and after that to hope for a reward from me. He has used far-fetched metaphors and profound images and attributed them, most inappropriately, to kings; whereas, had he applied these metaphors and images to the holy Imams, it would have been impossible to use expressions too extravagant to describe their exalted rank." In short, Mowlānā Moḥtašam did not receive any reward for his ode. When the Mowlānā received the Shah's reply, he sent him a work by the late Mowlānā Ḥasan Kāšī on the Imam ʿAlī, which he had put into verse in the form of a *haft-band*[61] —a really inspired piece of work—and in reward for this he received a fitting present. At once all the poets at court set to work madly writing *haft-bands;* fifty or sixty such poems rained down on the Shah, and their authors were all rewarded. Of the other poets of note, some were at court, and some in the provinces.

Mowlānā Żamīrī Eṣfahānī. In the top rank of poets, Mowlānā Żamīrī was also an expert in geomancy, which is how he acquired his pen name of Żamīrī, indicating that he had knowledge of the occult. He was an extremely fast worker, and every day produced at least ten lyrics. He spent a lot of time answering the collected works of the poets of antiquity; he also threw off individual verses of limpid beauty. A selection of them may be found in the anthology of Mīr Taqī Kāšī.

Mowlānā Moḥtašam. The Mowlānā was a celebrated poet from the Kashan district. He wrote an ode in praise of Shah Esmaʿil II, one hemistich of which contained the chronogram of his accession. He wrote a large number of carefully crafted odes, and also lyrics, "composite-tie" strophe poems *(tarkīb)* and "return-tie" strophe poems *(tarjīʿ).*[62] His most famous poem, however, which will perpetuate his memory until the day of judgment, is his threnody on the Prince of Martyrs, Ḥoseyn. It superseded the threnody of Shaikh Āẕarī, which no poet had succeeded in emulating up to that time. Mowlānā Moḥtašam also wrote some powerful love lyrics, but space does not permit me to quote from these.

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[61] A *haft-band* is a poem of seven-verse strophes. Moḥtašam's *haft-band* in praise of the Imams consisted of twelve strophes each of seven verses, each strophe ending with an additional verse in a different rhyme—making 96 verses in all (see E. G. Browne, *History of Persian Literature,* Vol. IV, pp. 172–73).

[62] Both the *tarjīʿ-band* and the *tarkīb-band* consisted of a series of stanzas containing an equal, or roughly equal, number of couplets, with a monorhyme. These stanzas are separated by isolated verses which may be in the form of a refrain *(tarjīʿ-band),* or different at the end of each stanza *(tarkīb-band)* (see Browne, Vol. II, pp. 39–40).

Mowlānā Valī. The most elegant of poets, Mowlānā Valī came from the Dašt-e Beyāż[63] region of the Qāyen district of Khorasan. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, he came to court with Ḵāja-zāda Maṭlūb, an eminent *seyyed* from that area, and resided for a while at Qazvin. He was on familiar terms with Mowlānā Żamīrī and other court poets. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah he returned to Khorasan, but was arraigned by Yatīm Sultan Uzbeg on a charge of being a Rāfeżī[64] and put to death. As an excuse for this act, the latter used to say that "all poets have scurrilous tongues." "Since I knew that the Mowlānā had been vexed by me, I kept an eye on him in case he should satirize me in such a way that the stigma would remain for all time."

On one occasion, a distinguished Ḵorāsānī made the following rejoinder: "What satire could possibly leave a worse stigma than your action in putting to death a man who was unique in his time? There is a perpetual record of this shameful crime in the pages of history." Yatīm Sultan admitted the justice of this remark, but later put to death the man who uttered it because of his insolence. The Mowlānā also composed love poetry.

Mowlānā Vaḥšī Yazdī. Mowlānā Vaḥšī spent his whole life at Yazd. He was unequaled in the composition of lyrics and *maşnavīs;* his *maşnavī* on the theme of Farhād and Šīrīn is particularly celebrated, and his love poetry is well known by everyone.

Ḵāja Ḥoseyn Ṣanā'ī Ḵorāsānī. Ḵāja Ḥoseyn is from Mašhad, where he was in the service of Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, who favored him highly. He composed mostly odes, but his language is so involved and abstruse that the majority of contemporary poets are defeated in their attempts to understand it.

Mīr Ḥeydar "Mo'ammā"-ye Kāšān. Mīr Ḥeydar was a Ṭabāṭabā'ī *seyyed,* and the possessor of benefices at Kashan. He was a master of acrostics, and unrivaled in the composition of chronograms. He lived to be more than ninety, but the murmurings of his libido were never stilled. In the time of Shah Tahmasp, he was the intimate friend of

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[63] Dašt-e Beyāż, the White Plain, lay northwest of Qāyen in the district of Qohestān.
[64] A heretical Shi'ite sect.

Mīrzā Ja'far, the son of Mīrzā Badī' al-Zamān, the vizier of Kashan. Mīrzā Ja'far was noted for his beauty, and was a paragon of physical and spiritual virtue. He went to India, where he rose to the rank of vizier.

About the time of the accession of Shah 'Abbas I, Mīr Ḥeydar conceived the desire to go and see Mīrzā Ja'far, and visited India. Through the favor of Mīrzā Ja'far, he obtained an audience with the Mogul emperor Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, and was granted the privilege of appearing at royal assemblies. Although Mīrzā Ja'far was not noted for his generosity, he gave Mīr Ḥeydar 30,000 Akbarī rupees, the equivalent of 1,000 royal Iraqi *tomān*, and Mīr Ḥeydar also received favors from the emperor. After he had spent some time in India, Mīr Ḥeydar decided to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He stayed in Mecca for two years, and then his love of his native land drew him back to Kashan, where he was loaded with gifts and granted benefices by Shah 'Abbas I. Mīr Ḥeydar was a prolific poet, composing occasional verse, odes, lyrics, and chronograms.

Mowlānā Malek Ṭeyfūr Anjodānī and *Mowlānā Dā'ī.* These brothers are both men of substance and profound learning. Malek Ṭeyfūr, during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, was at the Zar-Menārīya seminary in Qazvin. He had a roving habit and an amatory disposition, and in spite of his piety and probity, had his share of handsome youths. His carnal desires dominated his nature. In the time of Shah 'Abbas I, he moved from Qazvin to Kashan in hope of getting a post. He had a curious idiosyncrasy; despite his penurious circumstances, he made do with barley bread and never resorted to mendicancy.

His brother, Mowlānā Dā'ī, lives at Anjodān. Sometimes he comes into Kashan and mixes with the poets and people of that city. Like his brother, he is a man of ascetic temperament. He is the author of agreeable odes and lyrics.

Mīr Vālehī Qomī. Mīr Vālehī is a *seyyed* of Qom, and the author of elegant verse; his love poetry contains themes worthy of a master. He has a colorful personality, and his conversation is spiced with wit. He is also an accomplished musician.

Mowlānā Malek Qomī. From the outset, Mowlānā Malek's poetry had a distinctive flavor which was lacking in the poetry of others. As he progressed, his writing acquired maturity. He left Iran and emigrated to the Deccan in India, where he entered the service of the 'Ādelšāh. In collaboration with Mowlānā Ẓahūrī, he has just completed a book of poetry containing nine thousand verses, dedicated to the 'Ādelšāh. Each poet has contributed four to five thousand verses. As a reward for this, the two poets received a gift of nine thousand *hūn,*[65] which they divided equally.

Mowlānā Fahmī. A veteran poet, after Mowlānā Moḥtašam, Mowlānā Fahmī claimed supremacy at Kashan. He was held in greater respect than the other poets, and his utterances were taken for gospel.

Mowlānā Ḥātem Kāšī. Mowlānā Ḥātem was an extremely mellifluous poet. He had a very swarthy complexion, and the wags of Kashan used to assert that he was an Indian. They would talk about India in his presence, and the Mowlānā used to be incensed. On one occasion, the Mowlānā was wearing black hose, and one of the wits exclaimed, "Mowlānā, have you rolled up your breeches?" He was constantly being made the butt of jokes like this.

Mīr Ḥożūrī Qomī. Mīr Ḥożūrī was a *seyyed* of integrity and ascetic habit who spent most of his life in the practice of religion at the holy shrines. After the death of Shah Tahmasp and the accession of Shah Esma'il II, when Qazvin became the rallying point for members of the religious classes, Mīr Ḥożūrī took up residence there too. Since he was then advanced in years, and furthermore was a *seyyed,* he was accorded great respect by the other members of the religious classes there. Although his output of poetry was small, he possessed considerable skill in the composition of lyrics.

Mīr Ṣabrī Rūzbehān Eṣfahānī. Mīr Ṣabrī resided in the Isfahan district, and his ancestors were *seyyeds* of Ardestān.[66] He wrote lyrics.

Mīrzā Ḥesābī Naṭanzī. Mīrzā Ḥesābī came from Naṭanz and was a relative of Moḥammad Qāsem the *mostowfī.* He was a talented and capable young man who wrote excellent poetry, was a skilled musician and composer, and produced unusual paintings that were the talk of Iraq. At Qazvin he spent his time in the company of members of the fair sex.

Qāżī Nūr Eṣfahānī. Qāżī Nūr Eṣfahānī was from Andelān in the

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[65] A gold coin.

[66] Northeast of Isfahan.

Barā'ān district of Isfahan. He studied under Ḵᵛāja Afżal Tarka at Qazvin, and also under Mīr Faḵr al-Dīn Sammākī. At that time he had not acquired his reputation as a poet; indeed, he composed very little poetry, but his work was mellifluous and he spoke from the heart.

Mowlānā Ḥoznī. The Mowlānā was a learned and witty man who not only wrote good poetry but understood it well, unraveling with ease any knotty problems submitted to him in regard to the interpretation of particular verses. He was a complete extrovert, and since he was skilled in the understanding of poetry and unequaled in the art of idle gossip and witty off-the-cuff remarks—all necessary attributes of a poet—he acquired a reputation for being a poet.

Mowlānā Halākī Hamadānī. A man of ascetic habit, the Mowlānā was an illiterate; he had literally never read anything. He used to ask people he met in the street or in the bazaar to write down his poetry for him, but for a long while people did not realize this. He composed lyrics; he also composed a congratulatory ode on the accession of Shah Esma'il II, for which he received twelve thousand *tomān* as a reward. This produced a spate of odes from other poets, but they failed to find favor.

Maẓharī Kašmīrī. Maẓharī was an agreeably handsome youth whose good looks made a great impression on women. His poetry created an equal sensation among contemporary poets. While still a young man he left Kashmir and came to Iran, where he traveled widely with the object of meeting Persian poets. Eventually he returned to Kashmir.

Poets of the Capital, Qazvin

In Qazvin, there was a considerable number of poets of note, and brief mention has already been made of the most celebrated of these. However, just as the people of this realm in general bear without complaint the greatest financial hardships, in the same way there are those among the ranks of the poets who are not without talent, but who are not accustomed to beg. They rarely dispatch occasional verses and odes to high officers of state in the hope of getting rewards and favors. The poets whom I am now going to mention eked out their livelihood by engaging in trade on a modest scale.

Mowlānā Forūḡī 'Aṭṭār. The Mowlānā made his living as a drug-gist, and poets used to congregate in front of his shop. While he dealt with the needs of his customers, the conversation turned on the subject of poetry.

Mowlānā Ṭabḵī Qazvīnī. The Mowlānā was a man of short stature, simple habits, and pleasant countenance. He loved good company, and was a man with a social conscience, so that many penniless poets and indigents down on their luck received lunch and dinner from his restaurant.

Solṭān-e Foqarā. Initially, Solṭān-e Foqarā made his living as a moneychanger, and he went around dressed in the style of a dervish. He modeled his poetic style on that of Ḥāfeẓ; he wrote a rejoinder to the *dīvān* of Ḥāfeẓ and claimed equality with him. Intelligent men used to distinguish between the two by means of the greater esoteric meaning of Ḥāfeẓ's verse. Solṭān-e Foqarā spent some time in India and then returned to Iran, where he attracted the notice of Shah 'Abbas I. He expressed the desire to live at Mašhad, and was granted a stipend from the revenues of the shrine administration there. However, death intervened before he reached Mašhad.

Kākā-ye Qazvīnī. Kākā-ye Qazvīnī was a man of swarthy complexion, but pleasant visage. He made his living as a barrow-boy and greengrocer.

Mowlānā Šarmī. The son of a tailor, the Mowlānā made his living as a tailor in the bazaar. He was exceedingly modest and unassuming—qualities not usually found in poets—and for this reason was given the pen name of Šarmī (bashful). He composed verse in the Rāmandī dialect, after the fashion of Ḥāfeẓ Ṣābūnī, and eventually made considerable progress in the composition of lyrics.

Minstrels and Musicians

Since Shah Tahmasp always eschewed all practices forbidden by religious law, musicians found little favor with him. He fired most of those who already had employment at court, and retained only the singer Ostād Ḥoseyn Šūštarī Balīānī and Ostād Asad, who was the haut-bois player in the royal military band. Toward the end of his life, the Shah expelled from court various celebrated minstrels, such as Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Qazvīnī, who was renowned for his superb tremolo singing and for his graceful style; Ḥāfeẓ Lala Tabrīzī; and others. The

Shah had the idea that perhaps the royal princes, by associating with them, might begin to pay too much attention to music, and that they might corrupt the emirs who were their moral tutors and guardians and thus generate a general demand at court for such forbidden pleasures. Even Ostād Ḥoseyn the haut-bois player was arrested as he entered the royal assembly, and spent some time in prison. Finally, he swore a solemn oath that he would not play his haut-bois at any other place than the one appointed for performances by the royal military band.

After the accession of Shah Esma'il II, however, musicians began to gather again at court. They included such singers as Hāfeẓ Aḥmad Qazvīnī and Ḥāfeẓ Jalājel (the bells) Bāḵarzī, who excelled at both singing and chanting. He was appointed master of the musicians *(Čālejī-bāšī)* under Shah Esma'il II and continued in favor under Shah 'Abbas I until his eventual death at Qazvin. There was also Ḥāfeẓ Moẓaffar Qomī. Chanting is the special forte of Ḵorāsānīs, and singing is the forte of the people of Iraq. Although Ḥāfeẓ Moẓaffar came from Iraq, he used to chant in the Ḵorāsānī style, in which art he was supreme in Iraq. Ḥāfeẓ Hāšem Qazvīnī, although at the period we are speaking of was not in the same class as the others, later came into his own and was raised to the heights by Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. Moḥammad Kamānča'ī (the violinist) was an unrivaled performer on the violin, and he also played the lute. In the time of Shah Esma'il II, he performed at court. Moḥammad Mo'men was an unrivaled lute player, his playing being distinguished by the precision of his bowing, his technical skill, and his sweetness of tone. Eventually he decided to enter the service of Khan Aḥmad Gīlānī, and he died in Gīlān while still a young man. Ostād Šāhsavār Čahār-tārī played the four-stringed guitar *(ṭonbūr)*. His playing was technically excellent, but lacked sweetness and character.

Ostād Šamsī Šeypūrgū'ī was a master musician who was also a composer. He served at court during the time of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā and continued in favor after the accession of Shah 'Abbas I. Ostād Ma'ṣūm Kamānča'ī, his brother, was an unrivaled performer on the *qačak* (a type of ten-stringed violin). In the Varāmīn district, a group of talented brothers became accomplished players, and the quality of musical entertainment there reached a high level through their efforts. Ostād Sultan Maḥmūd Ṭonbūra'ī was a skilled performer on the *ṭonbūr*. He remained at Mašhad in the service of Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, and did not travel elsewhere. Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Ṭonbūra'ī was the champion *ṭonbūr* player in Iraq; Ostād Sultan Moḥammad Čangī was a skilled harpist. Skilled musicians existed in other places too, but this brief list is sufficient.

Of the class of professional storytellers, *Šāh-nāma* reciters, and the like, there was a considerable number, but I will just mention two or three: Mowlānā Ḥeydar Qeṣṣa-ḵān (the storyteller), who was unequaled in his art; Mowlānā Moḥammad Ḵūršīd Eṣfahānī, also a good storyteller but not better than Mowlānā Ḥeydar; Mowlānā Fatḥī, the brother of the preceding, unrivaled *Shāh-nāma* reciter whose peerless voice carried—without exaggeration—for several miles, without any loss of quality.

Martyrdom of Prince Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā and the Accession of Esma'il Mīrzā as Shah Esma'il II

As I have previously stated, on the night of Shah Tahmasp's death Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, who was the heir-apparent and the aspirant to the throne, remained in the palace at the wish of his father, or on the advice of his mother, or of his own free will. By remaining in the palace, he thought, he would be closer to the attainment of his objective, but through an evil destiny, he not only failed in his purpose but lost his life in the attempt.

To begin with, on the advice of foolish women he dismissed his supporters and retainers and sent them outside the palace, while he himself remained within. The second factor in the tragedy was that, by a coincidence, the guard that night was composed of supporters of Esma'il Mīrzā. Ḥeydar Mīrzā was unaware of the fact that the guard consisted of his enemies, who would in all probability bar the doors of the palace and prevent any of his own supporters from entering. By remaining inside the palace, he had made himself the prisoner of his opponents. A third factor was that Parī Khan Ḵānom, who was an extremely clever woman, was hostile to him and a member of the pro-Esma'il faction. On this fatal night, Parī Ḵānom was actually held prisoner by Ḥeydar Mīrzā, but by dint of a little flattery she managed to gull him.

It happened this way. On the night in question, Parī Khan Ḵānom, who was in the harem, realized she was a virtual prisoner of Ḥeydar Mīrzā. She decided that her only course lay in being tractable and submissive. Approaching Ḥeydar Mīrzā with an air of helplessness and perturbation, she said: "Women are foolish creatures. If, in my stupidity and short-sightedness, I have been guilty of any misdemeanor, I beg you to pardon me and spare my life. In that event, I will follow the path of obedience to you, and will not deviate by so much as a hair's breadth from the course of conduct which is pleasing to Your Royal Highness." Then she kissed her brother's feet and, turning to the prince's mother, said: "Be my witness that no one has taken precedence over me in the formal act of kissing the king's feet and congratulating him on his accession." The prince, being extremely ingenuous, was deceived by this flattery. Looking fondly at his sister, he said, "I have always loved you. Make your brother, Sultan Soleymān Mīrzā, and your mother's brother, Šamḵāl Sultan, my allies, and

I shall hold you even dearer than I did during our father's lifetime." The princess made her brother swear to this, and Ḥeydar Mīrzā produced a copy of the Koran and swore a solemn oath on it. Parī Khan Ḵānom then requested permission to leave the palace so that she might go and bring her brother and uncle to Ḥeydar Mīrzā. The latter let her go, and she slipped out of the palace by a path which led from the harem garden to the Meydān-e Asp.

When she reached her house, Parī Khan Ḵānom summoned her uncle, Šamḵāl Sultan, and gave him the keys of the palace. With three hundred Circassians, all enemies of Ḥeydar Mīrzā, he made himself master of the harem. Other enemies of Ḥeydar then entered the harem garden by this route, and Ḥeydar Mīrzā was slain, as will be related. Parī Khan Ḵānom, who had betrayed her simple-minded brother, did not live long to enjoy the fruits of her crime, as will be described in its proper place.

The next day, Ḥeydar Mīrzā placed the royal crown on his head, buckled on Shah Tahmasp's personal sword, and produced the late Shah's will. This will, he claimed, was in the late Shah's own handwriting from beginning to end; in it he was named heir-apparent, and all the royal princes, emirs, Sufis and supporters of the Safavid house were enjoined to tender their allegiance to him. Then, putting the letter in a fold in his turban, he went to the Čehel Sotūn hall. His enemies muttered that the will was not in Tahmasp's handwriting, but in that of one of the women of the harem whose hand resembled Tahmasp's. The document, they alleged, had been written after Tahmasp's death, and his signet ring removed from his finger and the will sealed with it. God alone knows the truth!

Ḥeydar then spoke warmly to the centurions, *qūrčīs, ešīk-āqāsīs,* guards, and other officers who were assembled in the hall, distributed gifts among them, and uttered fair promises. Several times he gave the order that the main gates of the palace should be opened so that his retainers might enter. But the group which was inside from morning till noon continued to pay its respects to him in the customary manner and kept on postponing the opening of the gates, soothing him with evasive replies. It is reliably related on the authority of Valī Beg, centurion of the harem and a relative of Qolī Beg Afšār, the governor of Kerman, that Ḥeydar summoned him and promised him the governorship of Kerman and the office of *qūrčībāšī* if he would take up his station with the *qūrčīs* who were guarding the main gates, open them, and admit the Shah's personal retainers. According to the account of Valī Beg, he made his way to the gates and then came back and reported without equivocation to Ḥeydar Mīrzā that the *qūrčīs* were behaving mutinously.

The *qūrčīs* were saying, he reported, that the Shah was dead, and that the *qezelbāš* tribes had split into two factions. "We say," said the *qūrčīs*, "a plague on both your factions. We are concerned only to guard the palace, and to protect the harem and the honor of the Shah. Until the emirs and the principal officers of state of both factions are able to reach agreement, until this vital question is solved to the satisfaction of the statesmen and elders of both parties, and until we loyal servants of the dynasty, who have no other thought but to protect the rights of the heir-apparent, are quite satisfied that the danger of treachery and a *coup d'état* is passed, we will allow no one to enter or leave the palace." Ḥeydar Mīrzā, realizing that the *qūrčīs* were up to some mischief, put his hand on his sword hilt and said, "I am sure I am going to be killed." His mother, who was watching him from behind a curtain, shrieked and prevented him from drawing his sword, and he turned and went into the harem. For the rest of the day, Ḥeydar Mīrzā was in a highly nervous state, and kept emerging from and returning to the harem. He knew that he was the prisoner of his enemies, and that his own allies and supporters were unable to enter.

The bulk of the emirs and principal officers of state had heard the news of Shah Tahmasp's death shortly before daybreak. Emir Aṣlān Khan Afšār, together with Sultan Aḥmad Mīrzā, went to the house of Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā and brought there Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā, who was staying with the parents of Aras Khan Rūmlū. All the pro-Esma'il faction assembled there. The Šeyḵāvand tribe, the Ostājlūs, the Georgians, and the rest of the supporters of Sultan Ḥeydar gathered at the house of Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī* (the centurion). Their leaders were Ma'ṣūm Khan Ṣafavī, Ḥamza Sultan Ṭāleš, Seyyed Beg Kamūna, 'Alī Khan Beg Gorjī, and Allāhqolī Khan Enjīk-oğlū Ostājlū. They pledged themselves to the service of Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā, and were joined there by Sultan Ebrāhīm Mīrzā, the son of Bahrām Mīrzā. A number of the leading *qezelbāš* emirs, such as Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq Torkmān, Qolī Beg Afšār (the governor of Kerman), Moḥammadqolī Ḵalīfa Ẕu'l-Qadar (keeper of the seal), and Mīrzā 'Alī Sultan Qājār, kept to their houses the whole day and joined neither faction.

The supporters of Ḥeydar were confident of their strength and scornful of the opposition. Their plan was to mass in front of the palace gates, storm the palace, and place Ḥeydar on the throne. Their minds were easy in regard to Esma'il Mīrzā, who was still imprisoned at Qahqaha, because the commandant of the fortress, Ḵalīfa Anṣār Qarādāḡlū, was one of their number. He had agreed to carry out whatever orders should be issued about Esma'il Mīrzā after the enthronement of Ḥeydar Mīrzā. Some of the wiser heads among them pointed out that, since the *qūrčīs* on guard duty had barred the palace gates and shown signs of hostility toward Ḥeydar Mīrzā, fighting might break out when Ḥeydar's supporters forced their way into the palace, and their enemies inside the palace might be compelled to take some action against Ḥeydar's person.

Every few minutes Ḥeydar's supporters changed their minds and produced some new plan. In the end, they agreed to do nothing until evening, when the guard would be changed. Then, on the pretext that it was the turn of the Ostājlūs, they would go on guard duty in the usual way. One of Ḥeydar's supporters, Allāhqolī Sultan Enjīk-oḡlū, said: "To parade fully armed before the royal palace is incompatible with Sufi conduct and with true devotion to the Safavid house; moreover, we will not attain our object in this manner. The group which has gathered at the house of Ḵolafā is not yet very large. Let us first march against him, deal with him as we will, and scatter his followers. When their dispersal becomes general knowledge, those within the palace will open the gates without delay and will join Ḥeydar."

Indeed, this was the most sensible plan. But Ḥeydar's supporters were blinded by their arrogance, and each of them wanted the earth. Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā, on the other hand, an intelligent man who had seen the world, was extremely anxious about the turn of events. He feared that Ḥeydar's supporters might attack him, and he kept thinking of ways to delay them. First of all, he sent Būdāq Rūmlū and Šāhqolī Sultan Tabat-oḡlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, both experienced officers, to Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā, Ḥoseyn Beg, and their followers on behalf of Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā and his followers. He suggested they should put their heads together and try to avoid conflict; the gist of the message was that they should heal the division between them and work in harmony together. First of all, he said, they should all don mourning for the late Shah, and see that he received a fitting burial. After that, the elders should sit down together and discuss the rights and wrongs of the matter and the wishes of both parties, bearing in mind the best interests of religion and the state. They should choose as king whichever of the two princes would, in their judgment, best uphold religion and the state. Although Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā knew that there was no point to such a meeting, his object was to gain time. Ḥeydar's supporters sent back uncompromising replies, and some time was spent in negotiations.

Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā's second delaying tactic was to send a courier to a point about one *farsaḵ* (6 km) from Qazvin, with orders to gallop into the city and spread the news that Esma'il Mīrzā had arrived. Early in the forenoon, the courier galloped into the city, his horse all in a lather, shouting 'Esma'il Mīrzā's here!" It was rumored that twelve days before his death, Shah Tahmasp had secretly sent a courier to summon Esma'il Mīrzā with all urgency, and now here he was. The populace of Qazvin, which supported Esma'il Mīrzā, rose excitedly and made their way toward Ḥoseyn Ḵolafā's house, and a large crowd gathered there. This disconcerted Ḥeydar's supporters and dissuaded them from taking any action before evening.

Toward the end of the day they received reports that the whole thing was a hoax devised by Ḥoseyn Ḵolafā, but by that time the false rumor had had a tremendous effect, and people began to think less of the pro-Ḥeydar faction's chances. One important result was that some of the uncommitted emirs, men like Moḥammadqolī Ḵalīfa *mohrdār* (keeper of the seal) and Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq Torkmān, now went to Ḵolafā's house and threw in their lot with Esma'il's supporters.

In the evening, Ḥoseyn Beg and his followers decided to put into effect their plan to go to the palace and replace the guards with their own men, and they marched out with Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā. While all the troops were mounting, however, Sultan Ebrāhīm Mīrzā took advantage of the confusion to slip away to his own residence, which was nearby; his example was followed by Allāhqolī Sultan Enjīkoġlū, who retired because he disapproved of this action.

Ḥoseyn Beg followed the usual route to the palace, along the main road. When he neared the district where Ḵalīfa *mohrdār* and Qolī Beg Afšār resided, he found that their troops had barricaded the street. As his men approached, they opened fire on them from the rooftops. Ḥoseyn Beg retreated and took another route which led him behind the royal treasury. The clerks (*'azabs*)[1] of the royal treasury, thinking that Ḥoseyn Beg's men were making for the treasury, also opened fire on them. Ḥoseyn Beg shouted, "We have no quarrel with anyone; we are going to mount guard. What do you think you are doing?" The treasury clerks ceased firing, and Ḥoseyn Beg's men proceeded to the palace, where they found the gates locked. They pounded on the doors, but no one opened them.

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[1] See *TM*, p. 144.

At this point, they received news that Ḳolafā and his followers had marched to the Meydān-e Asp, which is adjacent to the harem garden. Ḥeydar's supporters, terrified that Ḳolafā's men might get to the harem garden first by that route and that some harm might befall the prince, smashed the palace gates with battle axes and poured into the palace. Ḥeydar was in the harem, with the doors barred. His supporters rushed in all directions, but could not find a way in. Finally they got in via the kitchen, and they stormed on, smashing down every door they came to, until they reached the residential part of the harem. As they went, they shouted "Shah Ḥeydar!"

Meanwhile, on the other side, Ḳolafā's men had reached the gate of the harem garden, which Šamḳāl Sultan unlocked for them. The men, most of them mounted, poured into the garden, and they too began to search for the prince. When Sultan Ḥeydar saw his enemies pouring in, he realized that the barricaded doors and posterns were an obstacle to his escape rather than a protection. He went back into the women's quarters and sat down by his mother, thinking that the *qezelbāš* would respect the sanctity of the harem and that he would be safe there for a few minutes until his supporters could reach him. What he did not realize was that the group of men who had dared to ride into the harem garden, a place particularly sacred to those loyal to the Safavid house, would not be stopped by any consideration of the niceties of etiquette. Ḳolafā's men came on, showing no respect for their surroundings, and entered the women's quarters, searching for the prince. Ḥeydar saw his only chance was to don women's clothing and leave the building with the women of the harem and the maidservants.

One of the *ešīḳ-āqāsīs* of the harem, 'Alī Beg Šāmlū, recognized him and pointed him out to his pursuers, saying "There's your man!" Jamšīd Beg Čerkes, a *ḡolām* of Sultan Soleymān Mīrzā, and Valī Khan Beg Rūmlū the centurion seized Ḥeydar and dragged him outside. Ḳolafā and Šamḳāl Sultan, declaring that it was lawful to kill him, fell on the prince and slew him with their battle axes, swords, and daggers—heedless of the wrath of God. They severed his head from his body with a dagger and, as ʿAlī Khan Beg Gorjī, the prince's maternal uncle, with Zāl Beg Gorjī and a number of other loyal supporters of the prince, reached the door of the harem, Ḳolafā's men threw the prince's head down from the roof of the portico and shouted, "There's your king!"

All the ardor went out of Ḥeydar's supporters. Although they had with them another prince, the twenty-year-old Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā, who was capable of ruling and whom they might have been able to place on the throne, they were thrown into black despair by the death of Ḥeydar and had no thought but to get out of the city. They left the palace in a body and rode outside the city, intending to hold a council in the saddle and decide what to do.

Since fate was completing its preparations for the accession of Shah ʿAbbas I, the plans of the leaders of both factions turned out to be right or wrong depending on whether they contributed to the attainment of this ultimate objective or not. Moreover, since divine providence had decreed that Esma'il Mīrzā should hold power for a short while and rule the state, naturally all the plans made by the former supporters of Ḥeydar proved to be wrongly conceived.

After the latter left the palace, some two-thirds of the troops, and all those who had no regular military affiliation and were subject to no particular discipline, retired to their homes. Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā and Ḥoseyn Beg were forced to flee because so few men remained with them. When day broke, even those few who were left were fearful and suspicious of one another. Some of the Ostājlūs had deserted and gone to join Pīrī Beg Qūčlū, a former Ḥeydar supporter, at Varāmīn. Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā wanted to join the Bayāt tribesmen, who were his supporters and comprised about ten thousand households living in the Kazzāz and Karahrūd area. Ḥoseyn Beg accompanied the prince for two or three marches, but fearing some treachery on the part of the Bayāts, decided to visit Moḥammad Tarka, the governor of half of Lorestān-e Feylī,[2] who was a friend of his. He left his two brothers with the prince.

Once he had left the prince, Ḥoseyn Beg gave his clothes to a shepherd, and dressed himself in shepherds' garb; then he set off on foot to Lorestān. But since he was an affluent man, of good family and proud of it, he could not endure hunger and traveling on foot, and he longed to see some sign of civilization. Some passing nomads peered closely at his aristocratic features and realized he was a fugitive from the fighting at Qazvin. Finally, a certain Ḵ̌āja Farroḵ, a retainer of Ḥājjī Veys Beg Bayāt, recognized him and took him into custody. On the day that Esma'il Mīrzā entered Qazvin, he took his prisoner to that city.

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[2] See *TM*, p. 172.

As for Sultan Moṣṭafā, when he reached the Bayāt tribe he was received by Ḥājjī Veys Sultan Bayāt, but with no marked enthusiasm. The Bayāt chief observed the proprieties in his conduct toward the prince, but gave secret orders for him to be watched. At the same time, he sent a courier to Qazvin to notify Ḵolafā and the pro-Esma'il faction that he had Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā in custody and would bring him to Qazvin as soon as he heard that Esma'il Mīrzā had reached the city from the fortress of Qahqaha. The remaining fortunes of Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā, Ḥoseyn Beg, and the other former supporters of Ḥeydar Mīrzā will be related in the section on the history of the reign of Shah Esma'il II.

Ḵolafā and the supporters of Esma'il Mīrzā, after the murder of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā and the dispersal of his followers, left a detachment on guard at the palace and retired to their homes. That night, men of all classes mounted their horses and rode off to Qahqaha; there were even some Ostājlūs among them, on their way to offer their allegiance to Esma'il Mīrzā.

The following morning, all the emirs and princes assembled at the royal palace. Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, declaring that his sole object in joining Ḥeydar's supporters had been to admonish them and try to prevent them from taking up arms, and that he had stayed behind when they marched on the palace, now proclaimed himself to be a supporter of Esma'il. He came to the palace, where he was greeted with due respect by the emirs. Allāhqolī Enjīk-oġlū, who had similarly left the cavalcade when the men mounted and was relying on this to save him, entered the palace with 'Alī Khan Beg, the son of Pīra Moḥammad Khan, and a group of emirs' sons from the Ostājlū tribe, and sat in the circle of the emirs. But people ignored him. Zāl Beg the Georgian, Ḥamza Beg Ṭāleš, and a number of other supporters of Sultan Ḥeydar, some of whom were wounded and some of whom had disobeyed Ḥoseyn Beg Ḵolafā and had not gone to the palace, were arrested in their houses, taken to the palace, and executed.

Ḥakīm Abū Naṣr, the son of Ṣadr al-Šarīfa-ye Gīlānī, who had been one of Shah Tahmasp's private physicians and a supporter of Sultan Ḥeydar, had remained at court with the prince after the Shah's death. During the assault on the palace, looking in vain for a way of escape, he had hidden himself in one of the palace buildings, behind a stove. The *qūrčīs* of the cistern house *(howżḵāna),* at the instigation of some enemies of the physician, accused him of treachery while the Shah was under his care. They alleged that the physician, on instructions from Ḥeydar Mīrzā, had mixed some deadly poison in the Shah's depilatory, with the result that surgery had been necessary. They dragged him out of his hiding place and cut him to pieces on the spot. Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan Šeyḵāvand, the guardian of prince Ḥeydar, was placed in chains to await the Shah's pleasure.

In this interregnum, before the arrival of Esma'il Mīrzā from Qahqaha, it was Parī Khan Ḵānom who gave the orders. Among the emirs, Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā suffered from an inflated ego by virtue of having pulled off a coup of such magnitude, and all the emirs and royal princes obeyed his orders. On the advice of Parī Khan Ḵānom, Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq Torkmān was sent to Qahqaha to fetch Esma'il Mīrzā. The *'olamā* and shaikhs then assembled for the funeral rites. The body of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā was ritually washed for burial. The body of Shah Tahmasp was placed in a coffin inscribed with the words, "May the Ever-living God have mercy on him!" The coffin was placed in the gabled building in the palace to await the Shah's orders; the account of its removal to Mašhad for burial will be given in the chapter on Shah Esma'il II. The body of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā was taken to the shrine of the Imamzāda Ḥoseyn and buried there.

During the interregnum, which lasted from the death of Shah Tahmasp, which occurred on Tuesday, 15 Ṣafar 984/14 May 1576, until Friday of the following week, that is to say, for a period of ten days, the city was in turmoil. The terror of judgment day afflicted the populace, as the riffraff and unruly elements of various districts of the city turned to rioting. Anyone who had an old score to pay off went out and murdered his enemy, calling his action "killing government informers." No one dared to stir from his house for fear of suffering injury at the hands of undisciplined *qezelbāš* or others, and everyone who could hired armed men to protect himself.

On Friday, 24 Ṣafar 984/23 May 1576, heralds, at the orders of Mīrzā 'Alī Sultan Qājār, proclaimed in all quarters of the city that the barricades should be removed, and that henceforth any citizen who molested another would be put to death. The bazaar was reopened, and trade began again. The populace was urged to go to the Masjed-e Jāme'. When all the royal princes and emirs had assembled there, the *ḵoṭba* was recited in the name of Esma'il Mīrzā. The *ḵaṭīb* first recited an obituary ode on Shah Tahmasp. When he came to the hemistich "The city is full of sorrow and woe; O where is our king?" cries and lamentation rose on all sides. Until the arrival of the new Shah, all the emirs waited daily upon Ḥoseynqolī Ḵolafā, and then proceeded with him to the residence of Parī Khan Ḵānom, where they brought to her notice pressing administrative and financial problems. Not one of them dared to contravene her orders.

At this juncture, Sūlaḡ Ḥoseyn and Ordūḡdī Ḵalīfa, who had been in Gīlān, at Samām and Eškavar and Sīmgar, arrived at Qazvin. These Takkalū troublemakers intended to revive the long-standing feud between the Takkalūs and Ostājlūs, and to take this opportunity[3] of getting revenge on the Ostājlūs for what they had suffered at their hands during the reign of Shah Tahmasp. One matter that rankled particularly was the dismissal and disgrace, as a result of Ostājlū intrigue, of Qarā Khan, the son of Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū, who was governor of Herat. Since a number of Ostājlū emirs, including Allāhqolī Sultan Enjīk-oḡlū, and a large number of the sons of Ostājlū emirs were then in Qazvin, the Takkalū emirs determined to kill them. Ḥoseynqolī Ḵalīfa gave them their head and took no steps to prevent them, because it had been reported to him that Allāhqolī Sultan, on the day the Ostājlūs marched against the royal palace, had expressed the opinion that the best plan would be to march first to Ḥoseynqolī Ḵalīfa's house. In fact, Ḥoseynqolī had once alluded to this in conversation with Allāhqolī Sultan, saying, "If Ḥeydar's supporters had followed your advice, they would have succeeded in their purpose!"

The Takkalū emirs, having made inquiries and discovered that Ḥoseynqolī would not interfere, mounted and rode in a body to the house of Allāhqolī Sultan. The latter, forewarned, barricaded the doors of the house and prepared to defend it, but most of his retainers deserted him; only some forty trustworthy men stayed with him. The Takkalūs, who numbered some fifteen hundred men, poured in from all sides and put the Ostājlūs to the sword. Among the slain were Allāhqolī Sultan, several of his sons and other kinfolk, 'Alī Khan

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[3] When the Ostājlūs were in disgrace because of their support of Ḥeydar Mīrzā.

Beg, the son of Pīra Moḥammad Khan, a number of men of the Čāūšlū tribe, and other supporters of the Ostājlūs—altogether about twenty-four men. The house was looted and its inmates, even the women and children, plundered. This was the signal for the urban riffraff to follow the Takkalū example and plunder houses belonging to former supporters of Ḥeydar, and no one stopped them. In this way, fantastic amounts of personal property and precious items were looted from the houses of Ḥoseyn Beg *yuzbāšī*, Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan, Ḥamza Sultan, and other members of the pro-Ḥeydar faction.

The purge of the Ostājlūs spread to the provinces too. Emir Khan Mowṣellū Torkmān, who was in the Ḵār district of Rayy province, conspired with Ḥoseyn Khan Sultan Ḵenūslū to slay Pīrī Beg Qūčīlū and the Ostājlūs who were with him at Varāmīn, and they besieged Pīrī Beg's house. Once again most of his supporters defected; only some thirty or forty men of substance remained loyal to him, and fought on as long as they had arrows in their quivers. But the Turkmans and the Ḵenūslūs, who numbered altogether ten thousand men, slew Pīrī Beg and all his men, and scattered their possessions like dust.

The reason for all this lawlessness was that for ten to fifteen days no word came from Qahqaha. The emirs and the people feared that Ḥeydar's former supporters, with the help of Ḵalīfa Anṣār Qarādāğlū, the commandant of the fortress, had harmed Esma'il Mīrzā. Thinking there was no hand at the helm, people threw off all restraint in their behavior. Finally, word came that Esma'il Mīrzā had left the fortress. Parī Khan Ḵānom ordered the Takkalūs to go out and welcome the new Shah; and as soon as they had left the city, law and order was restored. After the Takkalūs had gone, Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, who held the office of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*, together with Mīrzā Salmān,[4] who was the keeper of the royal regalia, including the golden parasol, and supervisor of the royal workshops, went to meet Shah Esma'il II on the plain on Zenjān.

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[4] For the career of this powerful official, see R. M. Savory, "The Significance of the Political Murder of Mīrzā Salmān," *Islamic Studies, Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi*, III/2, 1964, pp. 181-191.

The Accession of Shah Esma'il II and Events During His Reign

As already recorded, Esma'il Mīrzā, the bravest[1] of the sons of Shah Tahmasp and the brother of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā, had been guilty of a number of forbidden practices—the sort of behavior that is part of the rashness of youth, such as associating with certain crazy fools among the *qezelbāš*. These practices had not been acceptable to the Shah, who had considered it advisable to send Esma'il Mīrzā away from the court and recall Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā from Herat. Esma'il had been appointed in his place as governor of Khorasan, with Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū Takkalū as his guardian. However, Esma'il's behavior in Khorasan had not pleased the Shah either. Tahmasp recalled him and sent Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā back to Herat. Esma'il Mīrzā was not even granted an audience with the Shah, but was met by Sevendūk Beg the *qūrčībāšī* who, acting on orders from the Shah, bypassed Qazvin and took Esma'il Mīrzā directly to the fortresss-prison of Qahqaha. There he was placed in the charge of the commandant, who was changed every few years.

After Esma'il Mīrzā had been in prison for nineteen years, six months, and twenty-one days, at a time when Ḵalīfa Anṣār Qarādāḡlū was commandant and Esma'il's guard had been reduced to no more than eight *qūrčīs,* he received the news of the death of his father, Shah Tahmasp, and the murder of his brother, Sultan Ḥeydar. As it happened, the commandant had gone hunting and was not in the fort when the news arrived. Since Esma'il Mīrzā distrusted Ḵalīfa Anṣār, considering him a supporter of Sultan Ḥeydar, and since he thought it possible that the report of Ḥeydar's death was false, he conspired with the *qūrčīs* to overpower the commandant's retainers, some twenty in number, and to tie them up and hold them prisoner in the fort. He then had the gates of the castle barricaded, so that no one could go in or out, and awaited confirmation of the news from Qazvin.

Meanwhile Ḵalīfa Anṣār, at the hunting grounds, had received a well-corroborated report and was convinced that Sultan Ḥeydar was in fact dead. He returned to the fort and found the gates barred. However much he abased himself and declared his fealty to Esma'il Mīrzā it had no effect. For three days, not one person succeeded in getting into or out of the fort. Finally, a crowd of people from court and from Azerbaijan appeared before the castle and confirmed the news of Sultan Ḥeydar's death. Esma'il then ordered the gates to be opened, and troop after troop of men flocked into the fort and made their obeisance to the new Shah. Among them were some men from the Ostājlū tribe; one of them, who was a close companion of Sultan Ḥeydar, and a few others who were recognized by Esma'il Mīrzā, were put to death in the fort. This caused the rest of the Ostājlū emirs to panic; they fled to Ardabīl and sought asylum at the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn.

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[1] It is not clear what the author means by *aršad*. Clearly it cannot mean "eldest," since Esma'il Mīrzā was the second son of Shah Tahmasp, unless it means "eldest of those fit to reign."

When all the *qezelbāš* had assembled and Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq had arrived from Qazvin to escort him, Esma'il Mīrzā came out of the fortress, at an hour selected by himself, and took up residence in Ḥeydar Sultan's tent. Daily large numbers of men entered his tent, prostrated themselves before him, and kissed his feet. The men of the Qarādāğlū tribe planned to put Ḵalīfa Anṣār to death, and the latter presented himself to the Shah and fully acknowledged his guilt. "If the Shah wishes to put me to death," he said, "let him give the sign, so that the servants of the Safavid house may hasten to carry out his order. If the Shah decides to pardon me, it will be such a token of royal favor that it will raise me from my present humiliation and abasement." Esma'il Mīrzā replied: "I have vowed that, if I emerge unscathed by the machinations of my enemies and my affairs prosper, I shall not exact vengeance on anyone. You have faithfully performed the services of a servant of the crown, in that you have kept me in close confinement and have ignored my commands and prohibitions, and it is the duty of a good servant not to be deflected from his allotted task by taking the part of even a royal prince like myself." Esma'il Mīrzā then gave orders that Ḵalīfa Anṣār should resume his former place in the ranks of the emirs. Ḵalīfa Anṣār was slightly reassured[2] and the Qarādāğlū tribe abandoned its intention of killing him.

After three days, Esma'il Mīrzā marched away from the fortress and proceeded by easy stages toward Ardabīl, where he visited the sacred enclosure of the Safavid mausoleum. From Ardabīl he marched to the meadows of Zenjān, where Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, Mīrzā Salmān the *nāẓer,* and the majority of the servants of the court had assembled. The tents of the royal complex—the harem pavilion, the audience pavilion, and the tents for the royal workshops—had been erected, and Esma'il Mīrzā entered the camp with full ceremony, the golden parasol of royalty held high above his head. Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā was received by the new Shah, and the prince congratulated him and offered him felicitations. Esma'il Mīrzā embraced him warmly and sought to win his heart; he addressed him as "brother," and made him a favored companion of royal assemblies and a constant confidant.

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[2] Personally, I regard Esma'il's remarks as sinister in the extreme!

While the court was still encamped at Zenjān, Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū arrived from Gīlān, bringing Emāmqolī Mīrzā. I mentioned previously that Shah Tahmasp, after he had fully recovered from his illness, sent Morād Khan Ostājlū, the leader of the pro-Ḥeydar faction, to capture the fortress of Kojūr. Morād Khan was still encamped before the walls of this fort when he heard the news of the death of Shah Tahmasp and the murder of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā. Morād Khan marched from Kojūr to Lāhījān, where he joined forces with Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū. The latter was suspected of being a friend of Esma'il Mīrzā because, when Shah Tahmasp sent him and a number of other emirs to Qahqaha to bring back Esma'il Mīrzā's coffers and to investigate the charge of misappropriation of funds from the royal treasury, all the Khan's companions, with a view to ingratiating themselves with the Shah, treated the prince with great insolence; but Pīra Moḥammad Khan maintained correct behavior toward him. It was rumored that he had concluded a pact with the prince and had promised him his daughter. As a result, the Sufis and other loyal servants of the Shah had accused him of being a partisan of Esma'il Mīrzā.

When Esma'il Mīrzā heard of the concentration of Ostājlū forces at Lāhījān, although he considered Pīra Moḥammad Khan to be one of his supporters, he was apprehensive that Morād Khan might have diverted him from the path of loyalty. He feared that he might decide to keep his hands on Emāmqolī Mīrzī and stay in Gīlān, which was a strong and easily defended region, and that the Ostājlū tribe might raise the standard of revolt there. Esma'il therefore sent 'Alī Khan Beg Torkmān, the *dārūğa* of the *daftarḵāna,*[3] to Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū to tell him that the pact between them was still in force on the same terms they had agreed to at Qahqaha. As far as the Ostājlū tribe as a whole was concerned, any submission he might care to make stood a reasonable chance of success. Morād Khan, however, who had caused division and discord among the *qezelbāš*, he could not pardon. Pīra Moḥammad Khan was bidden to pluck out Morād Khan's eyes and then to present himself at court with Emāmqolī Mīrzā.

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[3] See *TM,* pp. 71-72. The *dārūğa* was an official of the royal secretariat, called by Chardin *prévôt de la chambre* (*TM,* p. 198).

After 'Alī Khan Beg reached Gīlān, Pīra Moḥammad Khan hastened to carry out Esma'il's orders. He arrived at Zenjān with Emāmqolī Mīrzā, as stated above, and was received with great favor by the Shah. Esma'il Mīrzā greeted Emāmqolī Mīrzā as "my son," and embraced him warmly. The Shah then proceeded to the capital, Qazvin, which he reached on Thursday, 17 Rabī' I, 984/13 June 1576.[4] The royal princes, together with Ḥoseynqolī Kolafā and other great emirs who were in the city, paid their respects to him. The Shah did not enter the city at once, but camped on the northern side of it, since he was awaiting a propitious hour for his entry. While he was there, Ḥoseyn Beg was brought in, disguised in a shepherd's felt cloak and hat so that no one should recognize him. But he was recognized, and the populace began to revile him and to brandish knives, daggers and swords at him; they were prevented by the guards from harming him. When he entered the presence of Esma'il, he looked around at those in attendance and said, "Glory be to God! I am the only guilty one here!" Esma'il Mīrzā replied, "There were others who were more zealous in the cause of Sultan Ḥeydar than you, but all their hopes were smashed because of you." Ḥoseyn Beg retorted, "O king! the whole world supported Sultan Ḥeydar! Yet in the end, your affairs prospered, and Almighty God acted as He thought fit. If you now are of a mind to exact vengeance, you will have to slay the whole world!"

Esma'il Mīrzā acknowledged the truth of his remarks, and this preliminary exchange led him to delay Ḥoseyn Beg's execution. He sent him off to the audience hall, entrusting him to the care of the royal guards on duty there. Those who were present in the audience hall, especially Ḥoseyn Kolafā, who had demanded the extreme penalty for Ḥoseyn Beg, now held their peace.

The following day, Shah Esma'il II visited the Bāg-e Sa'ādatābād, a beautiful garden which was the creation of Shah Tahmasp. Still observing the hour his astrologers had indicated, however, he did not enter the royal palace, but took up residence for a few days in the house of Ḥoseyn Kolafā, which had been made available to him. There, Ḥājjī Veys Sultan Bayāt brought before him Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā.

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[4] I.e., one month after the death of Shah Tahmasp.

Esma'il Mīrzā embraced him and bade him take his place among his brothers. Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā did so, but not one of his brothers had the courtesy to greet him; he took his place below Sultan Soleymān Mīrzā, who was a year older than he, and saluted his brothers in turn. Esma'il Mīrzā then offered some words of advice to his brothers, speaking to them in kindly fashion: "If you treat me lovingly and justly, I shall, God willing, treat you in a way in which no other king has treated his brothers." But in his heart he planned only to eliminate them, and in the end he carried out what was hidden in his heart, as will be related at the proper place.

Ḥoseyn Beg's brothers, Fatḥollāh Beg, Šāhqolī Beg, Nader 'Alī Beg, and Šāhverdī Beg, were brought in and handed over to Morād Khan Kangarlū, who was enrolled among the Ostājlū emirs.[5] He, to show how reliable he was, at once put all four to death in Ḵolafā's house. (It had been stipulated that each should be entrusted for safekeeping to a tribe other than his own, because anyone who was handed over to the men of his own tribe was at once put to death.)

For fourteen days, Esma'il Mīrzā remained in Ḵolafā's house. During this period, the majority of the emirs continued their usual practice of calling at the house of Parī Khan Ḵānom, thinking in this way to improve their standing in the eyes of the Shah and to assure him of their trustworthiness. Parī Khan Ḵānom's stewards began to act with greater pomp and circumstance than during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and her doorkeepers, chamberlains, and other retainers instituted ceremonies more appropriate to the court of a king. Parī Khan Ḵānom confidently expected that, since Shah Esma'il II owed his throne to her, and since she had also been his supporter during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, she would have greater influence in matters of state than Tahmasp's sister, Šāhzāda Solṭānom. But fate decreed otherwise. Shah Esma'il began dropping hints to the emirs about their practice of dancing attendance on Parī Khan Ḵānom, and on one occasion he came out openly and said: "Have you not understood, my friends, that interference in matters of state by women is demeaning to the king's honor, and that for men to associate with the women of the Safavid royal house is an abominable crime?" The emirs soon understood the message, and stopped going to Parī Khan Ḵānom.

Meanwhile, the Shah had turned against Ḵolafā, and determined to smash him. The apparent reason for this—at least the one which com-

[5] The Kangarlūs were a clan of the Ostājlū tribe.

mends itself most to reason—was that Ḵolafā had got altogether too big for his boots, and had begun to act like a king. Moreover, Shah Esma'il was under a great obligation to him, and kings hate to be placed in this situation; they usually do not allow anyone to survive who does not owe his existence to them. Another reason, which only came to light later, had its origin in events following the murder of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā. A few days after this, when still no word had come from the fortress of Qahqaha, the people of Qazvin became perturbed, and Ḵolafā inquired what they were worried about. Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā, who was also a son of the late Shah Tahmasp, and who was a young man of ability, capable of being king, had informed Parī Khan Ḵānom that most people thought the pro-Ḥeydar faction had done away with Esma'il Mīrzā at Qahqaha as soon as the news of Shah Tahmasp's death had reached that prison. If this was so, they wished to make Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā king. At this juncture, however, the news reached Qazvin that Esma'il Mīrzā was alive and well. During the period that Shah Esma'il resided at Ḵolafā's house, the enemies of the latter seized their opportunity to relate all these events to him and to poison his mind against Ḵolafā.

But no! I am mistaken; neither of the reasons mentioned above is the real one. Rather, God (may He be glorified and exalted), who is the true Avenger, in conformity with the saying, "If any man help a tyrant, God has already placed that man in the tyrant's hands," turned the Shah against Ḵolafā. Fate demanded revenge for the blood of the murdered Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, and would no longer allow the tyrant Ḵolafā to remain in power. Within a short time, all those who had had a hand in the murder of Sultan Ḥeydar were struck down by some calamity.

In short, Shah Esma'il had lost confidence in Ḵolafā, and he enjoined him to assume the office of *vakīl* and the position of deputy *(nāyeb)* to himself.[6] Esma'il's purpose was this: Since the Sufis considered Ḵolafā their *ḵalīfa* and the deputy *(nāyeb)* of their *moršed-e kāmel,* and considered his orders second in importance only to those of their *moršed* (i.e., the Shah); and since at that time there were about ten thousand Sufis at Qazvin, subject heart and soul to the orders of Ḵolafā, who had acquired all this power and position with their help, the Shah wished to test his loyalty. He therefore said to him: "Your power has exceeded that appropriate to the rank of *ḵolafā*. You must assume the office of *vakīl-e dīvān-e 'ālī*." Ḵolafā replied: "I will not surrender the position of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*. If the office of *vakīl* be added to that, well and good; but if not, I will not be satisfied with the office of *vakīl* alone." He said this because he considered his power to be greater than that of a *vakīl*.

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[6] For a discussion of this incident, see my article, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Ṣafawids," *JAOS,* 85/4, 1965, pp. 499ff. I have corrected here a serious error contained in that article.

The Shah showed his annoyance at these words and took exception to them. He addressed the Rūmlū emirs and said: "In Sufi practice, and according to the rules of conduct drawn up by the Safavid shaikhs, what is the penalty for any Sufi or postulant who transgresses the limits of the words and directions of the *moršed-e kāmel*?" They replied: "Whoever opposes or disobeys the will of the *moršed-e kāmel* is guilty of error and is to be rejected." The Shah asked: "Then why does Ḵolafā reject my words?"

This was reported to Ḵolafā. In the morning, he came to pay his respects to the Shah and to report certain matters to him. When he reached the gatehouse, the *ešīk-āqāsīs* and *ḥājebs*, on instructions from the Shah, blocked his path, saying: "Although this is your house, it is also the residence of the Shah. As long as it is the place where the Shah resides, it is also the royal lodging of the *qezelbāš*. You are guilty of error and of shortcomings in your service to the Shah, who is our *moršed*. Until the *moršed-e kāmel* overlooks your sin, you are not allowed, according to Sufi conduct and practice, to enter the court. Sit opposite the entrance, until the *moršed-e kāmel* comes to see you at his convenience."

Ḵolafā, confronted by an order he had never conceived of or expected, was overcome by consternation. He sat in the gatehouse, like a malefactor, until midday. Early in the day, a large number of Rūmlūs and others expressed their sympathy for him. Eventually, the Shah sent a man out to tell Ḵolafā to return to his own house; the Shah would say in person what he wanted to say to him. Ḵolafā was greatly reassured by this statement, and everyone thought that the Shah would go to his house and seek to conciliate him. But Ḵolafā sat at home, ignored, for two days, and there was no sign of the promised visit from the Shah. The Rūmlū emirs continued to befriend him in the usual way.

On the third day, Delī (Mad) Bodāq, a Rūmlū emir of integrity and sincere faith, was summoned by the Shah, who asked him how

Ḵolafā was feeling. He replied: "He is full of remorse and regrets his disobedience to the royal order, and he will thankfully accept and discharge any duty the Shah may bid him to do, even if it be the duty of keeper of the royal kennels." The Shah said: "If he is sincere and obedient to my command, in return for his services to the crown I will appoint him to a post that will exalt his position both in this world and the next. We hereby appoint him commander of the *qūrčīs* at Mašhad, in order that, being in the service of the holy shrine of the Imam 'Alī al-Reżā, he may acquire credit in this world in Khorasan, and obtain his reward also in the next world. You must see that he mounts and sets off immediately."

Delī Būdāq and the Rūmlū emirs, and the other supporters of Ḵolafā, realized that the Shah had no confidence in him, and that it was impossible for him to remain at court. They further realized that, to a man whose pride and arrogance were such that he would turn down the office of *vakīl-e dīvān-e a'lā*, the offer of the post of commander of the *qūrčīs* at Mašhad—an office he would consider beneath the dignity of the humblest of his retainers—was a clear indication of royal anger and disfavor. They therefore kept their distance from him. Not one of the Rūmlū tribe, not even one of the servants, went to his house, and he was left aghast at his action. At this point, Delī Būdāq arrived and delivered the royal message. Delī Būdāq did not give Ḵolafā a chance to speak, but mounted him on his horse, escorted him one *farsaḵ* outside the city, and returned. His arms, equipment, and baggage were loaded at once and sent off. When Ḵolafā reached Damghan, 'Alī Ḵalīfa Āqča-Qoyūnlū, governor of Damghan, showed him a royal order to the effect that he was to remain there pending the arrival of further orders from the Shah. A few days later, Kūr Shah 'Alī Rūmlū reached Damghan, and at the Shah's command, blinded Ḵolafā. The Shah, after he had expelled Ḵolafā from Qazvin, left the latter's house and went to the home of Šāhqolī Yakān Ostājlū, which was situated between the Meydān-e Asp-e Šāhī and the home of Parī Khan Ḵānom. There, Parī Khan Ḵānom and other women of the royal harem were received in audience by the Shah, but Parī Khan Ḵānom was not honored by the overwhelming display of royal favor she had expected. From there, the Shah proceeded to the royal palace, at an hour chosen by himself.

Shah Esma'il II made considerable changes in the buildings of the palace complex, and ordered the construction of some new buildings. Every day the builders were at work, and during the construction the

Shah lodged at the house of Yakān Shahqolī or at that of Parī Khan Ḵānom, or in the Bāġ-e Sa'ādatābād. The *qezelbāš* tribes came to court from all parts of the Safavid empire. Qazvin became so crowded that it was difficult to push one's way through the streets and markets. Such vast quantities of gifts reached the capital from emirs, from the rulers of neighboring countries, and from the nobility and populace in general that officials confessed their inability to enumerate them.

When the Shah had determined on the hour of his coronation, he placed a moratorium on all state and royal business, and set the time for the ceremony. The people counted the days in anticipation of this event. The *qezelbāš* tribes were so completely subject to his command that, if they perceived he entertained the slightest suspicion of anyone, that person's relatives would murder him on the pretext that he had belonged to the pro-Ḥeydar faction. In this way, a considerable number of the Ostājlū tribe were put to death. Even men like Sārū Lājīn and Allāhqolī Beg, the brother of Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq who had been sent as an ambassador to Turkey, who were assiduous in their daily attendance on the Shah, were murdered by one of their cousins, Abū Torāb Beg the son of Eyġūt Mīrzā. The latter, with a group of his retainers, lay in ambush for these two emirs' sons in an alley, and as they were making their way home after leaving the royal palace, cut them down.

When acts of this sort were perpetrated at court, without any inquiry being instituted, men became more bold, and these odious practices spread to the provinces. Wherever anyone was in a position to murder a member of the Ostājlū tribe, he rushed off and killed him without delay. Among those murdered in this way was Šāhqolī Sultan Yakān, the governor-general of Herat and the guardian of the prince 'Abbas (the future Shah 'Abbas I). After the death of Shah Tahmasp, Šāhqolī Yakān had summoned all the emirs of the regions near Herat with a view to making plans for the defense of the frontier. These emirs had worked on Ḥoseyn Sultan Afšār, the governor of Farāh, and persuaded him to join a conspiracy against the governor-general. The conspirators gathered outside the Molk gate; the Ostājlū nobles, learning of the plot, assembled in the governor-general's gatehouse, fully armed.

The conspirators sent a message to them saying that the Ostājlū tribe had incurred the royal wrath and forfeited the confidence of the Shah. They (the conspirators) would not leave the city of Herat in

Ostājlū hands; they would allow no interference from Ostājlūs, but would take over the citadel and the defense of the region themselves, and would it hand over to whomever the Shah might appoint. The best course was for the governor-general to leave the city; if he wished to go to court, let him go; otherwise, he should retire from the scene and await orders from the Shah. The Ostājlūs protested that they had been charged by the Shah with the government and security of the province of Khorasan, and until they received an order from the Shah dismissing them from this charge, they would continue to govern. Troublemakers on both sides whipped up the fervor of their respective parties, and there were many inflammatory statements and much saber-rattling.

Although there were some cooler heads in Herat, men like Mīr Ḥoseyn the *katīb*, who could have extinguished the flames, they made no effort to check the attack on the Ostājlūs, because they knew that the latter were out of favor with the Shah. Šāhqolī Sultan, an intelligent Tork of sound judgment, who did not want to bring the Ostājlūs into still greater disfavor, gave orders that his men should not wear their weapons or make military demonstrations. He himself stopped seeing people, ceased to take any part in the business of government, and waited to see what orders the Shah would issue concerning himself and the government of Herat. The Afšārs were not satisfied with this, however, and launched a sudden attack on Šāhqolī Sultan's house. The few Ostājlūs who were in the house put up some resistance, but in vain; the Afšārs rushed upon Šāhqolī Sultan with drawn swords and cut him down as he stood there unarmed, trying to prevent his men from offering resistance. The Afšārs then plundered his house.

After the murder of their leader, the Ostājlūs fled from Herat, abandoning their possessions. Some took refuge with Šāhqolī Sultan's son, Ebrahim Sultan, who was governor of Saraks, and others went to court. The young prince 'Abbas, then six years of age, was thus left without a guardian. The Afšārs and other *qezelbāš* who were in Herat paid no attention to him, thinking that if they did they might incur the Shah's displeasure. When the news of the murder of Šāhqolī Sultan reached court, the Shah appointed as governor of Herat and *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan 'Alī Beg Šāmlū, the son of Sultan Ḥoseyn Beg Šāmlū and the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan;[7] he also raised 'Alī

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[7] The famous Šāmlū chief of the time of Shah Esma'il I. He was governor of Herat 1521-24.

Beg to the rank of khan and honored him by a marriage alliance with the Safavid house. The Shah turned a blind eye toward the murder of Šāhqolī Sultan and did not order a judicial inquiry. The Ostājlūs who had gone to court fell into even deeper despair; not one of them slept peacefully in their beds at night, and their lives were filled with terror.

At this juncture, Moḥammadī Khan Toḳmāq, a trusted Ostājlū emir and governor-general of the province of Čoḳūr-e Sa'd, returned from his mission to Turkey. He was received in audience by Shah Esma'il II, but the Shah did not display the degree of warmth toward him which he had expected. On the contrary, the Shah decided to take away his tribal lands in Čoḳūr-e Sa'd and give it to his cousin Abū Torāb Sultan. Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja-oğlū Ostājlū, who had been in Tiflis, also returned to court, but he did not receive any mark of royal favor either. Thus in the eyes of the other *qezelbāš*, the Ostājlū tribe remained in disgrace, and lived from day to day in a state of great anxiety.

Finally, the Ostājlūs got together and decided to proceed in conformity with the rules of Sufi behavior. "Since we have been guilty of shortcomings in our duty toward our spiritual director," they said, "until our spiritual director pardons our sins, we are debarred from our homes, our wives, and our children, and we shall have no peace of mind." All the Ostājlū emirs and centurions gathered in front of the royal palace and camped opposite the audience hall. There, they were joined by Pīra Moḥammad Khan and Moḥammadī Khan Toḳmāq, who decided to throw in their lot with the Ostājlūs. Shah Esma'il II, who did not approve of this move, said, "Pīra Moḥammad Khan was never one of this group. Why has he joined them and put himself foward to intercede for their sins?" But Pīra Moḥammad Khan did not waver in his support of his fellow Ostājlūs, who remained camped before the palace gates for about ten days, hoping to hear the good news that their lives had been spared. In the meantime, however, they set up pavilions, filled them with an impressive amount of equipment, and banqueted in royal style every day, eating off silver dishes that aroused the envy of passers-by.

After ten days had elapsed, Shah Esma'il II removed an arrow fired by the Ostājlūs on the night of Ḥeydar Mīrzā's murder that had imbedded itself in a plane tree opposite the Čehel Sotūn hall, and delivered it to the Ostājlūs by the hand of one of the *moqarrabs*, with the following message: "You claim to be sincerely devoted to the crown, and to have acted in accordance with the rules of Sufi behavior. In that case, what is this arrow, and who fired it in the direction of the palace of their spiritual director, and toward the corpse of Shah Tahmasp?" The Ostājlūs replied: "From the time of the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, we have served the royal house, generation after generation. We have no other refuge than this court. Some misguided persons among us, incited by others, have strayed from the path of rectitude, and have been guilty of improper behavior. Those who are guilty have already paid for their crimes or will do so. What crime have the rest of us committed? However, we are all guilty and deserve to be punished, and we are grateful for any favors or kindness from the Shah which may fall to our lot while we are carrying out our duties."

At this point, the Shah sent some men out to pull down the tents about their ears, so that the common people might loot their belongings. People rushed in and began to plunder them, and the Ostājlūs, in their humiliation, slipped away quietly so that no one should see them, and reached their own homes. For some days, Pīra Moḥammad Khan remained under a cloud, but finally the Shah summoned him. "Sultan Moṣṭafā and Sultan Soleymān," said the Shah, "are hostile to me—the former because of his friendship with Sultan Ḥeydar, and the latter because his credibility has been destroyed by Parī Khan Ḵānom and he has not obtained what he expected; I am not safe from either of them" Pīra Moḥammad Khan replied: "Whenever the king's mind is uneasy about either of them, they can be sent to one of the fortress-prisons and spend the rest of their lives there."[8] Shah Esma'il retorted sarcastically, "Sultan Moṣṭafā was reared among the Ostājlū tribe. I am going to hand him over to you, and Soleymān to Šamḵāl Čerkes, his maternal uncle. If you wish, you may place them in prison; or, if you like, you may train them and make them king!"

The next day, Ḥājjī Veys Sultan was ordered to conduct Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā to the house of Pīra Moḥammad Khan, hand him over to the latter, and get a receipt for him! In the same way, Sultan Soleymān Mīrzā was conducted to the house of his maternal uncle. For several days, the Ostājlūs discussed what to do. Although they did not want to sully their hands with the blood of the children of Shah Tahmasp, the wiser heads among the tribe realized that Shah Esma'il would be satisfied with nothing less than the deaths of the princes, and that there was no way out of it. In the end, they agreed to put the prince to death. The prince realized what was being planned, and during his stay in Pīra Moḥammad Khan's house, was in nightly expectation of being murdered. He spent his time at his prayers and devotions. Finally, a few vile men from the Ostājlū tribe entered his room at night and strangled him. Šamḵāl did the same for Sultan Soleymān Mīrzā, and both princes were murdered on the same night. Their corpses were taken to the Imamzāda Ḥoseyn, and buried there.

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[8] A tactless remark in view of the Shah's own experience!

Pīra Moḥammad Khan was then reinstated in royal favor, and his daughter, who was betrothed to the Shah, was given a royal wedding feast and conducted to her husband's house. The Shah also asked for the daughters of Šamḵāl Sultan Čerkes and Ḥoseyn Khan Sultan Ḵeneslū in marriage, and both women were admitted to the harem on the same night. Once he had become the son-in-law of an Ostājlū emir, Shah Esma'il II showed mercy toward the Ostājlū tribe. He took under his wing Ebrahim Sultan and Moršedqolī Sultan, the sons of Yakān Šāhqolī; Ebrahim Sultan was appointed governor of Qazvin, and Moršedqolī Sultan governor of Sīstān. Since the Ostājlūs had now regained their prestige, no one dared to molest them further.

Among the royal princes, Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā was an intimate companion of the Shah and attended his private audiences. The Shah said to him: "During Shah Tahmasp's reign you were treated like one of his sons,[9] and you served him devotedly. Now to me you are like a brother,[10] and the office of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* is not suitable to you." The Shah therefore made Ebrahim *mohrdār* (keeper of the seal) instead, so that he could always keep an eye on him, and the prince had the privilege of conversing with the Shah. The office of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* was conferred on Ḥoseynqolī Sultan Šāmlū. Mīrzā Šokrollāh Eṣfahānī, who had been comptroller of finance *(mostowfī al-mamālek)* under Shah Tahmasp, was made vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, and Mīr Shah Ġāzī, formerly *mostowfī-e baqāyā*, was made comptroller of finance.

As the day selected by Shah Esma'il II for his coronation was still some way off, the Shah took no part in affairs of state. The settlement of the problems and petitions of all those, both Turk and Persian, military and civilians, who had assembled at Qazvin was put off until this appointed day. Meanwhile, skilled craftsmen were hard at work on the construction of the new palace buildings; every group of artisans was under the supervision of a *qezelbāš* officer. The Shah had established himself on the throne so firmly that no neighboring ruler thought of displaying hostility toward him. Even though the frontiers were devoid of emirs, frontier guards, and troops generally, no one dared to set foot on Safavid territory without acknowledging fealty to the crown, or dared to steal even a calf from the realm of the *qezelbāš*. The Shah's power was unquestioned, and his ruthlessness inspired awe.

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[9] Ebrahim was actually Tahmasp's nephew—the son of his brother Bahrām Mīrzā.
[10] He was Shah Esma'il II's cousin.

When the day appointed for Esma'il's coronation drew near, he expressed the wish to hold a wake[11] to comfort the spirit of the late Shah Tahmasp, and have his body, which still lay in the palace, borne to the Imamzāda Ḥoseyn shrine, to lie there until it could be transported to Mašhad in the autumn. Tahmasp's arms and personal possessions were taken to the shrine, and numerous tents were pitched there for the wake. Altogether, twelve thousand plates of different kinds of food and sweetmeats were prepared, and the great emirs were charged with the responsibility of providing one thousand plates each. The body of the late Shah was then brought forth from the palace, and the Shah himself, with the assistance of the royal princes, acted as pallbearer. Outside the palace the Shah mounted his horse, but the princes continued to act as pallbearers the whole way to the shrine. The coffin was set down within the shrine, close to the tomb of the Imamzāda, and a cloth was draped over it. The Koran reciters recited the Word of God, from beginning to end, in the prescribed manner. At the conclusion of this ceremony, the guests proceeded to the wake, where twelve thousand plates of food and dessert were distributed, and were enjoyed not only by the poor but by all believers, including both military and civilians.

On the day appointed for the coronation of Esma'il II, Wednesday 27 Jomāda I 984/22 August 1576, a great celebration was organized in the Čehel Sotūn hall. When the emirs, royal princes, and principal officers of state were assembled, Shah Esma'il II entered the hall and took his place in Shah Tahmasp's seat. Then there filed before him, to perform the ceremony of kissing the Shah's feet, the royal princes, followed by the *seyyeds, 'olamā,* and *mojtaheds.* After them came the Georgian princes: 'Īsā Khan, the son of Lavand Khan; Samā'ūn

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[11] Lit.: to distribute *āš*—a dish distributed, especially to the poor, on mourning occasions (*e.g.*, Moḥarram, etc.).

(Simon) the son of Luārsāb, who had been brought from the fortress-prison of Alamūt; and Shah Rostam the Lor. After them came the high-ranking emirs, the *qezelbāš* nobility, the viziers and members of the bureaucracy, men of note from the provinces, ambassadors from the Neẓāmšāh and from Ebrahim Khan, the ruler of Lār, and from Mīrzā Khan, the ruler of Māzandarān, and from Seyyed Saḥḥar, the ruler of 'Arabestān, as well as ambassadors from Europe. All the presents and gifts from neighboring rulers which had reached the court from the time Esma'il left the Qahqaha prison until the day of his coronation were brought before him.

However, even after his coronation, the normal business of government continued to be in abeyance, and Shah Esma'il II made no decision on any important matter. The length of time people waited for their business to be attended to exceeded all reasonable limits. In order to pacify hostile critics, the Shah ordered Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, together with Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, Mīrzā 'Alī Qājār, and the vizier Mīrzā Šokrollāh, to take their seats in the court of justice and to give judgment both in individual cases involving financial problems and in matters affecting the welfare of the realm as a whole. Their judgments and mandates were to be embellished with the endorsement "ratified by the supreme *dīvān*," and were to bear the imprint of the *mehr-āṣār* seal,[12] which Shah Esma'il had allocated for this purpose, and on which had been engraved the formula "the seal of the supreme *dīvān*." Since the Shah was in the habit of composing poetry, he chose the pen name of 'Ādelī, and at the top of his orders and letters of appointment was the superscription "He is just."

The office of *ṣadr* was divided on a territorial basis, half the provinces being allocated to Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī, and half to Shah 'Enāyatollāh Eṣfahānī, the *naqīb*, who had been *qāżī-ye mo'askar* during the reign of Shah Tahmasp. They were empowered to make judicial decisions in accordance with the canon law.

For a few months, the court of justice gave rulings on comparatively minor legal and fiscal matters affecting ordinary people in all parts of the Safavid empire, and issued judgments and mandates bearing the imprint of the seal of the supreme *dīvān*. But the Shah took no steps to deal with the major problems relating to the royal household, the appointment of emirs and governors, and the like. The Shah spent most of his time complaining about the inexperience and lack of expertise of the vizier, Mīrzā Šokrollāh, and making the latter the target of criticisms he did not deserve; no one was privy to the Shah's thinking.

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[12] See *TM*, p. 202. The entire question of the seals used by the Safavid shahs is confused and needs elucidation.

At this juncture, news arrived of the death from natural causes of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, who had been appointed governor of Kandahar by Shah Tahmasp. Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā went into mourning for his brother, and the Shah went to his house and offered his condolences. He gave robes of honor to the prince, his wife and daughter, and to Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, his son, who was at court, and persuaded them to emerge from mourning. A few days later, however, the Shah completely changed his attitude toward him, and the prince received no more sympathy or attention. On the contrary, the Shah began to criticize him. Gradually the Shah became so ill-disposed toward him and toward the other royal princes that he determined to put them to death—and he put this plan into effect almost immediately.

The Martyrdom of the Royal Princes

Almighty God, the Creator of all created beings, has declared that cutting the bonds of kinship is the depth of depravity, whereas preserving them is a good act. Shah Esma'il II was a hard-hearted man, not possessed of normal feelings of affection toward his family. He never displayed any kindness toward his brothers, cousins, and nephews. On the contrary, he considered them to be a blot on the landscape. As for the formal civilities which he on occasion displayed toward Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, it turned out that the only reason for these was his concern regarding the latter's brother, Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who was at Kandahar. The Shah was afraid that Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā might start a revolt in Khorasan. After the latter's death, therefore, the Shah's attitude toward Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā changed within a matter of days.

Sultan Ebrahim, who had a good head on his shoulders, sensed the change in the wind. Although he knew that nothing less than his death would satisfy the Shah, he left court and retired from the scene, hoping to mourn in private for a few days. He ordered his servants and retainers to keep to their houses and not to attend him, but he momentarily expected to receive his death warrant. Eventually, the Shah sent a squad of blue-eyed Circassians of hideous aspect to mount guard over the prince's house. When the Circassians arrived, the prince was in his mirror room in the harem. The Circassians sealed all the outer doors, locked all the inner doors, and stationed themselves in the harem, where they kept watch.

Four or five days passed in this manner until one day a quarrel broke out in the Meydān-e Sa'ādat between some townspeople and the servants of 'Abd al-'Azīz Beg Ostājlū, the *dārūğa* of Qazvin, over the purchase of a sheep. The Sufis rushed into the fray and started beating the *dārūğa* of the bazaar and other retainers of the *dārūğa* of Qazvin. When the *dārūğa* heard what had happened he sent some men to arrest the Sufis, but they were unable to quell the riot. The *dārūğa* then rode to the Meydān with such men as he had at hand. The Sufis attacked him with stones, and finally the affair became one of knives and daggers, and the *dārūğa* was forced to retreat.

The Shah, who bore a grudge against the Sufis because of their devotion to Ḵolafā, seized the opportunity to order a group of emirs to arm themselves and assemble in the Meydān-e Asp-e Šāhī. The emirs gathered, troop by troop, and the Shah ordered them to take punitive action against the Sufis, and concluded by authorizing a general massacre. A body of the *qezelbāš*, led by Mosīb Khan Takkalū and Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, made for the homes of the Sufis, which were located in the vicinity of the home of Ḵolafā. When the Sufis realized what was happening they threw away their weapons and ran, but the *qezelbāš ğāzīs* overtook them, slew some, and took others prisoner. In the twinkling of an eye, some five hundred Sufis were killed.

Shah Esma'il, having occupied the *qezelbāš* elsewhere by sending them against the Sufis, put into effect his plan to murder the royal princes, and sent word to the custodians of each prince to carry out their orders. First, the Circassians entered the harem of Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, dragged him away from his wife, who was the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, and strangled him. His death was signaled by an outburst of cries and lamentations. One by one, the same treatment was meted out to the other princes. When the Shah was assured of the death of the princes, his mind was set at ease and he called off the troops who were hounding the Sufis, issuing a pardon to those who had survived the massacre. It is clear that the Shah deliberately escalated the conflict with the Sufis in case the *qezelbāš* had refused to have any part in these foul murders, in which case there might have been a revolt against his authority. While the *qezelbāš* were occupied elsewhere, the Shah was able to carry out his secret designs.

On that day, six royal princes were put to death at Qazvin by the order of the Shah: Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, a most talented and cultured man, who wrote a fine *nasta'līq* hand, was a skilled miniaturist, an outstanding musician, proficient in the art of composing rounds, the pupil of Mowlānā Qāsem Qānūnī in the art of composing ballads, an accomplished player of stringed instruments, and proficient in the crafts of carpentry, the manufacture of musical instruments, and inlay work. In Khorasan, he spent most of his time in the company of poets and men of letters generally. He himself wrote poetry under the pen name of Jāhī, and some of his love poems survive. He had built up an impressive private library, which contained specimens of the work of the master calligraphers of former times and of the finest miniaturists, in addition to other treasures. His collection of china was the envy of all. After his murder, his widow destroyed most of the contents of his library by throwing the manuscripts into water, so that they should not fall into the hands of the Shah; the china she smashed, and his other belongings she destroyed by fire. By her excessive demonstration of grief she exhausted herself to such an extent that she too died that same month.

The second victim was Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā's nephew, Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who was an able youth of seventeen years. He was blinded but cried aloud from the pain, and would not be quieted; when this was reported to the Shah, he ordered him to be put out of his misery.

The third victim, Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā, who was in the care of the Rūmlū tribe, was an innocent, pious man, free from any suspicion of worldly ambition. He was dispatched along with his brothers, but when his corpse was being washed and prepared for burial, he stirred and opened his eyes. Apparently, the stranglers' cord had missed one of the veins in his neck. Shah Esma'il gave orders for him to be finished off, since he had been a witness to the Shah's vile crimes; his infant son, Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā, who was only a year old, was also murdered. Emāmqolī Mīrzā and Sultan Aḥmad Mīrzā, both of whom had been taken to the palace and kept in custody there, were put to death in the vicinity of the Meydān-e Asp.

Shah Esma'il II than sent men to Sīstān to put to death Badī' al-

Zamān Mīrzā, the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, together with his infant son Bahrām, and sent other men after Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā, who was at Ganja. A few days later, a group of Qājārs brought in the prince; the Shah spared his life, but had him blinded.

The Shah was also apprehensive about his own brother, Sultan Moḥammad Ḳodābanda, whose sight was already seriously impaired, and about the latter's sons. But his mother, Solṭānom, was inordinately fond of her sons and grandsons, and this induced some slight feeling of shame in the Shah and made him hesitate to take action against them. Nevertheless, he pondered their fate night and day, and ultimately his evil intent toward them came out into the open.

First of all, he murdered at Tehran Ḥasan, the eldest son of Sultan Moḥammad Ḳodābanda.[13] This prince had been summoned to court from Herat by Shah Tahmasp. After several years at court, he was appointed governor of half the province of Māzandarān upon the death of Sultan Morād Khan, the independent governor of Māzandarān; the other half of the province went to Mīrzā Khan, the son of Sultan Morād Khan. Mīrak Dīv, a veritable Māzandarānī demon,[14] was appointed his *vakīl,* and assumed effective control of the administration. However, the prince did not like the way in which Mīrak Dīv managed affairs, since he made decisions as he thought fit, and excluded from any participation in the government of the province retainers of the prince who had served him for years. The prince was naturally displeased with this state of affairs. Refusing to brook Mīrak Dīv's control any longer and urged on by some of his officers, he had Mīrak Dīv put to death without obtaining authorization from Shah Tahmasp. Ḥasan Mīrzā followed this up by restricting the influence of Māzandarānīs in the management of the province, but the Māzandarānīs appealed to the Shah.

Shah Tahmasp, when he learned the facts of the case, strongly disapproved of the prince's temerity and headstrong behavior. It was represented to the Shah that the prince had been instigated to act in the way he did by Mīr 'Azīz Khan, the son of Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan, who was the prince's maternal uncle and had been the prince's companion at court. The Shah sent some officers to make an unexpected raid on the prince's quarters, and they brought back all his private papers and effects. Among his papers were discovered some letters from Mīr 'Azīz Khan which made it clear that the prince had acted on his prompting. Mīr 'Azīz Khan was arrested and imprisoned at the fortress of Eṣṭaḵr. In order to appease the Māzandarānīs, Shah Tahmasp removed from Māzandarān all Ḥasan Mīrzā's old retainers, with exception of a few. The prince's prestige and credibility in Māzandarān were reduced.

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[13] The five sons of Sultan Moḥammad Ḳodābanda were Ḥasan, Ḥamza, 'Abbas, Abū Ṭāleb, and Tahmasp. L. L. Bellan, *Chah 'Abbās I,* p. 4, is incorrect in stating that Ḥasan was the son of Shah Tahmasp.

[14] A pun on the word *dīv,* demon; in Persian legend, the forests of Māzandarān were the home of many demons, including the celebrated White Demon *(dīv-e sapīd).*

The prince protested that Mīrak Dīv had exceeded his powers and had been guilty of disobedience and insubordination; if he (Ḥasan Mīrzā) had delayed taking action until he had received authorization from the Shah, all kinds of disorders would have broken out within a short space of time. For this reason, the prince asserted, he had dared to act in an improper manner. The prince was to some extent forgiven; and his situation improved, no further attempts at reparation were made, and he continued to rule the province rather ineffectually. In the end, the prince won over a number of Māzandarānīs by his moderation and kindness. He was in the process of rehabilitating himself when Shah Tahmasp died and Shah Esma'il II succeeded to the throne.

Since Solṭānom, Shah Esma'il's mother and the grandmother of Ḥasan Mīrzā, was extremely fond of her grandchildren, Ḥasan Mīrzā thought he would gain power and influence during his uncle's reign, particularly because his uncle had no children. He became dissatisfied with the inglorious position of governor of a truncated Māzandarān. People whispered in his ear that in the service of his uncle and grandmother he might come to be treated as if he were the Shah's own son. He might become a powerful man in the affairs of Iran—he might even become heir-apparent. Ḥasan Mīrzā therefore left Māzandarān and came to court, but without obtaining permission from the Shah. It never entered his head that Shah Esma'il might attribute some ulterior motive to his coming.

In fact, Shah Esma'il, who was excessively cautious and wary, viewed his arrival with displeasure, but could do nothing to get rid of him without some overt cause. Ḥasan's father and one brother were at Shiraz, residing among the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe and another brother was at Herat, in the care of the Ostājlū tribe, and he had to be mindful of public opinion to the extent of not doing anything to upset his own mother. Shah Esma'il therefore sent the following message to Ḥasan

Mīrzā: "My revered mother, your grandmother, is presently at Qom; I plan to bring her back to court with all due pomp and ceremony, and am in the process of equipping her retinue. I am told that you have arrived also without a retinue, and so I suggest that you remain at Tehran for the time being. After I have organized my mother's cavalcade, I will send an officer to you who will make plans for the equipping of your own retinue. This being done, I will send one of the great emirs to my mother to arrange where the two of you will meet."

Ḥasan Mīrzā, obeying orders, remained in Tehran, but the Shah put off making arrangements for the meeting. He brought forward various excuses for the delay: the need to complete some new buildings, the need to make houses ready for their occupation, and all sorts of other reasons. Finally, rumors of religious differences were heard at court; certain people gleefully told the Shah that the majority of the *qezelbāš* suspected him of being a Sunni at heart, and had therefore withdrawn their allegiance from him and aimed to make Ḥazan Mīrzā king. This gave the Shah exactly the excuse he was looking for, and he gave orders for the execution of the prince. Initially, he designated for this task Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū Takkalū, who was Solṭānom's nephew and therefore cousin to himself and Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda. Mosīb Khan, regarding his task with abhorrence, marched as slowly as possible; word came four or five days later that he still had not passed Karaj in the province of Sāūj Bolāğ. The Shah, infuriated by his procrastination and sympathy for the victim, sent another *qezelbāš* emir, Kūsa ʿAlīqolī, with forty-four men of the royal bodyguard, two men being drawn from each tribe. The idea was that they should place a cord round the prince's neck and then, with twenty-two men pulling on either side, strangle him. When Mosīb Khan heard the news, he rejoiced that he did not have to commit the murder and returned to court.

At Tehran, Ḥasan Mīrzā had gradually inferred some loss of the Shah's favor from the inordinate delay, and had come to despair of receiving any kindness from his uncle. When he tried to leave Tehran, however, he found his way barred. When the *qūrčīs* burst into Tehran, he bolted the doors of his house, picked up his bow and quiver, and went up on to the roof, vowing to himself that he would fight valiantly as long as he had strength remaining and arrows in his quiver. Kūsa ʿAlīqolī announced that he and his men had come at the Shah's command to fetch him and take him to court, and they swore a false oath to this effect on the Koran. Relying on their oath, the prince went down to meet them, whereupon the *qūrčīs*, heedless of God's wrath, fell on him and strangled him as they had been ordered.

The same day, Shah Esma'il sent Ĝāzī Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, a member of the royal bodyguard, to Shiraz with orders to place Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda and his sons under arrest and not to allow people to have access to them—particularly any member of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe. Having done this, he was to await further orders. Word went round that the Shah's ultimate intention was to destroy Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda, his sons who were with him at Shiraz, and 'Abbas Mīrzā who was at Herat. It was rumored that the Shah had issued a warrant for their execution. However, events proved inauspicious for the Shah; before his orders could be put into effect he died, as will be recorded in greater detail at the appropriate place. Thus, through the intervention of Almighty God, who had ordained that 'Abbas Mīrzā should become king and had sealed the diploma of his kingship with the inscription "Thou givest sovereignty to whomsoever Thou willst," and inscribed it on the Preserved Tablet,[15] the Shah's orders were not carried out, and his own life and reign were brought to an end.

Certain Events Which Occurred during the Reign of Shah Esma'il II

Shah Esma'il II, after his mind was set at rest concerning his brothers and cousins, turned his attention to state affairs. Since the Shah was displeased with the conduct of the vizier, Mīrzā Šokrollāh, and was always complaining about him, he dismissed him from his post as *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā*, and appointed to that high office Mīrzā Salmān the *nāẓer*.[16] The Shah raised Mīrzā Salmān to a position of great power and decreed that the vizier was not obliged to make obeisance to any of the great emirs. Mīrzā Salmān took up his duties with complete independence of action. However, the Shah rarely devoted his personal attention to the affairs of state. He was excessively negligent in ordering the affairs of the frontier regions, and none of the orders and letters-patent issued by former rulers had been renewed. Every few days he would appoint someone to some post or other, but then change his mind. Some of the emirs had actually received their letters of appointment and had departed to take up their posts, but the remainder were still at court when the Shah died.

[15] On which, according to Muslim belief, the decrees of God are preserved through all time.

[16] This appointment was made on 26 Rabī' I, 985/15 June 1577.

The appointments actually made by the Shah included the following: Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū Takkalū, the son of Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū, the cousin of the Shah, promoted to the rank of khan and appointed governor of Rayy; Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn Takkalū, sent to Kurdistan and given jurisdiction over the tribes and certain places in the district of Hamadan; ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū and his father Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, both appointed to governorship. ʿAlīqolī Khan was appointed governor of Herat and was given in marriage Zeynab Begom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, the agreement being that his bride should follow him to Herat the next year. Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk was appointed governor of Mašhad; Peykar Sultan, Shah Tahmasp's nephew, was appointed governor of Ganja and *amīr al-omarā* of the province of Qarābāğ in place of Yūsof Ḳalīfa Zīād-oğlū, who had held the post under Shah Tahmasp.

It occurred to Peykar Sultan that, since Yūsof Khan had been accused of being one of the partisans of Sultan Ḥeydar, he might acquire credit with the Shah and increase his own power by putting Yūsof Khan to death. Peykar Sultan accordingly awaited his opportunity. One morning when Yūsof Khan had just emerged from the bath and was putting on his clothes, he and a few of his retainers fell on him and murdered him. Not content with this, Peykar Sultan murdered his mother and brother as well. The Shah, however, did not approve of this action and dismissed him, giving the governorship of Ganja to Emāmqolī Khan Qājār. Allāhqolī Beg Afšār, the governor of Kerman, was appointed to the office of *qūrčībāšī;* Maḥmūd Sultan Afšār was appointed governor of Kerman; Valī Khan Qolḳānčī-oğlū was confirmed in office as governor of Shiraz.

At this juncture, one of the Shah's slave girls, who was pregnant, was delivered of a son. The Shah, beside himself with joy, sent an announcement of the birth to all the emirs and lavishly rewarded the bearer of the good tidings. A few days later, the Shah named his son Šojāʿ al-Dīn Moḥammad, and appointed Valī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Shiraz, his guardian. He hoped that the young prince, being brought up in Shiraz, the seat of the ruler of the Moẓaffarīd dynasty,[17] might revive in the province of Fārs the customs and practices of Jalāl al-Dīn Shah Šojāʿ. Valī Sultan organized a festival on a royal scale in his own house; the royal crib was brought there from the palace, preceded by horsemen and escorted, at the governor's command, by the emirs and chief officers of state on foot.

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[17] The Moẓaffarīds, a fourteenth-century Iranian dynasty, controlled Fārs from about 758/1356 until the extinction of the dynasty at the hands of Tīmūr in 795/1393 (see C. E. Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties*, pp. 161–62). Jalāl al-Dīn Shah Šojāʿ reigned from 765/1364 to 786/1384 and was the patron of the poet Ḥāfeẓ.

However, Šojā' al-Dīn's being brought up at Shiraz led to strained relations between him and Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda. The Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe, in accordance with the rules of Sufi conduct, gave their support to the latter and treated Šojā' al-Dīn with disdain and discourtesy. Šojā' al-Dīn, feeling himself despised and ignored, left Shiraz and returned to court. His arrival there fanned the flames of the Shah's resentment against his elder brother, and he decided to see to the prince's education himself. Meanwhile he lost confidence in, and censured, those Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs who had been guilty of discourtesy toward his son—especially 'Alī Beg and his brothers, and the sons of Moḥammad Khan Aqa Šādī[18] Takkalū, a former governor of Shiraz.

About this time there was much debate among the people concerning sectarian differences. On the basis of the Shah's conduct and various remarks he had made in private regarding Shi'ite beliefs, people generally regarded the Shah as being weak in his attachment to Shi'ism and suspected him of being a Sunni. The grounds for their suspicion were first that the Shah was reluctant to speak ill of 'Ā'eša.[19] In order to remove the cause of his reluctance, he sought instruction from the doctors of theology who were in attendance at court, particularly from Ḵāja Afżal Tarka. "For what reason," inquired the Shah, "do Shi'ites consider it lawful to speak ill of the members of the harem of the Prophet of God? For the Koranic verses concerning chastity and purity were revealed specifically with reference to her;[20] she had the privilege of sharing the Prophet's bed, and had shared many private and intimate moments with him; and she was dearly loved by the Prophet. How can such a pure woman, beloved of the Prophet, the companion of his bed, deserve hell fire and the everlasting torments? Further, what transpired at Baṣra between 'Ā'eša and the Caliph 'Alī occurred at the instigation of Ṭalḥa and Zobeyr,[21] and

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[18] I have been unable to identify this clan, which is variously given as Šādī, Sādī, and Sāvī.

[19] The daughter of Abū Bakr and the favorite wife of the Prophet Moḥammad. Disliked by the Shi'ites because of her hostility toward 'Alī.

[20] See Koran, *sura* 24, revealed to Moḥammad immediately after he had been assured by God in a vision that 'Ā'eša was innocent of the slanders uttered against her.

[21] 'Ā'eša, because of her dislike of 'Alī, joined the revolt of Talḥa and Zobeyr against 'Alī after the murder of the caliph 'Oṣmān in 36/656.

'Alī later forgave her, attributing her actions to women's lack of judgment and intelligence. The proof that 'Alī forgave her may be seen in the fact that he sent her to Medina with every mark of veneration and, out of reverence for the Prophet, spoke no ill of her; on the contrary, he himself accompanied her and her attendants for several stages on their journey. To abuse 'Ā'eša, therefore, is to abuse the Prophet, and the Shi'ite theologians have exceeded all reasonable bounds in this respect." The Shah uttered remarks like these in a number of assemblies—either openly or by allusion.

The theologians did not contradict him openly or make any categorical denial, but whenever the occasion seemed appropriate, they answered him with veiled words. Mīrzā Makdūm Šarīfi,[22] who during the reign of Shah Tahmasp had been accused of being pro-Sunni, encouraged the Shah by supporting his arguments and daily bringing forward fresh evidence to support their case. Under his tutelage, the Shah came out into the open and engaged in debate and argument with the *'olamā* regarding strengthening the position of the Sunnis, and the abolition of the ritual cursing of the three Caliphs Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān. For their part, the *'olamā* in the main gave oblique replies, and tried to avoid a confrontation.

One day, Shah Esma'il addressed Bolġār Kalīfa, who held the high office of *kalīfat al-kolafā*, as follows: "O Kalīfa, if someone should speak ill of your wife in a public place and revile her, would you be annoyed or not?" "I would," said the Kalīfa. "Then how is it," said the Shah, "that men curse the revered wife of the Prophet of God?" 'Abuse," replied the Kalīfa, "is forbidden, but cursing implies the denial of God's mercy and constitutes an imprecation; if you curse someone, you are in fact submitting his case to God, and there is no harm in that." The Shah exclaimed, "You are indeed a simple-minded Turk! Who told you that story?" He replied, "I heard it from the *'olamā* during the time of Shah Tahmasp. Some sycophants said to the Shah, "He is lying. This same story was related by a group of *'olamā* a few days ago in the royal palace, in the presence of Sultan Ebrahim Mīrzā, and Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn the *mojtahed* and Kāja Afżal saw to it that he learned it by heart."

The Shah flared up in anger and gave a sign to his Sufi guards, saying, 'A *Kalīfa who lies to his* spiritual director deserves to be punished." The Sufis fell on Bolḡār Ḵalīfa and beat him with their clubs and left him for dead. His body was wrapped in felt and carried to his house for burial. After a while he regained consciousness, and a few months later regained the power of movement. The Shah appointed Dada Ḵolafā Ostājlū to his office and censured the *'olamā* severely. They were, he said, holding meetings every day, and by uttering abominable statements like these they were poisoning the minds of the *qezelbāš* against him. They had fooled his father (Shah Tahmasp), he said, by their hypocritical remarks, but they were not going to fool him. The Shah made various derogatory remarks about the *'olamā,* and in particular about Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn and the Astarābādīs, who were zealous Shi'ites. Despite the *'olamā,* the Shah decreed that the *tabarrā'īyān*[23] should abandon the practice of ritual cursing which was current in the streets and wards of the city. He was displeased, he said, with the *tabarrā'īyān,* who derived their livelihood from this practice of ritual cursing.

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[22] He was the grandson of Tahmasp's celebrated vizier Qāżī Jahān. Because of his pro-Sunni tendencies, he was not regarded with favor by Shah Tahmasp.

The Shah then extended his favor to a group of *'olamā* who were suspected of being pro-Sunni—men like Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī, Mowlānā Mīrzā Jān Šīrāzī, and Mīr Maḵdūm Lāla. Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī sometimes used to preach in the mosque. On one occasion, he reported to the Shah that a group of *tabarrā'īyān* had interrupted his sermon in the mosque by uttering their ritual curses, and had made insinuating remarks about himself. The Shah sent twelve *qūrčīs* to the mosque, with orders to punish anyone who gave utterance to ritual curses. One Thursday evening, a sermon was in progress; at its conclusion, Darvīš Qanbar the *tabarrā'ī* recited the following verse:

With all my heart and soul I invoke blessings on 'Alī
and his house,
So that the enemies of 'Alī may be cursed for all eternity.

Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī charged that he was alluding to himself, and became enraged. The *qūrčīs* beat Darvīš Qanbar and cracked his skull in several places. The Shi'ites were filled with grief at this incident; the people's suspicion of the Shah increased, and there was much talk. People censured the Shah for his action in private, and the loyalty of the *qezelbāš* toward him began to wear thin, but no one dared to breathe a word in public. Relations between the Shah and the *'olamā* in general deteriorated, and the Shah looked with particular disfavor on Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn the *mojtahed,* Mīr Seyyed 'Alī the *ḵaṭīb,* and the Astarābādī faction, which consisted of especially militant Shi'ites who were extra-zealous in the practice of ritual cursing. Some of this faction were expelled from court, and the Shah ordered all Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn's books to be impounded and sealed. Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn himself was evicted from his house, which was then rented.

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[23] The *tabarrā'īyān* were a special corps of men who went through the streets calling down curses on the "rightly-guided" caliphs and other enemies of the Shi'ites. In the time of Shah Esma'il I, who instituted the practice, anyone who failed to respond "may it (the cursing) be more rather than less" stood in danger of his life.

The Shah had vowed he would give a sum of money to any pious Muslims who had never cursed the Ten Blessed Ones.[24] Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī made an inquiry, and many avaricious persons came forward, but their claims were rejected. A number of deserving persons in Qazvin did register their names and swear that not once in their lives had they cursed the Companions of the Prophet, especially the Ten Blessed Ones. Since, in former times the people of Qazvin were adherents of the Šāfe'ī rite, and there was a possibility that some of these still existed, Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī proceeded to verify their claims and to pay out the sum allocated by the Shah for this purpose, which amounted to about two hundred *tomān.* After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah these grants were revoked, and the recipients forced to pay back the money; in the long run, therefore, these people acquired nothing but a reputation for being Sunnis.

As a result of all this, the people, both Turk and Tājīk, became convinced that Shah Esma'il II had a strong predilection for Sunnism, but such was the Shah's power and the awe in which he was held that no one dared to say anything openly about this. Certain members of the *'olamā* who had acquired a reputation for being zealous in the practice of ritual cursing during the reign of Shah Tahmasp and had continued this practice under Shah Esma'il II fell under a cloud and were forbidden to attend this Shah. They could not enter his presence without permission. Others, more prudent—men like Ḵāja Afżal Tarka—would talk about these matters in secret and continue to come and go freely at court.

On one occasion, when conversation in the royal assembly turned

[24] Those to whom the promise of Paradise was made. The names on the list vary (sometimes the Prophet Moḥammad himself heading the list), but a list commonly accepted is Abū Bakr, 'Omar, 'Oṣmān, 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb, Sa'd b. Abū Waqqāṣ, Talḥa, Zobeyr, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Owf, Sa'd b. Zeyd, Abū 'Obeyda b. al-Jarrāḥ.

to matters of religion, Ḵ̌āja Afżal made some excellent remarks to the effect that the Es̱nā ʿAšarī rite was the true religion and the beliefs of the Sunnis false, but he remained silent on the question of the ritual cursing of and hostility toward the Companions of the Prophet. Still others remained aloof from these proceedings, assuming them to have been considered necessary in the best interest of the king and to conciliate the hearts of the people.

As for the *qezelbāš* emirs, they just did not believe what was happening to be even remotely possible until one day it was stated in a royal assembly that it was illegal to recite or write down poetry in the mosques. Now the doors and walls of the mosques in Qazvin were plastered with love poems people had written down. The Shah ordered Mīrzā Zeyn al-ʿĀbedīn Kāšī, the *moḥtaseb*,[25] who despite his innate predilection for Shiʿism was a man given to jest, to go to the mosques and remove all traces of poetry from the ceilings and walls. The *moḥtaseb*, to please the Shah, also obliterated the name of the Commander of the Faithful ʿAlī and verses written in praise of the Twelve Imams (the blessings of God be upon them!). The people were extremely disturbed by this action, and the talk to which it gave rise among the common people reached the ears of the Turks.

A group of emirs and *qezelbāš* nobles met near the gatehouse of the Bāḡ-e Saʿādatābād and told one another that the people were saying extraordinary things about the religious beliefs of their spiritual director *(moršed)*, who was the true son of Shah Tahmasp, and the descendant of Shaikh Ṣafī and of ʿAlī b. Abū Ṭāleb, and were accusing him of being a friend of the enemies of ʿAlī. "God forbid that this be so!" they said. "We do not know the reason for all this talk among the people, or what has happened to give people this idea. The people have given us a problem as to what our proper course of action as Sufis and loyal supporters of the Shah should be. We do not dare to ask our *moršed* himself to resolve the problem." Some of the greybeards and wiser heads among the *qezelbāš* said: "To question the actions of one's *moršed*, according to the rules governing discipleship and the loyalty of the *qezelbāš* toward the Safavid family, is tantamount to unbelief. Why is it necessary to admit the possibility that this suspicion of the Shah may be justified? If the Shah has taken various actions which have been criticized by his detractors, they are not necessarily inexpedient. Our best course is to take no part in this argument because it would be improper for us, the servants of the

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[25] The officer charged with the protection of public morals.

Shah, to raise this matter in his presence. In any case, who would dare to raise it?"

Ordūḡdī Ḵalīfa Takkalū, a Sufi loyal to Shah Esma'il II who stood high in the Shah's favor because of his sincere devotion to his *moršed,* said: "God forbid that these accusations against the Shah should prove to be true. If you want to set your minds at rest, let a deputation of *ḡāzīs* and Sufis drawn from the retainers of Emir Khan, one of the great emirs, go to the Shah. I will address the Shah and beg him to resolve our problem." A number of ambitious toadies who were present at this meeting at once went to the Shah and reported to him privately that a group of Turkman and Takkalū emirs, led by Emir Khan and Ordūḡdī Ḵalīfa, had banded together and declared that their king had abandoned the true religion. They were plotting to do away with the king, and to put on the throne Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā, the son of Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda, who was then at Tehran. Meanwhile, Ordūḡdī Ḵalīfa announced to the *qezelbāš* that Emir Khan had arrived to support him, and that he (Ordūḡdī) would lead the way and speak to the Shah. Others say that it was Ḵalīfa-e Anṣār[26] who went and reported to the Shah, in the hope of making amends for the past by demonstrating his solidarity with him. God alone knows the truth!

Esma'il II was perturbed by this tale, which had no foundation in fact, and he proceeded to vent his wrath on those involved. He summoned Emir Khan and upbraided him harshly: "You have given me a bad name among the *qezelbāš* by alleging that I have embraced the Sunni rite, and you have poisoned men's minds against me." Emir Khan answered stoutly: "God forbid that I should ever believe such a thing, or that I should have entertained any unwarranted suspicions of the king. I say that if the king has on occasion been negligent in matters of religion, it has doubtless been for reasons of state and to pacify his enemies. It is Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī who has given your majesty a bad name by openly saying that you are inclined toward the Sunni rite and that you dispute with the Shi'ite *'olamā* concerning the status of Sunnism as the true religion. Every time the Shah fails to deny these stories, he gives him encouragement. What fault have we committed?" The shah then turned on Ordūḡdī Ḵalīfa and said, "I see that Emir Khan is standing close behind you, supporting you. What is *your* story? Come on, speak out!" But Ordūḡdī Ḵalīfa refused to speak.

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[26] The former warden of the fortress of Qahqaha, where Esma'il Mīrzā was imprisoned.

Emir Khan resumed, "Why do you listen to tales told about us, your loyal servants, by men who have their own personal reasons for doing so? Before even finding out the truth or falsehood of their charges, you brand your devoted servants as seditious persons!" The Shah replied, "If I am not worthy to be the ruler of the *qezelbāš*, then bring Sultan Ḥasan from Tehran and make him king, as you plotted and planned among yourselves to do." Emir Khan replied, without a trace of fear or dissimulation, "For twenty years I have been your supporter and friend. Now we have come to the real point at issue. What benefits have we ever received, or are likely to receive, which would lead us to expect any advantage from Sultan Ḥasan? The idea of his accession to the throne has never even entered our heads!"

The argument went on for a long time. Ordūğdī Ḵalīfa was seized and placed in a solitary cell. 'Alī Khan Beg, the *dārūğa* of the *daftarḵāna,* was accused by his own brother, Bābor Beg, who hated him, of being in league with Ordūğdī Ḵalīfa, and he too was arrested and placed in confinement. To Emir Khan and Mosīb Khan Takkalū, who were both his protégés, the Shah said, "If you are speaking the truth, set my mind at rest in regard to Sultan Ḥasan." The two emirs, whether they liked it or not, were forced to acquiesce. They sent Kūsa 'Alīqolī Torkmān, one of their emirs, and a detachment of forty-four *qūrčīs* to perform the dastardly deed. As I reported earlier, this detachment went to Tehran and murdered Sultan Ḥasan. Despite this, the Shah was still slightly mistrustful of the Takkalūs and the Turkmans, and began to favor the Ostājlūs more.

As I have already mentioned, he extended his patronage to the sons of Yakān Šāhqolī Khan: Moršedqolī Sultan was appointed governor of Sīstān; Ebrahim Sultan, his brother, was favored, together with his cousins; Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq was confirmed in his post as governor of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd; Abū Torāb Sultan, who had hoped to replace Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq as governor of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, was made governor of Šīrvān. In short, the Ostājlū tribe regained the Shah's confidence, and its fear and apprehension abated.[27] At the same time, in order to remove the suspicions of the people that his faith had been corrupted, the Shah turned on Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī and placed him under arrest. When the common people learned this, they began to revile Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī and subjected him to every kind of ignominy; they were delighted by this turn of events, which allayed

[27] The Ostājlūs had supported the attempt to put Ḥeydar Mīrzā on the throne after the death of Shah Tahmasp and had been purged by Esma'il II for this reason.

their suspicions, and there was no further talk of religion in the Shah's assemblies.

So far, Shah Esmaʿil had not minted any coinage in his own name, and all commercial transactions had been carried on using the old coinage. The officers of the mint were continually pressing the Shah to renew the gold coinage and show concern for the interests of the mint, but the Shah procrastinated in regard to the striking of coins which bore on one face the inscription, "There is no god but God; Moḥammad is the Prophet of God, and ʿAlī is the Friend of God." He kept on pointing out that *dirhams* and *dīnārs,* in the course of normal trade and commerce, were handled by all manner of infidels—Jews, Armenians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and others; it was not right that such ritually unclean persons should handle coins bearing the name of God, for the Koran said, "None shall touch it except those who are purified."[28] So the Shah pondered what phrase he could put on the coinage that would be acceptable to the people. One day he spoke to a group of people as follows: "Since men have reviled my friends, on this issue too they will do the same, saying that the motive for my desire to change the inscription on the coinage is to remove from it the name of ʿAlī." After much thought, he decided to stamp on one side of the coins the following verse:

> Though there be Imams from East to West,
> ʿAlī and his family are all-in-all to us,

On the reverse of the coins, there would be his own name and the place of issue. At an hour chosen by him as auspicious, therefore, the new die was cast and the coins stamped with it.

After these events, the Shah gave permission to Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, who had been appointed governor of Mašhad, to take the body of Shah Tahmasp there. Three hundred *qūrčīs* were to act as escort and to bear the coffin stage by stage on its journey. ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the governor-general of Herat, was instructed to proceed to Mašhad, take charge of the royal coffin there, and escort it to Herat. It was generally rumored that ʿAlīqolī Khan had secret instructions, on his return to Herat, to put to death ʿAbbas Mīrzā, so that the Shah's anxieties on that score too might be removed. The Shah also sent a courier to Shiraz with orders for Ḡāzī Beg Ẓu'l-Qadar, instructing him to keep Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā and Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā and his brother under close arrest until Valī Sultan Qolḳānčī-oğlū, the governor of Shiraz, should arrive and put them to death. His plan was that no single member of the Safavid royal house should remain alive save himself and his own son Shah Šojā‘, but he forgot the adage "Man proposes, but God disposes."

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[28] Koran, 56:80. The reference in the Koran is to the book of the Koran itself, not to the name of God.

At this juncture, a comet was seen under the sign of Sagittarius, and its tail was suspended in the midst of the western heavens. Since Esma‘il II had considerable knowledge of astrology, he was filled with apprehension. He consulted his astrologers daily and inquired of them what the comet portended. The astrologers gave a soothing answer, but Esma‘il reminded them that the appearance of a comet like this portended the downfall of a king. The astrologers then said that, because the tail of the comet appeared in the west, the bulk of its effect would be felt in the Ottoman empire and western lands. Although the assurances of the astrologers were of some comfort to him, the Shah was not entirely satisfied. And indeed he had good reason to be alarmed, because the principles of astrology show that, whenever a comet appears in the house of a person's ascendant star, that person will surely perish. Shah Esma‘il II was born under the constellation of Gemini. The star governing his horoscope was Mercury, and this comet had appeared in the house of his ascendant star; but the astrologers misled him and prevented him from finding this out, and a few days later he died.

The Murder of Shah Esma‘il II

On the eve of Sunday, 13 Ramażān 985/24 November 1577, Esma‘il, together with Ḥasan Beg Ḥalvāčī-oğlū, with whom he had a close and affectionate relationship, and who was his boon companion night and day, left the palace and went for a walk accompanied by a number of personal attendants. He walked around in the side streets and quarters of Qazvin for two-thirds of the night. Then he returned to the palace and retired to rest in Ḥasan Beg's quarters, which adjoined the palace and had a door which gave on to the Meydān-e Asp-e Šāhī. Esma‘il closed his eyes, which never rested from the contemplation of the ephemeral desires of this deceitful world, and sank into the happy sleep of oblivion. Ḥasan Beg fastened the doors on the inside, and lay down near the Shah. The doors remained closed until breakfast time. The *moqarrabs*[29] and servants assembled there, waiting for the doors to be opened. No one had had the courage to enter the rooms adjacent to the Shah's bedroom.

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[29] Probably the staff of the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* of the harem, who held the rank of *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* (see *TM*, pp. 63–64).

When the length of his sleeping time and repose had exceeded all reasonable bounds, Mīrzā Salmān the vizier and the *qūrčībašī* who were in the anterooms about noon, became extremely worried. They charged Ḥakīm Abu'l-Fatḥ Tabrīzī, known as "the little physician," who was distinguished among the other court physicians by his rank and degree of intimacy with the Shah, to approach the door of the bedroom and investigate. Ḥakīm, plucking up his courage, went up to the door; but hearing no sound, he did not dare to speak, and returned. The vizier and the *qūrčībāšī* importuned him to go back and this time to speak in the manner of prayer and supplication. Ḥasan Beg Ḥalvāčī-oğlū cried out, "O Ḥakīm! I cannot move to open the door! Open the door from the outside in whatever way you can and come in, for an astonishing event has occurred!

The physician, overcome by terror, returned and informed everyone of the situation. Mīrzā Salmān, with a group of *moqarrabs,* opened the door and went inside. They found Esma'il immobile but still breathing. The lower portions of Ḥasan Beg's body, when touched, had no sensation, and his voice emerged as a stutter. Everyone panicked. The *qūrčībāšī* was summoned to the *andarūn*[30] and someone was sent to summon Emir Khan, Pīra Moḥammad Khan, and the other emirs. At that moment, however, Shah Esma'il II died.

Ḥasan Beg, handicapped by his stutter, and with a hundred difficulties, stated that the previous evening, at the time of breaking the fast,[31] the Shah had consumed pure opium and had given some to him (Ḥasan). "When we went out for a walk," continued Ḥasan Beg, "we reached the entrance to a bathhouse. A seller of sweetmeats was sitting there. The Shah took a lot of *ḥalvā*[32] and pastries from him. When we returned to the house, he said, 'Dawn is near; we will eat another electuary and then sleep.' When the servants brought the round box in which the Shah kept his electuaries, I noticed that the seal had been tampered with (I always sealed the box myself). I said to the Shah, "The lid of the box does not bear my seal and mark," but he paid no heed to my words. Taking the electuary, he consumed more than was his wont, and pressed it upon me with great insistence, but

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[30] The private quarters of the harem used by the women of the royal household.

[31] It was the month of Ramażān.

[32] A type of sweetmeat.

I consumed rather less. Then we both slept. At breakfast time, when I awoke, I found myself in the state in which you see me, and the Shah was unable to speak. He moved his arms and legs, but after a while he ceased to move, and his breathing stopped. As soon as I heard the physician's voice, I called out. This is the truth of the matter. The rest you know better than I."

Emir Khan and Pīra Moḥammad Khan, who had just arrived and were surveying the scene, were overcome with astonishment. Emir Khan threatened to kill Ḥasan Beg Ḥalvāčī and said: "Tell the truth; whoever poisoned our king could not have done it without your help and assistance." Ḥasan Beg replied, "I, through the felicity of the Shah, was obeyed by all the *qezelbāš;* without him, I have no thought of life. Even though it is not certain whether I shall survive or not, what was evident to me is as I have stated." Emir Khan became more importunate in his efforts to ascertain the truth and to investigate the matter, but Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs intervened, saying, "What is the point of importunity in this matter? Now that an event like this has occurred, we must take thought for our religion and the state."

The physicians discovered indications of poison in the Shah's body. People had various theories about his murder: One was that the Shah had spurned Parī Khan Ḵānom, and the latter had therefore conspired with maidservants of the harem to arrange that poison be inserted in the electuary mixture. Another theory was that the Shah had died of the colic, which afflicted him from time to time, and had on another occasion flared up and brought him to the brink of death. The physicians had treated him, and he had recovered. This time, since he was in better health, there was no physician present, and so he died. Other people pointed out that the Shah had repeatedly consumed mixtures containing opium and had eaten excessive quantities of food; their theory was that severe flatulence had twisted his stomach and blocked his windpipe. However, none of these theories solved the fundamental problem of how it happened. The common people were stupefied by such an unexpected and curious incident.

The emirs were anxious that the news of the Shah's murder should not get out too rapidly, and so they gave orders to the gatekeepers to close the gates leading to the Meydān-e Asp-e Šāhī. Moreover, there had recently been a renewal of *qezelbāš* intertribal factionalism. The Takkalūs and the Turkmans had been guilty of numerous offenses against the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs. Blood had been spilled, and eventually the latter had gained the advantage. Mīrzā Salmān and Kalīl Khan Afšār, who was an experienced statesman, acted to prevent a possible outbreak of general conflict among the *qezelbāš*. They called on the emirs to set aside tribal rivalries in the interests of the state and to swear friendship to one another. Emir Khan, who was the leading emir of the Turkman tribe, set the example by coming forward and swearing to observe a father-son relationship with Pīra Moḥammad Ostājlū. All the emirs followed their lead and swore mutual friendship toward one another.

This done, the debate began regarding the succession. Valī Sultan Qolkānčī-oğlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Shiraz, urged the claim of Esma'il's infant son, Shah Šojā', on the ground that inheritance is from father to son. The other emirs demurred, alleging that Valī Sultan merely wanted to become *vakīl al-salṭana* and thus to exact obedience from the rest of the *qezelbāš*. How could an eight-month-old infant be a suitable king of Iran, they asked. Valī Sultan then tried another tack. Since he knew that all the emirs would obey Parī Khan Kānom, he suggested, hoping to flatter Parī Khan Kānom, that she should be the real ruler of the state, but that coins should be minted in the name of Shah Šojā', since it was not appropriate that a woman should sit on the throne. But he did not have any luck with this suggestion either.

Emir Khan Torkmān, Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū, Kalīl Afšār, and the other emirs then declared: "Sultan Moḥammad is the eldest son of Shah Tahmasp, and the father of several royal princes. God's choice has fallen upon him." Some shortsighted persons objected, saying, "He is almost blind; how can he possibly discharge the weighty burden of being monarch? In order to control the military and civil affairs of the kingdom, one has to be able to see! The choice must fall on his sons." The *qezelbāš* nobles who were present, given inspiration by the Almighty, shouted, "Sultan Moḥammad is our king; his sons, who are now children, will in the years to come, God willing, come to the throne after being nurtured in the shadow of their father's protection. Let Sultan Moḥammad name as his heir-apparent whichever son he considers most suitable." No one spoke. Valī Sultan, who had been guilty of many discourtesies toward Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā at Shiraz, was extremely apprehensive and did not like the decision at all. But no one listened to him, and in any case he could not say very much.

All those present shouted "The realm belongs to Sultan Moḥammad the king," and they chanted "Allah! Allah!" for it is the agreeable practice of the *qezelbāš*, whenever they take a decision on any matter, to repeat this holy word by way of benediction and blessing. The emirs then rose and went to the private apartments of Parī Khan Ḵānom, both to seek her advice and to inform her of what had happened. Parī Khan Ḵānom considered herself to be the ruler. She agreed that, when Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā arrived from Shiraz, he would become the titular king, but the real power would reside in her hands.

Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the father of 'Alīqolī Khan, immediately sent to Herat a certain Sultan Maḥmūd, 'Alīqolī Khan's agent who was at court on business, to give the news of the death of Shah Esma'il II and to cancel the order for the execution of 'Abbas Mīrzā, if by any chance it had not been carried out.

The emirs all affixed their seals to a covenant pledging their allegiance to Sultan Moḥammad, and sent it to Shiraz by the hand of 'Alī Khan Beg Mowṣellū Torkmān, who was Sultan Moḥammad's cousin. Following him went 'Alī Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, the son of Moḥammad Khan Aqa, who was a supporter of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā and an enemy of Valī Sultan, bearing an order testifying to the death of Shah Esma'il II and the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. It was late afternoon when the gates of the Meydān-e Asp were opened and the couriers galloped on their way; it was about the time of the breaking of the day's fast that the people realized that Shah Esma'il II had died.

The next day, Parī Khan Ḵānom gave orders that all the emirs and nobles who were languishing in jails and dungeons as political prisoners—either because they had supported the cause of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā or for some other reason—should be released. Men of every class were held in jail, including Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan, the son of Ma'ṣūm Beg and Seyyed Beg Kamūna. They were all released with the exception of Ḥoseyn Beg *yūzbāšī*, who had died of dysentery a few days earlier.

Mīrzā Maḵdūm Šarīfī was spared because of Parī Khan Ḵānom's affection for his mother, but he felt he could not stay in Iran. With a view to visiting the holy places, he went first to Baghdad, where he was received with favor by the Ottomans. For several years he held the post of *qāżī al-qożāt* at Mecca, where he handed down legal decisions in accordance with the Ḥanafī school of law. He eventually died there. It is reported by many sources that on his deathbed he asked that his body be washed and buried according to the Imami rite; for, he said, "I am an Eṣnā 'Ašarī, even though I have committed many unworthy actions out of worldly considerations and spurred by my own ambition; knowledge resides in God, and He knows the inner truths of all matters."

Since most people had suffered as a result of the evil actions of Shah Esma'il II, no one was particularly disturbed by his death, and the transfer of power was effected without any disturbances. All servants of the royal household, heads of departments, members of the royal bodyguard, and *moqarrabs* who wished to travel to Shiraz to present their respects to the new Shah had to seek permission to do so from the emirs, who in turn cleared the names with Parī Khan Ḵānom. Only then were they allowed to leave Qazvin.

The Accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah

As previously mentioned, Esma'il II had sent a *qūrčī* named Ğāzī Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar to Shiraz to see that Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā and his sons were kept under close arrest and that no one had access to them; this *qūrčī*'s conduct toward the prince was most unpleasant. After the death of Shah Esma'il II, the great emirs dispatched 'Alī Khan Beg Mowṣellū Torkmān and 'Alī Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar in succession to Shiraz. But Eskandar Beg Šāmlū, who was the son of a Šāmlū emir, left for Shiraz without permission before either of the other two emissaries, and rode hell for leather to Shiraz. Traveling day and night and not stopping to rest, he reached Shiraz two days before 'Alī Beg. Horse and rider were covered with sweat, but he rushed into Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā's rooms and gave the good news that Shah Esma'il II had died and that all was now right with the world.

Ğāzī Beg was not there at that time, and the servants ran in panic to the harem to tell the prince that a *qūrčī* had arrived from Qazvin with news of the Shah's death. The prince, either because his lofty mind was above such mundane matters or because he considered it inexpedient to show his hand prematurely, showed no reaction at the news. It occurred to him that Esma'il might merely be putting him to the test, and had deliberately sent the courier to find out whether he had any ambitions regarding the throne or not.

At this point, Ğāzī Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar arrived and began shouting at Eskandar Beg and threatening to kill him. Eskandar Beg said, "What is so surprising about my news? Even the Prophet Moḥammad died, and now Shah Esma'il II is dead. You will know within three days whether I am lying or not; if I am, do your worst to me." Meanwhile, the news spread through the city, causing an uproar, and people flocked to the palace. Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā said to Ğāzī Beg, "Perhaps this fellow is an epileptic, and does not know what he is saying. Lock him up! If his news is confirmed, that is God's will, and we must bow to it; if not, visit upon him a severe punishment." Although Ğāzī Beg did not dare to arrest Eskandar Beg, he uttered threats against a group of Šīrāzīs and Ẕu'l-Qadars who came to offer their condolences. Every hour he sent some message to the prince, and got the same reply. No news came from Qazvin that day, and Ğāzī Beg's confidence was restored.

But on the second day, toward evening, 'Alī Beg arrived and confirmed the news. He was received by the new Shah. A group of Ẕu'l-Qadars who were friends of 'Alī Beg and enemies of Valī Sultan then entered and saluted Sultan Moḥammad Shah and congratulated him on his accession. Eskandar Beg was promoted to the rank of emir, with the sobriquet of Ḵoš-ḵabar-Ḵān,[1] and the Ẕu'l-Qadars, in accordance with Sufi practice, began to revile Ḡāzī Beg. The Shah stopped them, saying, "I have suffered considerably at the hands of Ḡāzī Beg, but I pardon him in gratitude for God's act of grace toward me; Ḡāzī Beg is a reliable and experienced officer who was merely carrying out the orders of his king in regard to me, and therefore deserves my patronage." The Shah then conferred on him the office of *ešīk-āqāsī,* and for a few days Ḡāzī Beg was in attendance at court. But Mahd-e 'Olyā[2] had not forgotten his insolent manners and harsh words, and she had him seized and sent in disgrace to the fortress of Eṣṭaḵr, where he died.

The next day, all the *seyyeds* and nobles of Shiraz, together with the elders of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe, presented themselves at court and performed the ceremony of kissing the Shah's feet. 'Alī Beg was appointed governor of Shiraz, with the title of khan. Of the *seyyeds* of high rank, Shah Moẓaffar Enjū, a strong supporter of the Shah, was made *qāżī 'askar.* Mīrzā Aḥmad Kofrānī, who had been vizier and superintendent of the royal household at Shiraz for a number of years and had performed notable service in these offices, particularly during the reign of Shah Esma'il II, was promoted to the office of *nāẓer-e sarkār-e ḵāṣṣa-ye šarīfa.*[3] Since the new Shah's household had been allowed to run down, 'Alī Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar and Mīrzā Aḥmad Kofrānī the *nāẓer* provided everything that was necessary from their own budget, from the resources of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe, and from the revenues of the state treasury.

Every day, fresh contingents of centurions, *ešīk-āqāsīs,* and court officials, both Turks and Persians, kept arriving at Shiraz from Qazvin, and were graciously received by the Shah. Mīr Qavām al-Dīn Ḥoseyn, the comptroller of finance at Shiraz, had sided with the Ẕu'l-Qadars in their dispute with Valī Sultan; in revenge, Valī Sultan had lodged a complaint against him at Qazvin with Shah Esma'il II. Mīr Qavām al-Dīn had been arrested and placed in irons in the solitary cell. He had now been released, and made his way to Shiraz, where he was appointed vizier to the Shah's wife, Mahd-e 'Olyā Faḵr al-Nesā Begom.[4] Mahd-e 'Olyā was the architect and organizer of the affairs of state; no decision was taken without her approval, and Sultan Moḥammad Shah deferred to her constantly.

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[1] Lit.: the Khan who brings good news.

[2] Sultan Moḥammad Shah's wife, and the real power behind the throne until her downfall in 1579 (see R. M. Savory, "Safavid Persia," in *Cambridge History of Islam,* 1970, Vol. I, pp. 410-11.

[3] In other words, the *nāẓer-e boyūtāt,* or superintendent of the royal household (see *TM,* pp. 48ff).

Mahd-e 'Olyā wished to release from prison in the fortress of Eṣṭaḵr Khan Aḥmad, the semi-independent governor of Gīlān, who was related to her. To please her, Sultan Moḥammad Shah released him, made much of him, and appointed him governor of the province of Gīlān. The Shah also released from jail Šāhroḵ Beg Tātī-oḡlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, promoted him to the rank of governor and *khan,* and appointed him to the office of *mohrdār* (keeper of the seal). The latter had been arrested, along with other friends of Esma'il Mīrzā, and imprisoned with him by Shah Tahmasp; when Esma'il Mīrzā came to the throne, he promised him the post of personal *vakīl* and *vakīl* of the supreme *dīvān.* He kept promising to release him from prison, but he never carried out his promise.

About this time, the vizier Mīrzā Salmān[5] arrived in Shiraz and went first to the house of 'Alīqolī Khan to seek his good offices. An audience was arranged for him with the Shah by the latter and by Mīrzā Aḥmad the *nāẓer,* who was a friend of his, and he was received by the Shah and by Mahd-e 'Olyā. While Mīrzā Salmān was giving the Shah news of happenings at Qazvin and of the activities of Parī Khan Ḵānom, and assuring the Shah of the fealty of the emirs, he managed to slip in a few words to indicate his own undying loyalty to the Shah. He was well received, and at the same audience was re-appointed *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā* with the title of *e'temād al-dowla.*[6]

Meanwhile, at Qazvin, Parī Khan Ḵānom had taken upon her own shoulders the responsibility for the conduct of state affairs. The emirs obeyed her orders, and every day presented themselves at her house. Each tribe chose a trusted elder to represent it and agreed to follow his counsel: the Turkmans chose Emir Khan; the Ostājlūs, Pīra Moḥammad Khan; the Šāmlūs, Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, the grandson of

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[4] Mahd-e 'Olyā was the daughter of a local ruler in Māzandarān.

[5] Appointed vizier 26 Rabī' I, 985/13 June 1577, by Shah Esma'il II (see R. M. Savory, "The Significance of the Political Murder of Mīrzā Salmān.")

[6] Lit.: the trusted support of the state.

Dūrmīš Khan; the Takkalūs, Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oġlū; the Afšārs, Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī;* the Ẕu'l-Qadars, the keeper of the seal of the supreme *dīvān* (Šāhrok̲ Khan Tātī-oġlū Ẕu'l-Qadar); and so on. The council of emirs that was thus constituted submitted its requests to Parī Khan K̲ānom through her uncle, Šamk̲āl Sultan Čerkes, and carried out the orders relayed to it. One of the orders issued by Parī Khan K̲ānom was that, apart from those emirs who had been officially dispatched to Shiraz, no one else should leave Qazvin without permission; when Sultan Moḥammad Shah approached the capital, all the emirs were to escort her litter and go out to greet the Shah.

After a few days, Mīrzā Salmān, who did not entirely trust the K̲ānom and Šamk̲āl, decided that his best course of action was to leave Qazvin and join the Shah at Shiraz. Talking smoothly, he got Emir Khan to agree to this; then he went behind the lattice of the harem and got some of the inmates to persuade the K̲ānom that it was in the best interests of the state that he should hasten to Shiraz and be in attendance on the Shah. In that way, he could frustrate any attempts by outsiders to cause a rift between brother and sister. The K̲ānom, although she doubted whether either the Shah or the army would act contrary to her wishes, admitted there was something in what he said and gave her permission. Without wasting a moment, Mīrzā Salmān left the harem and departed for Shiraz, not taking the usual route. The following day, the emirs learned of his departure; since they disapproved of his being allowed to go, Šamk̲āl Sultan wanted to send a courier to fetch him back, but Emir Khan prevented him. Mīrzā Salmān rode hell for leather to Shiraz, reached that city before the Shah's cavalcade had left, and as already described, entered the Shah's service.

Mīrzā Salmān soon perceived that the Shah's wife, Mahd-e 'Olyā, held the reins of power. Looking to his own interests, therefore, as all officers of state and aspirants to high office have to do, he told the Shah and his wife the truth about events at Qazvin, and something about the powerful position of Parī Khan K̲ānom and the way in which the *qezelbāš* emirs obeyed her. It is generally agreed he made it clear to the Shah and Mahd-e 'Olyā that, as long as Parī Khan K̲ānom was mistress in the palace and controlled affairs of state, the Shah would possess nothing but the title of king, and his wife would not be admitted to the harem. The Shah and his wife, deciding that the K̲ānom had to be rendered powerless, deliberated as to how this might be achieved. All the reports that came from Qazvin confirmed them in this resolve. In short, Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Mahd-e 'Olyā determined to remove Parī Khan Ḵānom from the scene because they were filled with apprehension by reports of her treacherous plotting against Shah Esma'il II—and indeed, they had good reason to be apprehensive. Day by day, Mīrzā Salmān consolidated his position and increasingly took charge of state affairs.

About a month passed, and then the Shah and his party left Shiraz for Isfahan, where the citizens gave them a great welcome and showered them with gifts. The city was placed under the personal jurisdiction of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, and Emir Ḥoseyn Khan Māzandarānī, the nephew of Mahd-e 'Olyā, was appointed its *dārūḡa*. From there the royal party traveled to Kashan, where they spent three days, and thence to Qom, where they visited the Shah's mother, Solṭānom. The latter was still mourning the death of her son, Shah Esma'il II, and the murder of her grandson, Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā, but she rejoiced at the sight of her eldest son, Sultan Moḥammad Shah, and her other grandchildren, from whom she had been separated for an age. While they were at Qom, Ḥoseynqolī Sultan Šāmlū, the *ešīk-āqāsī-bāšī*, arrived from Qazvin bringing with him a quantity of stores from the royal workshops and the royal regalia to greet the Shah. A number of *moqarrabs* also arrived at Qom and kissed the Shah's feet.

Meanwhile, reports had been reaching the emirs at Qazvin that the Shah and Mahd-e 'Olyā were displeased by the degree of power wielded by Parī Khan Ḵānom, and by the fact that they themselves were concentrated there. Accordingly, Emir Khan, Pīra Moḥammad Khan, Ḵalīl Khan, the *qūrčībāšī*, and other emirs and high-ranking khans sent their sons and leading nobles of their tribes (having obtained a sort of permission for so doing) to Qom to greet the Shah. In the end, matters reached the point that emirs were leaving Qazvin without Parī Khan Ḵānom's permission, and were making their own way to Qom. Gradually, almost all the emirs and nobles came to pay their respects to the Shah, and even Parī Khan Ḵānom's lieutenants, including Šamḵāl Sultan and his supporters, felt the Shah's displeasure and were perturbed.

Finally, the royal cavalcade moved off from Qom toward the capital, Qazvin. At Ḵoškrūd, just past Sāva, Emir Khan, Pīra Moḥammad Khan, Ḵalīl Khan, the *qūrčībāšī*, Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, and others still left at Qazvin (the group which had agreed to escort Parī

Khan Ḵānom's litter and meet the Shah with her) considered it to be in the best interests of the state[7] to leave her service and presented themselves to the Shah. Some had left Qazvin with the Ḵānom's permission, some without. Word reached the Shah that Šamḵāl Sultan was maintaining a group of Circassians under arms at the house of Parī Khan Ḵānom and was in a rebellious mood. When he neared Qazvin, the Shah summoned Emir Aṣlān Khan Arešlū Afšār, who had been a staunch supporter of Shah Esma'il II, and charged him with the task of dealing with Šamḵāl Sultan.

With him the Shah sent a letter to the following effect: "I hereby grant you the governorship of the province of Šakkī, which was your fief for a number of years in the time of Shah Tahmasp, and which you have always wanted. The moment is now opportune; take your men and camp outside the city. When I enter the city and take up residence in the royal palace, come alone and perform the ceremony of kissing my feet; then you may depart for Šakkī." Emir Aṣlān Khan, who was a close friend of Šamḵāl Sultan, delivered the Shah's letter and ordered him to mount. Šamḵāl Sultan, although he realized full well that this was not an act of generosity on the part of the Shah, could see no other solution to his problem. So he accepted joyfully the chance of retiring from the scene and going to Šakkī. Whether he really wanted to or not, he mounted and rode with Emir Aṣlān Khan to Šantan, about one *farsaḵ* outside the city.

The next day, 1 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 985/9 February 1578, the Shah reached Pīra Ṣūfīān, one *farsaḵ* from Qazvin. Parī Khan Ḵānom was carried into the royal presence in her litter, which was carried on the shoulders of the *qūrčīs* of the harem and her own personal attendants, some four or five hundred of whom escorted her. The court eunuchs made the arrangements for her audience with the Shah, and she met her royal brother and his sons in the harem. They exchanged mutual condolences on the death of their father, Shah Tahmasp, and their brothers, and railed against the enormity of Shah Esma'il II's behavior and his temerity in flouting the ties of kinship. I heard from some of the eunuchs who were present that Mahd-e 'Olyā, as a point of courtesy, kissed the hand of Parī Khan Ḵānom, but that the latter, in her pride and folly, displayed no great regard for her in return.

On Tuesday, 3 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 985/11 February 1578, eleven months of the Year of the Ox having elapsed, at a time fixed by Mowlānā Afżal

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[7] A delicious piece of irony on the part of the author!

Qazvīnī, the court astrologer, Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā entered Qazvin, escorted by a large crowd of townspeople who had come out to Pīra Ṣūfīān to greet them. The Shah entered the palace in triumph and with a joyful heart, and the daughters and wives of Shah Tahmasp came and kissed his feet. The author was in Qazvin on the day the Shah entered the city, and I was one of those who went out to greet him. It was Tuesday, the third of Ẕu'l-Ḥejja, but Ḥasan Beg the historian[8] has stated that it was the fifth of Ẕu'l-Ḥejja, and it is possible that I may be mistaken. The Shah had given orders to Ḵalīl Khan Afšār, who had for a while during the reign of Shah Tahmasp been the guardian of Parī Khan Ḵānom, to take the latter to his own house when they reached the city and to keep her there.

After the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā had mounted, the *qūrčīs* picked up the litter as before, and Mahd-e 'Olyā and the other women of the harem rode behind it. When they neared the palace, they found the road blocked by the crowds. The *qūrčīs* and the personal attendants of the Ḵānom, at her order, started to carry the litter in the direction of her house, so that she might enter the harem garden, along with the other women of the royal household, via her own house. When the litter reached the gate of her house, the retainers of Ḵalīl Khan rushed forward to take it to the latter's house. At first the Ḵānom's personal attendants tried to prevent them, not realizing how the land lay, until Ḵalīl Khan's men stated frankly that they were acting on orders from the Shah himself. Parī Khan Ḵānom, who was being tossed to and fro as the two groups struggled for control of the litter, realized what had happened and acquiesced in her fate, unexpected though it was, and was taken to Ḵalīl Khan's house.

The same day, Aṣlān Khan was ordered to go to Šantan and murder Šamḵāl Sultan. He took a few men with him and went on the pretext of saying goodbye to Šamḵāl. As soon as they met, some of the Afšārs drew their swords and killed Šamḵāl, and the Circassians were powerless to intervene. Emir Aṣlān Khan took Šamḵāl's head back to court, where he was promoted to the rank of khan and suitably rewarded.

The same night, some of Ḵalīl Khan's men, acting on orders, strangled Parī Khan Ḵānom. The whole of her property, popularly estimated at some two thousand *tomān*, was bestowed on Ḵalīl Khan as a reward for this deed. Shah Esma'il's infant son Shah Šojā', who was not yet a year old, was also put to death. Valī Sultan Qolḵānčī-oġlū was seized and handed over to his enemies among the Ẕu'l-Qadars at Shiraz to be put to death.

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[8] Ḥasan Beg Rūmlū, the author of the chronicle *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ*.

With all these enemies out of the way, Mahd-e 'Olyā was in complete control of the state, and nothing was done without her order. Ḥamza Mīrzā was appointed to the office of *vakīl-e dīvān-e a'lā,* and was authorized to place his seal on official documents above that of the vizier. Ḥoseyn Beg, the son of Ḵāja Šojā' al-Dīn Šīrāzī, who was the maternal uncle of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū (his sister, Ḵānī Jān Ḵānom, was a trusted servant of both Mahd-e 'Olyā and Ḥamza Mīrzā), as a reward for his devoted service at Herat, was appointed vizier to Ḥamza Mīrzā and entrusted with the seal of stewardship *(mohr-e vekālat).* Mollā Afżal Qazvīnī the astrologer, who was a house guest at the home of Mahd-e 'Olyā, whose confidence and trust he enjoyed, was appointed *kalāntar* and placed in charge of state transactions at Qazvin. Mīrzā Salmān became vizier, with full independence, and acquired the titles of *rokn al-salṭana* (pillar of the kingdom) and *e'temād al-dowla* (trusted support of the state).

The office of *ṣadr* was entrusted to Mīr Šams al-Dīn Moḥammad Ḵabīṣī Kermānī, a learned *seyyed* of pleasant temperament, formidable presence, and ascetic habit. He had attracted the attention of Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda when the latter stopped at the small town of Ḵabīṣ[9] on his way from Herat to Shiraz, and the prince had promised he would petition Shah Tahmasp to grant him the office of *ṣadr.* Nothing happened at the time, but now that he was Shah, Sultan Moḥammad was able to raise him to this office. A courier was dispatched to bring him to court, where he entered upon his new office with full independence of action.

Sultan Moḥammad Shah divided up the Safavid empire among the emirs of the *qezelbāš* tribes: the governorship of Tabriz was given to Emir Khan Mowṣellū, and a number of men (Esma'il Sultan and Šāhqolī Sultan, the brothers of Emir Khan; his son, Sultan Morād Khan; and Ebrahim Sultan Pīāda Torkmān) were promoted to the rank of emir on the recommendation of Emir Khan and were allocated fiefs in Azerbaijan. The office of *amīr al-omarā* of the province of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd was given to Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq Ostājlū on the same terms on which he had held the office under Shah Tahmasp.

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[9] Ḵabīṣ lay east-northeast of Kerman, almost on the edge of the Great Desert.

Emāmqolī Khan Qājār was confirmed in office as *amīr al-omarā* of Qarābāğ, a post to which he had been appointed by Shah Esma'il II. The office of *amīr al-omarā* of Šīrvān was awarded to Aras Khan Rūmlū, and Ordūğdī Ḵalīfa Takkalū and a number of Rūmlū emirs were given fiefs in Šīrvān. Valī Khan Takkalū was made governor of Hamadan.

Of the Ostājlū emirs, Moršedqolī Khan Yakān was made governor of Bāḵarz and other districts of Khorasan; his brother, Ebrahim Khan, was given a fief at Esfarā'īn; Maḥmūd Khān Ṣūfīoğlū was given Toršīz, and Ḵ̆āf was given to Valī Khan the *čarḵčībāšī* (commander of the skirmishers); Būdāq Khan Čeganī[10] was made governor of Ḵabūšān and districts of Khorasan; Abu'l-Fatḥ Khan, the son of Ağzīvār Khan Šāmlū, and his brother Ḵ̆oš-ḵabar Khan were given fiefs in the Kūsūya and Ḡūrīān districts. The governorship of Kerman was given to Valī Khan Afšār, a kinsman of the *qūrčībāšī*, and Ḵalīl Khan Afšār was confirmed as governor of Kūh Gīlūya. The majority of the districts of Persian Iraq were allocated to the emirs of the court: Kashan was given to Moḥammad Khan Mowṣellū, the kinsman of Emir Khan; Qazvin, to Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū; Qom, as before, to Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq Torkmān; Sāva, to Abu'l-Ma'ṣūm Sultan Tarḵān Torkmān; Rayy, to Mosīb Khan Takkalū; Ḵ̆ār and Semnān, to Šāhqolī Sultan Tabat-oğlū Ẕu'l-Qadar; Sā'ūj Bolāğ and Jowšaqān, and some Arab districts, to Šāhroḵ Khan the keeper of the seal; Ṭārom, Ḵalḵāl, and some other districts, to Pīra Moḥammad Khan. The province of Fārs was allocated to the Ẕu'l-Qadars. Astarābād was granted to Moḥammad Khan Ḥājjīlar Ẕu'l-Qadar, the cousin of Ebrahim Khan. In this way, all the emirs received fiefs appropriate to their station and were dismissed to their posts.

Khan Aḥmad Gīlānī was placed in charge of Bīya Pīš (eastern Gīlān), as had been promised, and the title of "brother" was conferred on him; in addition, he was honored by a marriage alliance with the Safavid royal house and was given the hand of Maryam Sultan Begom, a daughter of Shah Tahmasp. The marriage was celebrated in fitting style at Qazvin, and Khan Aḥmad departed for Gīlān.

Two Georgian princes were also honored by the Shah: 'Īsā Khan Gorjī, the son of Lavand Khan, and Homāyūn Khan, the son of Lūārsāb, both of whom had been imprisoned in the fortress of Alamūt and had been released by Shah Esma'il II. 'Īsā Khan was given the hand in marriage of a daughter of Sām Mīrzā, the brother of Shah Tahmasp, and sent to the province of Šakkī. Homāyūn Khan embraced Islam and assumed the Muslim name of Maḥmūd Khan; by virtue of the precept "Verily all believers are brethren,"[11] he too received the noble title of "brother." He then left for Georgia, where he took possession of his ancestral lands.

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[10] A Kurdish tribe.

Of the eminent *seyyeds* and other nobility at court, some had remained there since the time of Shah Tahmasp, and others had gathered there during the reign of Shah Esma'il II; both groups had petitions and requests of every kind to present to the Shah. All received offices compatible with their station and were dismissed with robes of honor. Among them, Mīrmīrān-e Yazdī[12] had his *soyūrḡāls*[13] renewed; his younger son, Shah Ḵalīlollāh, was married to a daughter of Sultan Begom, the daughter of Shah Esma'il II, who was his nephew,[14] and his elder son, Shah Ne'matollāh, was given in marriage to Ḵāneš Ḵānom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp. Shah Ne'matollāh also received the noble style of "brother," and departed for Yazd.

When Sultan Moḥammad Shah was firmly established on the throne, since he was zealous in the discharge of business, he opened the doors of the treasury and began to hand out money lavishly—so lavishly, in fact, that it bordered on extravagance. The principal officers of the state, and the vizier Mīrzā Salmān, because of the temper of the people and their eagerness for money, kept their own hands off these handouts. The result was that all the emirs who had been dispatched to the provinces received their pay and subsistence allowances for a year or even two—which was far more than they had expected to receive. For example, Emir Khan and his followers received seven thousand *tomān*. The royal tailoring department, which had an enormous stock of robes of honor that had accumulated over the years, distributed its garments to the emirs and officeholders, to financial agents, *kalāntars* (mayors), and other dignitaries in the pro-

[11] Koran, 49:11.

[12] This was Emir Ġīāṣ al-Dīn Moḥammad Mīrmīrān, the son of Emir 'Abd al-Bāqī, who held the posts of *ṣadr, vakīl,* and *amīr al-omarā* under Shah Esma'il I, and was killed at the battle of Čālderān. It is significant that Sultan Moḥammad Shah continued the policy of his predecessors of maintaining close marriage ties with the Ne'matollāhī Order. Mīrmīrān himself held the posts of *naqīb* and provincial *ṣadr,* under Tahmasp and Sultan Moḥammad Shah (see A. K. S. Lambton, "Quis custodiet custodes?" in *Studia Islamica,* vi/1956, p. 130 and p. 131, n.1).

[13] Tax immunities.

[14] By marriage only.

vinces. Never a day passed without the Shah bestowing ten or twenty robes of honor on unknown persons. The troops of the royal bodyguard, who had received no pay for ten years, if not longer, were paid all the arrears due to them. Every day, chests full of gold and silver coins were brought from the royal treasury, and the money was doled out to the *qūrčīs;* in this way, the Shah discharged the obligations of Shah Tahmasp.

The way was open for the holders of *dīvān* offices to line their pockets, and bribery became the order of the day. The *qezelbāš* tribes, with the support of the elders of each tribe, put forward demands that were often incompatible with one another, but having bribed the viziers and the principal officers of state, they pressed on with their schemes. New emirs were added to the establishment of every tribe, but since all the provinces had already been allocated in the form of fiefs, they drew their pay from the royal treasury.[15] At the same time, militants in every tribe began to stir up trouble, and each tribe began to claim precedence over its rivals and to act in an independent manner. In short, the *qezelbāš* put the satisfaction of their own aspirations first, and the interests of religion and the state a poor second.

As a result, within a short space of time the royal treasuries were denuded of both money and goods, which were scattered like particles of dust.[16] Turquoise dust from the mines, which had been accumulated over a period of fifty years, was squandered with reckless extravagance. Although there was little peace and security for the populace in general during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, and the civilian population endured hard times, the military were loaded with benefactions and favors, and gained high office. The arrogant *qezelbāš* tribes pursued conflicting goals, and every head contained some selfish ambition. Arrogance and conceit produced discord and division among this traditionally loyal body of men, and factionalism reared its head.

As rumors of the dissension among the *qezelbāš* spread, grave weaknesses appeared in the body politic. Neighboring monarchs and other enemies, who were awaiting just such an opportunity, encroached on Persian territory from east and west. Sultan Morād,[17] breaking the covenants made by his brothers, laid covetous eyes on Iran, especially Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, and various refractory elements seized the occasion to claim their independence and to make inroads on Persian soil.

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[15] A radical departure from normal practice. The *qezelbāš* troops were paid by assignments on land or on the revenue from land in the "state" *(mamālek)* provinces; the resources of the royal treasury at this time were totally inadequate for the purpose of making cash payments to the troops.

[16] Koran, 25, 24.

Sultan Moḥammad Shah, because of the disunity and factionalism in the army, the dissension among the emirs, the disputes between the *qezelbāš* tribes, and the disobedience of even the army commanders, and because of his own mild nature, was unable to ward off his powerful foes. Finally, matters reached such a pass that large areas of Iran, including Šīrvān and its dependencies, and the cities of Tabriz and Herat, both former capitals of mighty princes, fell into the hands of enemies. Men prayed for deliverance, which God in His mercy vouchsafed unto them by bringing to the throne 'Abbas Mīrzā, who subjugated the realm by his wise administration and his fiery sword, as will be described in more detail at the appropriate place, God willing!

The Invasion of Khorasan by Jalāl Khan Uzbeg and His Death at the Hands of Morteżāqolī Khan Torkmān

The news of the murder of the Safavid royal princes by Shah Esma'il II spread far and wide and called attention to the fact that, apart from the Shah himself and his year-old infant son, no descendant of Ṣhah Esma'il I had survived.[18] When Esma'il II was murdered, the external foes of Iran, thinking that the foundations of the Safavid empire were crumbling, and that dissension was rife among the *qezelbāš*, began to make inroads on Safavid territory. One of these enemies was Jalāl Khan, the son of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, who after the death of Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan, was distinguished by his valor above the other sultans of Ūrganj.[19]

With six or seven thousand Uzbegs of the Nāīman[20] tribe, Jalāl

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[17] The Ottoman sultan Morād III (982-1003/1574-95).

[18] This is, of course, an exaggeration; Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda and his sons were still alive.

[19] The former Gūrganj, called by the Arabs al-Jūrjānīya. The earlier city was destroyed by the Mongols in 1220, and the site of the new city, named Ūrganj, lay a few miles to the south. From the seventeenth century onward, Ūrganj was gradually replaced by Ḵīva as the capital of the province of Ḵārazm.

[20] Originally a Mongol tribe.

Khan, bent on plunder and pillage, swept into Khorasan from the regions of Nesā and Abīvard and reached Mašhad. Since none of the great emirs individually had the strength to oppose him, they crept into their forts and waited for one of the *beglerbegs*[21] to organize a campaign against him; then they would rally round and take the field. After plundering the Mašhad region, Jalāl Khan moved to Jām; after plundering that province too of its flocks and herds, he planned to return by way of Saraḵs, driving the stolen animals before him. Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, the *beglerbeg* of Mašhad, sent couriers to the various emirs who had been placed under his command and issued a call to arms. Since he knew that Jalāl Khan did not have as his objective the conquest of territory but would be satisfied with the acquisition of booty and was, in fact, already on his way back, Morteżāqolī Khan did not wait for the arrival of his reinforcements, but set off in pursuit of Jalāl Khan with a body of his own retainers and a detachment of *qūrčīs* stationed at Mašhad. When he reached Jām, he was joined by some of the emirs and some local troops—about three thousand men in all.

At ʿEšqbād, in the province of Jām, Jalāl Khan received news of the approach of Morteżāqolī Khan and the *qezelbāš* army, and halted his march. Some of the experienced Uzbeg elders counseled Jalāl Khan that, since they had come on a raid and were not prepared for a pitched battle, they should first put the stolen cattle in some safe place. Jalāl Khan, however, in his arrogance, cared nothing for the *qezelbāš* army and prepared for battle. On both sides the trumpets sounded the call to arms, and the fighting raged from late afternoon until sunset. Jalāl Khan, who had not previously experienced a *qezelbāš* charge or witnessed the steadiness of the *ḡāzīs* in battle, was astonished at the prowess of the small band which faced him, and began to regret his decision. When the last rays of sunlight had departed, both sides broke off the battle, retired each to its own camp, and mounted guard for the night.

For their part, the *qezelbāš ḡāzīs* were sufficiently dismayed by the valor of the Uzbegs not to wish to resume the fight, but Morteżāqolī Khan was determined to rout the enemy. At first light, he led his men once again into the fray, urging them on by his personal example. At the height of the battle, Ommat Beg Ostājlū came upon Jalāl Khan, without recognizing who he was, and unhorsed him with a thrust of his spear. Ommat Beg was about to dismount and cut off his head when an Uzbeg in Jalāl Khan's retinue shouted, "Do not kill him; it is Jalāl Khan." When the *qezelbāš* heard the name Jalāl Khan, a group of Turkmans and Čegenīs rushed up, snatched him from the grasp of Ommat Beg and the Ostājlūs, and dragged him into the presence of Morteżāqolī Khan. I have heard from some of the men who fought in this battle that the Ostājlūs displayed great valor, and that there was a dispute between them and the Turkmans and Čegenīs over this incident of the capture of Jalāl Khan, each tribe claiming the credit for it.

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[21] Provincial governors.

Morteżāqolī Khan put Jalāl Khan to death. After the capture of their leader, the Uzbegs fled, and much booty fell into the hands of the *qezelbāš*. Jalāl Khan's head, equipment, and weapons were sent to court, and Morteżāqolī Khan was suitably rewarded. After this splendid victory, he raised the standard of independence in Khorasan. Since he had achieved a victory of such magnitude without the assistance of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg* of Herat, he began to ignore the latter, who was the guardian of the prince 'Abbās. Morteżāqolī Khan always did the opposite of what he was instructed to do by 'Alīqolī Khan, and considered himself superior to the latter. Their feud, fanned by mischief makers, became an open rift and eventually led to conflict; on several occasions the two officers led their forces against each other, as will be related in the appropriate place, God willing!

The Revolt in Sīstān and the Struggle Between the Rebels and Ja'far Sultan Afšār

After the death of Shah Tahmasp, discord and strife arose in various parts of the Safavid empire. The first revolt to occur in Khorasan was sparked by the people of Sīstān. When Shah Tahmasp died, Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā, the son of the late Bahrām Mīrzā, was governor of the province of Nīmrūz[22] and Tīmūr Khan Ostājlū was his guardian. During the reign of Shah Esma'il Mīrzā, Tīmūr Khan put Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā to death on the orders of the Shah. Tīmūr Khan himself remained in Sīstān, but his misdemeanors and unjust practices and those of the Ostājlū tribe caused the emirs and nobles of Sīstān to loathe the *qezelbāš* domination. They banded together and expelled Tīmūr Khan from Sīstān, and for a while the province was without any *qezelbāš*.

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[22] Another name for the province of Sīstān (see Le Strange, p. 334).

As a result, rebels emerged on all sides. They tried to revive Ṣaffārid rule [23] by offering the government of the province to a number of emirs who had the ability to do the job, but some of the latter prudently declined the offer. After the death of Esmaʻil II and the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, the activities of seditious elements increased. Determined to repudiate *qezelbāš* dominance entirely and to declare their independence, they persuaded Malek Maḥmūd to accept the governorship of the province. Hardly had he done so, however, when Sultan Moḥammad Shah appointed Jaʻfar Sultan Arešlū Afšār governor of Sīstān. Those who supported the local emirs and *maleks* retired to the islands and various other strongholds, but the rest of the people of Sīstān, including all the emirs and *maleks* who did not support Malek Maḥmūd, casting a prudent eye to the future, went out to welcome Jaʻfar Sultan and to tender their submission to him.

When Jaʻfar Sultan had taken stock of the situation in Sīstān, he realized he was not strong enough to deal with those he suspected of disloyalty. He therefore maintained a bland front of apparent friendship toward these elements, and allowed most of them to disperse to their own homes. He retained at his side, however, Malek Ĝīāṣ al-Dīn Moḥammad from among the *maleks*, and Emir Mobārez ʻAlī from among the emirs. The rest of the populace, both friend and foe, he dismissed to their own homes. Some of the notables of the province, for example the *maleks* of Sarāyān and Pošt-e Šahr, made common cause with Jaʻfar Sultan and submitted to him. Other districts alternated between hope and fear, and the Sultan kept up his conciliatory policy for six months. During this period, Malek Ĝīāṣ al-Dīn Moḥammad died a natural death, and his sons and dependents were allowed to rejoin their relatives. No sooner had they done so than the dissidents who had retired to the islands, at the instance of Malek Maḥmūd, began to make daily forays in the vicinity of the city.

When their behavior had exceeded all bounds, Jaʻfar Sultan, with ʻEbād Sultan Afšār, governor of Garmsīrāt, who had been ordered by the Shah to go to his assistance, marched out against them with two thousand fully equipped *qezelbāš* troops, together with some thousand Sīstānīs loyal to the *qezelbāš*. Malek Maḥmūd and his emirs marched to meet him with a large army, crossed the Hīrmand River, and fought a battle on its banks. Ja'far Sultan led charge after charge in the most intrepid manner, exposing himself to greater danger than was suitable for a commanding officer. Suddenly his horse was struck by an arrow, and Ja'far Sultan was flung down with such force that he lay stunned on the ground, where he was at once slain by one of the enemy. His death was the signal for the rout of his troops, who streamed back to the city in full retreat. Malek Maḥmūd forbade a pursuit, so the *qezelbāš* did not lose many men. He then sent a courier into the city to inform the *qezelbāš* that they were free to pack their bags and go, and the crestfallen *qezelbāš* left the province.

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[23] The Ṣaffārids were a native dynasty which had, in the ninth-tenth centuries, made Sīstān the center of a large but ephemeral empire. Descendants of the original Ṣaffārid rulers continued to hold intermittent authority in Sīstān for at least another six centuries (see C. E. Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties*, Edinburgh, 1967, pp. 103–106).

When Malek Maḥmūd was sure that the *qezelbāš* had left the city, he entered it in great style and took over the government of the province. News of his prowess spread to all parts of Khorasan, and notable men of every class of society gathered round him. So Malek Maḥmūd, who had hitherto had to make do with the modicum of respect shown to him by the *qezelbāš*, now found himself undisputed master of a rich province. He rejoiced the hearts of men by his prodigality, and he distributed largess to the extent that he was able. Soon, however, evil men and flatterers, seeking their own profit, began to whisper to him, "You are of the stock of Ya'qūb b. Leyṣ,[24] who styled himself King of the World. Why be satisfied with Sīstān?" This sort of talk filled his head with wild ideas, and he aspired to be an independent ruler. But some prudent souls counseled him not to seek open conflict with the Safavid house, and he himself came to regret his action.

He sent an envoy to the royal court to offer his submission. He chose as his intermediary Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, who had been governor of Sīstān and guardian of Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and through him he petitioned for the governorship of Sīstān. Malek Maḥmūd's envoys reached court and delivered their gifts. Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, who at that time was a powerful figure in the state, supported Malek Maḥmūd's cause, and obtained for him from the Shah the governorship of Sīstān. Sultan Moḥammad Shah and his principal officers of state decided in the circumstances to turn a blind eye to the death of Ja'far Sultan, and the letters-patent were sent to Malek Maḥmūd without delay. The latter's power increased apace, as did that of the princess of Kandahar—but all this will be related in Book II of this work, under the events of the reign of Shah 'Abbas I.

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[24] The founder of the Ṣaffārid dynasty (ruled 867-79).

Events in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, the Ottoman Campaign in Those Regions, and Subsequent Events

Since God so willed, hardship and tribulation became the lot of the people of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān after the murder of Shah Esma'il II, and all peace and security departed from those regions. Sedition and discord consumed the lives and property of civilians and military alike. For some two years, these regions were the scene of repeated invasion by foreign troops, who killed and looted. Muslims were taken into captivity, a thing which had never happened before in history, and many wives and sons of *seyyeds* and men of rank were subjected to the yoke of slavery. I hope to give the details of this at the end of this section of the book. But since God had decreed that it should be the destiny of Shah 'Abbas I to restore stability to the realm of Iran and to remedy the affairs of Iranians, no relief was forthcoming until Shah Abbas came to the throne. Praise be to God that, under that king's beneficent rule, the enemies of Iran have received their just deserts and have disgorged the territory they had seized, and the warring tribes once again live together in harmony. Today the land of Iran, under the just rule of the *šāhanšāh* of the world, invites comparison with Paradise. May God preserve him and prolong his reign, so that his subjects may continue to enjoy peace and security! Glory be to God! What lay have I been singing, and whither has the Lord of Felicity been leading my involuntary pen?

To return to my theme. A number of seditious Kurds, notably Ġāzī Beg and other sons of Šāhqolī Balīlān and Ġāzī Qerān, lived between Vān and the Azerbaijan border. As is the custom of landowners in frontier areas, these men, as occasion demanded, from time to time attached themselves to the saddle straps of one of the rulers in the area and claimed to be his retainers, but their real motive was to stir up trouble and achieve their own ends in the ensuing confusion. On the accession of Shah Esma'il II they professed to enter his service, and were received with favor. After his death, however, when they saw the weakness and disarray of the Safavid state and of the *qezelbāš* army, they went to Vān and started to create trouble there. They incited Ḵosrow Pasha, the governor of Vān, to take advantage of the situation. As a result, Ḵosrow Pasha, either for his own ends or on orders from the Ottoman Sultan, cast into oblivion the treaty that had been concluded between Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Sülaymān. That treaty was reinforced by sworn oaths and by an instrument in Sultan Sülaymān's own hand, and binding on succeeding generations.[25]

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[25] The reference is to the Treaty of Amasya (1555), which inaugurated a period of thirty years of peace between the two empires.

Ḵosrow Pasha sent a force composed of Ottoman troops and Kurdish emirs against Ḵ̆oy and Salmās; he thus rendered himself liable to the penalty expressed in the saying: "Sedition is sleeping; may God curse him who wakes her up."

Before Emir Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, and his fellow emirs had arrived at Tabriz to take up their posts, this combined Ottoman and Kurdish force made a sudden attack on Ḥoseyn Khan Sultan Ḵeneslū and Maḥmūd Sultan Rūmlū, who were holding the area of Tūprāq Qal'a-Orūmī-Salmās-Ḵ̆oy. The *qezelbāš*, lulled by years of peace and not expecting the Ottoman sultan to break his covenant, were caught off guard. They went out to do battle, but heavily outnumbered and deceived by a stratagem of the Kurds, were defeated. Since most of the *qezelbāš* had their families with them, they fought desperately to protect them. But they were wiped out, their women and children taken prisoner, and their belongings plundered. The enemy also ravaged the surrounding area. The Kurds then occupied the forts of Gowgar-Čīnlīq and Tūprāq-Qal'a in the district of Orūmī.

When Emir Khan reached Tabriz, he assembled a force of about fifteen thousand men and marched against them. Some of the Kurds decided to remain in their forts; others retreated whence they had come. Emir Khan found the region devastated and the peasants scattered, and no *qezelbāš* force could obtain the supplies necessary for its maintenance. He was therefore unable to reduce the forts or bring the region under Safavid control, and he retired to Tabriz. As a result, the plight of that region became worse; the inhabitants were forced to choose between leaving their homes and submitting to the Ottomans, who continued to occupy the area.

The pasha of Erzerum also sent a force of some six or seven thousand men, in the depth of winter, to Šūra Gel, and burned the tents of Qarā Sultan Bāybordlū. Qarā Sultan counterattacked with two to three thousand men, and the Ottomans suffered some three hundred casualties; he pursued the retreating Ottomans and slew many more as they got stuck in the snow. The Bāybordlūs lost no more than forty or fifty men, but they moved their campgrounds from Šūra Gel.

The presence of the Ottomans and the successful revolt of the Kurds encouraged others to rebel: among them was a tribe which had long enjoyed the favor of the Safavid royal house, and which resided in the Soldūz and Mīāndūāb districts of Marāḡa. The leader of this tribe, Amīra Beg, now styled himself Amīra Khan, came to Marāğa, seized possession of the royal stud at Qarāčūq, and went off with nearly ten thousand horses of Bedouin Arab stock—stallions and mares, large and small. When Emir Khan heard of this he rushed off in pursuit, but succeeded only in recovering and taking to Tabriz a few horses which had foundered along the road and been left behind by the raiders lest they slow up their retreat.

In Šīrvān too, there was trouble. Abū Bakr Mīrzā, the son of Borhān, a descendant of the former kings of Šīrvān, who for fear of the *qezelbāš* was in exile in Dāğestān and Circassia, was persuaded to put himself at the head of a force of several thousand Lezgīs[26] and men of the Qarā Būrak tribe, who were descended from the former soldiers of the armies of Šīrvān. They began to ravage the borders of that province. Abū Bakr Mīrzā sent an envoy to seek the aid of the Ottoman sultan in installing him as vassal ruler in Šīrvān, and a delegation of Šīrvānīs went to Istanbul, where they made much of their common faith with the Ottomans as they sought help against the *qezelbāš*. These events led Sultan Morād to break the treaty of peace with Iran and to decide on the annexation of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān.

The invasion force, more than 100,000 strong, was led by Moṣṭafā Pasha, the Sultan's guardian and thus known as Lala Pasha. He ordered Moḥammad Gerāy Khan Tātār, an ally of the Ottomans and the son of Dowlat Gerāy, who was descended from Jočī the son of Genghis Khan, to mobilize a large Tartar army and march to Šīrvān via the Ḳazar steppe. Moḥammad Gerāy lived in Bāğča-sarāy with some one hundred thousand Tartar households. The Crimean khan, attracted by the prospect of plundering that reputedly rich region, responded eagerly to Moṣṭafā Pasha's summons. When this news reached Qazvin, the Shah's advisers counseled him first to send a friendly letter to the Ottoman sultan inquiring why he had broken the peace treaty and permitted his wardens of the marches to act with such insolence, and reminding him that on the Persian side the treaty had been observed. The letter was sent with Valī Beg Ostājlū, a retainer of Moḥammadī Khan Toḳmāq, but the courier was intercepted by the governors and pashas in the frontier regions and not allowed to proceed to Istanbul.

Moṣṭafā Pasha continued his march: he left Anatolia and reached the province of Qārṣ, which lies between the provinces of Čok̲ūr-e Sa'd and Erzerum. One of the conditions of the Treaty of Amasya was that the province of Qārṣ should remain a no-man's land between the two empires, and that neither side should attempt to rebuild or fortify it. Moṣṭafā Pasha now set about repairing the forts in the area and installing garrisons and commandants. He then marched on to the province of Āk̲esqa, a district of Georgia, the fief of Manūčehr Khan Gorjī, the son-in-law of Samā'ūn (Simon) Khan. The latter opposed the Ottomans, put his fortress in a state of defense, and himself visited Samā'ūn Khan. Moṣṭafā Pasha invested the fort with artillery, and leaving the siege in the hands of a detachment of Janissaries, marched on into Samā'ūn Khan's territory.

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[26] Or Lakz; see V. Minorsky, *A History of Sharvan and Darband,* index, especially pp. 80–81.

Moḥammadī Khan Tok̲māq Ostājlū, the *beglerbeg* of Čok̲ūr-e Sa'd, reported the approach of Lala Pasha to the Shah, who ordered the *beglerbeg*, Emir Khan, and Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, to mobilize the troops from Azerbaijan and move against the enemy. After several meetings of the council, it was agreed that since the Ottoman sultan was not leading his army in person, it would be beneath the dignity of the Shah to lead the Persian forces. Ḥamza Mīrzā was ordered to mobilize the troops of Iraq and Fārs, join forces with the Azerbaijan army, and take charge of operations. Meanwhile, Moḥammadī Khan had written to Emir Khan and Emāmqolī Khan, bidding them join him in Čok̲ūr-e Sa'd, since this seemed to be the probable line of Ottoman advance. Once they arrived, he said, they would take counsel together as to how to proceed. But Emir Khan, because of the quarrel between the Turkmans and the Ostājlūs, did not want any member of the Ostājlū tribe to hold any post of importance, and delayed his departure beyond all reasonable bounds. Emāmqolī Khan joined Moḥammadī Khan at Čoldor, but there was no sign of Emir Khan.

Moṣṭafā Pasha, meanwhile, had repaired the fort at Qārṣ, and was engaged in reducing the fort at Āk̲esqa. It became clear that he was making for Georgia. The two *qezelbāš* khans decided to bar his passage, thinking in their arrogance that it was an easy matter to give battle to the Ottomans. They marched against the Pasha with fifteen thousand men from Čok̲ūr-e Sa'd and Qarābāğ. When he heard of their approach, Moṣṭafā Pasha sent out large patrols daily—about ten thousand men from the troops of the *sanjaq-begs* and the frontier regiments, under the command of reliable pashas and *beglerbegs*. The Pasha did not pay much attention to this *qezelbāš* threat because of the size of his own army and the reports he had received, from rebel Kurds and others, of the disunity of the *qezelbāš* tribes.

When the skirmishers on both sides met, the *qezelbāš* charged and scattered the Ottomans and put to flight the troops stationed behind them. The *qezelbāš* emirs in the center then charged and slew two or three thousand of the enemy, mostly frontier Kurds; others were taken prisoner, secured by lassos. The emirs, realizing that their men had gone too far ahead in pursuit of the enemy, decided to follow them in case there was an Ottoman counterattack. When the news reached him, Lala Pasha calmly detailed a force of thirty thousand men, under the command of certain notable pashas and *beglerbegs,* to counterattack. As soon as the Ottomans sighted the *qezelbāš,* now strung out some two or three *farsaḵs* ahead of the emirs, they launched an attack with ten thousand men, driving the *qezelbāš* back before them. By this time, the *qezelbāš* horses were beginning to flag; any man who had a prisoner alongside cut him loose, but even so the *qezelbāš* sustained a severe defeat, losing about a thousand men killed, mostly Moḥammadī Khan's men from Čoḵūr-e Sa'd. The emirs, trying to keep up with the *qezelbāš* ahead, had lost formation and had no time to re-form; they therefore fell back on their own camp.

The first crime of which the *qezelbāš* were guilty was intertribal bickering, which prevented them from working harmoniously together. Their second fault lay in their taking on an Ottoman army of one hundred thousand men with their own force of fifteen thousand, without waiting for other contingents to arrive. The result of their folly was that Lala Pasha was encouraged, and the slight apprehension he had felt in regard to the *qezelbāš* was removed. If all the forces of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān had assembled at one rendezvous, they would have numbered more than fifty thousand men; if the Georgian princes had joined them, Lala Pasha's task would have been difficult. As it was, because of *qezelbāš* disunity, their strength in Azerbaijan was gradually frittered away; their leaders were killed one after the other, and the financial resources they had built up over the years were dissipated.

A few days after his victory at Čoldor, Lala Pasha captured the fort of Āḵesqa. Leaving a garrison there, he pressed on toward the territory of Samā'ūn (Simon) Khan. Moḥammadī Khan remained in his own province, and the Qarābāg army under Emāmqolī Khan returned to its base. Lala Pasha called on Samā'ūn Khan and Alexander to submit, but there was even dissension between the two Georgian princes. Samā'ūn remained steadfastly loyal to the Safavid royal house, took his men into the mountain fastnesses, defied the Ottomans, and scored some notable successes over them. Alexander Khan, on the other hand, was a diplomatic man who looked to his own future; he dissembled with the Ottomans and sent gifts to Lala Pasha, declaring his submission. Cheered by this, Lala Pasha marched without trouble through the mountain passes and reached Tiflis. In the time of Shah Tahmasp, the fortress there had been held by Dā'ūd (David) Khan, the brother of Samā'ūn. When the Ottomans arrived, Dā'ūd Khan, despairing of help from his brothers because of family quarrels, evacuated the fort, which was promptly occupied by the Ottomans and garrisoned.

At Gori, the capital of princes of Georgia, the Ottomans put the fort in order and then marched against Šīrvān. 'Alī Khan Gorjī, the brother of Alexander, who was at Šakkī, was unable to oppose the Pasha, who marched without hindrance into Dāğestān. The Lezgīs and the governors of Dāğestān submitted to him. The populace showed itself hostile to the *qezelbāš*, and Aras Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, a sensible commander, considered himself unable either to meet the Ottomans in the field or, in view of the hostility of the citizens, to attempt to hold the fort. He therefore withdrew, with all his baggage and dependents, to the river Kor, and the province of Šīrvān was annexed by the Ottomans. Lala Pasha appointed 'Os̱mān Pasha *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, left Qeytās Pasha at Aras, and appointed governors for all areas of Šīrvān. He strengthened the forts at Šamāḵī, Aras, and Bākū, and then began his homeward march. Abū Bakr Mīrzā, the son of Borhān, who had expected to be installed as governor of Šīrvān on condition that he send tribute to the Ottoman sultan, was left behind in Šīrvān to cooperate with the Ottomans in administering the province. Moṣṭafā Pasha pacified him by promising, on his return to Istanbul, to obtain from the Sultan letters appointing him governor of Šīrvān.

When the Ottomans withdrew, Emāmqolī Khan joined forces with Samā'ūn Khan, and on several occasions they suddenly emerged from the forests of Georgia and achieved notable successes against the Ottomans. Although the Ottomans, in the course of this whole campaign, lost about twenty thousand men, this did not affect the overall strength of Lala Pasha's army, because of its size. Emir Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Tabriz, had belatedly marched with ten thousand men to the assistance of Moḥammadī Khan Tokmāq. When he heard that Moḥammadī Khan had been defeated and that the Pasha had gone on to Georgia and Šīrvān, he marched to Qarābāḡ, where he joined forces with Emāmqolī Khan. Together, the khans marched from the river Kor and caught up with the Ottomans on the banks of the river Qabrī, in Georgia. Awaiting their opportunity, they fell on a detachment of some four or five thousand Ottoman troops who had left the main body to forage, slew two thousand of them, and carried off their horses and possessions. A number of Ottoman emirs were taken in this engagement.

Emir Khan, satisfied with this victory, wished to retire and winter in Qarābāḡ, and there await the arrival of Ḥamza Mīrzā and the main royal army. A number of inexperienced hotheads among the *qezelbāš*, including Emir Khan's own son Sultan Morād Khan, wanted another victory. They crossed the river Qabrī and gave battle. The Ottomans crossed the river and encircled the *qezelbāš*, catching some two or three thousand of Emir Khan's men in a trap. The *qezelbāš* were defeated, with the loss of several thousand men dead, and Emir Khan saw nothing for it but to retire to Tabriz. Lala Pasha wintered at Erzerum.

The Arrival of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā in Qarābāḡ and Šīrvān and His Successful Campaign There

Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, accompanied by the chief officers of state and by his mother, Mahd-e 'Olyā, who could not bear to be parted from her favorite son, left Qazvin and marched to Azerbaijan. Royal mobilization orders were sent to all parts of the empire. When the prince reached Mīāna he paused for a few days' rest to be briefed on the course of operations in Georgia and Šīrvān, and to hold a council of war. The consensus was that the best plan was to march in the direction of Qarābāḡ, and the prince adopted this plan. En route, he went to Ardabīl and visited the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī, where he invoked the aid of the spirits of the Safavid shaikhs. Then he marched to Qarābāḡ. It was agreed that he and Mahd-e 'Olyā should encamp at Qezel Āḡāj, and the emirs and the vizier, Mīrzā Salmān, should cross the river Kor and enter Šīrvān.

When they heard of the approach of the royal army, Aras Khan and the emirs of Šīrvān feared that they might be criticized by the officers of the central administration and censured by the *qezelbāš* for failing to give battle to the Ottomans and for abandoning Šīrvān. They therefore decided that, before the prince arrived, they would mount an expedition against Šamāḵī and lay siege to it; if they took it, they would redeem themselves. Accordingly, they recrossed the river Kor and marched on Šamāḵī. But the Rūmlūs had been in Šīrvān for a number of years, and their discipline had become soft. Disaster overtook them, most of their leaders were killed, and the large quantity of stores and possessions they had accumulated was plundered. It happened in the following manner.

I mentioned earlier that Sultan Morād Khan, the Ottoman sultan, had enjoined Moḥammad Gerāy Khan, the son of the khan of the Crimean Tartars Dowlat Gerāy, to attack the *qezelbāš* by way of Darband, and Moḥammad Gerāy had sent his brother, 'Ādel Gerāy, with twenty thousand men, to the assistance of the Ottomans. Aras Khan and the Šīrvān emirs were preparing to give battle to the Ottomans when the advance guard of the Tartars came in sight, and within a short time the hills and plain were swarming with them. Some of the *qezelbāš* emirs were for turning back and fighting their way through to some secure place. Aras Khan, however, could not bring himself to retreat; and indeed, it was already too late. Resolved to die valiantly, the *qezelbāš* flung themselves upon the hordes advancing on them from all sides—Ottomans, Tartars, Lezgīs, Qarā Būrak, and Šīrvānī rebels. Aras Khan and others were taken prisoner and put to death; still others died in battle; the rest fled back to their camp. After the battle, 'Oṣmān Pasha retired again to the fortress at Šamāḵī, but 'Ādel Gerāy Khan and the Tartars went in pursuit of the *qezelbāš* toward the river Kor, intending to plunder their camp.

Ordūḡdī Ḵalīfa Takkalū and some of the sons of Aras Khan who had escaped from the battle reported the affair to Ḥamza Mīrzā, Mīrzā Salmān, and the emirs who had reached Qarābāḡ. Ḥamza Mīrzā ordered the emirs of Ṭavāleš to hasten to Aras Khan's camp, to set up patrols along the Kor river, and to guard the camp. The royal army, he said, was on its way to Šīrvān. The Ṭāleš emirs were holding the bridge at Javād to permit the passage of the *qezelbāš* wounded and patrolling the banks of the river when they received the news of the approach of the Tartar and Lezgī army. The emirs at once cut the bridge, but a group of the enemy flung themselves recklessly into the water, swam across, and gave battle to the *qezelbāš*. While the fighting was in progress, the *qezelbāš* heard that another group of the enemy, guided by Šīrvānī rebels, had crossed the river at another point and made its way around to their rear. *Sauve qui peut* became the order of the day for the *qezelbāš*, who fled in disorder back to the camp, where their arrival caused the utmost panic and confusion. The men in the camp were still struggling to pack their equipment when the Lezgīs and Tartars fell on them; the women and children were taken prisoner, and all their stores were plundered. 'Ādel Gerāy Khan, with his Tartar and Lezgī forces, retired across the river with their loot the same day and returned to Šīrvān.

Meanwhile, Mīrzā Salmān and the great emirs marched from Qarā Kūtal in Qarābāg̈, crossed the river Kor at Qūmīn Ūlamī,[27] and laid siege to Šamāḵī. Leaving a force to prosecute the siege, the main army, under Mīrzā Salmān, the *qūrčībāšī*, Šāhroḵ Khan the keeper of the seal, Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū, Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan Šāmlū, Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-og̈lū Takkalū, Emāmqolī Khan Qājār, Emir Ḥamza Khan the son of 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājlū, and others, went in pursuit of the Tartars. 'Ādel Gerāy, confident of his ability to repeat his recent victories over the *qezelbāš*, moved toward Šamāḵī in support of 'Os̱mān Pasha, and the two armies met at the village of Mollā Ḥasan. 'Ādel Gerāy Khan drew up his forces, consisting of twelve thousand Tartars and four or five thousand Lezgīs, Qarā Būrak, and Šīrvānī rebels, and Emir Ḥamza Khan Ostājlū led the attack on him with the Safavid skirmishers. Some of the emirs who were besieging Šamāḵī, deciding that there was more to be gained by taking part in the action against the Tartars than in their siege operations, marched without orders and joined the royal army.

The Tartars stood firm under repeated *qezelbāš* charges, and the battle raged all day. When 'Ādel Gerāy Khan perceived some signs of weariness among his men, he cheered them on. At this point, a certain Bābā Ḵalīfa Dānqarālū unhorsed 'Ādel Gerāy with a thrust of his spear; when the Khan disclosed his identity, he took him prisoner. The Tartars broke and fled, and the *g̈āzīs* in their pursuit slew many of them, but many of the Lezgīs and Šīrvānīs, because they knew the land, escaped. When the *g̈āzīs* saw the rich booty to be had, they abandoned their pursuit of the Tartars. Almost all the booty which had been taken by the Tartars from Aras Khan's camp fell into their hands—whole camel trains of goods, just as they had been carried off by the Tartars. Because there was no one there to claim them, the *ğāzīs* officially took possession of them.

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[27] I have been unable to identify this place.

Mīrzā Salmān and the great emirs, following this great victory, returned to Šamāḵī. ʻOṣmān Pasha, considering his position there untenable as a result of the defeat of his Tartar allies, abandoned the fortress and retreated in the direction of Darband. A detachment of *qezelbāš* emirs pursued him as far as Šābarān[28] and captured a number of Ottoman guns and a quantity of equipment. ʻOṣmān Pasha occupied the fort at Darband, and awaited help from the Lezgīs and Dāğestānīs.

When the news of the victory reached the royal camp, Ḥamza Mīrzā and Mahd-e ʻOlyā had the kettledrums sound a triumphal fanfare and sent a troop of *qūrčīs* to bring ʻĀdel Gerāy to the camp and to instruct the emirs to attack Darband. Against the wishes of Mahd-e ʻOlyā, however, Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs left a detachment in Šīrvān and themselves returned to the royal camp in Qarābāğ, bringing with them ʻĀdel Gerāy. The advisers of the prince and his mother counseled them to establish friendly relations with the Crimean Tartars in the hope of weaning them away from the Ottomans and thus making Šīrvān immune from their attacks. This advice was accepted; ʻĀdel Gerāy Khan was received with honor, and several Tartar prisoners were released to serve him. A number of *qūrčīs* were placed at his service and also ordered to keep watch on him.

The emirs' choice as governor of Šīrvān was Emir Ḥamza Khan, but Mahd-e ʻOlyā, still angry because the emirs had returned to Qarābāğ instead of marching against Darband, decided to leave the decision to the Shah. The emirs and Mahd-e ʻOlyā did not see eye to eye on many matters, and she made some quite reasonable criticisms of their behavior. This dispute led Mahd-e ʻOlyā to strike camp and return, and no one could stop her from taking this imprudent action. So the army set off, in the depths of winter, with mountains and plains covered in a blanket of snow. Despite the fact that it snowed continuously on the way, the army covered a distance normally considered to be a month's hard march in a fortnight, and entered Qazvin on the fifteenth of Dey.[29] The great emirs, ashamed of the uncivil words they had spoken to Mahd-e ʻOlyā, were constant in their attendance on her and the prince, and entered Qazvin with them. The Shah gave

[28] Three days' march from Šamāḵī on the road to Darband (Le Strange, p. 180).
[29] About the end of the first week in January, 1580.

'Ādel Gerāy lodgings in the state apartments alongside the hall of audience, and detailed a group of *qūrčīs* to guard him and to serve his needs and those of his men in regard to food, drink, and clothing. It was agreed that 'Ādel Gerāy should send a courier to inform his brother, Moḥammad Gerāy Khan, and his mother that he was safe and being well looked after at the Safavid court. So 'Ādel Gerāy detailed ten of his retainers for this task, and the Shah sent a letter of friendship with them by the hand of one of his *qūrčīs*.

The post of governor of Šīrvān was awarded by the Shah to Moḥammad Ḵalīfa Ḥājjīlar Ẕu'l-Qadar, who had been governor of Astarābād at the end of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, but had been forced to leave his post and come to Qazvin by the seditious activities of the black-robed ones and the Yaqqa Turkmans. A number of other governorships were also filled. Moḥammad Ḵalīfa and his emirs left for Šīrvān, and went each to his fief.

After 'Ādel Gerāy had been in residence in the state apartments for some time, differences of opinion arose among the emirs and principal officers of state concerning him, but the consensus was that he should be removed from the state apartments and possibly transferred to one of the fortress-prisons which had pleasant apartments. They considered this step particularly desirable since a further campaign in Azerbaijan was being planned, and it would not be expedient that 'Ādel Gerāy should accompany this expedition. Sultan Moḥammad Shah said that Shah Tahmasp, in order to conciliate the hearts of his Georgian followers, had lodged in the state apartments as an honored guest the Georgian prince Samā'ūn, although he was a stranger to the true faith. "Since we started off by treating the Tartar prince with respect," said the Shah, "we would acquire a bad name if we were now to incarcerate him in a fortress, however agreeable the spot might be. Such a course is therefore not expedient. I suggest that he remain in the state apartments as at present, until the expedition has left; after that, we will take whatever course of action seems appropriate. As it is, he is actually a prisoner within the walls of the palace, although the polite fiction is that he is a guest. He does not have permission to go out or to ride a horse, and a group of *qūrčīs* guard him day and night."

The emirs, however, did not act in accordance with the policy proposed by the Shah; they sent a detachment to fetch 'Ādel Gerāy out of the palace. The Tartar khan, since he was familiar with the ways of the *qezelbāš*, thought they had come to kill him, and he and the group of Tartars who were with him stupidly seized their weapons and started to fight. They shot down several *qezelbāš* with arrows and went on fighting without giving anyone a chance to speak. The *qezelbāš*, with equal stupidity, rushed upon them, and several more were killed by Tartar arrows. The Tartars also began firing their arrows and muskets out of the windows of the palace. In the melée the Tartar khan was killed, and once he was dead, there was no point in sparing the others. Although this incident actually took place after the return of the emirs from Māzandarān, I mention it here because it was connected with events in Šīrvān.

The Expedition to Māzandarān Sent at the Wish of the Queen and the Capture of Mīrzā Khan, Ruler of That Province

In the reign of Shah Tahmasp, Mahd-e 'Olyā's father, Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan, had become the hereditary and independent governor of Māzandarān. But one of his cousins, Mīr Sultan Morād, challenged his authority and gathered round himself a number of Māzandarānīs who had not obtained from Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan the benefits they had sought. Mīr Sultan Morād then made representations to the Safavid court assuring Shah Tahmasp of his loyalty and willingness to serve him. Since Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan had at times got a bit above himself and had procrastinated in making payments of tribute and in sending in his tax returns,[30] Shah Tahmasp decided to extend his patronage to Sultan Morād Khan. Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan then regretted his laxness and hastened to assure the Shah of his loyalty. The Shah divided Māzandarān between the two rivals, both of whom entered into contractual arrangements to make payments to the Safavid treasury, and to live together on friendly terms and not make incursions on each other's territory. Mīr 'Abdollāh, however, was unable to reconcile himself to the power wielded by Emir Sultan Morād Khan, and against the Shah's wishes, set out to undermine his authority; he could not bear to see him exercising independent authority in a province he regarded as exclusively his.

Reports of what was going on kept reaching the Shah, who repeatedly sent orders to both parties confirming them in their respective governorships. Finally, after Mīr 'Abdollāh had been guilty of various unfriendly acts, Mīr Sultan Morād seized him and got all the people of Māzandarān to agree to his being strangled with a bowstring. In this way, Mīr Sultan Morād got possession of the whole of Māzandarān. But fate did not give him much opportunity to enjoy his newfound power, and he died soon afterward. Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm, elder son of Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan, together with his brother, Mīr 'Azīz, and his sister, repaired to the Safavid court in the expectation of receiving royal favors. But 'Abd al-Karīm one day unwittingly consumed some opium, and died.

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[30] On the meaning of the difficult term *avārajāt*, see *TM*, pp. 144 ff.

After the murder of Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan, Shah Tahmasp, with his natural kindness, looked after the Khan's family. His daughter was married to Tahmasp's son, Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā Ḵodābanda, and there were children of this union. His son, Mīr 'Azīz Khan, was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* at court, and his half of the province of Māzandarān was given to Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā, as already related. The other half of the province was given to Sultan Maḥmūd, known as Mīrzā Khan, the son of Mīr Sultan Morād. After the death of Shah Tahmasp and the evacuation of the province by Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā, the whole province came under the control of Mīrzā Khan through the efforts of Šams al-Dīn Dīv. When Mahd-e 'Olyā became queen of Iran, Mīrzā Khan came to court to get his position confirmed, since Māzandarān was the ancestral possession of her family. Mīrzā Khan sought forgiveness for his father's deeds, and was given permission by the queen to return to Māzandarān. Although she disapproved of his being governor of Māzandarān, she was wise enough to know when to bide her time, and not to interfere in matters that were beyond her powers. But it was clear that, if ever Mīrzā Khan tried to act independently or intransigently, Mahd-e 'Olyā, who was extremely jealous of her family honor, would try to destroy him.

Mīrzā Khan, because he was a naive person, allowed himself to be maneuvered into a rebellious posture by troublemakers, particularly Šams al-Dīn Dīv, who had a record of misdemeanors against those connected with the Safavid dynasty. The Queen set out to exact revenge for the murder of her father. She appointed as governor of Māzandarān Mīr 'Alī Khan, who was one of her relations,[31] and sent him to Māzandarān with the support of Valī Jān Khan Torkmān, who was connected by marriage with the Safavid house. Mīrzā Khan, who was an upright youth of ascetic habit, did not dare to go to court, but shut himself up in the fortress of Fīrūzjāh, where he was

[31] Mīr 'Alī Khan b. Solṭān Maḥmūd b. 'Abd al-Karīm was the queen's uncle (Rabino, p. 143). Rabino incorrectly states that Mīr 'Alī Khan was not made governor of Māzandarān until "after the death of Mīrzā Khan."

joined by some of the former retainers of Mīr Sultan Morād Khan. Although Mīrzā Khan had thus relinquished an effective say in the government of the province, the fortress of Fīrūzjāh remained in his hands. Mīr 'Alī Khan consequently made no progress in establishing his authority, and the reduction of the fortress was no easy task.

Mahd-e 'Olyā was determined to destroy the line of Sultan Morād Khan. First she sent Pīra Moḥammad Khan, one of the principal officers of state, with Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū and other emirs, to capture the fort. When some time passed and she received no news, Mahd-e 'Olyā grew impatient and planned a second expedition under Šāhroḵ Khan, the keeper of the seal. The latter, who was one of the most important officers of state, considered a task like this beneath his dignity; he demurred, saying that Pīra Moḥammad Khan was capable of handling the job. If Mahd-e 'Olyā sent anyone else, Pīra Moḥammad Khan would take umbrage. If the latter needed any reinforcements, they should send him whatever was required. Mahd-e 'Olyā was highly annoyed by Šāhroḵ Khan's intransigence and persuaded the Shah to send for him to dress him down and order him to go, whether he wanted to or not. Šāhroḵ Khan produced all sorts of excuses, but finally his ingenuity was exhausted, and Mīrzā Salmān the vizier, the *qūrčībāšī*, and some of the emirs soothed him and persuaded him to go. Nevertheless, he set off under protest, and in a resentful mood.

When Šāhroḵ Khan joined Pīra Moḥammad Khan and Qūr Ḵoms Khan before the walls of the fortress of Fīrūzjāh, he realized that its strength would necessitate a long siege, and that the morale of the *qezelbāš* force would decline. He therefore entered into negotiations with Mīrzā Khan. He warned him that, since the Shah had decided to appoint a different governor in Māzandarān, his continued resistance could only lead to the destruction of his house. He pointed out that, even if the siege took a year or two years, he would eventually have to capitulate, because no help could reach him. He further warned him that, if he persisted in his obstinate defense of the fort, there could be only one fate for him after its capture. "If you place yourself in my hands," continued Šāhroḵ Khan, "since I am one of the most trusted and loyal servants of the king, it is possible that Mahd-e 'Olyā may be placated by your submission, and may show favor toward you. If this is impossible, she may allow you to live in voluntary exile at some suitable place."

Mīrzā Khan, being a sensible man, responded favorably to these overtures, but said: "The people of Māzandarān are never satisfied, even if they have suffered a small wrong, unless they kill their enemies; as long as Mahd-e 'Olyā regards my father as the murderer of her father, she will never be satisfied with anything but my death. My efforts are directed not toward preserving my wealth and possessions, but toward preserving my life, so that I may enjoy a few more days of borrowed time."

Šāhrok̲ Khan and the other emirs pledged themselves to act as his agents to assist him in the presentation of his case, and swore solemn oaths on the person of God Himself that they would neither put him to death nor blind him; they further bound themselves to plead for his life with the Shah and Mahd-e 'Olyā, and to protect him from harm at all costs. Since the emirs concerned were among the principal officers of state and no decisions were taken in policy matters, great or small, without their being consulted and without their agreement, Mīrzā Khan trusted their sworn oath and came out of the fort. In order to give him confidence, the emirs did not interfere with his possessions. They left the fort in charge of some officials appointed by Mahd-e 'Olyā and set off for Qazvin with Mīrzā Khan, never dreaming that Mahd-e 'Olyā would reject their plea.

When Mahd-e 'Olyā heard that the fort had been taken and that Mīrzā Khan had surrendered to the emirs, she was angered by the sworn covenant they had entered into. She had wanted the fort taken by storm and Mīrzā Khan seized by force so that, if his life were to be spared, she would be the one to pardon him and he would owe his life to her. She determined to kill him, despite the emirs. When the emirs were encamped about a *farsak̲* from Qazvin, intending to enter the capital the next day, Mahd-e 'Olyā sent a detachment of thirty *qūrčīs* with orders to take charge of Mīrzā Khan, and with secret orders to put him to death the same night without the knowledge of the emirs. The emirs were extremely uneasy, and at first thought of refusing to hand Mīrzā Khan over to the *qūrčīs*. They said, "We have completed the task we were sent to do; tomorrow we will bring Mīrzā Khan to court with an escort of *qezelbāš*." The *qūrčīs*, however, refused to accept this suggestion, and the emirs, partly because they did not think that the *qūrčīs* would kill Mīrzā Khan and partly because they did not care openly to disobey a royal order, handed him over to the *qūrčīs*, who slew him the same night, as instructed.

Šāhrok̲ Khan, Pīra Moḥammad Khan, Qūr K̲oms Khan, and the other emirs were distressed by this occurrence. It increased their resentment against Mahd-e ʻOlyā, and they determined to have their revenge. For the moment, however, they could do nothing about it; so they said nothing, entered the capital, and prostrated themselves before Mahd-e ʻOlyā. The latter did not even reward them as they had expected, and this too added fuel to the flames of their resentment, which were fanned by Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, who had been dismissed from his post as governor of Kashan. It led them to conspire to murder Mahd-e ʻOlyā.

Thus the murder of Mīrzā Khan, who was the son of a *seyyed* and an innocent and upright man, proved inauspicious for Mahd-e ʻOlyā —but the rest of this story will be given after some details of events in Khorasan. Mīr ʻAlī Khan did not derive any benefit from his appointment as governor of Māzandarān, because he died soon after this, and Māzandarān fell into a state of chaos, with petty rulers arising everywhere. Finally, Aqa Alvand Dīv gained control of Qalʻa-ye Owlād and half of the province, and Seyyed Moẓaffar Mortażāʼī, one of the emirs of Māzandarān, controlled the other half. Because of the renewal of factionalism among the *qezelbāš*, however, the principal officers of the Safavid state were unable to devote their attention to Māzandarān.

Events in Khorasan

I described earlier how Shah Esmaʻil II, not content with murdering his own brothers and cousins, also planned to kill his elder brother, Sultan Moḥammad K̲odābanda, and the sons of the latter, and charged ʻAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan, who held the posts of governor and *amīr al-omarā* at Herat, with the execution of ʻAbbas Mīrzā. How could ʻAlīqolī Khan, who was the son of one of Sultan Moḥammad K̲odābanda's retainers and had been the recipient of Sultan Moḥammad's patronage for many years, commit such a crime against his patron's son? The Shah's order filled ʻAlīqolī Khan and the women of the royal household, especially his mother, who had been the midwife at the birth of ʻAbbas Mīrzā and was his foster-mother, with sorrow and grief. However, ʻAlīqolī Khan owed his appointment to Shah Esmaʻil II, and could see no course but to obey the order. He therefore agreed that he and other Šāmlūs would carry out the order on their arrival at Herat; it did not occur to them that any delay might be possible.

According to the statements of reliable sources who were in Herat at the time, 'Alīqolī Khan, despite the fact that he owed his elevation to Esma'il II, was loath to commit such a terrible crime. He protracted his journey and did not arrive at Herat until Wednesday, 26 Ramażān 985/7 December 1577. The eve of 27th Ramażān, according to some Muslims, is the Night of Power,[32] and the women of the royal household dissuaded 'Alīqolī Khan from putting to death an innocent descendant of a *seyyed*[33] on that holy night. They persuaded him to postpone the execution till the next day. But next day was the eve of Friday, and 'Alīqolī Khan thought it necessary to avoid carrying out his orders on that holy eve, too. After that came the 'Eyd-e Feṭr festival; the Khan did not want to spoil the festivities, so he postponed action until after they were over. In accordance with the traditional saying "The night is pregnant; let us see what it will bring forth," the members of the royal household had a premonition that some wondrous event was about to happen.

After the festival, on 2 Šavvāl 985/13 December 1577, both civilians and military were convinced that 'Alīqolī Khan would not dare to postpone the execution further, and that the prince would be put to death that night. Toward the end of the day, Sultan Maḥmūd Beg Bīčerlū, the Khan's agent, who had stayed behind at court to conclude some business for 'Alīqolī and had been sent posthaste with the news of the death of Shah Esma'il II, reached Herat. As he passed through the Iraq gate, he shouted to the gatekeepers, "Is the prince alive and well?" and received an affirmative reply. Although the Khan and the Šāmlūs, who had done nothing since their arrival at Herat to put the city in a state of defense or to see to its government, were fearful that the Shah's death would be the occasion for an insurrection on the part of the Uzbegs, they rejoiced that the prince was saved and returned thanks to God. They considered him a factor making for the stability and security of the realm, and they pledged themselves to his service.

'Alīqolī Khan organized a great assembly, and took upon himself the duty of guardian of the prince. The inhabitants of Herat, both civilians and military, together with the chiefs of the *qezelbāš* tribes, and of the Balūč and Qepčāq, and others, came company by company to pledge themselves to the prince. Meanwhile, the Afšār emirs, who had slain Šāhqolī Yakān and appropriated his property, were encamped outside the city in the direction of the Darvāza-ye Molk. They entered into negotiations with the 'Alīqolī Khan's agents regarding the disposal of this property and were allowed to retire to Farāh and Esfezār, districts they held in fief.

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[32] Leylat al-Qadr: according to Muslim tradition, the night on which the Koran was handed down.

[33] The Safavid claim to *sīāda* has been shown to be spurious; see Savory, Development, pp. 1ff.

The news that the prince was safe caused great joy to his parents at Qazvin, and Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Mahd-e 'Olyā decided to bring him to court. For one thing, they badly wanted to see him again; for another, on account of possible *qezelbāš* sedition, they decided not to leave any of the royal princes in the provinces. Accordingly, they sent to Herat one of the most trusted of their personal servants, Aqa Naẓar, a former servant of Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan who had been inherited by Mahd-e 'Olyā and had won the trust of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. They gave Aqa Naẓar orders for 'Alīqolī Khan to prepare a cavalcade for 'Abbas Mīrzā in anticipation of the arrival at Herat of one of the principal officers of state, who would escort him to Qazvin. The emirs in Khorasan, loath to part with the prince, urged 'Alīqolī Khan to disobey the Shah's orders. He could give as an excuse, they said, the fact that Khorasan was adjacent to Transoxania and was always subject to Uzbeg incursions. Moreover, from the time that Khorasan first became part of the Safavid empire, Herat had always been the seat of one of the princes of the blood royal, and it would not be possible to defend the province if this support were withdrawn. The ringleader of these emirs was Moršedqolī Khan,[34] and he made a covenant with 'Alīqolī Khan, sealed by solemn oaths.

When Aqa Naẓar arrived in Khorasan, he found all the emirs discussing this issue. Morteżāqolī Khan, the governor of Mašhad, pretended to encourage 'Alīqolī Khan to hold out against sending 'Abbas Mīrzā to Qazvin, but in secret, because he wished to break the power of 'Alīqolī Khan, he not only did not oppose the idea of the prince's going to court but positively promoted it. None of the other emirs, however, supported the idea. When Aqa Naẓar approached them they received him with formal correctness, but put their point of view to him under the guise of concern for the interests of the state. They urged Aqa Naẓar to try and dissuade Mahd-e 'Olyā from this action, and they told him quite bluntly that, if she insisted on removing 'Abbas Mīrzā from Khorasan, they would have no choice but to resist the order.

[34] Moršedqolī Khan Ostājlū, the son of Šahqolī Sultan Yakān mentioned above.

Aqa Naẓar returned to Qazvin and reported to the Shah and Mahd-e 'Olyā, but the latter, in her longing to see her son, refused to listen to the pleas of the emirs. She sent a second courier to Khorasan, Ebrahim Beg, the son of Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq Tarḵān Torkmān, a trusted *qezelbāš* noble. Ebrahim Beg took with him fifty Turkman retainers. When the news of his approach reached Khorasan, 'Alīqolī Khan and Moršedqolī Khan met and agreed to send Ebrahim Beg back without his having accomplished his objective. They sent reliable couriers to all the emirs in Khorasan asking their sworn support for this policy. Morteżāqolī Khan was unwilling to assist 'Alīqolī Khan to assume a position of even greater power; he was already the leader of the Khorasan emirs by virtue of his position as guardian of 'Abbas Mīrzā, and he refused to lend his support. In addition, he forbade the emirs under his command to give their support. This led to an estrangement between him and 'Alīqolī Khan.

'Alīqolī Khan, Moršedqolī Khan, and the other emirs who were at Herat sent friendly letters to Ebrahim Beg, who had reached Mašhad, and presented their formal compliments. But they all, with one accord, stated categorically that if he intended to come to Herat to take away 'Abbas Mīrzā, there was no objection to his coming but he would not succeed in his objective. At the same time they sent a dispatch to court, arguing that to remove 'Abbas Mīrzā from Khorasan would be to encourage an Uzbeg attack; this was not in the best interests of the state, and it was for this reason that they had had the temerity to express their dissatisfaction with the scheme. Ebrahim Beg wanted to stay at Mašhad long enough for a reply to come from the court; meanwhile, Morteżāqolī Khan continually urged Ebrahim Beg to carry out his orders, and assisted him. Ebrahim Beg, who was an intelligent and prudent man, suspected that Morteżāqolī Khan's attitude was dictated by a personal feud against 'Alīqolī Khan and realized that Morteżāqolī Khan's behavior might lead to a general conflict. Ebrahim Beg therefore proceeded to Ġūrīān,[35] stayed there a while, and then returned to Qazvin, to the satisfaction of 'Alīqolī Khan and the emirs.

When Ebrahim Beg reported to the court, Mahd-e 'Olyā flew into a rage, summoned Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, the father of 'Alīqolī Khan and *tovāčībāšī* (chief army inspector) at court, who was one of the principal officers of state, and upbraided him in threatening language. Ḥoseyn Khan offered excuses on behalf of his son; "If all the

[35] One day's march west of Herat.

emirs of Khorasan had decided on a certain course of action," he said, "what could my son do?" But Mahd-e 'Olyā withdrew her favor from 'Alīqolī Khan and his supporters, and decided to back Morteżāqolī Khan. Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, in an effort to further the best interests of the state, continued to offer excuses, but Mahd-e 'Olyā refused to listen to him. Finally, he undertook to go to Khorasan himself and resolve the matter. He was given three months to bring his son to heel and return with the prince 'Abbas. If 'Alīqolī Khan and the emirs who were in league with him should persist in their disobedience to the royal *farmān,* said Mahd-e 'Olyā, Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan should stay in Khorasan as well and not return to court; that group would, from then on, be deemed to be rebels.

Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, knowing that Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Mahd-e 'Olyā were in earnest, set off for Khorasan. When the Khorasan emirs heard he was coming, they held a council of war with 'Alīqolī Khan and confirmed their previous decision not to hand over 'Abbas Mīrzā. When Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan arrived at Herat, he was not greeted by 'Alīqolī Khan with the enthusiasm he considered was due from a son. They deliberated repeatedly, both in closed meetings of council and in public session. A number of the elders of the Šāmlū tribe considered the best policy to be to obey the royal order, to send Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan back to court with his mission crowned with success, and not to place the Šāmlū tribe in a posture of revolt. Another group, composed of both Turks and Tājīks, rejected this view; they argued that if a group of persons loyal to the Safavid state proposed to act in a manner they considered in the best interests of the state, why should this be construed as sedition? On the contrary, they argued, such a course of action should be considered faithful and devoted service. As the discussions dragged on, relations between father and son deteriorated. Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan realized that, if he returned empty-handed, he would not be received at court; it was therefore better, he decided, to stay where he was.

At this point, Moršedqolī Khan and the emirs loyal to him, fearing that 'Alīqolī Khan might give in to his father's prompting and the advice of the Šāmlū elders, repaired to Sabzavār, which was governed by Qobād Khan Qājār, an officer loyal to Moršedqolī Khan. From there, Moršedqolī Khan sent to Herat Mīrzā Aḥmad, the son of Mīrzā 'Aṭā'ollāh, who had been vizier of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān during the reign of Shah Tahmasp; Mīrzā Aḥmad, the vizier of Moršedqolī Khan and a man of great influence, urged his master to take this course of action. The message Mīrzā Aḥmad took to the Šāmlū emirs at Herat was that they should give up the idea of sending 'Abbas Mīrzā to Qazvin. The idea was pointless, they said, because even supposing all the Šāmlū emirs agreed to send 'Abbas Mīrzā, they at Sabzavār stood astride the road to Iraq and would do their utmost to block his passage. If the Šāmlūs abandoned their precious charge, they would be proud to fly his standard in Khorasan.

'Alīqolī Khan, alarmed by this message, devoted his efforts to persuading his father to return empty-handed. Finally, Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, seeing that his son and the emirs and troops of Khorasan were adamant, left for Iraq. On arrival at Sabzavār, he discussed the problem from every angle with the emirs there. He delayed his departure for Qazvin, since he could not think how to report his failure without being visited by the royal wrath and without the disgrace of himself and his son. While he was still at Sabzavār, he received the news of the murder of Mahd-e 'Olyā. Following this event, the principal officers of state at Qazvin considered it wiser to keep 'Abbas Mīrzā where he was, and Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan received a royal command to return to court. The emirs at Sabzavār returned each to his own post.

'Alīqolī Khan and Moršedqolī Khan, with all the emirs of Khorasan (the majority of whom were Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs), held another council and renewed their oaths of fealty to 'Abbas Mīrzā. They pledged themselves to ignore all orders emanating from the principal officers of state at Qazvin, most of whom were Takkalūs and Turkmans and were hostile to the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs. They further pledged their obedience to 'Alīqolī Khan, whom they agreed to regard as their paramount chief *(ḵānlarḵānī)* and leader. All took this oath of obedience except Morteżāqolī Khan and followers. Khorasan was thus divided into two factions, one based on Herat, the other on Mašhad. Relations between the two steadily deteriorated, and the eventual result was open conflict.

The Murder of Mahd-e 'Olyā by Evil Men

Under Shah Tahmasp, the realm had been prosperous and at peace.[36] Since that time, however, the *qezelbāš* tribes, whose relationship to the Safavid family is that of disciples to their spiritual director, have allowed themselves to be seduced from the path of loyalty by their own selfish ambitions and rivalries. Although some

[36] The author must be referring to the latter part of Tahmasp's reign.

forty-five years[37] have elapsed between that time and the present, which is the year 1025/1616–17, the effects of that disloyalty still remain among their descendants, and the sins of their fathers are visited upon them. The most heinous of their crimes was the murder of Mahd-e 'Olyā Ḵeyr al-Nesā Begom. They were not deterred from committing this crime by the fact that she was the wife of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and the mother of Safavid princes. The expediency of the moment and the desire to maintain some ephemeral position of power made them unmindful of retribution in this world or the next.

Mahd-e 'Olyā, because of her husband's defective eyesight and the minority of the Safavid princes, had taken upon her own shoulders the government of the realm. Her desire was that every order emanating from the court should be obeyed instantly and discharged fully, and this was not agreeable to the self-willed emirs. Gradually, the disquiet felt by emirs like Šāhroḵ Khan, Pīra Moḥammad Khan, and Qūr Ḵoms Khan in regard to happenings in Māzandarān, especially the murder of Mīrzā Khan by order of Mahd-e 'Olyā, when added to their other grounds for discontent, made them determined to break her power.

At this juncture, the people of Kashan came to court and complained of the conduct of the governor of that city, Moḥammad Khan Torkmān; his extortion, they said, had exceeded all bounds. A royal commission of inquiry was set up, and the governor's guilt clearly established. As a result, the Shah ordered the governor to be deprived of his fiefs. Moḥammad Khan, who was an emir of the highest rank and one of the principal officers of state, did not brook this disgrace and tried to get his peers to intercede for him. But Mahd-e 'Olyā, considering it incompatible with the dignity of a monarch to do so, refused to countermand the order. The result was that Moḥammad Khan joined the other discontented emirs in their conspiracy, and by subtle arguments they suborned Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, one of the leading officers of state known to all as a man of integrity, wisdom, and experience.

The conspirators knew that, as long as Mahd-e 'Olyā was alive, she would never leave the side of her husband and sons or give up her position of power and dominance. They therefore decided that she had to be removed from the scene. They brought into the conspiracy emirs of standing from every tribe, winning them over by fair promises. Ambitious emirs and simple-minded *qezelbāš* tribesmen listened to their complaints about the patronage extended by Mahd-e 'Olyā to the Māzandarānīs, her allocation to them of provincial governorships and grants of money, and her transfer of the harem treasury to Māzandarān—an allegation which was absolutely absurd and had no basis in fact.

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[37] This takes us back to the year 980/1572. Two years later, in 982/1574, Tahmasp fell ill and there was a recurrence of civil war among the *qezelbāš*.

The conspirators assembled in the portico of the Čehel Sotūn palace and sent a message to the Shah to the effect that the improper treatment of the emirs and chief officers of the Shah by Mahd-e 'Olyā and her patronage of Māzandarānīs had caused great displeasure to the *qezelbāš*. Her interference in the affairs of state was strongly disapproved of by the elders of the *qezelbāš* tribes. Troublemakers were always stirring up mischief among the tribes, and the Shah's loyal servants were deliberating the best way to prevent disaffection among the *qezelbāš* from becoming general. When this message was communicated to the Shah via the officials of the harem, Mahd-e 'Olyā, who had a choleric temper, lashed the emirs with scathing words. They stamped out, fuming with rage. The same day, one of the conspirators sought an interview with Mīr Shah Ġāzī the accountant on the pretext of drawing his pay, and wounded him with his sword; Mīr Shah Ġāzī was related to Emir Qavām al-Dīn Šīrāzī, the queen's vizier. The next day, the conspirators gathered in the Bāġ-e Sa'ādatābād and affirmed their resolve to cause Mahd-e 'Olyā's downfall.

Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oġlū Takkalū, who was the senior emir of the Takkalū tribe and one of the chief officers of state, and who was the Shah's cousin and trusted by him, took no part in the conspiracy. The Shah and Mahd-e 'Olyā now consulted him, and requested that if the emirs showed any signs of open revolt, he issue a call to "all those who loved the Shah"[38] to rally to his defense at the palace. But since Mosīb Khan was a mild, gentle man, he was unable to take charge of the situation; he remained in his own house and decided to keep out of things. The conspirators sent Čelebī Beg Takkalū, the *mehmāndār*,[39] to enlist his support. At first, Mosīb Khan made various excuses for not joining them, but finally he capitulated and went to the Bāġ-e Sa'ādatābād.

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[38] *Šāhī-sevanī*; see Minorsky, in *EI*^{1}, *s.v.*

[39] The officer responsible for the care of state visitors, official guests, and so on.

The conspirators then sent a further message to the Shah: "Your Majesty well knows that women are notoriously lacking in intelligence, weak in judgment, and extremely obstinate. Mahd-e 'Olyā has always opposed us, the loyal servants of the crown, and has never agreed with us on matters of state policy; she has acted contrary to the considered opinions of the *qezelbāš* elders, and has constantly attempted to humiliate and degrade us. We have not been safe from her actions, even though up to the present time we have not been guilty of improper conduct, nor have we done anything to cause her alarm. So how can we feel secure now, when our basic incompatibility has come out into the open, when she has lashed with her tongue the elders of the *qezelbāš* tribes, has called us mutinous, and has uttered dire threats against us? In short, we do not consider it proper that word should spread among neighboring rulers that no member of the royal family still remains in the care of the *qezelbāš*[40] because a woman has taken charge of the affairs of state and is all-powerful. Mahd-e 'Olyā's power and influence in the government of the realm is objectionable to all the *qezelbāš* tribes, and it is impossible for us to reach a *modus vivendi* with her. If she is not removed from power, in all probability revolts will occur that will be to the detriment of both religion and the state."

Sultan Moḥammad Shah was a pious, ascetic, and gentle soul who wanted to do the right thing. Mindful of his illustrious ancestors, he admonished the emirs mildly, as is the manner of saints and men of God. If the emirs considered Mahd-e 'Olyā's intervention in state affairs to be not in the best interests of the state, then he would exclude her from them in the future. Just as his own mother, Shah Bābā, had been sent to Qom, he would send Mahd-e 'Olyā to Qom to spend some time there with her son. If the emirs did not like that idea, he would send her to Māzandarān to her father's house. If neither of these alternatives appealed to them, the Shah said that he himself would willingly abdicate and retire to Shiraz with his sons, leaving the *qezelbāš* to choose whomever they wished as king. But he would not consent to the death of an innocent woman. The conspirators, however, continued to put pressure on the Shah to do just that.

Mahd-e 'Olyā, being of an aggressive temperament, strongly disapproved of the Shah's mild rejoinder to the emirs. She refused to climb down and declared that she had no intention of changing her behavior. She would not swerve a hair's breadth, she said, from the line of conduct she had followed so far. If the *qezelbāš* cared nothing for the king's honor and were prepared to perpetrate such an evil act as murder their own king's wife, then God would judge them. She was the mother of four royal princes; after God, she would trust them to revenge her.

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[40] Presumably this is a reference to the practice, followed by earlier Safavid kings, of placing the royal princes in the care of *qezelbāš* emirs. 'Abbas Mīrzā was, of course, still at Herat, but the queen had made repeated efforts to bring him back to court.

I have heard from a reliable source that Mīr Qavām al-Dīn Ḥoseyn Šīrāzī, her vizier, went to Mahd-e 'Olyā at this point and urged her to take bags of gold from the harem treasury to the Čehel Sotūn portico, and to announce to the troops of the royal bodyguard that there was going to be a distribution of gold. When the royal bodyguard rushed into the palace to get their gold, he said, the conspirators would be thrown into disarray. Mahd-e 'Olyā retorted with spirit: "O Āṣaf[41] of well-directed judgment! You are the one who knows what is going on outside. You ought to have thought of this plan before the emirs got the upper hand. Now that matters have reached this state, your idea reminds me of the proverb about 'barley at the foot of the pass.'[42] It is also beneath the dignity of kings to buy kingly power with gold. I will submit to nothing but God's will."

The emirs chose several of their number from different tribes to commit this foul murder; they included Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan Ṣafavī;[43] Ḥoseyn 'Alī Beg Alkasan-oğlū Ẕu'l-Qadar; and Imam Qolī Mīrzā Mowṣellū, the kinsman of Solṭānom, the Shah's mother. They burst into the harem without ceremony and strangled Mahd-e 'Olyā. Not satisfied with that, they went to the house of her mother, an old woman whom Mahd-e 'Olyā had brought from Māzandarān with some other relatives, and slew her too, together with several Māzandarānī notables who happened to be there. Supposing that Mahd-e 'Olyā had taken large sums of money and quantities of stuffs from the harem treasury and given them to her mother, the murderers broke open all the chests in the house and plundered their contents. The populace of Qazvin meted out the same sort of treatment to any Māzandarānīs they came across in the bazaars and the various quarters of the city; any they spared, they stripped of their clothes.

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[41] Solomon's celebrated vizier. The queen is indulging in heavy irony.

[42] I am indebted to Professor Elwell-Sutton, of the University of Edinburgh, for drawing my attention to the proverb *jow pā-ye goẕār*, "barley at the foot of the pass." When a pack animal has been starved of barley and consequently finds it impossible to climb from the foot of a steep pass, the improvident muleteer offers it "barley at the foot of the pass." This, of course, has no effect, and the proverb is thus equivalent to the English expression "shutting the stable door after the horse has gone." The reading *čū pā-ye gerīva*, which appears both in the manuscript and in the printed edition of the text, is clearly wrong and should be amended to *jow pā-ye gerīva*.

[43] As his name indicates, this Khan was related to the Safavid royal house and must therefore have belonged to the Šeyḵāvand tribe (see *TM*, pp. 14-15).

Mīrzā Salmān the vizier had no hand in the *qezelbāš* plot. He went to the house of Ḵalīl Khan Afšār, apparently to save himself. Toward the end of the day, Sultan Moḥammad Shah summoned the *'olamā* to see to the burial of the slain, and the bodies were buried the same night in the precincts of the Imamzada Ḥoseyn.

After the murder of Mahd-e 'Olyā, the emirs sent a courier to Khorasan, to Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan and 'Alī Khan; they stipulated that 'Abbas Mīrzā should stay at Herat and that Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan should return to court. Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, who was considered the heir-apparent, realized that men who could show so little regard for the royal family as to murder his mother might have plans for him too. He therefore looked to his own safety, and went up on to the harem roof with a group of his retainers. He took an adequate supply of food and drink, blocked the stairway with rubbish, and prepared to withstand a siege. He stayed up there for several days, determined not to come down until he was sure that the emirs were not plotting against him. Esmā'īlqolī Beg Šāmlū, the son of Valī Ḵalīfa, who was one of the prince's friends, performed services of such sterling worth that he was dubbed "comrade."

The conspirators sent a messenger to the Shah, assuring him that the oath of fealty they had sworn to him had not been vitiated by the murder of Mahd-e 'Olyā, and expressing the hope that they would not be called to account for their part in the affair. The Shah wisely did not reproach them for what they had done, but they were not received in audience for several days. Then, all the emirs assembled at the palace. In the presence of the *'olamā* and *mojtaheds,* they reaffirmed their oath of fealty to the Shah, swearing fifty-one times that, as long as Sultan Moḥammad Shah was alive, they would have no other king but him, and after him, they would consider Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā the heir-apparent. The instrument of this sworn oath was sealed with the seals of the *'olamā* and *mojtaheds* and forwarded to the Shah. The Shah, with great reluctance, came forth, and the emirs kissed his feet and uttered many assurances indicative of their faithfulness and their determination to behave in a manner appropriate to Sufis. The Shah, regarding the murder of his wife as God's will, uttered soothing words to calm their fears.

But Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā and a few of his dedicated friends suspended judgment in this matter and refused to trust the emirs. The emirs renewed their pledges with binding oaths, and begged the Shah to persuade Ḥamza Mīrzā to believe them. The Shah finally succeeded, and the following day brought Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā with him to the audience hall. The emirs kissed the prince's feet. Mīrzā Salmān, with the approval of the emirs, was brought from the house of Ḵalīl Khan Afšār and resumed his post without opposition, and with greater power and independence of action than before. During this period, the emirs were assiduous in their attendance on the Shah and prince Ḥamza. Eventually, retribution overtook all of them after the accession of Shah 'Abbas, as will be related later.

The Shah's Expedition to Azerbaijan

The districts of Ḵoy, Salmās, Orūmī, Ūšnī,[44] and parts of Marāḡa had been overrun by hostile Kurds who with the assistance of the Ottomans harassed the border regions of the Safavid empire. The fortresses of Tiflis and Gori—the latter the capital of Georgia—had fallen to the Ottomans. 'Oṣmān Pasha held the fort at Darband, and the Lezgīs of Šakkī and Šābarān rallied around the son of Borhān and went to the aid of 'Oṣmān Pasha. The rulers of Dāḡestān were ravaging the kingdom of Šīrvān and gave the *qezelbāš* emirs no peace. The Ottomans planned to annex Ṣīrvān. Their commander in chief was camped at Erzerum; he sent Bahrām Pasha with thirty thousand men and stores and equipment to Darband, and Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, with forty thousand men, to Erīvān.

Although Emāmqolī Khan and the emirs of Qarābāḡ joined forces with Samā'ūn Khan the Georgian and harassed the Ottomans as they were bringing in their supplies, killing considerable numbers of them and taking large quantities of booty, and although Moḥammadī Khan and Ḥasan Pasha could not remain at Erīvān for more than a single night, the overall effect of Safavid action was very slight. The forts remained in Ottoman hands, and Lala Pasha was still encamped at Erzerum, planning his next campaign. The Shah's advisers proposed that the royal army should proceed to Tabriz to stabilize the situation in Azerbaijan. Some of the emirs who had fiefs in that area were at court: Emir Ḥamza Khan Ostājlū, Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, and Šāhqolī Sultan Q̱āranja Ostājlū, among others. The Shah, who had made some changes in the fiefs belonging to the Khorasan emirs, allotted fiefs in Khorasan to the Azerbaijan emirs and sent them on their way.

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[44] Southwest of Lake Orūmīya (see Lane-Poole, p. 165, where the variant forms Ošnūya and Ošnoh are given).

The royal army left Qazvin and proceeded by easy stages to Tabriz, where Emir Khan and the officers under his command came out to greet the Shah, accompanied by a throng of townspeople. The Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā took up residence at the ancient palace. Emir Khan was singled out for special favor, and was honored by being given the hand in marriage of Fāṭema Sultan Begom, a daughter of Shah Tahmasp.[45]

At this point, the Shah heard of the approach of Moḥammad Gerāy Khan. After the capture of his brother ʿĀdel Gerāy Khan by the *qezelbāš*, Moḥammad Gerāy, hearing reports that the Shah had treated his brother with honor and had decided to send him back to the Crimea, and that ʿĀdel Gerāy was presently living as a guest of honor in the royal palace, had planned to send ʿĀdel Gerāy's mother and a few reliable men, accompanied by suitable gifts, on an embassy to the Shah. They would bring back with them ʿĀdel Gerāy and would arrange a treaty of peace between the Safavids and the Crimean Tartars. But everything had changed when Moḥammad Gerāy heard that his brother had been murdered. In his desire to revenge his brother's death, or at the instigation of the Ottoman sultan and in the hope of booty, he had joined ʿOṣmān Pasha at Darband, together with ʿĀdel Gerāy's brothers, Tartar princes of the blood of Jočī[46]—Ǧāzī Gerāy, Ṣafī Gerāy, and Saʿādat Gerāy.

When Moḥammad Ḵalīfa reported this, the Shah held a number of councils of war. As a result, it was decided that he and Ḥamza Mīrzā would winter at Tabriz, and Mīrzā Salmān should lead to Šīrvān a force that included most of the emirs. Ḵalīl Khan Afšār and a few other emirs remained at Tabriz with the Shah, and Moḥammad Ḵalīfa was notified that the *qezelbāš* army was on its way. Before this force could reach him, the Tartar sultans entered Šīrvān. Moḥammad Ḵalīfa, who was a valiant man and would not contemplate the disgrace of flight, gave battle. His forces, heavily outnumbered, were defeated, and he himself and many of his men were killed. The Tartars ravaged Šīrvān and Qarābāǧ at will, and many Muslim women and children were taken prisoner. When he heard of the approach of the *qezelbāš* reinforcements, Moḥammad Gerāy returned to the Crimea with his spoils, leaving Ḡāzī Gerāy, Ṣafī Gerāy Khan, and several other brothers to assist the Ottomans in Dāḡestān and Darband.

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[45] She was his sixth daughter.
[46] The eldest son of Genghis Khan.

The people of Šīrvān had been battered by these events. Some returned with ʿOṣmān Pasha to Darband; other rebels gathered round the son of Borhān at Čāḵmez[47] and prepared to resist any attack. When Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs reached Šīrvān, Emir Khan Torkmān marched against the Dāḡestānī and Šīrvānī rebels at Čāḵmez, but achieved nothing. Some of the Šāmlū and Ostājlū emirs, supported by Šāhroḵ Khan, criticized Emir Khan's handling of the campaign. Šāhroḵ Khan wanted to be put in command of this force and given a chance to show that he could do better, and a feud developed between him and Emir Khan. Emir Khan blamed Mīrzā Salmān, who was the commander-in-chief of the army, for putting Šāhroḵ Khan up to this, and so there was enmity between Emir Khan and the vizier. The supporters of the two factions went about with their weapons concealed under their uniforms, each apprehensive of the other. The quarrel was patched up by the *qūrčībāšī*, and Šāhroḵ Khan gave up his ambition to be sent to Čāḵmez. But although things were outwardly peaceful, the quarrel still smoldered under the surface.

For a variety of reasons, therefore—the devastated condition of the region, the resultant acute shortage of foodstuffs and provisions, and the dissensions among the *qezelbāš*—the Safavid army was unable to proceed against ʿOṣmān Pasha with the object of capturing Darband. None of the emirs was willing to take charge of Šīrvān, and so the *qezelbāš* army returned to Tabriz. There was a severe famine in many parts that year; many poor people died at Tabriz for lack of bread, and there was serious hardship throughout the provinces of Azerbaijan, Qarābāḡ, Iraq, and Gīlān.

Events in Khorasan after the Departure of Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū

As already mentioned, Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan Šāmlū, was the acknowledged leader of the Šāmlū tribe at court by virtue of his noble birth, his tribal connections, and his service to the state. No decision concerning the Šāmlū tribe was taken without his approval. When the seditious attitude of his son, ʿAlīqolī Khan, was reported to the court, Mahd-e ʿOlyā upbraided Sultan

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[47] Or Ḵājmīr or Ḵakmīr; the reading is uncertain.

Ḥoseyn Khan, compelled him to go to Khorasan to bring back 'Abbas Mīrzā, and looked with disfavor on the Šāmlū tribe. Against the advice of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, she appointed Ḱoš-ḳabar Khan Šāmlū governor of Fūšanj and Ḡūrīān. The latter, when he arrived in Ḡūrīān, began to cause trouble for 'Alīqolī Khan, relying on the support of Mahd-e 'Olyā. On the basis of the situation existing in the time of Shah Tahmasp, when the great khans and the *beglerbegs* had neither the ability nor the temerity to behave in this way, Ḱoš-ḳabar Khan did not think that 'Alīqolī Khan could hurt him.

For a while, 'Alīqolī Khan turned a blind eye to the activities of Ḱoš-ḳabar Khan. After Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan returned to court, however, since the majority of the emirs of Khorasan supported 'Abbas Mīrzā and 'Alīqolī Khan, the latter presumed to try and bring the whole of Khorasan under his authority. He therefore marched from Herat against Ḱoš-ḳabar Khan at Ḡūrīān. Ḱoš-ḳabar Khan fled, but was given sanctuary by Morād Beg Afšār, who held Esfezār on behalf of Yakān Sultan, after a skirmish between the Afšārs and the Šāmlūs in which a number of people were killed. Morād Beg treated Ḱoš-ḳabar Khan with deference and sent him on his way to Iraq, much to the chagrin of 'Alīqolī Khan, who returned to Herat on hearing the news of the murder of Mahd-e 'Olyā, and spent the rest of the winter there.

At the beginning of the Year of the Dragon, 988/1580–81, 'Alīqolī Khan led a punitive expedition from Herat against Yakān Sultan and his supporters at Esfezār. Morād Beg fled from Esfezār to Farāh, and 'Alīqolī Khan allotted the region of Esfezār to the Šāmlū tribe before returning to Herat. While he had been away, Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk Torkmān, the governor of Mašhad and *beglerbeg* of half of Khorasan, whose ambitions were greater than those of 'Alīqolī Khan and who held the latter in extremely low esteem, had seized possession of Sabzavār. After Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan had returned to court and the great emirs who had been at Sabzavār had dispersed, Morteżāqolī Khan had decided to chastise his vassal Qobād Khan Qājār, the governor of Sabzavār, who had shown sympathy toward 'Alīqolī Khan. Qobād Khan was persuaded to apologize for his behavior, and was reprimanded by Morteżāqolī Khan. The latter had lost confidence in Qobād Khan and took him back with him to Mašhad; he made one of his own officers governor of Sabzavār.

ʿAlīqolī Khan was infuriated by Morteżāqolī Khan's action; on his return from Esfezār he marched against him, taking with him the prince ʿAbbas. He sent couriers to summon to his side the emirs who had pledged themselves to support him—men like Moršedqolī Khan, Maḥmūd Khan Ṣūfī-oğlū, Valī Khan Čarkčī, and others. At the same time, those emirs who had been deprived of their fiefs by the Shah and whose replacements (men like Valī Ḵalīfa Evčī Šāmlū; Emir Ḥamza Khan, the son of ʿAbd Allāh Khan Ostājlū; Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja) had already been dispatched to Khorasan, had no choice but to throw in their lot with ʿAlīqolī Khan.

Moršedqolī Khan and the other emirs congregated at ʿAbbas Mīrzā's camp sent the following message to Morteżāqolī Khan:

> You and we are brothers, and loyal supporters of the royal house. We consider the Shah to be our spiritual director and our patron. Nothing is further from our minds than opposition to him. There are two reasons why we have mobilized in support of ʿAbbas Mīrzā and ʿAlīqolī Khan: the first is that the Ottoman sultan has violated the peace treaty and invaded Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, and the Shah is engaged in trying to repel this invasion. It is probable that the Uzbeg sultans may seize this opportunity to make incursions into Khorasan. Herat is the capital city of Khorasan and is the seat of ʿAbbas Mīrzā, the Shah's son. Our principal concern is that there shall be amity and solidarity among the great emirs and that all discord be swept away, so that should the need arise (which God forbid!), we may present a united front, since it is obvious that we can expect no help from the Shah. Let us all rally round ʿAbbas Mīrzā with one mind and with one voice, and so frustrate our enemies. Let us follow the orders of ʿAlīqolī Khan, who is the guardian of the prince ʿAbbas, and let us consider him our leader and supreme chief *(ḵānlar-ḵānī);* for whenever our Uzbeg foes hear of dissension and discord in our ranks, they are encouraged to cause us trouble which could seriously endanger this realm.
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> Secondly, it is apparent to all that, at court, control

> of state affairs and the ultimate authority in administrative matters lies in the hands of the vizier, Mīrzā Salmān, and a group of emirs. They are constantly making changes in and reallocating our fiefs, and are trying to discredit us, although neither we nor you are inferior to them, whether we are judged on our record of generations of service to the state or on the basis of blood and lineage. On the contrary, the record shows that our loyalty and devotion to the state is greater than theirs, and we are superior to them in numbers. If the administration of Iraq, Azerbaijan, Fārs, and Kerman remains in their hands, an arrangement could be made whereby the administration of Khorasan is made our responsibility, so that we have a free hand in this province.
>
> Such an arrangement has been approved by the great emirs of Khorasan, who have pledged their fealty to their supreme chief, 'Alīqolī Khan. The interest of the state demands that you should now follow suit, and gain honor by being admitted to the service of prince 'Abbas and of the supreme chief, 'Alīqolī Khan. In this way, rancor and strife will disappear. Qobād Khan, who has fallen into disfavor with you by virtue of his supporting 'Alīqolī Khan, should be reinstated at Sabzavār.

Morteżāqolī Khan, an arrogant man, detested these overtures. He was from the Pornāk branch of the Turkman tribe, and the Turkmans and Takkalūs were old enemies of the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs. He had no confidence in the latter, and sent back a harsh and offensive reply which effectively destroyed any chance of reconciliation. He charged that 'Alīqolī Khan's action constituted rebellion against Sultan Moḥammad Shah, and he represented himself as "one who loves the Shah." Meanwhile, he sent courier after courier to Azerbaijan to warn the Shah.

The breach between the two parties being final, 'Alīqolī Khan and his supporters decided to attack Morteżāqolī Khan at Mašhad. They intercepted Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, the first of the replacement emirs to reach Khorasan, and put him to flight in a skirmish near Mašhad; he himself was killed by some retainers of Maḥmūd Khan

Ṣūfī-oḡlū. At Mašhad, Morteżāqolī Khan and his supporters (Būdāq Khan Čeganī, the governor of Ḵabūšān; Darvīš Moḥammad Khan Rūmlū, the governor of Nishapur; Soleymān Ḵalīfa Torkmān, the governor of Tūn; Šāhqolī Sultan Afšār, the governor of Jām; and others), prepared for battle. A bloody battle was fought within sight of the city in which the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs were eventually victorious. Morteżāqolī Khan, after all efforts to rally his men had failed, fell back on the city and feverishly strengthened the fortifications. But many of his men were overtaken outside the walls and killed or wounded. In the battle, Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm, the warden of the shrine at Mašhad, who was stationed at the foot of the standard, was slain by unknown assailants. Qobād Khan Qājār, who accompanied the Turkman forces, seized the opportunity to join the Šāmlūs. Šāhqolī Sultan Afšār, governor of Jām, was taken prisoner. The other replacement emirs, Emir Ḥamza Khan and Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja Ostājlū, when they heard of the death of Valī Ḵalīfa and of the insurrection in Khorasan, beat a retreat to Iraq.

'Alīqolī Khan and Moršedqolī Khan laid siege to Mašhad, but four months of siege produced no results. 'Alīqolī Khan then decided to seize control of the fortress at Nishapur (the governor of that city, Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, was shut up in Mašhad), and to denude the surrounding area of Morteżāqolī Khan's supporters and deal with Morteżāqolī Khan later. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, hearing of this, got permission from Morteżāqolī Khan to return to Nishapur. He reached the city before the Šāmlūs, intending to resist a siege, but when 'Alīqolī Khan arrived, he decided that discretion was the better part of valor and came out of the fort with a promise of quarter. He was received by 'Abbas Mīrzā, but it was considered unwise to allow him to remain at Nishapur, and that region was therefore allotted to Moršedqolī Khan.

Moršedqolī Khan left some men to garrison Nishapur and took Darvīš Moḥammad Khan with him to Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya, which was held by Farroḵ Khan, the brother of Morteżāqolī Khan. Farroḵ Khan, like Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, handed over the fort on promise of quarter and retired to Mašhad. 'Alīqolī Khan made Darvīš Moḥammad Khan governor of Torbat in place of Nishapur, and arranged for him and his men to be transferred to Torbat. 'Alīqolī Khan then returned to Herat and demobilized his forces. As soon as he had gone, however, Darvīš Moḥammad Khan regretted his action and began to long for Nishapur. He marched rapidly there with a band of Rūmlūs and entered the city unsuspected. Most of his men, who were still at Nishapur, rallied round him and expelled Moršedqolī Khan's men from the city. 'Alīqolī Khan heard the news on his return march to Herat, but because of the distance involved and the fact that many of his troops had by then been disbanded, he decided to postpone action against Darvīš Moḥammad Khan until the following year. He returned to Herat and enjoyed some relaxation after his campaigning.

Morteżāqolī Khan and the inhabitants of Mašhad, released from the siege, set about repairing the damage caused by the operations in the Mašhad area. Morteżāqolī Khan submitted a full report to the Shah. The news caused consternation at Tabriz, where Mīrzā Salmān had arrived with the emirs who had been with him in Šīrvān. Meanwhile Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, who had returned from Khorasan and was at the capital, Qazvin, was guilty of various acts which were not worthy of his position. Officials of the *dīvān* incited him to appropriate money from the rich, and confiscations and fines became the order of the day. The victims were not confined to residents of the Qazvin area; merchants and wealthy citizens from all parts of the country who happened to be in Qazvin were relieved of their cash and goods, and the proceeds were used for various disgraceful purposes. As a result, Sultan Ḥoseyn fell into disrepute. He was also slow in putting in an appearance at court. When the delay had exceeded all reasonable limits, his enemies seized the opportunity to attribute it to rebellious tendencies on his part. His fate will be related below.

Events at Tabriz in the Year of the Dragon, 988/1580–81

I mentioned previously that a quarrel had occurred in Šīrvān between Emir Khan Torkmān and Šāhrok Khan over the expedition to Čakmez. The Ostājlūs and Šāmlūs, whose leaders were Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū and Ḥoseynqolī Sultan Šāmlū, the *ešīk-āqāsī-bāšī*, had supported Šāhrok Khan, and eventually the dispute was settled through the good offices of the *qūrčībāšī*. When the news from Khorasan of the siege of Morteżāqolī Khan at Mašhad by Moršedqolī Khan and 'Alīqolī Khan reached Tabriz, the Turkman emirs promptly charged the Ostājlūs and Šāmlūs with rebellion, and the quarrel broke out anew. The infamous behavior of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan provided the Turkmans with a decisive argument.

The Ostājlūs and Šāmlūs were in a position of entrenched power at court, and for this reason the Turkmans were constantly trying to undermine their position. Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan's wife (the mother of ʿAlīqolī Khan), had been midwife at the birth of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā and subsequently his nurse. She had returned from Khorasan with her husband and was installed in the harem of the prince, who regarded her as his mother. Her brother, Ḥoseyn Beg Šāmlū, was the prince's vizier. In addition, a considerable number of Šāmlū nobles were in the service of the prince—men like Esmāʿīlqolī Beg, the son of Valī Ḵalīfa, who rejoiced in the title of *yoldāš* (comrade); Mahdīqolī Beg, the son of Ḥoseynqolī Sultan the trusted *ešīk-āqāsībāšī;* Abu'l-Fatḥ Beg, the son of Fūlād Beg the *amīr-aḵorbāšī* (master of the king's horse); and Ṭahmāspqolī Beg, the son of Qūr Ḵoms Khan, who was enrolled among the *moqarrabs.* The vizier, Mīrzā Salmān, spurred on by the rivalry that exists between all holders of high office, was envious of Ḥoseyn Beg Šāmlū and tried to discredit him. He therefore threw in his lot with the Turkman faction.

The Turkman leaders, Emir Khan and Moḥammad Khan, and Mosīb Khan Takkalū and their supporters, now saw their opportunity to make a submission to the Shah. They argued that, since ʿAlīqolī Khan and Moršedqolī Khan had shown signs of rebellions against Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, ʿAlīqolī Khan's mother could not be considered a trustworthy member of the harem. As long as Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs held high office in the state, they, the Turkmans, would not be able to remove this slur on their name; the schism between the two factions would continue, and they could not give their wholehearted and undivided loyalty to the Shah and Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. Therefore, they argued, it was not in the best interests of the state to continue to place Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs in positions of trust and power.

Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū and Ḥoseynqolī Sultan Šāmlū put themselves forward as spokesmen for their faction. They attributed events in Khorasan to the dissension and discord between the *qezelbāš* tribes, and they rejected the arguments put forward by the other side. "God forfend!" they said, "that any opposition should emanate from us against the Shah or Ḥamza Mīrzā." At Mašhad, Morteżāqolī Khan had asserted his independence and had striven to destroy the authority of ʿAlīqolī Khan. The emirs had been worried that the Uzbegs would take advantage of this disunity among the *qezelbāš;* they were also concerned about the Ottoman occupation of parts of

Azerbaijan and Šīrvān. For this reason, all the emirs of Khorasan had rallied around ʿAbbas Mīrzā; if the Uzbegs made any move, the emirs would be able to show a united front. They had no other object in mind, and any statement to the contrary was pure falsehood and the invention of Morteżāqolī Khan.

These arguments went on for several days, and both sides went around with weapons concealed on their persons, ready to fight. But they listened to peacemakers, for neither side really thought the issue warranted bloodshed. At this point, however, the news arrived of the slaying of Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū. It roused Esmāʿīlqolī Beg to demand vengeance for his father's death. Because the Ostājlū and Šāmlū tribes had traditionally been on friendly terms, the Turkmans and Takkalūs saw this as a splendid opportunity to drive a wedge between the two. They told Esmāʿīlqolī Khan that his father had been slain on the orders of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan and his son ʿAlīqolī Khan, and they tried their utmost to cause trouble between the Ostājlūs and the Šāmlūs. They succeeded in making some of their remarks stick in the minds of the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā, and in poisoning their minds against some members of that group. Ḥoseyn Beg's wife was dragged from the harem and strangled, innocent though she was of any crime, and they did not give a thought to the vileness of this deed.

They appointed Esmāʿīlqolī Khan governor of Qazvin in place of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, with the rank of *ḵān* and *tovāčībāšī* (chief army inspector). They also gave Esmāʿīlqolī Khan permission to murder Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan in revenge for the death of his own father, Valī Ḵalīfa. In addition, Qūr Ḵoms Khan, who for years had been in the service of Valī Ḵalīfa and had risen to the rank of emir, was promised the post of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī,* and was given *carte-blanche* to dispose of the incumbent, Ḥoseynqolī Sultan, who was a supporter of ʿAlīqolī Khan. Qūr Ḵoms Khan, partly from a desire to avenge Valī Ḵalīfa, and partly from a desire to hold this high office, allowed himself to be seduced by the enemies of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan and Ḥoseynqolī Khan, and by so doing blotted his own escutcheon.

First, the brothers Esmāʿīlqolī Khan fell upon the brother of Maḥmūd Khan Ṣūfī-oğlū Ostājlū, who was visiting shrines in the vicinity of Mount Sorḵāb, and slew that innocent man in revenge for the slaying of their father. This started a feud between the Ostājlūs and the Šāmlūs. Next, Ḵalīfa Anṣār Qarādāğlū took a band of men at midnight to the house of Ḥoseynqolī Khan Šāmlū and murdered him. Ḥoseyn Beg the vizier escaped on this occasion, but was seized and murdered a few days later at the convent of Mīr-e Maqtūl-band. While the Šāmlūs, at the instigation of the Turkmans, were busy murdering one another in this fashion, to outward appearances the Turkmans had no hand in these events, and so Pīra Moḥammad Khan was unable to take any revenge on them.

The post of vizier to Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā was assumed by Mīrzā Salmān, in addition to the post he already held, that of *vazīr-e dīvān-e aʿlā.* "Comrade" Esmāʿīlqolī Khan became governor of Qazvin, and the retainers of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan at Qazvin were ordered to transfer themselves to him, and to arrest Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan and bring him to court. Qūr Ḵoms Khan received his reward, the office of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī,* and the post of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* to Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā was given to Pīrī Beg Inānlū Šāmlū. Shah Ğāzī, the comptroller of finance, was arrested on suspicion of being hostile toward Mīrzā Salmān and an ally of the opposition party, and his post was allotted to Ḵāja Moḥammad Bāqer Haravī, who had held previous office under Sultan Moḥammad Shah.

As soon as the announcement of Esmāʿīlqolī Khan's appointment was made, Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan slipped out of Qazvin to the summer quarters of Čekī Jekī. Some of his retainers went with him; others remained in the city. Despite all the kindness and consideration they had received from him, they began to desert him—such is the despicable behavior typical of worldly men and time-servers—and to outdo each other in their eagerness to enter the service of Esmāʿīlqolī Khan. Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, seeing the plight he was in and fearing arrest, took a few men and hastened to Ardabīl, where he took sanctuary in the Safavid shrine. Shortly afterward, however, a body of men from the Šeyḵāvand tribe, notably Vāstār Beg, the brother of Shaikh Shah Beg, lured him out of the sanctuary by trickery and handed him over to his enemies, who put him to death.

After this, a truce was patched up between Mīrzā Salmān, the vizier; the *qūrčībāšī;* and Šāhroḵ Khan, the keeper of the seal; and Emir Khan and Pīra Moḥammad Khan. Emir Khan's marriage to Fāṭema Sultan Ḵānom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, was celebrated at Tabriz by three days of festivities. Fāṭema Sultan Ḵānom, who had been betrothed to Emir Khan the previous year, was conducted to the bridegroom's home with due ceremony, and the groom offered suitable gifts to Sultan Moḥammad Shah and to Ḥamza Mīrzā. In return, he received splendid robes of honor, hats[48] studded with jewels, dagger belts and sword belts, weapons with hilts and scabbards encrusted with jewels, horses with jeweled saddles and bridles, and robes of brocade, cloaks, "four-meter" robes, and other garments. Emir Khan, on his part, gave robes of honor to the servants, boon companions, and entertainers in the employ of the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā.

Emir Khan, in order to conciliate Pīra Moḥammad Khan and the Ostājlū tribe, and also because Pīra Moḥammad Khan was his kinsman (Pīra Moḥammad Khan's daughter was a member of the household of his son, Sultan Morād Khan), charged him with the preparation of a *sāqdūšī*[49] feast. Mosīb Khan Takkalū was given the responsibility of arranging a *soldūšī*[50] feast. Each of the two khans provided a royal banquet in their own homes, and sent gifts of food from their tables to the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā. Mosīb Khan Takkalū, because he was related to Sultan Moḥammad Shah, had considered himself a more suitable person than Emir Khan to be honored by a royal marriage alliance, and had looked to win the hand of Fāṭema Sultan Ḵānom. For a variety of reasons it was considered inexpedient to grant his suit, and the princess was bestowed on Emir Khan instead. Despite this, when he was asked to arrange the wedding feast, he agreed and carried out his duties.

After these events, the discord between the tribes died down for a while. Salmān Khan, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā, was also honored by a royal marriage; he was given the hand of Šahrbānū Begom, another daughter of Shah Tahmasp.[51] Once again Pīra Moḥammad Khan undertook the responsibility of arranging the wedding feast—this time out of tribal loyalty[52] and in memory of the services of 'Abd Allāh Khan to the crown.[53] Emir Khan showed him every courtesy. The province of Šīrvān was allotted to Salmān Khan and the Ostājlū emirs, who departed by way of Arasbār. When they reached the river Kor, because of the heat, they camped at the summer quarters known as Hama-tara, planning to move on across the river when the temperature moderated. The leader of the Ostājlū emirs was Salmān Khan, who was *beglerbeg* and governor of Šamāḵī; other emirs accompanying him were Ḥoseynqolī Sultan, the son of the famous Naẓar Sultan Lala; 'Alīqolī Sultan, the son of Ešīk 'Evaż Čāūšlū; Moṣṭafā Sultan Šaraflū;[54] Mahdīqolī Sultan Čāūšlū, the son of Eyḡūt Beg; and several emirs from other tribes—the Jāgīrlūs, the Qarāmānlūs, and so on. All these emirs had been allotted fiefs in Šīrvān.

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[48] The *tāj* or distinctive headgear of the *qezelbāš*.

[49] *Sāqdūšī (sāqdūš* literally means right shoulder) is the function of the *sāqdūš*, that is, the person who, on the wedding night, stands shoulder to shoulder with the bride and groom (Moḥammad Mo'īn, *Farhang-e Fārsī*, vol. 2, p. 1801).

[50] Since *soldūš* means literally left shoulder, the *soldūš* presumably stood on the left of the bride and groom, while the *sāqdūš*, holding the position of greater honor, stood on their right.

[51] Šahrbānū, or Šohra Bānū, was the seventh daughter of Shah Tahmasp. Fāṭema was the sixth.

[52] Salmān Khan was an Ostājlū.

[53] 'Abd Allāh Khan Ostājlū, *amīr al-omarā* under Shah Tahmasp, was a nephew of Shah Esma'il I, and was also the son-in-law of Esma'il I and the brother-in-law of Tahmasp.

Also in this year (988/1580-81), Ḵalīl Khan Afšār, who had been away from his tribal district for four years, was granted permission to leave court and return to Kūh Gīlūya to deal with a revolt there by a certain Qalandar (details of this will be given in due course). Finally, a decision was made to equip an expedition for Azerbaijan, and Ḵalīl Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, was detailed for this, along with the emirs under his command, and Valī Khan Afšār, the governor of Kerman.

The Shah's March to the Summer Quarters of Aškanbar and Kalanbar, His Wintering in Qarābāḡ, His Correspondence with the Ottoman Grand Vizier Senān Pasha, and Related Events

When signs of spring began to appear and the weather at Tabriz began to warm up, famine also appeared in the city. The Shah repaired to the summer quarters, and the royal camp was located in the Aškanbar and Kalanbar districts.[55] This year, the Ottoman sultan appointed Senān Pasha commander-in-chief of the Ottoman forces and dispatched him to the assistance of 'Oṣmān Pasha, with orders to complete the conquest of Šīrvān and neighboring regions. Senān Pasha reached Erzerum with a vast army, and sent an envoy to Sultan Moḥammad Shah with a letter addressed to Mīrzā Salmān. The letter was full of vain boasts, and the gist of it was that it was contrary to Ottoman law for Ottoman troops to withdraw from any area they had occupied, and in which the *ḵoṭba* had been recited in the name of the Ottoman sultan. The provinces of Šīrvān and Šakkī, and parts of Azerbaijan and Georgia had been occupied by Ottoman forces. If *qezelbāš* forces did not interfere in those areas, they would be administered by Ottoman officials; there would be no need for further conflict, and past actions would be forgiven. A friendly letter should be sent to the Ottoman sultan by the hand of a trusted and able ambassador. If this were done, Senān Pasha would use his good offices to persuade the sultan to conclude a peace treaty. If this offer were rejected, then Ottoman forces would continue their conquest of Iranian territory.

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[54] The Šaraflūs were a clan of the Ostājlū tribe (see *TM*, p. 16).

[55] See G. Le Strange (trans.), *The Geographical Part of the Nozhat al-Qolūb, composed by Ḥamd Allāh Mostowfī of Qazvin in 740 (1340)*, 1919, p. 85.

The stubborn *qezelbāš* emirs, particularly Šāhroḵ Khan the keeper of the seal, although they did not consider themselves strong enough to withstand such a huge Ottoman army, and although there was disunity among the emirs themselves, refused to act in the manner demanded by Senān Pasha. They replied:

> If you mean a peace treaty on the terms of the treaty concluded in the time of Shah Tahmasp, well and good. But we will not voluntarily surrender one yard of Persian soil. This is our fixed resolve, as long as one of us hundred thousand *qezelbāš* remains alive. We are not afraid of you, or of ten like you. You should not compare yourself to Lala Pasha. When the latter invaded Iran, the Shah was absent in Iraq, and the emirs of Azerbaijan were in disarray. Now the whole of the *qezelbāš* forces in Azerbaijan are in attendance on the Shah and ready for action. Your statement that the province of Šīrvān has been annexed by Ottoman forces is incorrect. The administration of Šīrvān, as usual, is in the hands of *qezelbāš* emirs. Nothing is in Ottoman hands except the fortress at Darband, which is nothing more than four walls. Had the *qezelbāš* been united at the time of the earlier Ottoman invasion, our enemies would not have been able to make inroads into Safavid territory.

On receiving this letter, Senān Pasha decided to proceed with caution. He wrote another letter, this time couched in milder terms. He pointed out that 'Oṣmān Pasha had reported to the Ottoman sultan that he had subjugated the province of Šīrvān. If this was correct, the most sensible policy for the *qezelbāš* would be not to set foot in that province. If he could receive assurances to that effect, he pledged himself to use his good offices to negotiate a peace. To this letter the Persians sent a pleasant reply, as seemed expedient in the circumstances. Senān Pasha then agreed that both sides should winter where they were, and that each should send a reliable representative to Šīrvān to inspect the province, district by district, and to report whether each region was in the hands of the Ottomans or the *qezelbāš*. He himself nominated a certain 'Omar Aqa as his representative, and dispatched him.

The royal army meanwhile was advancing on Qarābāḡ from Naḵčevān. But alarming reports kept arriving from Khorasan, and Morteżāqolī Khan kept sending in dispatch after dispatch informing the Shah of the rebellion of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū and Moršedqolī Khan Ostājlū and their supporters. So the Shah decided to send to Khorasan Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, a skillful and experienced officer, together with a group of other emirs such as Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šāmlū and Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū, both of whom were the enemies of 'Alīqolī Khan. Their orders were to talk to the emirs in Khorasan with a view to suppressing the fires of civil war between the Šāmlū-Ostājlū group and Morteżāqolī Khan, and to recalling them from the path of sedition.

At this juncture, Ḡāzī Gerāy Khan, Ṣafī Gerāy Khan, and the Tartar host suddenly appeared in Šīrvān. Salmān Khan, who had been appointed *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, was still encamped and had not entered the province. The Tartar chiefs, finding no trace of the *qezelbāš* in Šīrvān, made inquiries, and the Šīrvānīs, notoriously unreliable, informed them that the *beglerbeg* and the *qezelbāš* chiefs who had been appointed to Šīrvān were still in camp at such-and-such a place. Led by Šīrvānī guides, the Tartars crossed the river Kor and fell unexpectedly on the *qezelbāš* camp at a time when the movements of the *qezelbāš* had been restricted by a week of heavy rain. The *qezelbāš* did not even have time to put on their armor and form for battle. Abandoning their equipment and stores, the *qezelbāš* fled, on foot and on horseback. The few valiant souls who stood and fought were slain to a man, and the camp was plundered. Of the Ostājlū emirs, 'Alīqolī Sultan Čāūšlū, the son of Ešīk 'Evaż, was killed; the rest escaped and re-formed in the region of Qezel Āḡāč. The same day, the Tartars retreated with their plunder. On the arrival of the Tartars, 'Oṣmān Pasha sent an Ottoman garrison to Bākū and put the fort there in a state of defense.

The news of the *qezelbāš* defeat was extremely distasteful to the

Shah. When he reached Solṭānbūd in the Qezel Āgāč district he sent the vizier, Mīrzā Salmān, together with Emir Khan, the *qūrčībāšī*, Šāhrok Khan Pīra Moḥammad Khan Ostājlū, and others, plus the *qūrčīs* of the royal bodyguard, against the Tartars. The Safavid skirmishers made contact with the Tartar-Ottoman force at Mollā Ḥasan, but as the main Safavid army came on the scene, the enemy broke contact. The Ottomans, as usual, retired behind the walls of Darband, and the Tartars withdrew to their own territory by way of Dāgestān.

When he heard of the approach of the royal army, Salmān Khan, with his men in disarray and short of equipment, hastened to make amends for his defeat at the hands of the Tartars by laying siege to Bākū, where he was joined by Emir Khan, who had marched by way of Šābarān. After besieging the fort for eighteen days, the *qezelbāš* were forced to abandon the siege on account of the shortage of supplies and the destitution of the population in the area. For a few days the *qezelbāš* obtained barley flour by paying 600 *dīnārs*, equivalent to six *meṣqāls*[56] of silver, for a Tabriz *sang*,[57] but even that came to an end, and it was impossible to stay any longer. The *qezelbāš* force retired to Qarābāg, and that winter[58] there was not a single *qezelbāš* emir in Šīrvān. As a result, the Ottomans consolidated their hold on parts of Šīrvān, levied taxes, and reduced the local population to submission.

Pīra Moḥammad Khan fell ill and died during the Šīrvān operations, and the influence of the Ostājlū tribe was thereby greatly reduced. Although his son, Pīra Morād Khan, was given a governorship and the rank of *kān*, he did not carry the same weight as his father. The influence of the Ostājlū group at court declined steadily as the star of Moršedqolī Khan Yakān Ostājlū rose in Khorasan. The Turkman-Takkalū faction now set about discrediting the weakened Ostājlū group at court, and even went as far as trying to eliminate some of their number. For instance, Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja-oglū Ostājlū, who had returned to court from Khorasan, was set upon at Varāmīn in the district of Rayy by a band of Takkalūs, retainers of Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oglū, under the command of Moḥammad Beg Nodāqī, the grandson of Qarāja Sultan. Some three hundred fully armed Takkalūs mounted and set off with the intention of killing

[56] A *meṣqāl* equals 24 grains or 1/16 of a *sīr*.
[57] A *sang* is a popular weight, of approximately one kilogram.
[58] I.e., the winter of 988-99/1581.

Šāhqolī Sultan and plundering his property. By the time Šāhqolī Sultan heard of their coming, he found his path of escape blocked. He had to stand and fight, which he did so effectively that Moḥammad Beg Nodāqī was put to flight and many Takkalūs were killed. Šāhqolī Sultan decided to leave the province of Rayy, which was thick with Takkalūs, and joined the royal camp in Qarābāġ. The Shah expressed his disapproval of the Takkalū action. Some troublemakers tried to incite Mosīb Khan to take revenge on Šāhqolī Sultan, but Mosīb Khan was a man of peace and refused to take any action.

The elders of the Ostājlū tribe sought the help of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, and on his instructions took Šāhqolī Sultan to the house of Mosīb Khan. Although the Takkalūs who had lost relatives in the engagement uttered threats and were spoiling for a fight, since the Takkalūs had started the fight and the Ostājlūs had been forced to defend themselves, Šāhqolī Sultan was clearly in the right. For this reason, and in deference to the Shah's wishes, Mosīb Khan, despite his great power and authority, overlooked the deaths of two hundred Takkalūs and took no action against Šāhqolī Sultan. Considering that the Turkmans and Takkalūs were allies and that their influence was paramount at court, whereas the Ostājlūs, for the reasons I have given, were temporarily in eclipse, Mosīb Khan could have taken any action he liked against Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja, his sons and relations, without fear of reprisal; his posture of disinterested justice is therefore commendable.

Certain Events Which Took Place toward the End of the Year in the Winter Camp at Solṭānbūd in Qarābāġ, and the Dispatch of Ebrahim Khan Torkmān as Ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan

After the death of Pīra Moḥammad Khan, who was the driving force behind Ostājlū affairs, Salmān Khan and his fellow emirs were unable to hold their ground in Šīrvān, and they retreated from that province. At the same time, 'Omar Aqa, whom Senān Pasha had sent to Šīrvān to report which districts were held by whom, arrived at the royal camp.

The emirs and principal officers of state deemed it advisable to mobilize a large force of Qājārs, Otūz-ikī,[59] and other tribesmen living in Qarābāġ and to make the defense of Šīrvān their responsibility, under the command of Emāmqolī Khan. Having secured the agreement of the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā to this policy, they obliged a reluctant Emāmqolī Khan to accept this command. On the latter's recommendation, Peykar Beg Zīād-oğlū Qājār was promoted to the rank of *ḵān* and awarded a governorship, and appointed *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān. A number of other Qājār emirs were allotted fiefs in Šīrvān, and accompanied the new governor to Šamāḵī.

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[59] The "thirty-two" clans of Qarābāġ; see *TM*, p. 167.

After this force had left, an Iranian delegate was nominated to accompany 'Omar Aqa, and another force was sent to Tiflis to assist Samā'ūn Khan, the independent governor of Tiflis. This force was accompanied by Morād Beg, the commander-in-chief of artillery, with cannon founders and all materials needed for the casting of cannon. The hope was that, by the time 'Omar Aqa returned from Šīrvān, the fortress at Tiflis might be in Safavid hands. However, this hope proved to be vain. Peykar Khan and his fellow emirs took up their stations in Šīrvān and succeeded in convincing 'Omar Aqa that 'Oṣmān Pasha held nothing but the four walls of the forts at Darband and Bākū. Šāhqolī Sultan Tabat-oğlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, with instructions to discuss peace terms, accompanied 'Omar Aqa when the latter returned to report to the Ottoman sultan.

The Safavid envoy took with him a submission by the people of Šīrvān to the effect that, since certain lands in Šīrvān were held in mortmain in respect of the shrines at Mecca and Medina, and since the Ottoman sultan was the guardian of those shrines, the people of Šīrvān were prepared to send a number of consignments of silk to the Ḥejāẓ, the proceeds of the sale of this silk to be used to defray the expenses of the holy shrines. The only condition was that any revenues from these lands which had fallen into Ottoman hands prior to this should not be tampered with but handed over to the *qezelbāš*. So Šāhqolī Sultan Tabat-oğlū set off for Erzerum, laden with gifts.

Since there was a feud between Senān Pasha and 'Oṣmān Pasha, and since Senān Pasha was disposed to negotiate a peace, he sent Tabat-oğlū back with an encouraging communication in which he suggested that the *qezelbāš* appoint one of their high-ranking emirs to go with him to meet the Ottoman sultan and determine the peace terms. Ebrahim Khan, the son of Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq Tarḵān Torkmān, the governor of Qom, was the man selected, and he set off equipped with suitable gifts. However, when Senān Pasha reached Istanbul, his enemies, especially 'Oṣmān Pasha (who was stationed at Darband), accused him of dereliction of duty, and strongly urged the Ottoman sultan not to negotiate a peace. As a result, Ebrahim

Khan's affairs at Istanbul made no progress. The following year, Farhād Pasha was made commander-in-chief of the Ottoman forces and succeeded in wresting from *qezelbāš* control the provinces of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, Qarābāḡ, and most parts of Azerbaijan. Ebrahim Khan remained at Istanbul for seven years until finally, after the accession of Shah 'Abbas, he obtained permission to return to Iran. I hope I may be spared to narrate all these events in their proper place.

Miscellaneous Events and Auspicious Happenings during This Year through the Will of Almighty God

One event that took place in this year was the assassination of Jamšīd Khan, grandson of Moẓaffar Sultan and governor of western Gīlān (he was also the son-in-law of Shah Tahmasp), by Mīrzā Kāmrān Kūhdomī, who was incited by some treacherous retainers to perpetrate this act.

The feud between the ruling houses of western and eastern Gīlān was traditional, and the present heads, Jamšīd Khan and Khan Aḥmad, were no exception to the general rule. They were constantly sending armies against each other's territories and striving to destroy each other. Mīrzā Kāmrān, the ruler of Kūhdom, which was situated between the two realms of western and eastern Gīlān, decided that his best course was to cultivate a closer relationship with Khan Aḥmad, whose lineage was impeccable, but both rulers tried to win over Mīrzā Kāmrān.

In this particular year (988/1580–81), Jamšīd Khan redoubled his efforts to secure an alliance with Mīrzā Kāmrān. He begged him to visit him, made the friendliest of overtures to him, treated him like a brother, and constantly sent him gifts. Intermediaries went to and fro and succeeded in allaying mutual fears of treachery by binding oaths. So the meeting took place. Jamšīd Khan took Mīrzā Kāmrān back with him to Rašt and gave him a royal reception there.

Jamšīd Khan's primary object was to secure an alliance between the forces of western Gīlān and Kūhdom—an alliance that would give him military superiority over Khan Aḥmad. As long as Mīrzā Kāmrān and Jamšīd Khan were in alliance, Jamšīd Khan was able to follow an aggressive policy. He seized control of Kūčesfehān,[60] territory which was in dispute between himself and Khan Aḥmad.

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[60] See *Ḥodūd al-'Ālam*, p. 390.

Khan Aḥmad, at Lāhījān, was kept on tenterhooks and in constant fear of some further demarche on the part of Jamšīd Khan. Mīrzā Kāmrān, as he got more deeply involved in the politics of western Gīlān, was tempted by a faction hostile to Jamšīd Khan to think in terms of becoming ruler of western Gīlān himself, and began to plot against Jamšīd Khan.

At this point, Jamšīd sent his commander in chief, Qarā Bahādor (who was actually the leader of the conspiracy) on an expedition with Mīrzā Kāmrān against Khan Aḥmad. The plot was revealed to Jamšīd Khan by one of his emirs, Čerāğ Sultan, who hoped to get Qarā Bahādor's place. Such was Jamšīd Khan's faith in the sworn oaths of Mīrzā Kāmrān, however, that he did not raise the matter with the latter, who continued to speak agreeably to Jamšīd Khan and to allay his suspicions.

Now that the conspiracy was known, Mīrzā Kāmrān, extremely apprehensive about his own position, decided to act without delay. While Mīrzā Kāmrān and the forces of western Gīlān were at Kūčesfehān, Qarā Bahādor and many other nobles from western Gīlān, who were friends of Qarā Bahādor and implicated in the plot, to save their necks conspired with Mīrzā Kāmrān to get rid of Jamšīd Khan. They murdered Čerāğ Sultan at Kūčesfehān and then marched back to Rašt. The troops, as usual preferring a period of leave to action, asked no questions. The conspirators arrived unexpectedly at Jamšīd Khan's house; even then, Jamšīd Khan, in his innocence, did not suspect that anything was wrong, but thought that circumstances had obliged them to return. Mīrzā Kāmrān entered his private apartments, seized him, and sent him to Kūhdom under guard, with orders that he should be held in a secure place. Jamšīd Khan confidently expected that some of those who owed a debt of gratitude to his house would come and release him, but no one came.

Mīrzā Kāmrān himself took custody of Jamšīd Khan's sons, Moḥammad Ebrahim Mīrzā and Moḥammad Amīn Mīrzā, who were grandsons of Shah Tahmasp and still infants. Through the efforts of Qarā Bahādor, all the people of western Gīlān acclaimed Mīrzā Kāmrān as their ruler, and the nobles and military commanders pledged their fealty to him. A few months later, Mīrzā Kāmrān, to forestall any possible move against him in support of Jamšīd Khan, had the latter put to death in Kūhdom. He did not long enjoy the fruits of this crime, for the murderers of that innocent ruler were ere long deprived of life and fortune.

After establishing himself as ruler of western Gīlān, Mīrzā Kāmrān continued the struggle against Khan Aḥmad and gained the upper hand. He sent a message to the Safavid court to the effect that, since Jamšīd Khan had rebelled and contrary to the Shah's orders had made incursions against the territory of others, the Shah's loyal subject Mīrzā Kāmrān had taken matters into his own hands and had dealt with the rebel. If the royal clemency extended to the conferring of the governorship of western Gīlān on the said loyal subject, he would not only send the Shah an impressive sum of money as a gift, but would undertake to remit tribute and taxes annually. Mīrzā Kāmrān sent along with the messengers a large sum in cash which he had taken from Jamšīd Khan's possessions, hoping thereby to win the support of Mīrzā Salmān, and the emirs and principal officers of state, for his scheme to marry Jamšīd Khan's widow, a daughter of Shah Tahmasp, and to be confirmed as governor of western Gīlān.

Khan Aḥmad, a clever man of sound judgment who was far more frightened of Mīrzā Kāmrān than he had been of Jamšīd Khan, for his part sent repeated petitions to court strongly urging that Mīrzā Kāmrān's proposals be rejected. He urged that the administration of western Gīlān be placed in the hands of seven or eight *qezelbāš* emirs; it did not belong, he said, to Mīrzā Kāmrān. When the *qezelbāš* emirs arrived, he would assist them in wresting the province from the hands of Mīrzā Kāmrān and would then hand over control of it to them. The prospect of Mīrzā Kāmrān's acquiring power as the protégé of the Safavids was repugnant to Khan Aḥmad.

Since Sultan Moḥammad Shah regarded Khan Aḥmad with affection, he did not wish to take any action that was abhorrent to him. The Shah also thought he could not overlook Mīrzā Kāmrān's temerity in murdering Jamšīd Khan, and so Mīrzā Kāmrān's petitions fell on deaf ears. Since Salmān Khan and the Ostājlū emirs were at court without fiefs, and since in addition Salmān Khan was the brother-in-law of the murdered Jamšīd Khan,[61] the Shah appointed him governor of Rašt, and western Gīlān was divided up among the Ostājlū emirs. Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja Ostājlū was appointed guardian and senior counselor to Salmān Khan and was allotted Kūčesfehān, which had been a bone of contention between the rulers of western and eastern Gīlān. The Ostājlū emirs allotted fiefs in western Gīlān included Ḥoseynqolī Sultan, the son of Naẓar Sultan Lala; Moṣṭafā Sultan Šaraflū; Mahdī Sultan Čāūšlū, the son of Eygūt Beg;

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[61] They had both married daughters of Shah Tahmasp.

Aḥmad Sultan Asāyeš-oḡlū; Tenger-bīrdī Ḵalīfa Kangarlū, the son of Ja'far Sultan; and Abu'l-Qāsem Sultan Čāūšlū, the kinsman of Pīra Moḥammad Khan. From the other tribes, there were Aṣlān Sultan 'Alī-beglū Ẓu'l-Qadar; Qarāmān Sultan Rūmlū; and Šāhverdī Sultan Jalāl-oḡlū Čapnī. The gold, formerly the property of Jamšīd Khan, which Mīrzā Kāmrān had sent to court as a gift was allotted to the emirs as a subvention for expenses,[62] and they were sent to Gīlān. In addition, the Shah issued orders to the local governors in Gīlān, Bāyandor Khan Ṭāleš and Emir Ḥamza, the son of Emir Sīāvoš, the governor of Gaskar, instructing them to assist the emirs.

When Salmān Khan and the emirs reached Gīlān, Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja was ordered to Lāhījān to hold counsel with Khan Aḥmad, and to seek his advice as to how they might together settle the affairs of western Gīlān to the best advantage. Meanwhile, a certain Šīrzād, a notable of the Fūmen district, had put forward the son of an itinerant dervish as the son of Jamšīd Khan, had named him Sultan Maḥmūd Khan after the father of Jamšīd Khan, and had adopted a rebellious attitude toward Mīrzā Kāmrān. Šīrzād, at the head of a band of men from Fūmen, descended on Rašt without warning. Mīrzā Kāmrān decided not to defend the city because he thought Šīrzād must have been encouraged to take this bold step by support from within; in actual fact, he had no opportunity to defend it anyway. Taking Jamšīd Khan's sons with him, he abandoned his baggage and fled back to Kūhdom by little-known routes. At Kūhdom, he rejoined Qarā Bahādor and his other supporters.

Šīrzād entered Rašt in triumph, and led "Sultan Maḥmūd Khan" into the presence of Jamšīd Khan's widow, Shah Tahmasp's daughter. Although the latter was well aware that Jamšīd Khan had only two sons, she considered it expedient to pretend to believe Šīrzād and to encourage him to assume control of western Gīlān. Šīrzād, departing from the practice of his predecessors, sent couriers to Khan Aḥmad indicating his willingness to acknowledge his suzerainty. Khan Aḥmad considered this turn of events the greatest piece of good fortune and regretted having called in the *qezelbāš*. He saw this as his opportunity to get his revenge on Mīrzā Kāmrān, and the force he sent to Kūhdom ravaged the area and pursued Mīrzā Kāmrān as far as Rostamābād and the neighborhood of Ṭārom.

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[62] *Madad-e ḵarj;* a technical term for a specific type of *soyūrḡāl*, immunity from tax or special privilege of a financial nature (see *TM*, p. 183).

At this point, Salmān Khan had reached Manjīl. Mīrzā Kāmrān saw submission to the *qezelbāš* as his only way of escaping from the clutches of Khan Aḥmad, and he craved an audience with Salmān Khan. Moḥammadī Beg Sārū Sūlāğ, the *vakīl* of Ḥoseynqolī Sultan, was sent to Kūhdom with a detachment of two or three hundred *qezelbāš*, and they brought Mīrzā Kāmrān and Qarā Bahādor back with them to Manjīl. Mīrzā Kāmrān was fearful that Khan Aḥmad's troops might descend on his house and plunder it that very night. Such was the urgency of his pleading that he persuaded Salmān Khan to march to Kūhdom that same day. Hearing of the latter's approach, Khan Aḥmad pulled back his troops, but at the same time he warned Salmān Khan that Mīrzā Kāmrān was a deceitful and treacherous mischief-maker, and that he should not be taken in by his words. The best course, he said, would be to charge him with the murder of Jamšīd Khan and to imprison him. "I suggest," said Khan Aḥmad, "that first you occupy Mīrzā Kāmrān's territory, and camp there until the autumn. Then at a season when it will be difficult for the forces in western Gīlān to put up any opposition, we will march together and occupy that province."

Mīrzā Kāmrān, however, was extremely astute and a smooth talker, and he carried the day with Salmān Khan. "Khan Aḥmad," he said, "originally asked for the assistance of the *qezelbāš* because he was afraid of my power. Now that he thinks he has destroyed me, he does not want you any more. If Šīrzād and 'Sultan Maḥmūd Khan,' the alleged son of Jamšīd Khan, become masters of western Gīlān, they will without doubt submit to Khan Aḥmad; and the latter will, in reality, become ruler of the whole of Gīlān. You have absolutely no need of his help. Without any recourse to him, I will conquer western Gīlān for you."

Salmān Khan took Jamšīd Khan's sons from the custody of Mīrzā Kāmrān and sent them to Qazvin. He decided to wait until Šāhqolī Sultan returned from Lāhījān and the emirs under his command had marshaled their forces. A few days later, Šāhqolī Sultan arrived and reported that Khan Aḥmad had said that, at the present time, when the trees were in full leaf, every tree in the forest was a defensive position, and it was not the right time to advance on Rašt; he therefore advised that they should wait until winter. This report merely reinforced what Mīrzā Kāmrān said. The great emirs, now assembled, unanimously decided to march on Rašt. They marched by way of Raḥmatābād, sending Mahdīqolī Sultan Čāūšlū ahead with the skirmishers. Tenger-bīrdī Kangarlū led the advance guard, and Šīrzād and 'Sultan Maḥmūd Khan' marched out from Rašt by the usual route through Bījār Pas to confront him. With them were 'Alī Beg and Moḥammad Beg the son of Kār Kīā Aḥmad Fūmenī, who during the reign of Shah Tahmasp was the guardian and *vakīl* of Jamšīd Khan. But Mīrzā Kāmrān marched on Rašt with the *qezelbāš* by a little-used route.

When he got news of their movements, Šīrzād left the youth whom he had elevated to the rank of khan in the care of his main army, and himself marched rapidly back toward Rašt with a small force, to find out what was going on there. He reached the Meydān-e Sīāh Gūrāb, which was not far from Jamšīd Khan's house, just about the same time that a few *qezelbāš* skirmishers entered the city. Šīrzād at once charged them, but one of the *ğāzīs*, without realizing whom he was attacking, hurled Šīrzād from his saddle with a lance thrust. He was promptly seized by the *qezelbāš* and, when they discovered his identity, held prisoner. Ten or fifteen of Šīrzād's men were also taken prisoner, and the rest were killed. Salmān Khan and the main force of *qezelbāš* emirs reached the city and camped in the Meydān-e Sīāh Gūrāb.

When the news of these events reached Šīrzād's army, it marched back to Rašt to give battle to the *qezelbāš*. As soon as the sound of their trumpets, fashioned from *concha veneris*, reached the ears of the *ğāzīs*, Salmān Khan and the main body of emirs remained where they were and sent a detachment out to meet Šīrzād's men. The latter stood firm for a while, but then broke and fled. The *qezelbāš* cavalry could not pursue them among the woods and forests, particularly as night was falling. But the Kūhdomī infantry pursued them and took many prisoners, all of whom were put to death on the orders of Mīrzā Kāmrān. Moḥammad Beg and 'Alī Beg retreated to Fūmen. Salmān Khan sent a report to court, and on orders from the Shah, sent Jamšīd Khan's widow to court. Salmān Khan took up residence in Jamšīd Khan's house, and the other emirs found suitable residences for themselves. Qarā Bahādor was appointed *vakīl* to Salmān Khan and set about winning the support of the people for the new regime.

The people of Gīlan, however, refused to reconcile themselves to *qezelbāš* rule, and they carried on a guerrilla war from the forests. Every night, a detachment of Kūhdomī troops under the command of an emir would go out on patrol. One night, Moḥammad Beg and 'Alī

Beg got into the city, intending to enter Jamšīd Khan's house by means of ladders and assassinate Salmān Khan. Some of the Gīlānīs were killed by Qarā Bahādor and Salmān Khan's retainers; the rest, knowing that the patrols would be on the watch for them, left their ladders and ran. The next day the emirs, considering it inexpedient to keep Šīrzād a prisoner any longer, put him to death. Bāyandor Khan Ṭāleš, Amīra Sīāvoš, and Emir Ḥamza Khan came from Ṭavāleš and Gaskar to Rašt, met Salmān Khan, and outwardly expressed their joy. But in their hearts they refused to countenance interference by the *qezelbāš* in the affairs of Gīlān. They adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the *qezelbāš*.

As most of the inhabitants were scattered among the forests, they had little contact with those who governed them, and few tangible benefits came the way of the *qezelbāš* emirs. Their men, who had come to Gīlān hoping for action and plunder, began to disperse. No help came from the capital, and the emirs, tired of constant patrol activity, decided that service in Gīlān was not all that they desired. They abandoned the attempt to govern Gīlān and decided to leave the province. Although Salmān Khan was opposed to this scheme and refused to give his consent to it, Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja, who was a clever and experienced man, committed himself without reservation to this decision, since he thought it best for himself and for the whole Ostājlū tribe. He consulted Mīrzā Kāmrān, Bāyandor Khan, and Amīra Sīāvoš, who uttered words of encouragement, so the emirs decided to go ahead with their plan. On the appointed day, the *qezelbāš* rode out of Rašt, with the Gaskar and Kūhdom infantry forming a protective screen on all sides as they made their way through the forests. As the *qezelbāš* rode out in one direction, the Gīlānī troops, who had heard of their intention, entered the city from the other. They pursued the *qezelbāš* for a few *farsaḵs* and there was some skirmishing; toward the end of the day, the emirs reached Kūhdom.

The same day, Mīrzā Kāmrān, Bāyandor Khan, Amīra Sīāvoš, and Qarā Bahādor all left the emirs without even taking their leave, and went their separate ways. Because of what had happened in the past and what might happen in the future, they were all afraid of one another, and each returned to his own seat by a route familiar to him. The *qezelbāš* emirs reached Qazvin in some disarray. Since the author of this history was with Salmān Khan on this expedition, he was an eye witness to the events just described; for this reason I temporarily waived my rule against being prolix and narrated these events in detail.

Events in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān and the Capture of Ğāzī Gerāy Khan Tātār by the ğāzīs, by the Will of God

The winter of the Year of the Dragon came to an end, and in the winter quarters of the *qezelbāš* signs of spring ushered in the Year of the Serpent (990/1582). As already reported, Ebrahim Khan Torkmān had been sent to Istanbul to negotiate for peace. In Georgia, Alexander Khan, the ruler of Kakhetia, who had always been a supporter of the Safavid house, made friendly overtures to the Ottomans and declared his submission to them. This caused conflict between him and Samā'ūn Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, who considered himself a supporter of the Safavids.

Alexander Khan even began to accuse Samā'ūn Khan of nursing a secret friendship with the Ottomans, and although Samā'ūn Khan was innocent of this crime (when Lala Pasha first invaded Šīrvān, Samā'ūn Khan had fought mightily against him, and as recently as this year, when the Ottomans had sent reinforcements to their garrisons at Tiflis, Gori, and other fortresses, he had joined forces with Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, intercepted the Ottomans, fought several engagements against them, and obtained large quantities of booty), Sultan Moḥammad Shah and the principal officers of state decided to ask for Samā'ūn Khan's daughter as a bride for Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. This, they thought, would relieve their minds of all anxiety on the score of his loyalty, and the problem of Alexander Khan could be resolved as he thought fit.

Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū Takkalū was sent to Georgia on this mission. Outwardly, Samā'ūn Khan demonstrated his joy at the honor conferred on him, but in their hearts the Georgians, because they belonged to a different religion and for various other reasons, disliked the proposed marriage alliance. They therefore procrastinated as long as possible over the preparations for the wedding.

At this juncture, news arrived that Ğāzī Gerāy Khan and Ṣafī Gerāy Khan were making repeated incursions into Šīrvān. Before the Tartars came on the scene, Emāmqolī Khan had sent considerable reinforcements to Peykar Khan in Šīrvān, and 'Oṣmān Pasha had sent a detachment from Darband, under Dāl the *doranči* (stirrup-holder), to Šīrvān to support the Tartars. The two armies met between Šamāḵī and Šābarān: on the one side, Peykar Khan and the Qājār, Jāgīrlū, and Qarāmānlū emirs and others; on the other, the Tartars and the Ottomans. Ġāzī Gerāy Khan, who had been rendered overconfident by his previous successes against the *qezelbāš* and had a low opinion of them, at once gave battle. In the course of the fighting, however, he was cut off by a group of Qājār horse and taken prisoner.

His capture turned the tide of battle, and Ṣafī Gerāy Khan only saved himself with great difficulty. Peykar Khan was loaded with honors by the Shah for this distinguished service, but the same year he was overtaken by illness and died. Ḵalīfa Anṣār Qarādāġlū was appointed governor of Šīrvān in his place. Fate willed, however, that the Ottomans should for a time exercise jurisdiction over Šīrvān. Ḵalīfa Anṣār was unable to achieve anything, and eventually beat a retreat from Šīrvān and died soon afterward. The death of Ḵalīfa Anṣār and the return of the Shah to Iraq to prepare his expedition to Khorasan, which he launched the following year, meant that no *qezelbāš* emir could maintain a foothold in Šīrvān. 'Oṣmān Pasha moved from Darband to Šamāḵī, strengthened the fort there, and proceeded to govern the province without opposition, as will be related in due course.

Ġāzī Gerāy Khan was consigned to the prison at Alamūt, a famous fortress situated between Qazvin and Gīlān, the former stronghold of the Ismā'īlīs, and entrusted to the commandant of the prison for safekeeping.

Since the delay by Samā'ūn Khan in sending his daughter to Qazvin had exceeded all reasonable bounds, Mīrzā Salmān, with some of the emirs and about twenty thousand men, proceeded to Georgia with orders to settle the problems connected with Alexander Khan and Samā'ūn Khan in the way he thought in the best interests of the state. At the approach of the Safavid army, the rulers of Georgia hastened to make amends for their behavior: Alexander Khan sent a self-imposed fine as a token of his submission to the Ottomans, together with the arrears of taxes that had not been paid to the *qezelbāš*. Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs thought it a good idea to bind Alexander Khan to the Safavid dynasty also by a marriage between his daughter and Ḥamza Mīrzā, and to get him to swear his fealty to the Safavid crown and his enmity toward the Ottomans. Negotiations were begun, and when Alexander was satisfied that Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs were not contemplating treachery, he came to meet them. Samā'ūn Khan also joined them, with Mosīb Khan.

The two Georgian princes were brought together and made to swear to keep the peace; they swore solemn oaths on the Holy Gospel and on the Cross, as is the custom of those of the Christian faith. They swore that they would remain constant in their loyalty to the Safavid house, and that they would fight by the side of the *qezelbāš* against the Ottomans. Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs were not satisfied with bringing back the two Georgian princesses; they demanded that each prince should also send one of his sons to the Safavid court, to enter the service of Ḥamza Mīrzā. The Georgian princes had no choice but to obey. Alexander Khan sent his twelve-year-old son Kūstandīl Mīrzā, and Samā'ūn Khan sent his son Lūārsāb Mīrzā, who was the same age.

Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs then presented the Georgian princes, on behalf of the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā, with robes of honor. Alexander Khan paid the arrears of tax and tribute he had not paid for years, and remitted a sum of three thousand current royal Iraqi *tomān* to the royal treasury. He also agreed to send one thousand *tomān* to Ḥamza Mīrzā and to collect one thousand *tomān* to defray the expenses of the visit to Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs and to go to the principal officers of state. Alexander instructed his vizier, a wealthy and influential Jew named Jacob, to go with the emirs to the Ganja district and see to the collection of these monies. Alexander begged that his brother 'Īsā Khan be allowed to stay in Georgia, and Samā'ūn Khan made a similar request on behalf of his brother, Dā'ūd Khan, who was then with Alexander.

Both princes pledged their good behavior toward their brothers and swore they would commit no treachery against them. Each promised to allot to his brother a specific part of his territory from which he might derive his livelihood without hindrance or difficulty. Neither prince kept his promises, however; shortly afterward each took steps to get rid of his brother, and let it be known that he had died. Since circumstances at the time did not permit any action to be taken against them, the princes went unpunished.

Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs, having settled the affairs of Georgia in the manner just described, returned to the royal camp, which was at a place called Zagam, with the Georgian princes and princesses. The Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā were extremely pleased by their report. The royal camp then moved to the summer quarters of Meydānjūq, where the court spent a pleasant summer without the worry of an Ottoman attack, since Senān Pasha was away in Istanbul with Ebrahim Khan, trying to negotiate a peace settlement. Reports kept coming in from Khorasan concerning the revolt of the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs, and the Shah, fearful that the Ostājlū emirs who had just returned from Gīlān might go to Khorasan and stir up more trouble there, decided to move back to Iraq in the autumn. He spent the winter at Qazvin.

The Revolt of Qalandar in Kūh Gīlūya and His Ultimate Ruin

An event which took place this year[63] was the revolt of Qalandar in Kūh Gīlūya, and a brief account of this strange incident follows. A *qalandar*, who resembled Esma'il Mīrzā[64] in every particular and who, like Esma'il, had only two teeth (or, in order to avert suspicion, had himself pulled out the others—God alone knows!) went among the Lors of Kūh Gīlūya and opened the doors of deception and deceit. He declared:

> I am Esma'il Mīrzā, whom a group of ingrates conspired together to kill. On grounds of expediency, I had no course left open to me except to flee and conceal myself.
>
> On a certain night in Ramażān, when I was sleeping in the house of Ḥalvājī-oḡlū, I noticed that a group of people who had enmity for me in their hearts had surrounded my bedroom and intended to break in. I broke the window shutters of that house and hurled myself outside. Divested of the garb of sovereignty and kingship, I clothed myself in the costume of dervishes and *qalandars*, and concealed myself in a remote corner. That group produced the body of a strangled *ḡolām* who looked like me, and announced that Shah Esma'il II was dead.
>
> For about two years I was absent from Iran, dressed as a *qalandar*. I traveled around a great deal, particularly in Asia Minor. I observed with close at-

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[63] "This year" appears to be 988/1580-81, rather than the year 989/1581-82 which has been under discussion, because *TAAA*, i, 261, states that in 988/1580-81 Ḵalīl Khan Afšār, governor of Kūh Gīlūya, obtained leave from the Shah to go to his post to deal with this revolt. But the chronology of this period is a little uncertain.

[64] I.e., Shah Esma'il II.

> tention the good and bad points of the Ottoman empire. Until this moment I have not revealed to anyone the secret which I have carried in my head. I have waited patiently, with the result that most of my enemies have, one by one, paid the penalty for their crime.
>
> When the time came for me to manifest myself and my mind was completely set at rest regarding the machinations of my enemies and the guile of my foes, I revealed myself. If God wills, I will take revenge on the rest of my enemies. Then, with my true supporters and like-minded friends who exist on the periphery of Asia Minor, I shall set out to conquer the Ottoman empire, and I shall do this and that.

During his youth, Qalandar had used Indian hemp *(cannabis indica)*, and had allowed corrupt thoughts to enter his brain. He used to utter foolish boasts, and make fine promises to all and sundry. Each man was nominated to a post in the government or financial administration of one of the provinces of Iran, Tūrān, or Rūm. Those ignorant rustics were deceived by the absurd utterances of a fool who had turned aside from the path of reason.

Although the death of Esma'il Mīrzā occurred without any doubt, people remote from the scene who were not fully informed of all the details of the affair, thought that these delirious ravings were probable, and gradually Qalandar's fame spread among the Lor tribes. From concealment, he came out into the open. People flocked in from all sides, bringing offerings and presents. Qalandar, seeing a favorable opportunity for the furtherance of his plans among that unintelligent group of people, laid the foundations of kingship and spread out the carpet of royalty. Everyone who visited him to pay his respects was expected to prostrate himself and kiss his feet in the traditional manner. People in every tribe brought their beautiful daughters as an offering to him, so that they might have the honor of sharing his bed.

In short, that madman, who had the appearance of sanity, adorned the role of sovereignty and kingship with deception, and decked it out with folly. He appointed to high office the leading men of each class, and gave orders for the mobilization of the army. When the size of his army, which was composed of the Jākī, Javānakī, Bandānī, and other Lor clans and tribes, reached twenty thousand, he marched with this large force, which he had ready for action, to Dehdašt, which is the seat of the governor of Kūh Gīlūya. The Afšār tribes informed Ḵalīl Khan, the governor of that province, who was in the royal camp, of the fact of Qalandar's revolt.

To resist Qalandar, the sons of Ḵalīl Khan, the leader of whom was Rostam Beg, assembled, and major battles were repeatedly fought by the two sides. Qalandar's men were sometimes victorious, sometimes defeated. A large number of Afšārs and Lors were killed in these battles. By divine decree, Rostam Beg, the son of Ḵalīl Khan, was killed. His death resulted in the triumph and ascendance of Qalandar, and the Afšār tribe was no longer able to resist him. Many of them had been killed in this campaign, and Qalandar's men took prisoner many Afšār women and youths. The Qalandar sent orders and letters of appointment to all parts of Fārs and Ḵūzestān, and summoned his partisans. Since the royal retinue was far off, engaged in important operations on the Azerbaijan frontier, Qalandar's writ ran everywhere. The people of most of the neighboring districts, seeing no course open to them but submission, bowed to the expediency of the moment and sent gifts.

Since Qalandar was an unintelligent fool, as indicated by the hemistich: "The lamp of falsehood gives no light," the falsity of his words gradually became apparent as the days went by, and the wiser men among the Lors began to have doubts regarding him. Also, the approach of Ḵalīl Khan himself was reported. Qalandar, becoming suspicious and mistrustful of some of the Lors, abandoned the idea of fighting and went to Ḥavīza and Dezfūl to seek help from Seyyed Shojā' al-Dīn, as the Moša'ša'ī *shaikhs* were at that time governors of Ḥavīza and its dependencies in the province of 'Arabestān. Dismissing the Lors to their homes, Qalandar ordered them to be ready when he summoned them.

When Ḵalīl Khan, who was at court, heard the news of Qalandar's revolt, he obtained permission to proceed in that direction. When he reached those parts, he was intercepted by a group of ill-starred Samāyandānī Lors, partisans of Qalandar. They ambushed Ḵalīl Khan in a mountain valley which had only one road through it. As he was passing through the valley, they hurled large rocks down from the top of the hills, and fired arrows and muskets. By divine decree, an arrow struck and killed Ḵalīl Khan. At his death, the Afšār *gāzīs* were thrown into confusion, and the Lors turned to killing and plundering. This event increased the rebelliousness and audacity of the Lors.

When the news of the death of Ḵalīl Khan reached Qalandar, he returned from Dezfūl to Kūh Gīlūya. Once again, a great multitude rallied round him at Dehdašt. He wished, during the short space of time available to him before the news of his action was reported to the Shah, to take his fill of carnal pleasures and to live on borrowed time. When the news of the death of Ḵalīl Khan and the destruction of the victorious Afšār family was spread far and near and reached the ears of the Shah, the Shah appointed Ḵalīl Khan's nephew, Eskandar Khan, governor of Kūh Gīlūya, and dispatched him to those parts. He further ordered Ommat Khan, *beglerbeg* of Fārs, and the Ẓu'l-Qadar emirs who were subordinate governors in Fārs to suppress Qalandar and to aid Eskandar Khan.

The following year, when the royal standards went to Khorasan, Ommat Khan sent a detachment of the Fārs army, under the command of Dowrāq Ḵalīfa, to Kūh Gīlūya. Eskandar Khan and the Afšār tribe joined them, and they marched together on Dehdašt. The large crowd which had initially gathered around Qalandar dispersed and scattered. When the Fārs army moved rapidly to repulse him, since his design was by that time completely revealed and the faith of the Lor chiefs in him had been severely shaken, no one came to his support. Qalandar was forced to shut himself up behind the walls of that fortress, and for a few days he and the small group of men who were with him waited like animals for the slaughter. The Ẓu'l-Qadar *ḡāzīs* made an assault and penetrated the fortifications, and slew a number who opposed them. Qalandar was seized in his house and dragged outside. The Ẓu'l-Qadar tribe wished to send him alive to the court, but the Afšār *ḡāzīs* fell on him and slew him and sent his head to court. It was delivered to Sultan Moḥammad Shah while he was encamped at Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya in Khorasan, engaged in laying siege to the fortress of Torbat. Thus the fires of the sedition of that hemp addict were extinguished in Kūh Gīlūya.

After the episode of the *qalandar,* other hemp-addicted *qalandars* took it into their heads to pretend to be Esma'il Mīrzā. Tumult and disturbance occurred in several places. Every few days an Esma'il Mīrzā would appear in some province or other, and people would rally round him and then disperse again.

The second pseudo-Esma‘il made his appearance in Lorestān and Čamčāl. The ill-starred Kurds and Lors of the Hamadan district rallied around him, and his army soon numbered ten thousand men. He appointed emirs and officers, and began to cause trouble there. He sent a messenger to Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn Takkalū directing him to obey and submit, and an order appointing him to the *vekālat*, so that he might be *vakīl* and *rokn al-salṭana* in place of Čūha Sultan Takkalū.

Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn, as intelligence dictated, considered it better and more advisable to deal with him by first of all pretending to obey. He accepted his terms, and verified his claim to be Esma‘il Mīrzā. He declared his sincere devotion to and complete support of him, sent him a supply train, and begged him to visit him. He further sent him tents and equipment fit for a king, and went in person to meet the *qalandar*. The wretched *qalandar* believed him and set off for Čamčāl with the greatest pomp and circumstance.

Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn and the Takkalū nobles entered his presence and went through the ceremony of prostration and foot-kissing. By using their intelligence and sagacity, they dispersed the *qalandar's* followers, and when they saw their chance, seized him and imprisoned him. When the Shah, on his return from Khorasan, was encamped at Qazvin, Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn sent the *qalandar* to court. Ḥamza Mīrzā, in the Ḵīābān-e Meydān-e Asp, put a "gunpowder shirt" on him and detonated it. Despite that cruel method of punishment, the *qalandars* were not completely finished, and another *qalandar* had similar ambitions in Ṭavāleš. A group of ignorant people with no future gathered around him and went to Ardabīl, where they incurred the penalty for their actions.

The fourth pseudo-Esma‘il appeared in Ḡūr and on the borders of Farāh in the province of Khorasan. A large number of people of that region who were bankrupt of intelligence and were mischiefmakers rallied around him and started causing trouble. Ḥoseyn Sultan Afšār, the governor of Farāh, moved to suppress this revolt, and an engagement was fought between the two sides. The Ḡūrīs won, and Ḥoseyn Khan was killed in the battle. The Afšārs fled in confusion back to Farāh. When the news was received at court, Ḥoseyn's brother, ‘Alī Khan Sultan, who at court was a *yūzbāšī* of a group of Afšār *qūrčīs*, was appointed to his brother's post and went to Farāh. To avenge his brother's death he went after the *qalandar* to Ḡūr. The *qalandar's* followers prepared to fight, and after several struggles ‘Alī Khan

Sultan too was killed; once again the Afšār tribe had failed to achieve anything.

Yakān Sultan Afšār became governor of Farāh. After his arrival there, he was still pondering how to deal with the *qalandar* when the spuriousness of the latter became manifest to his followers, and in the end they themselves killed him.

In short, for the first four or five years of the reign of Moḥammad Ḵodābanda, whispers and rumors concerning Esma'il Mīrzā were on the tongues of men.

Events in Khorasan in the Year of the Serpent (989/1581–82), during Which 'Abbas Mīrzā Was Raised to the Throne of That Province

As previously related, the reports sent to court by Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, the governor of Mašhad, regarding the revolt of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg* of Herat, and Moršedqolī Khan Yakān Ostājlū, and their supporters, and their attack on Mašhad and Nishapur, had led the principal officers of state to decide (at the suggestion of Emir Khan and the other Turkman emirs, whose feelings of tribal loyalty led them to support Morteżāqolī Khan) to place the settlement of affairs in Khorasan in the hands of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān. The latter had been dispatched to Khorasan with Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šāmlū, who sought vengeance for his father's death, Qūr Ḵoms Khan, and a number of other emirs. Moḥammad Khan Torkmān's orders were to quench the fires of revolt in a wise and sensible manner; to put a stop to the opposition of the Khorasan emirs to the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā; peacefully to resolve the feud between the Khorasan emirs and Morteżāqolī Khan if it was susceptible of peaceful resolution and if not, to take such action as he might deem fit to end the schism between the *qezelbāš*.

When they heard of his approach, 'Alīqolī Khan and Moršedqolī Khan and their supporters marched from Herat toward Mašhad, taking with them 'Abbas Mīrzā. Morteżāqolī Khan hoped to raise a large army by means of largesse. He had made it a practice to make disbursements on a royal scale, to spend more than the revenue accruing from the Mašhad district, and to hand out grants of money on an unprecedented scale. He now announced that his troops would receive a handout of gold, intending to raise the money from the rich citizens of Mašhad. When, by means of fines and confiscations he had milked this source dry, he had the audacity to lay hands on the shrine treasury; he seized possession of the shrine ornaments, including all the gold and silver chandeliers and candlesticks, calling them payments on account, and used the money to provide his men with pay and allowances. Because he desecrated the shrine in this way, his affairs did not prosper, and events turned out contrary to his expectations.

Having arrived at Mašhad, Moḥammad Khan Torkmān opened negotiations with 'Alīqolī Khan, but the latter suspected that Moḥammad Khan Torkmān had come to Khorasan for reasons of tribal solidarity with Morteżāqolī Khan, that Esmā'īlqolī Khan was merely out for vengeance, and that they both intended mischief and had no real intention of negotiating a truce. Consequently, the overtures produced no result. 'Alīqolī Khan's case was that the fires of conflict between himself and Morteżāqolī Khan were burning with such an intensity that they could not be extinguished by the water of counsel and admonition. Reconciliation between them was out of the question. If Morteżāqolī Khan were removed from the governorship of Mašhad and replaced by one of the great emirs who would pledge his fealty to 'Abbas Mīrzā (who was in Herat on his father's orders) and give his word not to contravene the instructions or oppose the policies of the prince's guardian, who was the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, then a peaceful settlement was more likely. 'Alīqolī Khan concluded by repeating that he was, and always had been, loyal to the Shah. This statement led Moḥammad Khan Torkmān to break off negotiations with 'Alīqolī Khan and to mobilize his forces at Mašhad. Arrogantly relying on the numerical superiority of the Turkman tribe, and on the fact that they held more high-ranking positions at court, he and Morteżāqolī Khan thought they did not have to listen to this sort of talk.

'Alīqolī Khan and Moršedqolī Khan decided not to advance on Mašhad immediately, but to deal first with Darvīš Moḥammad Khan at Nishapur, whose behavior the previous year had gone unpunished. If the Mašhad emirs came out to help him, then the encounter in the open plain would be decided according to the inscrutable will of fate; if not, they would proceed to Mašhad with their minds at rest on the matter of Nishapur.

Darvīš Moḥammad Khan had done all he could to put Nishapur in a state of defense, and 'Alīqolī Khan commenced siege operations. Moḥammad Khan and Morteżāqolī Khan decided to keep their main force at Mašhad and to send a detachment under the command of Esmā'īlqolī Khan Čeganī to the aid of Darvīš Moḥammad Khan. A battle was fought outside Nishapur between this relief force and the Abbasid emirs,[65] at which Esmā'īlqolī Khan and Būdāḡ Khan and their men were routed. This victory raised the prestige of the Abbasid emirs even more, and correspondingly lowered the morale of the Mašhad emirs, who decided on a defensive policy.

The Abbasid emirs, and particularly the Ostājlūs, who had already been branded as rebels by the Shah and the principal officers of state, began to talk about raising 'Abbas Mīrzā to the status of king and installing him on the throne of Khorasan. They thought this would make the issue a clear-cut one of support for 'Abbas Mīrzā, and would enable them to distinguish clearly between friend and foe. They discussed the matter with 'Alīqolī Khan, and a decision was made to put this plan into effect.

The Elevation of 'Abbas Mīrzā to the Throne of Khorasan

In the year of the Serpent, equivalent to 989/1581, at an auspicious moment, 'Abbas Mīrzā was raised to the throne of Khorasan, with the style of Shah 'Abbas. Although 'Abbas Mīrzā was too young to have any real say in the matter[66] and did not wish to do anything which was displeasing to his father, nevertheless the agents of fate brought this about. Orders were embellished with the royal signature; coins were minted in Khorasan with his name and titles, and these were also included in the *koṭba*. High and low flocked to offer their congratulations and support: among them was Mīr Moḥammad Yūsof Nīšāpūrī, the son of Mīr Shah Ḥoseyn, who held the office of *monšī al-mamālek* (state scribe)[67] at court. He was raised to the rank of emir with the style Mīr Moḥammad Yūsof Khan.

This news, which caused consternation at Mašhad, was promptly reported to court, where it caused similar astonishment. Nothing like it had happened previously in the history of the Safavid dynasty. The *ṣadr-e a'ẓam,*[68] Qāżī Khan al-Ḥasanī,[69] told me that, during the winter that Sultan Moḥammad Shah spent in Qarābāḡ, Ḵāja Żīā al-Dīn Kāšī, the *mošref*[70] of the Georgian prince Alexander Khan, visited the royal court and asked him whether there was any truth in the rumors that the prince ʿAbbas had been proclaimed king in Khorasan. The *ṣadr-e aʿẓam* said he had replied it was true rumors to that effect were in circulation, but they had not yet been confirmed. The collected works of Kamāl Esmāʿīl[71] happened to be lying on the table. The Ḵāja picked the volume up to take a prediction from it. At the top of the right-hand page, his eye fell on verses which suggested that ʿAbbas Mīrzā's fortunes were as yet only beginning to dawn.

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[65] I.e., the supporters of 'Abbas Mīrzā.

[66] He was ten years old.

[67] See *TM,* pp. 61, 132.

[68] This title was used increasingly by viziers from the time of Shah 'Abbas onward, but here it refers to the *ṣadr*, not the vizier.

[69] Appointed *ṣadr* by Shah 'Abbas I in 1015/1606–07, having formerly held the office of *qāżī-ye 'askar*. He died in 1030/1620–21.

The Abbasid emirs now redoubled their efforts to capture Nishapur, but Darvīš Moḥammad Khan defended the fortress with intelligence, courage, and sound tactics, and the siege dragged on without the emirs' making any progress. Winter was coming on, and at the same time there came news of the approach of the army from Iraq. The emirs were forced to abandon the siege of Nishapur and return to Herat, where they dispersed each to his own fief.

Sultan Moḥammad Shah's Expedition to Khorasan with the Object of Quenching the Fires of Revolt in That Province

In the spring of the Year of the Horse (990/1582), the Shah sent *qūrčīs* to all parts to mobilize forces for the expedition to Khorasan. At Qazvin, Ḥamza Mīrzā was betrothed to the daughter of the vizier, Mīrzā Salmān; the vizier gave a party fit for royalty, and preparations were begun for the marriage the following year. After this, the vizier's arrogance knew no bounds, and his power and authority in office were unchallenged. The emirs and the principal officers of state were opposed to the marriage, but gave their consent to it out of regard to the prince and kept their true feelings to themselves.

Meanwhile, Moḥammad Khan, Esmāʿīlqolī Khan, and the other emirs who had been sent to Khorasan had returned to Qazvin and had reported the true state of affairs in Khorasan and the failure of their mission. Mīrzā Salmān and other devoted supporters of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, as well as officers in the personal service of Ḥamza Mīrzā, had risen up in wrath and demanded a punitive expedition against the rebels. The *qūrčībāšī*, Šāhroḵ Khan, and other emirs disliked this idea, and said in the council of emirs that too much reliance should not be placed on the word of the Ottomans. It was probable, they said, that when the Ottomans heard the Shah had left for Khorasan, Senān Pasha would seize the opportunity to invade Azerbaijan. The interests of the state dictated that the royal army should march to Azerbaijan to deal with the external enemy. If ʿAbbas Mīrzā had increased his authority in Khorasan, so much the better; the Uzbegs would take more account of him, the Khorasan emirs would be more obedient to him, and thus no harm would befall the state.

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[70] A financial official. In the Safavid bureaucracy, he was subordinate to *ṣāḥeb-jamʿ* (see *TM*, p. 64).

[71] Kamāl Esmāʿīl: Kamāl al-Dīn Esmāʿīl of Isfahan, put to death by the Mongols ca. 1237.

The emirs who were hesitant about the advisability of the Khorasan expedition were promptly branded as oppositionists by Mīrzā Salmān and the group that considered itself to be unswerving in its loyalty to Ḥamza Mīrzā. They lost no opportunity of telling the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā, both privately and in public, that the object of the emirs who opposed the Khorasan expedition was to continue the rift between the *qezelbāš*. The separate state that had been set up in Khorasan should not be destroyed, because in this way they could increase their own influence at court. The emirs decided to keep silent, withdraw their opposition to the expedition, and agree to take part in it. From Tabriz, Emir Khan Torkmān kept writing letters urging the dispatch of the expedition—though whether his motive was to conciliate Ḥamza Mīrzā or to assist Morteżāqolī Khan is hard to say.

The Shah took steps to conciliate the Ostājlū tribe: Salmān Khan, the son of Shah ʿAlī Mīrzā and grandson of ʿAbd Allāh Khan Ostājlū, was appointed to the office of *dīvānbāšī*,[72] and it was ordained that he should, like his illustrious grandfather,[73] affix his seal to official documents. Shah Tahmasp's daughter, Šahrbānū Begom,[74] to whom he had been married some two years previously, now formally entered his household. A number of Ostājlū emirs who had remained at court without having been allotted any tribal district, particularly Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja and Aḥmad Sultan Āsāyeš-oğlū, were given official allowances so that they could equip their men and join the Khorasan expedition.

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[72] This phrase, *dīvānbāšī*, is not used elsewhere in the *TAAA*, and presumably denotes the function of the officer in control of the supreme *dīvān*.

[73] ʿAbd Allāh Khan Ostājlū held the office of *amīr al-omarā* under Shah Tahmasp (see Savory, Offices II, p. 78).

[74] Salmān Khan had been given the hand in marriage of Šahrbānū Begom *before* his appointment as governor of Šīrvān (988/1580–81); it appears from this passage, however, that his bride had remained at court and had not accompanied him to Šīrvān or to Gīlān the following year.

The Shah's orders were that, if Moršedqolī Khan and the other Ostājlū emirs who were in Khorasan continued their opposition to the Shah, they should be replaced (after appropriate steps had been taken to deal with them) by loyal Ostājlū emirs. Salmān Khan and the senior Ostājlū emirs pledged themselves to send reliable emirs to Khorasan, and to counsel Moršedqolī Khan and the other Ostājlū emirs, who were all related by clan ties, in order to direct them away from the path of rebellion. They chose for this task Šāhverdī Beg Yakān, the paternal uncle of Moršedqolī Khan, who was one of the chief emirs of the tribe and had been a counselor and adviser to Shah Tahmasp. He was sent to Khorasan in advance of the royal army.

'Alīqolī Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, *beglerbeg* of Fārs, was dismissed from his post and replaced by Ommat Beg *yūzbāšī* Ẕu'l-Qadar, who was promoted to the rank of khan and made *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs. The reason for 'Alīqolī Khan's dismissal was that he had failed to send his quota of men to take part in the operations in Azerbaijan during the last two or three years, giving as his excuse the revolt of Qalandar in Kūh Gīlūya. Several other Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs were dismissed with him. The new governor-general was now ordered by the Shah to send a detachment of troops from the army of Fārs to deal with the Qalandar revolt and to assist Eskandar Khan Afšār in Kūh Gīlūya, and himself to report for duty in Khorasan with the remainder of his men. Valī Khan Takkalū, governor of Hamadan, and Valī Khan Afšār, governor of Kerman, were also ordered to report for duty in Khorasan.

The three months of spring were thus spent in mobilizing the royal army, and the Shah did not leave Qazvin until about the time the crops were ready for harvest. The Shah also sent *qūrčīs* to the Khorasan emirs, appealing to their love of the Shah and calling on them to rally around Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk and join forces with the royal army, which was the largest *qezelbāš* army ever mobilized.[75]

As the royal army proceeded toward Khorasan, it was rejoined by Šāhverdī Beg, who submitted various apologies on behalf of Moršedqolī Khan and his comrades. In the course of his submission, he made certain vexatious remarks that led to his being censured and arrested. Mahdīqolī Khan, the son of Valad Ḥasan Beg Čāūšlū, who was a *qūrčī* of bow and arrow and one of the reliable leaders of the Ostājlū tribe, also had the temerity to utter various remarks on the subject of tribal solidarity and in defense of the bonds of clan and

[75] According to Bellan, it numbered 80,000 men.

kin. Since he was an ambitious man and not trusted by the Shah, he was also arrested. Both men, at the instigation of their enemies, were put to death by Salmān Khan and the chiefs of the Ostājlū tribe, to demonstrate their friendship for Ḥamza Mīrzā.

When ʿAlīqolī Khan, Moršedqolī Khan, and their supporters heard of the approach of the royal army, they marched to Mašhad with the prince ʿAbbas. With the object of throwing Morteżāqolī's plans into disarray and of dispersing his allies, the Abbasid emirs ravaged the territory in the Rādekān plain of the Jānī Qorbānī[76] tribe, which supported him, and caused such havoc that that tribe changed its mind. The Abbasid emirs intended to do everything in their power to frustrate the hopes of Morteżāqolī Khan, but they did not have time to carry out all their plans before the proximity of the royal army forced them to march to Sabzavār by way of Jahān in the district of Arğīān. Despite the overwhelming superiority in numbers of the royal army, the royal party was considerably disconcerted by the audacity of the Ḵorāsānīs in advancing to Sabzavār, and the general opinion was that a major battle would be fought between the two armies within the next few days.

The majority of the *qezelbāš* chiefs regarded the prospect with abhorrence, because this civil war had split tribes down the middle, and many *qezelbāš* had kinsmen in the other camp. Voices were therefore heard counseling peace—in particular, the voice of Qọlī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, and that of Šāhroḵ Khan. Mīrzā Salmān, however, continued to represent these two emirs to Ḥamza Mīrzā as persons hostile to him and the Shah, and accused them of duplicity. They, out of expediency, were unable to reveal what was in their hearts.

When the royal army reached Mazīnān, it received news that the Abbasid emirs had returned to Herat. The reason for this was that when the Abbasid emirs reached Sabzavār and obtained accurate intelligence regarding the size of the royal army, they realized that they could not stand against it in the open field. They decided to return, each going to his own territory to fortify his own castle. Indeed, this was the only proper course open to them in the circumstances. Moršedqolī Khan repaired to Torbat, and ʿAlīqolī Khan and the emirs who had fiefs in the Herat and Ğūrīān districts retired to Herat, followed by the royal army. Morteżāqolī Khan and most of the emirs of Khorasan now joined the royal camp.

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[76] Obviously the tribe listed in *TM*, p. 17, as *Jown-ğorbān*, an *oymāq* of eastern origin.

The Shah decided first to lay siege to Moršedqolī Khan at Torbat, and not to make any attempt on Herat until this matter was settled. On reaching Torbat, the Shah allotted each emir a section of the siegeworks as his reponsibility; within a few days, heavy siege guns were installed and high palisades erected. Mīrzā Salmān and the Takkalū and Turkman emirs performed their tasks with the greatest vigor. The besieged put up a stout defense and threw up counterworks to enable them to make sorties. In one daring sortie, Ordūḡdī Ḵalīfa Takkalū, a leading emir of that tribe, was killed, as was Ṭahmāspqolī Beg, the son of Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū, who was the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* of Ḥamza Mīrzā.

The siege dragged on for six months, the besieged receiving material assistance from some of the besiegers, especially the *qūrčībāšī*, Qolī Beg, and Šāhroḵ Khan, who refused to storm the fort because of the heavy casualties this would involve. They also assiduously carried on a secret propaganda war among the *qezelbāš*, saying that they hoped *qezelbāš* swords would not be turned against *qezelbāš*, and that the dispute, which had been stirred up by troublemakers, could be resolved peacefully. In public, however, these emirs kept quiet for fear of their enemies and jealous rivals.

Winter passed, and Nowrūz of the year 991/1583, the Year of the Sheep, found the royal army still before the walls of Torbat. The elders of all the *qezelbāš* tribes, but especially of the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs, wearying of the long siege, now began to talk openly of the possibility of a peaceful settlement in the presence of Mīrzā Salmān and his party, and they made some slight progress toward getting them to entertain the idea. Two negotiators were appointed to enter the fort and begin talks with Moršedqolī Khan: from the emirs, Seyyed Beg Kamūna; and from the *seyyeds* and *'olamā*, Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī Enjū, the army chaplain *(qāżī-ye mo'askar)*.[77]

Moršedqolī Khan detained the negotiators in the fort, complained bitterly and at length about the execution of his uncle, Šāhverdī Beg Yakān, and said he had no confidence in the promises of pardon offered by the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā, or in the motives of the principal officers of state. Eventually, the keeper of the seal, Šāhroḵ Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, and Ommat Khan, governor of Fārs, volunteered the good offices of the entire Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe in obtaining a royal pardon for Moršedqolī Khan. Šāhroḵ obtained permission to enter the fort and meet Moršedqolī Khan. Since the siege had reduced the defenders to dire straits, they were ready to negotiate seriously. After some further exchange of envoys, Moršedqolī Khan had a meeting near the fort with Mīrzā Salmān and some of the emirs in the royal army.

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[77] See *TM*, pp. 43, 112.

Moršedqolī Khan renewed his oaths of fealty to the Shah and to Ḥamza Mīrzā, and it was agreed that the royal army should retire from the walls of Torbat and give Moršedqolī Khan a few days' grace to make ready gifts to be sent to court. At the same time, he sent several of his kinsmen and the elders of the Ostājlū tribe to intercede with the Shah for a royal pardon. Their mission was successful, and royal letters were issued pardoning Moršedqolī Khan and recalling the services his father, Šāhqolī Sultan Yakān, had rendered to Sultan Moḥammad Shah and his sons in his capacity as their guardian. These letters were sent to him along with splendid robes of honor. The royal army then marched to a point between Mašhad and Herat and was camped, awaiting the arrival of Moršedqolī Khan, when it suddenly became imperative for the army to march on Herat.

The Shah's March to Herat and His Victory at the Battle of Ĝūrīān over the Ḵorāsānī Forces

While the Shah and his party were still in camp, undecided as to whether to go to Mašhad or Herat, Ḵ̌āja 'Abd al-Mo'men Ḥaravī, a kinsman of Ḵ̌āja Eḵtīār Monšī, arrived from Herat with the news that 'Alīqolī Khan was camped outside Herat at Ĝūrīān, and had no more than seven or eight thousand men with him. Mīrzā Salmān and the emirs at court expressed their astonishment, and asked how 'Alīqolī Khan hoped to stand against a royal army ten times the size of his own, and how he hoped by these tactics to give assistance to Moršedqolī Khan. The Ḵ̌āja replied that the move was a ruse to tempt the royal army to give battle and abandon the siege of Torbat. As soon as the royal army neared Herat, 'Alīqolī Khan would shut himself up in the citadel there; he reckoned that, if Torbat could resist a siege for more than six months, it would take more than a year to reduce the citadel at Herat, which was one of the strongest fortresses in Iran. He did not think that the royal army could remain in Khorasan for that length of time, in view of the Ottoman threat and other preoccupations.

Mīrzā Salmān and the Ḥamza Mīrzā party (especially Esmā'īlqolī Khan, who was still seeking vengeance for the death of his father, Valī Ḵalīfa, and Valī Khan Takkalū and the other Takkalū emirs, who still nursed their traditional hatred of the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs), thought this a golden opportunity to smash ʿAlīqolī Khan. The latter, they calculated, would not yet have heard that the siege of Torbat had been raised; if they marched at top speed to Herat, they might catch him unaware and seize possession of the person of ʿAbbas Mīrzā. Once ʿAlīqolī Khan realized that the royal army had left Torbat, he would at once retire behind the walls of the citadel at Herat and prepare to withstand a siege. They won the support of Ḥamza Mīrzā for this plan, and urged him to march that very day. Ḥamza Mīrzā proposed this course of action to his father at a meeting of the council of emirs, and the decision was taken to proceed by forced marches to Herat. Many of the emirs and principal officers of state, for fear that calumniators might put a false interpretation on their words, took no part in the debate but merely signified their assent by nodding.

The moment this decision was taken, Valī Khan Takkalū, with a group of Takkalū and Turkman emirs, was detailed to lead the advance skirmishers, and the cavalry began to shoe their horses and make other necessary preparations for a forced march. The whole camp was in a tumult of activity. The other emirs, whether they liked it or not, were obliged to proceed by forced marches to Herat. They did not draw rein night or day until they reached Tīr-e Pol, covering the distance in three days and nights. On the morning of the fourth day, while it was still dark, ʿAlīqolī Khan's sentries reported to him that the royal army had arrived. He did not believe the reports because, in the first place, he thought the royal army was still before Torbat, and second, he did not believe it could have covered the distance between Torbat and Tīr-e Pol in the time.

When the false dawn gave way to daylight, however, ʿAlīqolī Khan heard the sound of troops passing Tīr-e Pol. At once he sent out skirmishers and drew up his men for battle. Some of the royal troops had already crossed the bridge; others were making their way across the ford. A hot encounter ensued, and the Šāmlūs put up a stout defense for a while. But when the Shah's standard and the prince's parasol came in sight, followed by the serried ranks of the royal army, ʿAlīqolī Khan knew the contest was hopeless. The Šāmlū ranks were broken by the press of the advancing army of Iraq. But as *gāzī* came upon *gāzī* during the pursuit, the royal troops in general, because they shared with their "enemy" a common tradition as *qezelbāš* and a common faith, displayed no enthusiasm for slaying or taking prisoner. The exception were the Takkalūs, who turned their vengeful swords on the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs and plundered their camp; for a while they abandoned the pursuit in their eagerness for booty. When the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā reached the battlefield they camped on the spot, because both men and horses were exhausted by the forced march in such heat. The same night, they sent Morteżāqolī Khan and other emirs to occupy the city prior to the royal entry.

In the course of his flight, ʻAlīqolī Khan had become separated from ʻAbbas Mīrzā, who had tried to make his way back to Herat earlier by another route. Most of the emirs who formed the prince's bodyguard were slain. The roll call of notable emirs who fell in this battle included Abu'l-Fatḥ Khan Šāmlū, the son of Aḡzīvār Khan; and Qobād Khan Qājār; Ḥājjī Sultan Čaḡatāy, known as the commandant *(kūtvāl)*. From among the men of the pen, Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī, the vizier of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, who was at that time acting as the vizier of ʻAbbas Mīrzā, was killed. Ebrahim Khan, Moršedqolī Khan's brother; Ḵoš-ḵabar Khan; Ḵāja ʻAlī Khan the *kalāntar;* and others were taken prisoner. Mīrzā Salmān, despite opposition from the emirs, insisted on the death penalty for a number of emirs' sons who had been taken prisoner. None was spared, despite the entreaties of their kinsmen in the royal army. This action by the vizier revived the feud between him and the emirs.

Just before midnight, ʻAbbas Mīrzā, with a few devoted followers, having separated from those whose loyalty he suspected, reached the citadel at Herat, where he was welcomed with joy by the small garrison of Šāmlūs. The prince was filled with anxiety as to the fate of ʻAlīqolī Khan, and was overjoyed when, later the same night, the Khan made his way safely to the citadel. Ḵāja Afżal, the vizier of ʻAlīqolī Khan, was put in charge of employing the fugitives from the battle in strengthening the fortifications, walls, and gates. Preparations for a siege were begun.

Still later the same night, Morteżāqolī Khan, Esmāʻīlqolī Khan Šāmlū, and other emirs who had been sent by the Shah entered the city and camped in the *madrasa* built by the Tīmūrīd ruler Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. There they spent the night, both men and horses being exhausted, intending to enter the citadel in the morning. Next morning, however, they found the gates of the citadel barred, the fortifications manned, and the fortress in a state of defense. When this was reported to the Shah, he reprimanded Morteżāqolī Khan for not having gone without sleep and pressed on to occupy the citadel before 'Abbas Mīrzā got there. But the Shah was asking the impossible. Most of the horses had been worn out by the forced marches from Torbat, by the heat, and by the battle. How could they possibly be expected to cover the distance between Ğūrīān and Herat in one night?

The *madrasa* of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was turned into a royal palace for the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā, and the royal workshops were set up there. Mīrzā Salmān selected a house near the palace. The emirs of each tribe took their men and camped near one of the city gates. Mīrzā Salmān directed all his energies toward capturing the citadel, and was constantly abusing and insulting the emirs, and accusing them of enmity toward Ḥamza Mīrzā. In the end, the emirs grew tired of this and decided to murder him.

The Murder of Mīrzā Salmān, the Truce Concluded with 'Alīqolī Khan, and the Return of the Royal Army to the Capital

When Mīrzā Salmān gave his daughter in marriage to Ḥamza Mīrzā, he thought he had finally removed any disfavor with which the prince might have regarded him as a result of the execution of Ḥoseyn Beg, the prince's vizier and foster-brother, and various other events which had angered the prince and which he had laid at the door of Mīrzā Salmān. Mīrzā Salmān's elder son, Mīrzā 'Abd Allāh, became the prince's vizier, and his younger son, Mīrzā Neẓām, became a *moqarrab al-hażrat*[78] and an intimate companion of the prince. Mīrzā Salmān himself regarded himself as one of the most devoted supporters of the prince, and he made greater demonstrations of his loyalty and fidelity than any other. He was constantly accusing the great emirs and the principal officers of state of dereliction of duty and of hostility toward the crown—particularly Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, Šāhrok̲ Khan, the keeper of the seal, and Moḥammad Khan Torkmān. He was forever saying to Ḥamza Mīrzā that, as long as these three men were alive, the prince's fortunes would not prosper. Sometimes he dropped hints to this effect in royal assemblies, and gave himself airs. Mischief-makers at court, particularly the ambitious Tājīk elements, would secretly report all this to the emirs.

After the victory of the royal army at Ğūrīān, Mīrzā Salmān no longer behaved in a rational way, but openly accused the emirs of sedition. The emirs perceived, from the way the prince behaved toward them, that Mīrzā Salmān's words would soon have some decisive effect, and so they determined to get rid of the vizier, who was the source of all this trouble. They awaited their opportunity.

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[78] A category of officials with a wide variety of functions; see *TM*, pp. 63ff.

At this juncture, Mīrzā Salmān announced his intention to visit Gāzor-gāh,[79] and he sent there all the provisions and stores necessary for festivities on a large scale. He invited his close friends, together with musicians and wits in attendance at court, to participate in these festivities on the prescribed day. The great emirs arranged with their sons, brothers, and nephews, who constituted a mindless, lunatic element at court, that they should follow Mīrzā Salmān to Gāzor-gāh and do away with him. On the appointed day, Mīrzā Salmān rode off to Gāzor-gāh with his own retinue and bodyguard, and the conspirators, whose ringleaders were Yūsof Khan, the son of the *qūrčībāšī;* Valī Jān Khan, the son of Moḥammad Khan; and Ḵalīl Sultan, the nephew of Šāhroḵ Khan, rode off by another route. One of their men, however, warned Mīrzā Salmān, and he at once rushed back to the city in alarm, his men making their way back in separate groups. When the emirs reached Gāzor-gāh, they found that Mīrzā Salmān had turned back. They sent some men to try and intercept him before he reached the city; if they failed, they would try again another time.

Mīrzā Salmān reached the city safely and rushed into the palace, still dust stained from the road, to inform the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā of the attempt on his life. The Shah summoned the emirs, and when all were assembled, asked them why they had adopted this attitude toward Mīrzā Salmān, who was the vizier and a trusted officer of the crown. At first, the emirs denied that they had any quarrel with the vizier; if some ignorant and unruly elements among the *qezelbāš* had acted disrespectfully toward him, they would take steps to punish them. At this point, however, the conspirators, who had gathered in the Madrasa-ye Mīrzā and were making a terrific din there, sent one of their number to the palace to declare that Mīrzā Salmān was the destroyer of the state and the enemy of the *qezelbāš*. It was his evil conduct which had been, and still was, the root cause of the discord among the *qezelbāš* and of the revolt of the Khorasan emirs. Until the vizier was removed from the scene, this rift between the two *qezelbāš* factions would not be healed.

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[79] See L. V. Golombek, *The Timurid Shrine at Gazur Gah*, Toronto, 1969.

After this outburst, the emirs were forced to state their position frankly. Mīrzā Salmān, they said, was a Persian. He was only expected to look after the accounts and *dīvān* business. It did not fall within his province to have an army at his disposal and to interfere in state affairs on his own behalf, and thus become the cause of discord and rebellion. Now that the *qezelbāš* had brought matters out into the open and their relations with the vizier had reached this point, it was better that he should withdraw from office and retire from affairs of state.[80]

The vizier, an intelligent man, knew that the emirs would not be satisfied with anything less than his death. Nevertheless, since the suggestion had been made in the presence of the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā, he said he was willing to have all his possessions expropriated if he were allowed to retire quietly somewhere; this was the last effort of a drowning man to save his life. The emirs then uttered prayers for the Shah's prosperity, rose, and left. They appointed one of their number to mount guard on Mīrzā Salmān, pending the Shah's decision as to his fate.

Since Mīrzā Salmān had always striven to increase the power and authority of Ḥamza Mīrzā, had represented himself as his devoted supporter, and had always aimed to see that Ḥamza Mīrzā had no partner in power, the prince was extremely upset by these events. He sent trusted envoys to the great emirs to sound them out on this subject. They all swore before God that their loyalty and fidelity to himself and the Shah were unshaken, and that the oaths of fealty they had sworn were inviolate. However, they said, it was true that Mīrzā Salmān was always stirring up trouble, and turning the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā against them, the loyal servants of the royal house. The elders of the *qezelbāš* tribes were not happy with Mīrzā Salmān's holding the office of vizier or with the power he wielded in that office. They would do whatever they were ordered to do in this matter.

When the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā had reassured themselves as to the loyalty of the *qezelbāš* emirs, since they themselves in their hearts were no longer satisfied with Mīrzā Salmān, they agreed to let the emirs do whatever they liked with him. The emirs gathered at the house of the *qūrčībāšī*, Qolī Beg, and sent men to fetch the vizier to the *qūrčībāšī's* house, where he was held in custody while all his possessions were expropriated. When this had been done, they decided to put him to death, even though he had been dismissed from office, since their own safety demanded it. They handed him over to the *qūrčīs;* Ṭahmāspqolī Beg Mowṣellū Torkmān, a *yūzbāšī,* struck the first blow, and the others finished him off.

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[80] Also translated in Savory, "The Significance of the Political Murder of Mīrzā Salmān."

Glory be to God! The more man is concerned with his own good, the more evil the outcome! The more ambitious a man is, the more calamitous his end! Mīrzā Salmān thought he had built his fortunes on firm foundations. He had made Ḥamza Mīrzā his son-in-law, but this marriage alliance only resulted in his being divorced from affairs of state and losing his life. His corpse was interred with contumely, but was eventually brought to Mašhad and buried in the shrine precincts, through the efforts of the *ṣadrs* and *ʿolamā.*

Mīrzā Salmān came from the Jāberīya family, a noble family of Isfahan which traced its descent from Jāber b. ʿAbd Allāh Anṣārī. I have already given some details of his career in my biographical sketches of viziers and men of the pen of the time of Shah Tahmasp. His abilities distinguished him among his contemporaries, and he acquired greater power and influence than is customary in the office of vizier. Fondly believing that the multitude of his servants and retainers would protect him from the blows of fate, he stepped out of the circle of the men of the pen and chose to follow the dictates of his own ambition. He was made master of drum and banner and placed in command of troops. He began to behave in a dictatorial way toward emirs of high rank and sought to place himself above them, until finally he reaped the reward of his improper actions and his ambition. He was a poet and writer of some distinction, and had a penetrating mind and great intellectual power. In the course of the day-to-day performance of his duties as vizier, he was surrounded by a great throng of people pressing petitions on him, and he frequently used to reply to these with impromptu verses, many of which were later polished and written down.

After the murder of Mīrzā Salmān, Ḥamza Mīrzā, at the request of the emirs, divorced Mīrzā Salmān's daughter. Of Mīrzā Salmān's property, part was appropriated by the *dīvān* and part was allotted to the *qūrčīs.* For a few months the siege of Herat was prosecuted in a desultory fashion, but the alarming news that Farhād Pasha had been appointed commander of the Ottoman forces and intended to renew operations on the Azerbaijan front induced the emirs to work for a truce with ʿAlīqolī Khan. The keeper of the seal, Šāhroḵ Khan, had a meeting with 'Alīqolī Khan and found the latter also to be desirous of a truce, which was eventually concluded in the following manner: 'Alīqolī Khan sent to the Shah his eldest son, Valī Khan Mīrzā, then twelve years of age, with a humble petition to the effect that Mīrzā Salmān was the origin of all the trouble. Now that he had been removed from the scene, they could all once more be loyal servants of the crown. 'Alīqolī Khan went on to crave pardon for his offenses; he pledged himself to follow the constant practice of Sufis of the Safavid Order, namely, to honor the father and the elder brother. He therefore agreed to reinstate the recitation of the *ḵoṭba* in the names of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā, and to consider Ḥamza Mīrzā the heir-apparent. 'Abbas Mīrzā was to be confirmed as governor of Khorasan.

The Takkalūs, especially Valī Khan, were opposed to the acceptance of these terms, but since their acceptance was advisable for a variety of reasons, Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū Takkalū, the chief of the tribe and a man of integrity who favored a peaceful solution, was eventually persuaded to accept them. He in turn persuaded Valī Khan to adopt a less intransigent attitude. The source of the feud between 'Alīqolī Khan and Esmā'īlqolī Khan was the slaying of the latter's father, Valī Ḵalīfa. But Esmā'īlqolī Khan had already slain in revenge 'Alīqolī Khan's father, Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan. And in the massacre at Ḡūrīān, a large number of the Evčī clan of the Šāmlūs, who had tribal affiliations and kinship with both factions, had lost their lives, and their intransigence and antagonism had led to nothing but discord and strife. Esmā'īlqolī Khan was therefore persuaded to accept the truce terms, and 'Alīqolī Khan signified his agreement—on one condition: The feud between himself and Morteżāqolī Khan was beyond all hope of reconciliation, he said; let him be taken back to Iraq and another of the great emirs appointed to the governorship of Mašhad, someone who would be a more reasonable person for him to work with.

Šāhroḵ Khan, with the assistance of the other emirs, obtained the approval of the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā for a truce on this basis, and persuaded them that their return to Azerbaijan was urgent. Šāhroḵ Khan, with their permission, then took Esmā'īlqolī Khan into the citadel and signed the truce with 'Alīqolī Khan. The next day, 'Alīqolī Khan sent a letter to Ḥamza Mīrzā; couched in humble terms, it recalled his past services, took refuge in plausible excuses in regard to his part in recent events, complained of the lack of support from the principal officers of state, of the overweening power wielded by Mīrzā Salmān, and of the misdemeanors of Morteżāqolī Khan. It also signified his assent to the truce terms with solemn oaths. However, the terms of the truce remained a dead letter, because God had decreed that 'Abbas Mīrzā should come to the throne.[81]

The Shah, at the request of the emirs and the principal officers of state, accepted 'Alīqolī Khan's submission and conferred on him the noble title of "my son." He and Ḥamza Mīrzā sent gifts to 'Abbas Mīrzā. 'Alīqolī Khan's son, Valī Khan Mīrzā, was enrolled as an attendant in Ḥamza Mīrzā's entourage. Four months after the vernal equinox, the Shah struck camp at Herat and began his march back to Iraq. At Mašhad he visited the shrine of the Imam Reżā and replaced Morteżāqolī Khan as governor with Salmān Khan, the grandson of 'Abd Allāh Khan Ostājlū. Morteżāqolī Khan was consoled with the governorship of Astarābād; Damghan, Besṭām, Bīārjomand, 'Arab 'Āmerī, and Hazārjarīb were also placed under his jurisdiction.[82] Shah Qolī Sultan Qāranja was made governor of Jām and appointed guardian of Salmān Khan.

People capable of looking into the future realized that the terms of the truce meant that before long 'Abbas Mīrzā's star would again be in the ascendant. The emirs in Khorasan who had demonstrated support for the Shah while the royal army was in Khorasan began to worry about their position after the royal army had retired, since they realized they would then be on their own. Ḥoseyn Beg Afšār, the son of Sevendūk Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, who was the governor of Sabzavār, had gone out to receive the royal army on its arrival in Khorasan and had declared himself to be "one who loved the Shah." Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī* had been instrumental in getting him confirmed in his post at Sabzavār.

On the royal army's return march, Ḥoseyn Beg Afšār felt he had to redeem himself in the eyes of the Abbasid emirs by displaying opposition to the Shah. Closing the gates of the city and the citadel, he greeted the royal troops with musket fire. Ḥamza Mīrzā consulted the emirs, who said: "We have made every possible concession in order to reach a peaceful solution of the Khorasan problem. We cannot overlook behavior such as that of Ḥoseyn Beg, who has had the effrontery to close the fortress against you, and has dared to open fire with muskets and cannon on the royal army. To condone this behavior is not in the interest of the state or compatible with the dignity of the Shah." Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, who was the senior emir of the Afšār tribe and the most powerful of the principal officers of state, was in a difficult position because he had negotiated the confirmation of Ḥoseyn Beg as governor of Sabzavār. He hung his head in shame, and agreed that Ḥoseyn Beg had to be punished.

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[81] There are references to two Koranic verses: 43:33, which reads in full: "Is it they who would distribute the mercy of thy Lord? It is We who distribute among them their livelihood in the present life, and We exalt some of them above others in degree, so that some of them may make others subservient to themselves. And the mercy of thy Lord is better than that which they amass"; and 38:27, which begins, "O David, We have made thee a vicegerent in the earth."

[82] Morteżāqolī Khan was thus left still in a powerful position in Khorasan, and this had unfortunate results, as we shall see.

The whole royal army thereupon attacked Sabzavār (Valī Khan and the Takkalū emirs were particularly active in this operation), and the same day royal troops began their assault on the city and the citadel. The besieged defended the citadel until nightfall but then showed signs of flagging, and royal troops stormed some of the outer fortifications. They launched an assault during the night, poured into the city, and took possession of the citadel as well. Ḥoseyn Beg was seized near the citadel gate; a member of the Sabzavārī sappers struck him a blow with the back of his spade that stunned him. He was hanged on the city walls as an example to others.

I will draw a veil over what the people of Sabzavār—who after all were Shi'ites—suffered that dreadful night at the hands of the royal troops, all because of the folly and disloyalty of Ḥoseyn Beg. Plunder and bloodshed continued unchecked. Ḥamza Beg, whose anger against Ḥoseyn Beg had now been assuaged, gave orders that the citizens of Sabzavār should not be molested. But since it was night and impossible to distinguish the houses of civilians from those of the military, the ordinary citizens suffered greatly. The following day, steps were taken to meet their needs. Aḥmad Sultan Takkalū was appointed governor of Sabzavār, and the royal army continued its return march to Iraq. On its arrival at Qazvin, the various provincial governors obtained leave to return to their posts (Ommat Khan to Shiraz; Valī Khan Afšār to Kerman, Valī Khan Takkalū to Hamadan), and the other emirs were given leave to disband and return to their tribal districts.

Events in Azerbaijan during the Shah's Absence and the Occupation of Erīvān by the Ottomans

'Oṣmān Pasha's accusations of dereliction of duty on the part of Senān Pasha had had their effect; he had declared additionally that, if another Ottoman army were sent during the Shah's absence in Khorasan, not only would it be possible to annex some other Persian province, but the province of Šīrvān would be effectively protected from incursions by the *qezelbāš*. The Ottoman sultan had reprimanded Senān Pasha and had appointed Farhād Pasha, the second vizier, to take command of a new Ottoman army for the invasion of Iran.

The Persian envoy, Ebrahim Khan, was detained at Istanbul and offered peace on the terms that any region which had been entered by Ottoman troops, and in which the *ḵoṭba* had been recited in the name of the Ottoman sultan, should be recognized as Ottoman territory, without argument. He was told that, as long as the Shah refused to accept these terms, the war would go on. Ebrahim Khan reported this to the Shah in Khorasan. He gave it as his honest opinion that the sensible course seemed to be to abandon whatever parts of Šīrvān had been occupied by the Ottomans and to make peace at once, while the most important provinces were still in Persian hands; otherwise, Iran stood to lose a province every year, and the peace terms would remain unchanged. The *qezelbāš* emirs, despite their domestic quarrels, refused to accept these terms, and told Ebrahim Khan that if peace could be obtained on the basis of the *status quo ante*, well and good; if not, the matter was in God's hands.

When Farhād Pasha reached Erzerum, the frontier troops and the Kurdish tribes marched to Čoḵūr-e Sa'd by way of Qārṣ. Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, the *beglerbeg* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, with Emir Khan and Emāmqolī Khan, mobilized his men to meet the Ottoman threat. But the *qezelbāš* khans, emirs, and *beglerbegs* who were in Azerbaijan and Qarābāğ considered it an impossibility, without assistance from Iraq, to meet the Ottomans in pitched battle. Moḥammad Khan harassed the advancing Ottomans, but his efforts had little effect on them. On arrival at Erīvān, Farhād Pasha put the fort in good repair, and left a garrison of Janissaries there with a year's supplies, including artillery, to enable them to defend the place. He then retired.

Moḥammadī Khan was forced to abandon that province and retire to Naḵčevān, where he placed the *ğāzīs'* families in the fortress of

Alanjaq for safety. In this campaign, Moḥammadī Khan received no help at all from Emir Khan and the Turkman emirs. Emir Khan, considering the defense of Tabriz to be of greater importance, and taking into consideration the proximity of the Kurds, did not stir from there. As a result, the prosperous province of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, which is the most important part of Little Armenia, fell into enemy hands. Šīrvān, as before, remained completely under Ottoman control. Incidentally, Fāṭema Sultan Begom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp and the wife of Emir Khan Torkmān, fell ill and died this year. Her body was buried in the Safavid shrine at Ardabīl.

Events in Khorasan after the Shah's Return

The removal of Morteżāqolī Khan from office as governor of Mašhad and the appointment of Salmān Khan were joyful news to Moršedqolī Khan. He at once wrote to Salman Khan, asking permission to visit the holy shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad, a duty he said had been denied to him while Morteżāqolī Khan and the Takkalūs were in power at Mašhad. Now—God be praised!—the affairs of Khorasan had been settled in a manner satisfactory to the Ostājlūs. "I entered the service of 'Alīqolī Khan, who is a Šāmlū," wrote Moršedqolī Khan, "in order to preserve the status and honor of the Ostājlū tribe, which had been trampled in the dust by Shah Esma'il II. You, however, are descended from the former chief of the whole Ostājlū tribe, and I would deem it an honor to place my services at your disposal. When we meet, we can arrange our affairs in accord with your wishes and to the satisfaction of the Ostājlū tribe."

Salmān Khan, since his position at Mašhad was not firmly established (he had no proper armed forces at his disposal, and the few men he had were scattered and were not first-line troops), and since he distrusted the words of Moršedqolī Khan and was opposed to his coming to Mašhad, could not decide what to do. He lacked the resolution to oppose him and the force to prevent him from coming. Šāhqolī Sultan Qāranja, who was an old soldier and had a wise head, had gone in the direction of Jām and was not on hand to advise him.

Without further delay, and without obtaining permission, Moršedqolī Khan marched on Mašhad with a small force. When he neared the city, the *seyyeds* and notables, dreading the hardships of a siege, begged Salmān Khan to receive him in a friendly manner. Salmān, when he heard that Moršedqolī Khan had brought only a few men with him, prepared to welcome him with a show of friendship. With the *seyyeds* and officials of the shrine, he went out to welcome Moršedqolī Khan, who greeted him in a courteous and deferential manner. Having performed the rites of pilgrimage, Moršedqolī Khan became the guest of the shrine administration, and for several days he did not leave the shrine precincts. Every day Salmān Khan visited him there, and feasted him with appropriate ceremony. Moršedqolī Khan, sensing his uneasiness, went out of his way to allay his suspicions.

Meanwhile, Moršedqolī Khan's men continued to slip into the city in small groups, and he was also joined by men from the rural districts who had not so far offered their services to Salmān Khan. The ambition to be master of Mašhad, which had always been in the back of his mind, now came to the fore. He marched out from the shrine toward the Čahār Bāḡ, which is the seat of the governors of Mašhad—ostensibly to meet Salmān Khan, but with the secret intention of seizing power.

Once again he was received hospitably by Salmān Khan, and the conversation ranged over a wide variety of subjects. Salmān Khan expressed his firm loyalty to the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā. At first, Moršedqolī Khan pretended to agree, but gradually he revealed what was in his mind. The people of Khorasan, he said, were behind 'Abbas Mīrzā. They had sworn fealty fo 'Alīqolī Khan, who was the guardian of that prince and the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, and the Shah had confirmed his son 'Abbas as governor of Khorasan. If Salmān Khan wished to remain in Khorasan, he had no alternative but to tender his submission to 'Abbas Mīrzā. "At the moment," he said, "you do not have forces at your disposal with which to maintain law and order in this district and the areas around Mašhad. The best plan would be for you to hand over the government of Mašhad to me and retire to the Ḵāf and Bāḵarz district, which belongs to me." Salmān Khan had no choice but to agree, and Moršedqolī Khan sent some of his men to escort him there.

Most of the men who had gathered around Salmān Khan at Mašhad because he was the governor now deserted him and remained in the city while he, with a few men, set off for Bāḵarz. However, he did not like the look of the situation in Khorasan, and he did not like the behavior of Moršedqolī Khan. Further, he did not see how he could remain in Khorasan without being disloyal to the Shah and Ḥamza

Mīrzā. On the way to Bākarz, therefore, he gave his escort the slip on the pretext of going hunting, and suddenly rode off like the wind in the direction of Iraq, abandoning his baggage. This suited Moršedqolī Khan perfectly. He consolidated his position at Mašhad and sent couriers to Herat with the news. He devoted his attention to ingratiating himself with Būdāq Khan Čeganī and the various Čaḡatāy khans who lived in the Mašhad area and ruled tribes such as the Owlād Bābā Elyās, the Bayāt, and so on. He sought the hand in marriage of Būdāq Khan's daughter and went out of his way to conciliate the ordinary people of the area, with the result that his influence spread rapidly. He rewarded those Ostājlūs who had served him well in these recent events by promoting them to the rank of emir and divided among them those districts he had recently brought under his jurisdiction.

His growing power aroused the jealousy of the Šāmlūs, but Moršedqolī Khan was careful to maintain friendly and cordial relations with ʿĀlīqolī Khan. Meanwhile, Salmān Khan had made his way to Qazvin via Tūn and Ṭabas, and delivered a report to the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā. Salmān Khan's wife, Šahrbānū Begom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, died a few days before he reached Qazvin, and the Shah devoted his efforts to consoling him for this double blow of fate.

The Shah's Second Campaign in Azerbaijan, the Arrest of Emir Khan Torkmān, Ḥamza Mīrzā's Adoption of ʿAlīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū Ostājlū as a Favorite, and the First Signs of Rebellion on the Part of the Takkalūs and Turkmans

At the beginning of spring in the Year of the Monkey, corresponding to the year 992/1584, Ḥamza Mīrzā, whose youth demanded some outlet in the form of physical pleasures, spent much of his time carousing and wenching in his private apartments with his close friends.

Emir Khan Torkmān, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, sent his vizier, Qāsem Beg, to Qazvin from Tabriz to report to the Shah the Ottoman occupation of Erīvān and to ask the Shah to send an army to lay siege to Erīvān. The council of emirs met and decided on an expedition to Azerbaijan, and the royal army left Qazvin early in the summer. Moḥammad Khan Torkmān obtained permission to go to Kashan to raise troops, and join the royal army later. Mosīb Khan

Takkalū, with his nephew Moḵtār Sultan, proceeded to their tribal district at Rayy for the same purpose. When the royal army reached the pasture grounds at Mīāna, Ḥamza Mīrzā left the army to make a pilgrimage to the tombs of Shaikh Ṣafī and the other Safavid shaikhs at Ardabīl.

Before Ḥamza Mīrzā returned from Ardabīl, Emir Khan marched out from Tabriz to welcome the Shah; with him were the emirs under his command, most of whom were his brothers and other kinsmen, and some twelve thousand men of the Turkman and other tribes. After Ḥamza Mīrzā's return, Emir Khan paid a ceremonial call on him, and then obtained an audience with the Shah through his agency. He was received with marked favor by the Shah. The size and good order of his army, the quasi-royal magnificence of its accoutrements, and the proud bearing of his officers aroused the envy of the other emirs and officers at court—for envy is an emotion from which ambitious men, however high-minded and wise they may be, are not wholly immune. The royal army then proceeded to Tabriz. The inhabitants of Tabriz, great and small, streamed out to greet the Shah, who took up residence in the palace in this, the capital city of his ancestors. Emir Khan acted as host and basked in the sunshine of royal favor, until suddenly he suffered an unexpected reversal of fortune.

On the occasion of the Shah's first expedition to Azerbaijan, when he wintered at Tabriz, Ḥamza Mīrzā was still comparatively young;[83] if Emir Khan or one of the other emirs committed some act that displeased him, he merely noted it and kept silent. Now, however, he was eighteen years old, and had reached the age of maturity. The natural arrogance of youth and the haughtiness deriving from his status as heir-apparent were compounded by his increasing addiction to wine drinking, and he was inclined to fly into a rage at the slightest thing. When the royal army first entered Tabriz, the insolent behavior of certain troublemakers among the *qezelbāš* had angered the prince and made him determined to do away with those concerned. Since Emir Khan had not been involved in these incidents, his record was apparently clean. Ḥamza Mīrzā planned to associate him with himself in all matters, and to carry out his secret plans through his agency. He therefore intensified his efforts to win the allegiance of Emir Khan and those connected with him, and he continued to show him the greatest possible favor.

[83] The Shah's first expedition to Azerbaijan occurred in 987/1579-80; Ḥamza Mīrzā was probably about thirteen years old at the time.

Emir Khan, however, who was a man concerned with the general good,[84] considered it inappropriate to get rid of a number of *qezelbāš* chiefs, each of whom was a senior chief of a major tribe, at a time when the Ottoman sultan was threatening to annex Azerbaijan. He therefore refused to discuss the matter with Ḥamza Mīrzā. Not only that, but he took it upon himself to give the prince fatherly advice on the subject of wine drinking, to which the youthful, pleasure-seeking prince was becoming increasingly addicted. Emir Khan considered the practice to be disapproved of by the canon law of Islam, and efforts were constantly being made to prohibit the use of wine altogether. Emir Khan began to criticize the emirs and principal officers of state, whose attitude toward wine drinking was hypocritical. His brothers, sons, and other kinsmen, an insolent lot, were frequently guilty of improper behavior, but the prince would generously overlook their misdemeanors out of his concern to preserve the well-being of the state and the prestige and dignity of Emir Khan.

Emir Khan himself, however, had been guilty of various improper practices. The courtiers present at royal assemblies, all of them ignorant young men who cared nothing for the well-being of the state—men like 'Alīqolī Beg Fatḥ-oğlū and his kinsman Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāğ, both Ostājlūs, both enrolled among the *moqarrabs* at court, and both inveterate enemies of the Turkmans—began to whisper insinuating remarks against Emir Khan in the ear of the prince as he caroused or lay intoxicated. One of Emir Khan's improper actions which they were able to use against him was his construction, without the Shah's permission, of a fortified tower near his house.

The second charge they brought against him concerned the sounding of golden trumpets, which was the prerogative of the royal family. Despite his marriage alliance to the Safavid royal family, he had not achieved any great renown. So he had obtained some trumpets as part of his military band and had them sounded in frontier areas, in the hope that the enemy would hear of them and that his prestige would be correspondingly increased. This practice had not been stopped by the officials of the royal bandmaster's establishment. Ḥamza Mīrzā did not attach any great importance to this accusation.

The third charge was that Emir Khan's brother, Esma'il Khan, who held the post of *šīrajībāšī* (master of the wine cellar),[85] had levied in Qarābāḡ more than the fees to which he was entitled. The money had been recovered from him by some Qājār junior officers;[86] in retaliation, Esma'il Khan had appropriated the possessions of some retainers of Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāḡ, who had gone to Tabriz to present gifts to the Shah. The victims had then protested to Ḥamza Mīrzā, who sent envoys to Esma'il Khan and Emir Khan to remind them that Emāmqolī Khan was a distinguished *beglerbeg,* and it was not fitting that his men be seized and their possessions appropriated in this way. The emirs had agreed that the Qājārs should pay back to Esma'il Khan, with interest, the sum they had seized from the revenues of his department.

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[84] This has to be taken *cum grano salis*, in view of Emir Khan's behavior in 987/1579-80.

Emir Khan and Esma'il Khan rejected this agreement, and so Ḥamza Mīrzā was forced to appeal to the principal officers of state. The unseemly behavior of the Turkman chiefs eventually exceeded all reasonable bounds. Emir Khan's enemies saw this behavior as constituting an act of rebellion, or at least as intent to commit one. They eventually succeeded in poisoning the prince's mind against Emir Khan. The latter, when he realized the situation, took to staying away from court, thinking in his arrogance that the prince's animosity could do him no harm.

The prince did not want openly to break with Emir Khan, but thought he could achieve his object in a roundabout way. He arranged a big feast in the Meydān-e Ṣāḥebābād, where Emir Khan's harem and citadel were located; there was to be polo and an archery competition. All the *qezelbāš* emirs and notables came to the festival, with the exception of Emir Khan—despite the fact that he lived close by. This resulted in further estrangement between him and the prince.

The month of Moḥarram came. It was the time-honored practice of the Safavid dynasty that on the day of 'Āšūrā[87] the Shah, with all the emirs and military commanders, would attend the performance of a passion play celebrating the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn on the field of Karbalā,[88] and the emirs would take part in the mourning ceremonies in the presence of the Shah. This year, these ceremonies took place in the mosque of Ūzūn Ḥasan, which was situated on the northern side of the Meydān-e Ṣāḥebābād. Emir Khan absented himself from these ceremonies too, but the great emirs, who considered his behavior absolutely disgraceful, sent someone to fetch him. The messenger found a private passion play performance in progress at Emir Khan's house, attended by a large group of Turkmans. Ḥamza Mīrzā was still further infuriated, and in the council of emirs began openly to complain of Emir Khan's conduct.

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[85] See *TM,* pp. 137-38.

[86] *Āqāyān;* see *TM,* p. 118, n.1.

[87] The tenth day of the month of Moḥarram, on which 'Alī's son Ḥoseyn was slain by Omayyad troops in the year 61/680.

[88] There is a verbal pun in the Persian text, which renders Karbalā as *karb o balā,* anguish and calamity.

Qolī Beg, the *qūrčībāšī*, secretly allied himself with Emir Khan, and most of the emirs supported one or the other. The *qūrčībāšī* wanted to heal the breach between Ḥamza Mīrzā and Emir Khan. On behalf of the latter, he begged the prince to end the estrangement by honoring Emir Khan with a visit to his house. The prince agreed to this, and Emir Khan gave a great feast in his honor, exerting himself to the utmost to show courtesies to 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū. However, Emir Khan's brothers, sons, and other kinsmen, most of whom had the rank of emir and commanded their own military forces, continued to act in an insolent fashion; they uttered threats (both openly and by allusion) against the prince's close companions, especially the Ostājlū and Šamlū nobles, who were not innocent of misdemeanors either. The result was that the attempt at a rapprochement was a failure—indeed, it made a final breach more likely.

When the wine had been flowing freely, Šāhrok̲ Khan, who had been honored by being selected as the prince's drinking companion, intuitively divined that the cup of the prince's wrath against Emir Khan and his house was running over, and he conspired with others to destroy Emir Khan. He revealed the prince's secret thoughts to the *qūrčībāšī*, and the latter failed to divert the prince from his intention or to persuade him to postpone his plans. Emir Khan and the Turkmans got wind of the plot against them. Assembling in Emir Khan's house, they issued a call for tribal solidarity. Almost the whole tribe, including members of the royal bodyguard, centurions and officers on personal duty to the Shah, gathered there fully armed—about ten thousand men in all.

The Turkman case was that Ḥamza Mīrzā had been turned against them by a number of ignorant people who were in his personal service, and especially 'Alīqolī Fatḥ-oğlū, Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāğ, and Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šāmlū. These men, they contended, were not worthy to be in the prince's service. They should be dismissed so that the anxieties of the Turkmans might be alleviated. The temerity of the Turkmans simply made the prince more determined than ever to destroy them.

First, in order to break the power of Emir Khan, he dismissed him from office and deprived him of his fief at Tabriz. This order was read to the burghers of Tabriz. The people of Tabriz, who had suffered greatly from the exactions of Emir Khan and the Turkmans, welcomed the change; henceforth, Emir Khan did not exist as far as they were concerned. When the steady flow of people from all parts of the province, to his door suddenly stopped, Emir Khan awoke to the realities of a situation he had never even envisaged. He closed the gates of his citadel and looked to his own defense. Muskets and cannon were stationed on the battlements, and a few cannon balls were fired from one of the turrets in the direction of the Meydān-e Ṣāḥebābād and the royal palace. Firing went on for three days. Ḥamza Mīrzā then issued a call to "those who love the Shah." Let those Turkmans who were loyal servants of the Safavid dynasty assemble at the palace; those who decided to stand by Emir Khan could expect nothing more from that dynasty. This call broke the resolution of the Turkmans; company by company they rode to the royal palace and recorded their names among "those who loved the Shah." Finally, Emir Khan sent his own sons and brothers so their names might not be excluded from this list, but he hesitated about going himself. His personal servants plucked up courage and urged him to submit voluntarily, but, not daring to go, he rejected their advice.

The emirs who had assembled at the palace then sent envoys calling on Emir Khan to refrain from defending the citadel and to cease firing muskets and cannon. If he failed to desist, they said, they would be obliged to storm the citadel, and if matters reached that pass, his fate was a foregone conclusion. Emir Khan sent a brusque reply, and Ḥamza Mīrzā ordered all the *qezelbāš* and the people of Tabriz to arm themselves and prepare to storm the citadel that night. Because of Emir Khan's intransigent attitude, his fellow emirs could not approach Ḥamza Mīrzā; they turned to the Shah and asked him to dissuade Ḥamza Mīrzā from assaulting the citadel and shedding blood on the eve of Friday. "If Emir Khan persists in his defiance tomorrow," they said, "we will carry out your commands."

The Shah summoned his son and persuaded him to take no action until the following day. The *qezelbāš* again assembled at the royal palace, and negotiations were reopened with Emir Khan. Emir Khan, with no choice but to surrender, sent the physician Abu'l-Fatḥ Tabrīzī, known as Ḥakīm-e Kūček, who was in his personal employ, to announce his intention to come out of the citadel. The *qūrčībāšī* and Šāhroḵ Khan met him at the Masjed-e Šāhī, on Ṣāḥebābād Square, and escorted him to the palace. When he entered the palace, he removed his sword and slung it round his neck. He was taken before Ḥamza Mīrzā, flanked on one side by the *qūrčībāšī* and on the other by Šāhroḵ Khan. When he reached the prince, the latter, in his clemency, at once removed the sword from his neck; Emir Khan, overcome with shame, burst into tears. The prince informed him that his life would be spared, despite all his misdemeanors.

Šāhroḵ Khan was ordered to act as host to Emir Khan at a banquet to be held in his honor that night in the palace. Adham Khan, a Turkman emir, was posted at Emir Khan's house to guard his family. Emir Khan spent the night at the palace and the next day was allotted a suite in the Hašt Behešt building. His property and possessions were confiscated, and a few days later he was sent to the fortress-prison of Qahqaha. He had an *inamorata* named Peerless who he asked be allowed to accompany him to Qahqaha; this request Ḥamza Mīrzā allowed.

ʿAlīqolī Beg Fatḥ-oğlū, who had played a leading part in these events, was rewarded by Ḥamza Mīrzā by being promoted to the rank of khan and made governor of Tabriz. As a result, he was regarded with envy by all the emirs. Although his position as the prince's favorite was abhorrent to the great emirs, they were unable to reveal what was in their hearts. Accordingly, they all sought his favor and cultivated friendly relations with him. Since Esmāʿilqolī Khan already held the title of comrade *(yoldāš)*, Ḥamza Mīrzā dubbed ʿAlīqolī Khan brother *(qardāš)*; Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāğ, who was the prince's adviser and was privy to his secret plans, was given the title of confidant *(serdāš)*.

The Ostājlū tribe, which had been under a cloud, came back into favor. Large numbers of Ostājlūs gathered at Tabriz and pledged their support to ʿAlīqolī Khan, whom they considered responsible for the revival of their fortunes. The sons, brothers, and followers of Emir Khan, on the other hand, saw no future for themselves at Tabriz now that their enemies, the Ostājlūs, had returned to favor, and they crept away to Iraq.

When this news reached Moḥammad Khan Torkmān at Kashan, he was filled with consternation and anxiety about his own position. Emir Khan's daughter had married Valī Khan Takkalū, and Emir Khan's brothers and kinsmen rallied around the latter at Hamadan. Moḥammad Khan marched from Kashan to join him, and with specious arguments persuaded him to form a Takkalū-Turkman coalition to march on Tabriz and exact vengeance from the enemies of Emir Khan, remove 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū and Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāḡ from the service of Ḥamza Mīrzā, and ravage the Ostājlū tribe.

The Turkman-Takkalū revolt signed the death warrant of Emir Khan, who was executed at Qahqaha. Moḥammad Khan Torkmān then incited Valī Khan to seek satisfaction for Emir Khan's blood. Since Ḥamza Mīrzā had assumed the position of de facto ruler of the state, he decided to take action against the rebels. The Ostājlū and Šāmlū emirs suggested that the best plan would be to seize control of Moḥammad Khan's base at Kashan, which would inevitably throw his affairs into confusion. It was agreed that Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, who was at Naṭanz, should go to Kashan and take possession of that region. Yūsof Beg, the son of Moḥammad Khan Torkman, who held the office of *davātdār* of the *dīvān-e a'lā*[89] and who was in charge at Kashan during his father's absence, shut himself up in the citadel and defended himself against Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa. Sultan Ma'ṣūm Khan came from Sāva and another group came from Qom to assist Yūsof Beg. Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa was within the city walls and the relief force was outside when a chance musketball killed Yūsof Beg. Moḥammad Khan became apprehensive and sent his son, Valī Khan, to restore the situation at Kashan.

One day, a group of townspeople of Kashan came out of the city on foot to repel the Turkmans and started plundering their tents. The Turkmans mounted and attacked them, and the Šāmlūs went to their assistance. About three hundred citizens of Kashan were killed—fifty of them *seyyeds*. After this, the Šāmlūs could not withstand the Turkmans; Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa, unable to capture the citadel, returned to Naṭanz. Further information on the Turkman-Takkalū revolt will be given later.

Further Events in Khorasan

At the beginning of the Year of the Monkey, Moršedqolī Khan sent his brother Ebrahim Khan to Herat. Ebrahim Khan, formerly governor of Esfarā'īn, had been taken prisoner at the battle of Ġūrīān and carried off to Iraq, but had managed to escape and make his way to Khorasan via Gīlān. The purpose of his visit to Herat was to urge 'Alīqolī Khan to proceed to Mašhad, bringing with him 'Abbas Mīrzā, so that Moršedqolī Khan and 'Alīqolī Khan could conduct a joint campaign in the Besṭām-Damghan-Astarābād area and bring the whole of Khorasan under their control up to the borders of Iraq.

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[89] I.e., inkhorn holder of the supreme *dīvān;* clearly the office was a sinecure, since its holder was in Kashan! *TM* does not list this particular office.

Some of the senior chiefs of the Šāmlū tribe, who detested the power and influence of Moršedqolī Khan, opposed this proposal. Ebrahim Khan declared that, since 'Abbas Mīrzā's authority was not yet firmly established in Khorasan, it would set everybody's mind at rest if the leading chiefs demonstrated their unity and accord by taking this action, one requiring considerable courage, under the vicegerency of 'Alīqolī Khan, who would have full discretion to settle the affairs of the newly conquered regions in accordance with his judgment. After the successful completion of this operation, the Ostājlūs would, of course, affirm their allegiance to 'Alīqolī Khan. As discussions dragged on between the Ostājlūs and the Šāmlūs, troublemakers were active.

Eventually, Moršedqolī Khan decided to visit Herat and use his personal powers of persuasion on 'Alīqolī Khan. He kissed the feet of 'Abbas Mīrzā and was warmly received by 'Alīqolī Khan. The Šāmlūs kept whispering to him that this was a wonderful opportunity to get rid of Moršedqolī Khan, but 'Alīqolī Khan refused to listen to them, not wishing to incur lasting infamy by murdering a man who was his guest. Inevitably, however, some of this talk got back to Moršedqolī Khan and made him apprehensive of the Šāmlū chiefs. One day, a man with a drawn sword entered the public baths to which Moršedqolī Khan had gone and slew one of the bath attendants who resembled him. Moršedqolī's men, suspecting that the attendant had been killed by mistake, rushed into the bathhouse and raised his suspicions. The incident made Moršedqolī Khan even more nervous than before, and he at once left the baths and went to his house. As soon as 'Alīqolī Khan heard the news, he went straight to Moršedqolī Khan and tried to reassure him by expressions of friendship. He attributed the death of the bath attendant as the chance deed of some personal enemy of the latter.

But this incident had completely shattered Moršedqolī Khan's faith in the Šāmlūs, and he decided to leave Herat for Mašhad without delay. He left his brother, Ebrahim Khan, at Herat. ʿAlīqolī Khan was aggrieved by his precipitate departure and showed his displeasure to Ebrahim Khan. This gave troublemakers their chance to widen the breach between Moršedqolī Khan and ʿAlīqolī Khan, and shortly afterward Ebrahim Khan, also nervous of Šāmlū intentions, fled from Herat to Mašhad. Although Moršedqolī Khan and ʿAlīqolī Khan continued to correspond, neither now trusted the other. The Šāmlū leaders urged ʿAlīqolī Khan to lead a punitive expedition against Moršedqolī Khan, and in the end ʿAlīqolī Khan marched out from Herat with the intention of replacing any governors appointed by Moršedqolī Khan of whose loyalty he was doubtful.

It was the firm belief of Moršedqolī Khan that ʿAlīqolī Khan's vizier, Ḵāja Afżal, was the cause of all the trouble, because Ḵāja Afżal had told ʿAlīqolī Khan that Sultan ʿAlī Ḵalīfa, the nephew of Fūlād Ḵalīfa and governor of Qāyen,[90] was secretly in league with Moršedqolī Khan. ʿAlīqolī Khan marched to Qāyen, seized Sultan ʿAlī Ḵalīfa, and confiscated all his possessions. From there, ʿAlīqolī Khan marched to Toršīz.[91] He issued a general call to arms to all the emirs of Khorasan, whether appointed by Moršedqolī Khan or not, instructing all who made common cause with ʿAbbas Mīrzā and his guardian, the governor-general of Khorasan, to join the prince's standard.

For his part, Moršedqolī Khan mobilized his own forces and marched out from Mašhad. But, according to what I have been told by men whose word I trust, he had absolutely no thought of armed conflict; he wanted the dispute to be settled by negotiation in such a way that the mutual suspicions of the two leaders would be removed, and they could meet and pledge their undivided loyalty to ʿAbbas Mīrzā. None of the chiefs on either side, however, came forward as mediator, and although Moršedqolī Khan invited Ḵāja Afżal and delegates from the Šāmlū chiefs to come and talk, there was no response. Ḵāja Afżal, afraid to go to Moršedqolī Khan, made no effort to settle the quarrel; on the contrary, he apparently was in league with the calumniators who were intent on destroying Moršedqolī Khan. The two armies therefore confronted each other at the village of Sū-safīd near Toršīz, and envoys passed to and fro between the two camps.

Ebrahim Sultan Šaraflū, a kinsman of Moršedqolī Khan, arrived in response to the latter's call. When he saw that Moršedqolī Khan and the Ostājlū emirs were camped on their own, apart from the others, to display his pride in his tribe he marched into Moršedqolī Khan's camp in full battle order, with drums beating and colors flying, and Moršedqolī Khan sent some of his men to greet him. The Šāmlūs, hearing the drums and seeing cavalry fully armed, thought an attack was imminent and sounded the call. As a precaution, 'Alīqolī Khan mounted and positioned his left, right, and center; Moršedqolī Khan followed suit. At this point, Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa, who had been released and pardoned after several days of imprisonment, showed his resentment at the treatment he had received at the hands of 'Alīqolī Khan by deserting him and going over to the enemy camp with all his men. His action, which caused consternation in the Šāmlū ranks, raised the morale of the Ostājlūs correspondingly.

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[90] Southwest of Herat, in the Qohestān district of Khorasan.

[91] Northwest of Qāyen.

When the fighting started, 'Alīqolī Khan spotted a group of Ostājlūs among whom he thought Moršedqolī Khan had stationed himself. Abandoning all caution, he led a charge of Šāmlūs against the group and scattered it. While he was pursuing the fugitives, Moršedqolī Khan, who was stationed elsewhere on the battlefield, caught sight of 'Abbas Mīrzā's standard and sent a troop of his men in its direction. The Ostājlūs routed the small band of Šāmlūs who were around the prince, and one of Moršedqolī Khan's men, Abū Moslem Khan Čāūšlū, reached the prince's side, seized hold of the reins of his horse, and led him to the Ostājlū camp. 'Alīqolī Khan, returning from his pursuit of the Ostājlūs, saw no sign of the troops of his center, or of the prince's parasol. When he heard what had happened, he broke off the engagement and retired to Herat, overcome with remorse and chagrin at his negligence, while Moršedqolī Khan carried 'Abbas Mīrzā off in triumph to Mašhad.

Because the prince had been brought up among the Šāmlū tribe since infancy and had developed personal friendships with 'Alīqolī Khan and his men, this turn of events was abhorrent to him. He was comforted, however, by the prospect of visiting the shrine of the Imam 'Alī b. Mūsā al-Reżā at Mašhad. Moršedqolī Khan behaved with great magnanimity toward the Šāmlū captives. After the mischiefmakers had been rebuked, the prisoners were released and treated well. Moršedqolī Khan gave orders that, if any of the Šāmlūs saw any of his property—be it horse, camel, or weapons—in the hands of his men, the property should be surrendered to him forthwith. The prisoners were then given the choice of returning to Herat or remaining with 'Abbas Mīrzā. Ḵāja Afżal, the vizier of 'Alīqolī Khan, was appointed vizier to Moršedqolī Khan. Those Šāmlūs who elected to stay with the prince were enrolled in his service—among the *qūrčīs* of his personal bodyguard, as centurions, or as personal attendants. Moršedqolī Khan wrote a friendly letter to 'Alīqolī Khan, still couched in submissive terms, indulging in some friendly protests, and attributing the capture of 'Abbas Mīrzā to the workings of fate.

Ḵāja Afżal and the Šāmlū officers were not happy at Mašhad, and one by one they drifted back to Herat. Finally, the only Šāmlūs left at Mašhad in the service of 'Abbas Mīrzā were Ḥoseyn Beg 'Abdellū, the prince's personal rein holder, who had become separated from his master in the battle at Ṭoršīz, and 'Alīqolī Beg, the son of Shah 'Alī Beg Garāmīllū, who had parted company from 'Alīqolī Khan during the flight from Toršīz and made his way back to Mašhad to place himself at the prince's service. Moršedqolī Khan therefore appointed officers to form a royal retinue for 'Abbas Mīrzā, and constituted himself his *vakīl* and guardian. As a result, his power in Khorasan was greater than before.

Events in Azerbaijan, 'Oṣmān Pasha's Expedition to Tabriz, and His Subsequent Capture of That City and Devastation of the Surrounding Area.

The occupation of Erīvān by Farhād Pasha has already been reported. 'Oṣmān Pasha left Šīrvān and Šakkī in the hands of his officers and went to Istanbul, where the Ottoman Sultan made him grand vizier and commander in chief of an army, with orders to conquer the whole of Azerbaijan, if not Iraq. The spring of the Year of the Fowl (993/1585) found 'Oṣmān Pasha at Erīvān and Ḥamza Mīrzā at Tabriz, as usual preoccupied with carousing and wenching. Ḥamza Mīrzā had also fallen in love with a boy named Šeyṭān, the son of a blacksmith, whom 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū had brought from Isfahan. When the weather turned hot and the plains became carpeted with poppies, the court moved to its summer quarters at Aškanbar and Kalanbar, and from there to Bāzār Čāy. At Sāḡrī Bolāḡī, Moḥammad Khan Toḵmāq, who had been pushed out of the province of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd by the Ottomans and had been wandering around bereft of men and equipment ever since, joined the royal camp. He was fitted out with troops and received in audience by the Shah.

The court was shaken out of its complacency by the news of the approach of 'Oṣmān Pasha. Mobilization orders were hastily issued to the troops of Fārs, Iraq, and Kerman. It was Ḥamza Mīrzā's secret desire that the *qezelbāš*, under his leadership, should revenge the defeats of previous years. He wrote conciliatory letters to Moḥammad Khan, Moṣīb Khan, and all the Turkman and Takkalū emirs reminding them that the *qezelbāš* tribes were the faithful Sufis of the Safavid house, and that to lose one's life in the service of one's benefactor was the ultimate degree of devotion. "Emir Khan," said Ḥamza Mīrzā, "departed from the path of devotion; he was guilty of certain acts which angered me and necessitated his execution. But no one else was involved in these acts, and I have absolutely no quarrel with the rest of the Turkman emirs and *gāzīs*. Adham Khan Torkmān, one of the leading emirs of that tribe, holds an honored place in my service. Purge your mind of seditious thoughts and be not afraid, for such behavior is not compatible with professions of selfless and devoted service.

"Furthermore, our enemies are at hand ready to conquer the realm of Iran and destroy the *qezelbāš* tribes. Even now they are making for Tabriz, the burial ground of the *qezelbāš* for a hundred years,[92] and the seat of Persian kings. Act wisely, with an eye to the future, and united in true devotion and service to the state, come to Tabriz with your men ready for action. Do not sully your record of a hundred years of devoted service by acts of sedition. Concentrate on one thing and one thing only, namely, fighting valiantly by the side of your prince. After the enemy has been repulsed, I will make every effort to fulfill whatever desires any individual among you may have. It is obvious that if Tabriz and the province of Azerbaijan, which is the most important province in Iran and its prime recruiting ground, were to fall into Ottoman hands, this would constitute a major blow to the whole state and would seriously affect the other provinces. I do not need to tell you what the state of the *qezelbāš* would be then."

After dispatching these letters, Ḥamza Mīrzā waited for a month at Tabriz to see whether 'Oṣmān Pasha might be making for Qarābāg. When it became clear that Tabriz was his objective, the emirs assembled there held a council of war. A number of experienced advisers were of the opinion that they should use the same tactics as in the time of Shah Tahmasp: all civilians should be evacuated from the city of Tabriz and the route by which the enemy would approach it and sent to Qarājadāg, where there were some strongly fortified places, and no food supplies should be left in the city. Until the Takkalū and Turkman emirs arrived they should fight a delaying action, blocking the roads to prevent any food supplies from reaching the Ottomans and the Ottomans from sending out forage parties. Once the other emirs arrived, they could give battle to the Ottomans on a field of their choice. The more impetuous elements rejected this advice: there were one hundred thousand souls in Tabriz, they said, of whom at least half were lusty, serviceable lads who would fight for their families and homes. The streets must be barricaded, and the inhabitants must fight on the barricades and prevent the enemy from entering the city. While the populace was fighting the Ottomans within the city, the *qezelbāš* would engage them outside.

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[92] A pardonable exaggeration on the part of Ḥamza Mīrzā; it was 86 lunar or 84 solar years since the coronation of Shah Esma'il I at Tabriz in 1501.

The majority supported the latter view. Some of the wilder elements at Tabriz, who were always at Ḥamza Mīrzā's side flattering him, uttered empty boasts and refused to allow the city to be evacuated. Since everyone considered this fatal decision to be the correct one, the people were allowed to stay. Ḥamza Mīrzā himself addressed the notables of Tabriz, urging them to fight like men against the enemy, and to protect their children, their dependents, and their property. He gave orders that, since the evacuation of families would cause confusion in the city, no families were to leave. "My men and I," he said, "will be engaging the enemy outside the walls, and we will not allow any harm to come to your families." Ḥamza Mīrzā ordered to the city a few of the emirs, in particular Pīr Ğeyb Khan Ostājlū, to organize the barricading of the streets in cooperation with Ḥoseyn Qolī Sultan, the brother of ʿAlīqolī Khan, who was acting in his place as governor of the city and defender of the realm. The townspeople were urged to man the barricades, to ward off any assailants, to prevent anyone from taking his family out of the city, and, if anyone succeeded in doing so, to punish the master of the house and plunder his possessions.

The prince's orders raised the morale of the townspeople of Tabriz to some extent, and they set to work with a will to build barricades in the streets, dividing up the city by wards for this purpose. A local hero was placed in charge of each district, and a *qezelbāš* was allocated to each barricade with a number of reliable men. But these measures were to prove no more effective than trying to dam the course of a torrent with brushwood.

As the reader will know, Tabriz had for long been the capital of Iran; it possessed fine buildings such as mosques, *madrasas,* and various pious foundations which the rulers, viziers, and governors of the city had over the years constructed. Flourishing villages, fields, and estates were held in mortmain for the benefit of these institutions, and pleasant gardens had come into being around them. Adequately to describe the prosperity of the city is beyond the scope of my pen. The townspeople displayed such rivalry in the building and beautifying of their houses that the home of the meanest bazaar dweller was a worthy place for a mighty emir to spend the night.

During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, when Sultan Sülaymān invaded Iran on several occasions, the people of Tabriz, who were noted for the strength of their Shi'ite convictions and their devotion to the Safavid house, performed valiant deeds on behalf of the Safavid dynasty. For this reason, Shah Tahmasp regarded the people of Tabriz with special affection. Since the majority of the citizens were merchants, artisans, and craftsmen, he waived the craft tax and absolved them from *dīvan* dues. The Shah's concern for these classes of society was such that he ordained that a *qāżī-ye aḥdāṣ* (judge with jurisdiction in respect of the night watch) be appointed; that the *dārūğas* should conduct their cases in the presence of the *qāżī-ye aḥdāṣ,* and that persons found guilty should be subject to the penalties prescribed by religious law and should not be fined.

After a long period of peace, the prosperity of the city of Tabriz had reached a pitch unequaled in the Islamic world. Such was the city now to be subjected to rapine and plunder; those of its inhabitants who survived the sword fled from their homes, and men of substance were brought low, in accordance with God's word: "Surely kings, when they enter a country, despoil it, and turn the highest of its people into the lowest. And this they will do."[93]

In Azerbaijan, the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā waited in vain for a sign of the *qezelbāš,* but none came, either from the Takkalū and Turkman tribes they had tried to conciliate, or from the armies of Fārs, Iraq, and Kerman. Sultan Moḥammad Shah, with the baggage, marched toward Ūzūmdel and Dezmār; Ḥamza Mīrzā, with a small force consisting of emirs, principal officers of state, *qūrčīs,* and personal retainers of the royal family, moved off in a different direction, with the intention of giving battle to the Ottomans. The *qūrčībāšī,* with a small force of *qūrčīs,* remained with the Shah.

[93] Koran, 27:35.

Ḥamza Mīrzā made for Tabriz from Marand, keeping to the mountains all the way, and watching the huge Ottoman army advancing from Ṭasūj.[94] He hoped for an opportunity to attack them and retreat into the mountains if he and his men appeared in danger of being overwhelmed. When the Ottomans saw the *qezelbāš* force, several regiments, contrary to the usual Ottoman practice, came out from behind the transport wagons and charged the *qezelbāš*. After inflicting heavy casualties on the Ottomans, the *qezelbāš*, following orders from Ḥamza Mīrzā, fell back on both flanks, still fighting, and suffering some casualties in the process. In view of the immense size of the Ottoman army and the fact that Ḥamza Mīrzā had less than twelve thousand men with him in all, he considered a pitched battle with the Ottomans an impossibility, and 'Oṣmān Pasha advanced steadily until he reached Šūrāb, just outside Tabriz.

The people of Tabriz were filled with fear at the size of the Ottoman army. After several assaults, the Ottomans reached the barricades in the vicinity of the royal palace. There was some brief resistance before the Ottomans smashed down the barricades with cannon and mortar fire and reached the Meydān-e Ṣāḥebābād. Civilians and military alike realized that further resistance was impossible; their scattered forces were unable to regroup anywhere to make a stand. Ḥoseynqolī Sultan and Pīr Ğeyb Khan, with the rest of the *qezelbāš*, left the city that night and rejoined the royal camp. The people of Tabriz, deprived of *qezelbāš* support, sent a delegation to 'Oṣmān Pasha consisting of Kāmrān Beg Owḥadī, who was *qāżī*, and Mowlānā Moḥammad 'Alī, the son of Mowlānā 'Enāyat, who was the *moftī* and *šeyḵ al-eslām*, to beg him to grant them security of life and property. 'Oṣmān Pasha upbraided them, but since he had seen much of the fighting qualities of the Tabrīzīs, he considered it more diplomatic to adopt a conciliatory policy. He promised them quarter, said that henceforth they should consider themselves subjects of the Ottoman sultan. He ordered them to return to the city and report to their fellows what they had seen and heard.

Men of intelligence realized, however, that the Ottomans had rancor in their hearts against the Tabrīzīs and, because of the difference of religious faith, would not mix amicably with them. The Tabrīzīs began to bury their money and belongings in cellars, secret hiding places, and pits, and to slip out of the city at night with their families, in twos and threes, on foot and on horseback. If they took any money with them, they were robbed and stripped by robbers on the way. 'Os̱mān Pasha entered the city, but finding the palace unsuitable for fortification, moved his forces from Šūrāb to Čarandāb, on the south side of the city, and laid the foundations of a fort there. The construction work, divided up among his men, was completed in forty days, despite harrying attacks both by day and by night by *qezelbāš* who had retired to Mount Sorḵāb. The *qezelbāš* were not able to form an accurate estimate of the size of the Ottoman army. The Ottomans completed the fort according to plan, stocked it with provisions, and equipped it with siege guns and mortars. The eunuch Ja'far Pasha was appointed commandant of the fort and governor of Tabriz.

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[94] On the north shore of Lake Orūmīya (Reżā'īya).

During the construction of the fort, 'Os̱mān Pasha permitted a general massacre to be perpetrated in Tabriz. The reason given for this was the lack of cooperation on the part of the townspeople. At night, ruffians from the city would creep into Ottoman tents, make off with anything of value they could find, and if they got the opportunity, kill the inmates. In addition, the townspeople would go to the fort by night and tear down what had been built during the day. On one occasion, the bath attendants at some public baths in the backstreets murdered an Ottoman soldier and threw his body down a well. This incident finally broke 'Os̱mān Pasha's patience, and he burst out in anger: "The Tabrīzīs are a seditious lot and all deserve to be killed!"

The Ottomans slew anyone they saw in the streets, so the citizens hid themselves as best they could. The Ottomans then started on the houses, slaying all they came across and plundering the contents of the houses; the women and children they took captive. A number of people who had the ear of 'Os̱mān Pasha sent to him and begged him to desist from this massacre. The Pasha called off his troops at nightfall, and the survivors left their belongings and fled from the city during the night. Enormous quantities of booty fell into the hands of the Ottomans. They were so assiduous in their search that they even extracted the treasures which had been hidden in wells, sometimes as much as twenty meters deep, on top of which had been piled rubble from ruined houses and walls.

This deed proved to be unlucky for the Pasha; in accordance with the tradition "God will not show mercy to him who refuses to show mercy to his fellow-men," the sighs and groans of the victims, and of Shi'ites of the House of the Prophet, caused the divine wrath to be visited upon the Pasha. He died of quinsy without any sign of previous illness. During the forty or fifty days of the Ottoman occupation of Tabriz, in addition to a number of minor clashes in the streets, there were three major engagements between the *qezelbāš* and the Ottoman forces, and on each of these occasions the *qezelbāš* were victorious.

The Three Engagements between Qezelbāš and Ottoman Forces; The First Battle, in Which the Qezelbāš Were under the Command of the Qūrčībāšī, Qolī Beg

When the *qezelbāš* abandoned the defense of Tabriz, Ḥamza Mīrzā rejoined the Shah at his camp at Ūzūmdel. He took counsel with Qolī Beg Afšār, an officer of sound judgment, and they admitted that it had been a mistake not to evacuate the city. Some advisers were now of the opinion that, since the city was under Ottoman occupation and the inhabitants dispersed, and in view of the shortage of regular and auxiliary forces and the numerical superiority of the enemy, no action should be taken until the Ottomans had completed the citadel and retired. As they retired, they should be kept under close observation and every opportunity of harassing them should be exploited. After they had retreated from Persian territory, an attack should be launched on the citadel at Tabriz.

The hot-tempered and impulsive Ḥamza Mīrzā, however, could not bear the thought of inaction while the Ottomans quietly completed the construction of the citadel. He wanted to lead his forces against them in person, trusting in the Word of God, "How many a small party has triumphed over a large party, through the will of God!"[95] The *qūrčībāšī* and some of the other senior emirs were reluctant to allow the prince to expose himself by leading the attack in person. The *qūrčībāšī* proposed that he should lead the first attack and test his forces; if the results were satisfactory, the prince should lead the attack on another occasion. If his men were defeated, the prince's servants would bear the blame and not the prince himself. This plan was agreed to, and the *qezelbāš* moved to Darra-ye Nahang, four *farsaḵs* from Tabriz, and camped there. The prince appointed the *qūrčībāšī* commander of the assault force, and Moḥammadī Khan Tokmāq remained with the prince.

The *qūrčībāšī* sent men ahead as skirmishers, and they crossed the Fahvasfanj River, which lies to the south of the city on the Iraq road, and came in sight of the Ottomans as they climbed the far bank. 'Oṣmān Pasha ordered Jeğāl-oğlū, the most valiant Ottoman commander at that time, to attack them. Jeğāl-oğlū, who had a low opinion of the *qezelbāš* and moreover could not see the *qezelbāš* center, which was still crossing the river, and thought that the skirmishers were the center, thought it safe to leave his artillery and gun carriages and to charge the enemy. At that point the main *qezelbāš* force breasted the far bank of the river and charged the Ottoman center at full gallop; some ten thousand Ottomans were killed in this single charge.

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[95] Korah, 2:250.

The Ottomans broke and fled; some men of note were taken prisoner by the *qezelbāš*, and Jeğāl-oğlū leapt on to a racing mare, which he kept ready for just such an emergency, and left the field. A *qezelbāš* trooper, Kūr Seyyedī Ḳeneslū, claimed to have wounded Jeğāl-oğlū with a spear thrust, but this was not verified. 'Oṣmān Pasha, receiving reports of the astonishing prowess of the *qezelbāš*, kept on sending reinforcements; but the *qūrčībāšī* wisely withdrew his men before these could reach the scene. That night, the *qezelbāš* camped on the banks of the river. The following day they returned to camp to display the heads of the Ottoman dead and the weapons and prisoners they had taken. Some townspeople from Tabriz who had escaped from the city and reached the royal camp reported that they had heard this defeat had made the Ottomans take the *qezelbāš* more seriously, and that 'Oṣmān Pasha had reprimanded Jeğāl-oğlū and accused him of cowardice and poor tactics.

The Second and Third Battles, in Which the Qezelbāš Were Led by Ḥamza Mīrzā

After a breathing space of four or five days, Ḥamza Mīrzā led the *qezelbāš*, numbering ten to twelve thousand men, in person in a further attack against the Ottomans. This time, 'Oṣmān Pasha sent against them Morād Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Qarāmān, and Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr, with the army of Anatolia. The skirmishers from both armies clashed on the banks of the Fahvasfanj River, and the fighting went on all day, with charge and countercharge. The *qūrčībāšī* and the senior emirs tried to restrain Ḥamza Mīrzā, but in vain, and he led his troop of young heroes against the Ottomans, inflicting heavy casualties. The prince, set on the destruction of the enemy, refused to break off the action at nightfall; on the Ottoman side, the pashas stood their ground, and lighted torches.

At this point, Ḥamza Mīrzā ordered Šāhrok̦ Khan, who was on the Safavid left, to detach himself from the main body and attack the Ottoman right. Šāhrok̦ led off his men, who included Ẕu'l-Qadars, and men from Qarāja-dāğ and the Šeyk̦āvand tribes. As they crossed the river, they outflanked the Ottoman center. The Ottoman center, hearing the sound of fifes at its rear and simultaneously faced by a frontal attack by Ḥamza Mīrzā, broke up in confusion. The two pashas, who had tried unsuccessfully to rally their men, were taken prisoner. Since Moḥammad Pasha was severely wounded and unlikely to live, he was decapitated. Morād Pasha, who had been taken prisoner by 'Alī Beg Šams al-Dīnlū, and the other prisoners, the most important of whom was Yūsof Aqa, the Sultan's chief taster *(čašnī-gīrbāšī)*, were led before the prince. The *qezelbāš* pursued the Ottomans all the way back to their camp at Čarandāb, and actually captured some of them among their own tents.

Since it was by now pitch dark, the *qezelbāš* returned to their camp. The following day was devoted to displaying the heads of the enemy dead and the captured weapons, and to rewarding those who had distinguished themselves by their gallantry. Morād Pasha and a few other captives of special note were sent on to the Shah's camp, whence they were taken to Qahqaha. For a few days, the *qezelbāš* rested their horses near the Fahvasfanj River, and then again prepared for battle. 'Oṣmān Pasha ordered his main force of some forty or fifty thousand men to mount guard on their camp and not to stir from it, since he was impressed by the amount of damage Ḥamza Mīrzā had managed to inflict on him with such a small body of men. However, his resources in men were still such that he could maintain a force of this size in battle readiness, and at the same time proceed with the construction of the citadel.

When the *qezelbāš* realized that 'Oṣmān Pasha did not intend to commit his forces to a major engagement, they decided on a policy of hit-and-run raids in order to give the Ottoman forces no respite. Their plan was to attack any Ottoman group which was prepared to give battle and, with luck, to break through their lines into the Ottoman camp without drawing rein, to continue fighting as long as they appeared to hold the advantage, and then to withdraw. With this resolve, the *qezelbāš* standards moved forward, with the royal parasol in the center. When the Safavid skirmishers reached the Ottoman lines, those who had been ordered to guard the camp maintained their positions and did not advance; the *qezelbāš* advanced with extreme caution, suspecting a trap and maintaining a guard on all sides. Night came without an engagement, and the *qezelbāš* camped on the spot.

The prince gave orders that a close guard was to be mounted all night; toward dawn, they would launch an assault and inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible before he could bring all his forces to bear. During the night, a daring *ġāzī* patrol penetrated the Ottoman lines and brought back a few prisoners from one of the enemy tents. They were immediately interrogated by the prince as to why the Ottomans had refused to give battle that day. They were only ordinary soldiers, with not much idea of the Ottoman commander's battle plans, but they declared that the latter had held several secret sessions with his staff officers, discussing plans for an Ottoman withdrawal, and that the men had received no orders other than to maintain a careful watch on the camp. At that moment, fires suddenly flared up all over the Ottoman camp. Old soldiers said that this was a sign that the enemy was about to strike camp, and that each man was burning the stocks of firewood he had accumulated in his tent. This seemed to corroborate what the prisoners had said.

About midnight, a Tabrīzī made his way to the Safavid lines from the Ottoman camp, where he had been well treated by an Ottoman nobleman, who had protected him from being molested by the soldiery. He brought the news that 'Oṣmān Pasha had been stricken by quinsy two days previously and had not stirred from his tent, but had died the previous night, the news being withheld from the men the following day. Jeġāl-oġlū had assumed command, and had called together all the pashas and other senior officers at the end of the day and asked their advice on how to proceed.

There had been a unanimous vote in favor of withdrawing from Iran, and the plan was to strike camp in the morning. However, it was only a few days since Ja'far Pasha had been sent to the citadel with orders to lay in a year's supplies; some of the pashas pointed out that, since this task had not been completed, the *qezelbāš* would take the citadel with ease once the main army had left. Why should the garrison, numbering several thousand men, be left to their fate? Jeġāl-oġlū had given Ja'far Pasha the choice of staying or leaving.

The latter had replied that, if he had not occupied the citadel, he would have left with the main army; now that he was in possession of the citadel, however, it would be a blow to the fortunes of their sultan if he were to abandon the citadel just because 'Oṣmān Pasha had died. "I will place myself in God's hands," he said; "do you strike camp. Whatever happens is God's will."

The Ottoman nobleman, said the Tabrīzī, had returned to his tent direct from the council of war and had recounted to him what had taken place there. He had said, "We march in the morning. Since the *qezelbāš* are close at hand, there will probably be a fierce battle, and you will lose your life in the process. It is still dark. If you can get yourself to the *qezelbāš* camp, then go." "He then," said the Tabrīzī, "gave me a few men as an escort through the Ottoman lines, and they turned back only when they could see the dark mass of the *qezelbāš* guard patrols." The Tabrīzī gave it as his opinion that the Ottomans had been shaken by the death of 'Oṣmān Pasha, and by the bravery and temerity of Ḥamza Mīrzā and the *qezelbāš*. He thought it unlikely that the Janissaries and others detailed to garrison the citadel would agree to stay; and, if they refused to stay, Ja'far Pasha would be forced to leave. This was a real possibility, and was much to be desired.

This news gladdened the hearts of the *qezelbāš*. Despite the disparity in numbers, they prepared to attack in the morning. Jeğāl-oğlū marched off, with a strong vanguard and rear guard. The Safavid skirmishers passed Čarandāb, the site of the Ottoman camp, and made contact with the Ottomans near Šanb-e Ġāzān. Ḥamza Mīrzā led the main Safavid force forward from Čarandāb, urging his men on to battle, and they drove the Ottomans back among their gun carriages, camels, and baggage.

There is little doubt that, had the strength of the *qezelbāš* been slightly greater, and had they fought with spirit, they might have inflicted a major defeat on the Ottomans on the day 'Oṣmān Pasha died and the Ottoman army was without a leader. This did not happen for several reasons: first, the *qezelbāš* were few in number, and the Ottomans knew that Ḥamza Mīrzā did not have more than ten or twelve thousand men. In addition, they knew of the disunity among the emirs, and that most of the emirs were at odds with 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū Ostājlū and envied him because he was the prince's favorite. They did not want his friends to obtain influence among the *qezelbāš* and win the kudos of victory. Second, when the *qezelbāš*, with scant ceremony, had driven the Ottomans back among their own baggage, they had turned to looting. Looting, of course, is second nature to any soldier, and these greedy fellows, showing lamentable lack of zeal, had stopped fighting and devoted all their energies to carrying away whatever they had laid their hands on among the baggage camels and the stores. Gradually, Ḥamza Mīrzā's forces had dwindled, and the impetus they had built up dissipated. Third, Jeğāl-oğlū, who had marched about two miles from Čarandāb to Šanb-e Ğāzān, when he saw his rear guard thrown into confusion and in danger of being scattered, decided to pitch camp where he was. He made a laager by placing the gun carriages on either flank, and behind them he stationed the Janissaries.

The Ottomans, seeing no further activity from the direction of the *qezelbāš*, rallied. Ḥamza Mīrzā, despite the fact that a considerable proportion of his forces was scattered, wanted to stake all on a desperate attack with the men he still had with him. But the emirs considered it madness to attack the laager, and held his horse to prevent him from doing so. The prince, realizing that their motive was to protect his person, agreed to break off the action, and camped at Čarandāb. In this action, although the *qezelbāš* obtained fewer enemy heads and weapons, they captured greater quantities of booty.

When the Ottomans marched from Šanb-e Ğāzān, they were harried at every stage as far as Ṭasūj by Ḥamza Mīrzā, who attacked them whenever it appeared advantageous to do so, his men bringing back enemy heads and weapons. At Māyān, a considerable battle was fought. Esmā'īlqolī Khan and the Šāmlūs launched an attack but were repulsed by the Ottomans. As luck would have it, that part of the plain had been irrigated, and the Šāmlūs' horses sank up to their chests in the mud. If help had not arrived quickly, the Šāmlūs would have been completely wiped out; but Pīr Ğeyb Khan Ostājlū, who was ahead with the skirmishers, came to their rescue and drove the Ottomans off. As it was, Esmā'īlqolī Khan's brother and a number of other Šāmlūs were killed. From among the prince's own personal retainers, Shah Ḥoseyn Beg, the son of Zeynal Beg the *šarbatdār*,[96] and Qūr Ḵoms Khan the director of the arsenal *(jabbādār)*, the son of Dīv Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar, both of whom were enrolled among the *moqarrabs*,[97] lost their lives.

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[96] The official in charge of sherbets, wines, and other drinks.

[97] The *jabbādārbāšī* is listed by *TM* (p. 56) among the *moqarrab al-ḵāqāns*.

In short, this action was a failure. ʿAlīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū, consumed by the jealousy and envy holders of high office customarily feel toward one another, started grumbling at Pīr Ǧeyb Khan: "Why did you go to the assistance of the Šāmlūs?" he asked. "Why did you not leave them to be disgraced among their peers?" When one gets squabbling like this among the army commanders, it is not difficult to surmise how effective their conduct of operations will be. Ḥamza Mīrzā abandoned the pursuit of the Ottomans at Ṭasūj. He was not guilty of any shortcoming in these operations; indeed, for fourteen days he had not taken off his jerkin and armor, but was in the saddle, pursuing the enemy, from morning to night. But the enemy superiority in numbers was too great. As for the conduct of the *qezelbāš*, who were too short-sighted even to forget their differences in face of their common enemy, what am I to say?

Ḥamza Mīrzā, with the intention of capturing the citadel, returned to Tabriz and camped at Šanb-e Ǧāzān. The Shah meanwhile marched back to the city from Kamar Darra with the baggage train and made his headquarters at the house of the *ṣadr*, Mīr Asadollāh Šūštarī. The emirs and principal officers of state found quarters where they could in the ruined city. The author was present in the royal camp. When I walked through the city, an astonishing sight met my eye. All the houses, formerly decorated with gold and lapis lazuli, were in ruins; their carved and decorated doors and windows had been ripped off and used as firewood. All the trees in the parks and gardens had been cut down to provide a year's supply of fuel for the citadel. Of all the thousands of houses, scarcely one middle-class residence remained unscathed. All the shops, two-storied tile factories, and bathhouses had similarly been destroyed. The corpses of the townspeople still lay where they had fallen, in the streets, bazaars, and shops. The city presented a picture of total desolation.

Mīr Jaʿfar, the son of Mīr Rāstī the *moḥtaseb al-mamālek*,[98] was ordered by the Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā to arrange the burial of the dead and to clear the streets of dung and the corpses of animals which had died because of lack of food. The citizens of Tabriz, who had dispersed to the villages and fields, began to trickle back into the city. They found their homes in ruins, and no sign of money and belongings they had hidden away. Both civilians and military cooperated to make the city fit for habitation again, and the Shah spent the winter at Tabriz.

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[98] For the duties of this official, see *TM*, p. 83.

The Siege of the Citadel at Tabriz

The emirs began to construct breastworks around the citadel; on the east side, the direction of the Meydān-e Ṣāḥebābād and the Mosque of Ūzūn Ḥasan, the work was allocated to Ḥamza Mīrzā and his personal retainers, including 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū, and to the Tabriz auxiliaries; the construction of breastworks on the southern side, the direction of the Sanjārān[99] and Deljūya districts, was allocated to the *qūrčībāšī* and his *qūrčīs,* and to various emirs. Other sections were allocated to Šāhroḵ Khan and the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe, and to Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, the officers under the command of Imāmqolī Qājār, and the men of Qarābāg. But because of their shortage of men, the *qezelbāš* were unable to construct siege works on two sides, namely, the west and the north. It was hoped that the arrival of the Takkalū and Turkman troops, so long awaited, would enable these gaps to be filled. A levy of men with spades and pickaxes was made throughout Azerbaijan, and siege guns were cast under the supervision of Morād Beg the *tūpčībāšī* (commander in chief of artillery). The mosque of Ūzūn Ḥasan was chosen as the starting point of a mine, and sappers started work.

A series of misfortunes, however befell the royal army during the siege operations, and lowered the morale of the *qezelbāš.* The first of these was the capture of Šāhroḵ Khan the *mohrdār* (keeper of the seal), a leading Ẕu'l-Qadar emir. Šāhroḵ Khan, a valiant officer, could not brook the presence of Ja'far Pasha, a eunuch whose responsibility was supervising the women of the harem, in the royal palace and the Hašt Behešt building at Tabriz, the seat of the *qezelbāš* for a hundred years; nor could he tolerate his having had the *ḵoṭba* read in the name of the Ottoman sultan. He vowed he would not sleep until the citadel was taken. Such was his zeal that he threw all caution to the winds; by the end of the first week of the siege, he had carried his breastwork forward as far as a house adjacent to the wall of the fort.

Ḥamza Mīrzā disapproved of his rash behavior, and twice sent couriers recalling him from this exposed position, and exhorting him to carry his breastworks forward step by step, and only after making sure that his rear was secure and he was covered by musket fire. Šāhroḵ Khan replied that what the prince said was correct, and his orders must be followed, but now that he had got so far, he considered it inappropriate to withdraw: within the next few days, he would either achieve his objective or die in the attempt.

[99] See *Nozhat al-Qolūb,* p. 79.

The following day, Ḥamza Mīrzā sent Pīrī Beg Šāmlū, the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*, to counsel him to leave his forward station. While they were still arguing, the Ottomans made a sudden sally; most of the guards on night watch had gone off duty and the daytime guards had not yet come. A group of Janissaries sealed off the street from which *qezelbāš* reinforcements might have come with musket fire; another group surrounded the house and opened fire against the doors and windows, eventually forcing their way into the house. Šāhrok̲ Khan, his son Abu'l-Qāsem Sultan, known as Zahr-e mār (snake's poison), Pīrī Beg the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*, and a number of others put up a brave resistance. Šāhrok̲ Khan was severely wounded and taken prisoner, and the others were killed.

By the time the *qezelbāš* counterattacks came, the Ottomans had made off with Šāhrok̲ Khan into the citadel. The defenders were exultant, and the besiegers correspondingly dismayed. Ḥamza Mīrzā's comment was that, if anyone behaved in a headstrong manner and refused to listen to his master and benefactor, he would inevitably regret it. However, because Šāhrok̲ Khan had striven mightily in the cause of religion and the state, the office of keeper of the seal was conferred on his son, Salmās Khan, and another son, Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan, received the office formerly held by his brother Abu'l-Qāsem Sultan. Reżāqolī Beg, a young and handsome officer, was made *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* in place of his father, Pīrī Beg. The Ẕu'l-Qadar troops retained their station at the fatal breastwork, but were unable to achieve anything more than holding their position.

The second misfortune to strike the besiegers was the loss of one of their best siege guns, a famous piece dating from the time of Shah Tahmasp, which hurled a ball weighing fifteen *man*.[100] This gun had been playing on one of the southern towers of the citadel and had demolished about half of it. The Ottomans made a daytime sortie against the gun, scattered its crew with musket fire, tied ropes to the wheels of the cannon, and dragged it off into the fort before anyone could stop them.

The third misfortune was the delay in the casting of new siege guns. It had taken two months to assemble the necessary materials and personnel. Because of the severe cold and the lack of sunshine, the mold did not set properly and retained some moisture. When the molten brass was taken from the furnace and poured into the mold,

[100] About 97.5 lbs.

it boiled up over the sides and was spilled in all directions. Ḥamza Mīrzā was nearly injured by the molten metal, and several of his close companions were burned. So, after two months of waiting, they still had no cannon. After this debacle, Barḵordār Beg, the son of Ḥeydar Beg Anīs, was placed in charge of the casting operations. The new commander in chief of artillery collected the necessary materials in about six weeks; and in the presence of a specially convened royal assembly, at an hour judged propitious by the astrologers, he cast a large siege gun that hurled a ball weighing twenty-five *man*. The gun was transported to the breastwork where Ḥamza Mīrzā was in charge, and opened fire on the fort.

Meanwhile the mining operations were being pushed ahead. The experts judged that the tunnel now extended beneath the walls of the citadel, and one night about three hundred men were sent down the tunnel to dig an exit shaft inside the fort. When they emerged into the open air they were to sound their trumpets, and this would be the signal for a general assault from the breastworks. But when the sappers opened the end of the tunnel they found that their calculations had been wrong; they had emerged in Šīr Ḥājjī district, and several days more work was required to take them within the walls of the fort. It was agreed to postpone this work to a more appropriate time.

For the moment, all action was postponed as a result of the defection to the Ottomans of the *qūrčībāšī*, Qolī Beg Afšār, one of the most important of the principal officers of state, and of his nephew, Jabbārqolī Beg, who was the *qūrčībāšī* of Ḥamza Mīrzā. Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, with Moḥammad Khan and the other conspirators, had been involved in the murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā's mother, Mahd-e 'Olyā, in the assassination of Mīrzā Salmān, and in other actions which had been abhorrent to the prince. The prince had always had the intention of taking revenge on these men when opportunity offered, but the Ottoman invasion had forced him to dissimulate and to postpone any action against them. The *qūrčībāšī*, not being a fool, knew what was in the prince's mind, and consequently was always fearful of what he might do; for his part, the prince constantly regarded him with suspicion.

At this juncture, Moḥammad Khan and Valī Khan, who had banded together to seek revenge for the execution of Emir Khan, had moved their forces close to Tabriz and adopted a rebellious posture. Ḥamza

Mīrzā knew that, although the *qūrčībāšī* was the most important of the principal officers of state, he was secretly in sympathy with the rebels. If they were to meet, all sorts of mischief might result. ʿAlīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū and Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāḡ, who had been primarily responsible for getting Emir Khan executed, now urged upon the prince the necessity of getting rid of the *qūrčībāšī* before he could make contact with the rebels. Once they joined forces, they said, they would be able to do anything they wished. The prince accordingly decided to get rid of the *qūrčībāšī*. Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan Arešlū Afšār, the son of Emir Aṣlān Khan, who had just arrived at court with three hundred men of the Arešlū clan, was appointed *qūrčībāšī* on condition that he undertook to do the deed.

Qolī Beg's nervousness had increased in proportion as the rebels approached; feigning sickness, he left his post on the breastworks and retired to his house to await their arrival. Jabbārqolī Beg, his nephew, happened to hear of the appointment of Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan and rushed to Qolī Beg's house. They saw no alternative but to defect to the Ottomans. At the very moment when Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan was on his way to Qolī Beg's house with his troops, they slipped out across the garden and made their way to the walls of the citadel, where they removed their *qezelbāš* hats and threw them away. The Ottomans, who had been watching all this from the battlements, opened the gates and admitted them.

The Ottomans considered this a blow to the *qezelbāš* and a piece of good fortune for themselves. The same day, Jabbārqolī Beg informed the Ottomans about the tunnel and took them to the exit shaft in Šīr Ḥājjī. The Ottomans opened up the mouth of the shaft, cleared the tunnel of sappers with musket fire, and stormed down the tunnel, emerging at the *madrasa* of Ūzūn Ḥasan; a melee occurred at the breastwork there. Ḥamza Mīrzā came up with ʿAlīqolī Khan, and heavy fighting ensued in which both sides suffered casualties. The Ottomans used the tunnel as cover from which to fire at the defenders of the breastwork. The *qezelbāš* were forced to make holes in the roof of the tunnel at several points, push straw through the holes, and set fire to it to smoke the Ottomans out. They also poured water into the tunnel, and this caused it to cave in and effectively blocked it. Thus two or three months work on the tunnel, which with luck might have led to the capture of the fort, came to naught. At this point, Ḥamza Mīrzā was forced to leave the defense of the breastworks to the Tabrīzīs and local irregulars in order to deal with the Turkman-Takkalū rebellion.

A notable death this year, which occurred during the siege of the citadel, was that of the *ṣadr*, Mīr Šams al-Dīn Moḥammad Ḳabīṣī Kermānī. He died of cachexy. He was a *seyyed* of noble birth and a man of great ability, skilled in the sciences of mathematics, geometry, geomancy, and astrology. He was a witty conversationalist, and composed good poetry under the pen-name of Fahmī. When he was appointed to the office of *ṣadr*, Sultan Moḥammad Shah honored him by giving him great power and influence in office and entrusting to him the administration of all matters, both great and small, connected with the religious law. Mīr Šams al-Dīn, within the space of two or three years, distributed among the *seyyeds*, the *'olamā*, the poor, students, and deserving persons in every walk of life the sum of almost one hundred thousand *tomān* which he found in the treasury in the form of cash and turquoise dust. They had accrued to the treasury from lands held in mortmain throughout the empire, from the votive gifts of Shah Tahmasp, and from the twenty percent tax on the turquoise mines. Many people, as the result of his efforts, became the recipients of royal benefactions.

The Takkalū-Turkman Rebellion

It was generally believed that the coalition of Takkalū and Turkman emirs intended to proceed to the royal camp and force Ḥamza Mīrzā to act in accordance with their wishes. Their plan was to hand over to Emir Khan's sons for capital punishment 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū, Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāğ, and the others responsible for his execution. They would then dislodge the Šāmlū and Ostājlū tribes from their favored position at court and see that no member of those two tribes had access to positions of power; the Takkalūs and Turkmans would then be in control of the affairs of state as in times past. Having agreed on this course of action, the Takkalū and Turkman emirs had dispersed to their tribal districts to mobilize their men, after which they planned to meet at an agreed rendezvous.

Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn Takkalū, who held a fief in the Hamadan area, had strenuously opposed this plan and had tried to prevent Valī Khan from being incited to rebellion by the Turkmans. He had been ordered, he said, to guard the Baghdad frontier, and until such time as he received a royal order to report to the royal camp, he would not leave his station. He said that kings controlled the lives and pay of their troops, and it would not be compatible with their duty and loyalty to the king and the prince to voice any criticism in regard to their treatment of Emir Khan. Valī Khan was afraid of what Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn might do, and particularly afraid that the latter might wean the Takkalū emirs from their loyalty to himself. But in the end he succeeded in winning the support of the majority of the Takkalū emirs. Together with Moḥammad Khan, they marched against Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn. Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn was severely wounded in the battle, in which his men fought in a half-hearted manner; he was taken prisoner by Valī Khan, who got rid of him during his advance on Tabriz.

When the Takkalū-Turkman coalition received the news of the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from Tabriz and the siege of the citadel by the royal army, they proceeded toward Tabriz, ostensibly answering the prince's summons, but with the secret intention of furthering their own designs. Their forces included the Turkmans from Kashan, Qom, and Sāva; Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū Takkalū from Tehran; Moḵtār Sultan, his nephew, from Varāmīn; Valī Khan Takkalū, with his son 'Alī Sultan Pākmāl, and the brothers, sons, and followers of Emir Khan from Hamadan. Their couriers scoured Iraq for other Turkmans and Takkalūs. Moḥammad Khan also won over to their cause Ommat Ḵhan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, who had been slow in answering the prince's mobilization call because his men had been disbanded and sent on leave after the Khorasan campaign. Ommat Khan agreed to join Moḥammad Khan because he was persuaded that the crisis could be settled through the good offices of the latter, to the satisfaction of the Shah and all concerned.

Although the fact that the emirs had assembled and acted in concert in this way was indicative of their rebellious intent, Ḥamza Mīrzā wanted the facts of the matter to be publicly known, and he opened negotiations with them. First, a messenger was sent to them on behalf of the Shah, who recalled their past services to the Safavid house and stated that their duty clearly dictated that they should have hurried to the defense of Tabriz as soon as they heard of the Ottoman invasion; they need not have awaited an official call to arms, and in any case there was no need for them to have delayed their departure by assembling at a rendezvous. If they had had some grievance to bring to the Shah, this could have been done after the enemy had been repulsed. Although urgent summonses had been sent requesting their assistance, they had procrastinated beyond all reasonable bounds, and now that they *had* come, they had come all together, thus demonstrating their seditious intent. If they were genuine in their protestations of loyalty, they should split up and proceed separately to Tabriz to perform the ceremony of kissing the Shah's feet. A separate message was sent to Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū Takkalū. It mentioned the close ties of kinship between him and the Shah, and asked what business he had getting involved in a dispute in which the Turkman emirs were accusing Ḥamza Mīrzā of being responsible for the death of Emir Khan. The message urged him to dissociate himself from the Turkmans and to proceed on his own to Tabriz.

The Takkalū and Turkman emirs replied that the Shah was well aware of the long-standing feud between the Takkalūs and Turkmans on the one hand, and the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs on the other. This feud had been revived by recent events in Khorasan, in which the Takkalūs and Turkmans, to demonstrate their loyalty to Ḥamza Mīrzā, had slain many *qezelbāš* from those two tribes. Now the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs had won the favor of Ḥamza Mīrzā, and had turned the prince against themselves. The execution of Emir Khan was clear proof of their mischievous intent, because Emir Khan had done nothing to merit death. "Our request is," concluded the emirs, "that the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs be removed from positions of influence around Ḥamza Mīrzā; the reason why we have come together in this way is that we are afraid of our enemies." Mosīb Khan excused his association with the other emirs in terms appropriate to his situation.

To this the Shah and the prince rejoined that all the devoted *qezelbāš* tribes deserved a fitting reward for their services. It was true that some members of the Šāmlū and Ostājlū tribes had staged a revolt in Khorasan. On the other hand, other members of those same tribes in Iraq and Azerbaijan were the obedient servants of the crown, and had performed outstanding services on its behalf—particularly men like Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, who was one of the senior Ostājlū emirs, and the sons of Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū. They should not be punished for the crimes of others. 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū, who was the recipient of royal patronage, had been in the service of Ḥamza Mīrzā since the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah; his conduct had been unexceptionable, and he had not been guilty of any misdemeanor. So if he had been the recipient of royal favor, what was wrong with that, and why should other *qezelbāš* tribes resent it?

As to the matter of Emir Khan, this action had been taken by Ḥamza Mīrzā entirely on his own responsibility, because Emir Khan had incurred his displeasure. It was no time to discuss this matter when Tabriz was in the hands of the enemy. The situation demanded that the emirs should assist in the capture of the citadel at Tabriz, and should desist from seditious activity. "If you persist in your attitude of rebellion," concluded the Shah and the prince, "we judge it necessary to take military action against you, since you are unable to see what the overall good of the state demands and are impervious apparently to feelings of shame at your disloyal conduct."

The emirs replied by reiterating their devotion to the crown. "But," they said, "we have banded together to resist our enemies; when we reach the foot of the throne, we will carry out any commands of the Shah and the prince which do not provide gratification for our enemies."

Next, Ḥamza Mīrzā tried to detach Ommat Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs and the leader of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe, from the coalition. The prince reminded the Khan that it was he who had appointed him to his governorate. The Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe had always been loyal Sufis devoted to the Safavid house; at no time had they been close friends of the Takkalū and Turkman tribes, nor had they suffered any affliction from their enemies. Consequently, said the prince, if the Takkalūs and Turkmans, in order to achieve their own ends, had elected to act in concert and march together on Tabriz, what had this got to do with the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe? If the Ẕu'l-Qadars were relying on the wisdom of the Takkalū and Turkman leaders to settle the crisis, there were other and equally wise heads at court of which use could be made. They should come to court and enter into discussions with the senior chiefs of the tribes; a course of action would be determined upon that would be in the best interests of the state. The alternative was to be treated as rebels, like the Takkalūs and Turkmans, and they would share the infamy which was the lot of traitors.

This message was conveyed to the emirs' camp by Ḥabīb Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, an *aide-de-camp* of Ḥamza Mīrzā. Ommat Khan considered himself bound by the oaths he had sworn to Moḥammad Khan and refused to submit to the royal commands. Moḥammad Khan and his fellow emirs, not satisfied with that, forced Ommat Khan to put Ḥabīb Beg to death at Solṭānīya, despite the opposition of some of the Ẕu'l-Qadars to this foul deed, as proof that he was sincere in his attachment to the Turkmans.

When the coalition of emirs neared Tabriz, Ḥamza Mīrzā sent another envoy, 'Alī Khan Beg Torkmān, the *dārūġa* of the secretariat,[101] one of the sons of Fatḥī Beg Parvānčī-oġlū and a leading emir of that clan, whose ancestors had a tradition of outstanding service to the state. 'Alī Khan Beg's mission was to try and bring the coalition emirs back to their allegiance and obedience to the prince's commands; to get them to desist from discussing Emir Khan; and to obtain from them a promise not to enter a dispute with 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oġlū and Moḥammadī Beg Sārū Sūlāġ on this matter. After the citadel at Tabriz had been captured, provision would be made for the posterity of Emir Khan in a manner satisfactory to Moḥammad Khan. However, when 'Alī Khan reached the emirs' camp, he pleaded an indisposition and did not return.

When the coalition finally reached the outskirts of Tabriz and camped there, Ḥamza Mīrzā sent yet another envoy, Adham Khan Torkmān, the son of Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq, who was an honored emir in his service and a friend of 'Alīqolī Khan. Adham Khan had been wont to hang his head in shame at royal assemblies during the recital of the misdemeanors of the Turkmans. Ḥamza Mīrzā now gave him the opportunity to sublimate his guilt feelings by going to the emirs' camp and counseling them not to continue on the path of revolt. If they had a mind to accept his advice, they could use him as a mediator and return to duty. If not, Adham Khan should remain with his tribe, because it was obvious that, if the emirs were bent on revolt, they would keep Adham Khan with them as they had kept 'Alīqolī Khan and others.

Adham Khan departed on his mission, but went the way of his predecessors. His words had no effect, and Moḥammad Khan was delighted to see him and kept him with him. The emirs were now at Sa'īdābād, only four *farsaḵs* from Tabriz, and the Takkalūs and Turkmans who were in the royal camp, fearful of their fate, began to slip away to join the coalition emirs. Not only that, but Kačal Moṣṭafā Afšār, who after the defection of Jabbārqolī Beg to the Ottomans had been appointed *qūrčībāšī* to Ḥamza Mīrzā, joined the rebels without apparent cause. Anyone who for any reason had a grudge against Ḥamza Mīrzā also slipped away by night to join them.

At this juncture, Ḥamza Mīrzā, fearing a sudden démarche on the part of the rebels, moved the Shah, the royal princes, and the members of the harem from their royal residence in the city to the house and castle of Emir Khan. These were located in the direction of the Ottoman fort and the breastwork commanded by Ḥamza Mīrzā; they were the residence of 'Alīqolī Khan, and Ḥamza Mīrzā had made them the headquarters from which he directed the siege operations. 'Alīqolī Khan thus became the host of the royal family and responsible for its safety. He ordered a number of the great emirs, with men of the royal bodyguard and personal retainers of the royal family, to maintain a constant guard on the royal residence, and other troops constantly patrolled the area up to the end of the main street that carried traffic to Iraq.

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[101] *Dārūġa-ye daftarḵāna;* he was subordinate to the comptroller of finance (See *TM*, p. 122); Chardin renders his title as *prévôt de la chambre* (see *TM*, p. 198).

The coalition emirs now advanced from Sa'īdābād to Fahvasfanj, two *farsaḵs* from the city, and sent forward armed patrols. The next day they sent to the Shah an envoy who restated their previous position: the Ostājlū tribe, they said, was guilty of slaying Emir Khan without cause; they considered 'Alīqolī Khan answerable for his blood. Ḥamza Mīrzā should arrest the murderers and hand them over to the sons of Emir Khan for execution; they could no longer tolerate the sight of them basking in royal favor and holding important positions in the state. Ḥamza Mīrzā did not shift from his former position either. Negotiations continued, but it was clear that the coalition emirs would not return to their allegiance unless their demands were satisfied, and there was a strong possibility that they might enter the city and try to obtain their ends by force. Ḥamza Mīrzā considered this an affront to his dignity as a prince. He abandoned his attempts at negotiation and began to upbraid the rebels in harsh terms.

The coalition emirs remained at Fahvasfanj for two more days, and then moved into the city in battle order, with skirmishers thrown out in front. Ḥamza Mīrzā insisted that the Shah himself should mount his horse, and he rode off at his father's side. The prince was by now so enraged by the behavior of the rebels that none of the principal officers of state dared to utter any protest at this action. By the time that the royal party had reached the beginning of the main avenue, the Ostājlū forward patrols had already engaged the rebels.

After a number of contestants had been wounded, a group of emirs (Emāmqolī Khan Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ; Moḥammadī Khan Tokmāq; Seyyed Beg Kamūna; Šāhqolī Ḵolafā-ye Rūmlū; and

'Alīqolī Khan), rode up to the prince and held his horse's reins while they made the following loyal address to him: "It is not fitting that illustrious kings should in person take the field against their rebellious subjects. Further, it is already evening. If your royal highness rides forward only a few more steps, many men will lose their lives this dark night. Are the rebels so powerful as to justify your taking punitive action against them in person? Our advice is that you retire for tonight and delay further action against the rebels for a few days. It may be that your loyal servants can persuade them to humble themselves and submit to you. If we fail in our attempt, there is no need to worry your royal head about them—we can cope with them quite adequately." Ḥamza Mīrzā followed their advice, recalled his patrols, reported the situation to his father, the Shah, and they returned together.

The next day, the coalition emirs sent a request that a team of negotiators be appointed. Ḥamza Mīrzā refused to send anyone, considering it beneath his dignity to negotiate further with the rebels. However, the Shah acceded to their request and sent the *qāżī-ye 'askar* (military chaplain), Mīr Abu'l-Valī Enjū (who later became *ṣadr);* Seyyed Beg Kamūna; and Šāhqolī Ḵolafā-ye Rūmlū, all moderate men. To prevent a repetition of the Adham Khan incident, when the royal envoy was detained by the rebels, it was stipulated that the negotiators from both sides should advance from opposite ends of the main avenue, and should meet and conduct their negotiations on horseback halfway down the avenue, under the watchful eye of their respective patrols, and should then return.

The negotiators for the rebels inquired why Ḥamza Mīrzā, merely for his own satisfaction, was sheltering two troublemakers from tribes which had caused all sorts of strife in Khorasan, at the expense of alienating three loyal tribes like the Turkmans, Takkalūs, and Ẕu'l-Qadars. They also inquired why, at a time when the Ottomans were occupying a citadel in Tabriz, he was seeking to disperse ten thousand men who had braved the rigors of winter to reach Tabriz. The Shah's negotiating team made soothing replies. The gist of these replies was that the Ostājlū and Šāmlū tribes were also loyal *qezelbāš* tribes. At the moment, there were some ten thousand members of these two tribes living in Iraq, and their destruction would throw the Ostājlū and Šāmlū tribes into despair. The Shah cultivated them in the hope of encouraging the Ḵorāsānī branches of these tribes to return to their allegiance, and it was much better for the rebels not to try and swim in these deep waters. After a great deal of discussion, the Shah's negotiators succeeded in persuading the rebels to refrain from demanding satisfaction for the death of Emir Khan.

"But," went on the rebels, "ʿAlīqolī Khan and Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāḡ are the authors of all this trouble, and have poisoned the Shah's mind against us. If, for the sake of the security of the realm, they cannot be deprived of royal favor, at least, for the sake of soothing the hearts of the Turkman tribe and the sons and followers of Emir Khan, let them be sent to some provincial governorate, say in the Hamadan area, so that they no longer remain at court. This will go some way toward restoring the prestige of the Turkman tribe, and will enable us to return to court in the Shah's service. If these conditions are fulfilled, we are ready to present ourselves at court whenever the Shah shall command." The royal negotiators dutifully reported all this, but no action was taken because Ḥamza Mīrzā was determined to protect ʿAlīqolī Khan and Moḥammadī.

These two men expressed their gratitude to the prince in a royal assembly. "However," they said, "we cannot agree to any course of action which is to the detriment of the state. Two men cannot be weighed in the scales against ten thousand. We will carry out without delay whatever course of action is, in the judgment of your royal highness, in the best interests of the state." The prince replied that his stubborn determination not to yield in this matter was not for their sakes. but for his own, because he had chosen to extend his patronage to them. The attacks of their enemies were an insult to himself, and to expel them from court would be bad policy and evidence of the weakness of the throne. He would therefore stand firm, and would never consent to any course of action of which he disapproved. God, he said, would soon judge between himself and those traitors. Meanwhile, the two men were to remain where they were.

The next day, an astonishing incident occurred at court. Esmāʿīlqolī, the brother of Ḥoseyn ʿAlī Alkasan-oḡlū Ẕu'l-Q̣adar, who was one of the troublemakers among the *qezelbāš* and was constantly instigating mischief of some kind, went to see Ḥamza Mīrzā with a number of other troublemakers like Ṭahmāspqolī Beg Afšār the *qāpūčī* (doorkeeper), the brother of Šahsavār Beg the chief doorkeeper, and Ḵalīfa Q̣ājār and other members of the royal bodyguard who were on guard duty. Adopting a hypocritical attitude of humble submission, they declared that the most important people at court were the members of the royal bodyguard. "We are involved in every aspect of state affairs, and other people have no option but to obey us. Now, however, we find ourselves in a quandary. We do not understand why, for the sake of 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū and Moḥammad Sārū Sūlāḡ, such a division has been allowed to occur between the *qezelbāš* tribes that civil war will ensue. Why are the Turkman, Takkalū and Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs not allowed to play their part in capturing the citadel from the Ottomans?"

A number of those brainless simpletons who are called *pīra* and *ḵalīfa*[102] among the *qezelbāš* Sufis applauded this action on the part of the royal bodyguard, calling it "conduct appropriate to a Sufi" *(ṣūfīgarī)* and "true devotion to the Shah." They all decided to go to Ḥamza Mīrzā, and in accordance with the normal practice between a spiritual director and his disciples, put their problem to him and ask him to resolve it. Meanwhile, the more stupid members of the royal bodyguard concocted a plan, if Ḥamza Mīrzā failed to set their minds at rest, to fall on 'Alīqolī Khan and Moḥammadī in a body and to slay anyone who stood in their way. With this vicious idea in their heads, they set up a shout, "Let all who love the Shah and are well-wishers of the Safavid house gather round us." A large mob assembled, as the appeal to "those who love the Shah" became generally known, and the leaders of the group went as a delegation to see Ḥamza Mīrzā. They formed a "circle of divine unity,"[103] as is the custom of Sufis of the Safavid Order, and began to chant the name of God and to declare His unity.

Before the meeting of this delegation with the prince had taken place, a group of ignorant mischief makers, looking for action and not talk, rushed into 'Alīqolī Khan's saddle shop and other workshops and started looting. A report having got around that 'Alīqolī Khan and Moḥammadī had been slain, the mob attacked and plundered the houses of most of the retainers of 'Alīqolī Khan, Moḥammadī, and other Ostājlū nobles in various wards of the city. This was joyful news to the Takkalū and Turkman emirs.

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[102] See R. M. Savory, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Ṣafavids" in *JAOS*, 85, 4, pp. 497-502. It is interesting to find a pejorative reference to the Safavid Sufi organization as early as this; of course this may be a case of prolepsis.

[103] *Ḥalqa-e towḥīd.* Every Thursday evening, the Sufis of the Safavid Order used to gather in the *towḥīd-ḵāna* (House of Unity), which was situated close to the palace, for the purpose of performing the *ẕekr* ritual (chanting the name of God), etc. (see *TM*, pp. 55, 126).

Meanwhile, the delegation had pressed up against the windows of the palace and spoken to Ḥamza Mīrzā, but they had only alluded to 'Alīqolī Khan and Moḥammadī, and had not dared actually to mention their names. Ḥamza Mīrzā initially received them courteously, but pointed out that he was not their spiritual director; their *moršed* was Sultan Moḥammad Shah, whom they would find at home. They should take their petition to him. He said he was the deputy and heir-apparent of their king and spiritual director, and had no ambition other than loyal service to him.

Ḥamza Mīrzā ordered Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šāmlū to go and find out what the trouble was really all about. Esmā'īlqolī Khan stood in the window and shouted soothing words to the delegation; God willing, he said, everything would be arranged in accordance with the interests of the state. Civil war would not be allowed to break out between the *qezelbāš* tribes; Ḥamza Mīrzā did not wish strife between two groups which were both in the service of the same monarch, and would do his best to avert it.

This did not satisfy the delegates, who started shouting more loudly, and this time, when the prince inquired whom they were talking about, 'Alīqolī Khan spoke up and said that, although they were using allusions, they were in fact referring to him. "They want," he said, "to make myself and Moḥammadī the victims of royal wrath in order to appease the rebel emirs and make it possible for them to return to court without fears and apprehensions. We have repeatedly said that our lives are at the disposal of your royal highness." Ḥamza Mīrzā replied: "If this is the case, they should be talking to me, not you, because I was responsible for the execution of Emir Khan, and it is I who have extended my patronage to you.

Esmā'īlqolī Khan failed in his attempts to satisfy the delegates and persuade them to depart; on the contrary, they became bolder and began to shout distinctly the names of 'Alīqolī Khan and Moḥammadī. Why should the foundations of the state be shaken, they said, for the sake of two troublemakers? They abused Esmā'īlqolī Khan and reviled him: "You are one of the seditious people who deserve to be put to death. You should be the first to be killed." Ḥamza Mīrzā, who hated Ḥoseyn 'Alī Alkasan-oğlū because the latter was one of the murderers of his mother, now flared up with rage at the insolence of the protest group. He drew his sword and waded into the rioters. The first person whose blood was up sufficiently to oppose him was Ḥoseyn 'Alī, and Ḥamza Mīrzā killed him with one blow of his sword. After him, Ṭahmāspqolī Beg the doorkeeper, and anyone else who had the temerity to stand against him, were also slain, and the rest scattered.

After this incident, the prince showed more favor than ever to 'Alīqolī Khan. The latter had lost his turban jewel, his turban, and his *qezelbāš* hat when his saddle room was looted. The prince replaced these with a brocade turban, a turban cloth woven with gold threads, and a distinctive turban jewel of his own. 'Alīqolī Khan was then ordered to take the Ostājlū emirs and parade through the city to put down rumors of his death. The following night, however, an even more astonishing event took place.

When he received the news of this setback to his hopes, Moḥammad Khan conceived the plan of abducting one of the royal princes, retiring to Iraq, and proclaiming him king. Two princes, Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā and Tahmasp Mīrzā, were with their father and brother in Emir Khan's fort. At night, guardians *(lala* and *dada)* were stationed to guard their bedroom, which was near the Shah's private quarters. Abū Ṭāleb's *lala* and *dada* were both Takkalūs; his *lala,* Ḵalīl Beg Takkalū, had remained in Iraq and at that time was with the coalition emirs.

Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā was an intelligent boy, and the emirs realized it would be difficult to deceive him. On the other hand, Tahmasp Mīrzā was still a youngster, and his *lala,* Keyḵosrow Beg Gorjī, was an ingenuous officer of limited intelligence. Moḥammad Khan persuaded two Turkman members of the royal bodyguard to suborn Keyḵosrow with promises of a governorship and monetary rewards, and to abduct Tahmasp Mīrzā and bring him to the Turkman camp. Keyḵosrow agreed to have two swift horses ready at the appointed time beneath the tower where the prince slept and to abduct the prince, either still drugged with sleep as is usual with children (the prince was ten years old at the time), or awake, as the case might be, and lower him in a sack by a rope from the battlements. All went according to plan, and Keyḵosrow delivered the prince to the Takkalū-Turkman camp. Some said that it was the *qūrčīs* who dreamed up this wild scheme, and that Moḥammad Khan Torkmān had no knowledge of it, but this is not credible. On the contrary, some such plan had been in their minds from the beginning of their revolt.

The emirs conferred kingship on Tahmasp Mīrzā because he bore the same name as Shah Tahmasp and because the latter also came to the throne in his eleventh year. They forgot that Shah Tahmasp was the eldest son of Shah Esma'il I and had come to the throne by virtue of being heir-apparent and the natural successor of his father, whereas Tahmasp Mīrzā's father was still living and still shah, and the prince had elder brothers who had a prior claim to the throne. It is difficult to see, therefore, how the emirs could have deluded themselves into thinking that Tahmasp Mīrzā had a valid claim to kingship.

As soon as Tahmasp Mīrzā was safely in the Turkman camp, the coalition emirs marched off in the direction of Iraq. The following morning, consternation prevailed in the royal household. A few shortsighted people actually suggested that Sultan Moḥammad Shah was behind the abduction of Tahmasp Mīrzā, and the Ostājlū and Šāmlū emirs, believing this absurd suggestion, made Ḥamza Mīrzā suspicious of his father.

The circumstances that had given rise to this rumor were as follows: Sultan Moḥammad Shah's mother was a Turkman[104] and had many relations among the coalition emirs. Many of these emirs were kinsmen of the Shah himself, and the Shah had always shown favor to that group as a result. For instance, Mosīb Khan Takkalū was the maternal cousin of the Shah, and Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīnoğlū, his father, had been the Shah's guardian when the Shah, then only a child, had been appointed governor-general of Khorasan. The Shah, in fact, had grown up among the Takkalū tribe; when he talked, the name of Moḥammad Khan Takkalū would often crop up. The Shah often used to praise his conduct compared with that of his subsequent guardian, Šāhqolī Sultan Ostājlū, and he used to think of the Takkalū tribe as being related to himself. Consequently, when the Takkalūs and Turkmans began to misbehave, the Shah, not wishing the Takkalū and Turkman emirs who were at court to become alienated from Ḥamza Mīrzā, from time to time adopted a conciliatory role that indicated his bias. Ḥamza Mīrzā, in the year or so that had elapsed since he gained his majority,[105] had taken the conduct of state affairs very much into his own hands, and had frequently behaved in a manner not unusual in young men but which annoyed his father. For all these reasons, people thought that the Shah harbored feelings of resentment against his son, and so they were ready to give credence to this rumor.

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[104] She was the daughter of the Turkman Emir Mūsā Sultan Mowṣellū.

[105] I.e., since he reached the age of eighteen in 992/1554-55.

The truth of the matter was, however, that the Shah continued to regard his son with affection, dedicated himself to gratifying his desires, and considered his opinion paramount in matters of state. As a result, he could not understand why, despite all the affection he had lavished on Ḥamza Mīrzā, despite all the efforts he had made to please him, and despite the fact that he had made him his heir-apparent, his relations with his son had deteriorated.

However that might be, Ḥamza Mīrzā and his supporters considered that punitive action against the coalition emirs should take priority over the capture of the citadel at Tabriz. Ḥamza Mīrzā realized that if he and the Shah went in pursuit of the rebels, with a view to intercepting them en route and attacking them before they had had a chance to set their affairs in order, they would have to abandon Tabriz and perhaps the whole of Azerbaijan. After the royal standards had left Tabriz, none of the Azerbaijan emirs would be able to maintain his position there; on the other hand, if they left a detachment to assist the Azerbaijan emirs in besieging the citadel, the forces left at their own disposal would be insufficient to deal with the rebels.

In the end, Ḥamza Mīrzā decided to leave his brother Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā with his father at Tabriz, with Moḥammad Khan Toḵmāq, Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, and other emirs together with a detachment of men of the royal bodyguard. He himself, with his personal retainers, and 'Alīqolī Khan and the emirs who had fiefs in Iraq, marched toward Iraq by way of Ardabīl and Ḵalḵāl, recruiting any supporters they found on the way. On the same day, Ḥamza Mīrzā obtained permission from the Shah to appoint as guardian of Esma'il Mīrzā Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Qazvin, and to send him ahead by forced marches via Ṭārom and Ḵalḵāl, with the object of getting to Qazvin before the rebels.

Since the families of most of the *qezelbāš* were at Qazvin, and men were pouring into the city to protect their wives and children, Esmā'īlqolī Khan was ordered to make use of these men to erect barricades in the streets and to put the city and the palace in a state of defense pending the arrival of the royal army. It was thought probable that, when the rebels heard that Esmā'īlqolī Khan had reached Qazvin, the emirs would disperse, each to his own fief. Esmā'īlqolī Khan left the same day to carry out his orders, but he did not take the young prince with him.

Ḥamza Mīrzā's Pursuit of and Victory over the Rebels

When the royal army marched from Tabriz, Moḥammadī Khan Tok̲mãq was appointed governor of the city and ordered, together with Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāḡ, and the other Azerbaijan emirs, to continue the siege of the citadel. A number of *qūrčīs* and attendants at court were detailed to guard the palace, where Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā was left with his father. Since the withdrawal of the major part of the siege force obviously meant further delay in capturing the citadel, the bourgeoisie of Tabriz became extremely restless. They were calmed by Ḥamza Mīrzā's promise to return to Tabriz within three months.

Ḥamza Mīrzā left Tabriz with a force made up of his personal retainers, some emirs and some *qūrčīs*—not more than three thousand men in all. He marched to Ardabīl in seven stages[106] and visited the Safavid shrine and the tombs of his ancestors. He spent a week there celebrating the advent of the Year of the Dog, 994/1586. Since the enemy forces were larger than his he was in no hurry to engage them, but advanced slowly toward Iraq by way of K̲alk̲āl. He tried to recruit men as he went, but with little success. Even the Šeyk̲āvand tribe, despite their ties with the Safavid house, failed to come forward; in fact, they showed signs of hostility, seizing some of Ḥamza Mīrzā's personal mounts which were being brought along in the rear. When Ḥamza Mīrzā reached Ṭārom, he paused again to gather his forces and orderd Pīr Ǧeyb Khan Ostājlū, the governor of Ṭārom, to guard the bridge. Because the river was in flood, few peasants joined the prince's army. Food supplies ran short. After a few days of short rations, Ḥamza Mīrzā broke up all the gold and silver vessels belonging to his establishment and distributed them among the *qezelbāš.*

At this juncture, news came that Tahmasp Mīrzā and the rebels had occupied Qazvin, and that Esmā'īlqolī Khan had fled to Rūdbār and then toward Deylamān. Esmā'īlqolī Khan had carried out his orders; he had barricades erected in the streets and placed musketeers and archers at each. When Tahmasp Mīrzā and the emirs of the Takkalū-Turkman coalition reached Abhar, they heard that Esmā'īlqolī Khan had occupied the city and sent an envoy, 'Alī Khan Sultan Torkmān, the *dārūḡa-ye daftark̲āna,* to call on him to submit. The substance of their message was as follows:

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[106] The distance from Tabriz to Ardabīl is about 120 miles.

> Our king and spiritual director, Sultan Moḥammad Shah, is—God be praised!—securely seated on the throne, and we have no object in mind but to render loyal service to him. We know that you are a reasonable and sensible fellow. We had expected that Ḥamza Mīrzā would have made some effort at Tabriz to satisfy our demands and would not reject them out of hand. We had despaired of obtaining any concessions from the prince, and had not even been granted an audience, when something happened which necessitated our return. Now we hope that you will put an end to discord and open negotiations with us, so that all outstanding issues may be resolved in the best interest of the state and in accordance with your considered judgment.

Without waiting for a reply, the emirs had advanced and camped about a *farsaḵ* from the city.

Esmāʿīlqolī Khan found the emirs' message unacceptable; moreover, he did not trust them. On the other hand, he felt unable to oppose them. He therefore sent ʿAlī Khan Sultan back with a friendly reply, but slipped out of the city the same night with his family and any unmarried men among the Šāmlūs, and went in the direction of Rūdbār. Mīr Jaʿfar Qazvīnī, the superintendent[107] at Qazvin, and Pahlavān Sultan Maḥmūd, the commander of the watch *(ʿasasbāšī)*, accompanied Esmāʿīlqolī Khan because they were supporters of Ḥamza Mīrzā. The Turkman-Takkalū emirs entered the city without opposition, and installed Tahmasp Mīrzā in the royal palace. At an auspicious moment, Tahmasp Mīrzā was proclaimed heir-apparent to Sultan Moḥammad Shah. The rebel emirs took possession of everything belonging to Ḥamza Mīrzā that remained in the city—including his *farrāšḵāna*,[108] his equipment, and the royal workshops. They also sought out and confiscated any money and property belonging to the civilian and military officers in the employ of the prince.

Shah Qevām al-Dīn Ḥoseyn, the son of the *ṣadr* Shah Taqī al-Dīn Moḥammad Eṣfahānī,[109] who was the grandson of Qāżī Jahān, the vizier of Shah Tahmasp, was on his way to court hoping to obtain employment in the service of Ḥamza Mīrzā. He arrived at Qazvin at this time and was appointed by the coalition emirs vizier to Tahmasp Mīrzā, with the title of *e'temād al-dowla.*[110] Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn, the son of Mīrzā Šokrollāh the comptroller *(mostowfī)* of Shah Tahmasp, was appointed comptroller of finance, and various other administrative appointments were made. The office of *vakīl* was a matter of dispute between the Takkalū and Turkman tribes, and finally Moḥammad Khan appointed himself guardian to the prince and named Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlū as his *vakīl.* The real power, however, was in the hands of Moḥammad Khan, who sent couriers to Isfahan, to all parts of Iraq, and elsewhere to announce the enthronement of Tahmasp Mīrzā. On their official documents, however, the coalition emirs continued to observe due protocol in regard to the Shah, Sultan Moḥammad; following the practice of Ḥamza Mīrzā, they affixed their seals at the bottom of the document, not at the top.

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[107] *Motaṣaddī* in Safavid usage usually denotes the manager of some subbranch of the administration.

[108] The *farrāšbāšī's* department dealt with the repair, maintenance, and equipping of tents, and so on (see *TM*, p. 67).

[109] He was *ṣadr* from 964/1556–57 to 970/1562–63 (see Savory, Offices II, p. 80).

Meanwhile, Valī Khan Takkalū had been sent in pursuit of Esmā'īlqolī Khan; he trapped the latter in a narrow defile near Rūdbār. Esmā'īlqolī Khan turned at bay with his musketeers and archers. One of the local inhabitants, who knew the country, led Valī Khan around to the rear of Esmā'īlqolī Khan's men, who were thrown into confusion by being attacked from two different directions. The sons of Mowlānā Ne'matollāh Rūdbārī volunteered their services to Esmā'īlqolī Khan and said that, if he would abandon his baggage, they would lead him through the forests by paths which were sure to be free of the enemy. Esmā'īlqolī Khan had no choice but to accept their offer and follow them to Deylamān, taking only a handful of men with him. Most of the Šāmlū soldiers dismounted from their horses, stripped off their military uniforms, and with great difficulty made their way to Deylamān. Khan Aḥmad, the governor of Gīlan, sent them gifts in homage and salutation. All the Šāmlū equipment and possessions fell into the hands of the Takkalūs; some of it had been damaged, but the rest they took back to Qazvin. Moḥammad Khan did not allow them to lay a finger on the families of the Šāmlūs.

After the return of Valī Khan, the coalition emirs decided to mount punitive expeditions against those *qezelbāš* tribes living in the neighborhood of Qazvin that had not so far come to the capital to tender their submission. Considering this misdeed, like their earlier misdeeds, a perfectly proper course of action, they plundered the Ūsālū and Īrlū clans of the Afšār tribe, and were on the point of making a similar raid on the Bayāt tribe when they heard that Ḥamza Mīrzā had crossed the Qezel Ūzūn and reached Čaman-e Māhān. They then marched out to give battle to him.

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[110] Lit.: trusted support of the state; see *EI*², under I'timād al-Dawla.

Hearing of Esmā'īlqolī Khan's defeat and flight, Ḥamza Mīrzā sent an aide to guide him to his own camp via Pāvrūd Bābā Manṣūrī and Ṭārom. From his own establishment, the prince sent tents, equipment for workshops, and other necessities to Esmā'īlqolī Khan, his brothers, and the Šāmlū junior officers. He sent mounts for the Šāmlū emirs and officers, and provided mounts for the other men by commandeering all the spare horses his own forces had with them. 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū and the other emirs also sent contributions. After Esmā'īlqolī Khan had rejoined him, Ḥamza Mīrzā crossed the Qezel Ūzūn and marched to Čaman-e Māhān, where he was joined by the Ostājlūs from Ḵalḵāl and Ṭārom. From there, he moved to Čaman-e Solṭānīya, where he was joined by Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Sultan and the Īmūr tribe from Zenjān-rūd. The news of the Takkalū and Turkman raids on the tribal encampments around Qazvin had the effect of sending everyone who could scurrying to join the prince at Solṭānīya. Dowlatyār Sīāh-Manṣūr,[111] a *qūrčī* in the service of the prince, whom he had made emir of the Sīāh-Manṣūr tribe, arrived with a body of Kurds from his tribe. Although most of these reinforcements were auxiliary troops and few were fully equipped, they helped to swell the numbers of Ḥamza Mīrzā's army to about seven thousand men, of whom some five thousand were battle-worthy.

Meanwhile, the Takkalū-Turkman forces had reached Čaman-e Māqlavā; they numbered more than ten thousand men, all fully equipped and most with spare mounts. Ḥamza Mīrzā moved from Solṭānīya to a point about two *farsaḵs* from Ṣāyen Qal'a[112] and sent forward Pīr Ĝeyb Khan Ostājlū and two thousand of his men and others ahead as skirmishers. On the left of the skirmishers he stationed 'Alīqolī Khan, Salmās Khan the keeper of the seal, 'Alī Sultan Tātī-oḡlū, and 'Alī Sultan the grandson of Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa Ẕu'l-Qadar the keeper of the seal—about two thousand men in all. On the right, he stationed Esmā'īlqolī Khan, Qūr Ḵoms Khan, and Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa

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[111] See *TM*, p. 16.

[112] Twenty miles southeast of Solṭānīya. The Mongols renamed the original village of Qohūd in honor of Genghis Khan's grandson Ṣāyen (Bātū Khan); see Le Strange, pp. 222-23.

Īnāllū, with the Šāmlū troops—one thousand two hundred in all. The prince took his place in the center with his personal retainers, and Šāhqolī Sultan Ḳolafā, Seyyed Beg Kamūna, and Dowlatyār Sīāh-Manṣūr. Most of the auxiliary troops, whose horses were poor, were placed in the center to create an impression of numbers. As a result, the center numbered in all some three thousand men.

Ḥamza Mīrzā drew up his men for battle, but waited all day in vain for their attack. When he heard that the rebels had camped for the night near the Mīānkūh River, he settled his men for the night and posted two or three thousand men in the open plain to guard against surprise attack. He himself, with a group of dedicated followers, spent the night in prayer: "O God," they prayed, "soften the hearts of our intransigent foes, and bring this rebellion to a happy outcome." A copy of the *Rowżat al-Ṣafā* happened to be lying around. Ḥamza Mīrzā ordered a prognostication to be sought from it concerning their fate on the morrow. By chance, the book opened at the chapter about the revolt of certain emirs against Emir Sultan Abū Sa'īd Khan, the son of Öljeytū,[113] with the object of breaking the power of Emir Čūbān; the battle fought between them; and the victory of Abū Sa'īd. Ḥamza Mīrzā vowed that, if he were victorious, he would not behave as did the victors in that battle; he would not put a single person to death.

Before dawn, Ḥamza Mīrzā said goodbye to Zeynab Begom,[114] his paternal aunt and chief lady of the royal household, and to the other women of the harem and their children. He placed Aqa Jān Beg Afšār and the *qūrčīs* of the harem bodyguard on guard over the royal tent, and drew up his men in the same battle order as the previous day. No sooner had his men taken up their positions on some rising ground than they saw a vast cloud of dust in the midst of which appeared to be about twenty thousand of the enemy. After hesitating for a while, they advanced into the plain until they were able to see that the "enemy" consisted of the rebel army's camels, which were laden and following in the rear of their troops. The morale of the prince's troops rose slightly, but there is every likelihood that, had the rebels been able to attack at the moment when the prince's forces had halted in dismay, they would have won the day.

I, the author of these words, then twenty-six years of age, and enrolled among the men of the pen and the officials of Ḥamza Mīrzā's bureaucracy, with the stupidity typical of a young man of my age, put on armor and took up arms, and took my place with my lance among the warriors. I never left the side of the prince until the victory was won. I was therefore able to perceive all the details of the engagement, and to set down on paper an exact account of the battle as I saw it.

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[113] The Mongol Il-Khan, ruler of Iran 1317-35.

[114] The daughter of Shah Tahmasp, and therefore Ḥamza's father's sister.

When the rebel army drew closer, it became possible to see that its center was in two parts: one commanded by Mosīb Khan and Valī Khan at the head of their Takkalūs, with 'Alī Khan Sultan Pākmāl out ahead in a skirmishing role; the other commanded by Moḥammad Khan, Ommat Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, Adham Khan, Esmā'īl Khan the brother of Emir Khan, Sultan Ma'ṣūm Khan Tarḵān, and the rest of the Turkman emirs, with Golābī Khan, the son of Emir Khan, out ahead as skirmisher. Tahmasp Mīrzā's golden parasol was visible in the center of the Turkman troops. When battle was joined, the Takkalūs faced the Šāmlūs, and the Turkmans the Ostājlūs. In the early fighting, 'Alī Sultan Pākmāl was killed by the Šāmlūs, and Esmā'īl Khan's vizier, Ḥamza Beg, reported this to Ḥamza Mīrzā. On the left of the royal army, the Ostājlūs also got the better of the Turkman skirmishers. 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū, who liked to think of himself as an outstanding warrior, foolishly left his station in the center of the Ostājlūs and rode forward to join those in the front ranks in hand-to-hand fighting. The Turkmans were thrown into disorder by the Ostājlūs, and Šāhqolī Sultan, the brother of Emir Khan, was killed; the Ostājlūs brought back his head, his war trumpets and his weapons.

On the right of the front, the Takkalūs now launched a fierce charge that shattered the Šāmlū ranks. Shah Karam Beg the Lame, the *dārūğa* of Qazvin, was slain with several other valiant youths, and Ḥamza Beg was taken prisoner. Simultaneously, the Turkmans, including all the brothers and followers of Emir Khan, and Šāhqolī Sultan Pīāda and others, charged the Ostājlūs, determined to smash 'Alīqolī Khan and take revenge for the death of Emir Khan. Pīr Ǧeyb Beg Ostājlū and his skirmishers were swept aside, and the impetus of the Turkman charge carried them right through to the Ostājlū center, where 'Alīqolī Khan had left his post. Without their leader to rally them, the Ostājlūs scattered in all directions, and their standards and war drums were lost. 'Alīqolī Khan, who had been riding furiously around the battlefield engaging in individual combat, finally extricated himself with a few companions and retreated to the foothills.

When the prince saw the rout of both his wings, he threw into the battle Aslams Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar the keeper of the seal and a number of other Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs, who had been stationed on the left of the center in reserve, to assist 'Alīqolī Khan, but the move was ineffectual. 'Alīqolī Sultan Tātī-oğlū Ẕu'l-Qadar was killed. The shattered remnants of the Ẕu'l-Qadars fled in disorder, not even stopping when they reached the center where Ḥamza Mīrzā himself was stationed. As a result, Ḥamza Mīrzā's men too were thrown into some disarray. They were saved by the fact that the wind was blowing toward Ḥamza Mīrzā. The dust of battle obscured the prince's parasol, so that the rebel troops passed right by the prince's center without realizing it and returned to their own lines.

The prince stood his ground resolutely, and sent Mīrzā Hedāyat Najm-e Ṣānī Eṣfahānī to find 'Alīqolī Khan and bring him to him. The reply came back from 'Alīqolī Khan that he did not dare to appear before the prince. All was lost, he said; there was no point in going on living merely to see the triumph of one's enemies. He was resolved to hurl himself into the battle and, engulfed by the enemy, sink into oblivion. The prince sent his messenger a second time, this time accompanied by 'Alīqolī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar Qorūğlū. "Do you imagine," asked the prince in tones of unmistakable scorn, "that I would turn and flee, and count as gain the two extra days of borrowed time thus won? What a vain thought! What an absurd idea! Come here at once, and share whatever befalls me!" After considerable insistence, the envoys succeeded in bringing 'Alīqolī Khan.

The rebel center now began a general advance. The Turkman portion of the center, where Tahmasp Mīrzā was stationed, advanced more slowly, but the Takkalūs, who had been inflamed still more by the death of 'Alī Pākmāl, moved rapidly against the prince's center, preceded by some four or five hundred musketeers who kept up a brisk fire. As they advanced, they left in their rear the Šāmlūs who had been stationed on the right of the prince's army and had been shattered by the earlier Takkalū charge. Moḥammad Khan and Adham Khan Torkmān, with three or four hundred men, placed themselves to protect the Takkalū rear in case the Šāmlūs should reform and attack it.

By the time 'Alīqolī Khan and 'Alīqolī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar reached the prince's side, the Takkalū musketeers were so close that bullets were raining all around him. His parasol bearer, Šāhqolī Beg, a *ḡolām* in the prince's private treasury department, was hit in the leg. Ḥamza Mīrzā gave the parasol to Farroḵ Beg, one of the *ḡolāms* of the royal household *(ḡolām-e ḵāṣṣa-ye šarīfa)* who, after this battle, became known as Farroḵ-e Yaka-tāz, with orders to hold the parasol over his (the prince's) head and not move from his side. The prince's center, shaken by the Takkalū charge, had suffered heavy casualties from musket fire. Many turned to flee. The prince himself, protected by the armor of divine providence, shielded himself against the bullets with his shining shield, now holding it before his face, now turning it this way and that. Even his personal retainers had fallen back several paces—an indication that they were about to flee. All those with him had lost hope, because none of their men remained alive on the battlefield; the plain behind was covered with fugitives for a distance of one *farsaḵ*.

At this point, 'Alī Khan Rūmlū, the chief herald *(jārčībāšī)*, leaped from his horse, seized the reins of Ḥamza Mīrzā's mount, and said: "War has its ups and downs. Brave men are sometimes victorious, sometimes defeated. If our fate is not to win this battle, do not throw away your life needlessly. The time for heroics has passed; there is none to come to our rescue, and the situation is not going to improve. By nightfall, we could ride ten *farsaḵs*—that is no problem for us. Do you ride direct to Azerbaijan, report to the Shah, and mobilize fresh forces there." The prince turned on him with great asperity and said: "What would be the purpose of living burdened with the disgrace of having run away? Men would say, 'that's the man who was put to flight by his younger brother!' I will die fighting, and will not tolerate the shame of flight." So saying, the prince snatched the reins of his horse from the hand of the chief herald, couched his lance, and shouted, "Whoever wishes to taste death with me, that man is my comrade; whoever chooses to save his skin, may God go with him!"

With these words, Ḥamza Mīrzā spurred his horse and charged the oncoming Takkalūs. I was in close attendance on the prince, and I did not see more than fifty men go with him. Simultaneously, Esmā'īlqolī Khan rallied his scattered Šāmlūs and charged Adham Khan Torkmān and his men, who had been detailed to guard the rear of the advancing Takkalūs. Adham Khan's men were broken by the Šāmlū charge, and the Šāmlūs carried on and attacked the Takkalūs in the rear. In the melee, Valī Khan Takkalū was struck by a ball fired by one of his own musketeers. A certain Jamšīd, a *ḡolām* of Sūlāḡ Ḥoseyn, is alleged to have fired the shot to revenge his master. One of Sūlāḡ Ḥoseyn's sons, Beyrām Khan, when this was reported to him, rode forward until he could see the prince's face, and then dismounted. The prince, who considered this action a portent of victory but had no time to stop and talk, told Beyrām Khan to get back on his horse and join in the attack on the Takkalūs. The latter, who had thought the prince's forces defeated, were now fiercely attacked both from the front and the rear; with their leader *hors-de-combat,* they broke and ran. Ommat Beg, an Ostājlū *qūrčī,* unhorsed Valī Khan Takkalū, who was weak from his bullet wound, and decapitated him.

Moḥammad Khan and his Türkmans drew off to the side of the battlefield. Because they had insufficient room to wield their lances, they began to fire volleys of arrows at the prince's forces. The author, who had managed to control his fear up to that point, was now absolutely terrified because the prince's men were surrounded by superior rebel forces. But the prince, drawing rein for no more than a moment, charged again, this time against the Turkman center. Some of the archers were caught with their arrows half-in and half-out of their quivers, and had no chance to get off another shot; the majority threw away their quivers and fled. Most of the Šāmlūs were now engaged in pursuing the Takkalūs, and the Ostājlūs the Turkmans, but Moḥammad Khan maintained his position beside Tahmasp Mīrzā's parasol and colors. Ḥamza Mīrzā's charge carried him past Tahmasp Mīrzā, but one of the prince's personal aides-de-camp *(yasāvolān-e ṣoḥbat),*[115] Rūḥollāh Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, forced his way through to Tahmasp Mīrzā and seized his crown, turban, and turban jewels; his dagger belt and other weapons were seized by 'Alīqolī Sultan. Tahmasp Mīrzā fell from his horse in the struggle and was held by Mahdīqolī Sultan Ṭāleš. The Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs formed a close guard around him and slew any who tried to come to his rescue.

His victory now assured, Ḥamza Mīrzā, mindful of God's injunction, "Fulfill your covenant with me, I will fulfill My covenant with you,"[116] ordered his heralds to proclaim that the slaughter should cease, that any prisoners should be brought to him alive, and that the pursuit should be called off. Some of the Turkmans made their way to the mountains and escaped—Adham Khan to Qom, and Sultan Ma‘ṣūm Khan to Sāva. Ommat Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar reached Yazd en route to Shiraz, but was slain there by the Afšārs. Esma‘il Sultan the brother of Emir Khan, Sultan Morād Khan and Golābī Khan, the sons of Emir Khan, and Shah Būdāq Sultan, a kinsman of Emir Khan, set off for Anatolia, but Morād Khan and Shah Būdāq Sultan later turned back. Esma‘il Sultan returned to the *qezelbāš* fold after the accession of Shah ‘Abbas I; Golābī Khan went to Tiflis to Šaraf Khan Kord, who was Emir Khan's son-in-law. Their subsequent history will be related under the reign of Shah ‘Abbas.

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[115] See *TM,* index, *s.v.*

[116] Koran, 2:41.

The Takkalūs had been scattered all over the plain of Abhar. Tahmasp Mīrzā's guardian, Ḵalīl Beg, was killed, along with many other Takkalū nobles. Of the survivors, some fled to Hamadan, others to Baghdad. Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū was taken prisoner by Moršedqolī Beg, Esmā‘īlqolī Khan's brother. Many of the fugitives were stripped of their possessions by the local peasants, but made their way to safety naked and on foot, thankful to have escaped with their lives. The Turkman and Takkalū baggage camels stationed about half a *farsaḵ* from the battlefield were plundered by the prince's men. Shah Qevām al-Dīn Ḥoseyn Eṣfahānī, Tahmasp Mīrzā's vizier and *e‘temād al-dowla,* was killed in the battle by an unknown hand. Moḥammad Khan was surrounded and set on by at least a hundred men of the lower ranks, but Ḥamza Mīrzā came up just in time to save his life. The prince kept his assailants away from him with his lance, looked at the Khan compassionately, and sent him back to his camp.

After the battle, the prince sent Ḵāja Aqa Shah Abharī, his overseer of the treasury *(mošref-e ḵazāna),* to take the news of victory to his aunt and the other women of the royal household. The messenger reached the prince's camp to find the women disconsolate at the bad news of the earlier course of the battle. On receiving the news of the victory, they beat the kettledrums in triumph. Ḥamza Mīrzā returned to his camp and rested awhile, since he had had two days and nights without sleep. At night, victory festivities were held and the heads of the rebel dead were displayed in front of the audience tent, as a warning to all. The same night, one of the prince's aides-de-camp, Šāhverdī Beg Bāybordlū, took the news of the victory to Tabriz. The next day, Ḥamza Mīrzā held an audience, seated on a jeweled throne, with ‘Alīqolī Khan, Esmā‘īlqolī Khan, Pīr Ḡeyb Khan, and Aslams

Khan standing on his right and left; the rebel heads, weapons, and prisoners were paraded before him.

The first of the prisoners was that innocent child Tahmasp Mīrzā. Ḥamza Mīrzā embraced him warmly and seated him at his side. At Ḥamza Mīrzā's command, Moḥammad Khan and Mosīb Khan were released from their bonds and given a seat at the assembly, and the other prisoners were pardoned. However, a number of particularly wealthy prisoners were handed over to the tax collectors who proceeded to mulct them of their wealth by means of fines and confiscation of property.

Moḥammad Khan was entrusted to the care of ʿAlīqolī Khan, and Mosīb Khan to Esma'il Khan, to be treated as honored guests in their host's house. The two rebel khans were overcome with shame at their misdeeds, and Moḥammad Khan was treated by ʿAlīqolī Khan as a father would treat his son. Two men who were judged to deserve punishment were sewn up in an ox skin for several days. These two were Satelmeš Beg Āsān-oḡlū Īnāllū, who, although from the Šāmlū tribe, had joined the rebels; and Kačal Moṣṭafā Afšār, who had forsaken his post as *qūrčībāšī* to Ḥamza Mīrzā and had also joined the rebels. When the two men were on the point of death, Esmāʿīlqolī Khan interceded for Satelmeš Beg and ʿAlīqolī Khan for Kačal Moṣṭafā, and both prisoners were released. On the other hand, those who had performed outstanding deeds of valor in the battle were duly rewarded.

A few days later, Adham Khan came from Qom, and Sultan Maʿṣūm Khan from Sāva. They were brought into the prince's presence with their swords slung around their necks. Since the prince had always regarded Adham Khan with special affection and had been heard to say that Adham Khan did not really want to belong to the rebel coalition, he pardoned him. Maʿṣūm Khan, however, because he had been guilty of previous misdemeanors and had been slow to answer the call to arms, and because the people under his jurisdiction had complained of his harsh treatment of them, was punished. His possessions were expropriated by the *dīvān*, and his fief of Rayy, the richest land in Iraq, was given to ʿAlīqolī Khan instead of Tabriz. Pīr Ḡeyb Khan was appointed governor of Hamadan, and the other Ostājlū emirs were also given appropriate fiefs and governorships. They included Sīmā Ḥoseynqolī Sultan, the brother of ʿAlīqolī Khan; Allāhqolī Sultan Kangarlū, the son of Jaʿfar Sultan; Aḥmad Sultan Āsāyeš-oḡlū; and Mahdīqolī Sultan Čāūšlū, the son of

Eygūş Sultan. Esmāʿīlqolī Khan, who already held the title of *yoldāš* (comrade) and the post of *tovāčībāšī*, was empowered to affix his seal to *dīvān* documents and letters of appointment. Moršedqolī Sultan, his brother, received the fief of Farāhān, and Qom was alloted to ʿAlīqolī Sultan Qorūġlū, the grandson of Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa the keeper of the seal.

The post of *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs was granted in the first instance to Mahdīqolī Beg Šādī Takkalū, the kinsman of ʿAlīqolī Khan, but subsequently to ʿAlī Khan Šādī Takkalū, as before, with Mahdīqolī Beg as his *vakīl*. Subordinate emirs were then appointed, and mobilization orders were served on the great emirs, bidding them report to the royal camp with their men. Tahmasp Mīrzā was imprisoned at Alamūt; the post of commandant of that fortress was in the possession of the Qūčīlūy family, kinfolk of ʿAlīqolī Khan. Since most of the summer of the Year of the Dog had already elapsed and Ottoman reinforcements might be on their way in a month or two's time, Ḥamza Mīrzā was impatient to capture the citadel before that happened. He therefore marched to Tabriz without waiting for his mobilization orders to take effect.

Ḥamza Mīrzā's Return to Tabriz, the Arrival of Ottoman Reinforcements, the Withdrawal of the Royal Army to Qarābāġ, and Associated Events

After Ḥamza Mīrzā had spent nearly two months at Qazvin dealing with various essential administrative matters and seeing to the welfare of his troops, he began his return march to Tabriz. As he hoped, after capturing and razing the citadel, to conduct operations against the main Ottoman army, he paused a few days at the Solṭānīya pastures, hoping that substantial contingents of *qezelbāš* would join him. But this did not happen. The fortunes of the *qezelbāš* were at an extremely low ebb: most of the chiefs of the Takkalū and Turkman tribes had either been killed or taken prisoner, and the rank and file of those tribes, although the prince had demonstrated his willingness to pardon them, had scattered hither and yon. The Afšārs, located mainly in the areas of Isfahan, Yazd, Abarqūh, Kerman, and Kūh Gīlūya, were still in a state of apprehension because of the defection to the Ottomans of their leader, Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, and they made this the excuse for inaction. There were other contingents whose arrival was more probable, but time was short, and so Ḥamza Mīrzā decided to march with the ten thousand or so men whom he had.

As the prince neared Tabriz, the Shah came out from the city a distance of nearly a *farsaḵ* to meet him, preceded by Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. As soon as Ḥamza Mīrzā saw his father's parasol, he dismounted and, as protocol demanded, kissed his father's thigh and stirrup, before entering the city with him and taking up residence at the house of Pīra Moḥammad Khan Čāūšlū. The next day, the prince received a visit from the Shah, in whose honor he gave a regal banquet. Everything was on a lavish scale—food, drink, carpets, and largesse. The prince offered all the contents of his household establishment to the Shah, who courteously refused them; in order not to hurt the feelings of his son, he accepted a few items and returned the rest.

The festivities over, they got down to the serious business of besieging the citadel. A large cannon was set up near the tomb of Ūzūn Ḥasan, and it began to play on the walls of the fort. Quantities of earth were brought from the direction of Ṣāḥebābād, and the siege works went on night and day. The arrival of Farhād Pasha, who had accelerated his march to relieve Ja'far Pasha when he heard of the return of Ḥamza Mīrzā to Azerbaijan, caused the prince to revise his plans. It seemed inexpedient to try and storm the citadel, a type of operation always fraught with heavy losses, especially because the equipment needed for an assault was not yet ready. Nevertheless, because time was short, a decision was made to launch a general assault. If they succeeded, well and good; if they failed, they considered they would not be accused by experienced campaigners of not having tried.

On the day appointed, therefore, having made this rash decision, which was contrary to all considered opinion, they paraded willy-nilly at the mosque of Ūzūn Ḥasan and received their orders for the assault. At the signal, they shouldered their scaling ladders and ran forward. The Ottomans, however, had not wasted their time, and had everything ready for the defense. Musket fire rained down like hail, and the air was filled with smoke. The ditch around the citadel was rapidly filled with the bodies of the slain and those wounded by stones or spear thrusts. Those who reached the walls with their ladders and ascended them were hurled down by the defenders with blows from blacksmith's hammers and iron war maces, and with thrusts from spears and spikes.

The attack was repulsed with heavy losses. The officers of state were dismayed, and the townspeople of Tabriz began to get restless.

Since Farhād Pasha's army was now nearing Tabriz, Ḥamza Mīrzā ordered an evacuation to Qazvin. The military were ordered to assist with mules and camels. A number of learned men, together with most of the nobility and persons of note in the city, were dispatched to Qazvin. The lower orders took refuge where they could, and the city was evacuated overnight. The royal troops marched off toward Ūzūmdel and Dezmār, intending to obtain information about the size and composition of the Ottoman army and make their plans accordingly. The following day, Farhād Pasha camped at Čarandāb. He transported to the citadel the year's supply of provisions he had brought with him and replaced some units of the garrison which had had too long a spell of duty. Having satisfied himself that all was in order at the citadel, he left Tabriz without delay on his return march; at the same time, he sent a letter to 'Alīqolī Khan and the *qezelbāš* emirs on the subject of a truce:

> From the time when strife, fomented by seditious persons, first broke out between our respective monarchs, thousands of believers have lost their lives. For our part, we have proposed peace on the basis that territory which has been occupied by Ottoman forces should remain part of the Ottoman empire, for it is contrary to Ottoman practice voluntarily to relinquish territory once occupied. You intransigent *qezelbāš* emirs have refused to accept these terms, with the result that every year you have lost further territory, and have now lost the city of Tabriz, the capital of the kings of Iran. If matters continue in this fashion, next year you will lose Ardabīl and Iraq. Since you are the servants of the Safavid dynasty, be guided by my well-intentioned counsel, and convince your prince of the desirability of peace. Since we in the Ottoman empire are well aware of the disunity among the *qezelbāš* emirs, and consider the conquest of Iran an easy task for us, the Safavid house would be well-advised to abandon its intransigent attitude and seek to placate the Ottoman Sultan, so that I and other well-disposed persons on our side may have some grounds for working for peace in the interests of all God's servants.

When Farhād Pasha's letter was received, some of the emirs, in their ignorance and pride, said: "Farhād Pasha's only object is to prevent us from making any attack on the citadel at Tabriz after the Ottoman army has left. We must not lose the opportunity of making a further attempt on it. After capturing the citadel, we can make a winter expedition against Ottoman territory, when all their troops have retired for the winter into their fortresses, and we can pillage and plunder." Ḥamza Mīrzā, deeply distressed as he was by *qezelbāš* disloyalty and disunity, refused to be rushed into making a decision. He knew it was true that, since the outbreak of the present round of hostilities, the Persians had lost more territory every year, but this fact had not restored unity among the *qezelbāš*, nor had the *qezelbāš* recovered a single piece of lost territory. If things went on in this way for a few years, the Safavid state would be completely destroyed. He therefore acted contrary to the emirs' advice and made a friendly reply to Farhād Pasha's overtures. The only condition he made was that Tabriz should be returned.

Farhād Pasha replied that, if one of the Safavid royal princes were to accompany him to Turkey, to be treated by the Ottoman sultan as one of his own sons, it was possible that that prince would be made governor of the province of Tabriz. No other solution regarding Tabriz was possible. Since Ḥamza Mīrzā regarded this as a possibility, he agreed to send his younger son, Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, to Turkey; 'Alīqolī Khan, who was the prince's guardian, agreed. The Shah and the army were opposed to this plan, but considered it necessary in order to protect the lives of Shi'ites and to give relief to ordinary people, who had suffered so much from the war. When Farhād Pasha learned that Ḥamza Mīrzā was acting contrary to the wishes of the emirs in making friendly overtures to the Ottoman sultan, he applauded him and exclaimed that he wished Ḥamza Mīrzā had been of this mind before Tabriz had been lost. Farhād Pasha considered it a great feather in his cap to have negotiated the transfer of a prince of the Safavid royal house to Istanbul, there to add to the prestige of his own royal master. He therefore pressed Ḥamza Mīrzā to put the plan into effect, and sent Valī Aqa, his chief taster and a trusted officer, to fetch the prince.

Valī Aqa reached the royal camp at Ganja and was allocated quarters in the house of 'Alīqolī Khan and treated with great honor. Farhād Pasha moved to winter quarters at Erzerum, from which he continued to send letters to Ḥamza Mīrzā urging him to send the prince, his letters of friendship for the Ottoman sultan, and suitable presents to his camp before the spring campaigning weather arrived. Ḥamza Mīrzā planned to return to Iraq to prepare a suitable retinue and equipage for his son. He would go to Isfahan, which came under his personal jurisdiction, to rest for a while after the pressures of recent events and to see to affairs in Fārs, Kerman, and Yazd, where various Afšār and Ẕu'l-Qadar governors had taken advantage of the disturbed times to behave in a seditious manner. Emāmqolī Khan was invested with robes of honor and confirmed in his governorship of Qarābāḡ. Affairs in Azerbaijan he decided to leave until after the conclusion of peace. He set off from Ganja, but while camped at a place called Āb-e Šaḥma, he was murdered.

The Murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā at the Hands of His Barber, Ḵodāverdī

On the night of 22 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 994/4 December 1586, Ḥamza Mīrzā camped at Čašma-ye Berenjerd and spent the evening with 'Alīqolī Khan, drinking wine. About midnight, he left 'Alīqolī Khan's tent, drunk as a lord, and went to the royal pavilion with a few of his personal retainers and *ḡolāms*. Eventually, he set off to go to the harem but finished up in the special tent which was used as an aviary, where a number of rare birds were kept. He called for a bed to be brought for him there. His barber, Ḵodāverdī, went out and spoke to the guard of personal retainers who were in the process of stationing themselves for the night around the prince's sleeping place. Telling them that the prince wished to be alone with a mistress and not to be disturbed, he moved the guards farther away from the tent.

Ḵodāverdī was an orphan of unknown parentage who used to ply his trade as a barber in Qazvin. As a youth he had entered the employ of Ḥamza Mīrzā, and since the two boys were of a similar age, the prince felt a natural affinity for him. The prince liked the way he performed his duties as a barber, and extended his favor to him and made him his confidant. As a result, persons of rank and wealth used him as a go-between, and he was deferred to by the emirs and principal officers of state. His evil nature now led him to commit the dastardly crime of murdering the prince.

The guards, hearing the words "private" and "mistress," and not suspecting that anything was wrong, followed his instructions and moved away from the aviary tent. Ḵodāverdī returned to the tent; finding the prince lying there dead drunk, he took the prince's dagger from his belt and stabbed him several times in the stomach and side. When he was satisfied that the prince was dead, he left the tent. One of the prince's servants, a boy named Fattāḥ, who had been instructed to wait on the prince, then entered and found the prince lying in a pool of blood and breathing stertorously. He rushed out, shouting for the guards, but none dared to enter the tent. Finally, the *šarbatdār*, Zeynal Beg, went in; he summoned surgeons and physicians, but the prince was beyond help and died a few minutes later.

ʿAlīqolī Khan and Esmāʿīlqolī Khan, who at that time were two of the principal officers of state, were then informed. Since the prince had given orders to march before dawn, many of those in the camp, ignorant of what had happened, had already left. The Shah and the women of the royal household, on receiving the news, raised a clamorous lament. The emirs assembled at ʿAlīqolī Khan's tent, and sent Adham Khan Torkmān to fetch the prince's body. Adham Khan, assisted by the prince's personal servant, placed the prince's body, still in its bloodstained clothes, on a litter; two or three thousand people, lacerating their breasts and heaping dust on their heads, preceded the bier and filled the air with their laments. When the emirs saw the body, they removed their *qezelbāš* hats and hurled them on the ground, adding their plaints to the general lament. The corpse was taken first to a special tent which had been erected near the harem, where it was visited by the Shah. The tent was filled with keening mourners who had scored their faces with their fingernails and torn handfuls of hair from their heads. The corpse was then entrusted to the *ṣadrs* and *ʿolamā*, who performed the ritual washing in accordance with the prescriptions of Islamic law and placed it in its shroud. A small party was then detailed to take the prince ahead to Ardabīl and bury him in the Safavid shrine there.

Not the least extraordinary aspect of the night's events was that the murderer was drawn back by feelings of guilt to view the body. After he had committed the murder, Ḵodāverdī went to his own tent, picked up a bag containing about fifty or sixty *tomān* in gold Ašrafī coins, saying that the prince wanted the gold to give to his mistress. He then went on foot and alone to the tent of Esmāʿīlqolī Khan, whom he knew best of the great emirs. Esmāʿīlqolī Khan was holding a party with some of his friends when Ḵodāverdī entered in a state of great perturbation. After the usual formalities, the Khan asked him why he had come at such an hour. Ḵodāverdī said, "I have committed a terrible crime. What am I to do?" He then confessed to the murder and begged the Khan to assist him. One might ask why the Khan did not slay him on the spot.

After Ḵodāverdī had related this astonishing story, the Khan handed him over to Reżāqolī Beg, the son of Pīrī Beg Īnāllū, who had succeeded his father as *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* to Ḥamza Mīrzā, with orders to guard him and take him to his tent. Reżāqolī Beg placed him in a chest, loaded him onto a cart with some other chests full of clothes, and took him to his tent. Later that night, on orders from Esmā'īlqolī Khan, he handed him over to two of his own men, with instructions to take Ḵodāverdī off into the forest and murder him. The two men, once they got Ḵodāverdī into the forest, struck him a couple of blows, but then got so interested in dividing up the gold he had with him that they neglected to finish him off. Ḵodāverdī was able to drag himself into a murky pool and conceal himself among the reeds; his wounds proved not to be serious.

After the two men had gone, Ḵodāverdī emerged from the pool, chilled to the bone, and made for a fire he could see in the distance. The "fire" turned out to be torches burning in the tent where the prince's body was lying. Some of the prince's retainers who were guarding the body saw Ḵodāverdī and seized him. When Ḵodāverdī saw the body, he wept with remorse. The guards said to him, "By virtue of enjoying this prince's favor, you were deferred to by emirs and the highest in the land. Why did you kill him?" He replied, "A group of people put me up to it, and made promises to me, and suborned me, and I was stupid enough to be deceived by them." However, Ḵodāverdī did not say who the people were who had worked on him to commit this crime.

In the morning, the Shah was informed of the arrest of Ḵodāverdī. The barber was taken first before an assembly of emirs, where he began to indulge in all sorts of loose talk. On the order of the emirs, a large packing needle was stuck through his tongue to prevent him from talking loosely and making wild accusations against the loyal servants of the crown. The Shah said he personally would exact retribution on the murderer. The Shah stabbed him several times in the stomach with his dagger, and his corpse was taken away by camp followers and burned. Glory be to God! How is it that man allows himself to be seduced by the whisperings of Satan and is persuaded to commit acts that result in his being doomed both in this world and the next?

An investigation into the motive for this crime failed to elicit any information; on the contrary, the more the investigators delved, the stranger the whole business appeared. No satisfying motive could be found. However, various rumors went around, and I will report these, since it is my duty as a historian to do so. One story, put about by persons who were on the fringes of the prince's circle, was that Ḵodāverdī had conceived an overwhelming passion for Reżāqolī Īnāllū, a handsome, beardless youth. Sometimes Ḵodāverdī would refer to this affair jokingly in the prince's assemblies, and the prince, in his more expansive moments, would refer to it (Ḵodāverdī was not sure whether he was serious or joking) in a way which upset Ḵodāverdī. Ḵodāverdī, suspecting that the prince too had a secret liaison with the youth, used to say, "I will be revenged on you for this!" The prince used to take this sort of remark as a joke, but (so this theory went) Ḵodāverdī's passion for Reżāqolī became so intense that it drove him to murder the prince.

Another theory was that Esmā'īlqolī Khan had become envious of 'Alīqolī Khan because of all the favors Ḥamza Mīrzā had heaped upon the latter, including the title of *ḵānlarḵānī* (chief khan), was willing to contemplate the murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā in order to bring down 'Alīqolī Khan, and had incited Ḵodāverdī to do the deed. Those who subscribed to this theory considered their case supported by the fact that Ḵodāverdī had gone to Esmā'īlqolī Khan's house after committing the murder, and that the Khan had concealed him.

Yet another theory was that the "triumvirs," 'Alīqolī Khan, Esmā'īlqolī Khan, and Moḥammad Sārū Sūlāğ, had conspired to kill the prince (employing Ḵodāverdī as their instrument) because he had written to Morteżāqolī Khan Torkmān at Damghan, summoning him to court, and had kept this a secret from the triumvirs, although normally they were his confidants. The three had concluded that they had lost the prince's favor and that he intended to get rid of them. In support of their case, those who held this theory pointed out that the triumvirs, after the murder, acted with complete unanimity, despite the enmity and rivalry which in fact existed between them. Esmā'īlqolī raised no protest when 'Alīqolī Khan assumed the office of *vakīl*, but on the contrary was at pains to demonstrate his friendship for him. The emirs had taken a crime of this magnitude extremely lightly, and they had made sure that Ḵodāverdī could not talk.

The triumvirs chose Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, who was still a minor,[117] to succeed Ḥamza Mīrzā as heir-apparent. I might add that I heard from Mīrzā Loṭfollāh Šīrāzī, Ḥamza Mīrzā's vizier, that the prince had indeed turned against the triumvirs and had become suspicious of them. "During the two days we were traveling from Ganja toward Iraq," said Mīrzā Loṭfollāh, "the prince summoned me to him while he was in the bathhouse and said, 'What have I ever done to those two ingrates[118] to make them now thirsty for blood? During our carousals, they start demanding justice—in other words, they are planning to kill me.' When the prince told me this, Ḳodāverdī was shaving him and heard everything. It is quite likely that Ḳodāverdī stupidly went and told the khans, and that they suborned Ḳodāverdī to commit the murder."

Prima facie it seems unlikely that these two khans, both of whom owed their rise to Ḥamza Mīrzā, who had elevated them from the status of attendants and servants and made them khans, governors, and important officers of state, and merely to please them had gone to war against the Turkman-Takkalū coalition, an action fraught with all sorts of evil consequences, could have forgotten all they owed to him. Why did they not consider the consequences of their action, and how could their own intelligence have allowed them to commit a deed that would bring them ill repute in this world and the next? Be that as it may, they decided on this course of action. I heard this alleged far and wide, and so I have set it down in my history. However, the khans did not long survive their crime, as will be related in due course.

How Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā Was Made Heir-Apparent and How His Fortunes Subsequently Declined

After the murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā, Sultan Moḥammad Shah convened a meeting of the great emirs and exhorted them to cease the intertribal strife, in particular the feud between the Šāmlū-Ostājlū faction and the Takkalū-Turkman faction. The Shah decided to undertake the burden of state affairs in person and not appoint any of his sons, or the other royal princes, deputy *(nāyeb)* of the ***dīvān-e a'lā*** and heir-apparent. He made this decision for various confidential reasons he considered it inexpedient to make public.

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[117] He was born in 1574, and was therefore now twelve years old.

[118] Clearly the two principal triumvirs, 'Alīqolī Khan and Esmā'īlqolī Khan, are meant.

The feud, however, continued between the Khorasan emirs, of whom Moršedqolī Khan was now the leader,[119] and the Iraq emirs. Neither Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā nor Tahmasp Mīrzā, by virtue of their age, was old enough to be heir-apparent, and Tahmasp Mīrzā, because he had been supported by the Takkalūs and Turkmans, was now incarcerated at Alamūt under Ostājlū guard. But the emirs at court rejected the Shah's view and decided that their best interest lay in making Abū Ṭāleb heir-apparent. The Shah continued to oppose this course of action and to counsel delay. He thought that Ḥamza Mīrzā had met his untimely end as a result of too close association with ignorant *qezelbāš*; in the future, he said, he would do without the assistance of any of his sons, and would not permit the *qezelbāš* to have constant access to them.

The emirs put forward Mīrzā Moḥammad, the comptroller of finance *(mostowfī al-mamālek)* to speak for them: "For some years," he said, "Ḥamza Mīrzā (by virtue of the Shah's decree) has managed the affairs of state and of the crown, and reports of his power and authority have spread to all parts. If our enemies do not speedily hear of the appointment of one of the royal princes as his successor, it is likely that trouble will break out on all sides, to the detriment of both religion and the state. 'Abbas Mīrzā, who is the eldest of your surviving sons, is in Khorasan and has been declared ruler of that province by the Khorasan emirs; on the other hand, Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā is here at court; he should be made heir-apparent without delay."

The Shah finally gave in, though with reluctance. This was the first mistake on the part of the Iraq emirs. It was obvious that 'Abbas Mīrzā's star was in the ascendant, but they closed their eyes to this fact. It was equally clear that, whenever 'Abbas Mīrzā chose to march from Khorasan to Iraq, the *qezelbāš* would have no option but to submit to him. The Iraq emirs thought, however, that the Khorasan emirs, especially Moršedqolī Khan, who was the guardian and *rokn al-salṭana* of 'Abbas Mīrzā at Mašhad, would prefer to remain in Khorasan, where he was all-powerful, rather than go to Iraq, where he might not wield the same authority.

On the 10th of Moḥarram 995/21 December 1586, at a time when the Shah and the troops were still clad in mourning for Ḥoseyn, the Iraq emirs, insisting on the need for haste, brought Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā into the presence of his father in the royal camp at Tatār Čāy. With his own hands, the Shah transferred his crown to his son's head, girded him with a jeweled dagger belt and sword belt, clothed him in a splended robe of honor, and named him his heir-apparent. Ḥamza Mīrzā's personal retainers and the administrative officers of the supreme *dīvān* were placed at the service of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, and the late prince's property and royal workshops were similarly transferred to Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. In accordance with Ṣafavid custom, all the emirs and *qezelbāš* nobles at court performed the ceremony of kissing the feet of the new heir-apparent, and proclamations were sent to the provincial governors. Emāmqolī Khan and the Qarābāğ emirs left camp and returned to their fiefs, while the royal army proceeded on its way to Ardabīl, where the body of Ḥamza Mīrzā was buried in the tombs of his ancestors. As part of the rites for his dead son, the Shah distributed food and alms to the poor.

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[119] By virtue of his seizure of 'Abbas Mīrzā.

ʿAlīqolī Khan and the Iraq emirs rewarded Mīrzā Moḥammad, who had worked hard on their behalf to achieve what the emirs desired, by securing him the appointment of *vazīr-e dīvān-e aʿlā*. Mīrzā Moḥammad had complete independence in the management of *dīvān* affairs, and received the title of *eʿtemād al-dowla*. The Iraq emirs now began to act in accordance with the dictates of their own ambition, and to put their own interests before those of religion and the state: however, they soon met their just deserts. From Ardabīl, the Shah marched to Qazvin via Ṭārom and Ḵalḵāl, and wintered at the capital.

The Actions of the Emirs of Iraq, Azerbaijan, Fārs and Kerman from the Time of the Murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā to the Time When the Sun of ʿAbbas Mīrzā's Power Rose Above the Horizon in Khorasan

After their defeat at Ṣāyen Qalʿa, many of the Turkman emirs made their way to Damghan, where they joined Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk. In order to win them over, Ḥamza Mīrzā, without the knowledge of the Iraq emirs, had written a conciliatory letter to Morteżāqolī Khan, summoning him to court and making various promises to him. The Khan had set out, but when he reached Rayy, he heard of the death of Ḥamza Mīrzā and the assumption of power by Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā with the support of ʿAlīqolī Khan and Esmāʿīlqolī Khan. He had not dared to proceed further, and he was apprehensive of possible punitive measures the Iraq emirs might take against the Turkman tribe. He had therefore proceeded to Qom and Sāva, in which areas most of the families of the Turkman tribe resided, and had compelled those families, whether they wanted to or not, to proceed to Damghan. The people of the region, thinking that Morteżāqolī Khan had rebelled, had sent him gifts with the object of persuading him not to do them any harm.

Valī Khan Torkmān, the son of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, who with his father had governed Kashan for some years, had always encouraged Morteżāqolī Khan to expect the most lavish gifts from the people of Kashan, most of whom were merchants and wealthy persons from many regions. It was he who had been the cause of Morteżāqolī Khan's commencing secret discussions with the people of Kashan. Initially, the people had rejected his overtures, but on second thoughts, concern for their lives and property had led them to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward him on the advice of the *dārūġa*, Behzād Beg, and the vizier, Mīrzā Aḥmad Kojojī. They had appealed to Valī Khan to protect them from Morteżāqolī Khan. Valī Khan had gone to Kashan without permission from Morteżāqolī Khan, and his entry into the city had not been opposed by the *dārūġa* and the vizier, who did not attach any great importance to him. Valī Khan had been a guest in the house of the *dārūġa*.

Within a few days, Valī Khan had gathered round him a group of veteran Turkmans who had been in Kashan since the days when Moḥammad Khan and his sons governed that city, and who had elected to remain there in the service of the *dārūġa*. He was also joined by men from outside the city. Feeling his own strength to be now superior to that of the *dārūġa* and the vizier, he determined to seize control of the city from them. His Turkmans seized their officials and employees and finally seized the vizier and the *dārūġa* too, and confiscated all their possessions. The people of Kashan submitted to him, having no other choice. Initially, Valī Khan treated them well, but as his power increased, his behavior changed.

Morteżāqolī Khan had therefore parted company with Valījān Khan and had proceeded to Damghan with the men who had elected to follow him. On arrival there, he sent a message to Moršedqolī Khan at Mašhad in the following terms: "While Ḥamza Mīrzā was alive, I, as a good Sufi, remained loyal to him, since he was the elder son of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and was his heir-apparent. Now that he is dead, however, I consider 'Abbas Mīrzā to be the heir-apparent. If prince's standards advance toward Iraq, he will find the Turkman tribe ready to obey him."

Valījān Khan, after consolidating his position at Kashan, had great expectations of exacting money from the wealthy burghers of that city. He gradually gathered more and more Turkmans under his banner. He then sent a letter to Qazvin representing himself as having performed a service to the crown by keeping Kashan out of the hands of Morteżāqolī Khan, and confidently expecting that the emirs and principal officers of state would furnish him with an official mandate as governor. The officials at Qazvin, however, did not like his headstrong action and dictatorial manner, and did not wish to bow to his demands. They therefore appointed ʿAlīqolī Khan Šaraf governor of Kashan. Valījān Khan, seeing that his hopes in that direction had now been dashed, sent a courier to Khorasan and declared himself a supporter of ʿAbbas Mīrzā. He arrested all the purveyors *(gerek-yarāqān)*[120] of the emirs and principal officers of state who were in Kashan and expropriated their supply caravans.

It will be recalled that Yūsof Khan Afšār, after the defection of his father, Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī,* had gone from Abarqūh to Yazd. In cooperation with the *dārūġa* of Yazd, Moḥammad Ḵalīfa Afšār, he had seized the citadel there and had taken the possessions of the royalist emirs. After the defeat of the Takkalū-Turkman rebellion, Yūsof Khan, at the command of Ḥamza Mīrzā and with the approval of Mīrmīrān, was placed in bondage and imprisoned. At this juncture, Valī Khan, the governor of Kerman, arrived in Yazd with his son Bektāš Khan; they were on their way to join the Shah in Azerbaijan. Since Bektāš was a rebellious and ambitious man, he released Yūsof Khan from prison, arrested the *dārūġa* and the purveyors who had been appointed by the supreme *dīvān,* and assumed a rebellious posture vis-a-vis the Shah. When they heard of the death of Ḥamza Mīrzā, Valī Khan marched back to Kerman and Bektāš engineered for himself a marriage connection with Mīrmīrān that increased his power and influence at Yazd and encouraged him to think of himself as the de facto governor of the region. With his blessing, Yūsof Khan returned to Abarqūh and resumed his post as governor there. Bektāš Khan's actions had made him a little apprehensive of retribution from the emirs and the principal officers of state. With the approval of Mīrmīrān, he too sent a courier to Khorasan to ʿAbbas Mīrzā and Moršedqolī Khan, assuring them of his fealty. The Arešlū and Afšār emirs of the Isfahan region followed his lead and declared their opposition to Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. The Afšārs of the Kūh Gīlūya region constituted themselves into independent groups, each with an emir.

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[120] See *TM,* pp. 177-78.

In Fārs, the governor ʿAlī Khan Šādī Takkalū was faced with open hostility from his Ẕu'l-Qadar subjects even while Ḥamza Mīrzā was still alive. ʿAlī Khan had therefore traveled to Qazvin to present his services to Ḥamza Mīrzā, consolidate his own position, and get the dissident Ẕu'l-Qadars punished. When he reached Qazvin and heard of the murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā, he remained there to pay his respects to the Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. The emirs and principal officers of state secured his reappointment as governor of Fārs, and letters were written to the Ẕu'l-Qadar junior officers in Fārs threatening them with the Shah's wrath and punishment. ʿAlī Khan was equipped with a robe of honor and sent on his way.

When the news of his return reached Fārs, Mīrzā ʿAbdollāh, the son of Mīrzā Salmān Jāberī, who aspired to hold the office of *vazīr-e dīvān-e aʿlā* and whose thoughts were dominated by this ambition day and night, instigated the Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs to oppose ʿAlī Khan. They singled out Mahdīqolī Beg Šādī Takkalū, raised him to the rank of khan and to the position of governor of Fārs, and expropriated for his use all of ʿAlī Khan's equipment and possessions that were in Shiraz. ʿAlī Khan heard the news as he approached Shiraz, but continued to press on fearlessly with the two to three hundred men he had with him. He warned the rebels of his approach, and confidently expected that rifts would appear in their ranks and that, group by group, they would come out to welcome him. But they pledged themselves to support Mahdīqolī Khan and to oppose ʿAlī Khan. ʿAlī Khan never imagined that the Ẕu'l-Qadars would disobey a royal edict. He reached Kūtal Māʾīn, some twelve *farsaḵs* from Shiraz, but not a soul came out to meet him.

When he realized the opposition to him was united, he was filled with consternation and did not dare to go forward or to return. Mahdīqolī Khan and the Ẕu'l-Qadar junior officers, having renewed their oaths, marched out against ʿAlīqolī, who had no alternative but to stand and fight with the small band of men at his disposal. The Šīrāzīs, outnumbering his men many times, routed them at the first charge. But because his men were also from the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe, they forebore from killing any great number of them. All the supplies in ʿAlī Khan's camp were looted, and he himself was taken in fetters to Shiraz and executed with great ignominy in the *meydān*. This foul deed was perpetrated by men who had been recipients of his favor for years; Mahdīqolī Khan was actually related to him, and had always been treated by him as a son. The just retribution that overtook those guilty of this deed will be related in Book II of this history.

Those who had committed this deed now stood in fear of the supporters of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā and the principal officers of state, and they hastily sent a courier to Moršedqolī Khan, declaring themselves to be Abbasid supporters. As a result, letters came from Khorasan appointing Mahdīqolī Khan governor of Shiraz and Mīrzā 'Abdollāh, the son of Mīrzā Salmān, *vazīr-e dīvān-e a'lā.* The latter, however, with an eye on Sultan Moḥammad Shah, made no changes in the *ḵoṭba* or the coinage, but continued to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.

At Isfahan, the *ḡolām* Farhād Aqa, who had governed that city for some years on behalf of Ḥamza Mīrzā and who had constructed a strong fort in the vicinity of Naqš-e Jahān and stocked it with everything necessary for its defense, was devastated by the turn of events at Qazvin. 'Alīqolī Khan had become *vakīl* with absolute authority, and Mīrzā Moḥammad had become vizier and *e'temād al-dowla.* The reasons for his alarm were that he had quarreled with 'Alīqolī Khan when the latter was *dārūḡa* of Isfahan and had refused to give the Khan's agents much freedom of action. As a result, Farhād Aqa now felt he could place no confidence in the Khan. Mīrzā Moḥammad too had a grudge against him. On the pretext of dealing with the disloyal Arešlū and Afšār tribes, therefore, Farhād strengthened the fort at Isfahan, not wishing to submit to the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction.

In Azerbaijan, after the murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā, it was a case of every man for himself. The king's commands were ignored, and local chiefs seized control of whatever territory they could. As a result, Ja'far Pasha was able to extend the area under his control, and most of Azerbaijan passed out of the hands of the *qezelbāš.*

To sum up, the affairs of Azerbaijan, Iraq, Fārs, Kerman, Kūh Gīlūya, and Ḵūzestān were in a chaotic state. The civilian population suffered because of the supremacy of the military in these areas, and the military were like sheep without a shepherd. Toward the end of the year, however (995/1587), 'Abbas Mīrzā began his westward march from Khorasan, and the promise of his coming was like the promise of rain in a parched land.

The Conduct of the Emirs and Principal Officers of State of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, and the Supporters of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā

Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā and the emirs at Qazvin did not for a moment imagine that Moršedqolī Khan would dare to advance on Iraq with the relatively small forces at his disposal. But, when New Year's day of the year 995/1587 ushered in the Year of the Pig and alarming reports began to come in regarding the situation in Kashan, Isfahan, Yazd, Shiraz and Kerman, the emirs recovered to some extent from their state of euphoria, and began more soberly to appraise what was happening in the provinces and to take steps to remedy the situation.

Mīr Ja'far Qazvīnī, formerly the vizier of Farhād Aqa at Isfahan and now holding the post of manager *(motaṣaddī)* at Qazvin, was sent to Isfahan to fetch Farhād Aqa to court. Orders issued to the latter were designed to conciliate him. Pīrqolī Beg, the son of Šāhqolī Saqqā, who had close relations with the family of Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī* and the Afšār tribe, was dispatched to Yazd to Bektāš Khan, in the hope of winning him over to support of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. Meanwhile, the royal camp moved to its summer quarters of Ḵarraqān.[121] Mīr Ja'far returned, bringing with him Farhād Aqa. The latter gave only a paltry present to the Shah and to Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, but he gave large sums in cash to 'Alīqolī Khan, Esmā'īlqolī Khan, and the vizier Mīrzā Moḥammad, and consequently succeeded in getting himself reappointed as governor of Isfahan. Farhād Aqa made haste to obtain permission to return to Isfahan at the earliest possible moment, while every day some unwelcome news reached the ears of the emirs and principal officers of state at Qazvin. The emirs deferred in all matters to the judgment of Mīrzā Moḥammad the vizier, but all their plans were frustrated, because fate willed that kingship and the government of the state be conferred on 'Abbas Mīrzā.

At this point, a quarrel that occurred between the Šāmlūs and Ostājlūs at Qazvin was patched up through the good offices of Moḥammadī Beg Sārū Sūlāğ. The cause of the quarrel was the appointment of Pīr Ğeyb Khan Ostājlū as governor of Hamadan by the late Ḥamza Mīrzā, because Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šāmlū wished to confer this governorship on Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa, his elder brother. Since 'Alīqolī Khan could not afford the luxury of crossing Esmā'īlqolī Khan, and since he bore a grudge against Pīr Ğeyb Khan in any case, he gave his approval, and a letter of appointment as governor of Hamadan was issued to Šāhverdī Ḳalīfa. Pīr Ğeyb Khan was angered by this action; although he ostensibly handed over the office to Šāhverdī Ḳalīfa, he remained in residence in the governor's house and did not go out. Šāhverdī Ḳalīfa was a diplomatic and dignified officer, but some of his Šāmlū troops urged him to expel Pīr Ğeyb Khan by force. However, Pīr Ğeyb Khan had more men at his disposal than Šāhverdī Ḳalīfa at that moment. He would not bow to force, and his resentment at the way he had been treated would not permit him to submit to the Šāmlūs. The quarrel developed into actual conflict, the Ostājlūs being mainly responsible, and the situation had an extremely adverse effect on Šāhverdī Ḳalīfa's prestige.

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[121] Southwest of Qazvin (see Le Strange, p. 196).

When Esmā'īlqolī Khan heard what had happened, he wanted to leap on his horse and lead his Šāmlūs at full-speed to Hamadan to punish Pīr Ğeyb Khan, but 'Alīqolī Khan, trying to avoid open conflict with the Šāmlūs, suggested that he should go himself to Hamadan, install Šāhverdī Ḳalīfa, and bring Pīr Ğeyb Khan back to court and hand him over to Esmā'īlqolī Khan. Esmā'īlqolī Khan agreed. Before 'Alīqolī Khan could set out, peacemakers had patched up a temporary truce between the two parties at Hamadan, and Pīr Ğeyb Khan had left the city. He met 'Alīqolī Khan on the way, and returned with him to Ḳarraqān. But since Pīr Ğeyb Khan was not on very good terms with 'Alīqolī Khan and was terrified of Esmā'īlqolī Khan, he fled from the royal camp with his brothers and a few Ostājlūs who had been his personal retainers for many years. Abandoning his baggage, he made for Khorasan. He did not rest night or day on the road, and a few days later was in Mašhad kissing the feet of 'Abbas Mīrzā. Then he was received by Moršedqolī Khan, in whom he instilled the desire to advance on Iraq by describing the chaotic state of affairs there.

While the royal camp was still at Ḳarraqān, 'Āšūr Aqa, a messenger from 'Abbas Mīrzā and Moršedqolī Khan, arrived bearing various letters. Moršedqolī Khan, an extremely cautious and experienced officer, had wanted to get firsthand information on the actual situation in Iraq before deciding on a course of action. There were two letters, one from 'Abbas Mīrzā to his father asking for information about the murder of his brother, Ḥamza Mīrzā, and the other from Moršedqolī Khan, addressed to the principal officers of state. The gist of the latter was as follows:

> For some years now, there has been division between

> the emirs of Iraq and those of Khorasan. As a result of this disunity and strife, our enemies have been able to encroach on our territory and the government of the realm is in complete disorder. Now that Ḥamza Mīrzā is dead and 'Abbas Mīrzā is the eldest son of the Shah and has reached maturity and given clear signs of his ability to rule, I beg you, the principal officers of state, to set aside your differences with us so that we may all pledge our fealty to one prince, restore unity to the realm, jointly take whatever action is judged necessary against our enemies, and heal this schism between the *qezelbāš.*

When 'Āšūr Aqa arrived at Qazvin he was detained by Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū, who had been charged with the defense of the capital; after permission had been received, he was sent on to Ḵarraqān. The great khans read the letter from Khorasan, but they distrusted Moršedqolī Khan, who had made himself *vakīl* with full powers in the service of 'Abbas Mīrzā. They were swayed by 'Alīqolī Khan Faṭhoğlū, who had been raised to a position of the highest authority in the supreme *dīvān*. He exercised control over both the affairs of state and the king and considered himself a kingmaker par excellence; he was also well aware that he and Moršedqolī Khan could not exist together.

Looking to his own interests, 'Alīqolī Khan interpreted Moršedqolī Khan's words as a deceitful trick, and the emirs rejected them utterly. In reply they wrote: "Ḥamza Mīrzā was made the heir-apparent by Sultan Moḥammad Shah. When Ḥamza Mīrzā left to conduct operations against the rebel Turkman-Takkalū faction, the Shah made a testamentory disposition to the effect that, if anything happened to Ḥamza Mīrzā in that campaign, Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā was to succeed him as heir. In pledging ourselves to Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, therefore, we are merely carrying out the wishes of the Shah, and we will not agree to any other course." They concluded by attacking Moršedqolī Khan for causing discord between the Iraq emirs and those of Khorasan. All the emirs and elders of the tribes affixed their seals to this document, handed it to 'Āšūr Aqa, and dismissed him with slights and insults. Apart from the triumvirs, 'Alīqolī Khan, Esmā'īlqolī Khan, and Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāğ, and the vizier Mīrzā Moḥammad, none of the other emirs wanted to affix their seals to this document. They were forced to do so, and some of them sent verbal messages to this effect to Khorasan.

After the courier had left for Khorasan, the Iraq emirs decided to march against Valī Khan and wrest Kashan from his control and then to proceed to Isfahan and Yazd to settle the affairs of Fārs and Kerman, intending to punish intransigents and replace unreliable governors with their own men. 'Alīqolī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Qom, and Moršedqolī Sultan Šāmlū, the brother of Esmā'īlqolī Khan, were sent on ahead to Kashan against Valījān Khan.

The Iraq emirs had hopes of extracting large sums of money from Farhād Aqa. Some Iṣfahānīs who had come to court to lay complaints against Farhād Aqa urged them to arrest and fine him. These men undertook to divest Farhād Aqa of his possessions, to extract money from his supporters and financial agents, and to hand the proceeds over to the emirs. Farhād Aqa, who had still not managed to leave the court's summer quarters at Ḵarraqān, was arrested, and everything he possessed was confiscated. Mīrzā Aḥmad Kofrānī, the *nāẓer*, was appointed vizier and business manager *(ṣāḥeb-e mo'āmela)* at Isfahan; Mīrzā Hedāyat Najm-e Ṣānī was appointed superintendent of commercial transactions *(nāẓer-e mo'āmelāt)*. Collectors *(żābeṭān)* were appointed to appropriate Farhād Aqa's property. They extracted considerable sums from some fifty or sixty of his officials and employees, and sent ruthless collection agents to Isfahan. Seyyed Beg Kamūna was appointed *dārūġa* of Isfahan. The royal army then marched to Kashan in twenty days.

Valījān Khan, who had given up hope of receiving any appointment from court, secured the gates of the city and prepared to defend it. He began to plunder the merchants and wealthy citizens of Kashan in order to give his retainers large grants of money. Gradually, taking as his motto "a slave and everything he possesses belongs to his master," if he suspected anyone of possessing some wealth, he regarded it as his own and extorted it from its owner by force. The besiegers gradually brought their earthworks forward as far as the ditch round the city walls.

At this point, the besiegers received bad news from Isfahan. When he heard of Farhād Aqa's arrest, Ḵosrow Beg, a *ġolām* and a relative of Farhād, had shut himself up in the citadel with some of Farhād Aqa's retainers and had defied the collection agents. Seyyed Beg Kamūna and Mīrzā Aḥmad Kofrānī, the vizier and fiefholder, took up their station in the compound of the Ḥoseynī *seyyeds* known as the Ḥoseynīya, long venerated as a sanctuary by the people of that province. Levying musketeers and archers locally, they settled down to defend the Ḥoseynīya and the city. The garrison of the citadel consisted mainly of destitute *ḡolāms* who began to plunder the citizens. Growing bolder, they finally attacked the Ḥoseynīya, breached its walls in several places, and rushed in and carried off enormous quantities of loot. Seyyed Beg Kamūna, the *dārūḡa*, and Mīrzā Moḥammad Amīn, both of whom were among the elect of the Islamic world, were seized and held as hostages for Farhād Aqa. The vizier, Mīrzā Aḥmad, fled with a few men to Kashan, whereupon Allāhqolī Sultan Kangarlū and other emirs were dispatched to Isfahan. As this force approached Isfahan, it was attacked by some of the rebel Arešlū emirs at Mūrča-Ḳort. Allāhqolī Sultan, Mīrzā Hedāyat Najm-e Ṣānī, and several other notables, both Turks and Persians, were taken prisoner. On receiving this news, the principal officers of state at Kashan redoubled their efforts to capture the citadel there.

Since their presence was urgently needed at Isfahan, the Iraq emirs launched a night assault on the citadel without having the necessary equipment, and fighting went on until midnight without their having effected an entry. Esmā'īlqolī Khan decided to call off the siege, to conclude a truce with Valījān Khan, and leave him to be dealt with after the more pressing situation at Isfahan had been settled. On his own responsibility, therefore, Esmā'īlqolī Khan opened negotiations with Valījān Khan, who responded favorably because he was hard pressed. He sent some of his men with insignificant gifts to plead for pardon, and Esmā'īlqolī Khan obtained an audience for them with 'Alīqolī Khan, who obtained an audience for them with the Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā.

Valījān Khan's request for pardon was granted, and he was given two months in which to complete his arrangements at Kashan and go to whatever destination the supreme *dīvān* might stipulate. It was agreed that, when the royal army left for Isfahan, he should open the gates of the citadel and admit a force of some three hundred Šāmlūs, Bayāts, and others. These would remain at Kashan as a garrison. The terms of this extraordinary truce were agreed to, and the royal army marched away to Isfahan, entered the city at an hour judged propitious by the astrologer Mīrzā 'Arab Haravī, and made the Ḥoseynīya their headquarters. 'Alīqolī Khan camped near the royal headquarters, but Esmā'īlqolī Khan camped at Golbār,[122] and the other emirs camped at suitable points. The royal army busied itself with casting cannon and preparing siege equipment, but after a few days 'Alīqolī Khan decided to see whether he could get possession of the citadel by guile. He brought Farhād Aqa to his own quarters, had his neck chains removed, treated him as his guest, made fair promises to him, and undertook to plead his case. Farhād Aqa then sent a messenger to Ḵosrow Beg calling on him to surrender the citadel. Ḵosrow Beg at first distrusted the message and sent back a harsh answer to Farhād Aqa, but he gradually became reconciled to the idea. Once he was assured that his life would be spared, he opened the gates of the citadel, which was thus captured by kindness.

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[122] See Le Strange, p. 205.

A delegation of tribal elders arrived on behalf of Mahdīqolī Khan and the Ẕu'l-Qadars of Fārs, asking pardon for their action in killing 'Alī Khan. If the principal officers of state would overlook this incident, they said, and confirm Mahdīqolī Khan as governor of Fārs, they would pledge the support of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe, which was noted for its loyal service and adherence to the rules of Sufi conduct; moreover, the tribe was willing to pay a large fine to the supreme *dīvān*. The sensible thing in that situation would have been to grant their requests, but Mīrzā Moḥammad the vizier did not like their servile attitude, and appointed as governor of Fārs, Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Dārābjerd, who was at court, and gave his post to Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan, the son of 'Alīqolī Khan. Although these appointees never succeeded in getting to Fārs, the fact of their appointment merely confirmed Mahdīqolī Khan and the Ẕu'l-Qadars in their opposition to the Iraq emirs, and caused them openly to proclaim their support of the 'Abbasid cause.

A quarrel now developed between two of the triumvirs, 'Alīqolī Khan and Esmā'īlqolī Khan, over the appointment by the former of 'Alīqolī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar as governor of Qom. 'Alīqolī Sultan was the grandson of Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa, who had held the office of keeper of the seal under Shah Tahmasp and had held Qom as a fief. 'Alīqolī Sultan wanted to take advantage of the fact that 'Alīqolī Khan, who was his friend and patron, was now the most powerful man in the state. He wanted the office of keeper of the seal, which had been held by his grandfather. 'Alīqolī Khan supported his request, partly because he wanted to indulge him and partly because he was dissatisfied with the performance of the incumbent in that office, Aslams Khan the son of Šāhroḵ Khan. Aslams Khan, however, was supported by those Ẕu'l-Qadars who owed their rise to the patronage of his father, Šāhroḵ Khan. Esmā'īlqolī Khan threw his weight behind this faction, an action that greatly displeased 'Alīqolī Khan and caused him to press more strongly the claims of his nominee. This was the origin of the feud between the two triumvirs which, fanned by troublemakers, led to an estrangement between them and the pairing off of the *qezelbāš* in support of one or the other. Each faction erected barricades in the streets of Isfahan, and each went around fearful of attack by the other.

This state of affairs produced a complete breakdown in the administration of the city and the realm, and no one showed any concern for the weak and indigent. The licentious behavior of rude and mischievous *qezelbāš* soldiers made it difficult for citizens to go about their business in the streets of the bazaar. Merchants closed their shops and business came to a standstill. But one activity that did continue was the business of extorting money from the citizenry by means of fines and confiscations. Large sums were levied on behalf of the fiefholder of Isfahan, and as billeting allowances *(dūšollokāt)*[123] for the principal officers of state. These levies were made by persons holding drafts issued by the emirs, and such persons employed collection agents to get the money. Since no questions were asked about the methods they used, anyone who got his hands on a draft was able to extort double the face value of the draft.

At this juncture, the news arrived that 'Abdollāh Khan, the Uzbeg ruler, had invaded Khorasan and besieged Herat. The report said that 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū was defending the city and that Moršedqolī Khan had left Mašhad with 'Abbas Mīrzā and planned to march to Iraq via Ṭabas. Since communications between Iraq and Khorasan were poor, it was not clear whether Moršedqolī Khan had left Mašhad simply in fear of 'Abdollāh Khan, or whether he intended to attempt a coup in Iraq. At all events, this news produced a rapid rapprochement between the two estranged triumvirs! However, the two khans approached the idea of a meeting between them with extreme caution; the Šāmlūs did not want Esmā'īlqolī Khan to go to 'Alīqolī Khan's quarters to patch up their quarrel. The meeting did take place, but each khan was supported by a fully-armed phalanx of his own men.

Esmā'īlqolī Khan marched to the Ḥoseynīya with great pomp and ceremony. On his side, 'Alīqolī Khan had turned out the court chamberlains and doorkeepers, and stationed plenty of musketeers on all sides. When Esmā'īlqolī Khan saw this formidable array awaiting him, he braved it out and continued to advance. But when he, his brothers, and the other Šāmlū emirs who were with him had entered 'Alīqolī Khan's quarters, 'Alīqolī Khan's men closed behind them and prevented the Šāmlū troops from entering. Esmā'īlqolī Khan, making no protest, went in and met 'Alīqolī Khan, and they concluded a spurious truce.

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[123] See *TM*, p. 157.

Hardly had the two khans become reconciled to each other than the news arrived from Khorasan of the death of Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, followed by repeated reports that Moršedqolī Khan was advancing on Iraq. 'Alīqolī Khan's first thought was to take his men, some five thousand in all, and to go first by forced marches to Rayy, which was his fief, and then to Ḵār and Semnān, with the object of securing the roads as far as Damghan and of preventing anyone who might feel disposed to do so from going out to welcome 'Abbas Mīrzā. Since the Khorasan army was small, he said, this would effectively prevent it from advancing on Iraq by this route. He suggested that Esmā'īlqolī Khan should proceed to Qazvin with the Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā and hold the capital. 'Alīqolī Khan's officers demurred; Esmā'īlqolī Khan could not be trusted, they said, and consequently it would be folly to place the Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā in his hands and then to take himself far away. They thought Moršedqolī Khan would move against Isfahan, rallying to him the Afšārs and Ẕu'l-Qadars from Kerman, Yazd, and Shiraz who had declared their support for 'Abbas's cause. They therefore deemed it wiser to remain at Isfahan. The argument went back and forth for several days. Then, on receiving reports that 'Abbas was advancing along the Damghan road, the triumvirs decided to fall back on Qazvin. Before they left Isfahan, however, they once more bled the population white. After the damage had been done, they appointed Ebrahim Khan Torkmān, the son of Ḥeydar Sultan Čābūq, *dārūga* of Isfahan. They marched off toward Qazvin, sending on ahead 'Alīqolī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Qom, with instructions to mobilize his men at Qom and rendezvous with them at some place to be determined.

Hardly had the khans left Isfahan than one of the triumvirs, Moḥammadī Sarū Sūlāḡ, the "brains" behind the movement to put Abū Ṭāleb on the throne, fell ill. The others waited for him for ten crucial days at Mūrča-Ḵort. Then, receiving confirmed reports that 'Abbas was advancing along the Ḵār and Semnān road, they marched off toward Jorpādeqān,[124] instead of taking the usual route through Kashan, because of the presence there of the hostile Valījān Khan.

Events in Khorasan, the Advance of 'Abbas Mīrzā on Iraq, and His Accession to the Throne of Iran

Although 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, at Herat, had lost custody of 'Abbas Mīrzā to Moršedqolī Khan, he continued to be apprehensive of the latter. He realized he could not expect any help from Iraq and so, like a drowning man clutching at a straw, he cast around for some ally. He sent couriers to the Mogul princes at Kandahar and to 'Abdollāh Khan Uzbeg at Bokhara, representing himself as their vassal. 'Abdollāh Khan considered this an amazing piece of luck, and sent back letters of apparent friendship; the princes at Kandahar made no response. In reality, 'Abdollāh considered this a golden opportunity to capture Herat, on which he had for long had his eye. He determined to invade Khorasan and, at the beginning of the Year of the Pig (end of 995/1587), appeared on the borders of Khorasan with a large army. First, he sent a message to 'Alīqolī Khan, as follows:

> You made friendly overtures to me, and paid me for compliments due from a servant to his master. Now I have decided to conquer Khorasan, and have brought an army for this purpose. If you are sincere in your avowals, then join me without delay and make your obeisance to me, and let my name be inserted in the *ḵoṭba* and stamped on the coinage throughout the province. If you prefer to hand over the administration of the province to my supreme *dīvān*, you may take your pick of any other governorship you fancy in the provinces of Transoxania, Turkestan and Badaḵšān. If, however, you were not sincere in your avowal of friendship and do not wish to enter my service, you should evacuate Herat and rejoin your fellow *qezelbāš*, since I do not intend to return without achieving my object.

This message filled 'Alīqolī Khan with alarm, and he bitterly regretted having, in his desperation, made overtures to 'Abdollāh

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[124] The modern Golpā'īgān, the town lies northwest of Isfahan. The necessity of using this route meant a considerable detour for the Iraq emirs if they planned to march east toward Khorasan.

Khan. He knew it was an impossibility for *qezelbāš* and Uzbegs to mix; he could not think of surrendering Herat, the most important region of Iran and one which aroused the envy of the gardens of paradise; and he could not trust the Iraq emirs. Consequently, he accepted his fate and prepared to defend the city. 'Abdollāh Khan, giving up hope of obtaining the submission of 'Alīqolī Khan, appeared before Herat and commenced the siege. Every day there were skirmishes between the besiegers and the besieged. The full story of the siege will be narrated in Book II.

Meanwhile, Moršedqolī Khan's envoy, whom he had sent to Qazvin to sound out the emirs there in regard to their willingness to acknowledge 'Abbas Mīrzā, had returned without the answer Moršedqoli Khan had hoped for. Morteżāqolī Khan, after his return from Iraq, had sent a delegation to Mašhad consisting of his brother, Kāẓemqolī Sultan; Besṭām Aqa; and Bektāš Beg the son of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, to declare his solidarity with Moršedqolī Khan. In addition, Morteżāqolī Khan urged him to march on Iraq, and the news from Fārs, Kerman, and Yazd all supported such a move. However, Moršedqolī Khan was an extremely prudent and experienced officer; in addition, because of the enmity between the Ostājlūs and the Turkmans, he did not altogether trust Morteżāqolī Khan. Moreover, he did not want to take his trump card, 'Abbas Mīrzā, and place him in the midst of two or three thousand Turkman households. He therefore procrastinated in regard to advancing to Damghan.

On the one hand, he did not consider the forces at his disposal strong enough for an advance on Iraq; on the other hand, he realized that it was not safe to remain where he was in view of the Uzbeg invasion of Khorasan. After spending sleepless nights trying to decide what to do, he finally decided that the best plan would be to advance on Iraq via Ṭabas and Yazd and avail himself of powerful reinforcement from the Afšār and Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs of Yazd, Kerman, and Shiraz, who kept assuring him of their fealty. At the same time, Morteżāqolī Khan would advance from Damghan, link up with Valījān Khan at Kashan, and constitute a second prong of attack on Iraq. Moršedqolī Khan appointed his brother, Ebrahim Khan, governor of Mašhad during his absence; he left with him Abū Moslem Khan Čāūšlū, governor of Esfarā'īn; Moḥammad Khan, the son of Eygūṣ Sultan Čāūšlū, governor of Jām; and Būdāq Khan Čeganī, governor of Ḳabūšhān. He also spread the rumor that he intended to march to Herat against the Uzbegs. When Moršedqolī Khan reached Toršīz,[125] however, he received news that caused him to abandon his original plan and to advance on Iraq via Damghan and Semnān.

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[125] Southwest of Mašhad, on the road to Ṭabas and the desert route to Iraq.

The first piece of news was that Morteżāqolī Khan had died at Damghan, and so Moršedqolī Khan no longer felt apprehensive about the Turkmans. His fears on this score were one reason why he had originally rejected the Damghan route. The second piece of news was that the Iraq emirs had moved to Isfahan and were intending to proceed to Fārs, Kerman, and Yazd to restore their authority in those areas. Moršedqolī Khan thought that the Afšār and Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs, confronted by this show of force, would abandon their intention of joining 'Abbas Mīrzā. In addition, by moving to Isfahan, the Iraq emirs had left the road to Qazvin exposed. When 'Āšūr Aqa was at Qazvin, some of the emirs there, especially the Šāmlūs, who were responsible for the defense of the city, had expressed to him their support for 'Abbas Mīrzā and had urged an advance on Iraq without delay. The third piece of news was the death of Šāhverdī Sultan Tabat-oğlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, governor of Semnān, who was a protégé of 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū and a supporter of the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction.

Moršedqolī Khan therefore retraced his steps to Mašhad. Before beginning his westward march, he satisfied himself as to the strength of the citadel and, with some fifty or sixty of his retainers, visited the shrine of the Imam Reżā and prayed for his support. When he reached Damghan, the brothers and sons of Morteżāqolī Khan pledged themselves to him and elected to accompany him. When he neared Semnān, he called on Aḥmad Sultan to tender his submission. Aḥmad Sultan, the *vakīl* of Šāhverdī Sultan Tabat-oğlū, after the latter's death had been elected governor of Semnān on the proposal of the elders of the tribe and with the approval of 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū. Aḥmad Sultan considered it expedient to comply; he sent officers to meet the prince's cavalcade and opened the gates of the citadel to his forces.

From Semnān, Moršedqolī Khan sent an envoy to Qazvin calling on Qūr Ḳoms Khan Šāmlū and the notables of the city and the populace generally to come out and welcome the prince's cavalcade. Qūr Ḳoms Khan called a meeting of those Šāmlū officers who were in Qazvin, including Esmā'īlqolī Khan's brother and 'Abbās 'Alī Sultan, the son of Čarandāb Sultan, and of the people and leading citizens, to decide what reply to give. Esmā'īlqolī Khan's brothers and the sons and supporters of Valī Ḵalīfa were for rejecting Moršedqolī Khan's demand, but the rank and file of the soldiers and the common people enthusiastically demonstrated their support for 'Abbas, and adopted 'Abbasid emblems. Group after group of people left Qazvin to go and meet 'Abbas's cavalcade.

Ḥoseynqolī Sultan Fatḥ-oḡlū, 'Alīqolī Khan's brother and governor of Rayy on his behalf, caught between the advancing Khorasan emirs and the rush of people coming east from Qazvin, abandoned his baggage and fled to Alamūt, where Tahmasp Mīrzā was held prisoner in the charge of men of the Fatḥlū clan, his kinsmen. 'Abbas Mīrzā entered Qazvin unopposed and took up residence in his grandfather's palace. Moršedqolī Khan assumed the office of *vakīl-e dīvān-e 'ālī*, with full powers, and from all parts of the realm *qezelbāš* emirs began their trek to Qazvin to offer congratulations to 'Abbas. Valī Khan marched by forced marches from Kashan, and performed the ceremony of kissing 'Abbas's feet. Moršedqolī Khan, very much on his guard against possible moves by the Iraq emirs, sent Pīr Ğeyb Khan Ostājlū and his brothers to take up their station at Deh-e Pīr-e Ṣūfīān on the Isfahan road.

Meanwhile, the emirs of the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction, advancing via Jorpādeqān, had reached the outskirts of Qom. The news that 'Abbas Mīrzā had entered Qazvin caused consternation in their ranks. They summoned 'Alīqolī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Qom, but he procrastinated and shut the gates of the citadel against them. 'Alīqolī Khan, since he considered the governor of Qom one of his devoted followers, had never envisaged this situation. He and Esmā'īlqolī Khan and some other emirs entered Qom on the pretext of making a pilgrimage to the shrine of Fāṭema and sent a smooth-talking envoy to 'Alīqolī Sultan to try to persuade him to join them. "We have come as your guests," said the emirs; "entertain us as befits a host. There are various vital matters which we must talk about face to face." The governor sent back a message to the effect that the Qorūḡlū tribesmen had declared for 'Abbas and would not let him leave the castle. So the emirs gave up the attempt, performed their visit to the shrine, and returned to camp. Up to this point, it had never occurred to them that their cause might not triumph, as they did not have a high opinion of Moršedqolī Khan and the Khorasan emirs. This incident opened their eyes to the realities of the situation and had a sobering effect on them.

When the Iraq emirs neared Sāva, their men began to drift away from camp without permission, as they all had families in Qazvin. The emirs stationed Moršedqolī Sultan Šāmlū, the brother of Esmā'īlqolī Khan, on the road to Qazvin with orders to slay and plunder any who left the camp without leave. This order only increased the determination of the men to leave; they slipped away at night by side roads, abandoning their belongings, and Moršedqolī Sultan was powerless to prevent them. The officers explained to the emirs that the families of most of the *qūrčīs* and retainers of the royal household were in Qazvin. The men were afraid that, if fighting broke out between the two factions, Moršedqolī Khan would molest their families.

The Iraq emirs, realizing that the majority of the *qezelbāš* were opposed to the idea of armed conflict between the two factions, changed their plans from one minute to the next. To make matters worse, 'Alīqolī Khan did not altogether trust Esmā'īlqolī Khan. Their discussions were not exactly friendly, and any plan suggested by 'Alīqolī Khan was criticized by Esmā'īlqolī Khan. 'Alīqolī Khan put his case as follows:

> In view of the dissension among the *qezelbāš* and the fact that most of our men are making off to Qazvin, we cannot stand against the Ḵorāsānīs in our present state of uncertainty and divided opinions. Let us take the Shah and our prince, and anyone who will stay with us, and go to Hamadan for a while. This will give the people of Iraq time to think of the future, and will stop the drift toward Qazvin. When word gets around that the Ḵorāsānīs have come empty-handed, whereas we have money and treasure with us, the ordinary soldiers, whose actions are always governed by material considerations, will rally around us. Let us lie low for a while and see what fate will bring; as the saying goes, "the night is pregnant; let us see what the morrow will bring forth."

Esmā'īlqolī Khan rejected this view: "The men we have with us," he said, "all have families at Qazvin, and naturally they want to see them. If we go to Hamadan this will seem to them like a retreat, and it is probable that those who are now on our side will desert us, which will mean the end of us. I think the better plan is for us to go to Qazvin. Moršedqolī Khan is only one man; we have heard that many of his followers have been forced to accompany him against their will. When we reach Qazvin, if he submits to us, well and good; if not, our forces are still stronger than his. We will destroy him, and make heir-apparent whichever of the princes we like."

'Alīqolī Khan refused to agree to this: "By going to Qazvin," he said, "we are surrendering the initiative to Moršedqolī Khan. He will attack us the day we arrive, and there will be no chance of second thoughts next day. Prudence and caution dictate that we should stay apart from each other and enter into negotiations with him until we see what fate has in mind." The vacillation of their leaders was now apparent to all, and the defection of men began to affect even the most reliable officers, who also began to desert and to vie with one another in their zeal to enter 'Abbas's service.

Since the emirs could not think of any other plan except the march on Qazvin, it was agreed that all the emirs, centurions, and nobles from every tribe should gather at an appointed place and conclude a solemn pact that they would be loyal to one another, would not depart from any agreed policy, would not attack one another either in the interest of their own ambition or at the instigation of someone else, and would unite against anyone who attacked any of his fellow *qezelbāš*. The principal emirs involved in this compact were 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū; Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šāmlū; Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa Īnāllū Šāmlū; Aslams Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, keeper of the seal; Adham Khan Torkmān; Šāhqolī Ḵolafā-ye Rūmlū; Seyyed Beg Kamūna; Esma'il Sultan Alplū Afšār; Shah 'Alī Ḵalīfa Ẕu'l-Qadar, governor of Shiraz; Mahdīqolī Sultan Ṭāleš, son of Ḥamza Ḵalīfa; and various other emirs from the Šāmlū, Ostājlū, and Bayāt tribes, and sons of emirs of the Mowṣellū Turkman tribe, kinsmen of Solṭānom, the mother of Sultan Moḥammad Shah.

All these emirs assembled at the quarters of Mīrzā Moḥammad the vizier, where they swore the oath on the Koran. Hardly had the decision to march on Qazvin been made, however, when two of 'Alīqolī Khan's trusted officers, Mahdīqolī Sultan Ṭāleš and Allāhqolī Sultan Kangarlū, left camp without permission, followed by the majority of the Ostājlūs. 'Alīqolī Khan was left virtually without any troops. The Šāmlūs, on the other hand, stood staunchly behind Esmā'īlqolī Khan, and the balance of power between the two khans therefore shifted in favor of Esmā'īlqolī Khan. He had received a bland message from Moršedqolī Khan Ostājlū to the following effect:

> "I need not remind you," wrote Moršedqolī Khan, "of the long-standing friendship between the Šāmlū and Ostājlū tribes, which have stood together in all vicissitudes. It is imperative that one of the great Šāmlū chiefs should hold one of the principal offices of state. Today, the only two Šāmlū chiefs who have the appropriate stature are yourself and 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Herat and grandson of Dūrmīš Khan. I need not remind you either that 'Alīqolī Khan is my enemy and your enemy, and therefore I have no option but to befriend you. You acquiesced in 'Alīqolī Khan's appointment to the office of *vakīl,* and deferred to him. I am no less a man than he is, and I shall treat you better than he has. I can understand that 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oḡlū may be nervous about coming to Qazvin, because he and I are members of the same tribe, and there will therefore be a problem as to which of us is to be *vakīl* and the senior chief *(riš-safīd)* of the tribe. But there is no reason for you to hold back."

Although there was not an ounce of truth in all this, Moršedqolī Khan's words were persuasive. Esmā'īlqolī Khan was deceived and would not consider any plan except that of going to Qazvin. 'Alīqolī Khan kept saying, "Moršedqolī Khan is from my tribe, and I know him better than you do; there is absolutely no reliance to be placed on his protestations of sweet reasonableness. As soon as he has us in his power, he will not leave us alive a day longer. There are many aspirants to power among the Šāmlūs; he will choose one of them, who will thus be 'his man,' and you will probably meet your end before I do! Let us think again." After more argument, the two khans finally decided each to send an experienced and trusted officer to Qazvin to seek audience with 'Abbas Mīrzā, to meet Moršedqolī Khan, and to deliver the following message: "The emirs and khans in our party, mindful of the overriding need to preserve the stability of the state, have waived their own claims and have refused to countenance civil war between our two parties; the possibility of negotiation between us still exists." The envoys were further instructed to find out what the real intentions of the 'Abbasid faction were and to report back. 'Alīqolī Khan chose as his envoy Aḥmad Beg Bebī'ī; Esmā'īlqolī Khan chose Aḥmad Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū. The two envoys were received by Moršedqolī Khan, who spoke diplomatically to both and reassured them by his moderation and by his deferential and suave manner. The envoys then returned and made a full report.

The emirs willy-nilly resumed their advance on Qazvin. When they reached Ḵošk-rūd,[126] they were met by a delegation from Qazvin consisting of Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn the *mojtahed,* 'Abbās 'Alī Sultan Šāmlū, and Aḥmad Beg the *ešīk-āqāsī,* a senior chief of the Ostājlū tribe. They delivered the following message from Moršedqolī Khan:

> The disunity which has existed between the *qezelbāš* has emboldened the enemies of our faith; as a result, much *qezelbāš* territory has been occupied by Ottoman forces. Now the Uzbegs plan to conquer Khorasan. It is perfectly obvious that, as long as this disunity continues among the *qezelbāš,* the Khorasan army is not strong enough to deal with the Uzbegs, nor that of Iraq to face the Ottomans. If this state of affairs is allowed to continue for another few years, both religion and the state will suffer irreparable harm. When 'Abdollāh Khan invaded Khorasan, I thought it inadvisable to remain there and allow 'Abbas Mīrzā, who is the Shah's eldest surviving son and has given evidence of fitness to reign, to be beleaguered by the Uzbegs. I considered it my duty to the Safavid house to bring the prince here, and my only objects were the preservation of unity, the strengthening of religion and the state, and the repulse of our enemies. My sincere wish is that the great emirs and senior chiefs will forsake their quarrels so that, with unity restored, we may jointly plan whatever measures are in the best interests of the state.

Moršedqolī Khan had instructed his delegates that, if the emirs were disposed to make peace, the delegates should administer to them an oath that they would be friends of Moršedqolī Khan and would not plot against him. The delegates went first to the quarters of 'Alīqolī Khan, and Esmā'īlqolī Khan and the other emirs and senior chiefs assembled there. Esmā'īlqolī Khan nodded his head in satisfaction more than any of the other emirs, and applauded Moršedqolī Khan for having sent this delegation. But 'Alīqolī Khan, who had a much wiser head on his shoulders, knew that there was no way in which he could live with Moršedqolī Khan, since they were both kingmakers and vicegerents of the realm *(vakīl al-salṭana).* Whichever gained the upper hand would kill the other without hesitation. However, since he could not see any way out, and since the rift between him and Esmā'īlqolī Khan was clearly visible, he surrendered himself to his fate with the greatest reluctance, and they all swore the oath. It was then agreed that each of the great emirs should send a reliable officer back with the delegates to the city to administer the oath to Moršedqolī Khan, so that both parties might feel secure against treachery on the part of the other. They would then enter the city, be admitted into audience with 'Abbas Mīrzā, and discord would be ended.

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[126] In the Ḵarraqān district; See Qazvīnī, *Nozhat al-Qolūb,* p. 215.

The emirs and khans, accompanied by the delegates, were then received in audience by Sultan Moḥammad Shah; 'Abbās 'Alī Sultan and the *mojtahed* of the age, brought salutations and greetings from the Shah's son, 'Abbas Mīrzā, and expressions of devotion from Moršedqolī Khan. Sultan Moḥammad Shah, who loathed all these intrigues and was heartily tired of the business of ruling, expressed his joy at the arrival of his son and applauded Moršedqolī Khan's action. The delegates, having discharged their mission with success, returned to the city, accompanied by Moḥammadī Beg Sārū Sūlāğ, who was instructed to administer an oath to Moršedqolī Khan that he would treat 'Alīqolī Khan like a brother and not be guilty of any treachery toward him. All the nobles sent their representatives to congratulate 'Abbas Mīrzā on his arrival.

When Moršedqolī Khan learned of the disarray of the army of Iraq and of the disagreements among the emirs, his anxiety about the possible outcome of an armed confrontation with the Iraq emirs disappeared. This major crisis had been resolved in favor of 'Abbas Mīrzā with an ease he would not have thought possible. However, he was still nervous about the possibility that, when all the Iraq emirs came in a body to offer their congratulations to 'Abbas Mīrzā, they might plot some treachery. He spent night and day pondering how he could split the Iraq emirs and bring them into the city one by one; he was particularly anxious that the triumvirs, 'Alīqolī Khan, Esmā'īlqolī Khan, and Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāğ, should be isolated from the other emirs, so that he could deal with them more expeditiously and rid himself of anxieties in regard to them.

When the *mojtahed* of the age, 'Abbās 'Alī Sultan, and Aḥmad Beg the *ešīk-āqāsī* reported to him and announced the arrival of Moḥammadī Sārū Sūlāḡ, Moršedqolī Khan pretended that the hour was inauspicious for their meeting. He gave instructions that he should lodge at the house of Moḥammad Šarīf Beg Čāūšlū, a *qūrčī* of bow and arrow, until the hour was auspicious for their meeting. Moršedqolī Khan then had orders, sealed with the royal seal, issued in the name of all the emirs and viziers in the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction and dispatched to them by the hand of their retainers who had come to the city. These orders bade them present themselves individually at an audience with 'Abbas Mīrzā. When Moḥammadī Beg saw what was going on, he realized that no reconciliation between his faction and Moršedqolī Khan was possible.

After Moḥammadī Beg left for the city, the Shah's camp deteriorated into a state of utter confusion. Soldiers of all ranks, not obeying anyone's orders, began to leave. Even the men in the royal workshops abandoned their gear and left. The men in the royal bandmaster's department decamped with the trumpets and kettledrums, and played a fanfare for 'Abbas Mīrzā after they reached the city. On the day they struck camp and moved toward the city, only a handful of grooms, reinholders, and stableboys were left to assist the Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. Of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā's servants, none remained except Zeynal Beg the master of the wine-cellar and a few menials. The great emirs, who were always in attendance near the royal tent and blew a fanfare on the trumpets when the Shah and the prince mounted, were absent. Each kept himself apart, apprehensive of his fellow emirs. They could not wait until Moḥammadī Beg returned from the city with news; when they camped at a place called Manbara, about four *farsaḵs* from the city, each emir planned to slip away during the night, without telling his fellows, and race to the city to beat them to an audience with 'Abbas Mīrzā and Moršedqolī Khan.

The first one away was 'Alīqolī Khan, who was afraid of Esmā'īlqolī Khan because the latter had far more troops left at his command. 'Alīqolī left after one watch of the night had elapsed, without telling Esmā'īlqolī Khan, and taking with him Aḥmad Sultan Āsāyešoḡlū, Qanbar Beg Gözü-büyüklü, and those who were with him. Esmā'īlqolī, who had had the same idea, followed suit, taking with him Šāhverdī Īnāllū Beg, a *qūrčī* of the sword, who was his nephew; Reżāqolī Beg, the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*, who was the son of Pīrī Beg

Īnāllū; and about five hundred Šāmlūs. Mīrzā Moḥammad, the vizier in office, and Mīrzā Loṭfī, the vizier who had been dismissed, with his son Mīrzā Moḥammad Zamān, who was the comptroller of finance, misinterpreted the actions of the two khans. They thought the khans might think there was some money to be had from them, since they were Persians and therefore cunning and greedy fellows. And so they made off in a different direction and reached the city that night by an unfrequented route. They went to the house of Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū and asked him to go with them to the palace and obtain an audience for them with 'Abbas Mīrzā that night, so that they might kiss his feet and meet Moršedqolī Khan. So it turned out that all those who had slipped away that night met outside the royal palace at Qazvin—it was a case of everyone being in the same boat![127]

Moršedqolī Khan had barred the doors of the royal palace and placed on guard there some trusted men brought with him from Khorasan. Although his visitors had arrived at an unreasonable hour, these were the men he wanted to get hold of more than any others, and they had fallen right into his lap. He gave orders that each of the principals should be admitted to the palace with one attendant, and that the rest of their men should be dismissed and instructed to report back in the morning. The guards and doorkeepers then opened the palace gates and admitted the khans and their companions as instructed. Moršedqolī Khan sent a man with the message that, since they had demonstrated their loyalty and behaved like devoted Sufis coming straight to the palace without going first to their homes, it was only proper that they should have the privilege of an audience with 'Abbas Mīrzā before retiring; unfortunately, the prince was asleep. He suggested, therefore, that they spend the rest of the night at the palace and be ready for an audience first thing in the morning.

Escorted to some apartments located between the palace and the Meydān-e Asp, they spent the night there under guard. The emirs realized they were prisoners and that they were not going to be received in audience by the prince, or even succeed in meeting Moršedqolī Khan. In the morning, the guards came in, removed their swords and all other offensive weapons. There was then no doubt about the fact that they were prisoners.

In the Shah's camp, the other emirs, when they realized their leaders had left them, all rode to the city with their men and lodged in their own quarters. In the morning, on orders from Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū, Mīrzā Šāhvalī, the vizier of Moršedqolī Khan, and a group of senior Ostājlū chiefs, rode out to escort the Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā to the city. On arrival at Manbara, they found the Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā sitting in their tent, stunned by the mysterious workings of providence, and escorted them into the city. 'Abbas Mīrzā greeted the Shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā at the royal palace; he kissed his father's hand, embraced his brother, and then escorted his father to the harem quarters. The Shah, heavy-hearted at the harsh treatment meted out to him by events, sought only peace and security. He demonstrated great joy at meeting his son 'Abbas, and divesting himself of kingship and royal authority, he placed the crown upon his son's head. He committed to his son those principles of spiritual guidance handed down in the Safavid family from generation to generation, and the prince, hitherto known in Iraq as 'Abbas Mīrzā, was named Shah 'Abbas. The same night, the women of the royal household, chief of whom were Zeynab Beg, Shah Tahmasp's daughter, and Solṭānom, mother of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, arrived in Qazvin with the rest of the royal princes, and were received in audience.

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[127] In Persian, "everyone you see is suffering from the same complaint."

Steps were now taken to destroy as rapidly as possible the powerful enemies who had fallen so easily into the hands of Shah 'Abbas and Moršedqolī Khan. The latter was still slightly nervous about possible reaction from the Šāmlū tribe, so he made Qūr Ḵoms Khan his accomplice by promising to make him senior chief of that tribe. The day after his accession, Shah 'Abbas convened an assembly in the Čehel Sotūn hall. All the emirs and principal officers of state were present. Sultan Moḥammad Shah having given his consent, Shah 'Abbas was formally acknowledged as the inheritor of temporal power and the spiritual succession. The *qezelbāš* emirs and nobles, standing in serried ranks before the throne, pledged themselves to serve Shah 'Abbas loyally. Shah 'Abbas then accused the emirs of the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction of being responsible for the murder of his brother Ḥamza and demanded the death penalty for them. All the *qezelbāš* tribes signified their assent, and it was agreed that the guilty persons should be summoned to the Čehel Sotūn hall and executed by the Sufis and loyal supporters of the Safavid house.

When the accused were brought down from the upper rooms where they had been quartered, they realized what their fate would be. As each of them entered the hall, swords were plunged into him from all sides. Ironically, as 'Alīqolī Khan had predicted, Esmā'īlqolī Khan was killed before him. Moḥammadī Khan Sārū Sūlāğ, brought from the house of Moḥammad Šarīf Beg Čāūšlū, shared the fate of his fellow triumvirs. Aḥmad Sultan Āsāyeš-oğlū, who was not marked down for execution, was moved by his friendship for the triumvirs to draw his dagger and inflict wounds on two men, and for this act he too was slain. Finally, Reżāqolī Beg Īnāllū, who had shared complicity with the barber Ḵodāverdī for the murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā, was executed. The possessions of the executed men were confiscated. Shah 'Abbas then decreed an amnesty for the crimes of other emirs, but all guilty persons were heavily fined and the proceeds used to reward the emirs who had accompanied him from Khorasan.

I stated in the exordium that this volume of my history would include twelve discourses *(maqāla).* God be praised! I have now completed the first of these discourses, which has dealt with the history of the ancestors of Shah 'Abbas and events from his birth to the time of his accession. I must now fulfill my promise by composing the remaining discourses. These will describe the character and conduct of Shah 'Abbas and give a snyopsis of the events of his reign, which will be related in much fuller detail in Book *(ṣaḥīfa)* II. In this way, those readers who have studied Book I will have a foretaste of what is to come and will gain some idea of Shah 'Abbas's powers of innovation, his abilities as a ruler, and his other outstanding qualities, which enabled him with God's help to achieve such mighty victories, to improve the possibilities of advancement on the part of the officers of state, and to order the affairs of his people in such a way that both princes and their counselors will make this record their exemplar.

Discourse 2

On the Piety of Shah 'Abbas

The ancestors of Shah 'Abbas were distinguished by their descent from *seyyeds* and by their spiritual authority. These attributes, coupled with the poverty, self-discipline, and the inner struggle against the carnal soul which they made their rule of life, earned their acceptance among the mystics, shaikhs, and holy men of their day; supernatural phenomena were constantly associated with them. Shah 'Abbas inherited these great gifts. Despite his preoccupation with the material affairs that are inescapably linked with government and administration, and despite the lure of the trappings of kingship, which are a test of a man's character, many supernatural phenomena were observed to derive from him. But it would take too long to relate these in detail.

Shah 'Abbas was never remiss in seeking to approach God's throne; when he prayed, he was so absorbed in his devotions that he appeared to have left his material body. In all affairs of state, he would seek an augury from the Koran, and he would take no action in the realm of government without asking God's advice. If the text of the Koran expressly forbade something, he would respect God's wise counsel and refrain from taking that action, even though it was desirable in order to gain some material advantage.

Discourse 3

On Shah 'Abbas's Judgment, His Divinely Given Wisdom, and the Excellence of His Policies, Which Are in Conformity with the Divine Will

Without wishing to wax lyrical in praise of Shah 'Abbas, that monarch is endowed with an unusual degree of understanding, shrewdness, acumen, native sagacity, and learning, and possesses a sound judgment in the everyday problems of this life. When he came to the throne, he set a new standard among the princes of the world in administration, in the conduct of war, in the management of armies and tactics in battle, and in the dispensation of justice. His excellent decrees were accepted as a model by other princes. Although he has wise and experienced officers in his service, in all the battles, sieges, and conquests in which he has been involved from his youth up to the present time, his judgment has been superior to theirs, and it has been his wisdom which has, in the long run, solved all the knotty problems of state affairs. Any course of action on which he has decided has proved to be in conformity with the divine will. Policies his counselors have considered to be a mistake have in the long run been proved to be right. Therefore it is apparent to all that, in all matters affecting his subjects, both great and small, or inescapably associated with government and conquest, the Shah is guided by divine inspiration, and by that alone.

When Shah 'Abbas undertook the personal direction of affairs of state, despite his youth, the multiplicity of his enemies, and the paucity of his helpers, by the grace of God, by good fortune, and by the exercise of his own divinely given intelligence and mother-wit, he succeeded in restoring such order to the state that men stood in amazement at it. It should not be forgotten that Iran had been without a strong king for more than ten years. As a result, the ignorant military, the army officers and the leading men of the tribes, had formed two factions and blotted their scutcheon by treachery and mad ambition. Their actions rent the fabric of the state and gave their enemies the opportunity to attack Iran on two fronts; every year, some new province was lost.

Shah 'Abbas took steps to remedy the situation: first, he judged it better to deal with his domestic foes. One by one, he got into his power and destroyed those seditious emirs and army officers who had risen to the rank of emir, sultan, or khan, whether by virtue of seniority or corrupt practices, and had then proceeded to stir up trouble between the *qezelbāš* tribes. In their place, he appointed to the highest offices, and to the emirate, promising officers who owed their rise to himself alone. Gradually, as the former class of officer faded into oblivion, he managed to reduce the dissension among the *qezelbāš*, and the king's commands were once more obeyed by the army. He was thus enabled to regain the territory that had been lost, and even to acquire some new. But this will be described in the proper place in Book II.

Discourse 4

On Shah 'Abbas's Good Fortune

It will not have escaped the notice of perspicacious persons that the title of *ṣāḥeb-qerān* (lord of the auspicious conjunction of planets) has, in the past, frequently been bestowed on princes by secretaries wishing to flatter their masters. In the case of Shah 'Abbas, however, it is verifiable by fact. From the time of his birth up to the present day, there has occurred the conjunction of various celestial bodies, the prognostications of which corroborate events in the life of Shah 'Abbas. According to the calculations of astrologers, each of these conjunctions foretell the appearance of a powerful and fortunate prince. Skilled astrologers, who have gone deeply into these matters, declare that the signs predict that his reign will be a stable one, and that his nature will reflect the influence of these conjunctions—particularly the conjunction of the planets which occurred in the station of Sagittarius, in the form of a fire, in the year 1012/1603-04.

The predictions astrologers have made in the past—for instance, those of Mowlānā Moḥyī al-Dīn Anār-o-pīāzī,[1] who was a master of the science of astrology—have come to pass in every particular. He predicted the appearance of a fortunate ruler, in whose reign there would be troubled times marked by the fluctuating fortunes of various religions; he predicted that some provinces would be devastated, and there would be killing and looting and taking prisoners.[2] This prediction has been fulfilled in its entirety during the reign of Shah 'Abbas in Azerbaijan, Šīrvān, and Georgia, where various vain religions that found currency in the course of time have been smitten by his shining sword. As a result of the passage of armies, some parts of the lands of Islam have been devastated, and many people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, have been displaced from their homes and scattered throughout other cities and regions. Finally, great slaughter and looting has taken place in Georgia, and many thousands of Georgian women and children, non-Muslims, have been taken prisoner and brought within the fold of Islam.

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[1] Lit.: he of the pomegranate and onion! I assume that the Mowlānā used these articles in making his astrological predictions.

[2] Needless to say, the Mowlānā's "remarkable" prediction was sufficiently vague to be applicable to almost any period of history!

In the common parlance and fancy of the vulgar, any great crisis is called a calamity (they use the same word, *qerān,* as is used for "a conjunction of the planets." According to them, Shah ʿAbbas, from his infancy until the present time, has survived more "calamities" than any other ruler who is "lord of a conjunction of the planets." They enumerate these major crises or calamities as follows:

1. For a child to be separated from its mother and father constitutes extreme hardship, and this calamity occurred to Shah ʿAbbas early in life.

2. During the reign of Shah Esmaʿil II, the Shah's sole ambition was to murder all the royal princes. ʿAbbas Mīrzā's guardian, Šāhqolī Sultan Yakān, was murdered, and the prince was saved only by the timely death of the Shah himself—a clear indication of the working of providence.

3. The third crisis which Shah ʿAbbas survived—and this was the greatest crisis of all—occurred when ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū arrived at Herat with orders from Shah Esmaʿil II (according to the popular and well-attested account—God alone knows the truth!) to slay the prince ʿAbbas. The Khan reached Herat during the month of Ramażān, and though filled with the greatest trepidation, delayed action until after the end of Ramażān. The very night on which he had decided to commit the murder, a courier arrived with the news of the Shah's death. Without a doubt, this remarkable event demonstrates that ʿAbbas was born under a lucky star.

4. When Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā led the royal army to Khorasan to put an end to the division between the Iraq and the Khorasan emirs, a battle was fought at Tīr-e Pol, near Ḡūrīān, as has already been related, and the Khorasan army was defeated. The fact that ʿAbbas, then only a child, escaped safely from that battlefield, with just a few of his retainers to protect him, is again an indication of the hand of providence.

5. Had ʿAbbas Mīrzā remained at Herat, he would have been in grave danger, since the city was fated to fall to the Uzbegs, and its defenders to be slain or taken prisoner. It was therefore the divine will that a quarrel should develop between ʿAlīqolī Khan and Moršedqolī Khan, hitherto firm friends, and that in the ensuing battle the Šāmlūs should be defeated. After this battle, ʿAbbas Mīrzā's

chain mail bore the marks of arrows and spear-thrusts, but fortified by the holy spirit of the Imam Reżā, he reached Mašhad safely and thus escaped a double danger.

6. By the grace of God, 'Abbas recovered from a number of serious illnesses which afflicted him. At Shiraz, he fell from his horse and was confined to his bed for a while, but from this too he recovered.

7. After the battle with Jeğāl-oğlū, when the Ottoman prisoners were being paraded before Shah 'Abbas, one of them, a tall, powerfully built Kurd of the Mokrī tribe, snatched a dagger from his boot and hurled himself on the Shah. With God's assistance, and the strength of his own right hand, the Shah grasped his assailant's wrist and wrenched the knife from his grip, as will be related in detail later, God willing!

Discourse 5

On Shah 'Abbas's Justice, Concern for the Security of the Roads, and Concern for the Welfare of His Subjects

The greater part of governing is the preservation of stability within the kingdom and security on the roads. Prior to the accession of Shah 'Abbas, this peace and security had disappeared in Iran, and it had become extremely difficult for people to travel about the country. As soon as he came to the throne, Shah 'Abbas turned his attention to this problem. He called for the principal highway robbers in each province to be identified, and he then set about eliminating this class of people. Within a short space of time, most of their leaders had been arrested. Some of them, who had been driven by misfortune to adopt this way of life, were pardoned by Shah 'Abbas and their troubles solved by various forms of royal favor. Overwhelmed by this display of royal clemency, these men swore to serve the king and to behave as law-abiding citizens. Others, however, were handed over to the *šaḥna* (a police official) for punishment, and society was rid of this scourge. With security restored to the roads, merchants and tradesmen traveled to and from the Safavid empire.

The welfare of his people was always a prime concern of the Shah, and he was at pains to see that the people enjoyed peace and security, and that oppression by officialdom, the major cause of anxiety on the part of the common man, was totally stamped out in his kingdom. Substantial reductions were made in the taxes due to the *dīvān:* first, the tax on flocks in Iraq, amounting to nearly fifteen thousand Iraqi *tomān,* was remitted to the people of that province, and the population of Iraq, which is the flourishing heart of Iran and the seat of government, by this gift was preferred above the other provinces. Second, all *dīvān* levies were waived for all Shi'ites throughout the empire during the month of Ramażān. The total revenues for one month, which according to the computation of the *dīvān* officials amounted to some twenty thousand *tomān,* were given to the people as alms. The object was that they should be free from demands for taxes during this blessed month, which is a time to be devoted to the service and worship of God.

Shah 'Abbas was constantly trying to alleviate the hardships of the poor and to ensure that none of his subjects should live in want. He also helped some descendants of the Prophet and other notables, who over the years had fallen on hard times, by granting them a lump sum from the royal treasury so that they might live their days without financial anxiety, and not fall into the clutches of usurers. On many occasions, he allocated substantial sums as subsistence allowances to the poor and to true believers. He also gave alms to these persons, and obtained the reward of these two good works. These are the charitable works the Shah has performed up to the time of writing; may he be spared to perform many others!

Discourse 6

On Shah 'Abbas's Authority and Despotic Behavior, Which are Divine Mysteries

From birth, the Shah has been inclined toward despotic behavior and has had a quick temper; he has never been slow to punish wrongdoers. The punishment of wrongdoers constitutes a major part of the command of armies, the government of empire, and ministry to one's people, and Shah 'Abbas has never been diverted, by worldly motives or by respect for rank, from inflicting punishment. The knowledge that this was the case has had a salutary effect from the early days of his reign. Reports of his sternness and severity have had a restraining influence on those who oppressed their subordinates, and have meant that his orders were carried out without delay. For example, if a father were commanded to slay his son, the order would be obeyed instantly; if the father procrastinated out of compassion, the order would be reversed; and if the son hesitated in his turn, another would be sent to put them both to death. His writ therefore became law, and no one dared to oppose his orders for an instant.

Before 'Abbas came to the throne, the *qezelbāš* tribes were frequently slow in answering a mobilization call, and many men drew their pay but stayed at home. If this was the case with the regular troops, it was more so with the irregulars. Shah 'Abbas therefore conducted an inquiry into the state of the army and issued orders that, whenever there was a call to arms, all men, whether regulars or irregulars, should report without delay out of zeal for their faith, and to save their honor and that of their tribe. If any one failed to answer a mobilization call, he would be put to death forthwith if he could not show cause for his absence, and his property would be made over to the person who reported him to the authorities. If his tribe took his side and concealed his offense, the whole tribe would be punished. After a few men had been executed and their property handed over to informers, mobilization orders were obeyed with alacrity.

Discourse 7

On Shah ʿAbbas's Policy-making and Administration

If scholars consider Shah ʿAbbas to be the founder of the laws of the realm and an example in this regard to the princes of the world, they have justification for this opinion, for he has been responsible for some weighty legislation in the field of administration.

One of his principal pieces of legislation has been his reform of the army. Because the rivalries of the *qezelbāš* tribes had led them to commit all sorts of enormities, and because their devotion to the Safavid royal house had been weakened by dissension, Shah ʿAbbas decided (as the result of divine inspiration, which is vouchsafed to kings but not to ordinary mortals), to admit into the armed forces groups other than the *qezelbāš*. He enrolled in the armed forces large numbers of Georgian, Circassian, and other *ḡolāms*, and created the office of *qollar-āqāsī*[1] (commander-in-chief of the *ḡolām* regiments), which had not previously existed under the Safavid regime. Several thousand men were drafted into regiments of musketeers from the Čaḡatāy[2] tribe, and from various Arab and Persian tribes in Khorasan, Azerbaijan, and Ṭabarestān. Into the regiments of musketeers, too, were drafted all the riff-raff from every province—sturdy, serviceable men who were unemployed and preyed on the lower classes of society. By this means the lower classes were given relief from their lawless activities, and the recruits made amends for their past sins by performing useful service in the army. All these men were placed on the *ḡolām* muster rolls. Without question, they were an essential element in ʿAbbas's conquests, and their employment had many advantages.

Shah ʿAbbas tightened up provincial administration. Any emir or noble who was awarded a provincial governorship, or who was charged with the security of the highways, received his office on the understanding that he discharge his duties in a proper manner. If any merchant or traveler or resident were robbed, it was the duty of the governor to recover his money for him or replace it out of his own funds. This rule was enforced throughout the Safavid empire. As a result, property was secure, and people could travel without hindrance to and from Iran.

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[1] See *TM*, p. 46. The *qollar-āqāsī* ranked second in importance to the *qūrčībāšī* during the later Safavid period.

[2] See *TM*, pp. 16–17.

Another of Shah 'Abbas's policies has been to demand a truthful reply whenever he asked anyone for information. Lying, he said, is forbidden and considered a sin by God, so why should it not be a sin to lie to him who is one's king, one's spiritual director, and one's benefactor? Is not falsehood to such a one ingratitude? In the opinion of Shah 'Abbas, lying to one's benefactor constituted the rankest ingratitude. If he detected anyone in a lie, he visited punishment upon him. The effects of this policy have been felt at all levels of society. For example, if someone has committed various acts that merit the death penalty and the king questions him on his conduct, the poor wretch has no option but to tell the truth. In fact, the opinion is commonly held that, if a person tells a lie to the Shah, the latter intuitively knows he is lying. The result is that the biggest scoundrel alive hesitates to allow even a small element of falsehood to creep into any story he is telling the Shah. The beneficial effects of this on government and the administration of justice need no elaboration.

Discourse 8

On His Simplicity of Life, Lack of Ceremony, and Some Contrary Qualities

The character of the Shah contains some contradictions; for instance, his fiery temper, his imperiousness, his majesty and regal splendor are matched by his mildness, leniency, his ascetic way of life, and his informality. He is equally at home on the dervish's mat and the royal throne. When he is in a good temper, he mixes with the greatest informality with the members of his household, his close friends and retainers and others, and treats them like brothers. In contrast, when he is in a towering rage, his aspect is so terrifying that the same man who, shortly before, was his boon companion and was treated with all the informality of a close friend, dares not speak a word out of turn for fear of being accused of insolence or discourtesy. At such times, the emirs, sultans, and even the court wits and his boon companions keep silent, for fear of the consequences. The Shah, then, possesses these two contrasting natures, each of which is developed to the last degree.

Discourse 9

On Shah 'Abbas's Concern for the Rights of His Servants and His Avoiding Laying Hands on Their Possessions

One of the most agreeable qualities of this monarch is his compassionate treatment of his servants, which is coupled with a concern that faithful service should receive its just reward. His record in this regard is so outstanding that it is not matched by that of any other chivalrous[1] prince. As long as his servants are constant in their loyalty, the royal favor is lavished upon them, nor is it withdrawn for any trifling offense committed out of ignorance or from negligence. If any of his servants dies from natural causes, or gives his life in battle in the defense of the faith and the state, the Shah is generous in his treatment of their dependents. In the case of officeholders, even if their sons are too young at the time of their father's death to be fit for office, nevertheless, in order to resuscitate their families, he confers the same office on the sons out of his natural generosity and magnanimity.

Moreover, since the Shah considers the possessions and treasures of this world of little value, even if the deceased has left substantial sums of money, such is the Shah's magnanimity and concern to follow the prescripts of canon law that he (unlike the majority of princes) does not lay covetous eyes on the inheritance, but divides it among the heirs in the proportions ordained by God. This is regarded by some as his most praiseworthy characteristic, for most of the princes of the world consider it impossible for them to show greater appreciation for their servants than by following this practice, which brings with it heavenly rewards.

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[1] Persian, *arbāb-e fotovvat. Fotovvat,* strictly speaking, is "conduct worthy of a gentleman."

Discourse 10

On Shah 'Abbas's Breadth of Vision, and His Knowledge of World Affairs and of the Classes of Society

After he has dealt with the affairs of state, Shah 'Abbas habitually relaxes. He has always been fond of conviviality and, since he is still a young man, he enjoys wine and the company of women. But this does not affect the scrupulous discharge of his duties, and he knows in minute detail what is going on in Iran and also in the world outside. He has a well-developed intelligence system, with the result that no one, even if he is sitting at home with his family, can express opinions which should not be expressed without running the risk of their being reported to the Shah. This has actually happened on numerous occasions.

As regards his knowledge of the outside world, he possesses information about the rulers (both Muslim and non-Muslim) of other countries, about the size and composition of their armies, about their religious faith and the organization of their kingdoms, about their highway systems, and about the prosperity or otherwise of their realms. He has cultivated diplomatic relations with most of the princes of the world, and the rulers of the most distant parts of Europe, Russia, and India are on friendly terms with him. Foreign ambassadors bearing gifts are never absent from his court, and the Shah's achievements in the field of foreign relations exceed those of his predecessors.

Shah 'Abbas mixes freely with all classes of society, and in most cases is able to converse with people in their own particular idiom. He is well versed in Persian poetry; he understands it well, indulges in poetic license, and sometimes utters verses himself. He is a skilled musician, an outstanding composer of rounds, rhapsodies, and part-songs; some of his compositions are famous. As a conversationalist, he is capable of elegant and witty speech.

Discourse 11

On Shah 'Abbas's Public Works and Building Achievements

Shah 'Abbas has been responsible for many public works, and has a natural inclination toward charitable activities. He has constituted as lands held in mortmain all the estates he has either inherited or acquired, the fair market value of which amounts to one hundred thousand *tomān,* and has made them over as endowments to the shrines of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones. The net proceeds of these endowments, after all necessary deductions have been made, amount to seven or eight thousand *tomān.* These funds are allocated to pensions and stipends for the *'olamā,* holy men in general, and residents of the shrines. The Shah has constituted all his private possessions into a *vaqf,* and is extremely careful in his own personal spending. This practice is peculiar to Shah 'Abbas among princes, and has rarely been followed either before or since.

In most provinces of the empire, he has left splendid monuments such as mosques, theological seminaries, pious foundations, and charming residences and gardens. Although a detailed description of each of these will be given at the appropriate point, I will list here the principal achievements, at the risk of prolixity: At Mašhad, the extension of the shrine complex, including lofty porticos and the buildings around them; the painting and decoration of the sanctuary; the building of new roads, and the construction of a water channel in the middle of the street; the construction of the large cistern within the main courtyard. This cistern is always brimming with water, and pilgrims to and residents of the shrine return grateful thanks for its existence; the construction of the dome over the tomb of Ḵāja Rabī' al-Ḵos̱eym, which is outside the city and is of peerless beauty and form; the buildings of the Qadam-gāh[1] of the Sasanian monarch Šāhpūr, and the ancillary buildings connected with this, together with the construction of a cistern and fountains fed by water led down from the mountains, and the planting of trees indigenous to the region—truly a site to gladden the eye of the beholder.

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[1] A *qadam-gāh* is a shrine built around a site containing the footprint of some holy man or other notable personage.

At Ardabīl, the shrine of Shaikh Jebrā'īl, the ancestor of Shāh 'Abbas; a gold railing round the dais, opposite the tomb; a silver railing and other adornments of the sacred enclosure; the restoration of the tomb of Shaikh Zāhed-e Gīlānī, the rehabilitation of that of Shaikh Šehāb al-Dīn Aharī, and the designing of the beautiful garden around the tomb.

At Isfahan, the Masjed-e Jāme', situated on the south side of the Naqš-e Jahān Square. People who have traveled widely say they have rarely seen marblework to equal that on the walls of this mosque; the building of another extremely fine mosque, opposite the royal court;[2] the building of a theological seminary; a hospital; public baths; the Qeyṣarīya,[3] and rows of shops flanking the Meydān, with apartments over; excellent caravanserais; the five-storied royal palace, and private apartments decorated in gold and named Sarvestān (the cypress grove), Negārestān (the picture gallery), Goldasta (the posy of roses), and the like; other five-storied buildings; reservoirs; the main avenue known as the Čahār Bāḡ, approximately one *farsaḵ* in length, and the gardens flanking the avenue on each side—not to mention the fine mansions erected in each garden, too numerous to specify; the magnificent bridge, consisting of forty arches,[4] situated in the middle[5] of the Čahār Bāḡ avenue and spanning the Zāyanda-rūd —a bridge without equal in the world; the suburb of 'Abbāsābād on the west side of Isfahan, built to provide housing for the colony of Tabrīzīs; and, outside the city, the Bāḡ-e Kowma; the Bāḡ-e Voḥūš (zoo); the Gāvḵānī inn, and another inn in the Ḵargūšī plain, between Varzana in the Isfahan district and Nadūšan in the Yazd district—a place where there always used to be great danger from highway robbers, but which is now safe.

At Qazvin, the capital, the royal palace, and the two-storied private apartments, decorated with gold, known as the New Building; the splendid caravanserai and the Jahān-nomā buildings situated both east and west of the Sa'ādat Square.

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[2] The reference is to the Masjed-e Shaikh Loṭfollāh, opposite the 'Ālī Qāpū (or Ala Qāpū) palace.

[3] The huge bazaar complex at Isfahan.

[4] There are actually thirty-three. This bridge was named for Shah 'Abbas's celebrated commander in chief, Allāhverdī Khan, who rose from the ranks of the *ḡolāms*. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, ii, 45, observes: "*A priori*, one would hardly expect to have to travel to Persia to see what may, in all probability, be termed the stateliest bridge in the world."

[5] After Safavid times, the portion of the Čahār Bāḡ south of the bridge fell into disrepair.

At Kashan, the palace complex, comprising several mansions and gardens; the public bath; the caravanserai; the Qohrūd dam; the Rebāṭ-e Sangīn inn; the Sīāh-kūh inn; and the roadbed between Namaksār and Sīāhkūh, which was consolidated with rock and lime over a distance of several *farsaḵs*, at a cost of about ten thousand *tomān*—a work for which the traveler offers a prayer of gratitude.

In Māzandarān, the construction of the summer palace at Faraḥābād,[6] near the shores of the Caspian Sea. A stream called Tejīna-rūd runs through the grounds, and Shah 'Abbas built the magnificent bridge and highway that connects Faraḥābād with Sārī, a distance of some four *farsaḵs*, and is constructed of solid blocks of stone. Each garden in the grounds has its own mansion, and the palace complex includes bathhouses, markets, and pleasure gardens. Because it is such a beautiful place, the bourgeoisie and artisans aspired to reside there. Over the years, thousands of houses belonging to Muslims and non-Muslims from all parts of the empire sprang up in the palace grounds. Today, it is doubtful whether there is another city of its size within the confines of the Islamic world.

Shah 'Abbas has also constructed residences and gardens at Sārī and Āmol, and the lake and mansions at Bār-forūš-deh, and at Ašraf,[7] another palace complex, with gardens and springs, and silver basins on the balconies of the mansions, which are cunningly fed with water brought from a point higher up the slopes of the mountains. Only half a *farsaḵ* from Ašraf, at a place called Bāḡāt, which lies at a higher elevation, there is another group of gardens, baths, and mansions equipped with halls and porticos. In the grounds, there are artificial lakes and fountains that beggar description. The whole way from Isfahan to Ašraf, at distances of four *farsaḵs*, Shah 'Abbas has constructed overnight accommodations consisting of guest rooms, workshops, and gardens, most equipped with bathhouses. Each lodging house is designed to provide anything the Shah may require on his overnight stay.

At Astarābād, the palace complex. At Naṭanz, the Bāḡ-e Tājābād, with court buildings, upper chambers, bathhouses; the Bāḡ-e 'Abbāsābād between Naṭanz and Kashan. At Tabriz, construction of the tombs of 'Eyn-e 'Alī and Zeyn-e 'Alī, and the restoration of the mosque of Shah Tahmasp. In the Hamadan region, near Šahr-e Now

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[6] See my article in *EI*².

[7] See my article in *EI*².

Čamčāl, on the slopes of the Bīsotūn mountain, a hospice for the use of pilgrims visiting the local shrines. Let us hope that each of the public works will bring the Shah victory and prosperity, and that these achievements will continue to be remembered in ages to come.

Discourse 12

On Shah ‘Abbas’s Battles and Victories

Since Shah ‘Abbas has always turned to God for help, his reign has been crowned by victories, and success has attended him from his accession up to the present day. Full details of all his victories and conquests will be given in Book II of my history, but as a compliment to the Shah, I will give a summary of them here.

When he ascended the throne, Shah ‘Abbas was faced by internal enemies, and he decided to deal with these first. He marched to Isfahan and Shiraz, dealt with Ya‘qūb Khan Ẕu’l-Qadar and Yūsof Khan, who had blockaded themselves in the fortresses of Eṣṭaḵr and Kerman, respectively, and returned to the capital. Next, he dealt with the rebel Dowlatyār Sīāh-manṣūr, razed his castle, and destroyed him. Next, he marched against Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of eastern Gīlān, who had been in correspondence with the Ottomans, expelled him from that province, and incorporated it with the western portion of Gīlān. Next, he subjugated the castle of Sendān, where Emir Ḥamza Khan Ṭāleš, the son of Bāyandor Khan, was showing signs of rebellion. Next, he determined to subjugate Māzandarān, his patrimony, and Rostamdār, which was divided between various princes and was a constant source of trouble. Both areas were incorporated into the Safavid dominions. After that, he took an army to Lorestān, where he captured the rebel Šāhverdī Khan Lor-e ‘Abbāsī.

Next, he turned his attention to Khorasan. After a number of inconclusive campaigns against ‘Abd al-Mo‘men Khan, the son of ‘Abdollāh Khan Özbeg, who made repeated incursions into Khorasan in an attempt to capture the forts at Nishapur, Esfarā’īn, and so on, but retired each time the royal army took the field, Shah ‘Abbas finally brought the Uzbegs to battle near Herat, at Pol-e Sālār and Rabāṭ-e Parīān. In the battle, the Uzbeg commander, Dīn Moḥammad Khan, who had succeeded ‘Abd al-Mo’men at Herat, was killed. As a result of this victory, Khorasan was returned to Safavid control.

From Khorasan, the Shah marched to Astarābād, where he suppressed the rebels and stamped out the *sīāh-pūšī* (the wearing of black) movement. The following year, Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān, who had been restored by Shah 'Abbas to his ancestral throne, rebelled. He was captured by the Shah, and the fortresses of Abīvard, Nesā, Bāğbād, Darūn, and Marv were added to the province of Khorasan. In the Year of the Tiger, 1010/1601-02, he marched again against the Uzbegs, this time to Balk̲, and captured the fortress of Andek̲ūd, a task which took his predecessors at least six months, on the second day of the siege. He camped before Balk̲ for twenty days, blockading in the city Bāqī Khan, the brother of Dīn Moḥammad Khan Uzbeg and ruler of Transoxania and Turkestan; Bāqī Khan did not dare give battle, and the Shah ravaged the area before returning.

In the Year of the Hare, 1011/1602-03, he took the field against the Ottomans, determined to regain the provinces of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, land in which the *qezelbāš* had buried their dead for so many years. Within sight of Tabriz he routed 'Alī Pasha and took him prisoner, and inflicted great slaughter on his troops. The citadel at Tabriz was finally retaken after a siege, and the Shah pressed on to lay siege to Erīvān. After a siege of seven months, the fortress at Erīvān, which consisted of three separate castles, was captured, and the province of Čok̲ūr-e Sa'd and its dependencies returned to Safavid hands.

In the Year of the Serpent, 1013/1604-05, the Shah led his army against Jeğāl-oğlū and fought a pitched battle with him near Vān. Jeğāl-oğlū was routed but, in late autumn of the same year, he regrouped the Ottoman forces and led them against Tabriz. Shah 'Abbas fought a second battle outside Tabriz; Jeğāl-oğlū was defeated and fled to Dīār Bakr, where he died. After this great victory 'Abbas led his men to Qarābāğ, and laid siege to Ganja. After four or five months the fortress fell; its commandant, Moḥammad Pasha, and the garrison, were put to the sword. From Ganja, the Shah marched against Tiflis, Tomanūs, Georgia, and Qal'a-ye Lorī. The Ottoman garrisons of these forts had no choice but to seek quarter and surrender.

The Shah then marched into Šīrvān and laid siege to Šamāk̲ī in the depths of winter, braving heavy rain and snow. The fortress fell and the Shah removed Aḥmad Pasha, the commandant, and all the garrison before marching on to capture the forts at Darband and Bākū, and the other forts in Šīrvān. Morād Pasha, the grand vizier, led another Ottoman force to Tabriz. He failed to take the citadel and sued for peace, sending various envoys including Naṣūḥ Pasha. 'Abbas, having now recovered all lost Safavid territory, was also willing to negotiate peace, and peace was eventually made on the same terms as the Treaty of Amasya that had been concluded with Shah Tahmasp.

Since the rulers of Georgia, Lūarsāb, and Ṭahmūraṣ, who were vassals of the Safavid house, had rebelled against their overlords, Shah 'Abbas decided to lead a punitive expedition to Georgia. Lūarsāb and the sons of Ṭahmūraṣ were taken captive and executed. Ṭahmūraṣ himself fled to Bāšī Āčūq and found sanctuary there with some Georgian princes who were vassals of the Ottomans. On several occasions, Ṭahmūraṣ disturbed the uneasy peace with the Ottomans. After the return of the royal army, he was guilty of various hostile acts against Muslims. Shah 'Abbas therefore took a second punitive expedition to Georgia, went through Ṭahmūraṣ's territory with fire and sword, and brought back to Iran more than one hundred thousand Georgian women and children who became converts to Islam. Ṭahmūraṣ himself became a fugitive.

The Ottomans then broke the peace and dispatched Moḥammad Pasha, the grand vizier, known as Öküz Moḥammad, to lay siege to Erīvān. But he failed to take it. In the process, he lost several thousand men and a number of Ottoman nobles were slain.

These are the events that will be described in detail in part I of Book II, which will bring my history down to the year in which I am writing this page, namely 1025/1616. The events that will be covered in part 2 are as follows:

When the Ottomans broke the peace, not satisfied with the failure of their expedition against Erīvān, they called in Jānī Beg Gerāy, ruler of the Qarā Qerem Tartars, to help them. In 1020/1611-12 a vast army, from Anatolia, Egypt, Syria, and Kurdestan, under the command of the Grand Vizier Ḳalīl Pasha, reinforced by twenty thousand Tartars under Jānī Beg Gerāy, invaded Iran. Shah 'Abbas stationed himself at Ardabīl and sent a force under Qarčaqāy Khạn, commander in chief of the army of Iran, against a combined Ottoman-Tartar force of fifty thousand men under Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, and Jānī Beg Gerāy, which had advanced as far as Sarāb. A great battle was fought this side of the Šeblī pass, and the Persian forces were completely victorious. Ḥasan Pasha and other

Ottoman officers were killed, together with a number of Tartar princes and countless Kurds; Jānī Beg Gerāy himself was wounded. Ḵalīl now sued for peace on the previous terms. Once again, envoys went to and fro, and once again peace was concluded.

In 1030/1620-21, Shah 'Abbas marched to recover the provinces of Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar, which the Mogul emperors had neglected to hand back to Iran, despite their earlier bonds of friendship with the Safavids. He wrested these provinces from Shah Salīm, the son of Emperor Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar. Similarly, Shah 'Abbas aspired to recover the province of Arab Iraq, which had always belonged to the kings of Iran and which had been in *qezelbāš* hands during the reign of Shah Esma'il I and the first part of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, but had then been occupied by the Ottomans. A mutiny of Ottoman troops at Baghdad gave him his chance. In 1031/1621-22, he marched to Baghdad and brought Arab Iraq back under Safavid control. He visited the holy shrines at Najaf and Kāẓemeyn.

In the Year of the Rat, 1033/1623-24, the commander in chief, Qarčaqāy Khan, was sent to Georgia to make certain necessary dispositions there with the help of the *beglerbegs* and emirs of Šīrvān and Qarabāḡ. The emirs took along with them a Georgian named Morāv, who had for years held an honored place in the Shah's service, because he was familiar with the Georgian scene and was thought to be a reliable man. On arrival in Georgia, however, that villain gathered together a group of Georgian dissidents, and they treacherously fell on the unsuspecting emirs and slew Qarčaqāy Khan and Yūsof Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān. The Georgians then again rebelled, and once again turned to the Ottomans and declared themselves supporters of the latter. Morāv was joined by Ṭahmūraṣ and 'Aṭā Beg, both of the stock of the Georgian princes of Meskhia and Āḵesqa, who had been defeated by the Safavid army in previous campaigns. At this point, the Ottoman Sultan 'Oṣmān II was assassinated by his own Janissaries, and his younger brother, Morād, was placed on the throne.[1] Morād sent an army to Arab Iraq, which had recently returned to Persian hands, under the command of Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, the grand vizier.

Shah 'Abbas dispatched an army to Georgia to deal with the revolt of Morāv; the army was a mixed force of *ḡolāms, qūrčīs,* musketeers, and troops belonging to the emirs of Azerbaijan and was under the command of 'Īsā Khan, the *qūrčībāšī*. Morāv, Ṭahmūraṣ and 'Aṭā Beg confronted them with a mixed force of infantry and cavalry totaling twenty thousand men. The Georgians were defeated, with about a thousand men killed. Morāv fled to Anatolia, and Ṭahmūraṣ and 'Aṭā Beg took refuge in the forests of Georgia.

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[1] After the assassination of 'Oṣmān II in 1031/1622, the previously deposed Moṣṭafā I was briefly reinstated, and was then succeeded by Morād IV (1032/1623).

Meanwhile, Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, who had reached Dīār Bakr, was incited by Morāv and other Georgian troublemakers to march on Baghdad with an army of more than a hundred and fifty thousand men. The Pasha laid siege to the citadel. Shah 'Abbas marched to the relief of Baghdad, although a large part of his army had not yet returned from Georgia. He reached the city with an army of forty thousand men, and camped near the Behrīz channel. Heavy fighting ensued between the two forces. The garrison of the citadel made frequent sorties in support of the royal army, and the Ottomans made great use of their siege guns in an attempt to batter down the fortifications. The siege dragged on for nine months, and the Ottomans had made no progress. On the contrary, they had suffered heavy casualties both in the field and in their assaults on the citadel, and had lost many men through desertion. Finally, they sued for terms. Shah 'Abbas allowed them to march away, leaving their heavy siege guns on the spot, and Arab Iraq remained in Persian hands.

Ṭahmūraṣ now begged forgiveness for his past sins and declared that in the future he would be a loyal servant of the Shah. The Shah replied that any time he cared to present himself at court, he would be pardoned. 'Īsā Khan recaptured the fortress at Āḵesqa, which had passed into Ottoman hands during the rebellion in Georgia. On the eastern front, the Uzbeg leaders showed an inclination to reach a peaceful settlement, and negotiations were opened. Shah 'Abbas was now at the height of his power, and both friend and foe hesitated to cross him. The events mentioned in the above summary will be related in greater detail in Book II.

God be praised that I have been permitted to complete the first book of my history, The World-Adorning History of Shah 'Abbas the Great. I have mentioned several times that I completed the original work in 1025/1616, and later added an account of the events of the remaining years of the reign of Shah 'Abbas, which is contained in part 2 of Book II. It seemed to me to be necessary, in order to quench the thirst for knowledge of those my readers who might have only

Book I at their disposal, to append to this volume, in the form of these eleven discourses, a general survey of the whole forty years of the reign of Shah 'Abbas, in summarized form. I have now remedied this deficiency, not worrying too much about being repetitious, and I have placed these discourses at the end of Book I, hoping thereby to escape criticism.

Although I hesitate to place these scattered and incomplete notes in the same category as the works of professional biographers and historians, I am nevertheless encouraged by the reflection that, in the market, even the humblest earthenware pot, though it has no intrinsic value, is not given away free, but is considered as much part of the shopkeeper's stock in trade as the most priceless gems. Indeed, when I consider that my subject is the history of the Safavid dynasty and of Shah 'Abbas the Great, I think my work might not unjustly be compared to the *Matla' al-Sa'deyn* or the *Ẓafar-nāma*. I beg scholars to look leniently on my work, and if they find errors in it, to correct them. As the saying goes, "Big fish do not bother to cavil at small fry," and so I ask their assistance in this regard, so that I may complete the project I have conceived in the best possible manner. Book II will consist of two parts (may the second part never be completed!).[2] I pray that my work will be acceptable to His Majesty, and that it will bring him felicity through all eternity.

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[2] In other words, "Long live the king!"

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(Tārīk̲-e ʿĀlamārā-ye ʿAbbāsī)

by

Eskandar Beg Monshi

Volume II

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Professor of Middle East and Islamic Studies, University of Toronto

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In the preamble to Book II of his History, Eskandar Beg Monšī states that he intends henceforth to use the Turkish calendar instead of the lunar *hejrī* year "in order to clear up ambiguities" caused by the non-correspondence of the two calendars.

Unfortunately, Eskandar Beg merely succeeded in compounding the problem. The resultant ambiguities have now been cleared up by Professor Robert D. McChesney, who generously made his findings available to me. Since this translation was already in galley proof, there was time only to adjust the Nowrūz date of each year, where this was necessary, in the light of his findings. The reader will therefore find occasional discrepancies between the Nowrūz date and the *hejrī* date given by Eskandar Beg at the head of each chapter.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

The only sure foundation of both temporal and spiritual authority is justice, beneficence, and compassion. All mighty monarchs are subject to God's injunction: "God enjoins justice, and the doing of good to others."[1] It is through their efforts in watching over their subjects that they have been raised on high: "And We exalted him to a lofty station;"[2] and it is in consideration of the dictum, "the just ruler is the Shadow of God," that monarchs are regarded as the shadow of divine power and as a part of prophethood and sainthood. God be praised, therefore, that He has chosen as ruler of Iran, which is the choicest part of the inhabited world and the most excellent region of the earth, a king who possesses these qualities to perfection.

The chronogram for the accession of Shah 'Abbas is The Shadow of God (996/1588). By a curious coincidence, his name, 'Abbas Bahādor Khan, is also a chronogram for this event. I trust that all loyal servants of the Safavid dynasty, and especially the *vazīr-e dīvān,* whose name[3] appears on the title page of this history, will be the beneficiaries of the favor of Shah 'Abbas.

In the first book of my history, I gave an account of the rise of the Safavid dynasty and of the ancestors of Shah 'Abbas, who were sovereign in the world of the spirit;[4] I described the events associated with the birth of the prince 'Abbas, and concluded with a summary of the events of the year of his accession, which is the Year of the Pig (996/1588)—using a plain, unvarnished style. Also in book I, I indicated that, if I was spared, I would rework this draft, which is too anecdotal in style, embellish it with noble phrases and elegant metaphors, and jettison the superfluous material that inevitably creeps in in the course of writing a history, but which has no place in the art of historiography.

However, I must now address myself to the task of fulfilling my other promise, namely, to give a chronological account of the events of the reign of Shah 'Abbas. I reflected that, if I used the *hejrī* year, as is the common practice of historians, which begins on the first of Moḥarram in Arab usage, the majority of the people of Persia would

[1] Koran, 16:91.

[2] Koran, 19:58.

[3] Abū Ṭāleb Khan b. Ḥātem Beg Ordūbādī, vizier 1019-21/1610-11 to 1612-13, and 1041-43/1631-33. The eulogy of this vizier was omitted from later recensions of this history.

[4] Presumably the author has in mind the shaikhs of the Safavid *ṭarīqa.*

not understand it. The reason for this is that, in both the Turkish and the Persian calendars, the New Year begins at Nowrūz (21 March), which is the first day of spring, and the calendar year comprises four seasons commencing from that date. The month of Moḥarram occurs in the course of the Turkish year, and so the chronograms learned scholars formulate for historical events are at variance with the Turkish year; some refer to the preceding *hejrī* year, and some to the following one. It was incumbent upon me to clear up ambiguities of this kind, and to use a system that will be understood by the common man and approved by persons of quality. I therefore decided to use the Turkish year, in order that students of history and those involved in the process of government might understand more clearly what events happened in which year.[5] During the first few years of Shah 'Abbas's reign, Persian fortunes were at a low ebb, and a number of disagreeable events occurred. This time of misfortunes soon passed, however, and a new era of prosperity dawned. I am not guilty of the slightest exaggeration when I say that the actions of Shah 'Abbas were taken as a model by other mighty potentates.

But now to my theme. As I have already mentioned, Moršedqolī Khan, his mind set at rest in regard to his rivals among the emirs, continued to hold the office of *vakīl* with full powers, and Shah 'Abbas, in order to consolidate his own position and in the interests of the state, gave him absolute authority in the affairs of government. To begin with, Moršedqolī Khan had quarters in the royal palace. Morning and evening, the emirs, viziers, and principal officers of state assembled in his presence and all *dīvān* business, of whatever importance, was concluded in accordance with his judgment. After a few days, however, Moršedqolī Khan moved out of the palace and took up residence in the house formerly occupied by the late Parī Kān Ḵānom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, which was situated at the side of the palace. The provincial emirs began to arrive to kiss the Shah's feet: Valī Khan Afšār from Kerman; Yūsof Khan Afšār, the son of Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, from Abarqūh; Mahdīqolī Khan

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[5] Unfortunately, Eskandar Beg did not succeed in removing all ambiguities in regard to the correspondences between the Turkish (or Torkī) solar calendar and the lunar *hejrī* calendar. Professor Robert D. McChesney, in an article to be published shortly, has painstakingly analyzed the discrepancies between the two systems, and I am indebted to him for making a copy of his article available to me. According to his findings, the correspondences for the years 996/1587-88 to 1009/1600-01 are consistently incorrect; those for the years 1010/1601-02 to 1015/1606-07 are inconsistently incorrect; and those for the years 1015/1606-07 to 1025/1616-17 are inconsistently correct. For a full discussion of the whole complex problem, the reader is referred to Professor McChesney's article.

Ẕu'l-Qadar, and Mīrzā 'Abdollāh, the son of Mīrzā Salmān, from Shiraz; 'Alīqolī Sultan, the grandson of Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa Ẕu'l-Qadar, from Qom; Emir Ḥamza Khan Ṭāleš, from Āstārā; and Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, from the Ardabīl region. Every day, too, contingents of *qezelbāš* arrived to pledge their fealty to the Shah.

About this time, Shah 'Abbas contracted two marriages: the first, with the daughter of Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā,[6] who had been brought up by her grandmother; and the second, with the daughter of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bahrām Mīrzā, who was the widow of Ḥamza Mīrzā. The theologians and jurists arranged a magnificent wedding feast in the Bāḡ-e Sa'ādatābād and the Meydān-e Asp. It went on for three days and nights, and the highest and lowest in the land joined in the festivities.

At the conclusion of the wedding ceremonies, the Shah appointed each of the high-ranking emirs to an office and granted him a fief. The office of *qūrčībāšī* went to Yūsof Khan; that of keeper of the seal, to 'Alīqolī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar; the governorship of Shiraz, to Mahdīqolī Khan; and Kūr Qūr Ḵoms Khan, the son of Delī Būdāq, was appointed to the office of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*. Although he had promised the office of vizier to Mīrzā 'Abdollāh b. Mīrzā Salmān (the letter of appointment had actually been issued), the Shah went back on his word; it was given to Mīrzā Šāhvalī, the son of Mīrzā Aḥmad, who was the vizier of Moršedqolī Khan. The reason was that Mīrzā Šāhvalī's father, who deserved well of the Safavid house, had lost his life in the citadel at Torbat.

The richest province, Isfahan, most of which was crown land *(ḵāṣṣa)* and had been the personal property first of Shah Tahmasp, then of Ḥamza Mīrzā, and finally of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, was reserved by Moršedqolī Khan for his own use. This act of presumption was his first false move in Iraq. Qom was allocated to Soleymān Ḵalīfa Torkmān; Hamadan to Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū; and the other provinces were allocated to the emirs as Moršedqolī Khan thought fit. With his letter of appointment, each emir received another document that listed the number of troops he was required to provide for the expedition to Khorasan against 'Abdollāh Khan Uzbeg, which was planned for the spring with the object of relieving the city of Herat.

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[6] The fifth son of Shah Tahmasp; he lost his life in the general massacre of Safavid princes perpetrated by Shah Esma'il II.

The Remaining Events of the Year of the Pig, the Year of Shah ʿAbbas's Accession, with Details of the Revolt among the Emirs and the Execution of Some of Their Number

As I related in Book I, Shah ʿAbbas had been brought up at Herat in the care of his guardian, ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū, and the Šāmlū tribe. The quarrel between his guardian and Moršedqolī Khan had finally led to his falling into the hands of the latter, but he had never liked the idea of Moršedqolī Khan being his guardian, or being among the Ostājlū tribe. However, there was nothing he could do but acquiesce in the situation. Some of those who had accompanied ʿAbbas from Khorasan knew of his antipathy to Moršedqolī Khan, and they perceived his dislike of the latter's ever-increasing power. These emirs, men like Pīr Ğeyb Khan Ostājlū and his brothers, were of course also consumed with envy of the *vakīl's* power on their own account and looked for an opportunity to bring him down. At the instigation of Mīrzā Abdollāh Khan b. Mīrzā Salmān, who resented not being given the office of vizier, a conspiracy was formed against the *vakīl*. Those involved were Mahdīqolī Khan, governor of Shiraz; Yūsof Khan the *qūrčībāšī;* ʿAlīqolī Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the keeper of the seal; and Kūr Qūr Ḵoms Ḵolafā. Mīrzā Moḥammad Amīn, the son of Mīrmīrān, who was the *ṣadr,* was due to arrive from Isfahan, and Moršedqolī Khan was due to ride out with the emirs to greet him. The conspirators saw this as their opportunity; they planned to surround Moršedqolī Khan as he rode along, and "relieve their minds of anxiety on his score."

On the morning in question, however, several of the conspirators went to the *vakīl* and warned him of the plot. Moršedqolī Khan gathered his men together and proceeded directly to the palace to inform the Shah of the emirs' treachery. The conspirators had assembled at the house of Yūsof Khan, the *qūrčībāšī.* When they heard that their plot was no longer a secret, and that the *vakīl* had gone to the palace and was with the Shah, they mounted and rode to the palace on the pretext of assembling to form the escort for Mīrzā Moḥammad Amīn. Since most of their men were armed, the *ešīk-āqāsīs* and the gatekeepers tried to prevent them from entering. But the conspirators forced their way into the palace and tramped into the Čehel Sotūn hall with their weapons, riding boots and all. They fondly imagined that their action was in conformity with the Shah's own desire and that, with his support, it would be an easy matter to deal with the *vakīl*. The Shah, although he was irked by the *vakīl's* overweening power, saw that the best policy lay in supporting him on this occasion. Most of the conspirators who had burst into the palace in this rude fashion had risen to high rank during the period of revolts and civil wars, and they behaved like unruly barons. The Shah thought it would be wiser to get rid of this group, and he would never have a better chance.

Shah 'Abbas therefore sent a messenger to the conspirators asking the meaning of this disruption and the name of its author. The conspirators then lost their nerve and did not follow through with the degree of boldness the occasion demanded. Concealing their real purpose, they replied that they had come to form the escort to lead Mīrzā Moḥammad Amīn into the city. If Moršedqolī Khan wished to ride with them, well and good; otherwise, they would take their leave. Since they made no mention of any other matter, the Shah merely told them to carry on with their duties, saying that the Khan had important business with him and could not come.

Once Mīrzā Moḥammad was safely in the city, the conspirators, knowing they would not now be safe from Moršedqolī Khan, went in a body to the Bāḡ-e Sa'ādatābād and—in an act of even greater stupidity—openly declared their opposition to the *vakīl*. They had made extremely difficult for themselves a task they could initially have performed with ease. This time, the Shah sent Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū to find out the cause of all the tumult, and the conspirators now said openly: "We are discontented with the amount of power and influence wielded by Moršedqolī Khan; we have observed his improper conduct toward your majesty's servants; this is unacceptable to the *qezelbāš*, and there is no possibility of our reaching a *modus vivendi* with him." In reply, the Shah said: "You are the servants of this court. If you have a genuine concern about something, or if you have a complaint against Moršedqolī Khan or any other, the rule is that you should bring your complaint to me and abide by whatever decision I make. To stir up trouble among the *qezelbāš*, and to ride around in armed bands, is tantamount to rebellion." The Shah, suspecting that they might still have some motive other than the one they had now revealed, decided to rid himself of them.

He issued an appeal to "those who love the Shah," and the *qezel-*

bāš began to assemble at the palace in the Meydān-e Asp. The conspirators' supporters began to disperse, and the ringleaders despaired of achieving their object. They sent back a message by Qūr Ḵoms Khan to the following effect: "We are not guilty of any shortcoming in our devotion to your majesty, with whom we are perfectly content. Our grievance is only against Moršedqolī Khan, because he has treated us unfairly. Each of us holds one of the important offices under the jurisdiction of the *dīvān-e a'lā*, but we have not been given sufficient independence of action to carry out our duties properly. We expected that the *vakīl* would delegate greater authority to us, but this has not happened. We beg you to give your personal attention to this, arbitrate between us and the *vakīl* in the light of the interests of the state, and reach an agreed settlement."

When Qūr Ḵoms Khan transmitted this message, the Shah issued orders that the ringleaders were to be lodged at the house of Qūr Ḵoms Khan for the night. In the morning, Moršedqolī Khan would seek to conciliate them and to reassure them on all points at issue; then Qūr Ḵoms Khan would act as intermediary and a peaceful settlement would be ratified between the conspirators and the *vakīl.* All night long, the *šāhī-sevans* kept guard. In the morning, Qūr Ḵoms Khan went to the palace, taking with him as the spokesman for the conspirators Mahdīqolī Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Shiraz, who was the most intelligent of them. On behalf of himself and his fellow emirs Mahdīqolī Khan apologized for their unseemly behavior, and then launched into a diatribe against Moršedqolī Khan: "Moršedqolī Khan," he said, "has been taking decisions on matters of state without consulting Your Majesty. He has used the royal seals, which are affixed to administrative documents and which open the doors of the treasury, to achieve his own ends. Moršedqolī Khan must surrender control of these seals to Your Majesty, and they should be deposited for safekeeping in the harem, as was the practice in the time of Shah Tahmasp. The *vakīl* should also be required to convene the council of emirs twice a week. All the great emirs on this council hold appointments from the *dīvān;* all are senior chiefs of their tribes; they should have a say in decisions affecting their tribal fiefs and military obligations, so that the *qūrčībāšī* may be able to maintain his prestige among the *qūrčīs,* and the tribal chiefs in their respective tribes."

The Shah replied: "During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, as a result of the power of the emirs, their intervention in government, and their feuds among themselves, sedition was rife among the *qezelbāš*. Now that I am king, we are going to forget about the practice of Sultan Moḥammad Shah; the king is going to make the decisions now. I have confidence in Moršedqolī Khan, and I have entrusted administrative matters to his sound judgment. All those who would please me must acknowledge him as their paramount chief."

In the course of the argument, Mahdīqolī Khan lost his temper and began shouting abuse at Moršedqolī Khan. The Shah, in his turn, flew into a rage, and shouted at Mahdīqolī Khan: "You seditious little man! It was I who made you governor of Shiraz, with the rank of khan. What more do you want? What gives you the right to cause trouble among the *qezelbāš*? You, and people like you, are thorns in the side of the body politic." The Shah then promised the governorship of Shiraz to Ya'qūb Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, son of Ebrahim Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, who had been governor of Fārs under Shah Tahmasp. Ya'qūb Beg had joined 'Abbas in Khorasan and had accompanied him to Iraq. Mahdīqolī Khan was handed over to him for disposal. Ya'qūb Khan bound Mahdīqolī Khan's hands and removed his *qezelbāš* hat, dragged him out, and slew him on the spot. Ya'qūb Khan was at once formally appointed governor of Shiraz. Aslams Khan, the sons of Šāhroḵ Khan Tātī-oḡlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, who had been keeper of the seal under Sultan Moḥammad Shah and had been dismissed and fined because of his association with the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction, was reinstated in office; the fate of 'Alīqolī Sultan, the incumbent, was left in his hands. Similarly, Šāhqolī Sultan Ḵolafā was appointed to the office of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*, and the incumbent, Qūr Ḵoms Khan, was handed over to him for disposal. Badr Khan Afšār, the brother of Eskandar Khan, was appointed *qūrčībāšī* and instructed to arrest Yūsof Khan, and Adham Khan Torkmān was deputed to arrest Abu'l-Ma'ṣūm Khan. The Ostājlū emirs undertook to deal with Pīr Ĝeyb Khan and his brothers.

All those who had received orders mounted and rode off to the house of Qūrs Ḵoms Khan. Before they arrived, most of the conspirators fled, many unarmed, to Dāman-kūh in the Qazvin district, hoping to get to Gīlān. Abu'l-Ma'ṣūm Khan Torkmān, and Emāmqolī Mīrzā Torkmān went in the opposite direction, to Hamadan. No one went in pursuit of Abu'l-Ma'ṣūm Khan, who reached Hamadan safely and fled from there to Baghdad. The main body of conspirators, however, was pursued by royal troops and overtaken almost before it had got clear of the city. Those emirs who resisted were killed on the spot; the rest were arrested, while their men fled. Yūsof Khan, the *qūrčībāšī*, was spared on orders from Moršedqolī Khan, who was a friend of his father, now in Turkey. Emir Aṣlān Khan, the brother of Pīr Ĝeyb Khan, was also spared, because Shah 'Abbas had a special liking for him. These two men were imprisoned, but the rest were put to death. Emir Aṣlān Khan was later put to death, but Yūsof Khan was again spared, this time on the intercession of his cousin Valī Khan, the governor of Kerman.

Mīrzā 'Abdollāh, the son of Mīrzā Salmān, who was the prime mover of this plot, was arrested, together with his brother Mīrzā Neẓām al-Molk. But since they were Persians, they were fined instead of being executed; they were handed over to the collectors, who had instruction to take them to Shiraz and relieve them of large sums of money. Mīrzā Šāhvalī, the son of Mīrzā Aḥmad and the grandson of Mīrzā 'Aṭā'ollāh Eṣfahānī, vizier of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān in the time of Shah Tahmasp, had been appointed as his own vizier by Moršedqolī Khan in recognition of the services of his father, who had been killed in the citadel at Torbat. Mīrzā Šāhvalī was now appointed vizier of the central *dīvān*, with the title of *e'temād al-dowla;* and at his urging Abu'l-Valī Enjū, who had held the office of *ṣadr* under Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, was reappointed to the *ṣadārat*. Finally, Seyyed Beg Kamūna was appointed keeper of the seal, known as the *mohr-e šaraf-e nafāẕ*.[1] After the abortive coup against him, Moršedqolī Khan held the office of *vakīl-e dīvān-e a'lā* with full powers, and devoted his attention to the affairs of government. The Shah continued to extend his favor to him and to support him.

Among the deaths which occurred this year was that of Emāmqolī Khan Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, who died at Ganja of natural causes. His governorship was given to Moḥammad Khan Qājār, the son of Ḵalīl Khan b. Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oğlū Qājār, who held the office of *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ under Shah Tahmasp. Emāmqolī Khan belonged to the Yava clan of the Qājār tribe, which had been responsible for the upbringing of Esma'il Mīrzā, and he had been rewarded with the office of *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ. During the period when Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā were in power, Emāmqolī Khan fought valiantly against the Ottomans. For ten years he held the office of *amīr al-omarā* of Qarābāğ and governed with great authority along that frontier.

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[1] See *TM*, 62,202.

The Year of the Rat (997/1588-89), the Second Year of Shah 'Abbas's Reign: In this year, the Uzbegs Captured Herat, 'Alīqolī Khan Evčī Was Slain, the Šamlū Tribe was Destroyed, and Khorasan Lapsed into Chaos

In the spring of 997/1589, Moršedqolī Khan was busy with preparations for the expedition to Khorasan. For fear of a *qezelbāš* uprising after the departure of the royal army, he placed the ex-shah, Sultan Moḥammad, and his son Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā under guard at Alamūt, where Ṭahmasp Mīrzā was also imprisoned. On second thought, he rejected the idea of Alamūt because of its proximity to Gīlān, and moved the ex-shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā to the fortress at Varāmīn in the district of Rayy, which was centrally located in the province of Iraq and had suitable accommodations. He placed a trusted Ostājlū officer, Aḥmad Beg Gerāmpā, in charge of the prisoners.

Despite all his talk of leaving for Khorasan, Moršedqolī Khan procrastinated because he was afraid of 'Alīqolī Khan, beleaguered by the Uzbegs at Herat. He knew of Shah 'Abbas's attachment to 'Alīqolī Khan, and was afraid that the latter might once again become *vakīl* and *rokn al-salṭana* and might seek revenge. Moršedqolī Khan procrastinated so long that the defenders, weakened by lack of food, the foulness of the air, and sickness, could no longer continue the siege, and the Uzbegs captured Herat.

'Alīqolī Khan was a man of such integrity and devotion to the Safavid house that, although he had heard of 'Abbas's westward march and had no hope of receiving any assistance from Moršedqolī Khan, he kept up a courageous defense of Herat and did not allow the Uzbegs to take the city. On several occasions the besiegers attacked the ditch, and two or three times, three or four hundred men succeeded in penetrating into the city. But each time the attackers were repulsed with heavy losses. Sickness, however, took its toll in the city because of lack of food, the consumption of unsuitable food, and the foulness of the air. Many people, both Turk and Tājīk, died daily. There was also treachery within the walls. Mollā Mīr Bāḵarzī, who was in charge of one of the towers of the fort, deserted and informed the enemy of the desperate state of the defenders.

Finally, 'Alīqolī Khan sent a delegation to ask for terms with 'Abdollāh Khan Özbeg; the delegation consisted of Pīr Būdāq Sultan Šāmlū and Abū Ṭāleb Beg Ordūbādī, his own comptroller of finance, who was related to 'Alīqolī Khan. 'Abdollāh Khan was at first inclined to accept the *qezelbāš* plea that they be allowed to march away from Herat unmolested, with their families and children, but he was persuaded to reject this proposal by Mollā Mīr, Mīrzā Arbāb, Abu'l-Ḥasan Ġūrīānī, and other traitors. He then had the *qezelbāš* envoys blown from the mouth of cannon, an act which brought him lasting infamy, for throughout history it has been considered a crime to kill ambassadors.

His truce overtures having been rejected, 'Alīqolī Khan had no option but to struggle on, and he held out for nearly another two months. By that time, most of the towers lacked defenders. In the eleventh month of the siege, on a night when 'Alīqolī Khan, contrary to his usual practice, had retired to his house and most of the *qezelbāš,* too weak from hunger to mount guard, were also in their homes, someone shouted from the battlements, "This tower has no defenders." At once a group of Uzbegs, always on the lookout for an opportunity to launch an assault, swarmed up the tower with a rope, pulled several other men up, and captured several other turrets. 'Alīqolī Khan and the *qezelbāš,* caught by surprise and hearing the sound of trumpets from the battlements, abandoned any attempt to defend the walls, and retreated into the citadel of Eḵtīār al-Dīn, a fortress originally built by the Ġūrīd monarchs. The Uzbegs began to kill, pillage, and burn throughout the city.

'Alīqolī Khan, with a small band of Šāmlūs and others who were with him in the citadel, ran out of supplies of both food and munitions after two days. 'Abdollāh Khan did not know the true situation inside the citadel; he imagined that the defenders had adequate supplies and would make every effort to defend the citadel, and envisaged a long siege. He therefore sent a message to 'Alīqolī Khan through Moḥammad Bāqī Atālīq, Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, and some trusted Uzbeg emirs to the effect that, if he would surrender the citadel and hand over all his possessions to the Uzbeg khan as a gift, the latter would allow him to retire with his *qezelbāš* to whatever point he wished. There was only one condition, that 'Alīqolī Khan should make his obeisance to the Uzbeg khan. Although 'Alīqolī Khan and his men did not trust the word of 'Abdollāh Khan or the Uzbegs, they could see no alternative but to comply. On the third day, therefore, they left the citadel. Escorted by Uzbeg emirs, they proceeded toward 'Abdollāh Khan's court, which had been set up in the mosque of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā; meanwhile, the Uzbegs occupied the citadel.

'Alīqolī Khan was taken first to the Bāğ-e Šahr to pay his respects to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, son of 'Abdollāh Khan. The perfidious 'Abd al-Mo'men incited a group of Uzbeg warriors, most of them the sons, brothers, and other relatives of men who had lost their life in the siege of Herat, to take their revenge on 'Alīqolī Khan and his men. (It is not clear whether this was his own idea, or whether he was acting on orders from his father—there are two differing traditions.) When 'Alīqolī Khan and his men neared 'Abdollāh Khan's house, they were deprived of their swords by the Uzbeg emirs, who said it was not proper to go into the Khan's presence wearing arms. Several Uzbegs then drew their swords and rushed at one of the Šāmlūs, and Shah Moḥammad Allāhčīān made a grab at 'Alīqolī Khan's turban; Ğāzī Sultan Šāmlū intervened and stabbed him with his dagger, but the remaining Uzbegs drew their swords and massacred the entire garrison.

'Abdollāh Khan then gave the order that any *qezelbāš* who could be found in Herat should be slaughtered. The Uzbegs were so zealous in killing and plundering that many Persians were also slain, simply because they were co-religionists of the *qezelbāš*. The Šāmlū women were sent as prisoners to Transoxania, but the wives of the Šāmlū nobles were tortured to extract from them their articles of value and their buried treasures. They were then stripped naked and turned loose, and few of them survived. A small number who managed to creep into holes and corners emerged at night and escaped into open country.

The slaughter of Shi'ites[1] at Herat went on for some time. Any citizen who had an old score to pay off would accuse that person of being a Shi'ite, get two ignorant fellows to act as witnesses, and haul him off before a Ḥanafī religious judge, who would at once condemn the poor wretch to death by burning or other means. Anyone who was suspected of having any wealth was seized by the Uzbegs and fined. The people of Herat thus endured severe hardships until 'Abdollāh Khan made Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš governor of the province. The latter was from a noble family of Samarkand; he was a learned and dignified man who enjoyed the Khan's confidence and had been raised by him to the rank of emir and appointed to the office of *ṣadr*. He gradually took over the reins of government, curbed the oppression of the populace, and checked the activities of religious bigots.

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[1] In the text, Rāfeżīs. Strictly speaking, the Rāfeżīs were a particular Shi'ite sect which supported Zeyd b. 'Alī b. Ḥoseyn, but the word was frequently used by Sunnis as a blanket term of abuse for Shi'ites, and I have so translated it here.

From Herat, 'Abdollāh Khan marched on Mašhad. The governor there, Ebrahim Khan the brother of Moršedqolī Khan, hoped by diplomacy to spare the inhabitants of Mašhad from harm at the hands of the Uzbegs. He opened negotiations with 'Abdollāh Khan's agents and sent gifts to the Khan, together with the following message:

> The Uzbeg army has been away from home for a long time and has suffered considerably during the siege of Herat. If you intend to lay siege to Mašhad, you should be aware that our capacity to withstand a siege is greater than that of Herat, and that we shall fight particularly hard in defense of the holy shrine of the Imam Reżā. Furthermore, the royal army is momentarily expected in Khorasan. Our Shah is now firmly established on the throne and is free to march here with the whole *qezelbāš* army. If he should reach Mašhad, it is extremely doubtful whether your forces, which have already fought a hard campaign at Herat, could withstand him. It seems to me your best plan would be to retire this year to Transoxania and give us a breathing space. Next year, if our Shah is in Khorasan, you will be free to take whatever action you please; if he is not, there will be no need for your army to march. I will surrender Mašhad to whichever of the Uzbeg emirs you care to send and take myself off.

This seemed a sensible idea to 'Abdollāh Khan, because he already had reports that the royal army was on its way to Khorasan. After numerous councils of war, the decision to retire was taken; and the Khan was content with a paltry present. The Uzbeg army marched to Saraḵs, which they besieged, making their camp beneath the city walls. Mīr Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, the son of Mīr Ḥoseyn Sultan Fīrūzjang, was the governor of Saraḵs. Enrolled in the ranks of the Čaḡatāy emirs of Khorasan since the time of Shah Tahmasp, he defended the city stoutly and drove the Uzbegs out of their camp. 'Abdollāh Khan continued the siege for six weeks, but achieved nothing except heavy casualties. He withdrew, uttering threats to the effect that he would be back.

After 'Abdollāh Khan's withdrawal, the *qezelbāš* recovered all the territory as far as Ğūrīān, but the Uzbegs held the territory between Ğūrīān and the Morğāb River, which was under the jurisdiction of Mīr Qolbābā. While the Uzbegs were in the Mašhad area they had spent their time pillaging, as was their custom. Since most of the revenue from this land went to defray the expenses of the shrine of the Imam Reżā, including the stipends of the shrine officials and the *naqībs*, the latter wrote to the Uzbeg theologians and scholars asking them to use their influence to get this looting stopped. The Uzbeg theologians sent the following letter in reply:

"It is, of course, clear to every Muslim that it is not permissible to take the property or the life of any person who has made the profession of the faith, provided that person has not committed any acts which are tantamount to unbelief, but has acted in the approved manner of his ancestors and the Imams.

"However, in the case of persons who, despite the fact that they have made the profession of the faith, have totally abandoned the Sunni rite and Sunni theology, and have turned believers away from their original faith to the abominable Shi'ite rite, and have permitted the ritual cursing of Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān, and of some of the chaste wives of the Prophet, an act tantamount to unbelief, Muslim rulers—nay, all believers—are under the obligation to kill and destroy them, as God has commanded, as the supreme act for the true religion. And the destruction of their homes and the seizure of their goods and property is permitted. If the ruler of the time is remiss in prosecuting a holy war against such people when he has the power to do so, and when the consensus of theologians is that holy war is mandatory and is faithful to the practice of the Prophet, how will he answer to God on the Day of Judgment? 'Fear the Day when no soul shall serve as a substitute for another soul, nor shall any intercession be accepted for it, nor shall ransom be accepted from it, nor shall they be helped.'[2] God has said, 'We shall surely question those to whom messengers were sent.'[3]

[2] Koran, 2:49.
[3] Koran, 7:7.

'Any intelligent man who cares to browse among the verses of the Koran and the traditions will clearly perceive that that group of people who were honored by being Companions of the Prophet, who pledged their allegiance to him and served him faithfully, and for years, following the commandment of God, rode at his side in wars against the infidel, is free from all suspicion of shortcoming, and is deserving of paradise: 'Surely God was well pleased with the believers when they were swearing allegiance to thee under the Tree.'[4] 'These it is whom God has guided aright, so follow thou their guidance.'[5]

"There is no doubt that Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān fall into this category, for by virtue of their marriage ties and close association with the Prophet, they were called by God his Companions: 'When he said to his companion, 'grieve not, for God is with us.'[6] Further, as God has also said, the Prophet 'does not speak of his own volition; it is nothing but revelation which has been revealed by God.'[7] In other words, the words and acts of the Prophet have their origin in revelation. The Prophet showed the greatest veneration for Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān, and there are numerous traditions concerning each of them. To deny the virtue of these men, therefore, constitutes deviation and desertion and, indeed, constitutes a rejection of the Koran and imputes a fault to the Prophet, whereas he who believes in and loves them is acceptable to and a follower of the Prophet.

"The Koran says: 'If you love God, follow me; then will God love you and forgive you';[8] by obeying his commandment, man may hope to obtain the love of God. The valor and zeal in the service of God of the Commander of the Faithful, 'Alī, are too well known to need mention. Moreover, 'Alī was a contemporary of the 'rightly-guided' caliphs, and gave his allegiance to them and followed them. So those people who impute fault to the Prophet overlook the fact that this necessarily involves the imputation of fault to 'Alī too. Again, how is it possible to allow the imputation of various shameful acts, or at least the knowledge of them, to 'Ā'eša, although she shared the Prophet's bed and was loved by him? As the Koran says: 'Evil women are for evil men, and evil men are for evil women; and good women are for good men, and good men are for good women.'[9] Consider well, there-

[4] Koran, 48:19.
[5] Koran, 6:91.
[6] Koran, 9:40.
[7] Koran, 53:4–5.
[8] Koran, 3:32.
[9] Koran, 24:27.

fore whither the imputation of fault to 'Ā'eša will lead you! Even the commonest fellow in the bazaar, if his wife is accused of some shameful act, will be horrified; so how is it possible to impute to the wife of the Prophet the sort of thing which some Shi'ites impute to her? 'We take refuge with God from such thoughts! So be warned, O men of insight!'[10] Some people may say, 'but we have never uttered words like these, nor ever will!' But they have heard other people utter them, and have not checked them, and are therefore as guilty as they are!

"In support of your view that the revenues and crops of Mašhad should be inviolate, you have quoted the Koranic verse: 'Do not consume your wealth among yourselves by unlawful means,'[11] and the tradition: 'No order issued by a Muslim makes lawful to him the property of another, unless he who gives the order has a pure heart.' The answer to this is that the Koranic verse and the tradition in question refer only to believers and Muslims, whereas it is abundantly clear that the foul sect of the Shi'ites is beyond the pale of Islam and the Muslim faith. Indeed, this very Koranic verse and this very tradition, according to the contrary interpretation of them by a number of sound theologians, and various other Koranic verses and traditions, which there is no need to mention here, prove that it is lawful to kill, plunder, burn, and destroy the crops, houses, and gardens of infidels. There is no dispute about this. It is also lawful to wage war on those who refuse to give allegiance to the ruler of Islam and the caliph; theologians are agreed that it is lawful to wage war on such persons even if they utter the profession of the Muslim faith and are Muslims. That this is so is shown by various declarations made by 'Alī himself during his caliphate, and the war which is being waged against you by our Khan falls into this category.

'As to what you say about the crops and gardens of the Mašhad region constituting a hereditary endowment of the shrine administration at Mašhad on the part of the Shah's ancestors, since the region in question is not part of the Islamic world, but part of the 'region of war,'[12] endowments have no meaning for the army of Islam. These gardens will be treated like any other gardens, and will be allocated to Muslims. In cases where the owner has not taken possession of the land, it is quite legitimate for the Muslim ruler to allow his *gāzīs* and the army of Islam to plunder it.

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[10] Koran, 28:3. The text has *albāb* instead of *abṣār*.
[11] Koran, 2:184; 4:33.
[12] *Dār al-ḥarb*, i.e., non-Muslim lands, which may legitimately be ravaged by Muslims.

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"As to what you say about most of the inhabitants of the region being descendants of the Prophet, do you not recall the Koranic verse: 'He is surely not of thy family, for he is a man of unrighteous conduct'?[13]

"As to your protestation that you are all righteous men, righteousness is not a central issue in Islam.

"As for what you say about your contacts with theologians at Mecca, Medina, and Damascus, 'it profits not a man to see the countenance of the Prophet, if he himself is not inclined toward good.'

"As to your argument that you have been applauded by Sunni theologians, it can only be because they did not know of your false opinions.

"As to your argument that the month of Rajab[14] is one of the proscribed months, and that during this period it is unlawful to kill or make war on anyone who is not in a state of war with oneself, the proscription on the month of Rajab has been abrogated. According to the canonical traditions, the Commander of the Faithful, 'Alī, himself carried out raids and military operations against the enemy during the month of Rajab.

"As to your argument that the Koranic verse 'I have not created *jinn* and men for any purpose save that they worship Me'[15] is one of the unequivocal verses of the Koran, we do not dispute this. But there is no dispute either about the fact that holy war against the infidel is one of the greatest acts of worship! Woe to that congregation which forsakes worship, and turns to reviling the Companions of the Prophet, and considers that unbelief and sin a reason for God's reward! And this despite the fact that not even the cursing of Satan—and we have clear evidence that he is to be execrated—constitutes a good worthy of reward, but rather the sin of pride.

"Although there are those among you who are capable of grasping the manifest meaning of the Koran and the traditions, and have demonstrated this in your translations of Koranic verses and traditions, you still adhere to the Shi'ite rite which is so clearly false, and persist in following the Twelve Imams and their descendants. God said: 'We have certainly made the signs plain for a people who firmly believe.'[16] If those who would seduce believers from the right path have led you astray by lies, and have transmitted to you false opinions from the Imams and their descendants, or if any of you has any questions or is in doubt about anything that has been said in this letter, send your spokesman to 'Abdollāh Khan, so that, having received guarantees of safe conduct, you may debate with some of his servants, in the hope that the true religion may become manifest to all. The Peace of God upon all who tread the path of salvation!"

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[13] Koran, 11:47.

[14] The Uzbegs captured Herat in February 1589 (McChesney: March 1588). They were now before Mašhad, in Rajab 997/May-June 1589 (McChesney: Rajab 996/May-June 1588).

[15] Koran, 51:57.

The Reply by Mowlānā Moḥammad Moškak-e Rostamdārī

"The letter of the learned scholars of Transoxania—may God guide them on the path of salvation and preserve them from error and hardness of heart!—has been received, and I must make a few comments, as appropriate, in reply.

"It will not have escaped your notice that the Prophet of God, as is recorded in both Shi'ite and Sunni books, commended to the Muslim community the Word of God and the Prophet's family. The Imam Sultan Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Mūsā al-Reżā died as an exile in the land of Iran.[17] I, Moḥammad, the author of these lines, have been chosen from among the other attendants of the shrine of the Imam to honor this Imam in exile, by virtue of various blessings which I have received from the holy spirit of the Imam but which need not be recorded here. I have no particular affection for the *qezelbāš* or grudge against the Uzbegs. I will set forth the results of my researches without partiality or bigotry, and will take my stand on the Koran, the traditions, and whatever is in conformity with God's command. If what I have to say is favorably received, I shall have achieved my goal; if not, I shall have done my duty, and you may either benefit from my counsel or be bored by it, as you please.

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[16] Koran, 2:119. The text has *ya'qūlūna* instead of *yūqenūna*—perhaps through confusion with 57:18.

[17] The Imam 'Alī al-Reżā was summoned from Medina to Marv in the year 200/815–16 by the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn, who wanted to make the Imam his heir-apparent. At the beginning of the year 203/818, 'Alī al-Reżā died at Ṭūs; Shi'ite sources allege he was poisoned by al-Ma'mūn.

"From what we have heard from students who come here from Transoxania, 'Abdollāh Khan is both perceptive and just, and some of his emirs, notably Gönültāš Bahādor, are scholars. However, the fact that they apparently believe the stories that the *'olamā* of Transoxania tell them brings to mind the saying that if you only ask the judge his version of a case and are content with that, it cannot be relied upon. We Shi'ite theologians have not had the honor of paying a visit to the court of 'Abdollāh Khan, but the Sunni theologians have told their ruler that the Shi'ite rite is heretical and fraudulent and without foundation. But if, after examining the doctrinal principles and dogmatic statements of both sects, 'Abdollāh Khan will study the traditions of each, he will discover both sets of traditions to be compatible with God's commands.

"Now, both the Shi'ites and the Sunnis have their own collections of traditions, but there are *some* traditions which are common to both sects. Since some of the traditions are mutually incompatible, one should be careful not to throw away those which are common to both sides, because the great schism in Islam is between those who consider that the rightful successor of the Prophet was Abū Bakr (the Sunnis), and those who consider that his rightful successor was 'Alī (the Shi'ites); there is no third opinion. So any doctrine that is held by both sects must represent the consensus of all Muslims; it would be sheer folly to reject what is agreed to by all in favor of doctrines on which there are differing opinions.

"The gist of the argument of the learned doctors of Transoxania is as follows: 'Shi'ism is tantamount to unbelief, because (a) the Prophet eulogized the men who became the first three caliphs; (b) the utterances of the Prophet are inspired by divine revelation. In support of this they quote the Koranic verse: the Prophet 'does not speak of his own volition; it is nothing but revelation which has been revealed by God'; (c) Shi'ites are therefore to be condemned for being opposed to divine revelation; (d) opposition to divine revelation is equivalent to unbelief.

"The answer to this is that the same evidence demands the cursing of the first three caliphs, and the repudiation of their claims to the caliphate; for, in the *Šarḥ-e Movāfeq* of Āmedī, one of the most learned of Sunni *'olamā,* it is related that, at the time of the death of the Prophet, there were a number of differences of opinion among the Muslim people. The first of these concerned the words of the

Prophet on his deathbed: 'Bring me some paper, so that I may write something which will ensure that you do not fall into error after I am dead.' 'Omar demurred, saying, 'The man is in pain. We have God's book; that is enough for us.' The Companions began to argue about it, and they made such a noise that the Prophet was distressed and said, 'Go away; it is not fitting to conduct an argument in my presence.' This tradition is contained in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bok̲ārī,[18] and is found in various forms in most of the collections of Sunni traditions.

"The second difference of opinion among Muslims at the time of the Prophet's death concerns the instructions given by the Prophet to 'Osāma b. Zeyd to lead an expedition to Syria. Some Muslims opposed the appointment of 'Osāma as commander of this expedition, whereupon the Prophet exclaimed vehemently, 'Make the preparations for 'Osāma's expedition, and may God curse any who remain behind!' The men who later became the first three caliphs were included in 'Osāma's army, but despite this, they disobeyed the Prophet's command.

"So we say that the command the Prophet gave regarding his desire for writing material was divinely inspired, and 'Omar's refusal to bring it constituted rejection of divine inspiration, and rejection of divine inspiration is equivalent to unbelief—both by your own admission, and according to God's word. 'And whoso judges not by what God has sent down, such persons are unbelievers,'[19] and such a person is not worthy of the caliphate.

"Accordingly, if 'Omar's unbelief and unsuitability for the office of caliph is taken as proved, then by your own argument, the claim of Abū Bakr and 'Os̱mān is also invalidated, if the principle of consensus is not to be violated, for all the Sunni schools maintain that all three men were caliphs, while the Shi'ites assert that none of the three was. To say that 'Omar was a caliph, but Abū Bakr and 'Os̱mān were not, does not accord with the views of anyone in the Muslim world.

"Using the same line of argument, we say that the opposition to 'Osāma's assuming command of the Syrian expedition was also tantamount to unbelief, and among the men who opposed it were the first three caliphs!

[18] The great Sunni traditionist; died A.D. 870.
[19] Koran, 5:45.

"Both the above-mentioned traditions, in many places, support the Shi'ite position and make the rejection of all other positions imperative. But we cannot go into detail within the compass of this letter. Suffice it to say that the Shi'ites have abundant evidence, both in the form of received tradition and in the form of closely reasoned argument, to support the validity of their school of thought and the rejection of that of the Sunnis. Only God can compute the value of this evidence, and there is no space to set it down in these pages. Verily God establishes the truth, and guides man on the path of righteousness!

"Since you learned gentlemen stated in your letter that the acts of the Prophet are also part of the divine revelation, we are forced to say that the expulsion of Marvān from Medina was divinely inspired, and that 'Oṣmān's bringing him back to Medina and entrusting him with important affairs constituted rejection of the words of the Prophet, and therefore unbelief, on two counts: (a) the Prophet had given clear orders on the matter; (b) God has said: 'You will not find any people who believe in God and the Last Day loving those who oppose God and his Prophet.'[20]

"There are also some cogent proofs which enable one to sift truth from falsehood in regard to the doctrine of the Imamate but, as we say in Khorasan, 'A kiss is the best message' and, if we have the honor of meeting you, we will present this evidence to you. We only agree to meet you, however, on condition that the contest is an academic one, and not one with swords, daggers, and pen sharpeners.

"In regard to the eulogizing of the first three caliphs, there is no agreement between Sunni and Shi'ite because there is nothing about this in Shi'ite works, and any evidence which shows them in a bad light, such as is contained in the two above-mentioned traditions, among others, is common to both Shi'ite and Sunni works. Furthermore, some Sunnis have allowed the fabrication of traditions on grounds of expediency, and so no reliance can be placed on a tradition whose authenticity is not generally accepted, especially if its transmitter permits the fabrication of traditions, or is not reliable, or if there is in existence a generally accepted tradition which contradicts it. We emphatically do not agree that nonacceptance of a unique tradition with the characteristics mentioned above constitutes unbelief; if that principle is accepted, 'there is no true Muslim in any

[20] Koran, 58:23.

age,' because contradictions regarding single traditions have always occurred among the *mojtaheds.*[21]

"The veneration and respect accorded by the Prophet to the three subsequent caliphs before the appearance of any signs of opposition on their part is no indication of their future integrity and probity, because it is not right to punish a man for sedition before he comes out into the open, even though one knows he is going to rebel. For example, 'Alī made a prediction about Ebn Moljam, but did not punish him. Consequently, a tradition which only comments on the excellence of a particular action is no use, as the verse 'God was well pleased' indicates.[22]

"Second, you argue that, by virtue of this same verse of the Koran, the three subsequent caliphs were promised entry to Paradise, and therefore abuse of them constitutes unbelief. In reply, we would say that we are not disputing the fact that God was pleased by this particular act of allegiance, or that they performed various acts pleasing unto God. What we are saying is that these men were subsequently guilty of shameful acts which involved the breaking of their sworn oath and pledge of fealty, so that, in the matter of the succession, they disobeyed the express designation of the Prophet, as is recorded in both Sunni and Shi'ite books, seized the succession by force, and caused pain to Fāṭema, as is stated in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Boḵārī: 'She left him, and did not speak to him again until she died'[23]—and I have seen this tradition with my own eyes. There is another tradition recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* in praise of Fāṭema: 'Whoever angers her, angers me.' There is also the following tradition in the *Meškāt:*[24] 'Whoever harms her, harms me, and whoever harms me, harms God.' The following Koranic verse is also extremely apt: 'Those who harm God and his Prophet, may God curse them in this world and the next!'[25]

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[21] *Mojtahed:* a practitioner of *ejtehād,* i.e., a theologian who formulates answers to problems of religious law by means of analogical reasoning from the Koran, the traditions, and the consensus of the Muslim community, in accordance with rules laid down in juridical works. The Shi'ites attach much greater importance to the principle of *ejtehād* than do the Sunnis, for whom the "gate" of *ejtehād* was closed in about A.D. 980.

[22] This verse (Koran, 48:19), refers to the Pledge of the Tree made in 6/628 between the Prophet and his followers, among whom were 'Omar and others, who were later guilty of disobeying the Prophet's commands, as we have seen above.

[23] After the death of the Prophet in A.D. 632, Fāṭema, his daughter, was refused her inheritance by the first caliph, Abū Bakr.

[24] The *Meškāt al-Maṣābīḥ* of Valī al-Dīn Maḥmūd—a reworking of the *Maṣābīḥ al-Sonna* of Baḡawī (d. 516/1122).

[25] Koran, 33:58.

"In short, the first three caliphs, by committing these reprehensible acts, by denying Fāṭema her inheritance from her father, by opposing the appointment of 'Osāma as commander of the Syrian expedition, and various other acts which I have not mentioned, rendered themselves liable to opprobrium, since salvation depends on fidelity to one's covenant and fealty to the Prophet. If any person is judged not worthy of salvation, it is because he has broken his oath of fealty to the Prophet and opposed him. This is explicitly stated in the Koran: 'Whoever breaks his oath, breaks it to his own loss; and whoever fulfills the covenant he has made with God, He will surely give him a great reward.'[26]

"Third, you argue that God called Abū Bakr the Companion of the Prophet, and a Companion is not susceptible of blame. Our reply is that the verse 'His companion said to him, while he was arguing with him'[27] refers to comradeship between Muslim and infidel. Comradeship based on kinship is accepted by both our parties—for example, fraternal relations. Every man has a fraternal relationship with his brother, whether his brother be Muslim or non-Muslim. In the same way, every brother is the companion or fellow of someone else, whether the latter be a Muslim or a non-Muslim. The Koranic verse 'O my two companions of the prison, are diverse lords preferable, or God the One, the Omnipotent?'[28] supports this interpretation of 'companion,' and it is so rendered by Beyżāvī and Zamakšarī in their commentaries. In other words, Joseph, who was a prophet, called two idolaters his 'companions,' and so to be called the 'companion' of a prophet is not necessarily a guarantee of one's goodness! As you learned gentlemen have yourselves pointed out in your letter, 'it profits not a man to see the countenance of the Prophet, if he himself is not inclined toward good!' Incidentally, we are rather surprised that you gentlemen, who claim profound knowledge of the finer points of Koranic exegesis, should have written *har keh ū* in the above couplet instead of *har kerā,* since by so doing you destroyed the grammatical connection between the two hemistichs, and left each incomplete and suspended in midair! We are surprised you did not spot this, but made Jāmī turn in his grave by misquoting him! However, since you have plundered and pillaged all the people of Khorasan and destroyed their houses, and Jāmī, after all, was a Ḵorāsānī, it is not surprising that you have plundered his poetry[29] too! As the poet says, 'If a disaster is universal, it is good,' and there are other Arabic verses too which we could quote, but it would not be proper to do so. We merely request you gentlemen not to go rushing off to do some research on the matter simply because of a verbal ambiguity!

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[26] Koran, 48:11.

[27] Koran, 18:38.

[28] Koran, 12:40.

[29] There is a superb pun in the Persian, since *beyt* means both "house" and "couplet."

"Your fourth argument is that 'Alī, in spite of all his bravery, was present when the people declared their allegiance to Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān, and made no protest; this, you say, proves that the declaration of allegiance was a fact. If not, it would be necessary to revile 'Alī. Our answer to this is that before 'Alī had completed the task of preparing the body of the Prophet for burial, the other three had convened the Companions at the portico of the Banū Sā'eda and had pledged their allegiance to Abū Bakr— we will not give all the details in this letter. 'Alī, because he had only a small number of followers and feared that his party might be destroyed, or for some other reason, did not march out and give battle. This fact, however, does not prove their contention, because 'Alī, as he had demonstrated in the service of the Prophet, was in no way inferior to the other three in bravery. The traditions remind us that the Prophet and his Companions did not fight the Qoreyš, but fled from Mecca to Medina. Later, when they returned to Mecca, they concluded the Treaty of Ḥodeybīya with the Meccans. So if there was sufficient reason for the Prophet, 'Alī, and the other Companions not to fight on these occasions, there was good and sufficient reason why 'Alī on his own should not fight! It would even have been a superfluous action, because it is inconceivable that the claim of the pagan Qoreyš should have been recognized as valid.

"Some scholars take this argument further. They point out that Pharaoh, despite the fact that he claimed to be God, sat on the throne of Egypt for some four hundred years, and other tyrants like Šaddād and Nemrūd were allowed to continue to make their false claims for a considerable period, and God, despite his omnipotence, did not destroy them, with the result that they led many people astray. If God can be patient in encompassing the destruction of his enemies, surely one of his servants can! As to what you say about 'Alī having pledged his allegiance to the other three, it could have happened only against his will and as an act of dissimulation,[30] but we have no space to investigate this question here.

"We assert that the commentator on the *'Aqā'ed* of Nasafī, when

[30] *Taqīya;* it is legitimate for a Shi'ite to dissemble in order to avoid persecution.

he says that the cursing of the orthodox caliphs is tantamount to unbelief, is ambiguous. The author of the *Jāme' al-Oṣūl* considers the Shi'ite sect one of the greatest of the sects of Islam, and the author of the *Movāfeq* agrees with this, and rejects the reasons you have given as justification for pinning an accusation of unbelief on the Shi'ites. Moḥammad Ğazālī does not consider the cursing of the orthodox caliphs to constitute unbelief. Consequently, the accusation of unbelief you gentlemen have leveled at the Shi'ites is contrary to the way of believers and contrary to the traditions and the Koran, even though the definition of Shi'ism is that which I gave at the beginning of this letter, which contains no mention of ritual cursing. It is right that the names of the three caliphs Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān should never pass the lips of a Shi'ite, but, if ignorant Shi'ites insist on the necessity for the ritual cursing of these men, there is no theological foundation for this, any more than there is any theological foundation for the belief of ignorant Sunnis that it is essential to slaughter Shi'ites. Such a belief had no place in the thinking of the generations that followed the Prophet.

"As for your statement that anyone who hears certain stories and does not stop the speaker from going on is an infidel, there is absolutely no support for this statement, either in logic or in canon law. Avicenna said, 'Anyone who becomes accustomed to accepting statements as true without proof has sloughed off his God-given human genius!'

"As for the vilification and abuse which you accuse Shi'ites of having directed against 'Ā'eša, God forbid that it should ever have occurred, for it is unlawful to direct abuse at any man, let alone the wife of the Prophet. However, since 'Ā'eša disobeyed God's command, 'Stay in your houses with dignity, and do not display yourselves,'[31] and came to Baṣra and took part in the civil war against 'Alī (both Sunnis and Shi'ites attest the tradition: 'Your war is my war'), and it is obvious that no one who makes war on the Prophet is pleasing unto God, she has been reviled on this ground. The writer of this letter saw a tradition in one of the collections of Shi'ite traditions to the effect that 'Ā'eša later repented of her part in the civil war in the presence of 'Alī; this, however, is a single tradition, whereas the tradition of her participation in the war is attested to by consecutive authorities. Nevertheless, if she did repent, even after the destruction of Baṣra and the deaths of forty thousand Companions and others,[32] and if her repentence is acceptable to God, then one should not revile her for taking part in the war. But God knoweth the inner truths of affairs, and He who rules with truth, 'His will be the kingdom on the day when the trumpet shall sound.'[33] The verse of the Koran which you quoted, 'Evil women are for evil men,' and so on until the end of the verse, does not convey this spiritual truth, for pairs of contrasting spouses deserving of praise or censure are to be found throughout human history, the one deserving heaven, the other, hell; otherwise, the apparent meaning of this verse would be contradicted by Noah and his wife, Lot and his wife, Āsīya and Pharaoh, and so on. Or perhaps this verse may be interpreted in a sense which is clearer in another verse from the Koran: 'The adulterer shall not marry any save an adulteress or a polytheist, and an adulteress shall not marry any save an adulterer or a polytheist.'[34]

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[31] Koran, 33:34.

"What you have said in an attempt to humiliate the *seyyeds,* who are descendants of the Prophet, has caused us much astonishment. Surely it is obvious that, if the Prophet's wife makes a journey contrary to his orders, and makes war on the man who has been acclaimed as caliph by all Muslims, and whose virtues she herself heard extolled, and has herself transmitted opinions to this effect in the form of traditions, then she, as the traditions affirm, is in effect making war on the Prophet himself. She was responsible for the deaths of forty thousand of the Companions and Followers.

"The daughter of the Prophet, on the other hand, abused one whom some Muslims consider to be caliph, but she had incontrovertible proof of that person's opposition to the Prophet, many indications having made it manifest to her that that person had acted contrary to the Prophet's wishes and broken his sworn covenant with the Prophet. Furthermore, no one was harmed either physically or financially by the words of the Prophet's daughter, and if what she said was incorrect, then the person to whom her remarks were directed will acquire heavenly reward. The conduct of which of these two, the wife of the Prophet and his daughter, is more disgraceful and more deserving of obloquy? If the conduct of the former does not even merit contumely, how can the conduct of the latter possibly be termed unbelief?

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[32] The Battle of the Camel (36/656), was the first occasion in which Muslim arms had been turned against Muslims. The actual casualties were very high, but probably did not exceed ten thousand on both sides.

[33] Koran, 6:74.

[34] Koran, 24:4.

"If you take your stand on the fabricated tradition, 'vilification of Abū Bakr and 'Omar constitutes unbelief,' the answer to this has already been made clear. But if we have missed any part of its significance, we shall be glad to be instructed, since it is most desirable to be fair.

"It is related in the Shi'ite books that, when Ebn Omm Maktūm, who was blind, was with the Prophet one day, a member of the Prophet's harem happened to pass by. The Prophet became upset, but the woman said, 'O Prophet of God, the man is blind.' The Prophet replied, 'But you are not blind!' The Sunni theologians relate that the Prophet on one occasion kept 'Ā'eša leaning on his shoulder while they watched a group of musicians playing in the street. After a while the Prophet said to her, 'O red-face,[35] not even the worst Jeremiah could impute any sin to the basest of these men for this; or if there is any harm in it, it is not serious enough to be discernible. As far as this incident is concerned, if one is a believer, then no one else is an unbeliever.' At all events, we do not consider anyone who followed the Prophet to be more noble or more perfect than he, and we do not believe in anything which militates against his dignity or bravery. But God preserve us from people like you gentlemen, who out of religious bigotry have undermined the faith and the religious law by the fabrication of traditions.

"As to what you have written about the violation of the forbidden months, the contrary of that is the truth, until such time as some trustworthy evidence shall appear which can justify violation of a Koranic interdict! The campaigns conducted by the Prophet during the forbidden months were carried out after an attack by some enemy; he did not initiate them—in fact, most of the Prophet's military operations were of this order.

"If it be not proven that Shi'ism is tantamount to unbelief, as we think has been demonstrated by earlier answers, then there is no ground for plundering and slaying the inhabitants of Mašhad. Apparently you gentlemen are informed of the innermost thoughts of people you have never seen! How did you acquire such information? For God alone has full knowledge of what is in men's hearts![36]

"At all events, kings have fiery tempers, and your proper course is to try and dampen down the flames of your monarch's wrath with the water of admonition, instead of fanning the flames in this way—an action that may lead to God's servants being destroyed root and branch. It is obvious that, by issuing these ill-considered *fatvās* (rulings on points of canon law), you are making every effort to destroy God's servants, and the destruction of the latter, even if they are unbelievers, is not agreeable to God, whose nature is forbearance —witness the tradition of Noah's remorse on the Day of Judgment for the destruction of unbelievers and others of God's people. If any army, therefore, commits such an act on the basis of a *fatvā* issued by those *'olamā*, the *'olamā* will have to answer for this on the Day of Judgment.

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[35] The Prophet's pet name for 'Ā'eša.

[36] An oft-repeated phrase in the Koran.

"You are aware that Ebn Ṭā'ūs was a Shi'ite *mojtahed* learned in the fundamental and derivative branches of the religious law, but he wrote no books on jurisprudence. His reason for this was that God, although the Prophet loved Him, and although He had created the world with him as an intermediary, nevertheless said about the Prophet: 'If he had forged and attributed sayings to Us, We would have seized him by the right hand, then We would have severed his life artery, and not one of you could have held Us off from him.[57] Ebn Ṭā'ūs felt that, since the Prophet had been threatened in his minatory fashion, if an ordinary person got involved in some matter, how could he ever discharge it satisfactorily? So, if you gentlemen will only follow the precedent set by pious men of former generations, and be circumspect, it will be for the best; for it is an extremely difficult task to answer the plaints of the oppressed, especially children. As tradition has it, 'Spare children, so that they may grow up, and spare madmen.'

"Most of the troubles in this world are caused by aspirations for things of this world; it is incumbent upon scholars, therefore, to keep themselves aloof from worldly ambitions. Perhaps, after the lapse of a little time, you scholars of Transoxania might visit Mašhad and come to regard us as your colleagues, and (if we are prevented from leaving the city by fear of the wrath of 'Abdollāh Khan), show your veneration for the Imam Reżā by visiting his shrine, and make us happy by your presence. If this does not come to pass, and you issue a *fatvā* permitting our death, may God recompense you to the full, and rectify your affairs! Farewell!"

[57] Koran, 69:45–48 inclusive.

The Shah's Expedition to Khorasan, the Assassination of Moršedqolī Khan, and Other Events on That Expedition

When the news of the fall of Herat, the death of 'Alīqolī Khan, and the massacre and enslavement of the Ostājlū tribe reached Shah 'Abbas, he was deeply grieved. Moršedqolī Khan pretended to be grieved too, and did his best to lift the load of care from the Shah's brow by telling him old soldier's stories. The Shah, before leaving for Khorasan, appointed as governor of Qazvin, with orders to guard the capital, Moḥammad Šarīf Beg Čāūšlū, the grandson of Ḥoseyn Beg who had been *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān*, under Shah Tahmasp. Moḥammad Šarīf Beg, himself *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān*, was now promoted to the rank of khan.

The royal army marched first to summer quarters at Lār, where it decided to remain until harvest time. At Lār, the Shah received the submission of the rulers of Rostamdār: Malek Bahman, the ruler of Lārījān; Malek Jahāngīr, the ruler of Nūr; and his namesake, Malek Jahāngīr the ruler of Kojūr. This was a great triumph for Shah 'Abbas because the forefathers of these rulers, secure in the mountains of Rostamdār, had never shown the proper degree of obedience to the *qezelbāš*. While the royal army was encamped at Lār, its numbers were daily increased by new contingents. Also while Shah 'Abbas was at Lār, his first son, Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā, was born, but the child died in infancy.

The royal army then marched by way of Fīrūzkūh toward Damghan, but on arrival at Besṭām, Moršedqolī Khan thought it essential to discuss peace with the Ottoman envoys, led by Valī Aqa the chief taster of the Ottoman sultan. The whole question of peace with the Ottomans had hung fire ever since the preliminary negotiations between the late Ḥamza Mīrzā and Farhād Pasha because the Persians could not bring themselves to accept the Ottoman terms. But now the impossibility of fighting simultaneously on two fronts forced the Persians to try and come to terms with the Ottomans. It was arranged, therefore, that a Persian delegation should return to Turkey with Valī Aqa.

The royal army then proceeded on its way toward Damghan but when it reached Šāhrūd, the assassination of Moršedqolī Khan occurred. Hitherto, Shah 'Abbas had put up with the overweening power of his *vakīl*, even though the latter permitted him virtually no say in affairs of state, because of his undeniable services to the state. After the news of the death of 'Alīqolī Khan had reached Qazvin, however, Moršedqolī Khan had gone too far by the importunate way in which he pressed the Shah to satisfy his ambition to be linked by marriage with the Safavid house. What right have the Shah's servants to nurse such an ambition? In the end, the *vakīl* paid the penalty for his incivility.

Some of the *vakīl*'s close supporters among the Ostājlū tribe, especially Maḥmūd Beg Ṣūfīler, had told the *vakīl* quite openly that the Shah was planning to get rid of him and that his downfall would mean the ruin of the Ostājlū tribe. They implanted various seditious ideas in the *vakīl*'s mind. Shah 'Abbas knew all about this, either by means of his divinely inspired acumen or through information given to him by one of his faithful supporters. The Shah realized that to hesitate might be fatal, but on the other hand he had the Khorasan expedition and other important matters in train, and so he kept the information to himself and bided his time. But the *vakīl*'s arrogance knew no bounds, and he continued to treat the Shah as though he were still a child.

Shah 'Abbas knew that his own loyal supporters would not tolerate much longer his turning a blind eye to the *vakīl*'s behavior, and his own rage was mounting. He therefore plotted the assassination of the *vakīl*, choosing as his instrument Ostājlū officers from Iraq who had never liked Moršedqolī Khan—men like Ommat Beg Qarāsārlū Kösek-oğlū, who had been fined and subjected to all sorts of ill-treatment by Moršedqolī Khan because of his friendship with 'Alīqolī Khan; and Qarā Ḥasan Čāūšlū, *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān*, who had accompanied the Shah from Khorasan and was ready to do his will. Others who willingly undertook this task were Allāhverdī Beg *zargarbāšī*,[38] and Moḥammad Beg the son of Aslams Beg the *sārūq-čībāšī* (head keeper of the royal turban). From among the Persian elements in the administration and the bureaucrats, Mīrzā Moḥammad, who had been *vazīr* and *e'temād al-dowla* to Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, joined the conspirators and urged them on.

Their opportunity came when the royal army was encamped at Šāhrūd. One night, Moršedqolī Khan had come on guard duty as usual and was sleeping in the audience tent, which was situated in front of the Shah's sleeping quarters. At midnight, when most of the guards were asleep, the assassins stole into Moršedqolī Khan's tent and dispatched him with their swords, Ommat Beg striking the first blow. This event came about because Moršedqolī Khan's disloyal and insolent behavior had made it clear that his services to the crown had no object other than his personal aggrandizement.

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[38] The head of the jewelers' department; he was a *moqarrab al-ḵāqān* (see *TM*, p. 129).

The same night that Moršedqolī Khan was assassinated, Mīrzā Moḥammad received his promised reward of the post of vizier of the supreme *dīvān*. Of the supporters of Moršedqolī Khan, those who had followed the lead of their chief and been guilty of improper conduct toward the Shah were arrested and called to account. Ebrahim Khan, Moršedqolī Khan's brother, was dismissed from his post as governor of Mašhad. Ommat Beg was promoted to the rank of khan, and received all Moršedqolī Khan's possessions, accoutrements, and retainers. Allāhverdī Beg *zargarbāšī* was promoted to the status of emir with rank of sultan and Jorpādeqān and its dependencies were allotted to him as a fief. Moḥammad Beg *sārūqčī* was made *dārūġa* of Isfahan, and Qarā Ḥasan, *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān*, was promoted to the rank of khan and received other marks of the royal favor. Shah 'Abbas, who up to this moment had not intervened in affairs of state, now personally assumed the government of the realm.

The same day that the *vakīl* was assassinated, the royal army marched to Besṭām. There, the Shah decided to carry out a purge of disaffected *qezelbāš* elements. The seditious acts of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā were known to all—how, because of the execution of Emir Khan, he had rebelled against Ḥamza Mīrzā, who was the Shah's eldest son and his heir-apparent, had taken into his custody Tahmasp Mīrzā, and had engaged in civil war against Ḥamza Mīrzā. Despite his past history, Moḥammad Khan thought he could take the place of Moršedqolī Khan, and take over the *dīvān* administration as he had done in the days of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. Shah 'Abbas, however, was determined to extirpate the troublemakers among the *qezelbāš* tribes, put an end to sedition among the *qezelbāš* once and for all, and recall them to their loyalty to the Shah and make them obedient to his commands. The Turkman tribe itself was ashamed of Moḥammad Khan's behavior, and he merited punishment on many counts.

Farroḵ Khan Pornāk Torkmān willingly accepted the Shah's commission to execute him. On leaving the royal tent, he found Moḥammad Khan sitting outside; he seized him, knocked his *qezelbāš* hat off his head, and killed him on the spot. The victim's head, impaled on a spear, was paraded round the royal camp. The Ostājlū tribe had been struck with terror by the assassination of Moršedqolī Khan, but they were reassured by the execution of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān and hoped to be reinstated in the Shah's favor. The remainder of the *qezelbāš*, frightened by these demonstrations of the Shah's fearlessness and ruthlessness, hastened to toe the line.

The Shah made other administrative changes while he was in camp at Besṭām. Badr Khan Afšār, the *qūrčībāšī*, was transferred from this office to that of governor of Astarābād, and Aḥmad Sultan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Ḵār and Semnān, was sent to assist him. The post of *qūrčībāšī*, which is the greatest of the offices of the supreme *dīvān*, was given to Valī Khan Afšār, the governor of Kerman; his son Bektāš Khan, who was at Yazd, was made governor of Kerman. At the same time, the Afšārs, who had for a number of years failed to do their duty in answering mobilization calls, were ordered to send a contingent forthwith to Khorasan, and Mahdīqolī Beg Čūpān-oğlū Afšār was ordered to see to this. The Shah stayed in the pastures of Esfarā'īn for about six weeks, awaiting the arrival of more troops, and then proceeded to Mašhad, where he visited the shrine of the Imam Reżā and launched an inquiry into the affairs of Khorasan and the situation of the Uzbegs at Herat. Mīrzā Moḥammad began his duties as vizier and wielded great power. Būdāq Khan Čeganī was appointed guardian of the infant prince, Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā, and was made governor of Mašhad. The fief of Ḵabūšān, which had formerly been his, was allotted to his sons, Ḥasan 'Alī Sultan, Ḥoseyn 'Alī Sultan, and so on.

Two other *qezelbāš* officers were arrested and called to account by the Shah: Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, who was governor of Qāyen on behalf of his paternal uncle, Fūlād Ḵalīfa (it was he who had deserted 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū and gone over to Moršedqolī Khan at the battle of Toršīz, and by so doing, had broken the Šāmlū line and caused their defeat); and Soleymān Ḵalīfa Torkmān, who was the son-in-law of Moršedqolī Khan and one of his party. The downfall of these two men caused Būdāq Khan Čeganī to panic, because he was also connected by marriage to and had thrown in his lot with Moršedqolī Khan. At the urging of his sons, who had always been ambitious and intemperate men, he took his ward and fled to the castle at Ḵabūšān.

Salmān Khan, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā Ostājlū, who was governor of Tūn, worried about the Turkman emirs of the Emir Khan faction who had fiefs in the area, closed the gates of the citadel at Tūn and engaged in a number of skirmishes with the Turkmans; eventually he seized the opportunity to escape to Iraq.

In Fārs, the Ẕu'l-Qadar junior officers, who had got into the habit of mutinying against their commanding officer, behaved in the same way toward Ya'qūb Khan as they had toward previous governors; they fled from the royal camp at Mašhad, and Ya'qub Khan set out for Shiraz in pursuit. However, when the mutineers, whose leader was Ḥamza Beg Jāmīllū, reached Yazd, they were arrested by Bektāš Khan and handed over for safekeeping to 'Alīqolī Šāmlū, a *qūrčī* of the quiver, who was the *dārūġa* of Yazd. When Ya'qūb Khan reached Yazd in pursuit of the mutineers, Bektāš Khan went out to welcome him and escort him into the city. Ya'qūb Khan, however, had reason to suspect that Bektāš Khan, at the instigation of Mīrmīrān, was plotting to seize him, release Ḥamza Beg and make him governor of Shiraz, and make the Ẕu'l-Qadars his partners in rebellion. Ya'qūb Khan prudently abandoned his baggage at Yazd and fled from the city at night. Bektāš Khan sent some men in pursuit of him, but they gave up the chase.

As a result of Būdaq Khan's action, Shah 'Abbas replaced him as governor of Mašhad with Ommat Khan Ostājlū who, in addition to Moršedqolī Khan's retainers, now received those of the latter's brother, Ebrahim Khan. The royal army then marched toward Herat, but bad news from Iraq frustrated the Shah's plans and forced him to return. The news was that Farhād Pasha had advanced on Qarābāġ from Erzerum, had wrested that province from the control of the Qājār emirs, and had garrisoned a fort at Ganja. Meanwhile Jeġāl-oġlū, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad, was advancing on Hamadan with a second army. He had defeated Qūr Ḵoms Khan, the governor of Hamadan (who was taken prisoner in the action), had pillaged that province, and advanced as far as Nehāvand, where he had built a fort and provisioned it. On receiving this news, the Shah hesitated to continue his march on Herat, because the siege of that city would in all probability be a lengthy one. 'Abdollāh Khan and his son 'Abd al-Mo'men would probably return to Khorasan in the spring, and the royal army, wearied by a long siege, might not be able to withstand them, which would be disastrous for the Safavid state. Another factor was that food supplies were short in Khorasan. The Shah decided to return to Iraq to meet the Ottoman threat, but before he left

Khorasan, he dismissed a number of emirs who owed their appointment to Moršedqolī Khan and whom he therefore suspected.

The Shah's plan was to march to Iraq via Yazd in order to restore order in that region on the way; the affairs of Yazd, Kerman, and Fārs were in confusion because Bektāš Khan had remained at Yazd and had not taken up his new appointment as governor of Kerman, and had supported the mutinous Ẕu'l-Qadar officers at Shiraz. The Shah's intention was to take possession of the Ẕu'l-Qadar mutineers from Bektāš Khan, put them to death, send Bektāš Khan to Kerman (if he showed satisfactory evidence of being willing to return his allegiance), and then proceed to Qazvin. With these aims in mind, the Shah marched from Band-e Farīmān in the direction of Dūğābād in the Zāva district and Moḥavvalāt, on the road to Yazd. Since Būdāq Khan's action in fleeing to Ḵabūšān merely encouraged other dissidents to behave in an insolent fashion, the Shah sent Kūr Ḥasan Ostājlū, a reliable Ostājlū officer, to Būdāq Khan to try and persuade him to come to court by promises of royal favor. Būdāq Khan was too apprehensive to comply.

At this stage of the Shah's march, the vizier, Mīrzā Moḥammad, was suddenly arrested by Farhād Khan on the Shah's orders. The reasons for the downfall of the vizier are not altogether clear, but the following commend themselves to the intellect as being reasonable ones: first, the vizier had thrown in his lot with Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā after the death of Ḥamza Mīrzā and on behalf of the Iraq emirs had written various insulting letters to 'Abbas Mīrzā in Khorasan; second, like Moršedqolī Khan, he wished to make administrative decisions in accordance with his own judgment and policies and without reference to the Shah; third, he had entered into negotiations with Mīrmīrān about a marriage alliance and had expressed the wish that, on arrival at Yazd, he might become Mīrmīrān's son-in-law like Bektāš Khan and, with his support and that of the Afšār tribe, make himself a kingmaker. Būdāq Khan had also written a letter to say that he had been seduced from the path of rectitude by Mīrzā Moḥammad. At all events, the vizier was a domineering, seditious, and ambitious man, and the *moqarrabs* of the court, who disliked his wielding so much power, urged the Shah to arrest him. The vizier was put to death by Pīr 'Alī Aqa Arbaṭān, a retainer of Farhād Khan. Also at this point, Malek Bahman Lārījānī left the royal camp and fled to Lārījān, for no apparent reason.

The Shah then held several sessions of the council of the great emirs to debate the relative merits of returning to Iraq via Yazd or via Toršīz and Sabzavār. Valī Khan the *qūrčībāšī*, who was the father of Bektāš Khan, argued that, if the Shah marched to Yazd, Bektāš Khan and Mīrmīrān would be even more afraid and would decline to present themselves before him, and they would have some difficult business ahead of them. On the other hand, if the Shah overlooked their misdemeanors, since they had hitherto been loyal subjects of the crown, and returned to Azerbaijan by the Toršīz and Sabzavār route to deal with the Ottomans, he, Valī Khan, would personally undertake to settle matters with Bektāš Khan in a manner satisfactory to the Shah, and would conduct him to court. The Shah accepted Valī Khan's suggestion.

By the time the Shah reached Damghan, winter was over, and he spent three days there celebrating the New Year festival (998/1590). On arrival at Rayy, the Shah released his father and the royal princes, who had been imprisoned in the fortress there by Moršedqolī Khan. When Sultan Moḥammad's cavalcade approached, the Shah dismounted from his horse and greeted his father affectionately. Carpets had been spread on the ground all the way from the place where they met to the Shah's camp. As the cavalcade moved forward, gold was scattered among the crowd several times, and the rest of the day was given over to festivities. After the banquet, Sultan Moḥammad was taken to the royal harem, where he met his sister, Zeynab Begom, and other women of the royal household. From Rayy, the Shah and his father proceeded together to Qazvin.

Farhād Pasha's Occupation of Qarābāğ, Jeğāl-oğlū's Advance into the Province of Hamadan and Construction of a Fort at Nehāvand, and Subsequent Events

As previously reported, peace negotiations on the basis of the *status quo ante* were under way with the Ottomans, and the principal Ottoman negotiator, Valī Aqa, the sultan's chief taster, was on his way to the Shah's camp at Šāhrūd when the assassination of Moršedqolī Khan occurred; as a result, the negotiations were in abeyance, and Farhād Pasha profited by the Shah's absence in Khorasan to resume his offensive in Qarābāğ, the area between Šīrvān and Azerbaijan.

Simon, the Georgian prince who had in recent years been loyal to the Safavid dynasty, was seduced by Farhād Pasha's specious promises and gifts (actually he had little choice in the matter, since he saw no likelihood of receiving any assistance from his *qezelbāš* masters), and gave the Ottomans right of passage across his territory. Farhād Pasha marched blithely through the narrow mountain passes of Georgia without any opposition and entered Qarābāg̈. The newly appointed governor there, Moḥammad Khan, who had not yet consolidated his position in the province, retired in confusion. Naẓar Sultan Qazāqlar defected to the Ottomans with all his tribe, and he himself was made a pasha. The Qājār tribe and the other tribes in Qarābāg̈ were in too much disorder to be able to put up any effective resistance against the Ottomans, and they retreated across the Aras River to Arasbār, leaving many of their possessions to be plundered.

Farhād Pasha paused a short while in the Ganja region to construct a strong fort, stock it with provisions, and garrison it with seasoned troops before he returned. Meanwhile, Ja'far Pasha, the commandant at Tabriz, thought he saw the opportunity to wrest other areas of Azerbaijan from the *qezelbāš*. He advanced as far as Sarāb, making for Ardabīl, but was unable to proceed further and returned to his base. However, Šāhverdī Khan, the son of Ḵalīfa-ye Anṣār, who was the governor of Qarāja-dāg̈, tendered his submission to Ja'far Pasha, and sent his son to Tabriz as a hostage. Ja'far Pasha extended his jurisdiction over various districts near the Aras—Ordūbād, Marand, Dezmār, Konūz, and Gargar.

At the same time, Senān Pasha, known as Jeg̈āl-og̈lū, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad, led the army of Arab Iraq into Hamadan province and reached the neighborhood of Hamadan before Qūr Ḵoms Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Hamadan, had time to mobilize his troops. Abandoning all caution, Qūr Ḵoms Khan attacked the Ottomans with the small number of men at his disposal. Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī, the governor of Lorestān, who was with Qūr Ḵoms Khan, tried to dissuade him from giving battle. But Qūr Ḵoms Khan, because he distrusted Šāhverdī Khan, attributed this counsel to some plot or machination against himself. As a result, Šāhverdī Khan took no part in the battle. The Ottomans made a series of attacks and surrounded the small *qezelbāš* force. Qūr Ḵoms Khan, who at the outset of the battle had ridden forward with a few Šāmlūs to tempt the Ottoman skirmishers into becoming involved, was recognized and pointed out to the Ottomans by some renegades. He was taken prisoner, and his men fled. Šāhverdī Khan beat a rapid retreat to Lorestān, and the Ottomans pillaged Hamadan.

Jeğāl-oğlū advanced to Nehāvand which, since it was on the borders of Lorestān, he selected as the site of a fort that would both consolidate Ottoman control of the province of Hamadan and enable them to extend their jurisdiction over Lorestān. He built one fort at Nehāvand, and another at Sa'd-e Vaqqāṣ, and provisioned and garrisoned them before retiring. The population of Nehāvand were mostly Shi'ites and did not mix with the Ottomans; they destroyed their homes and crops, and scattered in all directions. As a result of this campaign, the province of Hamadan suffered great devastation. Jeğāl-oğlū took Qūr Ḳoms Khan with him to Baghdad and received the plaudits of the sultan for his achievements.

I got the details of this campaign from Ḵāja 'Abd al-Raḥīm Darmanī, a secretary in Qūr Ḳoms Khan's administration, who was with him during the battle, went with him to Baghdad, and later returned.

The Activities of the Khorasan Emirs after Shah 'Abbas Had Left That Province

After the Shah left Khorasan, Būdāq Khan Čeganī, abetted by his sons, brought out into the open his plan to make himself *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan. With the young prince Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā in their possession, they summoned to their side some of the dismissed emirs who had remained in Khorasan. They told the people that Shah 'Abbas had returned to Iraq and that the Ottoman invasion would give him no opportunity to return to Khorasan. "We have a royal prince in our hands," they said; "let us take him to Mašhad, install him on the throne there, rally round him, restore order in Khorasan, and protect the province from the enemy. We will march against anyone who refuses to join us, take away his fief, and give it to another." They succeeded in persuading a group of emirs to accept Būdāq Khan as *amīr al-omarā* and senior chief in Khorasan. Among this group was Maḥmūd Khan Ṣūfī-oğlū, who had been dismissed from the governorship of Nishapur. He was reinstated as governor of Nishapur by the revels. The Ostājlū *ğāzīs* currently in the service of the legitimate governor, Shah Naẓar Sultan Köšek-oğlū, a kinsman of Ommat Khan, had formerly been retainers of Maḥmūd Khan, and they deserted Shah Naẓar Sultan and reentered the service of Maḥmūd Khan. Shah Naẓar Sultan repaired to Ommat Khan at Mašhad.

Similarly, Emāmqolī Khan, the son of Qobād Khan Qājār, who had been dismissed from the governorship of Sabzavār for misconduct and as a result of complaints from the people, and had been replaced by Moḥammad Khan Čāūšlū, the son of Eygūş Sultan, went to Sabzavār and recovered that region from Moḥammad Khan's appointees. The rebels were also joined by Abū Muslim Khan Čāūšlū, the governor of Esfarā'īn. Ommat Khan, the governor of Mašhad, who had been appointed *amīr al-omarā* of the province by Shah 'Abbas, sent a messenger to the rebels calling on them to desist. But the rebels, far from complying, decided to march on Mašhad and oust Ommat Khan. They had just taken this decision when 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan appeared before Mashad and surrounded the city. The rest of this story will be related under next year's events.

Some of the Khorasan emirs who had been dismissed from their posts and fined—for instance, Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū and Soleymān Ḵalīfa Torkmān—went to Rostam Mīrzā, the son of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the governor of Bost and Zamīn-dāvar, who had fought his elder brother, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, at Kandahar, and had defeated him. Some of the emirs, especially Soleymān Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, went to Kandahar, hoping to persuade Rostam Mīrzā to come to Khorasan. Considerable numbers of *qezelbāš* troops from Khorasan found their way to Kandahar and declared their allegiance to Rostam Mīrzā. The whole story of Rostam Mīrzā, his brother Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and events in Sīstān and at Kandahar will be the subject of a separate chapter later on.

Events in the Year of the Ox (998/1589-90), the Third Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Shah 'Abbas returned to Qazvin in the spring of 1590.[1] On his arrival, he appointed to the office of vizier of the supreme *dīvān* Mīrzā Loṭfollāh Šīrāzī, formerly the vizier of Ḥamza Mīrzā, who had been acting as vizier of the royal household.[2] The Shah enjoyed the spring, relaxing in the company of women, but not neglecting for a moment his administrative duties.

Although the basis for negotiating a peace settlement with the Ottomans—the sending of a royal prince as a hostage to Turkey and acceptance of annexation by the Ottomans of areas already occupied by their troops—was repugnant both to the Shah and the army, 'Abbas thought it prudent to submit to these terms. He was confronted by two powerful monarchs; the problem of *qezelbāš* disunity had not been solved; and he was faced by domestic revolts (Bektāš Khan at Yazd; the Ẕu'l-Qadars in Fārs, who had been incited to rebel by Bektāš Khan; some of the Arešlū emirs in Kūh Gīlūya, where Ḥasan Khan Afšār had assumed control of that province and ruled without reference to the central administration), and by rebellions on the part of the semi-independent rulers on the borders of the Safavid empire, who had taken advantage of fifteen years of weak Safavid rule since the death of Shah Tahmasp to shake off Safavid suzerainty and assert their independence. 'Abbas was thus forced to come to terms with one or other of his two principal enemies until such time as things took a turn for the better. The Shah devoted his attention to the preparation of the prince's retinue, and nominated as his ambassador Mahdīqolī Khan Čāūšlū, son of Simeon Khan, the governor of Ardabīl, who was distinguished among the other emirs by his superior intelligence, experience, and authority, The embassy set off, accompanied by the Sultan's envoy, Valī Aqa the chief taster, taking with it a friendly letter from the Shah to the Ottoman Sultan and suitable gifts.

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[1] The Muslim year 998 ran from 10 November 1589 to 29 October 1590. The Turkish Year of the Ox, we are told, began on New Year's Day, 20 March 1589 (3 Jomādā I, 997). But Moršedqolī Khan was assassinated in July 1589; after that, 'Abbas first marched toward Herat, then began to return to Iraq via the Yazd route, and finally retraced his steps via Toršīz. We are told that he spent New Year's Day at Damghan, and this must have been 21 March 1590. He cannot have been back at Qazvin before April-May 1590—i.e., after the end of the Year of the Ox.

[2] I am not sure if this is what *vezārat-e sarkār-e 'alīya-ye 'ālīya* means.

Since Jeḡāl-oḡlū had invaded Hamadan province, advanced as far as Nehāvand, and built a fort there, acting on his own authority and without orders from the Ottoman Sultan, Shah 'Abbas decided to send a force to recover that province, hoping to destroy the fort at Nehāvand before the embassy reached Istanbul. He appointed Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan Areślū governor of Hamadan, and the latter proceeded to Nehāvand and laid siege to the fort. The *qezelbāš* had to withdraw to face a new threat from the Uzbegs in Khorasan before they had accomplished anything, and Jeḡāl-oḡlū restocked the fort from Baghdad and changed the garrison.

After the conclusion of peace, Shah 'Abbas made no further efforts to oust the Ottomans from their fort at Nehāvand, situated though it was in the heart of the province of Iraq, because such action would have constituted an infringement of the peace treaty. The Shah's Ottoman policy came under severe criticism from those who thought he should adopt a harder line, but the Shah acted with a restraint beyond his years, and great benefits eventually redounded to the state from this policy. Once the Shah had concluded peace with the Ottomans, he was able to turn his attention to problems in other parts of the country—the disaffection among the *qezelbāš* and internal enemies. With these problems dealt with, he returned to the Ottoman problem and not only recovered lost territory but actually extended the boundaries of Iran.

'Abd al-Mo'men's Invasion of Khorasan, and His Siege and Capture of Mašhad

The fact that Shah 'Abbas had had to abandon his march on Herat and return to Iraq to meet the Ottoman threat made 'Abdollāh Khan more determined than ever to subjugate Khorasan. Accordingly, he sent his son 'Abd al-Mo'men from Balḵ, supported by his nephew Dīn Moḥammad Sultan, the son of Jānī Beg Sultan, who was known as Yatīm Sultan, and Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, the governor of Herat, with troops from Balḵ, Andeḵūd, Šoborḡān, Jījaktū, Meymana, Fāryāb, and Hezāra-ye Qepčāq. Before the crops were ready for harvest, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan appeared on the scene. Since he had come with great rapidity and with only a small body of men, he made first for Nishapur. Maḥmūd Khan Ṣūfī-oḡlū and the Ostājlū *ḡāzīs* of the Nishapur garrison, without waiting to find out who was in command of the Uzbeg force, marched boldly out and engaged the Uzbeg advance guard, taking prisoner several Uzbegs of note. When they discovered that ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan was in command, the Ostājlūs retreated hastily inside the fort. Since Maḥmūd Khan had not made preparations to resist a siege, he used his important Uzbeg captives to negotiate for him with ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan. He sent a present to the Uzbeg Khan and said that Nishapur was a dependency of Mašhad; whenever Mašhad fell, he would surrender Nishapur to the Uzbegs. ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan was prevailed upon by some of his emirs who had relatives in the hands of the Ostājlūs to accept these terms. Maḥmūd Khan then released all his prisoners, and the Uzbegs marched off to Mašhad.

ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan camped at Ḥowẕ Tūnī, about half a *farsaḵ* from Mašhad, and waited for the remainder of the Uzbeg forces to arrive; when they did so, he began the siege. Ommat Khan strengthened the defenses to the best of his ability and stationed *qezelbāš* troops and local militia on the walls. At the same time, he sent a courier to the Shah, informing him of their shortage of provisions and generally desperate situation. The Shah at once left Qazvin and marched to the relief of Mašhad. But when he reached Tehran, sickness struck his camp, and the Shah himself became seriously ill. He sent some troops on ahead to Besṭām, there to await his arrival after he recovered from his illness. However, his illness dragged on, and many of his men succumbed to the epidemic.

After four months, Ommat Khan gave up hope of being relieved, and sued for quarter through the mediation of Mīr Qolbābā. But ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan, aware of the weakness of the defenders, refused their plea and executed their envoy, Ḵodāverdī Khan Jalāyer, within sight of the citadel. The Uzbeg emirs then redoubled their efforts and launched a general assault, storming the battlements and pouring into the city. The *qezelbāš* and inhabitants of Mašhad took refuge in the great courtyard of the shrine of the Imam Reżā, and all the *seyyeds*, *ʿolamā*, shrine attendants, professors of theology, and the pious and holy men in Mašhad devoted themselves to prayer. The Uzbegs surrounded the courtyard and opened fire on those within with arrows and muskets. ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan and Dīn Moḥammad Khan rode into the city and made their way to the courtyard of the shrine.

One by one, Ommat Khan and all his men were killed, but the Uzbegs were not sated, and directed their fire on the *seyyeds*, *ʿolamā*, and other holy men assembled there. ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan took up his station in the portico of Mīr ʿAlī Šīr and sent his men into the shrine itself; they dragged their victims out of the *seyyeds'* quarters, the shrine attendants' quarters, and the Masjed-e Jāme', and slew them, tearing Korans from the hands of the attendants. The story goes that a *seyyed* of Mašhad named Mīr Moḥammad Ḥoseyn, known as Mīr Bālā-ye Sar, because he always took up his position over the tomb of the Imam and spent his time at his devotions and the reading of the Koran, was on this day of terror in his usual place. An Uzbeg seized him and tried to drag him outside; the *seyyed* clung to the screen round the tomb with one hand, whereupon another Uzbeg severed his hand with his sword and the *seyyed* was dragged outside and cut to pieces. His hand remained affixed to the screen. That melancholy day was like a second 'Āšūrā,[3] and the shrine ran with the blood of the martyrs.

The women and children were taken into captivity by the Uzbegs, who carried their looting and slaying to all parts of the city. If they found anyone in hiding, they tortured him to extract any wealth he might have, and then slew him. The holy shrine was plundered, and the jeweled chandeliers of gold and silver, the candlesticks, the rugs, and the china bowls and vessels were carried off. The shrine library, which housed a collection of books from all parts of the Islamic world, including precious copies of the Koran in the writing of the immaculate Imams and masters of the calligraphic art such as Yāqūt Mosta'ṣemī and the six masters, and other learned works of priceless value, was pillaged; and the Uzbegs sold these masterpieces to one another like so many potsherds. The sack of Mašhad went on for three days. Some people managed to escape from the city and make their way to Iraq; others, not wanting to abandon their families, found various hiding places outside. On the fourth day, the Uzbeg Khan put an end to the sack, but imposed ransom money; this was even demanded of those who gradually emerged from their hiding places, and if they could not pay it, their children were taken in lieu. Many women and children were taken to Transoxania and sold as slaves.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan appointed an Uzbeg governor of Mašhad. Before leaving the city, he removed the gold ornamental spike atop the dome of the shrine, which Shah Tahmasp had donated. The Khan then marched to Saraḵs and laid siege to the city and the castle. Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor, and his Čaḡatāy troops, who were old retainers of his, defended the city stoutly, and inflicted many casualties on the Uzbegs, who eventually marched away to Balḵ without having achieved anything. Many other parts of Khorasan, however, fell into Uzbeg hands: Jām, Ḳāf, Bāḳarz, Kūsūya, Ḡūrīān, and Fūšanj. Maḥmūd Khan evacuated Nishapur and moved his men and their households to Beṣṭām, and so the Uzbegs took over Nishapur too. Ganj ‘Alī Khan held the fortress of Salāma in the Ḳāf district for a while, but eventually, despairing of help from Iraq, retreated westward.

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[3] 'Āšūrā, the 10th of Moḥarram, commemorates the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn.

At Tehran, the Shah was recovering, though he had not regained complete health. The news from Mašhad threw the Shah and the army into a state of gloom, but because the blows of fate must be endured patiently, the people gave thanks for the Shah's recovery. When the Shah felt a little stronger, he went to the shrine of ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīm and spent a few days there in prayer before returning to Qazvin.

The Battle Between Būdāq Khan and His Fellow Emirs and Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and the Victory of the Uzbegs

Būdāq Khan Čeganī and his fellow emirs—Abū Muslim Khan Čāūšlū, Emāmqolī Khan Qājār, and Maḥmūd Khan Ṣūfī-oğlū Ostājlū, had planned to wrest Mašhad from Ommat Khan and make themselves masters of Khorasan. Before they could carry out this plan, however, Mašhad was invested by ‘Abd al-Mo'men Khan. Ommat Khan sent a message to the rebels telling them that their mobilization was most opportune, and suggesting that they deal with the external enemy first! If Būdāq Khan's force was strong enough, he said, they should march to his relief at Mašhad; if not, they should proceed to Rādekān and keep the road from Iraq clear of the enemy in case the royal army should put in an appearance. Although Būdāq Khan's forces were insufficient to engage ‘Abd al-Mo'men's army, nevertheless they began to march toward Mašhad.

At this juncture, Nūr Moḥammad Khan b. Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan b. Dīn Moḥammad Khan b. Alūš Khan, of the line of Šeybān b. Jočī b. Genghis Khan, who was governor of Marv, Nesā, Abīvard, and Bāğbād, but was on bad terms with ‘Abd al-Mo'men Khan because he suspected the latter of having designs on his territory, made an incursion into the Ḳabūšhān district with some six or seven thousand men, Uzbegs and men of the Ṣā'en-ḳānī Turkmans who lived in the area of Nesā and Abīvard. Būdāq Khan and his fellow emirs thought their best plan was to attack Nūr Moḥammad Khan and prevent him from joining forces with ‘Abd al-Mo'men Khan. They reasoned that;

if Nūr Moḥammad Khan had in fact come to join 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, if they could defeat him, this would weaken 'Abd al-Mo'men's position at Mašhad and the latter might raise the siege of that city. Nūr Moḥammad sent a message to Būdāq Khan saying that he had no quarrel with the *qezelbāš*; his only object was to protect his hereditary territory from 'Abd al-Mo'men. The *qezelbāš* emirs, thinking this was merely a trick, gave battle to Nūr Moḥammad.

The *qezelbāš* skirmishers swept aside the Uzbeg skirmishers and reached the Uzbeg lines, but the Uzbegs inflicted heavy casualties on them by firing volleys of arrows. The Uzbegs then charged, and the *qezelbāš*, many of whom, thinking the battle was won, had not maintained their positions, were routed, with some six or seven hundred men killed. Nūr Moḥammad did not pursue the *qezelbāš*, and Būdāq Khan and his fellow emirs, who were mounted on swift Tūbčāq horses, escaped and retired to their respective castles. Būdāq Khan wrote a humble letter to the Shah begging forgiveness for his actions, and sent it by the hand of his elder son, Ḥoseyn 'Alī Sultan. Nūr Moḥammad sent an announcement of his victory to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, thereby placing the latter under an obligation to him. Although 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan made no move against him that year, it was not long before 'Abdollāh Khan seized Marv, and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan Nesā and Abīvard and other districts, and drove him out of his ancestral lands.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year (998/1589-90)

Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū Qājār, who had evacuated Qarābāğ the previous year, took a force of Qājār troops and miscellaneous Turkmans from Qarābāğ and marched from Arasbār to lay siege to Ganja. He allocated duties regarding the digging of trenches and construction of earthworks, and set to work with a will, hoping to capture the castle before the Safavid peace mission reached Istanbul, so that Qarābāğ might be in Safavid hands by the time the treaty was signed. The Ottoman garrison at Ganja sent word posthaste to Ja'far Pasha at Tabriz, and the latter sent a pained letter to the Shah protesting that it was not right to conduct military operations while peace negotiations were in progress. The Shah, fearing that this action by Moḥammad Khan Qājār might jeopardize the chances of peace, ordered the latter to raise the siege. The Qājārs, however, refused to abandon so easily the rich province of Qarābāğ, which had been their tribal territory for many years, and where they had established estates and flourishing gardens, and they disobeyed the Shah's order.

Another complaint was then directed to the Shah, this time by Farhād Pasha, who had initiated the peace talks and was commander in chief of the frontier region; the Shah then sent a Qājār officer, Šāhverdī Beg, to Moḥammad Khan with the following message:

> Your forefathers, as a reward for their loyal services to the Safavid house, received the province of Qarābāğ from my forefathers. Policy now dictates that I should not at this moment contest this province with the Ottomans. If you are truly loyal to me, you will cease military operations and return, and I will give you fiefs elsewhere in the kingdom in lieu of Qarābāğ. Qarābāğ will not run away. God willing, it will easily be recovered; if not, one cannot fight against fate. I hope that, with God's help, right will shortly triumph.

Šāhverdī Beg was too frightened to deliver this message, which he suspected would not be acceptable to the Qājār emirs, and so he went to the fort and showed the Shah's orders to the Ottomans. The Ottomans passed the document on to Moḥammad Khan who, being a loyal Sufi, did as the Shah wished and raised the siege. His emirs and troops at once dispersed. Most of them, the chiefs of the Qazāqlar, Šams al-Dīnlū,[4] and Qarāmānlū tribes, renounced their allegiance, deserted and retired each to his own territory; others went to Arasbār. Of the other tribes, all those who were truly loyal, gave obedience to their Shah priority over money and property, but some defected to the Ottomans. Because of the hostile activities of the deserters, Moḥammad Khan was unable to move south, so he crossed the Kor River and, at the urging of Alexander Khan, took refuge with him. But that dishonorable prince arrested him and handed him over to the Ottomans, who sent him to Istanbul, where he spent some time in prison.

After peace was signed, prisoners on both sides were handed over, and Moḥammad Khan made his way to court via Baghdad and Šūštar, where he was with Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū for a time. On his return to Iran, he took up residence at Ardabīl. The story goes that

[4] A clan of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe.

Moḥammad Khan, while he was living at Ardabīl, always used to say that one day Ganja, through the power of the holy spirit of Shaikh Ṣafī, would return to Safavid hands, and the Shah would make him governor of the province of Qarābāğ. This eventually came to pass, for in the Year of the Horse (1014/1605-06), the province of Qarābāğ was recovered from the Ottomans after some twenty years of Ottoman occupation, and Moḥammad Khan, in recognition of his sterling services to the crown, was reappointed governor. At that time, all those who had opposed the Shah's order twenty years previously and had been guilty of disloyalty were exiled from their ancestral lands and sent to Māzandarān. In this way the goats were separated from the sheep and punished, and the province of Māzandarān was developed.

Another event which occurred this year was the flight of Moḥammad Šarīf Khan Čāūšlū to Gīlān. This man, who was the son of Ḵalīl Beg, the son of Ḥoseyn Beg, a *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān* at the time of Shah Tahmasp, and a grandson on his mother's side of Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, had found favor with Shah 'Abbas and had been made *qūrčī-ye tir-o-kamān* as his grandfather had been before him. When the Shah marched to Khorasan in 997/1589, Moršedqolī Khan had offered him the position of governor of Qazvin with the rank of Khan, and had given his hereditary office to his own nephew, Moḥammad Sultan Kūtvāl. Moḥammad Šarīf Khan, to please Moršedqolī Khan, and because he was an ambitious man, gave up his hereditary office, accepted the post of governor of Qazvin, and held that office until the Shah returned from Khorasan. At the beginning of this year (998/1589-90), although there was not the slightest indication that he had fallen from favor with the Shah, he was nervous because he had left his hereditary office against the Shah's wishes. His fears now got the better of him and he fled to Gīlān with a few companions. Moršedqolī Sultan, the brother of Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šamlū, who was also apprehensive because he was the latter's brother and had opposed 'Abbas during the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā rebellion, fled to Gīlān as well. There, they and other political refugees were given asylum by Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of Gīlān. Shah 'Abbas demanded their extradition, but this was refused. Because of other preoccupations, the Shah took no action at that time.

Finally this year, the *ğolām* Farhād Aqa, who was the governor of Isfahan and who had forgotten all he owed to Shah Tahmasp and Ḥamza Mīrzā and in his insatiable desire for the governorship of Isfahan had entered the service of Moršedqolī Khan, was dismissed and called to account. The post of *dārūga* and manager of all affairs at Isfahan was given to Yolī Beg, one of Ḥamza Mīrzā's *golāms*.

The War between the Qezelbāš Emirs in Fārs, Kerman, and Yazd

As I have already mentioned, Bektāš Khan Afšār had given a specious air of loyalty to his behavior by arresting the Ẕu'l-Qadar officers who had rebelled against the *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, Ya'qūb Khan, and had left the royal camp without permission. In reality, however, this was part of a plot by Bektāš Khan to have the Ẕu'l-Qadars eating out of his hand. Urged on by Mīrmīrān, his father-in-law, who was a seditious man, Bektāš Khan extended his authority over all the provinces of Fārs, Kerman, and Yazd, and paid no heed to the lawfully appointed officers of the crown.

When Ya'qub Khan reached Shiraz he proceeded to try and deal with the rebellious Ẕu'l-Qadars and to weaken Bektāš Khan by depriving him of their support. Since the Shah had given him full authority to settle the affairs of Fārs as he saw fit, he offered the governorship of Kerman to 'Abbas Sultan. The latter laid his hands on some *dīvān* funds and attracted to his side soldiers seeking pay or offices, and set about establishing himself as governor. When Bektāš Khan heard this, he began to have doubts about the loyalty of the Afšār emirs who were with him at Yazd. However, since he had heard nothing from his father, who was still at court, he realized that the appointment of 'Abbas Sultan must be the work of Ya'qūb Khan. He told the Afšār chiefs the truth of the situation and led a troop of about five or six hundred Afšārs to Kerman. He found himself confronted by 'Abbas Sultan and a composite force of Afšārs, local chiefs from the Kerman area, Arabs, and various tribal contingents—some three thousand men in all, both cavalry and infantry. Bektāš Khan, disconcerted by this turn of events and by the fact that he received no support either from the Afšārs at Kerman or from the local populace, and once more becoming nervous about the loyalty of even the few men he had with him, was at a loss for what to do.

Some of Bektāš Khan's supporters, who knew a lot about Safavid affairs, told him that 'Abbas Sultan's prevailing vice was avarice; he was not noted for his generosity. The Afšārs who had rallied round him, they said, had done so out of duty, because of their years of loyal service to the Safavid dynasty. It did not necessarily follow that they were prepared to follow 'Abbas Sultan into battle against Bektāš Khan. On the other hand, if he (Bektāš Khan) hesitated too long, this would be put down to cowardice, and 'Abbas Sultan's supporters would become correspondingly bolder. Bektāš Khan was an intrepid warrior. He accepted their advice, and at once prepared for battle. It was not a moment too soon, for 'Abbas Sultan's men were advancing from the city with musketeers on both flanks. Bektāš Khan led his men in a charge at full gallop and broke the opposing lines. As his counselors had predicted, 'Abbas Sultan's men put up only feeble resistance and began to flee after this first charge. 'Abbas Sultan retired to the citadel with his sons and a few trusty men, and Bektāš Khan occupied the city and laid siege to the citadel.

Bektāš Khan's vizier, Ḥātem Beg the son of Malek Bahrām, thought the interests of the Safavid state would best be served if a reconciliation could be effected between uncle and nephew.[5] With Bektāš Khan's permission, he negotiated a settlement between them, on condition that Bektāš Khan would commit no act of treachery against 'Abbas Sultan, his sons, or the men with him in the citadel, and that 'Abbas should retain his former fiefs. Bektāš swore mighty oaths to keep these conditions, but that treacherous man arrested his uncle and his cousins a few days later and, not content with that, put them to death, despite the fact that his uncle was like a father to him. However, this act of treachery portended his own end.

With affairs at Kerman settled to his satisfaction, Bektāš Khan returned to Yazd. Meanwhile, in Fārs, Ya'qūb Khan was consolidating his power and suppressing the dissident Ẕu'l-Qadars, putting to death any whom he suspected of opposition. He placed in bond the houses of the refugee Ẕu'l-Qadar officers who were at Yazd and appropriated all their lands and property. Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa, the son of Valī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū and the elder brother of Esmā'īlqolī Khan, who had been appointed governor of Īj and Neyrīz during the *vekālat* of Moršedqolī Khan, and still had some two or three hundred old Šāmlū retainers of Valī Ḵalīfa, was dismissed by Ya'qūb Khan, who knew the Shah's antipathy toward that family. Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa refused to obey Ya'qūb Khan's order, so the latter, either on his own initiative or on orders from the Shah, marched out of Shiraz on the pretense of going hunting and made a surprise attack on Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa, whom he captured and put to death, along with several of his sons and kinsmen.

[5] 'Abbās Sultan was Bektāš Khan's uncle.

He plundered the area thoroughly. Ḥoseyn Beg, the eldest son of Šāhverdī Ḵalīfa, managed to escape to Yazd, where he was warmly received by Bektāš Khan.

Bektāš Khan then released the Ẕu'l-Qadar officers who were held in custody in the charge of 'Alīqolī Beg Šāmlū, *qūrčī-ye tarkaš* (*qūrčī* of the quiver). He promised Ḥamza Beg Jāmīllū the governorship of Shiraz, and wrote a letter on his behalf to the Shah in which he agreed to pay a large sum as a fine if the Shah would dismiss Ya'qūb Khan from the governorship of Shiraz and appoint someone else; there was no possibility of reconciliation between the Ẕu'l-Qadar emirs and Ya'qūb Khan, he said, because the emirs would never accept the latter as governor of Shiraz. In this way, he hoped to achieve his secret ambition to make himself master of Fārs as well. Various people tried to dissuade him from meddling in this way. His vizier, Ḥātem Beg, reminded him that he belonged to the Afšār tribe and held a letter of appointment from the Shah appointing him governor of Kerman; affairs at Yazd and problems to do with the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe had nothing whatever to do with him. His best course, continued the vizier, was to leave Yazd, take over the governorship of Kerman, and stop interfering in matters that did not concern him, because this type of behavior would only annoy the Shah and the principal officers of state. His father, Valī Khan, who was at court, kept sending him similar advice, but he refused to be guided by it, thinking only that, if his démarche at court was successful, he would be master of the whole of Kerman and Fārs. Bektāš Khan did not drink much wine, preferring various opium-containing compounds; under the influence of these, he would rave deliriously: "I am no less a man than Emir Moḥammad Moẓaffar," he would say, "who rose from the post of police chief *(šaḥna)* at Meybod in the Yazd district, to the throne!" And Mīrmīrān would nod his head in agreement.

Eventually, the Ẕu'l-Qadar officers from Shiraz made a pact with Bektāš Khan to mobilize their forces and drive Ya'qūb Khan out of Shiraz. Bektāš Khan named Ḥamza Beg Jāmīllū governor of Shiraz and sent him off with an escort of one hundred and fifty Afšār *ḡāzīs*. Bektāš Khan next tried to gain possession of the citadel at Yazd, but its commandant, 'Alīqolī Beg Šāmlū, resisted him. When the Shah heard all this, he decided to go in person to deal with the matter. But when the royal army reached Kashan, the Shah heard that Bektāš Khan had been killed, and so he returned.

Ḥamza Beg Jāmīllū had gone first to the Šūlestān district, which used to belong to his tribe. With the help of the Afšār detachment, he seized Qal'a-ye Safīd, and installed there one of his men, Ommat Aqa. This fort was intended to be a refuge if things went wrong. He waited there for some time, but none of the Ẕu'l-Qadars came from Shiraz to join him. Ya'qūb Khan sent some men against him, and most of Ḥamza Beg's men were killed; a few escaped to Yazd. Ḥamza Beg himself, with Esma'il Ḵalīfa, the son of Esḥāq Ḵalīfa, and a few friends, repaired to Qal'a-ye Safīd. But to their consternation, Ommat Aqa, seeing which way the wind was blowing, shut the gates of the fort against them. They were still wondering what to do when Ya'qūb Khan was upon them, and they fled to Kūh Gīlūya. Ya'qūb Khan demanded that the governor of Kūh Gīlūya hand them over; the latter was unable to protect them further, and they scattered among the Jāmīllū tribe, where they were hunted down by Ya'qūb Khan's men and put to death. Ommat Aqa handed over Qal'a-ye Safīd to Ya'qūb Khan, and the latter, with Fārs securely under his control, moved against Bektāš Khan.

Yūsof Khan, the son of Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, who had been governor of Abarqūh before the accession of Shah 'Abbas, had held the office of *qūrčībāšī* whe 'Abbas came to the throne, and had been imprisoned for his part in the plot against Moršedqolī Khan, had eventually been released on the intercession of Valī Khan, the father of Bektāš Khan. When the royal army was in Khorasan, Yūsof Khan had gone to Abarqūh, gathered together some old retainers of his own and his father's, and installed himself again with the help of Bektāš Khan. However, Yūsof Khan resented Bektāš Khan's power, and secretly disliked him. Bektāš Khan, because of his close ties of kinship with him, and in memory of what he owed Yūsof Khan's father, pretended to be on good terms with him.

When Ya'qūb Khan neared Abarqūh, he sent a message to Yūsof Khan: It was necessary to deal with Bektāš Khan, he said, because the latter had committed acts of rebellion against the state. Yūsof Khan should forget about tribal solidarity and join him in this enterprise. If he did so, he would make him governor of Kerman. Yūsof Khan agreed with alacrity, and their combined forces reached Yazd while Bektāš Khan was still besieging 'Alīqolī Beg Šāmlū in the citadel there. The bulk of Bektāš Khan's troops were still at Kerman, and his advisers counseled him to leave Yazd and go to Kerman, thereby stilling the tongues of those who accused him of rebellion.

Ya'qūb Khan probably would not dare to attack him at Kerman, they said, and if he did, it would be an easy matter to repulse him.

Bektāš Khan was trapped by his own sense of honor, however, and could not bear to turn his back on his enemies. Further, he was encouraged in this attitude by Mīrmīrān, who owed his own influential position to Bektāš Khan. He therefore decided to give battle to his foes with the men he had with him. To begin with, his Afšārs repulsed repeated attacks by the skirmishers of the Shiraz army. Bektāš Khan, when he saw how inferior his army was in numbers to that of the enemy, realized he had no hope if he stuck to conventional tactics. He decided to use the same tactic he had employed against 'Abbas Sultan Afšār at Kerman—namely, to charge the enemy at full gallop. His charge swept aside the enemy skirmishers and threw the ranks of the Shiraz army into such confusion that Ya'qūb Khan wanted to abandon his colors. Moḥammadqolī Khan, the son of Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, one of the Fārs emirs, dissuaded him from doing so, and urged him to stand firm.

The Afšār charge on the center of the Fārs army had lost its impetus by virtue of the sheer weight of numbers of the enemy, and the Żu'l-Qadars began to rally. Some of Yūsof Khan's Afšārs recognized Bektāš Khan and reported to Yūsof Khan that he was among the group which had made the charge. Yūsof Khan, who had supposed that Bektāš Khan was still stationed with his own center and had a healthy respect for his prowess, now urged his Afšārs to cut off his retreat. Bektāš Khan repented of his rash charge; if he fought on, the chances were that he would be taken prisoner. He tried to retreat toward his own center but failed, so he hacked his way through the enemy and fled back to the city, followed by his men. He stationed trusted men on the walls and sought Mīrmīrān's advice as to whether to try and hold Yazd, or to go to Kerman. Bektāš Khan's supporters, who had followed him into the city, criticized his action. He must ride at once to Kerman, they said; by morning, he must be ten *farsaḵs* along the road to Kerman. Once again, however, Bektāš Khan's sense of honor prevented him from taking the logical course of action. He could not bring himself to abandon his wife, Mīrmīrān's daughter; taking her with him, however, was fraught with difficulties, because Ya'qūb Khan was sure to station men to guard the Kerman road, and he could not rely on the loyalty of his own men.

Since it was late in the day, the victorious army of Fārs did not pursue the enemy but camped on the spot, being unable to enter the cultivated belt round the city. Ya'qūb Khan was afraid that Bektāš Khan would elude him and slip away to Kerman during the night, so he sent a delegation to Mīrmīrān with the following message: "Bektāš Khan is the enemy of the state and the prisoner of the Shah. We have handed him over to you. If he escapes, you will answer for it to the Shah"; and he added various other threats. Mīrmīrān was an eminent and respected *seyyed,* and no emir had ever treated him with disrespect. But he knew that Ya'qūb Khan was an arrogant and shameless young man, and would probably carry out his threats and disgrace him. So he said to Ya'qūb Khan's delegates, in the presence of Bektāš Khan: "Bektāš Khan is here with me; as you see, he is not going anywhere. God willing, whatever is best will be done." He then placed a guard on Bektāš Khan to make sure he did not escape, and sent men to the city gate which was in his charge, admitted some of Ya'qūb Khan's men into the city, and posted them at the gatehouse.

Bektāš Khan realized that Mīrmīrān had betrayed him and that he could not hope to defend the city; further, he no longer had confidence in his own men, and was at a loss to know what to do. He paced restlessly in and out of his room, dreaming up one plan after another. Suddenly he noticed some strangers, fully armed, near the gatehouse, and knew at once that they were Ya'qūb Khan's men, who must have been admitted by Mīrmīrān. He grabbed his sword and started toward them. As he did so, a musketball struck his hand, with the result that he could not use it; it is not clear whether someone fired at him deliberately, or whether a musket belonging to one of his servants went off accidentally. Anyway, Ya'qūb Khan's men seized him, but Bektāš Khan's sense of honor would not permit him to be led bound before Ya'qūb. He made his captors fearful of possible rescue attempts by the Afšārs and instructed them to kill him, which they at once did. His death occurred about midnight, and the news, at once taken to Ya'qūb Khan, filled him with joy. He sent Bektāš Khan's head to court, together with a full report. Bektāš Khan's retainers, looking to their own safety, concealed themselves in various strongholds. Shortly after first light, the Ẕu'l-Qadars poured into Yazd and began to plunder the homes of the Afšārs. But in the ensuing confusion, friend was not distinguished from foe, and the soldiers plundered indiscriminately. The pillage went on for two or three days, and many citizens of Yazd and followers of Mīrmīrān suffered at the hands of the looters.

One of Mīrmīrān's sons, Shah Ḵalīlollāh, had always opposed his father's policy of supporting Bektāš Khan, and had conducted correspondence with Ya'qūb Khan. He was now honored and received with respect by Ya'qūb. Mīrmīrān himself and his other sons were accused of being in league with Bektāš Khan and of opposition to the Shah and rebellion; they were not only not treated with respect, but were humiliated. The officers appointed by Ya'qūb Khan to take possession of Bektāš Khan's treasures and property did not omit a search of Mīrmīrān's house, though it was treated a little less roughly than others, because several women of the Safavid royal house were in his residence. In general, houses belonging to members of Mīrmīrān's family suffered less than others. However, Mīrmīrān was humiliated, and Ya'qūb Khan extracted large sums from him by way of gifts and fines. My source of information for this episode was Bektāš Khan's vizier, Ḥātem Beg, who was of course involved, and other reliable sources have verified his account.

Ya'qūb Khan spent some time at Yazd, royally entertained by Shah Ḵalīlollāh, but his avarice proved his undoing. He was so dazzled by the prospect of getting his hands on the contents of Bektāš Khan's treasuries, which the latter had accumulated over a period of twenty years, that he appropriated the whole lot to his own use, and sent the Shah only a small proportion of the items he had marked down for himself. Had he been truly loyal, he would have been content with the honor of having performed a service for his master and would not have placed the treasures of this world before his duty to his benefactor; he would not have polluted himself by touching a single coin of that money. Had he acted thus, the Shah would have bestowed on him in the form of rewards the whole of the value of Bektāš Khan's property, and quite possibly even more than its value, for in the Shah's eyes it was worthless.

Unfortunately, Ya'qūb Khan was beguiled by the baubles of this world, and the opportunities for self-aggrandizement which he found ready to hand blinded him to the enormity of his own actions. For instance, having installed Yūsof Khan as governor of Kerman, he made him sign a sworn covenant that he would obey him in all things; he also installed his nephew, Nadr Khan, as governor of Abarqūh, and by these acts elected to remove himself from the Shah's favor. He repaired to Shiraz, where he began to behave like a king. He married Bektāš Khan's widow, Mīrmīrān's daughter, and took her off to Shiraz. He deprived some emirs of their fiefs, and considered the whole province of Fārs to be his own lawful property. He appropriated for his own use the estates of some of Ẕu'l-Qadars who had been killed in battle. He so far forgot his station as to send a robe of honor to the governor of Lār.[6] Since he was apparently secure in the Shah's favor, everyone obeyed him, and the governor of Lār obediently donned his robe of honor. The rest of Ya'qūb Khan's story will be told later.

The Shah's Expedition to Isfahan and His Victories in This Campaign

It will be recalled that Shah 'Abbas, when he heard of Bektāš Khan's revolt, marched toward Yazd. First, he went to Isfahan, where Yolī Beg, the *ğolām* of the royal household, who had been appointed governor of Isfahan, had found the province in a state of turmoil, strengthened the fort at Ṭabarak,[7] stocked it with provisions and munitions, and now thought of himself as the lord of Isfahan. When the Shah reached Kashan, he received the news, as already recorded, of the death of Bektāš Khan, and he sent robes of honor and his congratulations to Ya'qūb Khan. The Shah then sent a courier to Yolī Beg warning him that he would shortly be his guest at Isfahan. He repeatedly sent friendly letters and robes of honor to Yolī Beg in advance of his arrival, in case the latter should mistake the purpose of his visit. Yolī Beg had no choice but to obey; he entrusted the citadel of Ṭabarak to a reliable officer, rode out to meet the Shah somewhere between Kashan and Isfahan and was greeted with marks of great favor. The same day, he received permission to return to Isfahan to make the necessary preparations for the Shah's reception. Carpets were laid in the Shah's path for a distance of three *farsaḵs* from Dowlatābād to the city, and the Shah scattered largesse, in the form of trays of gold coins, at several points on the way.

The Shah entered Isfahan and took up residence at the palace. Yolī Beg carried out his duties as host to the Shah, but he allowed no one to have access to the fort of Ṭabarak—an action that particularly irked the Shah in view of the fact that he was a *ğolām*. However, the Shah said nothing to him about it, but bestowed on him some fresh mark of his favor every day. Finally, at the Shah's request, Yolī Beg was host to the Shah in his own home, and discharged his duties in a fitting manner. All the members of the court and the *moqarrābs* attended the banquet, which was followed by the drinking of wine and merrymaking. There is an old saying, "A traitor is always nervous," and Yolī Beg could not quiet his apprehensions despite the outward signs of the Shah's favor. A few days after the banquet, he retired into the citadel with his officers and defended the battlements with cannon and muskets. This action caused astonishment among the Shah's officers, who sent a delegation headed by Seyyed Beg Kamūna, one of the most distinguished emirs from the time of Shah Tahmasp, to talk to Yolī Beg, but the latter refused to listen to their well-meaning advice. Not only that, but he arrested the delegates and detained them in the citadel.

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[6] Southeast of Shiraz.

[7] See Le Strange, p. 205.

To be defied by a foolish *ġolām* when he himself was actually in residence at Isfahan was a source of acute embarrassment to the Shah, who was conscious of the fact that Yolī Beg's action might lead to all sorts of trouble. The Shah considered it politic not to subdue him by force, but by diplomacy, and he sent Farhād Khan Qarāmānlū, a most influential emir and an old friend of Yolī Beg from the time of Ḥamza Mīrzā, to bring him out of the fort. On the first day, Yolī Beg received Farhād Khan in a friendly manner and conducted himself according to protocol. On the second day, urged on by some of his supporters, he detained Farhād Khan in the citadel as well, disarmed him and his retainers, and broke off negotiations. The Shah, enraged, ordered the *qūrčīs* and the nobles of Isfahan to surround the citadel, and there were some armed clashes. This brought Yolī Beg to his senses, and he reopened talks with Farhād Khan. If the Shah would pardon him, he said, and reappoint him governor of Isfahan and call off his troops, he would come out of the citadel. Farhād Khan considered it expedient to communicate these terms to the Shah, and on his advice they were agreed to, and Yolī Beg sent a robe of honor.

Yolī Beg trusted Farhād Khan's assurances and came out of the citadel, but the Shah bore him a grudge for the way he had behaved, and why would he not? It is sheer stupidity to defy one's benefactor in such an insolent manner and expect to remain unscathed! A few days later, Yolī Beg handed over the citadel to the Shah, hoping that the latter would then fulfill his promise to reinstate him as governor of Isfahan. But the people of Isfahan, who had done their duty by the Shah during the siege of the citadel and had opposed Yolī Beg because they disliked him as governor, made representations to the Shah, and Yolī Beg had to be satisfied with his life. He gave Farhād Khan *carte-blanche* to negotiate for him with the Shah, and Farhād

Khan made every effort on his behalf because of their close friendship, but in the end Yolī Beg paid the penalty for his ingratitude.

Events During the Year of the Tiger, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 999/1590-91, the Fourth Year of Shah 'Abbas's Reign

Spring came this year on Sunday 14 Jomādā I, 999/10 March 1591.[1] This year, Yādegār Sultan Rūmlū was sent as ambassador to India. Readers will recall that Moḥammad Bābar b. 'Omar Shaikh Mīrzā b. Abū Sa'īd Gūrakān had established a dynasty in India after he had been driven out of his ancestral lands in Transoxania, and Aḵsī and Andejān in the province of Farḡāna,[2] by Moḥammad Khan Šeybānī. At first a refugee in the Kabul and Ḥeṣār Šādmān region, he had sent his cousin, Sultan Oveys Mīrzā b. Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā, known as Mīrzā Khan, who was governor of Badaḵšān, to Shah Esma'il's court to ask the latter's aid. With *qezelbāš* assistance, he had been reinstated at Samarkand. A few years later, Bābor had been defeated by 'Abdollāh Khan and other Uzbeg sultans near Bokhara, and had again appealed to Shah Esma'il for aid; this time, Shah Esma'il sent the *rokn al-salṭana* Mīr Najm-e Ṣānī Eṣfahānī, who was defeated by the Uzbegs at Ḡojdovān. It was after this that Bābor had founded the Mogul dynasty in India. Bābor had been succeeded as emperor by his eldest son, Moḥammad Homāyūn, who had eventually been driven from his throne by Šīr Khan and the Afghans; he had retired first to Tatta, Sind, and Kandahar, but was hounded from that refuge by his brothers. He was given sanctuary in Iran by Shah Tahmasp, as is recorded in the *Tārīḵ-e Akbarī* and other works. With Safavid assistance, Homāyūn regained his throne, and friendly relations were maintained between the two empires for the rest of Homāyūn's reign.

After the accession of his son, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, Shah Tahmasp had sent an embassy to India under Seyyed Beg, the son of the *vakīl al-salṭana* Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, to offer his congratulations and gifts, and to inquire about the circumstances of the death of his revered father. After Emperor Akbar became firmly established on the throne, he severed these friendly relations with Iran, and diplomatic intercourse ceased. As a result, when all sorts of disasters struck Iran after the death of Shah Tahmasp, the Mogul Emperor had not shown that solicitous concern which it is so pleasant to receive from one's friends when one is in trouble, and diplomatic relations had remained in abeyance.

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[1] Actually, on 14 Jomādā I, 998/21 March 1590.

[2] See Le Strange, pp. 477-78.

Shah 'Abbas tried to revive the former close relationship with the Mogul empire. Yādegār Sultan Rūmlū, a Sufi of pure faith and smooth tongue, was selected to head an embassy to India. He took with him suitable gifts and friendly letters, regretting the estrangement that had occurred between the two dynasties. The Shah informed Akbar of the occupation of Khorasan by the Uzbegs and told him he intended to make every effort to expel the Uzbegs and recover his lost territory there. If the Emperor was unable to give him material support, that was understandable; but he hoped that Akbar would not begrudge him moral support. The story of Yādegār Sultan's return from India, seven years later, will be told in its proper sequence.

Also this year, Mīrzā Loṭfollāh Šīrāzī, the vizier and *e'temād al-dowla,* was given a governorship as well as his office of vizier and was honored by the Shah with the gift of a hat, a jeweled sword belt, a horse fully equipped with saddle and bridle studded with jewels, a brocade cloak, and the standards and military band normally only bestowed on emirs. Mīrmīrān and his sons came to court at Isfahan, but because of their misdemeanors and support of the rebel Bektāš Khan, they received little attention. On the other hand, his son Shah Ḵalīlollāh, who had demonstrated his loyalty to the Shah, was rewarded by being placed in charge of affairs at Yazd. About this time, Ḵāneš Begom the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, who resided in the house of Shah Ne'matollāh b. Mīrmīrān, died a natural death at Isfahan.

When the Shah began to plan his expedition to Shiraz, he moved the royal princes from Varāmīn to the fortress of Ṭabarak at Isfahan. He considered Varāmīn too close to Gīlān, in view of the recent flight of political prisoners to that province. Aḥmad Beg Gerāmpā was made commandant of the fort and responsible for their safekeeping.

The Shah's Expedition to Fārs and Kerman

At Shiraz, some *qezelbāš* who had been guilty of various acts of misconduct and were therefore apprehensive of the Shah joined Ya'qūb Khan and encouraged him in his arrogant attitude by flattering him. These men included Būdāq Qarāgūna Ḵeneslū; Moḵtār Sultan

Takkalū; Torābī Beg b. Delī Ektīār Torkmān; and Abu'l-Fatḥ Beg Šāmlū b. Fūlād Beg, groom of the royal stables. These men made Ya'qūb Khan fearful that the officials of the central administration might demand from him Bektāš Khan's treasures, which he had appropriated for his own use. This fear merely confirmed Ya'qūb Khan in his rebellious attitude. He forced the emirs of Fārs to obey him, and any who refused were at once replaced by his own nominees. Letters repeatedly reached him from court summoning him to an audience with the Shah in order to purge his iniquities, but he ignored them. He used to say to his assembled emirs, "Of all the provinces of Iran, the land of Fārs is mine," and he made other idle remarks of this nature, which flatterers assured him were true. Since he enjoyed royal favor to such an extent, initially none of the emirs of Fārs dreamed of opposing him, but eventually, when his rebellious posture became more evident, some of his emirs slipped away from his summer camp at Kūšk-e Zard[3] and went to court, where they made a report to the Shah on Ya'qūb Khan's behavior.

Although Ya'qūb Khan's revolt did not merit action by the Shah in person, the latter decided to visit Kūšk-e Zard for some hunting, and at the same time to restore order to the affairs of Shiraz and Fārs. On the news of the Shah's approach, Ya'qūb Khan moved his baggage into the fortress of Eṣṭaḵr and took refuge there. The Ẕu'l-Qadar tribesmen rode out troop by troop to meet the Shah, who camped at the summer quarters of Kūšk-e Zard, and sent Aslams Khan, the keeper of the seal, with a force of Ẕu'l-Qadar centurions and *qūrčīs* and men from Fārs, to blockade the fort. When the weather cooled off a bit, the Shah moved to Shiraz, and the vizier, Mīrzā Loṭfollāh, since he was a Šīrāzī himself, devoted his energies to the administration of the province. Ebrahim Khan, the governor of Lār, sent gifts and tendered his submission. Despite Ya'qūb Khan's foolish behavior, the Shah still had considerable regard for him. However, in order to reassure the Ẕu'l-Qadars, who feared Ya'qūb Khan, he replaced him as governor of Shiraz and *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs with Bonyād Khan, a Ẕu'l-Qadar centurion.

While the Shah was at Shiraz, he had a riding accident, falling from his horse and severely bruising his leg. Fortunately, he recovered. About this time, the Shah received the news that Yūsof Khan Afšār had rebelled at Kerman and announced his support for Ya'qūb Khan, and had expelled from Kerman various officials who were there on government business and put the citadel in a state of defense. The Shah dispatched Farhād Khan to Kerman, and appointed Valī Khan Afšār governor of part of Kerman province, and Esma'il Khan Alplū Afšār governor of the remainder; both men, together with Yolī Beg the *ğolām*, accompanied Farhād Khan. Valī Khan Afšār was appointed because many of the Afšār troops in the Kerman area were the former retainers either of himself or of his son Bektāš Khan, whose misdeeds he had never ceased to condemn.

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[3] See Le Strange, p. 282.

At Shiraz, Šāhqolī Khan, the son of Ḵalīl Khan Afšār, was killed by Ḥasan Khan the son of 'Abd al-Laṭīf Beg, both of whom were supposedly related to the Afšārs. It will be recalled that, in the period of confusion in the province of Kūh Gīlūya which followed the revolts of Qalandar and Eskandar Khan's officers, no governor was appointed by the central *dīvān*, and Šāhqolī Beg, the younger son of Ḵalīl Khan, named himself governor of Kūh Gīlūya with the rank of khan. But Ḥasan Beg the son of 'Abd al-Laṭīf thought himself better fitted for the post, and opposed Šāhqolī Khan with a force of Afšārs and Lors. Both men occupied parts of the province. There was an uneasy peace between them, each being wary of the other. The two rivals presented themselves at court when the Shah was at Shiraz, each pressing his claim to the governorship, although neither was really suited for the office because they had grown accustomed to being their own master. Šāhqolī Khan in particular, making much of the fact that he was the son of Ḵalīl Khan Afšār, was fundamentally unwilling to brook authority. Ḥasan Khan, on the other hand, gave the impression of being more ingenuous and willing to submit to authority. Ḥasan Khan murdered Šāhqolī Khan, and was rewarded by being made governor of Kūh Gīlūya.

Another event which occurred this year was the execution of Ḥoseyn 'Alī Čeganī, the son of Būdāq Khan, who had been given a place among the *moqarrabs* and dining companions of the Shah. The apparent reasons for this were first, he was a seditious man, whose words did not correspond with his deeds; second, he had been involved in the acts of rebellion committed by his father in Khorasan, and was therefore considered unreliable; finally, even after he had come to court and had been admitted to circles close to the Shah, he showed signs of ingratitude and therefore merited death. He was executed by Kūr Ḥasan Ostājlū and some of the *moqarrabs* in the Shah's private apartments. Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Qom, on orders from the Shah, sent a posse of men to Būdāq Khan's camp at Rayy and arrested him and brought him to Qom; his camp and possessions were pillaged. Eventually, since Būdāq Khan was a man with great knowledge of affairs in Khorasan, he and his surviving sons were restored to favor. One of his younger sons, Ḥasan 'Alī, was appointed governor of Hamadan, and he himself and his other sons were given employment at court.

The fortress of Eṣṭaḵr was a hard nut to crack, and the Shah still wished to treat Ya'qūb Khan leniently. He decided to try and win him back by diplomacy, and so he set off on a hunting expedition with some members of the court in the direction of Kerman, at the same time sending Ya'qūb Khan the following message: "I am anxious that you should recover from your sickness; your name is constantly being mentioned at court, and it is your own folly which had caused this estrangement between us. Any time you decide to put these foolish thoughts out of your head and present yourself before me, you will be the recipient of my favor as your loyal service merits." Ya'qūb Khan was overjoyed at receiving this message because he was hard pressed by the siege, and decided that the expedient course was to abandon his rebellious behavior. So he replied to the Shah in submissive terms.

But his disloyal and corrupt nature led him first to send a delegation to court consisting of his vizier, Mīrzā Khan Beg; Torābī Beg, the son of Delī Eḵtīār Torkmān; and his own nephew Morteżāqolī Beg, to inform the Shah that, as soon as he was confirmed as governor of the whole of Fārs, with full powers, he would leave the fort and come to kiss the Shah's feet. It is surely the height of folly to make your benefactor detest you, and at the same time to hope to prosper! Mīrzā Khan Beg was deputed to return to the fort and fetch Ya'qūb Khan; it was clear from what the vizier said, and from what Ya'qūb Khan had demanded, that his conduct was a long way from being that of a loyal servant.

Mīrzā Khan Beg and Torābī Beg returned to the fort and persuaded Ya'qūb Khan to proceed toward the city of Shiraz with his retainers. He was received by the Shah, but he did not display any signs of contrition or intention to serve the Shah loyally in the future. On the contrary, it was clear that his head was still filled with the same vain ambitions. The inhabitants and nobility of Fārs, and members of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe presented themselves to him, and for three days an impressive number of people visited him in the royal audience hall. On the third day, Ya'qūb began criticizing the officials of the supreme *dīvān* and demanding an inquiry into certain actions taken by them in Fārs during his absence. Not only this, but he did not hand over the fort at Eṣṭaḵr. On the fourth day, the Shah stationed Bāyazīd Beg Ostājlū, the head doorkeeper, at the entrance to his private apartments, with instructions not to admit anyone without his orders, and not to let anyone out.

Ya'qūb Khan arrived as usual, sat down arrogantly in the royal assembly, and in the Shah's presence addressed Mīrzā Loṭfollāh, the vizier of the supreme *dīvān,* in a sharp and angry manner: "I demand a reckoning of all the transactions which you have carried on in my domains," he said. The vizier replied: "Upon my head and eyes![4] Whenever the Shah gives the word, your account will be presented to you in the twinkling of an eye!" At that moment, the Shah gave the signal to Ḥoseyn Khān Zīad-oḡlū Qājār, one of the emirs whom he trusted, and Ḥoseyn Khan grasped Ya'qūb Khan by the belt, picked him up, and threw him on the ground. At first, Ya'qūb Khan thought the whole thing was a joke, an example of the sort of waggish behavior that went on at court among the Shah's close friends. But, since he thought the action was too rude, he exclaimed, "I was in the middle of speaking! This is no time for jocularity!" Ḥoseyn Khan rounded on him; "Oh ingrate!" he said, "with a record like yours, what do you expect to happen to you?" Ya'qūb Khan then realized what his situation was and began to supplicate the Shah. Ḥoseyn Khan tied his hands, beat him over the head, and left him standing outside in the full sun, bareheaded, opposite the audience hall.

Ya'qūb Khan's men were then summoned into the private apartments one at a time; as each entered, he was cut to pieces by the *ḡolāms.* Outside, no one knew what was going on, and people thought the Shah was having a private party. The slaughter went on till late afternoon. Ya'qūb Khan's close supporters—Torābī Beg, Moḵtār Sultan, Būdāq Qarāgūna, Abu'l-Fatḥ Beg Šāmlū, and several others—met a similar end. Toward the end of the day, their bodies were suspended from a gibbet, as a warning to the others, and people then realized what had happened.

Ya'qūb Khan himself was not put to death immediately because he was needed to enable the Shah to take possession of the fort of Eṣṭaḵr. He was imprisoned that night in a dungeon he himself had constructed and in which he had incarcerated a number of innocent Ẕu'l-Qadars. He was forced to write a letter instructing his officers to hand over the fort to the Shah's officers, but his men refused to act on the authority of this letter, and it was clear that Ya'qūb Khan had anticipated this move. Every day the heirs of those Ẕu'l-Qadars who had been slain by Ya'qūb Khan took him out and suspended him upside down over a well, and his groans and cries rose to the heavens. After a few days of this, when Ya'qūb Khan remained intransigent and his men stubbornly continued to defend the fort, some elders of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe came forward and undertook to put Ya'qūb Khan to death in retribution for the innocent men killed by him. After Ya'qūb Khan had been killed, Ḥoseynqolī Sultan Sīāh-manṣūr scaled the walls of the fort with a band of other desperadoes. The fort was occupied, and those evil men received their just deserts.

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[4] A formula indicating compliance.

A courier arrived from Farhād Khan at Kerman bringing the news that he had settled affairs there in accordance with the Shah's wishes, and that the fortress had been taken. Farhād Khan, on his arrival at Kerman, had written to the Afšārs calling on them to return to their former allegiance to Valī Khan. The Afšārs decided prudence dictated that they should abandon Yūsof Khan, declare themselves to be among "those who love the Shah," and go out to welcome Farhād Khan and his fellow khans.

Yūsof Khan, who had imagined himself firmly established as governor of Kerman, now saw most of his men go over to Farhād Khan. He shut himself up in the citadel with some two or three hundred old retainers, and Farhād Khan entered the city and blockaded the citadel. After some negotiation, Yūsof Khan agreed to hand over the citadel and renounce all claim to the governorship of Kerman, being satisfied if his life were spared. Farhād Khan undertook to plead his case with the Shah.

Farhād Khan installed Valī Khan and Esma'il Khan at Kerman and, after everything was settled to his satisfaction there, returned to Shiraz. He joined forces with the royal army as it was marching back to Isfahan via Yazd. Yūsof Khan, throwing himself on the Shah's mercy and entering his presence with his sword slung round his neck and carrying a winding sheet, was granted his life. Yolī Beg, however, was executed, because he had plotted treachery against Farhād Khan at Kerman and had tried to ally himself with Yūsof Khan in further rebellion.

At this point, a courier arrived from Mahdīqolī Khan Čāūšlū, who had accompanied Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā on the embassy to Turkey, with the news that the prince had been well received by the Ottoman sultan, that peace had been concluded as desired, and that a friendly letter from the Ottoman sultan was being brought by the hand of Mahdīqolī Khan, who had received permission to leave Istanbul.

The court and the bulk of the army went on to Isfahan, but the Shah, accompanied by Farhād Khan, went to Yazd, where they were the guests of Shah Ḵalīlollāh, the son of Mīrmīrān, at the Bāğ-e Golšan. Ḥātem Beg, the former vizier of Valī Khan, was rewarded for his services at Kerman by being appointed *mostowfī al-mamālek* (comptroller of finance) of the Safavid empire. The Shah spent several days receiving and dealing with petitions from the people before returning to Isfahan, where he spent a month similarly occupied.

While he was at Isfahan, the Shah acceded to the petition of the citizens that the fortress of Ṭabarak be razed on the ground that it constituted a potential source of revolt and sedition. The immediate cause of the petition was the charge made against Aḥmad Beg Gerāmpā, the commandant of the fort of Ṭabarak, who had been left by the Shah to guard his father and the royal princes, that he was contemplating revolt. This charge was made because the commandant had taken into the fort large quantities of provisions. The Shah's officials knew that the charge had no basis in fact, but the Shah wished to gratify the people of Isfahan, and so he gave orders that the fort be razed. He then had the problem of what to do with his father and the royal princes. His advisers urged him to do away with them, but the Shah refused to do this. Eventually, he agreed under pressure to have them blinded and sent to the fortress of Alamūt to join Tahmasp Mīrzā.

The Shah returned to the capital, Qazvin, via Kashan, where he had Ḥasan Beg, *qūrčī* of the parasol *(qūrčī-ye čatr),* execute Kūr Ḥasan Ostājlū, because he owed his rise to Moršedqolī Khan and it was therefore not wise to trust him. When he reached Qazvin, he received Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, a trusted emir of Shah Tahmasp, and former *amīr al-omarā* of the province of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, who had been driven out by the Ottomans and had been wandering around in the Ardabīl and Moğān region. The Shah spent the winter at Qazvin.

Events of the Year of the Hare (1000/1591–92), the Fifth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's day occurred on Wednesday 25 Jomādā I,[1] 999/21 March 1591, and the New Year's festivities were held in the Bāḡ-e Sa'ādatābād at Qazvin. Mīrzā Loṭfollāh had fallen from favor because of the misdeeds of his son, and he was dismissed from the office of vizier. He was succeeded by Ḥātem Beg Ordūbādī, the comptroller of finance, who assumed the title of *e'temād al-dowla.* Allāhqolī Beg Qapāma-oğlū Qājār, who had been enrolled in the royal bodyguard before the accession of Shah 'Abbas, and after that had been promoted to the rank of *yūzbāšī* (centurion), was appointed to the high office of *qūrčībāšī.*

Embassies arrived from the pashas who were wardens of the marches to strengthen the bonds of peace, and hard on their heels came Mahdīqolī Khan, the head of the Persian peace delegation, who reached Qazvin via Ardabīl, which was his seat of government, and was welcomed by the Shah. He presented gifts and letters of friendship from the Ottoman sultan. After Mahdīqolī Khan had been at court for about six weeks, he was arrested by the Shah and put to death. Mahdīqolī Khan belonged to the Čāūšlū clan and was a kinsman of Moršedqolī Khan and of Moḥammad Šarīf Khan; the latter had committed various misdemeanors and had fled to Gīlān, and the Shah was fed up with the Čāūšlūs in general. After the execution of Mahdīqolī Khan, his brother, Morād Khan Beg, who was keeper of the inkhorn, fled to Anatolia. As a result of this, his other brother, Aḥmad Beg, had both his feet cut off.

After these two men had been punished, the Shah sent Moršedqolī Sultan Qūčīlū Ostājlū, who was nicknamed Čahārgāv, to Gīlān to bring back the political refugees who had been given sanctuary there by Khan Aḥmad. If the latter refused to give them up, Moršedqolī Sultan was to report back to the Shah Khan Aḥmad, knowing the Shah was determined to get the refugees back, surrendered them to Moršedqolī Sultan. When the prisoners reached court, they were at once executed. Khan Aḥmad's compliance with the Shah's wishes in this matter, plus the fact that he was a kinsman of the Shah's mother and was himself related by marriage with the Safavid royal house, led the Shah to overlook his previous actions and show him great favor.

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[1] March 21 was a Thursday.

The prince Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā[2] was appointed governor of Hamadan and *amīr al-omarā* of that province up to the borders of Baghdad province. He was placed in the care of the Bayāt tribe, and Oğūrlū Sultan Bayāt was appointed his *vakīl.*

One of the articles of the peace treaty with the Ottoman empire called for an exchange of prisoners, and so several pashas, including Morād Pasha who had been captured at Tabriz and was held prisoner at Qahqaha, were released and returned to Anatolia. Among the Persian prisoners returned were Šāhrok̲ Khan, the keeper of the seal; Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū; and Qūr K̲oms Khan Šāmlū. Šāhrok̲ Khan died en route. Qūr K̲oms Khan was killed by Shah 'Abbas himself the moment he set foot inside the Čehel Sotūn hall because of his past record: his complicity in the murder of Mahd-e 'Olyā; his complicity in the murder of Ḥoseynqolī Khan Šāmlū, the father of Mahdīqolī Khan, at Tabriz, at the instigation of Emir Khan; and his killing of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, the father of that 'Alīqolī Khan who had been Shah 'Abbas's guardian. Mahdīqolī Khan, on the other hand, was loaded with favors and reappointed to his hereditary post of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī.*

Another emir punished this year was Dowlat Yār Khan Sīāh-manṣūr, who had been in the service of Shah Tahmasp and Ḥamza Mīrzā and had rendered loyal service during the Turkman-Takkalū rebellion, been promoted to the rank of emir, and granted a fief in the Solṭānīya and Sojās[3] districts. After the assassination of Ḥamza Mīrzā, he had made himself the independent governor of these districts, and the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction was in no position to take action against him. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, Moršedqolī Khan was too preoccupied with preparations for the Khorasan expedition to take action against him, and later, Shah 'Abbas sent Ḥoseyn 'Alī Sultan against him without effect. It was not until after the Shah had settled the more important affairs of Iraq, Fārs, and Kerman that he had leisure to turn his attention again to Dowlat Yār Khan. By that time, the Kurds were ravaging the neighboring districts of Solṭānīya, Abhar, Zenjān, Ṭārom, and Dargozīn, and molesting travelers and indulging in highway robbery. The Shah sent against him Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū, reinforced by Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, *qūrčī-ye šamšīr (qūrčī* of the sword), the governor of Qom. After a further siege, Dowlat Yār sent word to Ḥoseyn Khan that he was unable to leave the fort because the *qezelbāš*, especially the Šāmlūs, were out for his blood. If the Shah marched in this direction, however, he would present himself before him and submit himself to his judgment. Ḥoseyn Khan reported to the Shah, who decided on a hunting expedition to Gözel Darra, and afterward rode near Dowlat Yār Khan's fortress. Dowlat Yār Khan came out of the fort and was taken to Qazvin for execution.

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[2] Shah 'Abbas's son.

[3] See Le Strange, p. 223.

Continuing his policy of consolidating his rule within the boundaries of the Safavid empire, the Shah sent an army against Emir Ḥamza Khan, the son of Bāyandor Khan Ṭāleš, whose father had been a loyal servant of the Safavid family during the time of Shah Tahmasp. Emir Ḥamza, considering himself cleverer than his father, pushed his father aside in his own ancestral dominions during the troubles in Azerbaijan and the rebellion of the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction, and interfered in the districts of Gīlānāt and Gaskar, which bordered on his territories. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, Emir Ḥamza was one of the first emirs from the Ṭāleš region to present himself at court, and Moršedqolī Khan dealt with his affairs in accordance with his wishes and sent him back to his domains. In this year 999/1590–91, however, when Shah 'Abbas was subduing one by one those who defied his authority, Emir Ḥamza failed to present himself at court.

The Shah had given Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, brother of Farhād Khan, full authority to restore law and order in Azerbaijan. The district of Langar Konān, which had been expropriated by Emir Ḥamza, had been allotted to Farhād Khan's brother Alvand Sultan. But Alvand Sultan was defied by Emir Ḥamza and was unable to take up his post. The Shah then ordered Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, stationed in the the Ardabīl area, to go to the assistance of Alvand Sultan with Ṣadr al-Dīn Khan Ṣafavī and men of the Šeyḵāvand and Šāh-sevan tribes, and to install him in his office. Emir Ḥamza attacked the Safavid force with an army of three to four thousand men, but was defeated and retired again to the fortress of Sendān. Ḥasan Khan Čāūšlū, *qūrčī* of bow and arrow, was sent by the Shah to call on Emir Ḥamza to demonstrate his fealty, but Emir Ḥamza refused to meet him.

The fort at Sendān is situated in a position of great natural strength on the side of a mountain, surrounded by forests, and approachable by only one road. The emirs camped nearby, sealing off this approach road, and the people of Ṭavāleš demonstrated their fealty by presenting themselves before the emirs. Emir Ḥamza sent a submissive message to the Shah, protesting that he could not leave the fort because there was a feud between his family and the sons of Ḥosām Beg Qarāmānlū, who held full authority in Azerbaijan; blood had been shed, and they were out for revenge. Emir Ḥamza requested that one of the Šāmlū emirs be sent so that he might hand over the fort to him and, after deriving strength from a visit to the holy Safavid shrines, present himself at court. This request was granted; Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Qom, was sent to Sendān. Ḥoseyn Khan, in order to set Emir Ḥamza's mind at rest, ordered Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and the Qarāmānlūs to retreat some distance from the walls of the fort. Emir Ḥamza then emerged, sent his sons to serve as *ğolāms* of the Shah, and left by the Šīrvān road with his women and daughters. Ḥoseyn Khan placed the fort in the charge of Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and returned to court.

Emir Ḥamza, after visiting the shrines at Ardabīl, returned to Šīrvān, not daring to go to Qazvin because of his fear of the Qarāmānlūs. He was eventually slain in Šīrvān by a Sufi from Ṭāleš because he had stayed in Šīrvān among the Ottomans and had become their friend; the Sufi took his head to court. In consideration of Emir Ḥamza's earlier services to the Safavid dynasty, his sons were treated with kindness by the Shah and enrolled in the ranks of the *ğolāms.*

The Shah ordered Ḥasan Khan Čāūšlū and Besṭām Aqa Torkmān, the *dārūğa* of the *daftarḵāna,* a wise and experienced officer, to demarcate the Azerbaijan border and settle problems connected with the frontier, in conjunction with the Ottoman officer appointed for the same purpose, Ḵeżr Pasha, governor of Naḵčevān.

The last rebel to submit to the Shah this year was Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī, the son of Moḥammadī Khan, the governor of Lor-e Kūček. Of recent years, he had kicked over the traces, had forcibly transferred to Lorestān many of the tribes living in the province of Hamadan, and had considered himself an Ottoman vassal. With the signing of the peace treaty between the *qezelbāš* and the Ottomans, he told the Shah that he would return to his allegiance to Iran if his past sins were pardoned. Since the Lors and the 'Abbāsī family of Lors had for long been Shi'ites and devoted to the family of the Prophet, the Shah agreed to this and dispatched Maqṣūd Beg the *nāẓer* to Lorestān to assure Šāhverdī Khan that all was forgiven.

Farhād Khan's Expedition to Khorasan, and 'Abd al-Mo'men's Occupation of Esfarā'īn and Other Places after His Return

Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, ruler of Ḵārazm, had long been a friend of the Safavid dynasty. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, he had sent his son, Moḥammadqolī Sultan, to Qazvin, and friendly diplomatic relations were carried on between the two states. When 'Abdollāh Khan and his son 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan invaded Khorasan, Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan renewed confirmation of his allegiance to the Safavid dynasty by sending an embassy to Shah 'Abbas, and the Shah sent a return embassy under Moḥammadqolī Beg 'Arabgīrlū.[4] Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan declared that if a Safavid army were sent to Khorasan he would cooperate with it, because he realized that the Uzbegs, if they were allowed to annex Khorasan, would next covet Ūrganj and Ḵārazm.

In the spring of 1591, therefore, the Shah decided to send Farhād Khan to Khorasan, accompanied by Moḥammadī Khan Toḵmāq, Aslams Khan the keeper of the seal and other emirs. The emirs of Khorasan were ordered to rendezvous with Farhād Khan. Farhād Khan's orders were not to engage the Uzbegs if they were commanded by 'Abdollāh Khan and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan in person, because it was contrary to protocol for emirs to give battle to kings; if that were not the case, he was to strive to recover as many of the places occupied by the Uzbegs as possible, and to protect those areas still in Safavid hands.

Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan was involved in a quarrel with Nūr Moḥammad Khan b. Abu'l-Moḥammad b. Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and had marched against the latter to the Nesā and Bāḡbād region. But when he heard of Farhād Khan's arrival he marched back to meet him at Besṭām, where Farhād Khan entertained him royally. Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan presented gifts, renewed his allegiance to the Safavid cause, and pledged his cooperation in operations against the Uzbegs. Farhād Khan then marched on to Nishapur, where he was joined by Abū Muslim Khan Čāūšlū, the brother of Ḥasan Khan, *qūrčī* of bow and arrow and governor of Esfarā'īn, and by the Bayāt emirs and others.

Farhād Khan laid siege to Nishapur, but when the news reached

[4] The 'Arabgīrlūs were a clan of the Šāmlū tribe (see *TM*, p. 16).

Balḵ, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan marched on Khorasan with troops from Balḵ, Badaḵšān, Ḥeṣār Šādmān, Andeḵūd and Šoborḡān, and he spread the rumor that 'Abdollāh Khan was marching on Ḵᵛārazm with troops from Transoxania and Turkestan. This report led Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan to return to Ḵᵛārazm, and Farhād Khan held a council of war to decide what to do. Some of the emirs were for giving battle; others were opposed. While they were still dithering, their spies reported that 'Abd al-Mo'men had already reached Mašhad and was advancing with all speed on Nishapur. Farhād Khan, not daring to contravene the Shah's orders, disbanded the Khorasan emirs, each of whom went to his own castle and prepared to defend it. He himself retired to Besṭām and reported to the Shah, who ordered him to return to Qazvin.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan reached Nishapur and was delighted to find that the *qezelbāš* had retreated, since he had come by forced marches and had only a small band with him. When the rest of his troops caught up with him, he marched against the Bayāt tribe living in the Nishapur and Ma'dan area. The chiefs of the Bayāt tribe thought it expedient to submit to him, and they came to meet him at Rādekān. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan put them all to death, including Maḥmūd Sultan the son of Bābā Elyās; he had an ancient grudge against the Bayāt tribe which, only the year before, had slain a considerable number of Uzbegs. Maḥmūd Sultan's brother, Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan, went to Qazvin and was given employment at court.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then laid siege to Esfarā'īn, held by Abū Muslim Khan and a group of Ostājlūs, Kurds, and others. The Uzbegs had siege guns, but even so the siege dragged on for four months, and the defenders repulsed a number of assaults and inflicted some four thousand casualties on the Uzbegs, the ditch being filled with the bodies of the slain. Finally, the Uzbegs stormed the walls and massacred the garrison; even then, Abū Muslim Khan held out in one of the towers, and as long as his handful of men had a bullet for their guns and an arrow for their bows, they held the Uzbegs at bay. When the sound of firing ceased, the Uzbegs rushed the tower, and the gallant defenders fought to the last with swords and daggers. Kačal Qobād Kalhor,[5] one of this valiant band, was recognized by one of the Uzbegs who, out of respect for his bravery, spirited him safely out of the Uzbeg camp. He reached Iraq safely and gave me this personal account of the siege. Since Abū Muslim Khan had been guilty of misconduct at the battle of Toršīz, Shah 'Abbas did not grieve overmuch at the news of his death.

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[5] A Kurdish tribe.

After his capture of Esfarā'īn, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan overran the districts of Sabzavār, Mazīnān, Jājarm, Šoğān, and Jūrbod. After installing governors at these places, he returned to Balk̡. As the season was now far advanced, Shah 'Abbas decided to lead an army to Khorasan in the spring. He spent the winter of 1591–92 at Isfahan and Yazd and returned to Qazvin at the end of the winter.

Events of the Year of the Dragon (1001/1592-93), the Sixth Year of the Reign of Shah ʿAbbas

New Year's Day occurred this year on 3 Jomādā II, 1000/17 March 1592.[1] Because of the troubles in Azerbaijan, Shah ʿAbbas had not been able to visit the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī and his other ancestors at Ardabīl. With the signing of peace with the Ottomans, he was able to remedy this situation. He bestowed alms on the inhabitants of Ardabīl and, after invoking the aid of his ancestors, set out for Khorasan. Before he left, however, he sent Allāhverdī Khan and a force of *ğolāms* to bring to court Šāhverdī Khan, the son of Ḵalīfa-ye Anṣār and governor of Qarāja-dāğ. Šāhverdī Khan, during the two or three years that Azerbaijan had been without any effective Safavid rule, had taken advantage of the situation to increase his own power, and had been guilty of various disloyal acts. Even before this, he had made overtures to the Ottomans, had sent his son to Jaʿfar Pasha at Tabriz, and had declared himself to be the servant of the Ottomans.

With the conclusion of peace with the Ottomans and the demarcation of the frontier of Azerbaijan, Šāhverdī Khan should have petitioned his spiritual director to be allowed to return to his allegiance to the Shah, because Qarāja-dāğ was allotted to Iran and Šāhverdī Khan's ancestors had a long history of loyal and devoted service to the Safavid house. He failed to do so, and he failed to avail himself of the Shah's presence at Ardabīl to make his peace with him; on the contrary, on the approach of Allāhverdī Khan, he fled across the border on to Ottoman territory, and Shah ʿAbbas appointed another as governor of Qarāja-dāğ.

The Conquest of Gīlān

"If a man's destiny is dark, he constantly commits acts which contribute to his downfall." Thus is was that Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of Gīlān, despite all the favors he had received from the Safavids, and despite the fact that Shah ʿAbbas had overlooked his giving asylum to a number of political refugees, committed further acts which provoked the Shah's anger against him. First, while he was still harboring the political refugees, he sent his *vakīl,* Ḵāja Ḥosām al-Dīn, to

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[1] Qāżī Aḥmad gives the correct date 6 Jomādā II, 1000/20 March 1592. I am indebted to Robert S. McChesney for this correction.

Istanbul to make overtures to the Ottoman sultan. Gīlān was his ancestral domain, he said, and he now offered it freely to the Ottoman sultan. If the sultan were to send a contingent of Ottoman troops by sea from Šīrvān, he would surrender to them the fortress of Lāhījān. It was only a short distance from Lāhījān to Qazvin, and the conquest of Iraq could easily be effected from Gīlān.

Shah 'Abbas was astonished when he heard this report, and sent one of his courtiers to tell Khan Aḥmad that, if he admitted his fault and disavowed his action, and asserted that he had behaved in this way because of his fear of the Shah and the suspicion that he had fallen from his favor, his conduct would be overlooked. Khan Aḥmad departed from the path of truth. He vehemently denied that there was any truth in the report; Ḳāja Ḥosām al-Dīn, he said, had been given leave to go on pilgrimage to Mecca; he had not sent him to Istanbul and knew nothing about the matter. At this point, a reliable man arrived in Qazvin from Istanbul and told the Shah that Ḳāja Ḥosām al-Dīn was in fact in Istanbul, and had delivered a message to the Sultan along the lines mentioned above.

The Shah, enraged at this treachery, decided that the only course was to take punitive action against Khan Aḥmad, who had repeatedly employed guile and deceit in his dealings with the Safavid dynasty; further, the existence of an enemy on the border of his territory was a danger to the state. He therefore ordered Farhād Khan and his brother Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan to proceed to Gīlān via Qezel Āḡāj and the Caspian coast with troops from Azerbaijan and Ṭavāleš. Orders were issued to Amīra Sīāvoš, the governor of Gaskar, and 'Alī Khan, the governor of western Gīlān, to assist Farhād Khan. In addition, Jamšīd Beg, a *ḡolām* of the royal household and governor of Qazvin, was dispatched via Deylamān. The Shah was still prepared to give Khan Aḥmad a chance, and he wrote the following letter to him:

> I am about to leave for Khorasan, and it may be that I shall be away two or three years. The ties of kinship between us, and the benefits which you have received from the Safavid house, led me to expect that I could ask various services of you in return—that you would give your allegiance to my father and those officers whom I am leaving behind at Qazvin. I had complete confidence in you; but now that you have declared your friendship with the Ottoman

> enemy and your willingness to hand over the province of Gīlān to them, how can I rely on you? Your best course is try and make amends for your past sins by throwing yourself on my mercy, by presenting yourself at court, so that the Ottomans may hear that you have returned to your allegiance to the Safavids. If your are too nervous to come in person, send the mother of your son, who is related to the Safavid house,[2] and the brother of Ḳāja Ḥosām al-Dīn, whom you sent as ambassador to Istanbul, to intercede for you. I shall expect to see you in person after my return from Khorasan.

Khan Aḥmad was in no mood to listen to this advice, but he was so terrified that he could not make up his mind whether to stand and fight or not. The story goes that he consulted his astrological tables (he had some skill in this science) to obtain his horoscope. His horoscope told him that that year his territory would be transferred to other hands and that he would be exiled from his ancestral domains. He therefore decided to take ship to Šīrvān and travel by that route to Istanbul. However, because the people of Gīlān were naturally inclined to support Shah 'Abbas, Khan Aḥmad could not reveal his secret plans to anyone, and he was afraid that the Gīlān emirs might force him to go to Qazvin. He made overt preparations for war and assembled a force of twenty thousand men, cavalry and infantry, under Emir 'Abbas Lešta-nešā'ī, a member of the Jīk family and one of the great emirs of Gīlān; Kār Kīā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad, the son of Kīā Rostam and marshal *(sepahsālār)* of Deylamān; and Ṭāleša Kūlī, marshal of Lāhījān.

After his army had marched to meet the *qezelbāš* on the Safīd-rūd, Khan Aḥmad gathered up all his cash, jewels, and contents of his treasuries, his articles of gold and silver, and anything he could lay his hands on, and sent them to Langarūd and Rūdsar to be placed on board ship and await his arrival. He sent away the women of his harem in the custody of Kīā Farīdūn, a distinguished Gīlānī emir who was the court chamberlain in charge of the harem, and himself awaited the outcome of the battle.

Farhād Khan spent several days reconnoitering the fords across the river; and finally selected one that appeared passable. He ordered

[2] Khan Aḥmad had married a daughter of Shah Tahmasp.

his army across the Safīd-rūd. The fire from the musketeers of the household *ḡolāms* was so effective and the morale of the Gīlānī forces was so poor that the Gīlān emirs soon abandoned the struggle. Emir 'Abbas, one of the commanders, was the first to leave the battlefield, followed by Ṭālesa Kūlī and the rest. When Khan Aḥmad received the news of the rout, he rode off to the shore of the Caspian, where he had arranged that Kīā Farīdūn should have his wife and daughter waiting, so that they might take ship together to Šīrvān. But Kīā Farīdūn considered it shameful that Shah Tahmasp's daughter and granddaughter should flee to Ottoman territory, and so he turned off the coastal road and took the women by little-known routes to Somām and thence to the Shah. Khan Aḥmad waited by the shore of the Caspian for a long while. Finally he despaired of their coming and took ship with Moḥammad Amīn Khan, the son of Jamšīd Khan, who was himself the grandson of Shah Tahmasp, and had joined him because of a quarrel with his brother and a revolt on the part of the inhabitants of western Gīlān.

After his victory, Farhād Khan proceeded to Lāhījān, to which Shah 'Abbas himself was making his way. The Gīlān emirs presented themselves to the Shah at Lāhījān and kissed his feet. To comfort the hearts of the people of Gīlān, the Shah greeted them all graciously and bestowed on them robes of honor; Kīā Farīdūn was singled out for special favors for his signal service in bringing the royal princess and her daughter. Those nobles of Gīlān who were considered fit for service in the Safavid army were signed on and allotted pay and allowances commensurate with their rank. The rank and file of the Gīlānī forces, consisting of daytime soldiers only, who were not capable of sustaining a prolonged campaign away from home, were disbanded; they returned thankfully to their agricultural pursuits.

The Shah spent some days at Lāhījān, dealing with local affairs and granting tax exemptions *(mo'āfīyāt)*[3] to *seyyeds*, *'olamā*, ascetics, and wardens of shrines. Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū was appointed governor and *amīr al-omarā* of Gīlān, with Ḵāja Masīḥ Gīlānī as his vizier. Emir 'Abbas was confirmed in his fief at Lešta-nešā'ī, and Ṭālesa Kūlī in his post of commander in chief at Lāhījān. Kīā Farīdūn was made senior chief for the province of Gīlān. Kīā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad was given the tribal district of Deylamān, and Rānekūh was allotted to Valī Sultan Ṣūfī. All other districts were placed under *qezelbāš* governors and *dārūḡas*. ʿAlī Khan was appointed governor of western Gīlān and contracted to pay the sum of one thousand *tomān* annually to the treasury. The district of Ḳalḳāl, a dependency of Azerbaijan and adjacent to Gaskar, was given to Amīra Siāvoš in recognition of his services. After making all these arrangements, the Shah marched toward Khorasan.

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[3] See *TM*, index, *s.v.*

The Shah's Expedition to Khorasan

Orders had been issued for the *qezelbāš* forces to rendezvous at Besṭām. Some of the emirs of Gīlān, including Mīr ʿAbbās, Ṭālešа Kūlī, and Kīā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad, elected to accompany the Shah on this expedition. The Shah marched to Besṭām via Lār and Fīrūzkūh and waited a month for his forces to assemble.

The quarrel between Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ḳārazm, and Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān, has been mentioned before. Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan had wrested from Nūr Moḥammad Khan's control the districts of Nesā, Darūn, and Bāḡbād, and Nūr Moḥammad had appealed to ʿAbdollāh Khan, promising to give him Marv, which is not far from Bokhara and Čahārjū, if ʿAbdollāh Khan recovered for him Nesā and Darūn. ʿAbdollāh Khan, who had always had his eyes on Marv, agreed with alacrity. He crossed the Oxus and marched to Marv, which Nūr Moḥammad stupidly handed over to his officers before ʿAbdollāh Khan had fulfilled his part of the bargain. ʿAbdollāh Khan marched a few stages toward Nesā, but on hearing that Shah ʿAbbas was on his way to Khorasan and that Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan was also advancing toward him, made this the excuse to retire to Bokhara, promising to return the following year to recover Nesā and Darūn for Nūr Moḥammad. ʿAbd al-Mo'men had tried to seize Nūr Moḥammad, and so the latter, becoming apprehensive, left ʿAbdollāh Khan's camp without permission and went to Abīvard. ʿAbd al-Mo'men then separated from his father, and marched to Khorasan by way of Qarāpālčaq. On arrival in Khorasan, he heard that the Shah was massing his forces at Besṭām, and he addressed an insulting letter to him:

> Between two kings there is either peace or war; I am ready for either. If you want peace, relinquish Khorasan to me and return to Iraq. We can then conclude peace on the same basis as existed between Ḥasan Padešāh Torkmān, who was ruler of Iraq and

> Azerbaijan, and Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bāyqarā, who was ruler of Balḵ and Khorasan.[4] But if you want war then advance further, for victory is given by God and does not depend on the size of armies.

Before he received this letter, the Shah, who had heard of 'Abd al-Mo'men's arrival at Nishapur, had marched from Besṭām via Ḥang, Maḡz, and Jājarm;[5] there he received the letter from the Uzbeg Khan, to which he made the following reply, couched in the courteous terms normally used between kings:

> We trust in the grace of God, and we will do our best to recover Khorasan, which has belonged to this dynasty for a hundred years. The peace concluded between Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bāyqarā, a Čaḡatāy prince, and Ḥasan Pādešāh, a Turkman king, has no relevance to our situation. If you wish to make peace on the same basis as it was concluded between Kesken Qarā Sultan Uzbeg, ruler of Balḵ, and Shah Tahmasp, my grandfather—in other words, if you hand over Khorasan to my officers—then I am ready to make peace too. If not, I am ready to fight, and have come from Iraq eager for such a fray; wherever we meet, God will decide between us.

At Jājarm, the Shah found a second letter from 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan awaiting him, the contents of which completely contradicted those of his first missive. The gist of the second letter was a challenge to the Shah to fight a pitched battle at Jām, where 'Abd al-Mo'men alleged he was waiting for him, but the Shah subsequently learned that the Uzbeg Khan, instead of remaining at Jām, had retreated to Balḵ.

About this time, the senior *seyyeds* and the nobles of Mazīnān in the district of Sabzavār banded together and killed the Uzbeg governor, Qovāydāš Bahādor. They took his head to the Shah and were rewarded by the grant of tax immunities and other favors. The Uzbeg governor of Jājarm abandoned his post, and his example was followed by those of Esfarā'īn, Šoḡān, Jūrbod, Jahān in the district of Arḡīān, and Sabzavār. The Shah advanced to Sabzavār and sent Allāhverdī Khan ahead to Nishapur with a detachment of *ḡolāms*. The Uzbeg governor abandoned the city, which Allāhverdī Khan entered without opposition. The Shah stayed a month at Esfarā'īn.

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[4] See Savory, Struggle, passim.

[5] This is the northerly of the two routes from Besṭām to Nishapur; see Mostowfī; p. 169.

Darvīš Moḥammad Khan Rūmlū was appointed governor of Nishapur (he had been governor there in the time of Shah Tahmasp); he was an officer experienced in siege warfare. A detachment of three hundred crack Eṣfahānī musketeers, under the command of Mīr Fattāḥ, the *mīnbāšī*[6] of the Isfahan regiment of musketeers, was stationed in the citadel. The district of Esfarā'īn was given to Moḥammad Sultan, the son of Bābā Elyās Bayāt, and the Bayāt tribe was granted a variety of tax immunities in consideration of the fact that its lands had been ravaged by the Uzbegs. The post of governor of Sabzavār was given to Moḥammad Sultan, the grandson of Mīr Šams al-Dīn 'Alī Sultan Moḵtār al-Ḥoseynī, and governors were appointed to each of the other reoccupied cities. Those local residents of these districts who had distinguished themselves by their services to the crown during the Uzbeg occupation were rewarded by grants of money or tax immunities, and robes of honor were bestowed on them.

The Shah then marched back from Esfarā'īn via Jahān in the district of Arḡīān to Sultan Meydānī, which is near Rādekān in the district of Mašhad. There he learned from some Uzbeg prisoners taken by Ganj 'Alī Khan that the Uzbegs remaining in the area were concentrating at Mašhad, where they had accumulated large stocks of provisions and were prepared to resist a siege. As it was now late autumn and the ravages of the Uzbegs had stripped the countryside bare of food supplies, the Shah thought a winter siege of Mašhad would only dissipate his forces. In addition, he was reluctant either to bombard the holy city with artillery fire, or to expose its inhabitants to the depredations of Uzbegs rendered desperate by the hardships of a siege. The Shah therefore decided to return to Qazvin. Before he left Sultan Meydānī, he handed over to Darvīš Moḥammad Khan at Nishapur all the food supplies remaining in his camp.

During this campaign, one of the Gīlān emirs, Kīā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad, suddenly fled from the royal camp, for no apparent reason, and the rest of the Gīlān emirs were rather ashamed of his behavior. However, the Shah graciously overlooked this misdemean-

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[6] Lit.: commander of a thousand. The Safavid troops were divided into thousands (battalions), hundreds (companies) and tens (sections).

or and allowed the other emirs, Mīr 'Abbas and Ṭāleša Kūlī, to return to their governorates. Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad died shortly afterward.

This year, Farhād Khan was appointed *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan and warden of the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī at Ardabīl. The vizier, Ḥātem Beg, the *qūrčībāšī*, and various other officers were ordered to look into the affairs of the army, and to see that they received their pay, allowances, and fodder allowance. They were also ordered to scrutinize the rolls of the *qezelbāš* tribes and other tribes liable for military service, and if they found any soldier drawing pay, in possession of a horse, and capable of bearing arms who had not reported for duty in Khorasan, he was to be charged with failing to report for duty. This time, delinquents were to be fined, and the money distributed as bounty to those retainers of the court and *qūrčīs* who had been the first to answer the call to arms and had endured the hardships of the campaign. This was to be both a punishment for and a warning to the guilty parties. In future, anyone failing to answer a mobilization call would be subject to a variety of penalties.

The result of these measures was that, whenever a levy was made, the *qezelbāš* and other tribesmen, for fear of being punished by the Shah, would set off to court without even waiting for their own mobilization orders, each contingent trying to outstrip the other. As I mentioned in book I, in my chapters on the qualities and behavior of Shah 'Abbas, this practice was maintained throughout his reign, and in future, no one was delinquent in this regard.

Leaving his officers to get on with this task, the Shah rode off to Isfahan with a few of his close companions, *moqarrabs,* and retainers of the royal household, and spent the winter there. This year, I was given a position at court and enrolled among the royal secretaries. When the Shah's officers remained at Qazvin, therefore, I accompanied the Shah to Isfahan and busied myself with secretarial duties. The period during which I was in the Shah's personal service therefore dates from this time (1001/1592-93).

The Battle between the Afšār Emirs from Kerman and the Uzbeg Emirs at Tūn, Which Resulted in a Qezelbāš Victory

Valī Khan, Esma'il Khan, and the Kerman emirs, together with the whole Afšār tribe, had been ordered to join the royal army in

Khorasan by way of Yazd and Ṭabas. On arrival at Ṭabas, they heard that Moṣṭafā Beg Kangarlū, the governor of Tūn and Ṭabas, was hard pressed by the Uzbegs. The Uzbegs had occupied the district of Tūn and its fort. Hearing that royal army was on its way to Khorasan, Moṣṭafā Beg had led his two hundred and fifty Ostājlūs and others from Ṭabas in a valiant attempt to recover control of the Tūn district. He occupied the outer walls of the fort and penned the Uzbeg governor, Qūzī Mīrzā, in the citadel. The Uzbeg garrison sent to Herat for help, and Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, governor of Herat, and Dīn Moḥammad Sultan, nicknamed Yatīm Sultan, 'Abdollāh Khan's nephew, sent a thousand men under Nājūlī Bahādor to the relief of Qūzī Mīrzā. Moṣṭafā Beg, a brave and headstrong officer who had on several occasions given battle to the Uzbegs with only small bodies of men at his disposal, gave battle to the relief force. Realizing that he was in a tight spot, he ordered his men to dismount and use their horses as cover to protect them from the Uzbeg arrows and musket fire. In this way, he conducted a fighting retreat on foot for about four *farsaḵs*. Toward night, he reached a village called Āyesk and took refuge behind its walls. Both sides mounted guard that night.

The Afšār emirs pressed on at full speed to rescue Moṣṭafā Beg, and reached Āyesk with six or seven thousand men on the second day of Moṣṭafā Beg's being blockaded there. The Uzbeg cavalry, driving their baggage train before them, tried to retreat, but Moṣṭafā Beg emerged from behind the walls of the village. With the support of the Afšār advance guard, he attacked the enemy. When the Afšār center arrived, it shattered the Uzbegs at the first charge, and most of the enemy were slain. Jān Moḥammad, the *dīvānbegī* of Yatīm Sultan and a distinguished Uzbeg noble, was taken prisoner, together with a number of other notables. After the defeat of the relief force, the Uzbeg garrison at Tūn evacuated the citadel. The Afšār emirs, hearing that the Shah had returned to Qazvin, marched back to Iraq via Toršīz and Sabzavār, leaving Moṣṭafā Beg in control of Tūn and Jonābād.[7] When they reached Isfahan, they kissed the Shah's feet and presented their prisoners and the heads of the slain Uzbegs. Jān Moḥammad was placed in the custody of Bījan Beg, a *ḡolām* of the royal household, but there is no record of the fate of the other prisoners.

The Afšār victory at Tūn also caused Yatīm Sultan and his brothers to raise the siege of Deraḵš. It will be recalled that, when Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa Šāmlū fell from favor, he went to Qā'en without the Shah's permission and found that the official governor, 'Alīqolī Khan Ostājlū, had been driven out by the Uzbegs and blockaded in the fortress of Jūr. Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa rallied around him a number of Šāmlū tribesmen, old retainers of his family, who were living in the area. When he heard that the Shah had arrived in Khorasan, 'Alīqolī Khan Ostājlū, although he was unwell, left his baggage in the fort and set off in a litter to meet the Shah. Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa, still lusting after the governorship of Qā'en and hoping to get his hands on his possessions, waylaid him. The Ostājlūs defeated Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa, but a bullet struck 'Alīqolī Khan's litter and wounded him, and he died toward the end of the same day. Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa then usurped the governorship of Qā'en. When Yatīm Sultan attacked Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa this year, the latter received little support from the local inhabitants, who were aware that he had usurped his position at Qā'en. He managed to get together about a thousand men, regular troops and militia, and fought a battle with Yatīm Sultan at Deraḵš, a dependency of Qā'en. Yatīm Sultan was victorious, and some four or five hundred *qezelbāš* were killed. The survivors were beleaguered in the fort at Deraḵš by Yatīm Sultan, but the latter called off the siege, as already stated, and Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa returned to Qā'en.

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[7] Northeast of Tūn; see Le Strange, p. 359.

Miscellaneous Events That Occurred This Year

Šāhverdī Khan Qarādāḡlū, who had defected to the Ottomans, received a cool reception from the frontier pashas, who did not approve of his defection so soon after the conclusion of peace. Despairing of receiving help from the Ottomans, Šāhverdī Khan saw no course but to throw himself on the Shah's mercy. He declared that he had been too afraid of the Shah's wrath to make his obeisance to him when he had the opportunity, but swore he would now do so if the Shah would pardon him. The Shah agreed to do so, and Šāhverdī Khan presented himself at Besṭām. However, he was still the same unreliable Šāhverdī Khan, and he conspired with some of the disgruntled emirs in Khorasan who had been dismissed from their governorships for various misdemeanors—men like Šāhqolī Sultan Pīāda Torkmān, Nadr Khan Afšār, and Emāmverdī Khan Atlāndīllū. Their plot was reported to the Shah, and the conspirators tried to escape by hanging behind when the royal army marched. They were seized; Emāmverdī Khan Atlāndīllū managed to prove his innocence, but the other three were put to death.

Also this year the Afšār tribe fell under a cloud for being slow in answering the call to join the royal army in Khorasan. The Shah thought the tribe had returned to its old, arrogantly independent ways, and so he deprived the tribe of the governorship of Kerman and gave that post to Ḥasan Khan Ostājlū, *qūrčī* of bow and arrow. Ḥasan Khan was on the point of leaving for Kerman when the Afšār emirs arrived at court, and the Shah was gradually persuaded to overlook their slowness in answering the mobilization call in view of their gallantry in the battle at Tūn. In gratitude for this act of clemency, and in view of the fact that Ḥasan Khan had after all been appointed, the Afšār emirs undertook to pay a large sum as a gift to the Shah, who distributed the money among those personal attendants who had shared the burdens of the Khorasan campaign.

The Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe of Fārs was also penalized for not having sent enough troops to Khorasan, and the governorship of Shiraz was taken away from Bonyād Khan and the Ẕu'l-Qadars and given to Ḥoseyn Khan Moṣāḥeb Qājār. When the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe petitioned for pardon, the Shah made it clear that, if they received a royal pardon this time and the governorship of Fārs was restored to them, in future they would have to make amends for their past shortcomings whenever there was a call to arms. Since Ḥoseyn Khan had actually been appointed, they had to wait a year before being reinstated in Fārs. Their rule there lasted only one more year, because their oppressive government caused complaints from the populace. The following year both tribes, the Afšārs and the Ẕu'l-Qadars, were deprived of their tribal districts, Kerman and Fārs, respectively.

This year there was an outbreak of plague and cholera at Qazvin, and many of the inhabitants fled into the country. Cholera carried off many of the people of Qazvin, the most notable victim being the seal of the *mojtaheds* Emir Seyyed Ḥoseyn al-Ḥoseynī Karakī 'Āmelī, about whom I gave some particulars in the biographical section on *seyyeds* and *'olamā* of the time of Shah Tahmasp, in book I. He was the maternal grandson of the *mojtahed* Shaikh 'Alī 'Abd al-'Āl, and was renowned among both Persian and Arab *'olamā* for the elegance of his speech and the eloquence of his expression. In Iran, he was renowned as a *mojtahed,* and wrote treatises on the fundamentals and branches of Eṣnā 'Ašarī Shi'ite doctrine. Shah Tahmasp's court was the meeting place of both Arab and Persian theologians and scholars, and Shaikh 'Alī 'Abd al-Āl's son, Shaikh 'Alī, was also recognized as a *mojtahed* by all his peers.

Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn, however, aspired to even greater heights; he called himself "master of those who affirm the truth," "lord of those who devote themselves to the minutiae of scholarship," "heir of the knowledge of the prophets," and "seal of the *mojtaheds,*" and had these titles stamped on his judicial decrees and other documents to which he affixed his seal. Although in private the *'olamā* did not recognize this claim of his, not one of them dared to dispute it openly, nor could any of them hold his own with him in debate, and so until the end of his life they called him "the seal of the *mojtaheds.*" The Shah had his body sent to the holy places in Iraq for burial.

Events of the Year of the Serpent, Corresponding to the Year 1002/1593-94, the Seventh Year of The Reign of Shah 'Abbas

For the New Year festival, 1593, Shah 'Abbas returned from Isfahan to Qazvin. Shortly afterward, he set off for Qarā Āḡāj to hunt. But when he reached Ṭārom, he received complaints from the people of Gīlān about the conduct of Mahdīqolī Khan. To satisfy the people, he dismissed Mahdīqolī Khan and appointed Aḥmad Beg Begdelū *dārūḡa* of Lāhījān, and sent the latter on his way with a detachment of Šāmlūs. On his heels the Shah sent the vizier with accountants and other bureaucrats, and Besṭām Aqa the *dārūḡa* of the royal secretariat, to Gīlān to fix the *dīvān* taxes and dues in an equitable manner. If they found that Khan Aḥmad and his predecessors had been in the habit of levying an unreasonable sum in taxes, they were to cancel this legislation and seek to alleviate the tax burden on the people. The Shah himself went to Ardabīl and invited Farhād Khan, who had come to welcome him, and 'Alī Khan from western Gīlān and Amīra Sīāvoš from Gaskar, to join him for hunting in Qezel Āḡāj. The team of bureaucrats headed by the vizier went to Gīlān, and the fiscal system they set up in that province is still in force and is used as a model. The Shah summoned the vizier to join him in Qezel Āḡāj. I was sent to fetch him from Gīlān, and I accompanied him to court and kissed the feet of the Shah.

The Shah wanted gradually to bring the whole of Gīlān and Ṭabarestān under his control, because the whole area was in a state of turmoil as the old, hereditary rulers died off and their places were taken by ambitious upstarts. A case in point was the western part of Gīlān province, the hereditary domain of Jamšīd Khan, the son-in-law of Shah Tahmasp. Jamšīd Khan's son, Moḥammad Amīn, went with Khan Aḥmad to Šīrvān, as I have mentioned before, and died there of smallpox. 'Alī Khan, the son of Kār Kīā Aḥmad, a retainer of that family, had behaved treacherously toward Jamšīd Khan's sons and had expelled them from the province, and he had no previous record of service to the Safavid house. The Shah therefore determined to annex western Gīlān as well and unite the whole province under Safavid rule. However, he thought it best to delay action for a while, because Farhād Khan had made certain contractual promises to 'Alī Khan when he took over eastern Gīlān. Furthermore, 'Alī Khan had popular support, and to remove him at this stage might provoke a revolt that, in turn, might spread to eastern Gīlān.

As regards Gaskar, the Shah planned to remove Emir Sīāvoš, who was considered unreliable because of his alliance with Emir Ḥamza Ṭāleš, and to unite Gaskar with the districts of Ṭavāleš and Āstārā. After extensive discussion, the Shah decided to go ahead with his plan to bring the whole of Gīlān under his control despite the risks involved. He had both rulers arrested and appointed a certain Emir Shah Malek marshal of the whole of western Gīlān. Emir Shah Malek was a kinsman of 'Alī Khan. Although he had no previous history of service to the Safavid dynasty and it was not wise to trust him, the Shah made this appointment in order to test the loyalty of the Gīlānīs. At the same time, a number of men of standing in Gīlān were enrolled among the retainers of the royal household and granted salaries and fiefs that exceeded anything they hoped for. *Dārūḡas* were appointed to Rašt and Fūmen and dispatched to Gīlān with these Gīlānī notables.

The Revolt in Gīlān and the Triumph of the Punitive Expedition Dispatched to the Province

Shortly after his appointment, Emir Shah Malek revealed the base metal of his character, which is universal among Gīlānīs, and rebelled. He marched against the *dārūḡa* of Fūmen and killed him; the *dārūḡa* of Rašt fled. The people of eastern Gīlān, ungrateful for the favors they had received from the Shah, joined the rebellion. Among the military classes in eastern Gīlān, two factions have traditionally filled the offices of *vakīl al-salṭana* and *ṣāḥeb-ekٍtīār* under the princes of that region: the Aždar and the Čapak. These two factions were old rivals for the offices of marshal and vicegerent of the ruler, and no quarter was given on either side. Emir 'Abbas, the governor of Lešta-Nešā, belonged to the Čapak faction. A certain Bū Sa'īd, who belonged to the Aždar faction, had hidden himself away in the forests and never proferred his allegiance to the *qezelbāš*. Consequently he lived in fear of Emir 'Abbas. He joined the rebel Emir Shah Malek and swore that he would recognize him as the senior chief in the whole of Gīlān until such time as Khan Aḥmad and Moḥammad Amīn Khan, the heir to the principality of western Gīlān (the reports of the latter's death in Šīrvān had not been verified in Gīlān), should return. At that time, the ancient rivalry between the two halves of Gīlān would cease: Khan Aḥmad would be the ruler of eastern Gīlān and Moḥammad Amīn of western Gīlān, and the *qezelbāš* would not get in.

On learning of the revolt, Aḥmad Beg, the *dārūḡa*, and the *qezelbāš* governors, together with Ṭālesa Kūlī and Kīā Farīdūn and the Gīlānī militia, marched to the Safīd-rūd to give battle to the rebels. Aḥmad Beg perceived signs of disaffection on the part of Ṭālesa Kūlī, and prudently led his *qezelbāš* troops aside. The two men regarded each other with mutual suspicion. When the rebels and the *qezelbāš* came face to face, Kīā Farīdūn, a man of great integrity, warned Aḥmad Beg that Ṭālesa was plotting treachery and was in league with the rebels. He advised the *dārūḡa* not to give battle at that time, since the *qezelbāš* contingent was outnumbered a hundred to one, and he guided the *qezelbāš* to Deylamān. Ṭālesa Kūlī informed the rebels of the departure of the *qezelbāš*, and the rebels advanced to Mazār-e Seyyed Ašraf, where they renewed their pledges to each other and confirmed their opposition to the *qezelbāš*. Emir Shah Malek then returned to western Gīlān, and Ṭālesa Kūlī and Bū Sa'īd to Lāhījān, whence they sent a courier to Šīrvān to summon Khan Aḥmad. They appointed administrative officers and met daily in Khan Aḥmad's residence to discharge the business of the realm. They made the most of their brief period of power, and took no thought for the future.

The revolt in Gīlān enraged the Shah. His first thought was to go to Gīlān in person and visit condign punishment on the rebels, so that there would be no further talk of rebellion among any who survived the sword. Since the revolt did not merit the Shah's going there in person, wisdom dissuaded him from this course of action. Farhād Khan was ordered to advance via Kūhdom, located between the two portions of Gīlān, and Allāhqolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī* was ordered to Deylamān with a detachment of *qūrčīs*, to link up with Aḥmad Beg and Kīā Farīdūn and advance into Gīlān by way of Šīma-rūd. Farhād Khan reported that the people of eastern Gīlān had been incited to rebel by those of western Gīlān; if the Shah would overlook the the sins of 'Alī Khan, reinstate him in his domains, and order him to accompany Farhād Khan, this would divide the rebels and make the reconquest of western Gīlān an easier matter. He, Farhād Khan, would take responsibility for the outcome, and if 'Alī Khan did do anything untoward, it would be an easy matter to deal with him. Farhād Khan urged this point of view vigorously, and the Shah finally capitulated. 'Alī Khan was released from jail, given a robe of honor, and entrusted to Farhād Khan, now appointed governor and *amīr al-omarā* of eastern Gīlān, and exalted above his peers by the title of "son" bestowed on him by the Shah. Farhād Khan then advanced along the Kūhdom road, and the *qūrčībāšī* via Deylamān.

Bū Sa'īd sent Ṭālesa Kūlī and Manṣūr Menkāl to meet the army from Deylamān, with orders to bar the Šīma-rūd road, which runs from Deylamān to Lāhījān and is an extremely difficult route, marshy and through forest so dense that the track is wide enough only for a single horseman. He himself planned to link up with Emir Shah Malek, to hold the Kūhdom road with the assistance of the people of western Gīlān, and to prevent Farhād Khan from entering that province. The *qūrčīs* learned that Ṭālesa Kūlī had moved to Šīma-rūd and had blocked the roads with trenches and barricades of tree trunks (the local term for these barricades is *bona-bor).* The advance guard of the *qūrčīs,* not waiting for Farhād Khan, who was still in Kūhdom, stormed the first of these barricades they came across, scattering the musketeers stationed behind it. The *qūrčībāšī,* following up with the main body, completed the rout of the rebels. Manṣūr Menkāl was killed, and Ṭālesa Kūlī escaped into the forests. The *qūrčīs* occupied Lāhījān, and Bū Sa'īd also fled. The *qūrčībāšī* sent a courier to Farhād Khan to tell him of the victory and prevented his men from looting in Lāhījān, his object being to conciliate the inhabitants.

Farhād Khan was piqued because the *qūrčīs* had stolen a march on him and won a victory for which he had hoped to gain the credit himself, but he pretended to be pleased at the news. He dispatched 'Alī Khan with a force to western Gīlān. Since he had made himself responsible to the Shah for the success of his policy, he admonished him soundly before he left. The *qūrčīs* remained in Lāhījān for a time, hunting down rebels and performing various other duties, and then returned to Qazvin, leaving Farhād Khan to devote himself to restoring order and sound government in eastern Gīlān.

When 'Alī Khan reached western Gīlān, the people deserted Emir Shah Malek and rallied round him. Emir Shah Malek, since his revolt had meant the release of 'Alī Khan from prison, thought the latter would be grateful to him for this, and confidently went to meet 'Alī Khan. But 'Alī Khan had no option but to put him to death, because failure to do so would have been construed as disloyalty and breach of faith. He therefore sent Emir Shah Malek's head to Farhād Khan at Lāhījān. Until the end of the year, he maintained good relations with Farhād Khan, although he did not see him more than once. At the end of the year, however, he felt his position was strong enough to enable him to return to his old rebellious ways. His fate, and that of Ṭālеša Kūlī and Bū Sa'īd, will be related under the events of next year.

The Invasion of Ḵārazm by 'Abdollāh Khan and of Khorasan by his Son, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan

Although Uzbeg affairs may be thought to have no place in a history of Iran, since they are relevant to my theme I have no choice but to record them. I have already described the dispute over Nesā between Nūr Moḥammad Khan b. Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ūrganj, and Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ḵārazm; the two men were cousins and were both descended from Jočī b. Genghis Khan. Nūr Moḥammad Khan had handed Marv over to 'Abdollāh Khan in the hope that the latter would in return assist him in regaining Nesā. The dispute between the two khans suited 'Abdollāh Khan admirably, and he did nothing for Nūr Moḥammad Khan.

'Abdollāh Khan's ambition had always been to annex Ḵārazm and Khorasan, and he had always resented the fact that the khans of Ūrganj gave their allegiance to the Shah. This year, therefore, he launched a two-pronged attack, himself going to Ḵārazm and sending 'Abd al-Mo'men to Khorasan. When the latter reached Marv, the Nāīman Uzbegs deserted him and joined 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. On the advice of Ḥāfeẓak Sultan Ḵabūšānī, Nūr Moḥammad Khan left Marv and took refuge at the court of Shah 'Abbas. The Shah sent his son, Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā, together with the vizier, and a number of emirs, *moqarrabs*, and personal retainers, for a distance of one *farsaḵ* to welcome him. Nūr Moḥammad Khan dismounted from his horse, embraced the prince, and was led into an audience with the Shah in the Čehel Sotūn hall. All his needs were taken care of, and he became the Shah's companion at private banquets and social gatherings.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, having consolidated his hold on the districts of Abīvard, Čahčaha, Mahna, Nesā, Bāḡbād, and Darūn, marched on Nishapūr. He arrived there before the crops had been harvested and blockaded the citadel before the defenders had had a chance to stock it with food. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, with the Rūmlū *ğāzīs* and Eṣfahānī musketeers, looked to its defense and reported the Uzbeg attack to the Shah, who was forced to delay marching to the relief of Nishapur because Farhād Khan was still in Gīlān.

The Uzbegs made several assaults on the citadel, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Sappers then dug a mine beneath one of the towers and filled the mine with gunpowder. One evening, they exploded the mine and caused a breach in the walls, through which some three or four hundred Uzbegs poured. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan and his Rūmlūs, and Mīr Fattāḥ and his Eṣfahānī musketeers, lit torches and rushed to the breach, pouring a heavy fire on the Uzbegs that prevented others from entering. Those Uzbegs who had already rushed through the breach, finding themselves without support, scattered throughout the city, where they were picked off one by one by the Rūmlū *ğāzīs*, the musketeers, and the townspeople. Fighting went on until midnight, and some ten or twenty members of the Uzbeg nobility were taken prisoner and put to death. The defenders worked all night to repair the breach.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was disconcerted by this setback, and friend and foe alike applauded Darvīš Moḥammad Khan and his men on their valiant defense. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then had a proclamation made beneath the walls to the effect that if such-and-such an officer had not already been killed, the defenders should spare his life, since the lives of these officers might be a basis for negotiation. A number of Rūmlū *ğāzīs*, one of them a kinsman of Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, had been taken prisoner early in the siege and had been held in custody. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan had similarly spared any Uzbeg prisoners who might be useful.

At this juncture, Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī suddenly descended on Oğūrlū Sultan Bayāt at Borūjerd and killed him. The Shah was forced to march to Lorestān to deal with this domestic enemy, and he dictated a message to be taken to Darvīš Moḥammad Khan by the hand of his brother, Šāhqolī Ḳolafā. The Shah explained his preoccupations and told Darvīš Moḥammad Khan that he could not lead the royal army to Khorasan that year. He advised Darvīš Moḥammad Khan to negotiate with 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and try and find some way of bringing his men and their families safely back to Iraq. Nishapur would not run away, he said, and could easily be retaken when opportunity offered.

Šāhqolī Ḵolafā refused to take this message. "We deem it our duty as loyal Sufis," he said, "to lay down our lives for our benefactor and our spiritual director *(moršed-e kāmel),* and we do so with pride in the knowledge that we shall thereby gain renown. My brother will defend that castle as long as there is breath in his body, and, when he is no longer able to continue the defense and is killed, he will win glorious renown down the ages." The Shah replied gently, "Since this self-sacrifice will be for my sake, it is better to seek to please me even when I give an order like this. Herat, the seat of government of the province of Khorasan, and the holy city of Mašhad, the burial place of the eighth Imam, and many other places, are in Uzbeg hands. What will be achieved by sacrificing so many men and their wives and families in the defense of Nishapur? God willing, the whole of Khorasan will one day again be ours; until that time, it is useless to kick against fate."

The Shah's message was eventually taken to Sabzavār by one of his attendants, and from there to Nishapur by an unknown hand. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan decided to fight on as long as his food supplies lasted. When they ran short, he opened negotiations with 'Abd al-Mo'men, who was glad to consider terms because his men had suffered during the long siege. He gave his word that Darvīš Moḥammad Khan would be allowed to march away to Iraq unmolested, with his possessions and the families of his men; there was to be a mutual exchange of prisoners. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan did not trust his word, because about two thousand Uzbegs had been slain in the course of the siege, and the Uzbegs wanted revenge. However, the terms were agreed to and cemented by solemn oaths.

Darvīš Moḥammad Khan marched out of Nishapur by the Iraq gate, and found 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan himself and all his men drawn up in battle array. When they saw this, the *qezelbāš* prepared to sell their lives dearly. The three hundred survivors of the Eṣfahānī musketeers lit their fuses and stood ready. Opposite them stood the Uzbegs, most of whom had lost relatives in the siege, eager to break their oaths and attack. 'Abd al-Mo'men took counsel with his chiefs. His chiefs said: "The enemy number altogether some thousand men; they are desperate, and will fight to the end. In addition, they have a body of musketeers who are incomparable marksmen. We would lose two or three thousand men. A further consideration is that it is not wise for kings to incur ill-repute by breaking their sworn oath."[1]

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[1] Eskandar Beg, quite rightly, attaches least weight to the argument about breaking a sworn oath. 'Abd al-Mo'men's father, 'Abdollāh Khan, had massacred the *qezelbāš* garrison at Herat in 1589, after having guaranteed that their lives would be spared.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan thought their advice sound, and gave up any idea of treachery. He sent a herald to Darvīš Moḥammad Khan calling on him to come and salute him before he went on his way. The Rūmlūs and musketeers begged him not to go, but Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, afraid of being called a coward, rode toward the Uzbeg Khan with a few of his men. The Uzbeg Khan praised him and said, "May your master reward you, for your fidelity and gallantry are above reproach." 'Abd al-Mo'men coveted Darvīš Moḥammad Khan's horse and jeweled bridle, so he gave him in exchange one of his lead horses, a poor nag, and let him go. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan rode without stopping until nightfall, and reached Sabzavār. He reached Qazvin just as the Shah was returning from his expedition to Lorestān. As a reward for his services, he was made governor of Gīlān and *amīr al-omarā* of that province.

After the departure of Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan sent a group of his emirs against Sabzavār and himself retired to Mašhad for the winter. Sabzavār was defended by Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan, the grandson of Mīr Šams al-Dīn 'Alī Sultan Sabzavārī. After a while, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan grew tired of Khorasan and retired to Balḵ. He sent a courier to the emirs at Sabzavār telling them to redouble their efforts to take the city. But the Uzbeg emirs, when they learned that 'Abd al'Mo'men Khan had retired to Balḵ, opened negotiations with Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan and sent the following message to the people of Sabzavār: "The king of the *qezelbāš* has not come to Khorasan this year, and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, who is a fearless and bloodthirsty chief, is sitting at Mašhad. If Sabzavār continues to resist, he may have to take charge of operations here in person. Your best course is to conciliate him." After some negotiation, it was agreed that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan would appoint an Uzbeg governor to Sabzavār, who would reside there for six months as the guest of the Sabzavārīs and would not interfere in the internal administration of the city. If, at the end of that time, a *qezelbāš* army appeared, the Uzbeg governor would retire. If not, the temporary governor would be replaced by an Uzbeg *dārūġa* who would take charge of the administration. Nadr Bahādor, an Uzbeg noble, was appointed governor and *dārūġa* of Sabzavār, with Mūsa Mīrzā and a retinue of fifty men, and the Uzbeg army at Sabzavār withdrew, overtaking 'Abd al-Mo'men near Jām. The Uzbeg Khan is reported to have criticized the emirs for making this settlement and to have refused to ratify it.

Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan provided accommodation for the Uzbeg detachment and every month sent them gifts; he also met Nadr Bahādor on several occasions. Because of these gifts, Nadr Bahādor's men did not molest the townspeople much. However, they wanted to make it clear who was master, and if anyone annoyed them, they threatened him and reminded him what would happen at the end of the six-month truce period. The Sabzavārīs, who were militant Shi'ites, used to curse the Sunni Uzbegs in the streets and in the bazaar. Some of the more ignorant Sabzavārīs went so far as to curse the first three caliphs. The Uzbegs would return their curses, and draw their swords and daggers and go for the townspeople. Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan complained several times to Nadr Bahādor about the behavior of his men and asked him not to allow them to wander in the streets. Nadr Bahādor expressed his apologies for the incidents, but laid the blame for them on the townspeople.

Relations between the two sides continued to deteriorate. On several occasions, the Uzbegs left the city and camped out at an inn some four *farsaḵs* away, between the city and Sang-e Kelīdar, and made this a sort of stronghold. Every time this happened, Mīrzā Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan and the Sabzavārīs, who thought it inadvisable to let them stay there, coaxed them into coming back into the city, and sometimes had to promise them considerable sums of money to persuade them to return. Every time they went back, they again began to bully and threaten the people, while their officers tried to conciliate them. Finally, the Sabzavārīs decided to get rid of them. They launched a sudden attack on the Uzbegs, overpowered Mūsa Mīrzā, and began to seize the other Uzbegs. Some tried to resist, but they were helpless against such a mob and allowed themselves to be taken prisoner.

Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan reported what had happened to the Shah, to whom he sent Mūsa Mīrzā and all the prisoners except Nadr Bahādor, whom he detained at Sabzavār. The Shah did not approve of this breach of faith. He declared that, if the Sabzavārīs and the Uzbegs could not live together, the Sabzavārīs should have apologized to the Uzbegs and let them return to their own territory. The Shah loaded Mūsa Mīrzā with favors and sent him on his way with a *qūrčī* as escort, with instructions to procure for the Uzbegs accommodation and fodder as they crossed Safavid territory. The *qūrčī* duly delivered his charges to the Uzbeg governor of Mašhad, Ḵoday Naẓar Bahādor, and obtained a receipt for them. This incident merely increased 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan's hatred of the people of Sabzavār.

Meanwhile, 'Abdollāh Khan had triumphed over Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan (it is not necessary in a history of Iran to give the details). Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan's men had not fought with much spirit—either for fear that their possessions would be plundered or because they were inferior in strength. At all events, most of them transferred their allegiance to 'Abdollāh Khan. Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan was forced to take refuge among the Ṣā'en-ḵānī Turkmans in the district of Astarābād, with his eldest son, 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan; his younger son, Sevīnj Moḥammad Sultan; his grandson Barandaq Sultan; his nephew Bābā Jān Sultan; and some fifty retainers. From there, he sought sanctuary with Shah 'Abbas, and reached Qazvin while the Shah was on campaign in Lorestān. The Shah was informed of his arrival and gave orders that he should be suitably entertained. On his return to Qazvin, the Shah went straight to visit Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan. He pledged himself to restore him and Nūr Moḥammad Khan to the thrones of Ḵ̌ārazm and Ūrganj, God willing.

The Shah's Expedition to Lorestān

The Lor tribes, which live in the districts of Ḵorramābād, Ḵāva, Aleštar, Ṣadmara, and Hazameyn, have been Shi'ites since ancient times. The author of the *Nozhat al-Qolūb* has not given the names of the small towns and other localities of Lor-e Kūček in sufficient detail. As far as I have been able to determine, this province lies to the south of Iraq, and is bounded on one side by the province of Hamadan and on the other by that of Ḵūzestān. East-west, it stretches from the town of Borūjerd to the environs of Baghdad—a distance of some one hundred *farsaḵs*. The author of the *Tārīḵ-e Jahān-ārā* has stated that the tribes of Lor-e Kūček are a mixture of different tribes which settled in that area and paid their taxes to the seat of the caliphate, Baghdad. In the year 580/1184-85, because of this lack of uniformity among the tribes, they chose as their governor and emir Šojā' al-Dīn Ḵūršīd b. Abū Bakr b. Moḥammad b. Ḵūršīd, of the Jangravī tribe, who established a ruling dynasty among them. The descendants of Šojā' al-Dīn were known as 'Abbāsī, but the reason for this is not known. The Lors themselves say it is because they are descended from 'Abbās b. 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb, but it could be that they were called 'Abbāsī because their taxes were earmarked for Baghdad, the seat of the Abbāsid caliphate.

At the beginning of the reign of Shah Esma'il I, the reigning member of this dynasty, Shah Rostam, was confirmed by the Shah in his ancestral domains. He had a long beard, which the Shah decorated with pearls. After the time of Shah Esma'il I, some of the Shah Rostam's descendants were loyal to the Safavid house; others who were not ravaged the neighboring province of Hamadan. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, Shah Rostam's son, Emir Jahāngīr, made more than the usual amount of trouble, and the Shah sent a punitive expedition against him under 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājlū, the *amīr al-omarā* in charge of that frontier. Emir Jahāngīr was killed, and Lorestān ravaged. His sons, Shah Rostam and Moḥammadī, fled to Baghdad and eventually won their way back into the Shah's favor as the result of the intercession of an eminent *seyyed* of Lorestān, Emir Shah Qāsem, who had married the daughter of Emir Jahāngīr. They were restored to their hereditary province of Lorestān, which was divided between them.

Moḥammadī later rebelled, and Emir Khan Mowṣellū was sent to deal with the revolt. Moḥammadī was captured and imprisoned at Alamūt; he was released toward the end of Shah Tahmasp's reign. The Shah intended to restore him as governor of Lorestān, but Moḥammadī, apprehensive about the Shah's intentions, took it upon himself to flee Lorestān without permission. His apologies for this action were accepted by Shah Tahmasp. After the Shah's death, when the Ottomans broke the peace and invaded Iran, he tried to protect the Lor tribes by keeping on good terms with the Ottomans.

About the time that Shah 'Abbas succeeded Sultan Moḥammad Shah, Moḥammadī's son Šāhverdī succeeded him as governor of Lorestān. When Jeğal-oğlū penetrated as far as Nehāvand and built a fort there, many of the Qarā Olūs tribes moved from Hamadan to Lorestān and sought sanctuary with Šāhverdī, who allotted them lands in Lorestān. Šāhverdī then became the vassal of the Ottoman governor of Baghdad. When peace returned it was difficult for Šāhverdī, who had become accustomed to independence, to think of submitting to anyone, and he continued to play the Ottomans and the Safavids against each other. As the occasion demanded, he would wear the *qezelbāš tāj*[2] or the large Ottoman turban.

In the year 1000/1591-92, however, which Shah 'Abbas devoted to suppressing various domestic revolts, Šāhverdī was forced to declare his allegiance to the Safavid crown. He sent his cousin, Ḥoseyn Beg Solvīzī, as a hostage to Shah 'Abbas, who pardoned him, promoted him to the rank of khan, and took his sister into the harem; all of which gave him greater power in Lorestān than any of his ancestors. He kept the members of the Qarā Olūs tribe in Lorestān and did not hand them over to the *qezelbāš* authorities. From time to time he sent an unimpressive gift to court, but the Shah, having regard for the patronage he had extended to him, overlooked the inadequacy of the gifts and did not send them back.

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[2] The distinctive scarlet headgear of the *qezelbāš*.

Šāhverdī, however, had grown up with the idea of being his own master and giving full rein to his ambition, and was habitually devious in his dealings with others, so eventually the Shah realized he was basically an evil man. Šāhverdī began to molest the governors of Hamadan and to make raids on Borūjerd and the surrounding area. The Shah continued to treat him leniently until this year (1002/1593-94), when 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, the son of 'Abdollāh Khan, invaded Khorasan and laid siege to Nishapur, and the Shah, freed from his preoccupations in Gīlān, made the decision to march to Khorasan. Oğūrlū Sultan Bayāt, who had been ordered to mobilize the Bayāt contingent for this expedition, had gone to Borūjerd for this purpose. Before he had a chance to mobilize any men, Šāhverdī Khan suddenly appeared with an army and made as if to give battle to him.

Oğūrlū Sultan, who had refrained from taking punitive measures against Šāhverdī Khan for the past two or three years because that seemed to be what the Shah wanted, was thrown into confusion. He was not strong enough to advance against Šāhverdī, and he was too proud to retreat. He gathered around him his small band of Bayāts, and it was agreed that one of the elders of the tribe should be sent to meet Šāhverdī to inquire what his purpose was and to dissuade him from making the dastardly attack on which he appeared to be set and which could only have serious consequences. But before this plan could be put into effect, Šāhverdī's advance guard came in sight, and Oğūrlū Sultan had no option but to fight. He did not fight with determination, however, and since the Lors attacked with great élan and greatly outnumbered his own men, they were victorious. Oğūrlū Sultan was slain, and his men scattered to their homes.

Although Šāhverdī Khan had been victorious, on reflection he was somewhat apprehensive of the outcome. He went to Ḵorramābād and again sent his cousin, Ḥoseyn Beg, to court to plead his case, but this time he had gone too far. An enraged Shah 'Abbas postponed his departure to Khorasan in order to deal personally with Šāhverdī. The result was that the Uzbegs advanced even beyond Nishapur, and Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, as we have seen, was ordered to negotiate a truce on whatever terms he could and retire to Iraq. As soon as Šāhverdī Khan heard that the Shah was on his way, he fled from Ḵorramābād, which was his seat of government, toward Ṣadmara. Some of the emirs of Lorestān and the tribal cavalry deserted him and joined the Shah, who occupied Ḵorramābād and made Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū governor of the city. The Shah pressed on to Ṣadmara, which is the winter quarters of the Lor tribes, arriving there in the intense heat of summer.

Šāhverdī Khan continued his flight, first to Kūr-kūh, on the border between Lorestān and Baghdad province, and then to Baghdad. At this point, Mīr Qeyṣar Ḵāma Bīdel, a leading Lor emir who commanded two thousand households, deserted him and joined the Shah. The Shah, leaving most of his men and his baggage at Ṣadmara, made a lightning dash to Kūr-kūh, some twenty *farsaḵs* away, with a small troop, hoping either to capture Šāhverdī Khan or drive him out of Lorestān for good. The Shah's troop covered the distance, through mountainous country, in twenty-four hours, but discovered that their prey had fled to Ottoman territory. Since to follow him there would constitute a violation of the peace treaty, the Shah returned.

The Shah detailed a number of *qūrčīs* and aides-de-camp to round up the Qarā Olūs tribes and send them back to Hamadan province. Sultan Ḥoseyn the son of Shah Rostam, who had fled in fear from Šāhverdī Khan and had been living among the Kalhor,[3] now presented himself to the Shah. He was favorably received and was made governor of Lorestān with the exception of Ḵorramābād and its dependencies, which had already been given to Mahdīqolī Khan. The Shah graciously received the elders of the Lor tribes, enjoining them to serve Sultan Ḥoseyn. The chiefs brought some hundred thousand sheep as a gift to the Shah, and the officers of the *dīvān*, at his orders, distributed them among the troops. The Shah then departed, intending to march to Khorasan via Dargozīn, without returning to Qazvin. When he reached Borūjerd, however, he received the news that Nishapur had fallen, that Darvīš Moḥammad Khan was on his way back to Iraq, and that Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ḵārazm, had arrived at Qazvin as a fugitive. The Shah therefore changed his plans and

[3] A Kurdish tribe (see *TM*, p. 34).

returned to the capital, stopping en route in Bayāt territory to impose fines on that tribe for its poor showing in the clash with Šāhverdī Khan. Šāhqolī Sultan, Oḡūrlū Sultan's brother, who had succeeded him as head of the tribe, sought the Shah's forgiveness and received the royal pardon. In gratitude, the Bayāt tribe sent as gifts to the *dīvān-e a'lā* about three thousand stallion colts and Bayātī mares, highly prized among the *qezelbāš*, and in addition paid three thousand *tomān* in gold as a fine.

The Shah entered Qazvin on 10 Moḥarram 1002/6 October 1593, and as already reported, went straight to the house where Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan was lodged to make gracious inquiries about his affairs. Nūr Moḥammad Khan, who had accompanied the Shah on his expedition to Lorestān, presented himself before Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, and having obtained permission, prostrated himself before him according to the manners and customs of the Genghizid sultans. In return, Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan embraced him.

The Shah remained for some time at Qazvin, entertaining the Uzbeg sultans at royal assemblies and talking informally to them. Whenever he summoned Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan to one of these assemblies, the Shah asked Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda to be present too; the ex-shah and the sultan were seated on the same throne, so that they could converse with each other. The Shah informally and good-naturedly served them himself, and it was a rare sight to see two monarchs sitting amicably on the same throne.

Having seen to all their needs, the Shah left for Isfahan in the autumn of 1593. Nūr Moḥammad Khan, who was his constant companion at private gatherings and banquets, went with him. To prevent Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan from being jealous, the Shah took with him Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan's son, 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan. However, since the latter was a descendant of the Prophet, the informal behavior which was innate in the Shah was foreign to him, and so he was not often invited to the Shah's private parties. The Shah spent the winter (1593–94) at Isfahan and returned to Qazvin in March 1594.

The Suppression of a Group of Heretics by the Authority of the Religious Law

One of the events that took place this year was the execution of Darvīš Ḵosrow Qazvīnī and a number of his disciples. Darvīš Ḵosrow was a member of the lower classes from the Darb-e Kūšk ward of Qazvin, and came from a line of well-diggers and refuse collectors. Abandoning his ancestral calling, he donned the robes of a wandering dervish and traveled around for a while in this guise. He spent some time in the company of a group of Noqṭavīs[4] and became so well informed about their doctrines that he acquired the reputation of one who furthered their cause. He then came to Qazvin and took up residence in one of the mosques. A number of dervishes gathered around him, and he began actively to expound to them the mysteries of gnosis. The *'olamā* and the *moḥtasebs*[5] placed a ban on his activities and forbade him to sit in the mosque.

Eventually, all this came to the ears of the then Shah, Shah Tahmasp, who instituted an inquiry. Darvīš Ḵosrow made public avowal, in the presence of the Shah, of the tenets of Islam and the basic doctrines of the Imami rite. He denied what was alleged against him, and since it could not be proved that he had done anything contrary to the religious law, the Shah observed the letter of the law and took no action against him, although he did order him not to take up his station at the mosque and not to allow members of the ignorant masses to come to him.

After this incident, Darvīš Ḵosrow began to frequent the *'olamā* in order to allay their suspicions, to study jurisprudence, and to attend the congregational prayers at the mosque on Fridays. He kept himself strictly aloof from everyone else. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, however, he resumed his former practice; he once again took up his station in the mosque adjoining his house, and displayed his mystical wares.[6] A number of luckless people and idlers, both Turks and Persians, began to frequent him, and he continued in this manner until the accession of Shah 'Abbas, deriving an easy livelihood from the dervishes to whom he ministered. Soon the mosque became too small to house the throng that followed him, and he began to build a hospice nearby. The people of the ward, both Turks and Persians, aided him in the construction and laid out a pleasant garden around the hospice. Every day, all kinds of dishes were prepared in its kitchens.

Shah 'Abbas, who spent a great deal of his time touring the side streets and city wards and making the acquaintance of all sorts and conditions of men, went to have a look at Darvīš Ḵosrow, and engaged in conversation with him. Gradually, the Shah took to frequenting his hospice. In order to understand his beliefs and to get to know how he behaved, he adopted the manner of speech used by travelers on the mystical way, and unfolded his own personal knowledge of God to him after the fashion of dervishes. Darvīš Ḵosrow, being an extremely cautious man, did not show his hand; he uttered no words that contravened the religious law. But some of the dervishes who frequented the hospice, especially Ostād Yūsofī the quiver maker and Darvīš Kūček Qalandar, uttered extravagant claims and, with a complete lack of caution, revealed Darvīš Ḵosrow's corrupt beliefs to the Shah. The Shah became convinced of the heresy of the group and determined, as the upholder of the religious law, to deal with them. On departing for Lorestān he gave orders for the arrest of Darvīš Ḵosrow and his followers, and entrusted a group of Tājī-büyük tribesmen with this task. All the suspects were placed in chains.

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[4] See Browne, IV, p. 8.

[5] The *moḥtaseb* had a variety of functions. Among other things, he was the guardian of public morals (see article ḤISBA in *EI*²).

[6] Lit.: spread the tablecloth of committing oneself to God *(tavakkol); tavakkol* is an advanced mystical station.

Astrologers had declared that the stars predicted the death this year of an eminent personage, probably in Iran, and the signs further indicated that this personage would be a royal one. In addition, their examination of the Shah's horoscope had revealed the quadrature of the two inauspicious planets (Mars and Saturn) in the ascendant, whereas the Shah's predominant star was at its nadir. Mowlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Yazdī, who was the outstanding astrologer of his age, suggested to the Shah the following plan: during the three days when the influence of the conjunction and quadrature of the two inauspicious planets was at its height, the Shah should divest himself of his kingly status and raise to the throne some criminal under sentence of death. During those three days both military and civilians would give their allegiance to that man, so that the essential business of kingship might be discharged by him. At the end of the three days, the temporary monarch should be executed.

This plan was approved, and the lot fell on Ostād Yūsofī the quiver maker, whose heresy was more heinous than that of his fellows. Ostād Yūsofī was given the title of king, the crown was placed on his head, and he was clothed in gorgeous robes. On the day of his installation, he was seated on a Barda'ī mule, with saddle and bridle studded with jewels, and the royal regalia were placed on his head. All the emirs, *moqarrabs*, and other officers of the court attended him with their troops and escorted him to his residence, where they brought him food and drink in abundance. At night, *qūrčīs* mounted guard over him. The poor wretch realized what his fate was to be and decided to make the most of the three days: "Kingship, however ephemeral, is an enjoyable experience."

Shah ʿAbbas spent these three days in the company of a handful of grooms and servants, and kept completely aloof from state affairs. Ostād Yūsofī, when he was out riding, caught sight of Mowlānā Jalāl the astrologer and called out to him, "Why have you decided to kill me?" One of the wags at court said jokingly to Mowlānā Jalāl, "One of the functions of a king is to issue orders, and so far this artificial king has issued no orders. Now that he knows you are out to kill him, if he decides to forestall you by issuing an order for your execution, the order must inevitably be carried out. You had better be careful for the next three days!" Mowlānā Jalāl, who was a simple fellow, was filled with panic, and spent the rest of the three-day period in a state of terror.

At the end of the three days, Ostād Yūsofī was put to death, and by this stratagem the Shah avoided calamity. Men of insight, however, realized that calamity was averted only because it was God's will.

Darvīš Kūček Qalandar, who was always making grandiose boasts, buried his head in his dervish robe and said to his guard, "I am going, but only to reappear in another age." He went, anyway! After the Shah's return from Lorestān, he summoned Darvīš Ḵosrow, convened the *ʿolamā*, and instituted an inquiry. Wine vats found in his hospice were produced as evidence that his beliefs were latitudinarian to the point that he did not observe the religious law. It became clear to the Shah that he was a Noqṭavī, and he ordered his execution in order to uphold the religious law. Darvīš was tied by his throat to the saddle of a camel and dragged around the city. Mowlānā Ṭabīb Sāvajī, also rumored to belong to this heretical group, and indeed to be one of the most learned members of it, was handed over to the *ʿolamā* for sentence. In order to strike fear into the ignorant and misguided he was placed in jail, but shortly afterward the Shah decided to put him to death too.

Another important member of the Noqṭavī sect was Mīr Seyyed Aḥmad Kāšī, who led many ignorant people astray. He was executed by the Shah with his own hands in the Naṣrābād district of Kashan, where he was cut in two by the Shah's sword. Among his books was a treatise he had written on the Noqṭavī science, and it became clear from this that the members of the sect, like the philosophers, believed that the world is pre-eternal, and that they did not believe in the resurrection and the day of judgment. They believed that one received the reward or punishment for one's actions in this world, and that this was the meaning of heaven and hell. God preserve us from such false beliefs!

Darvīš Kamāl Eqlīdī and Darvīš Beryānī, who were both leaders of a branch of this sect, together with several of their disciples, were put to death as they traveled to Khorasan. In the Eṣṭahbānāt district of Fārs, a few members of this sect were sent to join their fellows; no one suspected of this heresy was spared. Even some of the *qezelbāš* were members of this sect. Būdāq Beg Dīn-oḡlū Ostājlū, who was a disciple of Darvīš Ḵosrow, was put to death. It became clear that the heresy was widespread throughout the Safavid empire.

Travelers to India reported that it existed there too, and that Shaikh Abu'l-Fażl, the son of Shaikh Mobārak, a learned man in the service of the Mogul emperor Jalal al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar and esteemed by him, was a member of it. He had converted the Emperor to his latitudinarian ideas and seduced him from the path of the religious law. A document which had been signed by Shaikh Abu'l-Fażl and sent to Mīr Seyyed Aḥmad Kāšī, and had been found among his papers, corroborated this. Knowledge belongs to God, and He knoweth the inner truth of things! Šarīf Āmolī, who was one of the leading intellectuals of the Noqṭavī sect, fled to India to escape retribution at the hands of the judges. He was honored by the Mogul emperor, emirs, and nobles, who treated him as their spiritual adviser. As a result of this purge, all the followers of this sect in Iran either left the country or concealed themselves in some remote corner, and the heresy of transmigration of souls was eradicated from Iran.

Miscellaneous Events in Khorasan

This year there occurred a battle between Soleymān Ḵalīfa and the *qezelbāš* emirs, and Yatīm Sultan and the Uzbeg army, in the Ozḡand district of Toršīz in Khorasan. As is well known, the *qezelbāš* tribes are the servants of the Safavid house, and if they fall from the favor of their benefactor and incur the wrath of their supreme spiritual director, they are expected to regard this loss of favor as due to their own shortcomings and to consider it as purifying their souls. They are expected to endure patiently a thousand physical and spiritual hurts and to remain loyal to their supreme spiritual director until they have cleansed the stain of their sins with the sweat of remorse and humility and rendered themselves worthy of again being received into favor. But Soleymān Ḵalīfa, the son of Sohrāb Ḵalīfa Torkmān, and Sultan ʿAlī Ḵalīfa, the nephew of Fūlād Ḵalīfa Šāmlū, *ḵalīfas*[7] and descendants of *ḵalīfas* who had to their credit years of service under Shah Tahmasp, rebelled and became traitors. They did this because they were kept waiting for a few days as a punishment for certain misdemeanors and did not obtain the rank they expected.

They planned to bring to Khorasan Rostam Mīrzā b. Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bahrām Mīrzā, and Soleymān Ḵalīfa went to Kandahar with a few men for this purpose. They hoped by installing Rostam Mīrzā in Khorasan to satisfy their own ambitions. Since they were misguided they did not succeed in their object, but met their ends in battle against the Uzbegs. I said earlier that the later history of the sons of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and of events in Sīstān, would require a separate section, so I will deal with this now.

The Rule of the Sons of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā in Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar from the Time of Their Father's Death, an Account of Their Going to India, of Their Subsequent History, and of Events in Sīstān

Readers will recall that Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was appointed by Shah Tahmasp governor of Kandahar, Zamīn Dāvar, and the districts of Garmsīrāt along the banks of the Hīrmand, that he governed those provinces successfully, that he died during the reign of Shah Esmaʿil II, and that he left five sons: first, Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who came to court with his sister while Shah Tahmasp was still alive, and was murdered by Shah Esmaʿil II along with the other Safavid princes; second, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā; third, Rostam Mīrzā; fourth, Abū Saʿīd Mīrzā; fifth, Sanjar Mīrzā.

At the time of Shah Esmaʿil II's death, it was well known that the Shah had given orders for the murder of the surviving Safavid princes.

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[7] See Savory, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Ṣafawids," *JOAS*, 85/4, October-December, 1965, pp. 497-502.

One of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's retainers, a certain Qarā'ī of the Gūrkānī tribe, rode like the wind to Kandahar with the news of the Shah's death, and saved the lives of the princes there. When Sultan Moḥammad Shah came to the throne, he entrusted Kandahar to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the eldest surviving son of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and gave Garmsīrāt and Zamīn Dāvar to Rostam Mīrzā; he further ordained that Sultan Abū Sa'īd Mīrzā and Sanjar Mīrzā, who were brothers of Rostam Mīrzā, should reside in Zamīn Dāvar with the latter. Ḥamza Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, known as Kūr Ḥamza, who had been the *vakīl* of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and had accompanied Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā to court, was again made the *vakīl* and guardian of the princes. Ḥamza Beg sent Rostam Mīrzā and his brothers to Zamīn Dāvar and, acting on his own authority, appointed *vakīls* and guardians for them. He left Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā at Kandahar and himself took up the reins of government in both provinces to such effect that the princes were governors only in name. However, none of them thought of trying to increase his power, and they were obedient to the Shah's orders.

In the neighboring province of Sīstān, however, Malek Maḥmūd, who was descended from the ancient rulers of Sīstān and traced his lineage back to the Saffarid dynasty, took advantage of the absence of *qezelbāš* in Sīstān after the death of Shah Esma'il II to declare his independence. He defeated Ja'far Sultan Afšār, who was governor of Sīstān on behalf of the Shah, and imposed his rule on the province. No voice of opposition was heard. Since it was the policy of Sultan Moḥammad Shah to resurrect former ruling houses, and for various other considerations of state, Malek Maḥmūd was confirmed as governor of Sīstān through the good offices of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān.

When the news of Malek Maḥmūd's appointment reached Kandahar—actually before the letter of appointment had been issued by the court—Ḥamza Beg and the princes invaded Sīstān. The princes were indignant at seeing Sīstān, the former seat of government of their uncle Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā, in the hands of rulers who had never served the Safavid cause. When the army from Kandahar reached the old city of Sīstān and camped two *farsaḵs* from the island of Pošt-e Zarah, the stronghold and seat of justice and government of Malek Maḥmūd and the princes and emirs of Sīstān, they saw the natural strength of the site and the size of the Sīstān forces. Ḥamza Beg opened negotiations; from the other side, Ḡīāṯ al-Dīn

Moḥammad, Malek Maḥmūd's uncle, hastened to visit the Safavid princes. After much discussion, it was agreed that Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā should marry a princess of the house of Malek Maḥmūd, and that Malek Jalāl al-Dīn, the son of Malek Maḥmūd, should marry Ḥamza Beg's daughter. Sīstān would be left in the hands of Malek Maḥmūd, who pledged the maintenance of friendly relations with the Safavid princes.

This settlement aroused the resentment of Rostam Mīrzā, whose governorship was inferior to that of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and was not adequate to provide a livelihood for himself and his brothers. He thought Sīstān should have been annexed and added to his territories.

At this juncture, a group of *qezelbāš* and Kurdish tribesmen began to poison Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's mind against Ḥamza Beg; the prince, already jealous of Ḥamza Beg's power and his own impotence in matters of government, listened to their words and gave them permission to kill Ḥamza Beg. Ḥamza Beg got wind of their intention, went to Zamīn Dāvar, collected Rostam Mīrzā, and marched on Kandahar. The two brothers fought a battle on the banks of the river Ozḡand. During the battle, some of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn's men who sided with Ḥamza Beg deserted after the first determined charge by Rostam Mīrzā's men, and this led to the defeat of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn, although his force still far outnumbered that of Rostam Mīrzā. Moẓaffar retreated within the walls of Kandahar, and Rostam Mīrzā and Ḥamza Beg camped outside, at Darvāza-ye Māšūr.

A group of elders from the tribes tried to heal the breach, and a settlement was reached. Rostam Mīrzā, willing or not, was obliged to return to Zamīn Dāvar. Ḥamza Beg resumed his former post as *vakīl* to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and continued to hold this position with full authority for three years. Then, once more, a group of ignorant *qezelbāš* and troublemakers in Kandahar went secretly to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and once more planned to assassinate Ḥamza Beg. Ḥamza Beg, also in secret, sent a courier to summon Rostam Mīrzā, who entered the city one morning unheralded. All the emirs and people of Kandahar went with Ḥamza Beg to greet Rostam Mīrzā and offered him the governorship of Kandahar, which he accepted. Moḥammad Beg Bayāt, Ḥamza Beg's son-in-law, was appointed guardian of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and the latter was sent to the immensely strong fortress of Qalāt, in the Hezārajāt district of Kandahar, and placed in the custody of five hundred Bayāt soldiers.

Within six months, however, the prince and Moḥammad Beg were in league with each other, and the Bayāt troops pledged their support to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. It was decided that two hundred men should be left to garrison the fortress of Qalāt, and the remaining three hundred should march across the desert to Sīstān with the prince. Malek Maḥmūd received the prince graciously and lavished hospitality on him. Malek Maḥmūd's daughter, who had been promised in marriage to the prince, was handed over to him, and the prince spent six months with Malek Maḥmūd on terms of the closest friendship. But Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was a fickle man, easily swayed, and a group of Sīstānī emirs, habitual troublemakers, succeeded in turning him against Malek Maḥmūd. The prince rode out, as if on a hunting expedition, to the island of Pošt-e Zarah, to the fort of Trāgūn,[8] which was the residence of the great emirs of Sīstān and of those who were envious of Malek Maḥmūd. Within a week, all the emirs and *naqībs* of Zarah and Ramrūd[9] and the chiefs of the Sīstānī tribes had gathered around him, and the prince set out, with his personal retainers and a number of *qezelbāš* who had joined him from Farāh, with the intention of destroying the house of the *maleks* of Sīstān. First, he marched against Malek Maḥmūd's uncle, Malek Nāṣer al-Dīn, who with his sons held the fort of Jārūnak, and laid siege to the fort for a month.

Meanwhile Malek Maḥmūd, who had found himself bereft of men when the prince marched, at a place called Dāsalak on the banks of the Hīrmand, managed to levy an army by means of gifts of money, weapons, horses, and equipment, and marched to Jārūnak to the aid of his relatives. He sent on ahead his son Malek Jalāl al-Dīn, and his cousins Malek Maḥmūdī and Malek Shah Ḥoseyn, and himself arrived before the walls of the fort on 10 Ṣafar 990/6 March 1582. After fighting had gone on all day, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and his men broke off the engagement at nightfall and retired toward the forests and the island.

A week later, Malek Maḥmūd sent a group of *seyyeds* and other men of integrity and good will to the prince, asking that bygones be bygones, that they terminate their conflict, and that they meet without fear in a spirit of friendship. The prince agreed to this, and a few days later both princes took part in renewed festivities. Malek Maḥmūd sent a reliable man to Ḥamza Beg and advised him to desist from any course of action calculated to annoy Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. Meanwhile, envoys had also arrived from Ḥamza Beg, and a new covenant was arrived at between Ḥamza Beg and the prince. A group of *qezelbāš* emirs arrived in Sīstān from Kandahar to request the prince to return to Kandahar, and Malek Maḥmūd sent him off with a force of three thousand men, composed of Sīstānī troops and relatives of his. Rostam Mīrzā was unable to take any course of action other than that ordained by Ḥamza Beg, and so, faced with the return of his elder brother and with the policy decision by the senior emirs, he had no alternative but to retire once more to Kandahar.

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[8] The text has Tāgrūn. I think it must be the town referred to as Trākūn by G. P. Tate, *The Frontiers of Baluchistan*, London 1909, pp. 96-99. "Trākūn [Trāgūn] was situated on the Rud-e Biābān, east of the Hāmun and north of the Gowd-e Zereh."

[9] P. Sykes, *Ten Thousand Miles in Persia*, London 1902, p. 372, refers to the "immense ruins of Ramrud."

Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā entered Kandahar and dismissed his Sīstānī troops. Six months later, still irked by the power of Ḥamza Beg and his own dependence on him, he incited Moḥammad Beg Bayāt to murder him, and gave him the office of *vakīl* as a reward. The death of Ḥamza Beg emboldened Rostam Mīrzā to attack Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and he appeared before Kandahar with an army. Although his forces far outnumbered his opponent's, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn declined to give battle and prepared to resist a siege. Rostam Mīrzā camped at Darvāza-ye Māšūr, and daily skirmishing between the two sides went on for two months. Malek Maḥmūd sent assistance to Kandahar in the form of three thousand men led by his cousin, Malek Ḡarīb. Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā then sallied forth, joined forces with the Sīstānīs, and gave battle. Rostam Mīrzā's horse was killed under him, and the prince fought on on foot until evening, when, realizing that the combined forces of the enemy were too strong for him, he retreated to Zamīn Dāvar.

At Kandahar, the *vakīl* Moḥammad Beg soon acquired even greater power than his predecessor in office, Ḥamza Beg. Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was vexed by his dominance, but was not strong enough to do away with him as he had with Ḥamza Beg. He therefore left Kandahar with a few personal retainers and went again to Sīstān, where he was again given a royal welcome by Malek Maḥmūd, who begrudged him neither money nor land. Moḥammad Beg was left in full control of the government of Kandahar. In the end, mischief-makers in Sīstān once more incited Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā to turn against the Sīstānī *maleks* and to commence hostilities.

The prince had changed sides so many times that he was no longer in control of the situation. Once again, he turned to the people of Pošt-e Zarah for support, and marched against the same fort he had invested before (Jārūnak). Malek Maḥmūd sent against him his son Jalāl al-Dīn, and a battle was fought near the village of Deh 'Alī. To begin with, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was victorious, and Jalāl al-Dīn's men fell back and took cover in the houses of the village. About midday, Malek Maḥmūd arrived with a large force, and his cousin, Malek Nāṣer al-Dīn, sent a thousand men from inside the fort to assist him. The Safavid prince and his Sīstānī supporters were surrounded; in heavy fighting that ensued, Malek Maḥmūd lost about three hundred men killed, and his opponents some thousand men.

In the end, the Sīstānī emirs lost their stomach for the fight and deserted Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and retreated into the forests. Malek Maḥmūd sent a courier to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā with the following message: "The mischief-makers who stirred up strife between us have fled. You are the master of both armies, and I am that same loyal friend I always was. It will be better if you terminate the struggle and return to your friends." The Safavid prince was ashamed of his behavior, and went over to Malek Maḥmūd with a few of his personal retainers. He spent that night in Malek Maḥmūd's house and visited his own bride. He spent two months in Sīstān. At the end of that time, Moḥammad Beg Bayāt sent all the *qezelbāš* chiefs and nobles of Kandahar who genuinely supported Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's cause to Sīstān to crave pardon and beg the prince to return. The prince agreed, and made his preparations to return to Kandahar with his bride. Malek Maḥmūd distributed largesse, both in cash and in kind, with such generosity that Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was embarrassed. Not only that, but Malek Maḥmūd escorted him to Kandahar with all his troops.

Moḥammad Beg Bayāt, with his sword suspended from his neck, rode out from Kandahar to Garmsīr to greet the prince, and Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was reinstalled in the seat of government which his father had had before him. Moḥammad Beg Bayāt did his best to please the prince, and the latter spent his time agreeably in sensual pleasures, hunting, and the society of congenial companions, but he still had no part in the business of governing. The problem of how to get rid of Moḥammad Beg was consequently always on his mind. Finally, he suborned some of the *qezelbāš* nobles to assassinate him; in this way the prince achieved freedom of action in administrative and financial affairs.

In Zamīn Dāvar, Rostam Mīrzā, frustrated in his hopes regarding Kandahar and angered by the friendly relations between Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and the ruler of Sīstān, bided his time. About the time of the accession of Shah ʿAbbas, the Uzbegs, as already related, overran most of Khorasan, and the people of Farāh, which is not far from Herat, were hard pressed by repeated Uzbeg raids. The Afšār troops stationed at Farāh were not strong enough to maintain their control of the area and repulse the Uzbegs, and their chief, Yakān Khan, in order to protect the lives and property of his men, with the approval of his officers invited Rostam Mīrzā to come to Farāh. Rostam Mīrzā, who was informed of ʿAbbas Mīrzā's departure to Iraq, and of the divisions among the *qezelbāš*, accepted the invitation with alacrity. Yakān Khan, who was a simple-minded Turk, was overjoyed to see him and tendered the allegiance of the Afšār tribe to him.

The day after his arrival, however, Rostam Mīrzā, in his greed for money, arrested Yakān Khan, and two days later he put him to death. He followed this up by imposing fines on all the Afšār nobles and expropriating their possessions. The Afšārs were filled with horror and indignation by his behavior but, confronted by the Uzbegs, they had no alternative but to support him. Indeed, shortly after this, an Uzbeg force made for Farāh, and Rostam Mīrzā fought a number of engagements against them. In one of them, his force of three hundred *qezelbāš* routed a thousand crack Uzbeg troops from Samarkand, and reliable informants have told me that the *qezelbāš* performed such prodigies of valor in this action that eight hundred Uzbegs were slain.

After Rostam Mīrzā had been at Farāh for a while, some of the *qezelbāš* officers who had incurred the wrath of Shah ʿAbbas, the most important of whom were Soleymān Ḵalīfa Torkmān and Eslām Beg Šāmlū, together with a number of other ignorant fellows from Khorasan, came to Farāh and dazzled Rostam Mīrzā's eyes with the prospect of the governorship of Khorasan. Malek Maḥmūd, who was well aware of Rostam Mīrzā's hostility toward himself, viewed these developments with anxiety; he moved from his house to the courthouse known as The Vacillating and began to levy the troops of Nīmrūz. About ten thousand men rallied round him. They remained in a state of mobilization for seven months, until the unhealthiness of the climate caused an outbreak of plague and they disbanded.

Rostam Mīrzā had always wanted to govern Sīstān, and he now sent there as his agent Malek 'Abdollāh Farāhī, who was connected to the *maleks* of Sīstān and was very close to the prince. He was to try and wean some of Malek Maḥmūd's relatives away from their allegiance and persuade them to support Rostam Mīrzā. His first success was with Malek Ẓarīf, the son of Malek Nāṣer al-Dīn, Malek Maḥmūd's cousin, who was both a stupid and an ambitious man. Malek Ẓarīf plotted treachery against Malek Maḥmūd. When plague broke out among Malek Maḥmūd's men, Malek Ẓarīf invited him to his seat at Jārūnak for a change of air. Malek Maḥmūd accepted, but his son Malek Jalāl al-Dīn distrusted Malek Ẓarīf and efused to accompany his father. He went instead to the fortress of Fatḥ.

Malek Maḥmūd, with his nephew Malek 'Alī and with Malek Maḥmūdī and Malek Shah Ḥoseyn, went to Jārūnak. At the beginning of spring, the visitors were happily walking in the gardens at Jārūnak when Rostam Mīrzā, who had been informed by Malek Ẓarīf and other trusted retainers of Malek Maḥmūd, suddenly made his appearance only a few miles from the fort, having come by forced marches from Farāh with a band of Afšārs and others. Malek Ẓarīf was frightened by the arrival of Rostam Mīrzā and his men; regretting his treachery, he turned his mind to the defense of the fortress. Malek Maḥmūd, who had failed to follow the good advice of his son and other kinsfolk, awoke to the dangers of the situation.

Rostam Mīrzā invested the fort, and Malek Ẓarīf, contrary to his agreement with the prince, defended it for sixteen days. Rostam Mīrzā sent Soleymān Ḵalīfa Torkmān as his envoy to the fort, and he and Malek 'Abdollāh Farāhī again outwitted Malek Ẓarīf. The next day Malek Ẓarīf and his brothers left the fort without telling Malek Maḥmūd and went to see Rostam Mīrzā. When he heard what had happened, Malek Maḥmūd left his men in charge of the defenses. With the greatest reluctance, he went with Malek Shah Ḥoseyn to visit Rostam Mīrzā. Outwardly, Rostam Mīrzā received Malek Maḥmūd with deference and respect; in order to allay his fears, he treated coldly Malek Ẓarīf and his brothers. The same day, Rostam Mīrzā entered the fort, and Malek Maḥmūd extended suitable hospitality to him.

However, a number of ignorant and arrogant *qezelbāš* who were the close companions of Rostam Mīrzā agreed in the course of their drinking bouts with the prince to get rid of Malek Maḥmūd and several others of the royal house of Sīstān; these men, they said, had tasted the delights of governing and had been wrongly brought up to aspire to independence. Even though they professed friendship, they could not be trusted; once they were out of the way, Rostam Mīrzā could annex the province. On the second day, therefore, Malek Maḥmūd, Malek Nāṣer al-Dīn, Malek Ẓarīf, and a number of other *maleks* and their sons were arrested. A few days later, all were put to death with the exception of Malek Maḥmūd and one or two of his kinsmen, who remained in custody. Rostam Mīrzā then sent a detachment of troops against Malek Jalāl al-Dīn at the fortress of Fatḥ.

One night, Malek Shah Ḥoseyn and his brother Malek ʿAlī broke their chains and escaped from prison, and by good fortune made contact with a group of Sīstānīs who had come to try and rescue them. They made for the Sīstān islands, and took refuge among the Zarahī clan. Rostam Mīrzā had thus frightened off the wild Sīstānīs, who have to be tamed by offering them kindness and generosity. Some ten thousand men gathered around Malek Shah Ḥoseyn, and he sent a thousand men to Fatḥ to the assistance of Malek Jalāl al-Dīn. Rostam Mīrzā's men were defeated and fled. On receiving this news, Rostam Mīrzā put that fine man Malek Maḥmūd to death. The next day, Malek Jalāl al-Dīn and the other Sīstānī *maleks* arrived with the army from Zarah. They drove Rostam Mīrzā across the Hīrmand in the direction of Sarāyān, where he was again defeated and pushed back to Zamīn Dāvar. His troops straggled back across the Hīrmand and rejoined him near Pošta-zāda. Malek Jalāl al-Dīn and the other *maleks* took up the reins of government in Sīstān without opposition from their kinsmen who shared the government of that province with them.

Rostam Mīrzā's failure in Sīstān lost him the support of those *qezelbāš* from Khorasan who had urged him to make a bid for the governorship of that province. They found him lacking in the wisdom, magnanimity, and ambition necessary in a ruler. Rostam Mīrzā, cut down to size, lost all prestige. In Zamīn Dāvar, he was subjected to repeated attacks by the Uzbegs, and no help reached him from Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. He withdrew to Qalāt and Hezārajāt, and stayed six months at Qalāt.

While he was absent from the fort on a hunting expedition, the Bayāt *ğāzīs* who formed the garrison wanted to seize control of the fort on behalf of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, but they were foiled by

Rostam Mīrzā's mother, who closed the gates of the citadel and set the eunuchs and workers of the royal workshops to mount guard there. At this juncture, one of the Bayāt soldiers fired his musket at Rostam Mīrzā's mother and killed her. Rostam Mīrzā returned from his hunting expedition and managed to slip into the citadel. The Bayāts abandoned their attempt to seize the citadel and expressed their contrition at the death of the prince's mother, but Rostam Mīrzā executed most of them in revenge for her death and because they had rebelled against him.

Rostam Mīrzā then took stock of his situation, and did not like what he saw. His supporters had dispersed; the Uzbegs were in the ascendant in the area; and he was frightened of his brother. Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. He decided to go to India, and went first to the province of Bhakkar, where he found the governor, Mīrzā Jānī Beg Arḡūn, in revolt against the emperor and threatened by a punitive expedition sent against him by the latter. Rostam Mīrzā urged the governor to return to his allegiance, and together they set off toward the capital. There, Rostam Mīrzā was received in audience by the Emperor, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, who allotted to him initially as a fief the district of Moltān, and subsequently appointed him to a variety of governorships within the Mogul empire.

That wise and astute monarch, in order to win over Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and get his hands on Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar, loaded Rostam Mīrzā with such honors that eventually Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā thought it would be a good idea if he went to India too. The Uzbegs were in full control of Khorasan, where Dīn Moḥammad Sultan and Bāqī Sultan, the sons of Jānī Beg Sultan the nephew of 'Abdollāh Khan the ruler of Turkestan, had orders to subjugate that province. On numerous occasions Uzbeg raiders made incursions into the regions of Kandahar and Sīstān, and Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn fought many engagements against them. In most of these engagements the *qezelbāš* were victorious, but nevertheless the borders of his realm were exposed to the constant attacks of these raiders, and many of the *qezelbāš* chiefs and seasoned troops formerly in the employ of his father, Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, had been killed in battle.

Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā therefore thought he had little choice but to follow his brother to India. It was true that, after Rostam Mīrzā had left, 'Abdollāh Khan, the ruler of Turkestan, had sent an ambassador with gifts and a conciliatory letter to the effect that, although hostilities between the Uzbegs and the *qezelbāš*, between the people of Tūrān and the people of Iran, were traditional, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn had no need to fear him, for he felt nothing but love and friendship toward him. He should give up his plan to go to India, for it was not proper for him to abandon his father's seat of government to the house of Čağatāy.[10] In view of the constantly hostile relations between the Uzbegs and himself, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā distrusted 'Abdollāh Khan's words, and he was filled with alarm. The avarice of the Turkish mercantile elements in Kandahar, who could think of nothing but profits from Indian cloth and the accumulation of gold, finally disillusioned Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and destroyed his interest in governing the province of Kandahar.

At this point, Qarā Beg Kūrčā'ī, an old retainer of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who had fled to India before the time of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and had been made an emir and master of the royal falcons,[11] arrived at Kandahar. Qarā Beg had made a commitment to his master, the Mogul emperor, to bring Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā to the Mogul court and to secure the annexation to the Mogul empire of the province of Kandahar. He dangled before Moẓaffar the emperor's promises and, in the guise of a well-wisher and loyal servant of the family, enlisted the support of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's mother and others who had influence with the prince. His wily stratagems increased the force of the arguments already presented, and the prince resolved to go to India. First, he sent his mother and eldest son; subsequently, after the exchange of further letters and covenants, he set out for India.

Emperor Akbar appointed as governor of Kandahar Šāhī Beg Khan Kābolī, the governor of Bangeš, a leading emir who held the rank of commander of five thousand, who at that moment was at Moltān. As soon as he heard that Qarā Beg had successfully discharged his mission at Kandahar, he went there by forced marches with ten thousand men and lavished even more compliments on Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā on behalf of the emperor, and made him splendid promises. The Safavid prince evacuated the fort, and Šāhī Beg Khan entered Kandahar in the year 1000/1591-92.

After Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā had pitched his tent outside the city, he reviewed his *qezelbāš* troops. Although in the twelve years or so which had elapsed since the death of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā[12] these troops had experienced all sorts of vicissitudes, and few emirs and veterans had survived, the Safavid prince saw before him a numerous and well-turned-out body of men, and he was overcome with remorse at his action. At one stroke he had deprived himself of a fair province, the envy of Tibet and China, where he had been born and raised, and had fallen from the position of ruler and governor to that of servant. But the die was cast, and remorse was of no avail.

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[10] By "the house of Čağatay" is meant the Moguls; 'Abdollāh Khan was descended from the house of Jočī.

[11] *Qūšḵāna* in Safavid parlance was the royal falconry. The office of *qūšbegīgarī* is therefore equivalent to master of the royal falcons.

A prey to melancholy and vain thoughts, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā devoted his energies to entertaining Šāhī Beg and the Čağatāy emirs and to showing them the usual courtesies. He sent a messenger to them inviting them to come out of the city and be his guests for a day, so that they might discuss certain necessary matters face to face. The prince had the crazy notion that, on some pretext or other, he might be able to get himself back into the citadel. But Šāhī Beg was an old soldier, and was not about to jeopardize an operation he had handled successfully so far. He paid no attention to the prince's message, and excused himself from coming. He had entered the citadel at an auspicious hour, he said, and so it would be inappropriate for him to leave it again. If the prince had urgent matters to discuss, the discussion could be carried on by correspondence. Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā knew that the game was up; after a formal exchange of gifts, he marched away to India. On arrival at the Mogul court, he was loaded with favors, styled "my son" by the emperor, and given splendid fiefs. In return, he presented the emperor with gifts—precious gems and jewelry, whatever he had.

The situation in India, however, was not at all congenial to the prince, and his relations with the emperor deteriorated. He did not perform the required ritual of obeisance and prostration like the other princes, and he began to neglect his fiefs. The emperor noticed his disaffection, was angered by it, and resolved to humble him. The prince hankered more and more after Iran and the service of the Safavid crown. He applied for permission to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca, but this was refused. Finally, he fell sick and died in India, in the year 1008/1599-1600. He left three sons there: Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā; Esma'il Mīrzā; Bahrām Mīrzā.

Rostam Mīrzā, who was more worldly, was able to come to terms with his fate, and adapted himself well to his subservient role. He cultivated close relations with Ḵān-e Ḵānān, the son of Beyrām Khan Torkmān, who had a number of kinsmen among the *qezelbāš*, and from time to time he was appointed to some office through the good offices of the latter. After the death of Emperor Akbar and the accession of his son Salīm Shah, he continued to be in favor. Of his younger brothers, Abū Sa'īd Mīrzā died in 1005/1596–97, and Sanjar Mīrzā died at the end of the same year. He had a son named Morād Mīrzā, who became the son-in-law of Ḵān-e Ḵānān, and several other sons. Today, in the year 1025/1616–17, Rostam Mīrzā, his sons, and the sons of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, with several of their children, both male and female, are still in India, but at this point their history ceases to be relevant to the history of Iran.

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[12] Actually 16 (lunar) or 14 (solar). Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā died in 984/1576.

To return to events in Sīstān and Malek Jalāl al-Dīn. After Rostam Mīrzā's departure, the Uzbegs harassed Sīstān more than before, and there were frequent conflicts between them and the people of Sīstān. For a time, the *maleks*, the kinsmen of Malek Jalāl al-Dīn, put up a stout defense of their forts and cities, but the Uzbegs gained control of part of the province and strove to capture Malek Jalāl al-Dīn's own fortress. After resisting them for a while, Malek Jalāl al-Dīn left a garrison in the fort and marched away via Kerman to present himself to Shah 'Abbas at Isfahan, where he was made a guest at the Shah's private banquets. After a time, he wanted to return to Sīstān and see his children. When he got there, he found that the sons of Jānī Beg Sultan, who had been sent by 'Abdollāh Khan to subjugate Sīstān, had complete control of the province, and he was powerless to do anything. He was too impatient to wait for the Shah to march to Khorasan, so he took his sons and went to Kandahar. He was thinking of going to India and entering the service of Emperor Akbar when he heard that the Shah was marching to Khorasan.

After the Shah had recovered Khorasan and was encamped at Herat, Malek Jalāl al-Dīn visited him there from Kandahar. He was given the rank of khan and made governor of Sīstān, a post he still holds. The author obtained these details from reliable local sources, but the responsibility for them rests with the transmitter.

The Battle of Ozḡand in the District of Toršīz between the Qezelbāš Emirs and Yatīm Sultan Uzbeg and His Brothers, and the Rout of the Qezelbāš

As previously related, some of the emirs of Khorasan had fallen from the Shah's favor. Of these, Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa went to Qā'en, fought with and killed the lawful governor, 'Alīqolī Khan Ostājlū, and took over the governorship, declaring himself to be a supporter of Rostam Mīrzā. Another, Soleymān Ḵalīfa, went to Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar, and Eslām Beg Šāmlū, and *qezelbāš* of every rank who found themselves in difficulties as a result of the Uzbeg onslaughts on Khorasan, followed him to those parts, thinking to find a safe retreat there. Until these emirs arrived, relations were peaceful between the two brothers; Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā held Kandahar, and Rostam Mīrzā only Zamīn Dāvar. The emirs incited Rostam Mīrzā to think of governing Khorasan, with the results already described.

Soleymān Ḵalīfa obtained from Rostam Mīrzā letters of appointment and documents designed to win over the emirs concerned, making appointments throughout Khorasan. Armed with these, he set off for Khorasan. He went to the district of Tūn and Jonābod, which was his tribal district. Meanwhile Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa had seized Qā'en. Both men gathered around them an army from among the *qezelbāš* who were drifting around in Khorasan. They summoned Moṣṭafā Khan, the lawfully appointed governor of Ṭabas, and aimed at recovering some of the areas of Khorasan over which the Uzbegs had not yet established firm control—areas in which the forts were still in the hands of the local population and nobles. They marched to Toršīz, where they were joined by various Šāmlū, Ostājlū, Turkman, and Qājār emirs (these last being the sons of Qobād Khan) and their men—some four thousand troops in all—and by local militia drawn from the supporters of the *qezelbāš* in Khorasan. This force marched against the fort of Karāt near Toršīz, which was held by Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan Uzbeg. After about six weeks, the commandant surrendered on terms. But after he and his men had left the fort, the *qezelbāš* broke their covenant, pursued the Uzbegs, and slew many of them. Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan escaped and joined Yatīm Sultan and his brothers, who were in Khorasan on orders from 'Abdollāh Khan.

The *qezelbāš* emirs next marched against Ozḡand, held by Mīr Moḥammad Qāsem Ozḡandī, but Yatīm Sultan, having summoned assistance from Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš at Herat, went to its relief with a large force. There was some disagreement among the *qezelbāš*, some of whom questioned the wisdom of campaigning in an area on which the Uzbegs had set covetous eyes and in which the Uzbegs were lying in wait for them. However, when they realized that Yatīm

Sultan's force numbered no more than two thousand men, they were encouraged to fight a pitched battle. The Uzbeg charge drove back the *qezelbāš* skirmishers, and then routed the *qezelbāš* right wing and drove it back against the center, which wavered and then broke and fled. The *qezelbāš* left wing, which had held firm, was unable to fight on alone, and joined in the general flight. Soleymān Ḵalīfa, who was a large and heavy man, was unseated from his horse during the retreat and slain by the Uzbegs.

Sultan 'Alī Ḵalīfa escaped to Qā'en, but feeling insecure there, he decided to make for his base, which was in the Ṭabas district. He was overtaken by the Uzbegs at the fort of Āvīz, about halfway between Qā'en and Ṭabas, and was defeated and slain. Būdāq Sultan Torkmān survived this battle and fled to Yazd. Since he had been guilty of various misdemeanors in Khorasan, he was afraid of the wrath of Shah 'Abbas. He decided to return to Khorasan with the intention of offering his services to the Uzbegs, but he too was intercepted and killed by the Uzbegs. Mahdīqolī Sultan Qādemlū Ostājlū and Moḥammad Sultan the brother of Soleymān Ḵalīfa were killed in the battle at Ozḡand. 'Alīqolī Sultan Āsāyeš-oḡlū went to India, and Moṣṭafā Khan succeeded in making his way to Ṭabas with most of his men. He defended that district for a time, and then moved to Tūn.

Since the Uzbegs considered him an adversary to be reckoned with, Yatīm Sultan marched against him with four thousand men and blockaded him in the town. Moṣṭafā Khan had with him some skilled Ḵorāsānī musketeers, and the Uzbegs wanted to lure him out of his fortifications into the open plain. A feinted withdrawal achieved their purpose; Moṣṭafā Khan went in pursuit, and the Uzbegs suddenly wheeled and attacked. Moṣṭafā Khan put up a stout defense, but was overwhelmed by the main Uzbeg force under Yatīm Sultan, taken prisoner, and put to death at the order of the latter. Many *qezelbāš* lost their lives, and the disloyal emirs met a fitting end.

Because of their disloyalty, they had received no support from the Shah. But the Shah was grieved at the death of Moṣṭafā Khan, a valiant and loyal officer who, because of his courage and devotion to duty, had shared the fate of the others. The Shah therefore gave the post of governor of Ṭabas to one of his kinsmen, Tīmūr Sultan. But he was unable to assert his authority over the Ṭabas district, and so he was replaced by Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, a wise and courageous officer, who succeeded in bringing the region under his control and administering it until the Shah's victorious campaign in Khorasan. The author obtained the details of these events from persons who took part in these various battles.

This year, Kadam 'Alī Sultan Kānom died at Qazvin; she was well into her seventies. She was the sister[15] of Mūsa Sultan Mowṣellū, the wife of Shah Tahmasp, and the mother of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. Shah 'Abbas had always treated his grandmother with great respect. Shortly before Shah Tahmasp's death, she had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. One of her monuments was the hospice at Koškrūd, which was completed during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah.

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[15] *TAAA*, i, 125 describes Sultan Moḥammad Shah's mother as the daughter of Mūsā Sultan. She was also the mother of Shah Esma'il II.

The Events of the Year of the Horse, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1003/1594-95, the Eighth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

With the arrival of spring, the Shah's thoughts turned to a hunting expedition in Gīlān, the most pleasant part of Iran at that time of year. Farhād Khan, the governor of Gīlān, was sent on ahead to make the necessary preparations for the reception of the royal party. The Shah made a leisurely journey to Gīlān, stopping for several days en route near Manjīl and Ḳarzavīl, two villages in the Ṭārom district. These villages are situated on the slopes of the mountains, the houses being built on top of one another. Around the villages are numerous gardens, and springs of clear, sweet water, emanating from the upper slopes of the mountains, come together in a single channel. In the springtime, the abundance of blossom and the scent of herbs make this a delightful place. For several days the Shah made merry, and high and low joined in the conviviality; the air resounded with the strains of music and song. The Shah went on to Kūhdom, where he was welcomed by Farhād Khan and the people of Gīlān. Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Kūhdom, was received in audience; he exerted himself to the utmost in his role as host, and distributed generous allowances and bonuses among the royal troops. The next day, the Shah went on through the Gūka district to Lāhījān, where Farhād Khan acted as host and presented gifts to the Shah, the emirs, and the principal officers of state.

Before the royal cavalcade arrived, 'Alī Khan, the governor of western Gīlān, who had been reinstated in his post at the request of Farhād Khan, again revealed that tendency to rebellion that was inherent in his nature. Breaking his covenant with Farhād Khan, he collected armed men and sent the Safavid tax collectors back empty-handed. When the Shah arrived, he maintained his rebellious attitude and did not present himself. In Gaskar also, Amīra Moẓaffar, the brother of Emir Sīāvoš, adopted a hostile stance. The Shah ordered some contingents of the royal army to deal with the rebels, and Farhād Khan, who felt responsible for the situation since he had recommended the appointment of 'Alī Khan, at his own request was placed in charge of the expedition. A contingent of one thousand foot musketeers, who had arrived from Isfahan, was placed at his disposal under the command of Alpān Beg Qājār, an aide-de-camp. Ẕu'l-

Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū, the *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan, was ordered to march with his auxiliary troops via Āstārā and Ṭavāleš to Gaskar, to sweep that region clean of rebels, to arrest Amīra Moẓaffar, their ringleader, and then to proceed against 'Alī Khan. The Shah himself remained at Lāhījān, enjoying the hunting.

Mīr 'Abbas, the governor of Lešta Nešā, and Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Kūhdom, accompanied Farhād Khan to western Gīlān, and Kīā Farīdūn, that loyal servitor, went with the Shah on a boar-hunting expedition. The governors of Gīlān used to go every year to a certain spot in the forests to hunt boar, this occasion being known as the bell hunt. It is an astonishing sight, as the author can testify, since he accompanied the expedition. The Shah slew with his arrows some ten or fifteen boar, each the size of an ox, and displayed a degree of daring and courage that amazed the onlookers.

As everyone knows the people of Gīlān are dim-witted, ignorant, and improvident. They are treacherous and disloyal by nature, and are totally lacking in generosity and magnanimity. The common people are seditious to such a degree that, even when they are ruled by an independent sultan, some farmer's son has only to take to the forests in revolt for everyone to flock to his standard. On the first day, an enormous group gathers round him, but, on the very same day, either because there is some simple matter to be attended to, or because they hear a rumor from some ignorant fellow who does not even know what he is supposed to be doing himself, they disperse and pay the penalty for their folly. The next day, they are capable of repeating the whole performance. Even though they know they will pay the penalty for their actions the next day, they live for today and simply do not take thought for the morrow. For the sake of being king for a day, they are ready to destroy themselves. Two friends, though they be aware of the obligations which derive from having eaten each other's salt, are constantly at loggerheads, each imagining that the other has inflicted some injury on him. There are innumerable instances of this sort of behavior in the history of Gīlān—perhaps it is something to do with the climate! Every few days some governor aspires to be an independent ruler; if he succeeds in slaying the local chiefs by treachery, the flames of rebellion sweep the province from end to end. Prudence dictates that one should avoid having dealings with such a people.

Anyway, for the purposes of this hunting expedition, it was arranged that some ten thousand Gīlānīs (about whose characteristics I have just said a few words), should proceed on foot into the mountains and organize a *battue;* some of the men were to act as beaters, to drive the game into an area around which barricades had been erected to prevent the animals from escaping; others were sent off into the densely forested valleys to rouse the game by sounding their horns and firing their muskets.

When all was ready, the Shah set off with a small group of *moqarrabs* from the court and Gīlānī nobles, and spent the night at a place called Malāt, the site of a former Zoroastrian burial ground in the days of the ancient rulers of Gīlān. It is in the foothills, oranges are plentiful there, and it is one of the most pleasant spots in Gīlān. The next day, the Shah proceeded to the hunting site; when the royal party entered the valleys, the musketeers were ordered to go about their business. The whole area rang with the sound of horns, and smoke from the muskets drifted across the trees. The Shah charged fearlessly to and fro, with a disregard for his personal safety that alarmed more prudent souls, for caution is an important quality in kings. However, God had inspired in both friend and foe alike such awe of the Shah that no one dared plan any act of treachery against him, and he, placing his trust in God, felt anxiety on the score of the throng around him. On another occasion, the Shah and two companions seated themselves in a sailing boat, at the mercy of some improvident Gīlānī fishermen, and crossed the Safīd-rūd[1] near its mouth. Once across the other side, the Shah had no one to help him in an emergency, but he walked around for a long time, until eventually a group of *moqarrabs* and personal retainers commandeered some skiffs from other Gīlānī fishermen and crossed the river to join him.

After several days spent in hunting and pleasure trips along the shore of the Caspian Sea, the Shah returned to Lāhījān. At this juncture, one of the officers of Amīra Sīāvoš, the governor of Gaskar, who was still in jail, came to the Shah and reported that his master thought he could escape by inciting his brother and sons to rebel against the Shah, and was in secret correspondence with his brother to this end. The informant brought one of the letters to prove his case. The Shah at once gave orders for the execution of Amīra Sīāvoš, and also of the informant, because the latter, although he professed to be motivated by loyalty to the Shah, doubtless had some secret motive (being a Gīlānī), and in any case had betrayed his master.

[1] The Safīd-rūd rises in Kurdestan, flows north into Azerbaijan, then turns east into Gīlān, and finally empties into the Caspian Sea west of Lāhījān.

Since two months had elapsed since New Year's Day and the weather was becoming uncomfortably hot, the Shah returned to Qazvin. Before he left, he bestowed tokens of his favor on loyal Gīlānī nobles, in particular Kīā Farīdūn, who received magnificent robes of honor, and a bejeweled hat and belt.

The Rebellion of 'Alī Khan in Gīlān, the Dispatch of a Punitive Expedition against Him, and the Capture of That Misguided Man and a Number of Other Troublemakers

After 'Alī Khan, through the good offices of Farhād Khan, had been reappointed governor of western Gīlān, the soldiers of that region, who are distinguished by their bravery above men from other parts of Gīlān, soon succeeded in persuading him to depart from the path of obedience. Relying on the fact that he possessed large quantities of money and property, and on the shaky promises of Gīlānīs, he broke his covenant with Farhād Khan. When the Shah came to Gīlān he did not present himself before him, but mobilized his troops, vainly thinking he could oppose the royal army. He blocked all the forest paths and river crossings with barricades, heedless of the fact that a sparrow cannot elude the falcon's grasp.

Hardly had Farhād Khan's punitive force crossed the Safīd-rūd when panic struck 'Alī Khan's men and commanders. They began to desert and present themselves to Farhād Khan. As the royal army proceeded on its way, anyone who was slow in coming forward had his money confiscated and his property plundered. 'Alī Khan himself fled to Fūmen, the ancestral home of his family, but the people there refused to help him. He despaired of receiving assistance from Amīra Mo̤ẓaffar, who had his own problems, since the army of Azerbaijan was in hot pursuit of him. So, he planned to gather up his cash, his jewels, and his precious stuffs, and take ship and flee from Gīlān. But this plan was thwarted because Farhād Khan had stationed guards along the seashore. 'Alī Khan retired to his birthplace, a place called Zarmoḵ in the district of Fūmen.

Most of the inhabitants were for giving him sanctuary, and he retired with a few companions to a mountainous region so densely forested that the rays of the sun could hardly penetrate between the trees. But the unrelenting search for him went on, and Farhād Khan, having received a report of his whereabouts, surrounded the area with troops who proceeded to comb the difficult terrain on foot. Periodically, there were clashes between his men and those of 'Alī Khan, who changed his hiding place every night. This went on for two months. On several occasion, the *gāzīs* actually caught up with 'Alī Khan and slew many of his companions, but each time he succeeded in escaping.

Meanwhile, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan was advancing from Azerbaijan and Amīra Moẓaffar, together with the sons of Amīra Sīāvoš and the men of Gaskar, prepared for battle. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan routed them with heavy losses and plundered their possessions. Amīra Moẓaffar and his companions tried to escape but found every road barred to them; they too took to the forests. Many women and children in Gaskar were taken prisoner. Those men who survived the battle joined Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan in order to save their families. Amīra Moẓaffar and his nephews were eventually surrounded and taken prisoner, and Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan made contact with Farhād Khan.

Farhād Khan's men, closing in on 'Alī Khan, made his position in the forests untenable. One night, 'Alī Khan slipped out of the forests with a few of his close companions like Kāmrān, made his way to a village, and took refuge in a house belonging to an ordinary citizen who, with a magnanimity foreign to most Gīlānīs, agreed to shelter him. Meanwhile, the *gāzīs* went on fruitlessly searching the forests. It never entered their heads that their quarry was hiding in a house because Safavid troops were billeted in most of the houses; furthermore, they did not think the villagers would dare to shelter him.

After a long and weary search, the *gāzīs* ferreted him out, and 'Alī Khan was forced to leave the house and once again take to the forests. The *gāzīs* were ready for him, but 'Alī Khan's men wounded several *gāzīs* and killed others with their volleys of arrows. The *gāzīs* pressed their attack, and one of the Turkman *qūrčīs*, Ḥeydar Beg Delī-oḡlū, fought his way through to 'Alī Khan on foot and clung to the bridle of his horse, even though mortally wounded by two arrows from 'Alī Khan's companion, Kāmrān. Kāmrān rushed at him and slashed him several times with his sword, but Ḥeydar Beg still held on. Finally, his grip slackened as death claimed him, and 'Alī Khan was released. But Ḥeydar Beg's action had given other *gāzīs* time to come up behind 'Alī Khan and Kāmrān and pinion their arms, and one by one their other companions were also taken prisoner.

When Farhād Khan sent the prisoners, together with Amīra

Moẓaffar and his nephews, to the Shah, he was loaded with favors. The man who seized 'Alī Khan received a robe of honor, a jeweled sword belt, a turban jewel, and fifty thousand Köpekī *dīnārs*, the equivalent of fifty Iraqi *tomān*. In recognition of Ḥeydar Beg's heroism, his dependents were singled out for special favor. Abdāl Sultan Qājār was made governor of Gaskar.

Farhād Khan and Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan returned with the Shah in triumph to Qazvin, where the royal army was welcomed, on the Shah's orders, by the whole populace. All the riffraff of the city turned out, including clowns and circus performers with their drums, and a great throng gathered in front of the Čehel Sotūn portico of the palace. The prisoners were censured by the Shah and placed in the custody of the *dārūğa* of Qazvin, Shaikh Aḥmad Aqa, who took them to the fortress-prison of Alamūt a few days later. The Shah spared the life of Kāmrān, in view of the fact that his crimes were attributable to his loyalty to his master 'Alī Khan, removed his fetters, dressed him in a robe of honor, and enrolled him in the ranks of his personal retainers. Glory be to God! What an extraordinary change of fortune! Everyone expected that, since Kāmrān was the prime mover behind 'Alī Khan's rebellion, the Shah would make an example of him!

The Capture of the Rest of the Gīlānī Rebels

In eastern Gīlān, the arch-rebels Bū Sa'īd and Ṭālesa Kūlī were still at large. From time to time the Shah sent letters to them offering pardon and restoration of royal favor if they would submit and present themselves to him. After some time had elapsed, Bū Sa'īd visited Kīā Farīdūn at Lāhījān and tried to persuade him to act as intermediary for him. Kīā Farīdūn at once reported this to the Shah, who warned him to be on his guard against treachery on the part of Bū Sa'īd, and instructed him to send his guest to Qazvin as soon as possible. Kīā Farīdūn prepared what Bū Sa'īd needed for the journey and, in order to reassure him, said he himself would take him to Qazvin. However, as the Shah had predicted, Bū Sa'īd was plotting treachery; awaiting his chance, he slew Kīā Farīdūn and retreated again into the forests with a few companions.

Shah 'Abbas sent the *dārūğa* of Qazvin, Shaikh Aḥmad Aqa, to Gīlān to enlist the support of the people in tracing Bū Sa'īd and Ṭālesa Kūlī. Recognisances were taken from property owners, district by district, that they would not give the rebels a night's shelter but would seize them wherever they might be found and hand them over to the local governor. A detachment of troops under the command of Qanbar Beg Gözü-büyüklü was also dispatched via Kūhdom to search for Ṭālešа Kūlī. After an intensive search, Bū Sa'īd was arrested by the Sufi *ḡāzīs* and the retainers of Valī Sultan, the governor of Rānekūh. Ṭālešа Kūlī and several of his nephews and other kinsmen were caught by the people of Kūhdom, retainers of Ḥoseyn Khan Kūhdomī. The prisoners were then sent to Qazvin. Bū Sa'īd was put to death for his treacherous murder of Kīā Farīdūn and because he could not be trusted, but Ṭālešа Kūlī and his kinsmen were pardoned.

Later, Ṭālešа Kūlī wrote to some of his supporters who had escaped arrest, urging them to be steadfast in their rebellion and not to submit to the *qezelbāš*. After this act of treachery, his supporters were hunted down and put to death by Mīr 'Abbas, who now found himself the only surviving Gīlānī emir and, in his folly, had pretensions to being the military governor of Lāhījān. This aspiration led to his death. One night, when the Shah was walking in the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād at Qazvin, admiring the lights, one of the *moqarrabs*, Malek Jahāngīrī Kojūrī, got drunk, drew his sword, and made passes at spectators, sometimes in jest, sometimes in all seriousness. Coming upon Mīr 'Abbas, he inflicted several wounds on him and killed him. After that, he dispatched Ḵāja Sultan Maḥmūd, the brother of Ḵāja Ḥosām al-Dīn the *vakīl* of Khan Aḥmad, who had originally gone to Istanbul and had stirred up revolt in Gīlān. These attacks were generally attributed to the *moqarrab's* drunkenness and craziness, but thinking men saw the hand of the Shah in this. After the death of Mīr 'Abbas, no one of stature remained in Gīlān.

Some Events That Occurred after the Capture of 'Alī Khan and the Other Gīlān Rebels

After his return to Qazvin, the Shah ordered the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād to be decorated with lights, and the aide-de-camp, Alpān Beg Qājār, was detailed to see to this. The shops fronting on the Meydān were divided up among the emirs, principal officers of state, centurions, *qūrčīs*, attendants at court, townspeople, and the merchants who provided supplies to the royal army. The Shah ordered every man to construct, in front of the shop allotted to him, a portico twelve meters deep, supported on wooden pillars, and to hang lights and lanterns on these, so that every store would be decorated with upward of one thousand lamps and lanterns. All around the Meydān-e

Sa'ādatābād were placed lamps and candles, and the Shah spent several nights in the residences he had built in the southwest corner of Meydān so that he could enjoy the scene and take part in polo matches, shooting contests, and other pastimes. Then, refreshed by the celebrations and by his contact with the crowds in the Meydān, he returned to deal with matters of state.

When the posts of governor of Lāhījān and *amīr al-omarā* of Gīlān were conferred on Darvīš Moḥammad Khan Rūmlū, Farhād Khan was given instead the governorship of Fārs. In most of the provinces under the jurisdiction of the officers of the Safavid state, matters had now been settled in accordance with the Shah's intent; headstrong governors had been removed from office and replaced by the Shah's own protégés. But the provinces of Kūh Gīlūya and Ḵūzestān, which had been governed by Afšār emirs, had been in a fairly constant state of disorder. During the troubles that attended the accession of Shah 'Abbas, local chiefs had taken advantage of the situation to reassert their authority there. Although they had declared their allegiance to the Shah, the latter was not certain of their loyalty, particularly in the case of the commandants of the extremely strong fortress of Salāsel near Šūštar, because they did not obey the Shah's commands in a manner that was altogether satisfactory. In addition, Mīr Mobārak, the independent governor of 'Arabestān, had been guilty of various acts of impropriety.

The Shah therefore decided to take an expedition to Ḵūzestān and Kūh Gīlūya to restore order there. The Afšārs, who were fully conscious of their sins, took stock of their position and established contacts with Mīr Mobārak as being a person with whom they could take refuge in case of need. The Shah sent Morād Beg Šāmlū, the *jelowdārbāšī*,[2] to take the good news to Ḵūzestān of the Shah's impending expedition, to ascertain the situation on that frontier, and to capture the citadel of Šūštar. Šāhverdī Khan Afšār, the governor of Šūštar, against the advice of his officers, came forward loyally, welcomed Morād Beg, handed over to him the keys of the citadel, and expressed his willingness to leave the fort. Morād Beg kept him within the fort, encouraging him to entertain hopes of royal favor, and expelled the rest of his men. But eventually, nervous of Afšār strength, he put Šāhverdī Khan to death.

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[2] An officer under the orders of the *amīr-āḵorbāšī*, the master of the king's stables. See *TM*, p. 120, which renders *jelowdārbāšī* as "first equerry in permanent attendance on the king."

The Afšārs reacted violently to the execution of their leader. They sought assistance from Mīr Mobārak, while Morād Beg stationed his musketeers on the walls of the citadel and prepared to defend himself. Although Mīr Mobārak had professed his allegiance to the Safavid dynasty and had sent his son, Nāṣer, to court as an earnest of his good faith, he marched from ʻArabestān to Ḵūzestān,[3] occupied Dezfūl, and laid siege to Šūštar.

In the meantime, Šāhverdī Khan ʻAbbāsī had made a sudden raid against Sultan Ḥoseyn, his cousin, who was the governor of Lorestān, and had killed him, with the object of once again making himself master of Lorestān. For fear of the Shah's wrath he had not dared to reveal this purpose openly, but was making rather convulsive movements along the borders of Lorestān. The Shah therefore decided to lead an expedition there to restore order in the area. His advisers submitted that it was not necessary for him to go in person. The Shah accepted their advice and appointed to command the expedition Ḥātem Beg and Farhād Khan, with orders to pacify the whole area from Borūjerd to the farthest reaches of ʻArabestān. A number of the great emirs were detailed to go on this expedition: Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, Nadr Khan the keeper of the seal, and others, and various centurions and *qūrčīs* were also ordered to join. The Shah paid a visit to Kashan and Isfahan, and returned to Qazvin for the winter.

The Successful Expedition to Ḵūzestān and ʻArabestān, under the Command of the Eʻtemād al-dowla and Farhād Khan

When the *eʻtemād al-dowla* and Farhād Khan marched from Qazvin to Ḵorramābād, Šāhverdī Khan ʻAbbāsī hastened to send an envoy to them assuring them of his allegiance to the throne, expressing regret for his past actions, and asking them to intercede with the Shah for a royal pardon. The emirs, in order not unduly to alarm the independent governor of ʻArabestān and the governors of Kūh Gīlūya, thought it best to offer him the hope of pardon, so that again he might be appointed to the governorship of Lorestān. They therefore issued a conciliatory order, gave him assurances of receiving royal favor, and asked for a meeting with him. But Šāhverdī Khan was too frightened to meet them. After further negotiation, Farhād Khan and the *eʿtemād al-dowla,* accompanied by a number of unarmed men, met the Khan at the tomb of a celebrated local holy man; the Khan, who brought two hundred men with him, pledged his fealty to the Shah with binding oaths. If the Shah forgave his acts of rebellion, he said, he would not depart from the path of loyal service for the rest of his life. The *eʿtemād al-dowla* and Farhād Khan, although they knew his pledges were worthless, for reasons of policy accepted them at their face value, encouraged him to hope for royal favor, and reappointed him governor of Lorestān. They evacuated the fortress at Ḵorramābād and handed it over to him. In gratitude for these marks of royal favor, the Khan agreed to send a gift of one thousand *tomān* to the supreme *dīvān,* and suitable gifts to the principal officers of state.

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[3] ʻArabestān, in common usage, is synonymous with Ḵūzestān. The author is acknowledging here a de facto division between the area ruled by the Mošaʻšaʻ *seyyeds*, whose seat of government was Ḥavīza on the Karḵa River, and the eastern part of the province, the region along the Kārūn River, which was nominally under direct Safavid control.

After settling the affairs of Lorestān in this fashion, the emirs marched to Šūštar via Kūtal Kīālān, a route which they chose, despite its difficulty, because of its shortness; few armies traveled this route. When the emirs entered Ḵūzestān, a group of Seyyed Mobārak's men who were at Dezfūl fell back on Šūštar, but the *seyyed* evacuated that city and retired to Ḥavīza and Kamālābād, his seats of government. The Safavid army camped near Šūštar, and Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū, on orders from the Shah, took over the government of that province. It was now the turn of Seyyed Mobārak to send an ambassador to the emirs to open negotiations with them and to pledge his fealty to the Safavid house. As evidence of his loyalty, he pointed to the fact that, a few years previously, he had sent his son Nāṣer to the Safavid court as a hostage. He said that the evil actions and injustices of Morād Aqā the *jelowdār* had been the cause of his coming to Šūštar, and he asked for pardon.

The emirs had orders from the Shah that, if the *seyyed* asked for pardon and pledged his allegiance, he was to receive pardon, partly because he was a *seyyed,* partly because he was a natural Shiʿite, and partly because policy dictated that he should not be unmasked at this time, since the Shah had enemies enough already. So the *seyyed*'s sins too were forgiven, and Seyyed Mobārak also was offered a royal pardon. He was told that his willingness to meet the emirs would be a test of his sincerity. Seyyed Mobārak was extremely apprehensive, but after a further exchange of ambassadors, the emirs, confident in their ability to deal with the Arabs in case of trouble went with a small detachment of *qezelbāš* a few *farsaḵs* in the direction of Ḥavīza. Such was the degree of his fear that Seyyed Mobārak met them with his whole army.

The emirs pointed out to the *seyyed* his misdemeanors and told him that the Shah had agreed to pardon him only because he was a *seyyed* and descended from the house of the Prophet and of ʿAlī, and because of his own innate predilection for Shi‘ism. "If you mend your ways," they said, "and demonstrate your loyalty and devotion, the governorship of ʿArabestān will be conferred on you on the same terms as before. But if you swerve from this path by so much as a hair's breadth, be assured that your house will be wiped out without trace." Seyyed Mobārak confessed his sins and gratefully accepted pardon for his shortcomings. Henceforth, he said, he would be a faithful servant, and ever seek to do the Shah's will. The Shah's friends, he said, would be his friends, and the Shah's enemies, his enemies. A covenant on these lines was duly drawn up and sworn. He was invested with the royal robe of honor which had been sent for him, and went home rejoicing.

When they had finished dealing with the affairs of that province, the emirs marched from Šūštar toward Kūh Gīlūya, but, because of excessive rainfall and flash floods, they were unable to cross the Šūštar River for about a month. The troops suffered considerably from a shortage of food supplies for themselves and their animals. When the rain finally abated, some of the emirs took their leave, but Farhād Khan and the *e‘temād al-dowla* pressed on with a force composed of emirs, *qūrčīs*, and retainers of the court. When they reached Kūh Gīlūya, Ḥasan Khan, the governor, came out to welcome them with his Afšārs.

Ḥasan Khan had made himself master of the province by force, and had behaved in a very independent manner during the confused situation obtaining there. After the accession of Shah ʿAbbas, he had been guilty of certain improprieties, and his attitude to the Shah was not all that it might have been. He was accordingly now dismissed from his post and, together with a number of his followers who were suspected of seditious activities, arrested, handed over to guards, and sent to court. Emir Khan Afšār, the governor of Kāzerūn, was made governor of Kūh Gīlūya, and the tribal district of Kāzerūn was given to Esma‘il Alplū[4] Afšār. Fines amounting to ten thousand *tomān* were imposed on various of the Baḵtīārī Lors, the Jākī, Javānakī[5], Bandānī, Fahband, Mamasenī, and others because of their rebellious behavior of recent years, and this sum was used to defray the pay and allowances of the *qūrčīs* and court retainers. Having discharged their duties in that province too, the emirs marched to Shiraz and dealt with affairs in Fārs before returning to Qazvin, where they were received in audience by the Shah.

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[4] Alplū (or Ālplū), a clan of the Afšār tribe (*TM*, p. 16).

[5] See "ʿA Curious Episode of Ṣafavid History," in *Iran and Islam*, in memory of the late Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C. E. Bosworth, Edinburgh, 1971, p. 471, n.5.

Miscellaneous Events This Year

One of the events which occurred this year was the flight of Malek Jahāngīr Rostamdārī, the son of Malek Sultan Moḥammad[6] and ruler of Kojūr and Rostamdār. The religious faith of Malek Sultan Moḥammad, his father, had been extremely weak; in fact, as time went on, he had inclined more and more toward heresy, and during the reign of Shah Tahmasp had committed various actions contrary to the canon law of Islam. For instance, he had coveted and married his own niece, who had been promised to his son (after his death, his son Malek Jahāngīr married the companion of his father's bed), and he and his people committed many obscene acts of this kind. The observance of ritual fasts and the performance of the ritual prayers were in abeyance throughout his territories. For this reason, he had fallen from favor with Shah Tahmasp, who sent a punitive force against him under Emāmqolī Khan Ostājlū, the son of Nadr Khan.

Malek Sultan Moḥammad had deceived Emāmqolī Khan, made false protestations of fealty, and asked for a private interview with him. The simple-minded Turk had gone to the rendezvous and had been murdered by Malek Sultan Moḥammad's men. Shah Tahmasp had wanted to send a second expedition against him, but had fallen seriously ill before this could be arranged. Owing to other preoccupations, it was nearly two years before the Shah sent a second punitive expedition under the command of Morād Khan Ostājlū, the most powerful chief in the pro-Sultan Ḥeydar faction. Morād Khan blockaded Malek Sultan Moḥammad in the fortress of Kojūr. After a four-month siege, the fort was on the point of surrendering, when Shah Tahmasp died and Morād Khan raised the siege and joined Pīra Moḥammad Khan in Gīlān, where he was blinded at the order of Esma'il II.

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[6] Malek Sultan Moḥammad reigned from 975-984/1567/8-1576/7, according to Rabino, 146, but the *TAAA* states that Malek Jahāngīr had already succeeded him by the time of Shah Tahmasp's severe illness, which occurred in 982/1574. Shah Tahmasp died two years later, in 984/1576.

During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, things were so chaotic that no one paid any attention to the affairs of Malek Sultan Moḥammad. The latter died early in the reign of Shah 'Abbas, and his son, Malek Jahāngīr, together with the son of Malek 'Azīz the governor of Nūr, who was also named Jahāngīr, presented themselves to the Shah in his summer quarters at Lār and accompanied him to Iraq. When Shah 'Abbas determined on the subjugation of Gīlān, the prince from Nūr, seeing how matters stood, relinquished his hereditary territory and asked the Shah to grant him some place of residence in Iraq, together with a pension, and a place was allotted to him at Sāva. The prince of Kojūr was headstrong and refractory; nevertheless the Shah, for policy reasons, extended his favor to him, made him his companion at banquets and private assemblies, and granted the province of Kojūr to him on the former basis.

At the time when Farhād Khan and the *e'temād al-dowla* returned to Qazvin from 'Arabestān, Malek Jahāngīr, instead of going out to meet them with the rest of the court, turned the head of his Arabian horse (a gift from the Shah!) in the direction of Kojūr and Rostamdār —whether because he had become apprehensive of the Shah's intentions toward him or because he had the deliberate intention of rebelling is not clear. The Shah sent a body of men in pursuit, but they failed to catch up with him. Eventually, a force of *qūrčīs* under the command of the *qūrčībāšī* was sent to Kojūr. Malek Jahāngīr was taken prisoner and his territory incorporated into the Safavid empire, as will be related in detail in the appropriate place.

Another event this year was the arrival of an embassy from Russia, bearing suitable gifts. The ambassador was a trusted Russian emir who brought a letter from the Tsar couched in the friendliest terms. The court, acting in accordance with the dictum, "entertain your guest, even though he be an infidel," welcomed him ceremoniously and with respect.

Also this year there occurred the death of the Ottoman Sultan Morād III, on 4 Jomādā I, 1003/15 January 1595. He had come to the throne in 982/1574. During his reign of twenty-one years, the Ottomans subjugated many provinces of Iran, and Morād III was distinguished among the Ottoman sultans by the strength and vigor of his rule. However, he committed a number of unseemly acts: (1) He violated the peace treaty concluded between Sultan Süleymān and Shah Tahmasp, a treaty which had been sealed with the most solemn oaths, and disturbed the peaceful existence of Muslims by letting slip the hounds of war. (2) He was guilty of a dastardly act that had never been permitted by any previous Islamic sovereign, namely, the carrying off into captivity of Muslim women and children. Many Muslim women and children from Azerbaijan and Šīrvān were taken prisoner during his reign and sold as slaves to Jews and Christians and other infidels. Even some members of the families of *seyyeds* were sold in this way. This vile practice spread from the Ottoman empire to Transoxania and Khorasan, where 'Abdollāh Khan and his son behaved in the same way. In the end, Shah 'Abbas visited his vengeance on the descendants of Morād III and on the Uzbeg khans, and extended his just rule over all the territories which had been ravaged by them—God be praised for that!

Sultan Morād left twenty sons and a number of daughters. At the time of his death, his eldest son, Sultan Moḥammad Khan, was at his provincial seat of government. The rest of his sons were in Istanbul in the royal palace. After Sultan Morād's death, his corpse was placed in snow and kept for ten days within the palace. On the eleventh day, Sultan Moḥammad Khan reached Istanbul. His mother had been a highly respected member of the harem of the dead sulṭan, and he acceded to the throne through the efforts of the chief gardener.[7] The following day he saw to his father's burial, and the same night he had Sultan Morād's other nineteen sons strangled. They were buried alongside their father on 17 Jomādā I, 1003/28 January 1595.

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[7] The chief gardener *(bostānjībāšī)*, "though raised late to Stirrup rank, always remaining inferior to the Standard Bearer, enjoyed in fact greater influence in the palace than any of his fellows, partly because it was under his direction that delinquent officials were put to the question or executed, partly because over two thousand men, employed in many different ways, came under his control" (Gibb and Bowen, i, 84).

Events of the Year of the Sheep, Equivalent to the Muslim Year 1004/1595-96, the Ninth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day occurred this year on Sunday, 10 Rajab 1003/21 March 1595. Shah 'Abbas gave a great banquet in the Čehel Sotūn hall of the palace to celebrate the New Year festival, and this was attended by the foreign rulers and princes who were present at court: Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ḵ̌ārazm; Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān; the son of Seyyed Mobārak, the ruler of 'Arabestān; a number of Georgian princes; and the ambassadors from Russia and other foreign parts. The celebrations went on for several days. The bazaars were decorated, and in the Sa'ādatābād Square, there were polo matches and archery contests. For ten or twelve days, there was a public holiday.

At the conclusion of the holiday, Shah 'Abbas was finally able to turn his attention to Khorasan, the greater part of which had been overrun by the Uzbegs, who were plundering the province from end to end and had even made inroads into Iraq. Because of his preoccupation with other matters, the Shah had hitherto not been able to deal with the Uzbeg infiltration. This year, the Shah decided to send Farhād Khan, who was one of the high-ranking emirs of the Safavid state and had become powerful through the Shah's favor, to the borders of Khorasan. The Shah's intention was that Farhād Khan should constitute a strong bulwark against those who sought to undermine the realm, and should suppress any rebellious activities on the part of the Uzbegs. At the time of his appointment, the districts of Ḵ̌ār, Semnān, Damghan, Besṭām, Fīrūzkūh, Bīārjomand, and Hazārjarīb were added to his existing fiefs. Farroḵ Khan Pornāk, the governor of Damghan and Besṭām, was dismissed from office because he had failed to put up adequate resistance against the Uzbegs the preceding year. His troops were placed at the disposal of Farhād Khan, who was given sweeping powers to order the affairs of Khorasan in whatever manner he considered in the best interest of the state and the faith.

After Farhād Khan had left for Khorasan, the Russian embassy took its leave, loaded with robes of honor and gifts. The Russians were accompanied by an Iranian ambassador, Emāmqolī Beg Pākīza, a Turkman *qūrčī*. They traveled to Russia by ship from Gīlān.

About June 1595, when Farhād Khan was in summer quarters at

Fīrūzkūh, he received reports that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had laid siege to the fortress at Esfarā'īn, which was defended by Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan and a detachment of Bayāt troops. When he heard the news, the Shah ordered a general mobilization.

The Royal Army's March to Khorasan and the Flight of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan from Esfarā'īn and Sabzavār

The Shah allowed one month for his troops to mobilize, and then the royal campaign tents were sent on ahead from Qazvin. Meanwhile, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan arrived at Qazvin with the Azerbaijan contingent, about four thousand men. Reports kept coming in that Esfarā'īn would fall if the royal army delayed any longer. The Shah therefore marched with such troops as had arrived from the provinces, plus *qūrčīs* and *ḡolāms*. He went first to Fīrūzkūh to join Farhād Khan, and together they marched to the pastures of Besṭām via 'Alī Bolāḡī in the district of Damghan. Their combined forces numbered about twenty thousand men.

In an effort to prevent 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan from following his usual practice of retreating at the approach of the royal army, thus denying to the latter an opportunity for a pitched battle, the Shah sent a letter to the Uzbeg Khan. On several occasions, said the Shah, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had plundered Khorasan with the object of annexing it, but had retreated abjectly whenever the royal army had marched to Khorasan. He had heard, the Shah went on, that this year the Khan had laid siege to Esfarā'īn, and he (the Shah) had marched to Beṣṭām with such men as he had with him, without waiting for the mobilization of his troops, so eager was he to meet the Khan in battle. This time, declared the Shah, the Khan's reputation for valor demanded that he stand and fight like a man, so that God's will might be fulfilled and God's people spared the injury resulting from the ceaseless passage of armies. Qoṭb al-Dīn Čeganī took the letter to the Uzbeg Khan, and the Shah set his forces in motion, planning to reach Esfarā'īn within seven days. He sent a message to the beleaguered Moḥammad Sultan exhorting him to hold on for another week.

The Shah's letter provoked a furious response from 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, who uttered empty boasts. His men were considerably disturbed, but since they had not yet received any reports of the Shah's approach, they were inclined to attribute the letter brought by Qoṭb al-Dīn to a ruse on the part of Farhād Khan to get them to raise the siege of Esfarā'īn. On the pretext that Qoṭb al-Dīn Aqa was lying, they put him to death. Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was in a quandary. Suppose the envoy's message were true? In that case, should he prepare for battle, or should he abandon the siege and withdraw? His emirs and elders, especially Shah Moḥammad Īla, who was the most senior of the emirs and whose advice was relied on by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, plumped for the second alternative, for fear they might suffer some reverse. He was supported by the emirs, who were not prepared to fight. The upshot was that the Khan decided to send a patrol to ascertain the truth of the report, to continue meanwhile the siege of Esfarā'īn, and to postpone a decision until he had heard from his patrols.

He therefore sent a number of the great emirs, such as Moḥammadqolī Dūrmen; Jān Moḥammad Qarāvol, the governor of Badakšān; and Sevenj Moḥammad Bī, known as Sevenj Torkmān, the governor of Nesā and Abīvard, with three hundred veterans on reconnaissance in the direction of Besṭām. They had orders to go right up to the outskirts of the *qezelbāš* camp and to take prisoners in order to get information. In the meantime, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan urged on his men to capture the fortress, and the defense began to weaken. When Moḥammad Sultan got the news that the Shah was at Besṭām and would be at Esfarā'īn within seven days, he proposed a seven-day ceasefire period to the Uzbegs so that the garrison could put its affairs in order before handing the fortress over at the end of that period. The Uzbegs, agreeing to this, counted the days.

After spending three days reviewing his troops at Besṭām, the Shah marched via Ḥang and Maḡz, sending Farhād Khan and Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan half a *farsak* ahead of the main force. On the third day, the Shah's baggage train reached Jājarm, and the servants were busy erecting the royal tents. The Uzbeg reconnaissance force reached the Jājarm River at nightfall and camped there. At dawn, leaving the usual route, they rode cautiously forward for two *farsaks*, skirting the foothills, until the black mass of the Safavid army came into view. They then retired hastily to Jājarm by the usual route and, as they passed by, saw the royal tents being erected. Galloping forward, they carried off a number of the servants for questioning. As they made off with their prisoners, a group of the emirs' men who had been sent on ahead of their fellows as skirmishers came into view behind the fort and the gardens around it. Without considering the odds against them, the Safavid troops charged the Uzbegs who, when they realized how few the enemy were, turned to face them. As the minutes passed, more and more Safavid skirmishers arrived on the scene and joined in the fighting. The Uzbegs wanted to break off the engagement, but the *qezelbāš ğāzīs* and the camp servants who were pitching the royal tents plucked up their courage and engaged them in hand-to-hand fighting, with the result that the Uzbegs were routed. They fled toward the mountains, and in the confusion their prisoners made their escape, their captors being too exhausted even to kill or wound them.

The *qezelbāš* kept up their pursuit of the Uzbegs, and the Uzbeg chiefs Moḥammadqolī Dūrmen and Sevenj Torkmān were taken alive. Jān Moḥammad Qarāvol, the governor of Badak̲šān, was captured by Oloğ Khan, a celebrated Turkman chief known as the scourge, and put to death. Most of the Uzbegs were slain; those who were taken prisoner were paraded before the Shah, who considered this success a happy augury of future victory. He gave orders that one of the Uzbeg prisoners should be released and escorted through the Safavid lines that night to the neighborhood of Esfarā'īn, to inform 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan of the Shah's arrival and to bid him prepare for battle. The escort took the prisoners as far as the village of Sanğāst, eight *farsak̲s* from Jājarm. The Shah marched the same night and reached Sanğāst; he planned to reach Īra and Farīmān, four *farsak̲s* from Esfarā'īn, the next night, and be ready for battle at Esfarā'īn on the morning of the third day. On arrival at Īra and Farīmān, the camp was busy until midnight preparing for the battle on the following day. The men were still seeing to their horses, weapons, and equipment when Moḥammad Sultan Bayāt, the Safavid commandant at Esfarā'īn who had been besieged by the Uzbegs, was brought in by Safavid patrols and informed the Shah that the Uzbegs had fled.

Apparently, some Uzbeg fugitives from the battle at Jājarm had made their way to Esfarā'īn on foot, traveling by night and lying in caves during the day; they arrived in tatters and with blistered feet. When they reported to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan the news of the defeat at Jājarm and the capture of the Uzbeg emirs, the Uzbeg leaders were filled with consternation. Six days of the seven-day truce had elapsed. They sent an envoy, Shah Moḥammad Īlačīān, to Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan to remind the Safavid prince that he was due to hand over the fort to them the following day. It would be a good idea, they said, for him to hand it over a day earlier and thus win royal favors from the Khan. Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan sent back the following message: "Tomorrow, I hope that the splendor of the Shah's cavalcade will appear over the horizon. If the Khan is still here, I will keep my promise and hand the fort over to him!" The Uzbegs then realized that the prince had requested the seven-day truce in order to give the Shah time to come to his assistance. They despaired of capturing the fort and advised the Khan to strike camp that day and withdraw to Mašhad via Rādekān. The Khan followed their advice; the following day, the Shah reached Esfarā'īn and camped there.

Some of the Shah's advisers counseled him to pursue the Uzbeg Khan to Mašhad. Had the latter felt strong enough, they argued, he would have stood and fought at Esfarā'īn. The Uzbegs had apparently decided to retreat, and since it was not likely that they had adequate provisions at Mašhad to enable them to withstand a siege, they would probably evacuate that city too if pressed. Farhād Khan opposed this suggestion on two grounds: first, the object of this expedition had been to succor the garrison at Esfarā'īn, and this had been done. In addition, a serious defeat had been inflicted on the Uzbegs, some of their leading chiefs had been taken prisoner, and their Khan had incurred the ignominy of flight. His proposal was that they should stay a few days at Esfarā'īn to settle affairs there, and then return to Qazvin. Second, to advance to Mašhad might be to invite a reversal of fortune. Supposing 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan evacuated the city; he would not leave the place in flourishing condition for the benefit of the *qezelbāš* but would sack it before withdrawing, and thus the Shi'ite population would in fact suffer more as a result of the Shah's advance. On the other hand, argued Farhād Khan, neither religion nor the state would suffer any harm from their *not* going to Mašhad. Both sides continued to bring forward arguments to support their point of view. Finally, Farhād Khan won the day, and the pursuit of the Uzbegs was abandoned.

The Shah remained at Esfarā'īn for several days to deal with affairs there. Moḥammad Sultan and his Bayāts, who had endured the rigors of the Uzbeg siege, were in no state to continue to act as garrison of the fortress, and so Būdāq Khan Čeganī was made governor of Esfarā'īn. After ten days, during which the royal army put in much hard work repairing the fortifications and excavating the ditches, the Shah marched. Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ḵārazm, who was with the royal army, obtained permission to visit the Ṣā'en Turkmans, who lived in the Astarābād area and were dependents of his, in order to try and gain support. Since he insisted, the Safavid officials allowed him to go, even though they considered his hope a forlorn one, in view of the fact that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan controlled the area. He was allowed to draw an appropriate quota of horses and equipment from the royal stables and armory, and he set off with his son, 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan, and Bābā Khan. Details of his journey and eventual return to court will be given under the events of next year.

Because 'Alī Khan Gerāylī[1] had ignored the royal expedition and failed to present himself at court, the Shah planned to visit his tribe. If 'Alī Khan sought pardon and appeared to be loyal, he would take him along with him to Astarābād, a province that had slipped from *qezelbāš* control a considerable time ago, with the intention of dividing the province between the Ṣā'en-ḵānī, Īmūr, and Sīāh-pūš tribes. If 'Alī Khan showed himself to be rebellious, he would deal with him first and then march to Astarābād. When the royal army reached the plain of Baḥrīān, the Shah gave orders to the great emirs to return to Iraq and take with them all the baggage and any men whose horses were not up to par; he kept with him all his battleworthy troops. At this juncture, some Gerāylī elders arrived to say that 'Alī Khan was at the fort of Pā-ye Ḥeṣār and that he was too frightened to present himself at court; in short, he took refuge in useless excuses. The Shah sent Ḥoseyn Khan and his Šāmlūs to subjugate the fortress of Pā-ye Ḥeṣār, and 'Alī Khan fled to the fortress of Rūḡad.

The Shah planned to send another force against him there, because he wanted to take him prisoner and make himself secure in that quarter before he advanced on Astarābād. But at this point he received news that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had returned and laid siege to Sabzavār. Since most of the troops of the royal army had been dismissed to Iraq and since 'Abd al-Mo'men had been emboldened to take this action by the receipt of reinforcements from Balḵ and Transoxania, the Shah's advisers considered it inexpedient for him to march to Sabzavār. Then the news arrived that the city of Sabzavār had fallen to the Uzbegs, that 'Abd al-Mo'men had perpetrated a general massacre there, and that Mīrzā Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan, the governor of Sabzavār, was blockaded in the citadel and had little chance of being able to hold out.

The Shah divided authority over the Gerāylī tribe between Manṣūr Khan Gerāylī and Tavakkol Khan, and ordered them to deal with 'Alī Khan. Then, taking him with him Valī Ḡāzī and some men of the Gerāylī tribe, he marched to Sabzavār—hoping, despite the paucity

[1] The Gerāylī were another eastern Turkman tribe living in the Astarābād area.

of his forces, to save the besieged garrison. 'Abd al-Mo'men had been informed of all the Shah's actions and was aware of his plans. He knew Esfarā'īn was now too well garrisoned and provisioned for him to have any hope of success there, so he decided to attack Sabzavār. He bore a grudge against the people of Sabzavār because of their attachment to Shi'ism, and because they had had the temerity to seize Mūsā Mīrzā and his friends. He was further incited to attack Sabzavār by Mīr 'Alī Aṣḡar, the son of Mīr Moḥammad Keskenī. He was an Uzbeg noble from Sabzavār in the service of the Khan who had a hereditary feud with Mīrzā Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan, the governor of Sabzavār, and with the other sons of Mīr Šams al-Dīn 'Alī Sultan.

Hearing that the Shah had marched toward Astārābād, and assuming that he would not return to Khorasan, 'Abd al-Mo'men dispatched an advance force to Sabzavār by forced marches, under the command of Mīr 'Alī Aṣḡar. Raising their war cry, the Uzbegs assaulted the city. The Sabzavārīs, caught completely by surprise, could not offer any resistance, and Mīrzā Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan with great difficulty succeeded in reaching the citadel with a number of other nobles. He prepared to defend the fort and safeguard his family. The rest of the city was abandoned to the Uzbegs, who poured in and began the slaughter of the Muslim population. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan thought to erase the memory of his shameful flight from Esfarā'īn by slaughtering numbers of poor wretches in Sabzavār, where he perpetrated a general massacre in which not even suckling infants were spared. The author, who entered Sabzavār with the royal cavalcade, saw the corpses of mothers with the bodies of their suckling infants, cut in two by Uzbeg swords, lying across their breasts.

After sacking the city, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan laid siege to the citadel, carrying forward breastworks on all sides. He dispatched a force of some three or four thousand Uzbegs against the fort of Ṣadḵarv, but Ḵāja Moḥammad Ṣadḵarvī, a loyal supporter of the Safavid house, put up a stout defense and sent a courier to inform the Shah. As the Shah neared Sabzavār, the Uzbegs abandoned the siege of Ṣadḵarv and rejoined 'Abd al-Mo'men. He, when the Shah reached the village of Āzādvār in the district of Farīyūmad, evacuated Sabzavār and fled in his customary manner (not worrying now about the shamefulness of his action!) to Balḵ via Toršīz; he left Shah Moḥammad Īlačīān to hold the fort at Nishapur. The Shah entered Sabzavār, cared for the survivors of the massacre, saw to the burial of the dead, and left vengeance to the Lord. The laments of the people of Sabzavār were answered, and the Uzbeg tyrant was not destined long to enjoy life and prosperity, as will be related in the proper place.

The Shah appointed Būdāq Sultan Qājār, commandant of the fortress of Esteḡnā, governor of Sabzavār. This officer was a veteran experienced in siege warfare; he had fought several engagements against the Uzbegs, and had successfully defended the fort of Esteḡnā. The Shah then marched toward Nishapur and encamped at Baḥrābād. There, he learned that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had retreated by forced marches. It seemed to the Shah that nothing would be gained by pursuing him; as winter was coming on and there was a shortage of provisions in Khorasan, he decided against staying in that province either to lay siege to Nishapur or to complete his business in Astarābād. As it was, on the return march to Qazvin the royal army suffered the loss of many horses, mules, and camels because of the lack of fodder.

Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan's Embassy to the Ottomans

Before the Shah left for Khorasan, he had nominated as ambassador to the Ottomans Darvīš Moḥammad Khan Rūmlū, who was to bear a letter expressing the Shah's condolences on the death of Sultan Morād III and offering his felicitations to his successor, Sultan Moḥammad III.[2] The Shah's sudden departure for Khorasan had delayed the dispatch of this embassy. When the Shah returned to Qazvin, Farhād Khan put forward the claims of his own brother Ẕu'l-Faqār as ambassador, on the ground that, in the time of Shah Tahmasp, the governors-general of the frontier marches had traditionally been employed as ambassadors to the Ottomans.

Farhād Khan's petition was accepted, and Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan was appointed and set off for Anatolia. He discharged his mission in fine style. He took with him some three hundred of his own retainers, all picked men, in full panoply. On this mission, he bestowed gifts with such liberality that certain mean-spirited Ottomans accused him of foolishness and extravagance. The Ottoman Sultan, his viziers and pashas, received him with greater honor than had been the lot of Persian ambassadors during Shah Tahmasp's reign. When Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan arrived in Istanbul, the Ottoman Sultan was actually absent on campaign, and the ambassador had to await his return. That year, the

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[2] Reigned 1003/1595 to 1012/1603.

Frankish monarchs had launched an attack aimed at recovering certain territory and fortresses they had lost during the reign of Sultan Morād III, and Sultan Moḥammad III had taken the field against them in person.

In the ensuing battle, the Franks initially gained the upper hand, and their troops broke into the Ottoman camp and started plundering it. However, a quarrel broke out over the Sultan's treasury between the troops of the pope (the pope is the caliph of the Christian nation—peace be upon our Prophet and upon Christ!— and is obeyed by the Frankish kings) and the troops of the King of Hungary, each party considering that it had the better claim to it. While this was going on, victory smiled on the standards of Islam, and the banners of darkness and unbelief were overthrown. The camp servants drove out their attackers with blows from blacksmiths' hammers and clubs, and the Frankish kings were routed. Their coalition fell apart, and each retired to his own country. Sultan Moḥammad III returned in triumph to Istanbul, and Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan was received in audience. Before the ambassador's arrival, the Sultan had already sent Shah 'Abbas a letter announcing his victory,[3] and the Shah had returned a most friendly reply. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan was given permission to depart, and arrived back in Iran the following year bearing appropriate gifts. These he delivered to the Shah along with a courteous letter from the Ottoman Sultan in which he addressed the Shah by fitting titles.

Further Troubles in Eastern Gīlān, the Revolt of Ḥamza and His Death, along with That of Other Miscreants

This year was also marked by another revolt in Gīlān, where a group of rebels, in their folly and stupidity, brought about their own destruction. Malek Jahāngīr, the ruler of Kojūr, who had rebelled against the Safavid state only the previous year, took advantage of the Shah's absence in Khorasan to lead a band of marauders to Tonakābon. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, the governor of Lāhījān, marched against him to Rostamdār. No sooner had the governor left Lāhījān than a certain Ḥamza of the Čapak tribe, a relative of Mīr 'Abbas, rebelled simply because he saw Lāhījān, the seat of government, empty, and heard reports that things were not going too well in Khorasan for the royal army.

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[3] The reference is to the Ottoman victory at the battle of Hačova (Mezö-Keresztes), over a Christian coalition of 40,000 men under the command of the Emperor Maximilian. The battle was fought between 2-4 Rabī' I, 1005/24-26 October 1596.

Looking only to the short-term gains and not to the long-term consequences, he dubbed himself Sultan Ḥamza, gathered some ill-starred men from Lešta-Nešā and from some of the larger villages near Lāhījān such as Āstāna and Kamāčāl, and entered Lāhījān. First, his men poured into the caravanserai and started looting the property of merchants and others. They plundered the homes of the retainers of Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, caused a lot of damage in the city generally, and then made for the citadel in a body. The handful of Darvīš Moḥammad Khan's men who had been left behind hastily barricaded the gates and sent a courier to the Khan in Tonakābon. Despite their lack of skill in siege warfare, they managed to prevent the besiegers from penetrating their defenses. The latter, perceiving the inexperience of their opponents, redoubled their efforts.

When the news of Ḥamza's revolt reached western Gīlān, Ḵosrow Beg Čahār-yār, a *ḡolām-e ḵāṣṣa-ye šarīfa,* who was *dārūḡa* of Rašt, and Oḡūrlū Sultan Čapnī,[4] the governor of Fūmen, marched at full speed to Lāhījān. The rebels were defeated, Ḥamza and a number of others were killed, and the rest of his supporters scattered. Two days later, Darvīš Moḥammad Khan arrived, having come by forced marches from Rostamdār. Finding that the revolt was all over, he initiated an investigation and a search for the rebels who had fled; if any were found, they were put to death. Ḥamza's head was presented to the Shah in Sāūj Bolāḡ, and the Shah praised Ḵosrow Beg Čahār-yār for his conduct. The Shah's wrath was visited on Lešta-Neša, that hotbed of revolt, and he ordered a general massacre there. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan and his Rūmlūs carried out this mission, and many innocent persons suffered for the sins of the guilty. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, who was a God-fearing and provident man, tried to prevent the slaughter from getting out of hand, but many people lost their lives. However, this punitive action did have an effect: no one from that district had the temerity to rebel in the future.

Miscellaneous Events During the Year 1004/1595–96

After the suppression of Ḥamza's revolt and the punitive action against Lešta-Nešā, Oḡūrlū Sultan Čapnī was made governor of the latter province. The whole of western Gīlān was given to Farhād Khan, who was relieved of the governorship of Shiraz. The post of governor of Fārs was given to the *qollar-āqāsī*[5] Allāhverdī Khan, who took charge of all administrative affairs in that province. It was decreed that every year Allāhverdī Khan should take to Fārs three hundred *ğolāms* and appoint them to major and minor administrative positions throughout every district of the province. The revenue accruing from the province should be used to defray the cost of arms and equipment.

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[4] The text has Čīnī, but I think Čapnī must be the correct reading.

[5] The office of *qollār-āqāsī,* or commander of the *qollar (ḡolāmān)* was created by Shah 'Abbas. The commander of these non-*qezelbāš* forces took his place among the six principal officers of state under Shah 'Abbas.

This year, a group of Sa'd-e Vaqqāṣ from the Nehāvand area descended on a fort the Ottomans had built on their land and destroyed it. Then, together with a band of Lors and Kurds, they attacked the fort at Nehāvand. The Ottoman garrison, which promptly complained to the Shah, laid the blame for stirring up this trouble on Ḥoseyn 'Alī Khan Čeganī, the governor of Hamadan. Shah 'Abbas, always concerned with observing the conditions of the peace treaty, sent a force of *qūrčīs* to Nehāvand and dismissed Ḥoseyn 'Alī Khan from the governorship of Hamadan. The *qūrčīs* chastised the troublemakers and cut off a few heads, which they sent to Baghdad.

Also this year, Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, the governor of Herat and a *protégé* and devoted supporter of 'Abdollah Khan, made overtures to Shah 'Abbas, and sent ambassadors to the Shah bearing gifts. It is not clear whether this was his own idea, or whether he did it at the prompting of Khan 'Alī. As a result of the constant warfare between the Safavid and Uzbeg states, said Mīr Qolbābā, the inhabitants of Transoxania had for years been unable to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, because Iran lay across the road to the Ḥejāz. He, Mīr Qolbābā, therefore requested that parties of Uzbegs from Transoxania should be allowed to cross Safavid territory without hindrance for the purpose of performing the pilgrimage; if he allowed this, the Shah would acquire merit. The Uzbeg ambassadors reached Qazvin, where they made their salutations to the Shah. They returned to Herat laden with gifts and accompanied by Eslām Beg Šāmlū, a centurion, who delivered letters to Mīr Qolbābā granting the privilege he had requested.

Also this year, the poet Mowlānā Ṣa'nī, who enjoyed great fame in Iran and was a boon companion of the Shah and attended his convivial gatherings, composed a few verses in *maṣnavī* form in praise of the Shah and submitted them to His Majesty. When the Shah reached the verse:

> Whether it be friend or foe who quaffs the cup,
> He drinks to the arch of the Shah's manly eyebrows

he was visibly affected and ordered that the Mowlānā be weighed against gold and the equivalent of his weight in gold be given him as a reward for this verse. This act encouraged all the poets in the land to send in poems eulogizing the Shah. Poets excel all others in their envy of one another, and so they were all profoundly envious of Mowlānā Ša'nī and went on talking about this incident at court for ages. One of them, Mowlānā Ḥasan Vahm al-Dīn, a satirist, inserted this verse in a poem he had written for the vizier of Qom:

> Ḥasan Vahm-e Dīn, indigent though he is,
> is weighed by the king with the gold of loathing.[6]

Fortunately, the Shah did not get to hear of this. Another jealous rival was Mowlānā 'Ajzī Tabrīzī, a tall, stout man who considered himself an incomparable composer of lyrics. On the strength of a few verses of love poetry, and through the good offices of Mowlānā 'Alī Reżā Ḵošnevīs (the elegant penman), Mowlānā 'Ajzī found himself admitted to court for a few days. But he was soon out of favor because he had the impertinence to utter various insolent remarks which he confidently believed would be taken to be witty or facetious. Finding himself one day in the presence of the Shah in the royal stables at Qazvin, although it was an inappropriate moment, he had the nerve to bring up the matter of Mowlānā Ša'nī's being weighed against gold. He boldly asked the Shah why he had not been treated the same way. The Shah said jokingly, "since we find ourselves in the stables, if you like I will have you weighed against dung!" The courtiers standing around roared with laughter, and the tale was embroidered by poets and wits, with the result that everyone forgot about Mowlānā Ša'nī and plagued the life out of Mowlānā 'Ajzī.

An unhappy event that occurred this year was the death of the Shah's father, Sultan Moḥammad Ḵodābanda, in the palace at Qazvin. The ex-Shah fell ill, became afflicted by dysentery, and died. He was buried in the Imāmzāda-ye Ḥoseyn at Qazvin, but his remains were later transferred to Ardabīl. Since I have already said something about the virtues of this king in the appendix to Book I, I will not add anything here.

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[6] There is a word play, impossible to reproduce in translation, between *ša'nī*, the nom de plume of the favored poet, and *šāne'*, meaning "hating."

The Events of the Year of the Monkey, Corresponding to the Year 1005/1596–97, the Tenth Year of the Reign of Shah ʿAbbas

New Year's Day this year occurred on Monday,[1] 21 Rajab 1004/21 March 1596. The Shah's servants gathered as usual in the Čehel Sotūn hall of the royal palace at Qazvin to greet him and to take part in the celebration of the New Year festival; the festivities continued for several days. At their conclusion, the Shah felt the urge to go hunting in Gīlān and Qezel Āġāč. He traveled first to Rašt by way of Kūhdom, and from there to Fūmen and Gaskar. At ʿOlyābād in the district of Fūmen, the Shah took part in a bell-hunt—a most unusual and pleasant type of sport which I have described before;[2] then the Shah moved to Qezel Āġāč, where he spent a few days by the sea before going to Ardabīl. After visiting the Safavid shrine there, he returned to Qazvin.

The Conquest of Māzandarān and the Appointment of Farhād Khan as Governor of That Province

The province of Ṭabarestān, or Māzandarān, was the legal inheritance of the descendants of Mīr ʿAbdollāh Khan, the maternal grandfather of Shah ʿAbbas, who traced his lineage back to Seyyed Qavām al-Dīn, known as Mīr Bozorg, who took possession of that province by the sword, as I related at the beginning of Book I. At the present time (1005/1596–97), however, there was no male descendant of that line fit to govern his ancestral domains, and so the province came under the control of the Shah, both by right of inheritance and by right of conquest. Previously, the province had been subject to the authority of a number of different emirs and chiefs, men like Seyyed Moẓaffar Mortażā'ī, Alvand Dīv, and Malek Bahman Lārījānī. They had repeatedly been guilty of hostility and treachery toward the house of Mīr Bozorg, and each had seized a portion of the province and treated it as though it were his own property. From time to time, they were deliquent in the payment of the instalments of tax and tribute due to the supreme *dīvān,* and their behavior was generally fraudulent, deceitful, and seditious. The Shah had for long intended to wrest the province of Māzandarān from the hands of these usurpers. This year he took action; he instructed Farhād Khan to subjugate the province and to assume the governorship.

[1] 21 Rajab 1004 fell on a Thursday.

[2] See page 668-9.

Farhād Khan assembled his troops and sent letters to the various emirs and chiefs of Māzandarān, calling on them to tender their submission. Seyyed Moẓaffar, whose head was filled with delusions of grandeur, tendered his submission *in absentia.* Like a wild animal, he shied away from presenting himself before the Khan in person, and refused to be tamed. After a further exchange of correspondence and of smooth-tongued ambassadors, Seyyed Moẓaffar agreed to meet the Khan. He and a number of other Māzandarānī chiefs and nobles visited the Khan and were received with honor, although Farhād Khan would not allow Seyyed Moẓaffar to return to Māzandarān but insisted that he present himself to the Shah. Seyyed Moẓaffar agreed to this on condition that Farhād Khan accompany him and mediate on his behalf with the Shah. He further agreed that he would participate in whatever settlement the Shah might personally decree in regard to Māzandarān. His object was to get himself reinstated in Māzandarān on the same basis as before, namely, he would retain control and pay tribute and taxes to the supreme *dīvān.*

Farhād Khan considered it expedient to let Seyyed Moẓaffar think he was going to get his own way. He took him to Qazvin, where the Shah also considered it politic to receive him with outward marks of favor. Privately, however, the Shah frowned on him, because he had rebelled against his benefactor and been guilty of various misdemeanors against the house of Mīr Bozorg. Seyyed Moẓaffar, lodged at the house of Farhād Khan, became more and more apprehensive; as the saying goes, "the traitor is always nervous." He heard a rumor that the Shah intended to purge Māzandarān of headstrong chiefs like himself. Despairing of regaining his position of authority there, he agreed to return to Māzandarān with Farhād Khan and secure the submission of the inhabitants to the Khan. This done, he agreed to leave Māzandarān with his family and personal retainers and retire to a peaceful life in Iraq. But the demon ambition had possessed him, and his heart was not in what he said.

Taking his leave of the Shah, Seyyed Moẓaffar returned to Māzandarān with Farhād Khan, who treated him civilly in order to reassure him and the other frightened chiefs in the province. When they reached Āmol, one of the ancient districts of Māzandarān currently under the control of Malek Bahman, the latter's retainers prepared to defend the citadel there, and Farhād Khan commenced the siege. Malek Bahman was at Lārījān. With the cunning and guile that were second nature to him, he pretended to submit to Farhād Khan. He sent a message saying that the situation at Āmol was not under his control; a group of Āmolī rebels to whom *qezelbāš* rule was distasteful had taken matters into its own hands and was defending the castle. In secret, however, Malek Bahman behaved like a rebel and encouraged the defenders of the fort, most of whom were his own trusted retainers, to put up a stout resistance and to keep the *qezelbāš* out. In particular, a number of Takkalūs who were retainers of his urged the garrison to redouble its efforts.

At this juncture, Seyyed Moẓaffar showed his hand. He fled from Farhād Khan's camp to the district of Sārī, which was in the hands of his men, took refuge at the fort of Azdāra Kalā, and defied the Khan. His example was followed by a number of other Māzandarānī nobles who had accompanied Farhād Khan; each went to his own territory, and communication between the Māzandarānīs and the *qezelbāš* broke down. Farhād Khan's morale was not in the least shaken by these events. He pressed his attack on the fort at Āmol and tried to win over the people by his exemplary conduct and by financial inducements. Finally, he succeeded in capturing the fort and annihilating its garrison. Installing a *qezelbāš* governor at Āmol, he turned his attention to subjugating other areas. One by one, the Māzandarānī nobles who had fled from his camp returned and begged forgiveness, which the Khan graciously accorded them.

When the Khan marched against Sārī, Seyyed Moẓaffar abandoned Azdāra Kalā and took refuge in the forests. Seyyed Moẓaffar was an opium addict; every day, he consumed one and a half *meṣqāls* of pure opium. In the confusion that attended his flight, his servants failed to bring him his usual pipe of opium, and for several nights in the forest he suffered agonies as a result of being deprived of his narcotic. Finally, he became ill. It was impossible for him to go on existing in the forest in this condition; he was forced to repair to the Khan, in the sorriest of states. He took to his bed, but treatment proved of no avail; he was afflicted by a more and more severe diarrhea, and finally he died. After his death, Farhād Khan's lieutenants were able to take control of most areas of Māzandarān. The Khan left his brother, Alvand Sultan, as his deputy in the province, and himself returned to court to report to the Shah.

Alvand Dīv, the governor of Savād-kūh, did not believe Seyyed Moẓaffar had died a natural death, and consequently distrusted Farhād Khan. Malek Bahman, a born intriguer, whipped up opposition to Alvand Dīv among the Māzandarānīs, his object being to prevent the development of friendly relations between Alvand Dīv and the nobles of Māzandarān on the one hand, and the *qezelbāš* on the other. And Alvand Dīv, once having tasted the delights of independent government, found it difficult to contemplate giving it up; at the instigation of Malek Bahman, he rebelled. The Shah, realizing that until Malek Bahman was removed from the scene Māzandarān would never be firmly under Safavid control, therefore ordered Farhād Khan to move against him.

Farhād Khan's Expedition to Lārījān and Capture of Malek Bahman

Malek Bahman b. Malek Kayūmarṣ b. Kā'ūs was descended from Kayūmarṣ b. Bīsotūn b. Gostaham,[3] who in the time of Tīmūr was ruler of the whole of Rostamdār and commandant of the fortress of Nūr. After the death of the latter,[4] Rostamdār was divided between his two sons, Jahāngīr,[5] who took Nūr and its dependencies, and Eskandar, who received Kojūr and its appendages. Their descendants continued to observe this division of the province.

During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, however, three families, all cousins of one another, laid claim to power: Malek 'Azīz, the ruler of Nūr; Malek Sultan Moḥammad b. Jahāngīr, the ruler of Kojūr; and the above-mentioned Malek Bahman, ruler of Lārījān, which had formerly been a dependency of Kojūr. The history of the rulers of Nūr and Kojūr will be given in the section on the subjugation of Rostamdār. Although Malek Bahman was inferior to the rulers of Nūr and Kojūr in terms of territory, he was superior to them in terms of intelligence, maturity, experience, and length of reign. To begin with, Shah 'Abbas regarded him with favor, because Malek Bahman had gone to welcome him as he marched westward to Iraq to claim the throne, and had tendered his submission to him on several other occasions at the Shah's summer quarters at Lār.

But Malek Bahman, as we have said, was an intriguer, and was distinguished among his peers by his craftiness and deceitfulness.

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[3] See Rabino, pp. 144ff.

[4] In 875/1453.

[5] According to Rabino, p. 146, Jahāngīr was the *grandson* of Kayūmarṣ and became ruler of Nūr in 871/1467. Kā'ūs was the son of Kayūmarṣ who became ruler of Nūr in 857/1453.

Every time the Shah tested his loyalty and sincerity, Malek Bahman was found wanting. He was constantly stirring up trouble in Ṭabarestān, and he tried to destroy anyone who entered into relations with the Safavid court. Take, for example, the case of Sultan Ḥoseyn Lavasānī, who was a relative of his: Merely because Sultan Ḥoseyn Lavasānī had turned to the Shah and declared his loyalty to him, and his brother Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn had acquired honor in the Shah's service, Malek Bahman had attacked the latter, taken him prisoner, and put him to death. Moreover, he had carried off Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn's wives and children to Lārījān, and ill-treated his subjects in all sorts of ways. But divine vengeance was shortly to be visited upon him.

Shah 'Abbas had repeatedly sent couriers to Lārījān requesting that Malek Bahman hand over the dependents of Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn, but Malek Bahman kept procrastinating. The people of Māzandarān, who had adopted the system of dividing up the province into small feudal principalities, each man making some district his own bailiwick, considered Malek Bahman their overlord because of his proximity. They handed over to him the district of Āmol, one of the most celebrated regions of Ṭabarestān, which was adjacent to his own domains. When Shah 'Abbas decided to annex the province of Māzandarān, Malek Bahman, in his desire to hold on to Āmol, resisted the Safavid officers sent by the Shah in the manner already described.

Farhād Khan, provided with musketeers and siege guns, commenced the siege of the fortress of Lārījān. The Amīrī clan, the foremost military group in Lārījān, opened negotiations with Farhād Khan, and Malek Bahman lost confidence in them. He seized a certain Vardān Emir, who was their leader, flung him into a dungeon, and later killed him. The Amīrī clan then came out in open opposition to Malek Bahman and showed Farhād Khan secret ways into the fortress. Within a short time, the Safavid breastworks reached the walls of the fort, and Malek Bahman declared his readiness to submit. Farhād Khan encouraged him to hope for royal clemency and demanded a meeting. After sworn covenants had been entered into, Malek Bahman came out of the fort, hoping to save his skin by a lot of smooth talk, and by uttering empty compliments and making promises he had not the slightest intention of keeping, to persuade the *qezelbāš* to raise the siege. He tried to persuade Farhād Khan to enter the fort and be his guest. Farhād Khan refused and did not relinquish the bird he had trapped in his net; he insisted Malek Bahman accompany him to court. At this point, Malek Bahman bitterly regretted having come out of the fort. Since nothing he said had any effect on Farhād Khan, he resigned himself, extremely unwillingly, to going to court. Farhād Khan considered it politic to leave Malek Bahman's men in charge of the fort, and did not force them to evacuate it.

Farhād Khan took Malek Bahman to Isfahan and presented him to the Shah at a public assembly at which people from hither and yon were present. The Shah upbraided Malek Bahman, and enumerated his sins and acts of disloyalty one by one. Malek Bahman hung his head in shame, and gave up hope of saving his life. Because of the pledges Farhād Khan had made to Malek Bahman, the Shah took no immediate action against him, and he remained in Farhād Khan's house. At the beginning of the Year of the Fowl (1006/1597-98), when the Shah left Isfahan for Qazvin, he summoned Malek Bahman into his presence in the new palace building at Isfahan and, after upbraiding him further, handed him over to Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn Lavasānī, who put him to death in revenge for the death of his brother, Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn. The subsequent history of Malek Bahman's sons, and of the capture of his fortresses, will be given later, God willing!

The Adventures of Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, the Ruler of Ḵārazm and His Relatives, and His Turning a Second Time to the Shah's Court for Assistance

The reader will recall that, at the time of the Shah's expedition to Khorasan against 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan had obtained permission to leave the royal camp and travel to Ḵārazm with his son 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan and his nephew Bābā Khan. First, they visited the Ṣā'en-ḵānī Yaqqa Turkmans, groups of whom had migrated to Ḵārazm, where they were welcomed by the people and entered the service of Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan. 'Abdollāh Khan's officials and *dārūḡas* left their posts in Ḵārazm and retired to Transoxania. Ḵārazm was left free from foreign troops, and Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan regained his position there as independent ruler. But the majority of those who rallied around Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan were peasants and household servants, because 'Abdollāh Khan, when he overran Ḵārazm, had transferred to other areas most of the Uzbegs who constituted Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan's regular troops. The latter was therefore left without any substantial support.

When he heard of the return of Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, 'Abdollāh Khan sent some trusted emirs to Ḵ̌ārazm with a large force. Not satisfied with that, he himself followed on behind. Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan mobilized his men, marched against the Uzbegs, and engaged them in a major battle. The approach of 'Abdollāh Khan caused panic among the Ḵ̌ārazmians, who were routed. Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan did not wish to take refuge in some fortress and endure a siege by the Uzbegs, so he left Ḵ̌ārazm with his son 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan, traveled through Astarābād with the assistance of the Ṣā'en-ḵānī Yaqqa Turkmans, and reached Safavid territory. The Shah sent an envoy to escort him to Qazvin, where he was again received with great kindness.

Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan's nephew, Bābā Khan, remained behind in the fort at Šāhr-e Vazīr.[6] Although he was well aware that he would be besieged, that he could not expect help from any quarter, and that in the end he would fall into the hands of the enemy, nevertheless he considered an honorable death preferable to life with disgrace. For four months he defended the fort, but at the end of that time his troops and the inhabitants of the town, fearful that continued resistance would lead to even more savage reprisals, betrayed him and opened negotiations with the Uzbegs. Bābā Khan, followed by a few faithful men, opened the gates of the fort and flung himself in suicidal fashion upon the enemy. Engulfed by the mass of Uzbegs, he fell fighting; those few of his followers who survived scattered. Bābā Khan's heroism is still talked of today in Ḵ̌ārazm. 'Abdollāh Khan thus once more became the master of Ḵ̌ārazm. He eliminated anyone he thought might cause trouble anywhere in the province, and having strengthened the forts, returned to Transoxania.

The Conflict Between Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the Governor of Šūštar, and the Afšār Tribe, Supported by Mīr Mobārak, Ruler of the Ḥavīza District of 'Arabestān; the Dispatch of Allāhverdī Khan to Kūh Gīlūya and the Fate of the Ill-starred Afšārs

A group of seditious Afšārs, especially the Arešlū and Kondūzlū clans, rebelled against the governor of Kūh Gīlūya, Emir Khan. The rebels gathered at Rāmhormoz, a town in Kūh Gīlūya,[7] and proclaimed Abu'l-Fatḥ Beg, the grandson of Ḵalīl Khan, their khan. Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Šūštar, and a loyal Sufi, refused to countenance this action. Since he was the *qezelbāš* officer nearest the scene, he marched against the rebels with a small band of Šāmlū *ḡāzīs*. They met between Šūštar and Rāmhormoz and, despite the paucity of his forces, Mahdīqolī Khan routed the Afšārs, who took refuge with Seyyed Mobārak, the ruler of ʿArabestān.

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[6] North-northwest of Ūrganj.

[7] Rāmhormoz lies east of Ahvāz, and is usually reckoned to be part of the province of Ḵ̌ūzestān.

Mahdīqolī Khan had always regarded Seyyed Mobārak as an enemy of the Safavid state; consequently, he frequently interfered in the affairs of the Arabs of Ḥavīza and treated Seyyed Mobārak as a vassal. Seyyed Mobārak had lodged repeated complaints with the Shah against Mahdīqolī Khan's behavior and had tried to get the Khan chastised and brought to his senses, but he had no wish to incur the Shah's displeasure. However, the Afšār refugees fanned the flame of the Seyyed's discontent and urged him to take the field against Mahdīqolī Khan. He agreed to assist the Afšārs. At the head of a force of Arabs, he intercepted Mahdīqolī Khan as the latter was returning to Šūštar from the direction of Rāmhormoz. The Khan, finding himself heavily outnumbered, decided against a pitched battle in the plain and retreated to a nearby fort, where he was besieged by the Arabs and eventually obliged to treat for terms because of the weakness of the fortifications and lack of provisions.

For his part, Seyyed Mobārak was also ready to negotiate, since he stood in considerable awe of the Shah, and so a sort of truce was patched up between them: Seyyed Mobārak agreed to retire to Ḥavīza on condition that Mahdīqolī Khan leave the fort and return to Šūštar. Rumor has it that Seyyed Mobārak plotted treachery against Mahdīqolī Khan and planned to attack him when he emerged from the fort, but the plot was revealed to the Khan by Seyyed Mobārak's son, Seyyed Badr, who was loyal to the Safavids. As a result of this warning, the Khan remained on the defensive within the fort until Seyyed Mobārak, realizing that he had smelled a rat and was acting with caution, decamped and returned to Ḥavīza.

In Lorestān, Šahverdī Khan ʿAbbāsī had heard the news. To demonstrate his loyalty to the Shah, he had marched to the relief of Mahdīqolī Khan, but the affair had been settled by the time he got there.

As soon as Mahdīqolī Khan felt safe from any treacherous act on the part of Seyyed Mobārak, he marched out of the fort, returned to Šūštar, and sent a report to the Shah. Since the Shah did not wish to make a confirmed enemy of Seyyed Mobārak, and had in the past overlooked his misdemeanors for this reason, he enjoined Mahdīqolī Khan to keep the peace, not to make incursions on to Seyyed Mobārak's territory, and to have nothing to do with the Arab tribes subject to Seyyed Mobārak's jurisdiction.

However, the Shah's wrath was vented on the Afšārs who had caused all the trouble; the governorship of Kūh Gīlūya was taken away from them and given to Allāhverdī Khan in addition to that of Fārs. Allāhverdī Khan marched to Kūh Gīlūya and put to death many of the troublemakers among the Arešlū and Kondūzlū clans, and also many Lors from the Jākī, Javānakī, Bandānī and other clans, who were a perpetual source of sedition in that province. Heavy fines were imposed on others. In short, the Afšārs and Lors received such a drubbing that the mere thought of revolt never again entered their heads. Having carried out his orders in regard to Kūh Gīlūya, Allāhverdī Khan installed members of the *ḡolāms* as local governors throughout the province, and returned to court to report to the Shah. The Shah, praising him for his services, showed him high favor.

The Raid on Yazd by Uzbegs from Khorasan and Their Repulse by ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū and His Qezelbāš

This year, the Uzbegs disturbed the equilibrium on the eastern front by raiding Yazd, which they reached via Ṭabas and the way stations of Mafāza and Ḵandaq. ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū, a *qūrčī* of the quiver who was the governor of Yazd, had been warned of the approach of the Uzbegs by Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Ṭabas. He placed the city in a state of defense and marched out against the Uzbegs with some four or five hundred *qezelbāš* and local contingents of musketeers, only to discover that the Uzbegs were approaching the city by another route. After riding eight *farsaḵs* along the road to Ṭabas, ʿAlīqolī Khan turned back and reached Yazd. The next day, the Uzbeg advance guard, consisting of about twelve hundred seasoned veterans, followed by the main body of two or three thousand men, came in sight and camped outside the city, and the Uzbegs began plundering everything within sight.

The Yazdīs counseled caution, and at first ʿAlīqolī Khan followed their advice; he saw to the defense of the walls and gates of the city and of the citadel, while the inhabitants of Yazd continued to advise against a sortie. However, the Khan, though fully aware of the dangers of the situation and of the paucity of his forces, sallied forth with a small band of Šāmlū *ğāzīs*, musketeers, and the other men he had to hand, and boldly attacked the Uzbegs. The Uzbegs had come only for loot, and they wanted to get back with the booty they had amassed. They were therefore caught unprepared when 'Alīqolī Khan and his men charged them at full gallop, shattered their ranks, and slew some three hundred of their number, others being taken prisoner. The rest fled, concerned more about their survival than about their loot. The Šāmlū *ğāzīs* pursued the Uzbegs for several *farsaḵs*, capturing some of the enemy complete with their booty. The troubles of the Uzbegs were not yet over, for Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, who was on his way from Ṭabas with a force of seasoned young troops, intercepted the refugees at Rabāṭ-e Ḵarāneq and inflicted another severe defeat on them. Those Uzbegs who survived fled into the waterless wastes of the desert and the mountains. Even there, they were pursued by contingents of local musketeers from Bāfq and Behābād[8] under the command of Mowlānā Faḵr al-Dīn Aḥmad Bāfqī. Many more were taken prisoner; others perished from thirst. Few of the original Uzbeg army made their way back to Khorasan.

Also this year a contingent of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan's troops made a sudden attack on 'Alī Khan Gerāylī and slew many of his men; 'Alī Khan took refuge in the fort of Rūğad, but later became a traitor.

The Transfer of the Remains of Shah Tahmasp from Mašhad to Isfahan, and from there to Ardabīl

At the beginning of Book I, I stated that Shah Esma'il II had transferred the remains of Shah Tahmasp to Mašhad for reburial there. The officers entrusted with this task were Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, the governor of Mašhad, and 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg* of Herat. Three or four graves were dug within the precincts of the shrine of the Imam Reżā, so that the warden and attendants of the shrine might choose whichever site they thought most suitable and most likely to protect the body of the Shah from desecration by enemies. These sites were on display to the general public for several days.

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[8] Southeast of Yazd, on the edge of the Great Desert.

On the night the governor had decided upon for the burial, he went to the shrine in the company of Mīr Seyyed ʿAlī Mofaṣṣal Astarābādī or Mīr Seyyed ʿAlī Šūštarī the *ṣadr*[9] (authorities differ on this point) and Shaikh Ḥasan *ḥaffār* (the gravedigger) Mašhadī, and closed the gates of the sanctuary. Another grave was then dug adjacent to the sepulcher of the Imam, and the remains of Shah Tahmasp were buried there. The other graves were also filled in. The grave emblems were placed on the dais below the Imam's tomb. The Koran reciters on duty at the tomb of the Imam used to recite verses from the Koran at that spot, and the attendant appointed to be on duty at the Shah's grave lit his candles there, so it came to be generally accepted as the site of the Shah's grave.

When ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan captured Mašhad and the shrine fell into Uzbeg hands, the religious fanaticism of that ignorant miscreant made him resolve to desecrate the grave of Shah Tahmasp and those of the Safavid princes who were also buried within the shrine precincts. He therefore had the graves excavated, but found only a few putrefying old bones. Some years later, some misguided fellow told the ʿAbdollāh Khan and ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan that Shah Tahmasp's grave was elsewhere, and that he knew its location. Urged on by certain bigots, they sent an officer named Dūstom Bahādor to excavate the site so that the Shah's remains might be taken to Bokhara and subjected to every form of ignominy that their minds could devise.

Dūstom Bahādor carried out his orders, and the Shah's remains were placed in a sack which was then sealed by Ḳodāy Naẓar Bī, the Uzbeg governor of Mašhad. Dūstom Bahādor, before departing for Transoxania, spent a few days in a place near Mašhad called Jonābodak as the guest of Reżāqolī Beg, the son of Pahlavān Shah ʿAlī, who was the storekeeper at the shrine of Imam Reżā. He was an Eṣfahānī by birth. When he heard of Dūstom Bahādor's mission, Reżāqolā Beg put himself out to detain his guest for a few days by making himself an agreeable host. One day, he said jokingly to Dūstom Bahādor, "If you take these remains via Tūn and Ṭabas and deliver them into the hands of the *qezelbāš*, you will get ten times as much as you hope to get for this service from ʿAbdollāh Khan and

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[9] The son of Mīr Asadollāh Šūštarī, appointed *ṣadr* by Shah Tahmasp in 943/1536-37 or 944/1537-38 (see Savory, *Ṭahmāsp*, pp. 82-83). When Mīr Asadollāh reached a great age, his son acted as his *nāyeb* (deputy) and, in 970/1563, Mīr Seyyed ʿAlī was made *ṣadr* of Azerbaijan and Khorasan when the office of *ṣadr* was divided on a territorial basis *(idem,* p. 79). Mīr Seyyed ʿAlī apparently continued to hold the position of *ṣadr* after the accession of Shah Esma'il II in 984/1576.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan!" Dūstom Bahādor pricked up his ears when he heard this mention of a possible reward and said, "I do not have any family in Transoxania, nor do I have any particular ties with that region. If you are telling me the truth, and are willing to make a covenant that what you are telling me will happen, I will do as you wish." Reżāqolī Beg entered into the necessary covenants, and together the two men took the Shah's remains and rode by forced marches to Ṭabas.

In later years, Dūstom Bahādor used to say that he had had a dream in which he had been forbidden to take the Shah's remains to Transoxania and instructed to leave them in Iran, that he had revealed this dream to Reżāqolī Beg and asked his assistance, and that as a result the two of them had taken the remains to Ṭabas. At all events, when the two men reached Ṭabas, they were received with great honor by the governor, Meḥrab Khan Qājār; the governor immediately reported the situation to the Shah, who was overjoyed at the news. He ordered that Shah Tahmasp's remains should be escorted all the way from Ṭabas to Isfahan. At every stage on the journey, the populace turned out on the Shah's orders to carry the bier on their shoulders to the next stage and to proffer suitable hospitality to Dūstom Bahādor and Reżāqolī Beg, who had been responsible for bringing these blessed remains back into Iranian custody. When the cortège reached Isfahan, Shah 'Abbas, accompanied by all his emirs and the principal officers of state, came out on foot to meet it; themselves acting as pallbearers, they bore the bier into the city and set it down in the shrine ascribed to the Imam 'Alī Zeyn al-'Ābedīn,[10] which is the burial place of two eminent descendants of that Imam. As the news spread throughout the Safavid empire, this shrine became a place of pilgrimage for those who wished to pay their respects to the memory of Shah Tahmasp.

Although there are some doubts regarding the genuineness of this whole affair, nevertheless Shah 'Abbas considered it to be in his political interest to certify it as true and thus confound his enemies, the Uzbegs. But even if we suppose for the sake of argument that events did not happen in this way, there is no argument about the fact that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, when he first occupied Mašhad, disinterred some moldy bones belonging to persons buried beneath the dais below the Imam's tomb, removed these bones in the belief that they were those of Shah Tahmasp and the Safavid princes, and treated them with ignominy. The eternal divine will therefore turned its attention to removing this dishonor against the holy remains of Shah Tahmasp, because any act designed to bring dishonor upon that pious king and *seyyed* of pure faith could not be regarded with approval in God's court, and the eternal magician devised a stratagem designed to make it clear to all that the holy remains of Shah Tahmasp did not deserve to be treated with insults and dishonor.

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[10] The fourth Eṣnā 'Ašarī Imam, who died in 94/712-13 or 95/713-14, and was buried at Medina.

Both Reżāqolī Beg and Dūstom Bahādor were enrolled among the Shah's attendants at court and received gifts that exceeded their expectations. The *qezelbāš* emirs and nobles, and all supporters of the Safavid house, were ordered not to be derelict in their duty to see to their welfare.

Eventually, the remains of Shah Tahmasp were moved to Ardabīl and were reinterred within the shrine complex, but for security reasons I shall not describe the location of the burial place.

After the reconquest of Khorasan by Shah 'Abbas, I talked to Shaikh Ḥasan *ḥaffār*, and he declared that no alien hand had desecrated the grave of Shah Tahmasp. He further asserted that the remains in question were those of one of the *seyyeds* of the shrine establishment, who had been thus blessed by the spirit of Shah Tahmasp in that his remains had been saved from the mischief of the enemy and reinterred in such a holy place.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year

Ambassadors came from all parts of the world to the court of Shah 'Abbas this year: some were received at Qazvin, others at Isfahan, and there was such a throng of envoys, bearing countless gifts, as had rarely been seen in previous years. Among them were Mirzā Żīā al-Dīn Kāšī and Abū Naṣr Ḵāfī, ambassadors on behalf of the Mogul emperor Akbar; with them was Yādegār Sultan Rūmlū, who had been sent as an ambassador to India seven years before. Mīrzā Żīā al-Dīn, the son of Mīr Rafī' al-Dīn the *qāżī* of Kashan, had emigrated to India some twenty-five years previously and had acquired an honored position at the Mogul court; Abū Naṣr was from Ḵāf. They had traveled to Iran via Kīj, Makrān, and Kerman. They were received by the Shah at Qazvin. The Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād was illuminated and the bazaars decorated in their honor, and for several days they were guests at special banquets given in the Meydān.

After the usual formalities, the ambassadors delivered letters of friendship from Emperor Akbar, letters written by Shaikh Abu'l-Fażl, the son of Shaikh Mobārak, and replete with elegant conceits. Camels bearing the emperor's gifts were paraded before the Shah in the Meydān.

After these festivities, the Shah felt in the mood to visit Isfahan and enjoy the delights of the Naqš-e Jahān palace there. While he was in residence at Isfahan, various other Persian ambassadors returned from their missions. Among them was Asad Beg Tabrīzī the *gerek-yarāq* (purveyor of essential supplies),[11] who had been sent on an embassy to the rulers of the Deccan several years previously; he arrived with a whole camel train laden with the products and stuffs of India. Another returning ambassador was Eslām Beg Šāmlū the centurion, who had been sent on a mission to Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, the governor of Herat; he was accompanied by another embassy from the latter. Since it was clear that Mīr Qolbābā could not have sent these embassies without the knowledge, and therefore the consent, of 'Abdollāh Khan himself, Shah 'Abbas considered it sound policy to open correspondence with 'Abdollāh Khan. He therefore sent Mīr Qolbābā's ambassadors back in the company of Moḥammadqolī Beg 'Arabgīrlū,[12] an *ešīk-āqāsī*. Ambassadors also arrived from Georgia and, like the other envoys, were received with honor.

Ambassadors arrived this year as well from the *beglerbeg* of Baghdad. They brought the news that Aḥmad Khan, the former ruler of Gīlān, had died a natural death in Istanbul. Emir Tājmīr Baḵtīārī, whose family had been emirs of the Baḵtīārī Lors for generations, appeared in person at court; until now he had refused to be tamed, but at this point he declared his loyalty to the Shah and pleaded for forgiveness for his past misdemeanors, in return for which he undertook to express his gratitude in material terms. The Shah received him graciously, granted his requests, and sent him back with robes of honor.

Another visitor at court this year was Malek Jalāl al-Dīn Khan, the son of Malek Maḥmūd and ruler of Sīstān, who had been driven out of his territory by the Uzbegs. Mindful of the traditional loyalty of his house to the Safavids, he traveled to court at Isfahan by way of Kerman. The Shah was delighted to see him, and made him his companion at private assemblies and banquets.

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[11] See *TM*, pp. 177-78 and 178n.
[12] A clan of the Šāmlū tribe.

This year, the Takkalū tribe felt the full weight of the Shah's wrath, and were subjected to a systematic purge. The Shah had not forgotten that Ūlāma and Ġazī Khan had deserted to the Ottomans during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, had fought their own chief, Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū, and had handed over to the Ottoman sultan, Ṣülāymān, the provinces of Arab Iraq and Baghdad. More recently, they had fallen still more from favor because of their opposition to Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā.[13] This year, when Farhād Khan subjugated Māzandarān, he reported to the Shah that a number of Takkalūs had been supporting the rebel Mālek Bahman and had formed the garrison of the fort at Āmol. This news caused the Shah's rage to flare up, and he gave orders that Takkalūs be put to death, wherever they might be, and their property impounded. Since the bulk of the Takkalūs were in the province of Hamadan, Ḥasan 'Alī Khan Čeganī was ordered to deal with them. Among the Takkalū chiefs who perished in this purge were Moṣṭafā Khan, the son of Mosīb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū, and Valī Beg. After the fires of the Shah's wrath had been quenched, those Takkalūs who had escaped the sword were pardoned, and the Takkalū contingent of the royal bodyguard was allowed to resume its duties on the same basis as before.

Among the deaths this year was that of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, the son of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, whom Shah 'Abbas had been forced to send as a hostage to Istanbul. Since he was the Shah's nephew and it was not fitting that a Safavid prince, a *seyyed*'s son and a Shi'ite of pure faith, should sire children while he was in Ottoman hands, among the enemies of his faith, it was a merciful providence that decreed he should die a natural death of the plague at Istanbul, before he had had any children. Supporters of the Safavid house, nay, all the people of Iran, considered this yet another manifestation of the good fortune that attended this dynasty, since there was no longer any need to worry about this prince's future.[14]

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[13] See my chapter "Safavid Persia," in *Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. I, pp. 412ff.

[14] The source of the worry, of course, was that the Ottomans might employ Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, or his sons if he were to have any, as pretenders to the Safavid throne, as they had done in 1548 in the case of Alqāṣ Mīrzā.

Another event this year was the death of 'Alyār Khan Īmūr in the region of Astarābād. His son, Moḥammad Yār, a handsome young man, was fearful of the Göklen, Ūḳlū, and Sīāh-pūš tribes living in the Astarābād region, and took refuge at the Safavid court at Isfahan through the mediation of Mīrzā Beg Fendereskī, the son of Mīr Żīā al-Dīn, an eminent *seyyed* of Astarābād whose loyalty to the Safavid house was unquestioned. I mentioned in book I, under the history of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, that a group of Ṣā'en-ḳānī Turkmans, who were subject to the ruler of Ḵ̌ārazm, had taken up residence in the Astarābād area, between the Atrek and Gorgān rivers, and that the Īmūr tribe formed part of this group. Although the Īmūr tribe's ties with the other Ṣā'en-ḳānī tribes were relatively weak, 'Alyār Khan achieved prominence among them by virtue of his intelligence, wisdom, maturity, and experience, and his leadership was accepted. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, some of these tribesmen migrated to the banks of the Gorgān River and engaged in agriculture on an extensive scale. At times they were obedient to the governors of Astarābād and paid agricultural taxes; at other times they were in a state of rebellion, and the more unruly elements among them carried out raids along the frontier of that province.

After the death of Shah Tahmasp, *qezelbāš* affairs fell into such a state of chaos that no *qezelbāš* governor was able to maintain his position at Astarābād. In every district, some noble would follow the practice of the Sīāh-pūš tribe and build a castle to defend himself against the raids of the Ṣā'en-ḳānī Yaqqa Turkmans; he would stock his castle with musketeers and archers and assert his independence in his own particular district. 'Alyār Khan followed a prudent policy in regard to these upstart lords: He kept them happy with a minimum of blandishment and gifts, and got in their way as little as possible.

After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, the Uzbegs swept across Khorasan and subjugated the province of Ḵ̌ārazm and the districts of Nesā and Darūn, which are adjacent to Astarābād. Shah 'Abbas adopted a cautious policy toward the Yaqqa Turkmans, being afraid that, because they were coreligionists of the Uzbegs, they might make common cause with the latter and overrun the province of Astarābād. Therefore, when 'Alyār Khan made overtures to him through the good offices of Mīrzā Beg, the Shah was most gracious toward him, issued an order appointing him governor of Astarābād, and in general treated him with great civility.

ʿAlyār Khan was delighted by his appointment, and sent a *dārūḡa* to administer the city on his behalf. He himself remained near the Gorgān River and continued to cultivate friendly relations with the Sīāh-pūš tribe. Through his efforts, the inhabitants of Astarābād, most of whom were pious and God-fearing men, were protected from molestation by the other Ṣā'en-ḵānī tribes. Things went on in this way for a considerable time, but when ʿAlyār Khan died, his son repaired to the Safavid court, as I have already stated. Since Shah ʿAbbas was still obliged to act with great circumspection in this area, he issued an order appointing Moḥammad Yār Khan governor of Astarābād on the same basis as his father.

Another death this year was that of Aqa Shah ʿAlī Dowlatābādī Eṣfahānī, the comptroller of the realm *(mostowfī al-mamālek);* he died of pleurisy and pneumonia during the Shah's stay at Isfahan. He was a self-controlled and upright man who treated the people well. His skill in bookkeeping and clerical work was unequaled, and he was a master accountant. The chronogram of his death is "The standard of accountancy has departed" (1005/1596-97).

Events of the Year of the Fowl, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1006/1597-98, the Eleventh Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day occurred this year on Friday, 2 Ša'bān 1005/21 March 1597. The Shah was at Qazvin, and the weather, for once, was unseasonable, with an overcast sky and steady rain. Winter had not relaxed its grip, and the New Year's festivities had to be postponed for several days because of persistent snow and rain. When the weather at last improved, the Shah held his customary New Year's audience in the Čehel Sotūn hall of the royal palace. Monarchs and princes from many parts and foreign ambassadors were received by the Shah, and offered their felicitations on the occasion of the New Year.

An auspicious event which occurred this year was the birth of the Shah's son, Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā. Messengers were sent to all parts of the empire to announce the glad news; kettledrums were beaten for several days, and high and low, young and old made the prince's birth an occasion for further merrymaking. Every day the Shah played polo in the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād, and took part in archery contests. Then, his holiday over, he turned his attention once more to urgent affairs of state.

This year, the Uzbegs returned to the attack, this time from two different directions; their plundering raids extended from Khorasan to Iraq, and a number of skirmishers reached Damghan and Besṭām. Some of these scattered in pursuit of plunder; others stood on guard in case their assistance was required. Ḥoseyn Khan Čeganī, after being dismissed from his post as governor of Hamadan, had been made governor of Besṭām; he and Mīrzā 'Alī Beg 'Arab 'Āmerī, the guardian of the roads *(mostaḥfeẓ-e šavāre'),* who happened to be at Besṭām, abandoned all caution and attacked the Uzbegs without waiting for their troops to mobilize. The Uzbeg reserves emerged from their place of ambush and charged the Safavid forces, which were routed with heavy casualties; Ḥoseyn Khan and Mīrzā 'Alī 'Arab, after putting up a hard fight, were both killed.

Another group of Uzbeg raiders, starting from Toršīz, took the road to Kūharz, a dependency of Damghan. Going beyond the confines of Khorasan, they made their presence felt as far as Ārān and Bīd-e Gol in the Kashan district, on the edge of the desert. The *dārūġa* of Semnān, like Ḥoseyn Khan Čeganī, made the mistake of underestimating the opposition and pursued the Uzbegs with a force of local Persian levies from Semnān. They were attacked by the Uzbegs, the *dārūġa* was unable to hold his ground, and his men fled.

Shah 'Alī Khan Mīr Čamešgezek marched against the enemy from his fief at Ḵār, with a body of Čamešgezek *ġāzīs*, and caught up with them in the desert near Bojnūd; in the battle, several Uzbeg leaders were killed. Their men fled, abandoning their booty, which was later collected by Shah 'Alī Khan, who sent the heads of the slain, together with the prisoners, to court. This victory checked further Uzbeg raids for the moment, but prudence dictated that the Safavid forces remain on the alert. Steps also had to be taken to deal with the revolt of 'Alī Khan Gerāylī. A detachment of *qezelbāš* was therefore dispatched in the direction of Besṭām, with the object both of getting warning of Uzbeg movements in Khorasan and of suppressing the revolt of 'Alī Khan. Beyrām 'Alī Sultan, the brother of Ḥasan 'Alī Khan Čeganī, was appointed governor of Besṭām, and Darvīš 'Alī Ḵalīfa was made chief of the Gerāylī tribe; he was the son of Mīrzā 'Alī Ḵalīfa, whose family had been emirs of that tribe for generations.

Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Qom; Valī Khan Mīrzā, the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan Šāmlū; and Ḥoseyn Khan Moṣāḥeb Qājār were sent to Besṭām. Their orders were to camp in the Besṭām plain until the crop had been harvested and, if the Uzbegs launched any raids, to march against them; they were also to collect military intelligence from all parts of Khorasan. After the crops had been harvested and stored safely in the forts, Ḥoseyn Khan Qājār was to return to his fief, and Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Qom, was to march into Gerāylī territory with his Šāmlū troops, capture the fort held by the rebel 'Alī Khan Gerāylī, and install Darvīš 'Alī Ḵalīfa as governor of that region.

The emirs carried out their orders to the letter, and Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū returned to court and was received with honor by the Shah. 'Alī Khan Gerāylī had been deserted by most of the *begs* and elders of the Gerāylī tribes, who had elected to demonstrate their loyalty to the Shah and had transferred their allegiance to 'Alī Khan Gerāylī. 'Alī Khan Gerāylī sought some means of making amends for his rebellion and of reinstating himself in royal favor, but without avail, and he eventually paid the penalty for his disloyalty.

Although Shah 'Abbas, from the time of his accession, had been under the protection of providence and, with God's aid, his officers had won many victories, this year the divine favor was vouchsafed in the form of several notable successes that surpassed any which had preceded them. The whole of the province of Ṭabarestān, including all the forts in Māzandarān and Rostamdār, was brought under the control of Ṣafavid officers, as was the province of Lorestān, and Šāhverdī Khan, the governor of Lorestān, was taken prisoner.

The Subjugation of Rostamdār and the Capture of the Forts and Rulers of That Region, by God's Grace

The province of Rostamdār is situated between Gīlān and Māzandarān. It consists of plains and the mountains of Ṭavaleš from Āmol and Māzandarān on the east, to Tonakābon in Gīlān on the west; in width, Rostamdār consists of the strip between Mount Damāvand and the Caspian Sea. During the 'Abbasid caliphate, the whole of the province of Rostamdār, together with its dependencies, was in the hands of the ancestors of Malek Kayūmarṣ b. Bīsotūn b. Gostaham, who traced their descent from Jāmāsb b. Fīrūz, the paternal uncle of Nūšīrvān b. Qobād, the Sasanid monarch.

In the course of time, the power of the rulers of Rostamdār declined; Rūyān, formerly the administrative center and seat of the rulers of Rostamdār, slipped from their control, and other parts of the province were annexed by the rulers of Iran and incorporated in the province of Iraq. The portions left to the rulers of Rostamdār were Lārījān, Nūr, and Kojūr, which were divided among the various princes of this house in the manner already described.

In the time of Shah Tahmasp, the house of Rostamdār had three branches: Lārījān, formerly a dependency of Kojūr, ruled by Malek Bahman; Nūr, ruled by Malek 'Azīz; and Kojūr, ruled by Malek Sultan Moḥammad. By the time Shah 'Abbas came to the throne, Malek Sultan Moḥammad and Malek 'Azīz had both died, and their respective sons (both named Jahāngīr), had inherited their patrimony. Both Jahāngīrs had presented themselves to the Shah at Lār and had indicated their willingness to serve him. The ruler of Nūr, a man of ascetic temperament, made a gift of his territory to the Shah, and accepted a fief at Sāva, where he lived out the remainder of his days. Malek Jahāngīr, the ruler of Kojūr, was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* and officers in attendance at the Shah's private assemblies, so that he became the envy of his peers. He retained possession of his ancestral dominions, and his subsequent history will be given later, God willing.

When Malek Bahman, as already related, met his just deserts, his eldest son, Key Ḵosrow, then seventeen years of age, was at the castle of Došmankūr, together with his brothers and the rest of the family. He moved his father's treasury to the fort, thinking that as long as he remained there, no harm could come to him. However, he did not have the necessary support to enable him to maintain his opposition to the Shah. The former retainers and supporters of Malek Bahman were so disgusted by his improper actions and tyrannical behavior that his removal from the scene was a relief to them, and they refused to do their duty in regard to the defense of the fort and the protection of his family.

In this situation, Malek Key Ḵosrow had no choice but to throw himself on the mercy of the Shah, whom he visited with a number of the chiefs of his house. He agreed to hand over the fort of Došmankūr to the agents of the supreme *dīvān*, and the Shah ordered Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū, a senior Šāmlū chief and a *moqarrab*, to expropriate Malek Bahman's assets and take possession of his forts and his sons. Moḥammad Beg took possession of the forts at Lārījān and Došmankūr and expropriated all Malek Bahman's assets, comprising cash, precious items, handguns and other weapons, the provisions of the forts, and the trappings of a ruler, and sent it to Qazvin along with Malek Bahman's servants, family, and sons.

Since the Shah had promised Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn that, if Malek Bahman and his sons ever fell into his hands, he would turn them over to him, he now surrendered them all to him, both males and females, and Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn wreaked his vengeance on them for the sins of Malek Bahman (and in so doing he was merely acting as the agent of the divine will). The district of Lavāsān was allotted to Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn; Lārījān was made a fief of the *qezelbāš* governor; and this house became extinct. Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn was a ruthless man who thought nothing of shedding blood; he would impose severe penalties for minor offenses, and in his prisons languished persons who had been incarcerated for twenty or thirty years for some minor offense. One source informed me (the responsibility for the accuracy of this statement rests with its source) that one woman, who had been thrown into jail because of Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn's enmity toward her father and her brother, spent her whole life in prison and finally died there.

The Subjugation of the Province of Kojūr and the Capture of Malek Jahāngīr

As already mentioned, Malek Jahāngīr had initially obtained a position of honor in the Shah's service. The Shah, finding him a slightly mad, simple-minded fellow, treated him kindly, but eventually either his folly or his madness led him to throw away his honored position at court by returning to Kojūr, strengthening his forts, and becoming a rebel. The Shah sent a detachment of *qūrčīs* against him, under the command of Allāhqolī Beg, the *qūrčībāšī*. The *qūrčīs* laid siege to the fortress of Kojūr, known as Mārānkūh,[1] and gunners from the special *ḡolām* artillery regiment cast large cannon and bombarded the fort. The siege dragged on for four months. During this time a group of Rostamdārī *maleks* plotted treachery against the Safavid commander; if they could slay Allāhqolī Beg, they thought, the siege of Mārānkūh would be raised. They therefore tendered their submission to the Shah, declared themselves to be his loyal and devoted servants, went to Allāhqolī Beg with some fifty men, and bound themselves to help him capture the fort. The *qūrčībāšī* reported all this to the Shah; meanwhile, he bestowed on the Rostamdārī chiefs robes of honor, and they bathed in royal favor.

The Shah, however, relying on his intuition, warned him against possible treachery on the part of the Rostamdārīs, and urged him to be on his guard. The conspirators, apparently loyal, kept coming into the *qezelbāš* camp and entering the *qūrčībāšī's* tent, ostensibly to discuss with him details regarding the progress of the siege, but in reality waiting for their opportunity to murder him. The *qūrčībāšī*, wise as he was, was completely taken in by them. One day, when the *qūrčībāšī* had gone to the bathhouse, the conspirators, pretending they had to speak with him urgently, came armed and waited outside. One of the conspirators warned the *qūrčībāšī* of his danger, and the latter, before coming out, sent a servant to summon the centurions, who seized the conspirators. Upon interrogation, they all confessed and were put to death by the *ḡāzīs*.

[1] See Rabino, pp. 83, 106, 128, and 162, n. 104.

Soon afterward, the fortress fell to the Safavids. Before this happened, Malek Jahāngīr, despairing of success, had left his brothers at Mārānkūh and taken refuge in another fort. But he found his position there too untenable, and fled into the forests, constantly moving his quarters. A few days after he had left, the *qūrčīs* learned he was no longer in the fort. In the course of the bombardment, a considerable portion of the sun-dried brick of the towers had been smashed, and some of the interior timbers had been exposed. At dead of night, a small patrol of *qūrčīs* crept up to the walls and set fire to these timbers. The defenders cried for quarter and opened the gates of the fort. When the *qūrčīs* entered, they took prisoner Malek Jahāngīr's brother Malek Kā'ūs; another brother, Malek Ašraf, who was in the castle at Harsīn, was taken prisoner by Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan Fīrūzjāng, the governor of Tonakābon, and sent to Allāhqolī Beg. The greater part of the Kojūr troops were put to death; the survivors were enrolled among the Shah's servants.

After the capture of the castle of Mārānkūh, the *ḡāzīs* fanned out in the forests, searching for Malek Jahāngīr. As luck would have it, a group of Sufis, retainers of Valī Sultan the governor of Rānekūh in Gīlān, who in obedience to the Shah's orders were on their way to assist the *qūrčībāšī*, stumbled across Malek Jahāngīr on their way. When he caught sight of the Sufis, Malek Jahāngīr ordered the small group of picked men who were with him to engage the enemy and hold them off while he made his escape. The Sufis overcame the opposition; one of their number chancing to recognize Malek Jahāngīr, they did not call off the pursuit, but overtaking him in a defile, they dismounted from their horses and fell upon him.

Malek Jahāngīr and his companions were taken prisoner. The Sufis, taking their prisoners through the *qūrčībāšī's* camp during the night, took Malek Jahāngīr direct to court, and the *qūrčībāšī* sent in a full report. The Shah received the news of this triumph on his return from the campaign against Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī in Lorestān, and he returned thanks to God for this success. Since Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan and his men had performed notable services during the campaign in Kojūr, that province was initially allotted to him as a reward; after the reconquest of Khorasan, Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan was appointed governor of Saraḵs, and the *qūrčībāšī* was made governor of Kojūr. Malek Jahāngīr's brothers and the other prisoners were taken to court by the *qūrčībāšī* and put to death on the Shah's order at Sāūj Bolāḡ. This terminated the line of the third of the three *maleks* of Rostamdār (Nūr, Kojūr, and Lārījān), and the whole of the province was now under the jurisdiction of Safavid officers.

The Shah's Campaign against Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī, the Governor of Lorestān; the Capture of the Latter; and the Transfer of the Province to his Cousin, Ḥoseyn Khan

As already related, Farhad Khan and the *e'temād al-dowla* had made a settlement in Lorestān with Šāhverdī Khan.[2] Although the Shah intended to punish Šāhverdī Khan for his behavior, including his temerity in murdering Oğūrlū Sultan Bayāt, and was unable to condone acts of this sort, he did not repudiate the settlement made by Farhād Khan and the vizier and took no action against Šāhverdī Khan for a while. The loyalty of the latter, however, despite his assurances, continued to be in doubt; like so many people, he tried to keep in with both sides, the Ottomans and the Safavids. He continued to correspond with the Ottomans, in particular with the governor of Baghdad, to exchange envoys with them, and to engage in all kinds of intrigue, and this behavior continued to stoke the fires of the Shah's anger.

Šāhverdī Khan, conscious of his past misdeeds and afraid the Shah would march against him, avoided going to Ḵorramābād because it was too close to Borūjerd and Sīlāḵor. This year, however, because of the excessive heat, and on the advice of his senior chiefs, he had come to Ḵorramābād. While he was there, Seyyed Badr, the son of Seyyed Mobārak, who had left court without leave and was making for 'Arabestān, was brought in. The Shah dispatched a *qūrčī*, Abu'l Qāsem Ev-oğlū, to bring Seyyed Badr back, but Šāhverdī Khan procrastinated for several days, fobbing the envoy off with words, until Abu'l-Qāsem Beg was forced to use some strong language to get him to comply with the Shah's orders. The *qūrčī* reported Šāhverdī's Khan's obstructive and disloyal behavior to the Shah, and this finally tipped the balance and made the Shah determined to march against him.

Šāhverdī Khan never slept peacefully at night, because he knew it was only a matter of time before the Shah moved against him. He had stationed spies to send him word the moment the Shah left Qazvin. In order to put him off guard, the Shah informed only his personal retainers and *moqarrabs* of his real intention, and pretended to the rest of his troops that his destination was Isfahan. He marched to Sāva and then to Āva, and then swung west toward Lorestān, marching at full speed, and reaching Borūjerd, a distance of twenty *farsaḵs*, in a day and a night. He had ridden without pause, his men dropping out in large numbers as their horses foundered, so that by the time he reached the Borūjerd area barely five hundred were still with him. He waited a short time at Borūjerd to let some of his men catch up. Then he mounted again and covered another eight *farsaḵs* by morning; by breakfast time he was within sight of Ḵorramābād, but no more than forty or fifty *qūrčīs*, *ḡolāms*, and *moqarrabs* had stayed with him. They circled the town and surrounded Šāhverdī Khan's residence, hoping with God's help to succeed in taking him prisoner.

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[2] See pp. 675–6.

Šāhverdī Khan's spies had sent him daily reports of the Shah's departure for Isfahan, but the Khan had placed no reliance in them, saying that as far as Sāva the Shah could still turn in the direction of Lorestān, and caution was therefore necessary. He ordered a group of Lors from the Lāymardān tribe to camp on the banks of the river across the road to Ṣadmara, and he had several horses, recently broken in, kept saddled and bridled for a quick getaway. Then another courier arrived to say he had accompanied the Shah as far as Āva, and that he was bound for Isfahan. At this point, Šāhverdī Khan relaxed.

On the day the Shah reached Ḵorramābād, a courier had arrived early in the morning to inform the Khan that he had seen a posse of horsemen near Borūjerd, riding at full speed. The Khan, thinking the Lors had betrayed him in order to save their own necks, decided to be prudent and prepared for an immediate departure, without informing his troops. He saw that his women and children were mounted, and that his cash, jewels, and precious articles were sent in the direction of Ṣadmara in the charge of a few trusted servants. The Khan himself was still standing irresolutely at the Lāymardān Gate when he saw a group of *ḡolāms* of the royal household *(ḡolāmān-e ḵāṣṣa-ye šarīfa)*, who had lost their way among the orchards, making their way along by the river, where his quarters were located. He galloped away, pursued by the *ḡolāms*, but the latter had to abandon the pursuit after half a *farsaḵ*, since no one came to their assistance.

The Shah meanwhile had discovered that Šāhverdī Khan was not in his house, but camped down by the river. By the time the Shah and his party made their way through the orchards and reached his tents, he was half a *farsaḵ* away. The Shah waited a while for some of his men to catch up with him, but they were slow in arriving; and when they did come, their horses were exhausted and unfit for a pursuit. The Shah therefore waited in Ḵorramābād for three days, during which the majority of the Lor tribes came to him and tendered their obeisance. The Shah placed in charge of the tribes Ḥoseyn Khan b. Manṣūr Beg Solvīzī, whose father was the uncle of Šāhverdī Khan.

This year, the Shah had already subdued two rebels: ʿAlī Khan Gerāylī and Malek Jahāngīr, the ruler of Kojūr; he was determined to make Šāhverdī Khan the third. He marched to Ṣadmara to discover that the Khan had not tarried there either, but had left Lorestān. The Shah placed a garrison at Ṣadmara and sent two patrols to seek him out: The first, under the command of the *qollar-āqāsī*, Allāhverdī Khan, consisted of *ḡolāms* of the royal household; the second was under the command of Qan̄bar Beg Ostājlū, the chief sword bearer.[3]

Šāhverdī Khan had taken refuge with one of his relatives, a certain Šāhrokh who was commandant for the Ottomans of a fort named Jangala, which was under the jurisdiction of Baghdad. Šāhverdī Khan was confident that the Safavids would not pursue him into Ottoman territory, but the hunt went on remorselessly. One morning Allāhverdī Khan and his *ḡolāms* happened to pass by this fort and to learn from a cowherd that Šāhverdī Khan and his family were within. The *ḡolāms* at once galloped up to the fort, and a group of them swarmed over the drawbridge and reached the gates under a hail of arrows and bullets from the defenders. The *ḡolāms* returned their fire; those who had reached the gates knew they could not retreat without having to answer to the Shah and their commander.

They therefore set fire to the gates and stood there with their shields over their heads, hoping a gap would appear through which they could pour into the fort. The heat from the flames was so great it prevented the defenders from getting near the fire to extinguish it. The gates were soon half-consumed, and a crack appeared through which the *ḡolāms*, with their shields over their heads and their chain mail and jerkins protecting their chests, charged into the fort. Some

[3] *Salīḥdār-bāšī;* this office is not mentioned by *TM*. In the Ottoman administrative system, the office of *sılıḥdār-āḡā* was largely ceremonial, but its holder was nevertheless an important official with a large entourage (see Gibb and Bowen, pp. i, 339–40).

of the defenders rushed to the battlements; others took their stations on rooftops; and the fight went on.

Šāhverdī Khan appeared, gun in hand, on the roof of his house, but every time he aimed it at the *ḡolāms,* it misfired. He hurled the weapon away in a rage and took up his bow. A reliable witness reports him as saying: "The first time I fired an arrow, my bowstring snapped. I knew that my luck had run out. I hurled my bow away too, and gave up the struggle; I shouted to both sides to lay down their arms, and I sent a messenger to Allāhverdī Khan to beg him to order his men not to molest any of the people in the fort." Since the Lors had laid down their arms, the *ḡolāms,* on orders from Allāhverdī Khan, molested no one. Šāhverdī Khan was brought before Allāhverdī Khan, who treated him with due courtesy, and placed a guard on the women of his harem and his children. Šāhrokh, the Ottoman governor and commandant of the fort, who had received a mortal wound in the fighting, was taken to the Safavid camp for surgery, but died on arrival there; some of Šāhverdī Khan's men were also killed in the engagement.

Allāhverdī Khan took Šāhverdī Khan, his children, and his dependents to the Shah. When they reached the Ṣadmara River, chains were placed around Šāhverdī Khan's neck. Allāhverdī Khan held the other end of the chain and led the prisoner into the presence of the Shah. Šāhverdī Khan was a handsome young man; had he but dissembled and shown some humility, in all probability even now he would have escaped injury. But he adopted a proud and haughty demeanor, most unsuitable for a person who was in a bad position and in the presence of the Shah, and the Shah had the Khan and several of his supporters put to death immediately.

The second search party, led by Qanbar Beg Ostājlū, returned to Ḵorramābād; it had gone in the direction of Bādarāyā[4] and had carried out a raid in that area, taking many animals as plunder. The Shah disapproved of the property of the peasants being looted in this way, and he had all the booty gathered together and returned to the governor of Baghdad in the charge of a *qūrčī,* with the request that it be given back to its owners. Ḥoseyn Khan Solvīzī, the son of Manṣūr Beg, was appointed governor of Lorestān, except for Ṣadmara, Hendemīn, and other districts nearer Baghdad, which were allotted to Ṭahmaspqolī Sultan Īnānlū. Since the Ḵāma-bīdel tribe were enemies of the Solvīzīs and supporters of Šāhverdī Khan and the sons of Šojā' al-Dīn, they refused to accept Ḥoseyn Khan Solvīzī as their governor. The tribe thus incurred the wrath of the Shah, who had the ringleaders executed at Ḵorramābād, together with a number of other Lors whom he suspected of causing trouble. He had Jahāngīr, one of the sons of Šojā' al-Dīn, who was living among the Bayāt tribe, blinded, and two of the sons of Šāhverdī Khan sent to Alamūt. They were never heard of again.

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[4] A district east of the Tigris bordering on the provinces of Ḵūzestān and Jebāl (see Le Strange, *Lands,* p. 80).

Thus the rule of the so-called 'Abbasids of Lorestān came to an end, and the province was transferred to the true 'Abbasids, namely, the followers of Shah 'Abbas. The rest of the Lors submitted to Ḥoseyn Khan Solvīzī, whose power in Lorestān steadily increased and far surpassed that of any of the sons of Šojā' al-Dīn. At the time of writing (1025/1616), Ḥoseyn Khan is still governor of Lorestān.

The Capture of 'Alī Khan Gerāylī and His Paying the Penalty for His Treachery

As previously related, 'Alī Khan Gerāylī had rebelled and as a result had been deprived of his fief; Jājarm and some other districts had been allotted to Tavakkol Khan Gerāylī, and the forts at Pā-ye Ḥeṣār and Rūḡad, with some other places, had been allotted to Darvīš Ḵalīfa, who was duly installed at Pā-ye Ḥeṣār by Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū after he had captured that fort from 'Alī Khan. The majority of the Gerāylī chiefs transferred their allegiance to Darvīš 'Alī Ḵalīfa and Tavakkol Khan, and 'Alī Khan was at a loss where to find sanctuary. He had on a previous occasion taken refuge among the Uzbegs, but not trusting 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, had fled and thrown himself on the mercy of the Shah; he could not appeal to the Uzbegs a second time. Finally, he sent a messenger to Manṣūr Khan Beg Gerāylī, who was a relative of his and a loyal servant of the Shah and with whom he was on bad terms, and requested a meeting. Manṣūr Khan Beg having indicated his willingness to meet him, 'Alī Khan went to his house with a few men and tried by means of guile to persuade him to join him in fomenting rebellion.

Manṣūr Khan Beg, who always avoided getting involved in anything of this sort, would have nothing to do with the idea; not only that, but mindful of the Shah's wrath, he placed 'Alī Khan in custody and sent a report to the Shah. The Shah sent Ḥoseyn Beg Amākaš to fetch 'Alī Khan to court. Ḥoseyn Beg placed his prisoner in stocks and pillory and presented him to the Shah at Borūjerd when the Shah was on his way back from the expedition to Lorestān. The Shah condemned him to death, which indeed he deserved, for there is no worse sin than ingratitude toward one's benefactor. First, his eyes were plucked out; then, some of his limbs and members were cut off; finally, his body was left where it lay, as a warning to others, and the army marched. No one, soldier or civilian, dared go to his assistance, for fear of the royal wrath.

The Subjugation of the Castle of Owlād in Māzandarān, Which Is One of the World's Famous Castles

Another event which occurred this year was the capture of the fortress of Owlād in Māzandarān. The previous year, Farhād Khan had subjugated most of Māzandarān and installed his brother Alvand Khan there as governor, but the fortress of Owlād had remained in the hands of Alvand Dīv. Owlād was a legacy from the ancient kings of Iran, and was the strongest fortress in Ṭabarestān. Alvand Dīv became the focal point for dissidents in the province. Alvand Khan went out of his way to try and keep the peace with Alvand Dīv, to such an extent that some people accused him of being in opposition to his brother and on the side of the Māzandarānī rebels. Although Alvand Khan was a bit crazy and his actions were frequently irrational, he was not guilty of this, which would have been pure madness.

After the Shah had returned from Lorestān, he sent Farhād Khan to deal with the situation in Māzandarān by capturing Owlād. To begin with, Farhād Khan sent his brother Alvand to court to give an account of himself. The Shah soon realized that the charges of collaboration that had been leveled against him were completely without foundation, and that if Alvand Khan had committed certain actions which smacked of collaboration, he was guilty of nothing more than folly, stupidity, and mental aberration. At the worst, he had been forced by circumstances to behave in a conciliatory manner for a while toward the enemy, and the Shah therefore released him.

Farhād Khan first entered into correspondence with Alvand Dīv, but the latter, with the fate of Malek Bahman vividly before him, refused categorically to meet the Khan. Farhād Khan therefore proceeded to lay siege to Owlād. Prior to his arrival, Alvand Dīv, leaving his children and supporters in the fort, had taken to the forests with a small band of men. He was a man of action, and he saw no hope of salvation if he allowed himself to be besieged by the *qezelbāš*. Things began to get difficult for the defenders of the fort, and after Farhād Khan had suborned some of their number by means of bribes, the remainder saw no alternative but to surrender to the Khan. He took possession of all Alvand Dīv's property both in cash and kind, took prisoner his children and supporters, and reported the victory to the Shah. The latter received the news at Kashan, as he was on his way from Qazvin to Isfahan; he loaded Farhād Khan with robes of honor and rewards of all kinds. Alvand Dīv continued to roam the forests, constantly changing his abode. The rest of his story will be given, God willing, under the events of next year.

Miscellaneous Events That Occurred This Year

Early this year, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, who had been on an embassy to Istanbul, returned with a letter of friendship from the Ottoman sultan which urged the strengthening of the peace between the two empires. Also this year, the ambassadors from the Mogul emperor Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, Mīrzā Żīā al-Dīn Qazvīnī and Ḵāja Abū Naṣr Ḵāfī, were dismissed with robes of honor and gifts.

Manūčehr Beg, a *ḡolām* of the royal household and *ešīk-āqāsī-bāšī*, was appointed ambassador to India, and took his departure with Mīrzā Żīā al-Dīn. Among the gifts he took for the Mogul emperor were one hundred thoroughbred horses, all sired by pedigreed Arabian, Georgian, and Bayātī stallions; Arabian mares, each worth a fortune; and other gifts and products of Iran without number. The Iranian ambassador also took a letter of friendship addressed to Emperor Akbar. In the course of this letter, the Shah announced his firm intention to recover the province of Khorasan from the Uzbegs. On several occasions since his accession, said the Shah, he had marched against the Uzbegs, but each time circumstances had prevented him from wresting Khorasan from the hands of the enemy. He had also been much preoccupied with enemies at home. He was now free from these preoccupations, he said, and Iran was currently at peace with the Ottomans. He had sworn not to return to Qazvin until Khorasan was once more in Safavid hands. The ambassadors traveled to India by way of Kerman, Kīj, and Makrān.

Up till now, Qazvin had been Shah 'Abbas's capital, and Isfahan had been the place to which he had gone for recreation, especially hunting. The natural advantages of Isfahan, such as its favorable location and the abundance of water from the Zāyanda-rūd and other streams which fed it, had made a great impression on the Shah, and he had long planned to spend some time there, laying out and developing the city. This was the year in which he decided to implement these plans.

The Shah spent the winter of 1597-98 at Isfahan, residing at the Naqš-e Jahān palace and spending most of his days in hunting and his nights in feasting. In the spring of 1598, he approved plans for the construction of magnificent buildings in the Naqš-e Jahān district, and architects and engineers strove to complete them. From the Darb-e Dowlat, which is the name for the city gate located within the Naqš-e Jahān precincts, he constructed an avenue to the Zāyanda-rūd. Four parks[5] were laid out on each side of the avenue, and fine buildings adorned each. The avenue was continued across the river as far as the mountains bounding Isfahan to the south. The emirs and officers of state were charged with the creation of the parks and the construction of lodges on a royal scale within the parks, each to consist of reception rooms, covered ways, porticos, balconies, finely adorned belvederes, and murals in gold and lapis lazuli.

At the southern end of the avenue, there was to be a vast garden, terraced on nine levels, for the pleasure of the king's guests; it was to be known as the 'Abbāsābād garden. The river was to be spanned by a bridge of special design: it was to have forty arches and, when the river was in spate, water would flow through all of them. The southern and northern portions of the avenue met at this bridge, and the total length of the avenue, as far as the 'Abbāsābād, was about one *farsak̲*. On each side of the avenue, water flowed through channels, and trees were planted along them—planes, pines, and junipers. A stone conduit was also constructed down the center of the avenue to form another channel for water. In front of the buildings in the parks, ponds were to be constructed of the size of small lakes.

The emirs, nobles, and superintendents of buildings put the architects and engineers to work, and many magnificent buildings and splendid gardens have been completed in the last eighteen years, the whole scheme being the product of the Shah's fertile imagination.

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[5] This feature gave the avenue its name, Čahār Bāḡ, which it still bears today.

The gardens were planted with both shade and fruit trees, and the buildings were decorated with novel designs in gilt and embellished with the works of artists. Perhaps Sadīr and Ḳavarnaq[6] were their equal; otherwise it is hard to imagine that their peer exists anywhere in the world. Later on, the suburb of 'Abbāsābād was built to the west of the Čahār Bāḡ to afford lodging to the Tabrīzīs, as will be related in due course. Shah 'Abbas spent many hours beautifying Isfahan with buildings, parks, attractive residences with porticos and belvederes, the Qeyṣarīya and Čahār Bāzār markets, mosques, bathhouses, and the magnificent Meṣr-e Jāme' *caravanserais*. The chronogram for the commencement of work on the Čahār Bāḡ is: "The sapling bore fruit in accordance with the Shah's wishes."

Another event that occurred this year was the arrival of ambassadors from the Georgian princes Alexander Khan and Samā'ūn (Simon) Khan, who sent a number of Georgian girls and youths of noble birth for service in the royal harem. The ambassadors were loaded with gifts and sent on their way.

Also this year there occurred the murder of Moḥammad Yār Khan, the son of 'Alyār Khan Īmūr, at the hands of the Ūḳlū tribe; Moḥammad Yār Khan, after the death of his father, had been raised to the rank of khan and allotted the governorship of Astarābād on the same terms as his father before him. After the murder of Moḥammad Yār Khan, his younger brother, Qelīj Beg, presented himself at the Safavid court, and Shah 'Abbas made him governor of Astarābād.

Shah 'Abbas spent the winter of 1006/1597-98 at Isfahan, taking his ease, but never for one moment neglecting the affairs of state. The spring of 1598 ushered in the Year of the Dog, the year in which the Shah's prayers to the Imam Reżā to assist him in the recovery of the province of Khorasan were finally answered.

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[6] Two celebrated palaces built by No'mān b. Monẕer for the Sasanid monarch Bahrām Gūr.

The Events of the Year of the Dog, Corresponding to the Year 1007/1598-99, the Twelfth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Monday[1] 11 Ša'bān 1006/20 March 1598. Early in the year, Moḥammadqolī Beg 'Arabgīrlū, the *ešīk-āqāšī*, who had gone on an embassy to the Uzbegs and had met 'Abdollāh Khan at Herat, returned to Iran in the company of an Uzbeg ambassador, Tātloq Bahādor. Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš sent by the hand of the latter a letter of friendship. Also, since his son had recently become a married man, a portion of the wedding feast was sent as a gift to the Shah. With Tātloq Bahādor there also came Mīrzā Beg, an eminent *naqīb*[2] of Transoxania and a *ḵāja* of the Naqšbandī Order. Mīrzā Beg had with him his whole household (his wife was a daughter of the ruling house at Kāšḡar), and was on his way to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage. After being received with great respect by the Shah, he went on his way but died en route before reaching Mecca.

It seemed to Shah 'Abbas that he could take advantage of the estrangement between 'Abdollāh Khan and his son, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, to recover Khorasan—a province praised by poets, in which were situated the shrine of the Imam Reżā and his own birthplace, the city of Herat, where he spent his early years. In view of the fact the Mīr Qolbābā, who was the protégé and trusted officer of 'Abdollāh Khan, had seen fit to make overtures to the Shah because of his fear of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and the fact that 'Abdollāh Khan himself had used this démarche by Mīr Qolbābā to put his own relations with the Shah on a more friendly basis, and had sent an ambassador to the Safavid court as an earnest of this desire, it seemed to Shah 'Abbas to be sound policy to accept 'Abdollāh Khan's overtures, to send a return embassy to the Uzbeg ruler, and at the same time to march against 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, who had had the temerity to rebel against his father. In the first place, argued the Shah, father and son would be preoccupied with their own quarrel, which had now reached the stage of open conflict; in the second place, 'Abdollāh Khan, because of his son's lack of filial piety and his rebelliousness, was striving to break his power, and consequently would be unlikely to come to his son's assistance in Khorasan. "With God's help," said the Shah, "we will reconquer Khorasan; in any case, there is no harm in sending an embassy to 'Abdollāh Khan."

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[1] The eleventh of Sha'bān fell on a Thursday.

[2] The *naqīb* was an official in charge of guild affairs. In Safavid Iran, he was subordinate to the *kalāntar* (see *TM*, pp. 81, 83).

Moḥammadqolī Beg, a smooth-tongued man, was again chosen as ambassador to 'Abdollāh Khan, and the Shah began to make his preparations for the expedition to Khorasan. He gave orders that ten thousand musketeers be mustered from all parts of the Safavid dominions. After the departure of the embassy to 'Abdollāh Khan, his intention was to inform Mīr Qolbābā of his plan to recover Mašhad. At this moment couriers brought the news that 'Abdollāh Khan had died, and that most of the Uzbeg emirs (for instance, Moḥammad Bāqī Bī, who was 'Abdollāh Khan's *dīvānbegī* and chief officer of state), had given their allegiance, willingly or otherwise, to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. However, 'Abdollāh Khan's nephew, Hezāra Sultan, with Dūstom Sultan and Uzbeg Sultan, his cousins, had formed a coalition against 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and thought they saw the chance to make themselves independent. Those emirs who were dominated by their fear of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had rallied around him and marched against the rebel coalition. This news strengthened the resolve of the Shah to march to Khorasan.

In book I, I stated that I would give as much historical background pertaining to the Uzbegs and the Ottomans as was relevant to the history of Iran under Shah 'Abbas. At this point, therefore, I must digress to give the reader some details regarding the estrangement between 'Abdollāh Khan and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, the death of the former and the accession and subsequent death of the latter—details indispensable for a proper understanding of the Khorasan campaign.

Events in Transoxania and the History of 'Abdollāh Khan and the Other Uzbeg Princes

'Abdollāh Khan was extremely fond of 'Abd al-Mo'men, who was his only son, and used to call him Bābā. It is the tradition of the rulers descended from the house of Genghis Khan to style themselves khan. Princes of the blood royal, until they come to the throne, are styled sultan. But 'Abd al-Mo'men received the appelation of khan during his father's lifetime, with the result that the people of Transoxania and the Uzbegs used to call 'Abdollāh "the old Khan" and 'Abd al-Mo'men "the young Khan." 'Abd al-Mo'men was made governor of Balḵ, and, with his father's assistance, annexed the province of Badaḵšān, wresting it from the control of the princes of the house of Čaḡatāy.

In the Year of the Pig (994/1585-86), when ʿAbdollāh Khan captured Herat after an eleven-month siege, ʿAbd al-Mo'men had expected to be rewarded for the outstanding services he had performed in the siege and slaughter of *qezelbāš* by having Herat added to his territories, particularly since it was close to his fief at Balḵ. But ʿAbdollāh Khan considered him too young and inexperienced, and made Mīr Qolbābā, one of his own protégés and a man of sound judgment, governor of Herat. He distributed among the emirs those areas of Khorasan which came under Uzbeg control: Dīn Moḥammad Khan, the son of Jānī Beg Sultan, known as Yatīm Sultan, who was his own nephew, was given a fief in Khorasan, as were his brothers, whereas ʿAbd al-Mo'men was not allotted a fief in Uzbeg-occupied territory in Khorasan. He used to console ʿAbd al-Mo'men by saying, "since you are my heir, you will get all my possessions in the end." ʿAbd al-Mo'men resented being treated in this way, but at the time was unable to show his resentment.

Two years later, he asked his father that any part of Khorasan which might subsequently be conquered through his efforts should be allotted to him. The request was granted. In the Year of the Ox (996/1587-88), ʿAbd al-Mo'men led an army from Balḵ to Mašhad, which he besieged, and Yatīm Sultan and other emirs who were in Khorasan, on the orders of ʿAbdollāh Khan, went to his aid. After capturing Mašhad, ʿAbd al-Mo'men installed his own governor there. He did the same at Nishapur, Toršīz, and other places in Khorasan that gradually fell into his hands. After that, he picked a quarrel with Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the son of Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan, the son of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and annexed the regions of Nesā, Abīvard, Darūn, Bāḡbād, and so on, which were the ancestral territories of Nūr Moḥammad's family and of the Naīmān Uzbeg tribe.

Since ʿAbdollāh Khan had only one son, he supported this steady acquisition of power by ʿAbd al-Mo'men because he wanted his son to be powerful enough to deal with any challenge to his succession by one of his cousins or one of the other Uzbeg princes. In the end, ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan had an army of twenty thousand seasoned troops under his command. At this point, he began to show signs of rebellion against his father. When ʿAbdollāh Khan had seized power at Bokhara, his father, Eskandar Khan, was still alive; in accordance with Genghizid precedent and customary law, he allowed his father to keep the title of ruler in the *ḵoṭba* and on the coinage, but the real power lay in his own hands. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan began to cite this as a precedent: "My father is getting old," he said, "he should retire and let me take charge of affairs." 'Abd al-Mo'men by this time controlled most of Khorasan, but he wanted complete control over the whole province, as far as Balḵ and the Oxus River. He repeatedly asked his father for Herat and was refused. In his resentment he would say, "If my father will not give me Herat, I will march against Mīr Qolbābā and take it by force."

Such words, reported to 'Abdollāh Khan, were responsible for a change in the Khan's attitude toward his son. Although 'Abd al-Mo'men was his only son and his heir, he was now on his guard lest that son should, in his impatience, oust him from the throne, and he set about seeking means of reducing his power. He forbade 'Abd al-Mo'men to engage in further military adventures designed to increase the size of his territory, and gave orders to his emirs in Khorasan not to obey 'Abd al-Mo'men's commands and not to accompany him on any expedition.

The result was that when 'Abd al-Mo'men marched against Sabzavār and Shah 'Abbas led a counterattack against him from Iraq he received no help from Yatīm Sultan or from 'Abdollāh Khan's brothers in Khorasan. Since his father was not in favor of his expedition, he could achieve nothing further. 'Abdollāh Khan sent him a message: "Do not be greedy! Look after your affairs at Balḵ, and be satisfied with the fief you have! Act in a civilized way, and do not compare our situation with the case of myself and my father Eskandar, because you will never be the man that I am, and I am not as senile as Eskandar Khan was!" Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan refused to give up his dream of ruling Herat, and he kept on registering complaints against Mīr Qolbābā. His father, knowing his motive, disregarded them. Relations between father and son deteriorated, but neither side did anything to provoke open conflict.

In the Year of the Fowl (1006/1597-98), 'Abdollāh Khan came to Marv via Čahār-jū on a hunting expedition, with a few of his favorite emirs and close companions. Mīr Qolbābā begged him to visit Herat. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, with several thousand men, was on his way from Balḵ to meet his father. 'Abdollāh Khan's emirs pointed out that he had only a few men with him, that 'Abd al-Mo'men was not to be trusted, and that they should retire within the walls of the citadel at Marv and deny 'Abd al-Mo'men's men entry. 'Abdollāh Khan, refusing to be intimidated, received his son at his camp in the Šāhom Bī park. 'Abd al-Mo'men considered it politic on this occasion to treat his father with respect, and to ask forgiveness for his past shortcomings. Father and son spent several days hunting together in the Marv and Saraḵ districts. Mīr Qolbābā then extended his invitation to visit Herat to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan too, and father and son went to Herat together as the guests of Mīr Qolbābā, who offered suitable gifts to both "the old Khan" and "the young Khan."

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, however, still bore a grudge against Mīr Qolbābā and spoke to him harshly, accusing him of embezzling *dīvān* revenue. 'Abd al-Mo'men incited Moḥammad Bāqī, the *dīvānbegī*, and others who had the ear of 'Abdollāh Khan to tell the latter about Mīr Qolbābā's friendly relations with the *qezelbāš*. But 'Abdollāh Khan had complete trust in Mīr Qolbābā and refused to listen to anything they said.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then urged his father to break his return journey at Balḵ and be his guest for a few days; 'Abdollāh Khan agreed and gave his son permission to precede him and make preparations for a feast at Balḵ. He himself would be close behind. Reliable informants have told me that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had had a jeweled throne constructed from the gold and jewels obtained in Badaḵšān and Khorasan, and a short stepladder, fashioned of silver, to enable him to mount the throne. He had given it out that he was having it made for his father and would present it to him when the latter came to Balḵ; he would stand at the foot of this throne, he said, and would offer all his other possessions as a gift to his father.

Those who were afraid of 'Abd al-Mo'men, particularly Mīr Qolbābā, urged 'Abdollāh Khan not to go to Balḵ. "'Abd al-Mo'men is lying," they said; "he is up to some trickery. He aims to confine his father in the citadel at Balḵ and make himself ruler of Transoxania, Turkestan, Ḵārazm, Balḵ, and Badaḵšān." The upshot was that 'Abdollāh Khan, despite the preparations which had been made, did not go to Balḵ; he rode back to Bokhara at top speed, by the same route by which he had come. When 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan heard the news, he considered this proof positive that his father did not trust him, and he blamed it all on Mīr Qolbābā. He brought a large army to Khorasan, first going to Mašhad on the pretext of visiting the shrines there, and returning by way of Herat. As he neared the city, he sent a courier to summon Mīr Qolbābā, hoping to get him into his power by means of a ruse and thus take possession of the city. Mīr Qolbābā, who was not born yesterday, saw through his scheme and refused to go to meet him; he sent the Khan a trifling gift and barricaded the gates of the city. 'Abd al-Mo'men tried everything he knew to attain his object by guile; one day, accompanied only by five or six *moqarrabs,* he rode up to the walls of the fort and asked to speak with Mīr Qolbābā in private, hoping to deceive him, but to no avail.

Considering it inadvisable to lay siege to Herat, 'Abd al-Mo'men returned frustrated to Balḵ, and Mīr Qolbābā reported what had happened to 'Abdollāh Khan at Bokhara. 'Abdollāh Khan applauded his action and sent him gifts. The story goes that he also sent him a bow and set of arrows with instructions that, should 'Abd al-Mo'men appear before Herat again with hostile intent, he should go up on the walls, wait until he could see 'Abd al-Mo'men's eyes, and then fire off all the arrows at him.

This incident caused the rift between father and son to widen still further. Finally, 'Abd al-Mo'men heard that his father had left Bokhara and gone hunting, taking with him only a small group of gamekeepers, falconers, boon companions, *moqarrabs,* and entertainers. He had camped in a large park near Qaršī[3] and was busy celebrating. After hunting, he would return to this park and take his ease. 'Abd al-Mo'men decided to take a body of troops, ride like the wind from Balḵ, surround the park, surprise his father and his companions at their merrymaking, and thus achieve his ambition. 'Abd al-Mo'men made privy to the plot one of his most trusted emirs and close advisers, Shah Moḥammad Īlajīān, mobilized his men on the pretext of an expedition in the direction of Badaḵšān, and set off with five thousand seasoned troops. Crossing the Oxus at Termeẕ, he rode at full speed toward Qaršī.

Shah Moḥammad Īlajīān had long been suspected by 'Abdollāh Khan of being an evil influence on his son and of being responsible for his hostility toward himself. At this juncture, Shah Moḥammad

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[3] Southeast of Bokhara; in former times it was called Naḵšab by the Persians, and Nasaf by the Arabs. It was the scene of the massacre perpetrated by the Persian *vakīl* Emir Yār Aḥmad Eṣfahānī (Najm-e Sānī) in 918/1512 (see Savory, Consolidation, pp. 80–81).

Īlajīān, wishing to absolve himself from any charge of treachery toward "the old Khan," sent a messenger to 'Abdollāh Khan warning him of his son's intentions. The messenger found the Khan in the midst of a feast. Since the Khan had only a small number of retainers with him and no regular troops, he abandoned his tents and everything as it stood and retreated toward Bokhara.

Before he had gone more than three *farsaḵs,* 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan reached the park and rode on in pursuit of his father without so much as a glance at all 'Abdollāh Khan's paraphernalia. But 'Abdollāh Khan reached Bokhara before him and barred the gates of the city. Once he knew that he had no hope of overtaking his father, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan slackened his pace and rode the rest of the way to Bokhara at normal speed. Camping outside the city, he sent word to his father that he had been overcome by the desire to see him. Hearing that his father had come to Qaršī, which was nearer to Balḵ than Bokhara, he had taken the liberty of coming to visit him without permission; he now sought permission to enter the city and make his obeisance. Every day, 'Abd al-Mo'men sent someone new to intercede with his father, but 'Abdollāh Khan did not trust him and refused to grant him permission.

I heard from a reliable source that 'Abdollāh Khan's anger against his son was such that he kept saying, "Oh 'Abd al-Mo'men! If God spares me, I will force you to saddle your horse and fight, or else I am not a man." And he would pound his head with his fist and say to himself, "Oh 'Abdollāh! After sixty-five years of being unchallenged ruler, you are scared of your own shadow,[4] and have lost face throughout the world." He sent mobilization orders to his troops at Samarkand, Tashkent, and elsewhere, and paid no attention to the protestations of his son, backed up by written oaths, that his suspicions were without foundation.

When 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan discovered that Shah Moḥammad Īlajīān had revealed his plans to 'Abdollāh Khan, he at once put him to death. And hearing that his father's armies were mobilizing, he withdrew toward Balḵ. His father marched after him, and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was on the point of crossing the Oxus when he was joined by Šāhom Bī, the governor of Marv, who had a grudge against 'Abdollāh Khan. Šāhom Bī urged 'Abd al-Mo'men not to retire to Balḵ, but to stand and fight. 'Abdollāh Khan, when he heard that his

[4] Lit.: "You run away from your own urine."

son was preparing for battle, slowed his advance, and the elders and shaikhs of Transoxania began to mediate between father and son. 'Abd al-Mo'men sacrificed Šāhom Bī and a few others whom 'Abdollāh Khan considered troublemakers; he handed them over to his father for execution, and 'Abdollāh Khan then retired to Bokhara. I have heard, again from a reliable source, that after this incident 'Abdollāh Khan kept on saying, "All my life I have been victorious, in many mighty battles, and have never turned my back on the enemy. Now, in my old age, my son 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan (may he not enjoy life or prosperity!) has tarnished my reputation by forcing me to flee in a shameful manner." 'Abdollāh Khan's curse took effect, as will shortly be related.

The dispute between 'Abdollāh Khan and his son encouraged the Cossacks to revolt. Tavakkol Sultan Qazāq declared himself khan and marched on Tashkent with a large army. 'Abdollāh Khan, considering it beneath his dignity to take the field himself, dispatched several allied princes and the frontier emirs. A battle was fought between Tashkent and Samarkand, and 'Abdollāh Khan suffered the first defeat of his career. Great numbers of his emirs and notable men in his army, together with several of the allied princes, lost their lives. This defeat increased 'Abdollāh Khan's resentment against his son for his conduct, and he tried to repair this reverse. He sent a courier to summon Mīr Qolbābā Gönültaš from Herat, and set off toward Samarkand with all his forces to avenge his defeat at the hands of Tavakkol Khan. But all this worry over his son's hostility and his defeat by the Cossacks caused him to fall ill. He took to his bed, and died.

The Death of 'Abdollāh Khan, the Succession of His Son 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and the Uzbeg Sultans Who Succeeded 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan

Toward the end of the Year of the Fowl (1006/1598), when 'Abdollāh Khan fell ill and died on the road to Samarkand, Moḥammad Bāqī *atālīq*, the *dīvānbegī* and the most powerful of 'Abdollāh Khan's emirs, saw no alternative but to agree to the succession of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. He did not trust him, but he realized that, as long as the son was alive, no one would acquiesce in the succession of any of 'Abdollāh Khan's nephews. Moḥammad Bāqī therefore sent a confidential courier to tell 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan that his father was dying, and to invite him to come to Samarkand.

Mīr Qolbābā happened to be at Samarkand at this time. Since his name has frequently been mentioned in connection with events in Transoxania and Khorasan, it seems appropriate at his point to give an account of his fall from power, an account given to me by reliable sources in that region. He was a Samarkandī by birth, and his mother had been a wet nurse to the infant 'Abdollāh Khan. According to Uzbeg and Čağatāy customary law, a foster brother is called *gönültāš*,[5] and so Mīr Qolbābā became the *gönültāš* of 'Abdollāh Khan. He devoted himself to a variety of studies, and began to compose poetry. When 'Abdollāh Khan first became ruler of Transoxania, Mīr Qolbābā served him well and faithfully and rose rapidly through the Khan's patronage. He was appointed *ṣadr* with the rank of emir,[6] and for a number of years was governor of Herat; he was a firm but just governor. Because he stood high in the Khan's favor, he was regarded with envy by the other emirs and principal officers of state.

During 'Abdollāh Khan's last illness, the Khan, who was sincerely attached to Mīr Qolbābā, gave him leave to depart because he knew of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan's implacable hostility toward him. "While I am still alive," he said, "return to Herat and take refuge in the fortress there, so that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan may not be able to harm you. Once you are at Herat, follow whatever course seems to be in your best interests." Mīr Qolbābā took his leave of 'Abdollāh Khan, and he, his sons, and his retainers mounted their horses. Mīr Qolbābā told people that the Khan had sent him on a mission, but he was prevented from leaving by Moḥammad Baqī Atālīq, the *dīvānbegī*, who was afraid 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan would punish him if he let Mīr Qolbābā slip out of his grasp.

Mīr Qolbābā realized he could not quarrel with Moḥammad Bāqī when the Khan's life was in the balance, and he went back to the room where the Khan lay, hoping to obtain assistance from him. When he reached the Khan's bedside, he saw him much changed and noticed that the doctors had given up trying to save him, and that the Khan no longer understood what was going on.

Mīr Qolbābā was therefore forced to try and conciliate Moḥammad Bāqī *atālīq*, and by means of smooth words and logical arguments, to persuade him to let him go. "It will be better for both of us," he said, "if I go. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan is hostile not only to me but to you also. It does not make sense for both of us to remain here and put our heads in a trap. As long as I am in the fort at Herat, he will not be able to reveal openly what he has in mind for you or any of the other loyal servants of 'Abdollāh Khan." Since this scheme was sound common sense, Moḥammad Bāqī *atālīq* agreed to let him go, after they had made certain covenants with each other. Just as Mīr Qolbābā was leaving Samarkand, 'Abdollāh Khan died. But Mīr Qolbābā told no one outside the palace, and none of his retainers except Mowlānā Qarā, one of his emirs and a protégé of his in whom he had full confidence.

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[5] "United in mind and feelings."

[6] Under the early Safavids too, "the *ṣadrs* and other members of the religious classes held military command, or at least military rank, as had formerly been the case under the Timurids." (Savory, Principal Offices I, p. 103). The Uzbeg practice was in all probability a continuation of Tīmūrīd practice.

When his party reached the Oxus, he paused to procure boats for the crossing. Several of the boatmen greeted him and enquired after the Khan, and Mīr Qolbābā began to weep uncontrollably. Everyone now knew the truth, and Mowlānā Qarā formed a conspiracy with some of his retainers. "This man," he said, "is running away from his sovereign, and will seek refuge either among the *qezelbāš* or the Čaġatāy. Where do we think we are going by accompanying him?" When Mīr Qolbābā was about to step into the boat, Mowlānā Qarā said: "'Abdollāh Khan is dead, and his son, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, is now ruler of the Uzbegs. Unless you tender your services to him, obtain an appointment as governor from him, and have his letter of appointment in your hand, he will not allow you to remain in the fortress at Herat. It would be better for us to go to Balḵ and make our obeisance to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan." Mīr Qolbābā tried to reason with him on the grounds that this was not an opportune moment to visit the new ruler, but Mowlānā Qarā told him all his retainers were of one mind and united. Mowlānā Qarā said bluntly that, if Mīr Qolbābā refused to go to Balḵ, they would bind him and take him there. Mīr Qolbābā saw that they were determined and that all his entreaties had no effect. He set off to 'Abd al-Mo'men's court at Balḵ, resigned to losing his position and property, and probably his life.

When 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan moved from Balḵ to Samarkand, he took Mīr Qolbābā with him, apparently delighted to see him. Mīr Qolbābā declared that any shortcomings of which he had been guilty hitherto were attributable to his loyalty to his benefactor. "Now you," he said, "are my benefactor, and I shall not be remiss in my devotion to you." But Mowlānā Qarā told 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan about his own bit of loyal service. Mīr Qolbābā, he said, had intended to go to Herat, strengthen the fortifications there, and defy the Khan. "I was responsible for bring him here," he said, "by force and against his will." 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then seized Mīr Qolbābā. First he instituted an investigation designed to mulct Mīr Qolbābā of all his money and property. He had been told by the people of Khorasan that Mīr Qolbābā's fortune in Khorasan and Transoxania amounted to fifty thousand *tomān.* After obtaining full particulars of his assets, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan turned to the question of punishment. First, he had Mīr Qolbābā's two sons slaughtered like sheep in front of him, and asked, "Is the death of his sons bitter to a father, or not? So why did you stir up trouble between me and my father, in the hope that my father might destroy me?" My informants state that, after the sons had been killed, 'Abd al-Mo'men fired an arrow which struck Mīr Qolbābā in the chest, and his retainers finished him off. The Khan then sent Soleymān, an aide-de-camp, to guard Herat. Subsequently he appointed Ḥājjī Bī, one of his loyal retainers, governor of that city, and the latter proceeded to Herat with all speed.

To return now to the narration of 'Abd al-Mo'men's actions after receiving Moḥammad Bāqī's messages from Samarkand. Although the latter urged him to come to Samarkand as soon as possible, 'Abd al-Mo'men procrastinated because he did not trust Moḥammad Bāqī, remembering his hostility to him in the past. When all his troops were assembled, he proceeded slowly toward Samarkand, sending messengers ahead at every stage of the journey to obtain news of what was happening in the city. These messengers were instructed to say that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had heard that his father was ill and was coming to visit him. The day on which 'Abdollāh Khan died, several couriers left Samarkand to take the good news to 'Abd al-Mo'men. He refused to believe the first one to arrive, arrested him, and threatened to cut out his tongue, but the threat was not carried out. When the second courier arrived, he realized the news must be true, but he rounded on the courier, saying, "The news of their father's death should not be so lightly reported to their sons. Why were you in such a hurry to tell me, and bring grief to my heart?" But he wept tears of joy, and was nearly bursting with happiness. When the third courier arrived, bearing the additional news that Moḥammad Bāqī the *dīvānbegī* and the rest of the emirs had agreed to support his succession, he abandoned his caution, convened a royal audience, sat on the royal throne, and had the kettledrums beaten to celebrate his accession.

As 'Abd al-Mo'men continued to advance slowly toward Samarkand, he was joined daily by emirs and contingents of Uzbeg troops from all parts, come to welcome him and make obeisance. En route, he heard that Hezāra Sultan, 'Abdollāh Khan's nephew, who was in the Samarkand-Tashkent area, had styled himself khan and declared his opposition, and that Dūstom Sultan and Uzbeg Sultan, his relatives, had rallied to his support. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was a bloodthirsty and hard-hearted man, to whom relatives meant nothing; to him, they were merely obstacles in his path. Hezāra Sultan and his allies, knowing how he had treated his father and not rating their own chances very highly as a result, decided to come out in open opposition, in the hope of thereby saving their own lives and those of their families.

After entering Samarkand, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan marched against the rebels with forces from Balḵ, Bokhara, Qaršī and Samarkand. Since most of the troops were inclined toward 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, the rebels were routed. Their leaders were taken prisoner, and all put to death by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, along with their male offspring. The Khan showed no compunction in breaking the bonds of kinship. After his victory, 'Abd al-Mo'men appointed Moḥammad Bāqī, the *dīvānbegī*, governor of Samarkand. After appointing governors at all the towns under his jurisdiction, he returned in triumph to Bokhara. The Cossack princes and the governors of outlying areas hastened to send envoys signifying their allegiance to him. At Bokhara, 'Abd al-Mo'men continued his purge of any relative he suspected of being mature and capable enough to govern. The only exceptions he made were Pīr Moḥammad Sultan, who was an addict and spent all his time in opium dens in abject poverty ('Abd al-Mo'men Khan did not consider him worth killing), and two or three infants. No other relatives of 'Abdollāh Khan remained alive. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then marched to Balḵ to make preparations for the invasion of Khorasan.

The Death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and the Accession of Pīr Moḥammad Khan at Bokhara and of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan at Balḵ

After 'Abd al-Mo'men had eliminated all his rivals, he began to censure and indulge in veiled threats against some of his officers, usually emirs who had served under 'Abdollāh Khan, and those whom he threatened feared he would implement his threats on arrival at Balḵ. As a result, 'Abd al-Ṣamad Bahādor, formerly master of the horse to 'Abdollāh Khan, and Moḥammadqolī Bahādor, known as

Strongbow, who was a valiant young champion, conspired to assassinate him.

Because of the extreme heat, ʿAbd al-Moʾmen was marching at night; his order of march was such that the *ešīk-āqāsīs* and *šeqāvols* (escorts) and other servants rode a bowshot ahead of the Khan, while the emirs, pages, and other troops rode a bowshot behind. The Khan himself was surrounded by his grooms, a number of servant boys, and a group of boon companions and musicians. One night, as the cavalcade was passing a village, ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Bahādor and Moḥammadqolī Bahādor secreted themselves behind a wall at the side of the road, their bows at the ready. As the Khan drew abreast of the ambush, both assassins fired their arrows, aiming by torchlight. The arrows hit their mark, and the Khan fell from his horse as the assassins leapt forward with drawn swords, scattered the torchbearers (his boon companions and the minstrels, being Persians, were afraid of cold steel, and fled), and decapitated ʿAbd al-Moʾmen Khan. One of the pages who tried to resist them was cut to pieces. The assassins then leapt on their horses and made for Bokhara.

A few minutes later, the rear guard came up and saw ʿAbd al-Moʾmen Khan lying dead on the road. Some of the emirs, like ʿAbd al-Samīʿ Bahādor, master of the horse, and others who were privy to the plot, rode that night to Bokhara. The bulk of the troops did not realize what had happened, and when day broke and there was no sign of the Khan, thought he had gone out early hunting. When they heard the news, panic spread throughout the troops, who formed into two factions: the first consisted of former retainers of ʿAbdollāh Khan, and the second of the Balḵ emirs. The latter grabbed whatever they could from the Khan's treasuries and baggage and galloped off to Balḵ. The ʿAbdollāh Khan emirs and the troops from Bokhara plundered most of the Khan's workshops before returning home.

Since there was no one left at Bokhara fit to rule, the emirs were forced to acknowledge as their sovereign Pīr Moḥammad Khan, the man who had been saved from ʿAbd al-Moʾmen's wrath by his addiction to opium. He was made ruler, with the style of khan. The *ḵoṭba* and coinage were embellished with his name, and Moḥammad Bāqī, the *dīvānbegī*, who was at Samarkand, was informed. As for the Balḵ emirs, opinion among them was divided: Some wanted to make ʿAbd al-Moʾmen's infant son their ruler, to take possession of ʿAbd al-Moʾmen's territories from the Oxus to the boundaries of *qezelbāš* territory, and to punish his murderers; others were of the opinion that a two-year-old infant was not suitable to be their ruler. They wanted a young, seasoned leader who would stand up to their enemies.

Jānī Beg Sultan, 'Abdollāh Khan's nephew and the father of both Dīn Moḥammad Khan and Bāqī Khan, had been imprisoned by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. His sons, who held various governorships in Khorasan, wanted to free him and make him ruler of Balḵ and Khorasan. By chance, Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā, the wife of 'Ebādollāh Sultan, the brother of 'Abdollāh Khan, who had married 'Abdollāh Khan after her husband's death, came to Balḵ at this juncture. She had one daughter by 'Ebādollāh Sultan, who had been married to 'Abd al-Mo'men and had died in his house. A certain 'Ādel, together with Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and some of the other elders, went to see her and told her of their plans, but she rejected them. The elders said they had been driven to consider Jānī Beg Sultan, who was 'Abdollāh Khan's sister's son, as their ruler because of the dearth of other candidates from the ruling house. Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā said that, on the contrary, there was a scion of the royal house who was fit to rule. "Who is he?" they asked. "My husband, 'Ebādollāh Sultan, had a son by a concubine," she replied; "his name is 'Abd al-Amīn. After both my husband and his mother had died, I looked after him, and brought him up dressed as a girl for fear that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, who was busy murdering all his relations, would kill him to." The elders were amazed, because they had never heard that 'Ebādollāh Sultan had had a son.

After 'Ebādollāh's widow had taken from them several sworn oaths that they would not betray her, she produced 'Abd al-Amīn, dressed as a girl. The elders thought her story was a pack of lies, but the boy seemed to be presentable, and the fact that he was alleged to be 'Abdollāh Khan's nephew on the male side would carry great weight as regards his candidacy for the throne.[7] The same day, therefore, they had him taken to the bathhouse; his long hair was cut off, and he was dressed in male attire. He was styled khan and placed on the throne, and all the Balḵ emirs made obeisance to him. He appropriated for his own use all 'Abd al-Mo'men treasuries and other property in Balḵ. Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā took over control of the administration; the emirs and elders took no decision without consulting her. This was surely one of the extraordinary tricks of fate!

[7] 'Abd al-Amīn was alleged to be the son of 'Abdollāh Khan's *brother*, 'Ebādollāh Sultan, whereas their other candidate, Jānī Beg Sultan, was the son of 'Abdollāh Khan's *sister*.

When the Balḵ emirs received the news from Bokhara of the accession of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, on the advice of Bānū-ye ʻOẓmā they did not oppose his accession but sent a friendly letter on behalf of ʻAbd al-Amīn Khan, congratulating him on it. They entreated him to consider ʻAbd al-Amīn as his own son, and expressed the hope that the two khans could reign secure, each in his own seat of government, and assist each other in furthering the prosperity of the realm and rendering it secure against its enemies, as had been the case with ʻAbdollāh Khan and ʻAbd al-Mo'men Khan.[a]

The Bokhara emirs consulted the women in the royal harem there, and they were adamant in their conviction that ʻEbādollāh Sultan had never had a son, that this was a plot on the part of ʻEbādollāh Sultan's widow. However, as a matter of policy, in order to keep the people subservient to them, the elders accepted the veracity of this claim and did not refute it. On behalf of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, they sent letters of appointment to ʻAbd al-Amīn in which the latter was addressed as "my son" and confirmed in the governorship of ʻAbd al-Mo'men's former territories; the only condition they made was that the coinage minted at Balḵ should bear the name of Pīr Moḥammad Khan and that Pīr Moḥammad Khan's name should be mentioned in the *ḵoṭba* before his own name. Since the rule of neither prince was in conformity with God's will, both were short.

Events in Khorāsān, the Accession of Dīn Moḥammad Khan at Herat, and the Rise to Power of His Brother, Bāqī Khan, in Transoxania

It will be recalled that Yatīm Sultan, the son of Jānī Beg Sultan, nephew of ʻAbdollāh Khan, and his brothers governed part of Khorasan under mandate from ʻAbdollāh Khan. On the orders of the latter, they had refused to heed the dictates of ʻAbd al-Mo'men Khan. After the death of ʻAbdollāh Khan, ʻAbd al-Mo'men Khan came to power and imprisoned their father. In their anxiety about their own future, they sent an envoy, Yūsof Bahādor the *qūšbegī* (officer in charge of the aviary), to Shah ʻAbbas, through Ganj ʻAlī Khan, the governor of Kerman. They were assured of Safavid support, and thus encouraged, declared against ʻAbd al-Mo'men Khan and tried to seize possession of Herat by a ruse. With this object in mind, they appeared before Herat with a small band of men. But the Uzbeg emirs in Herat, de-

[a] An unfortunate precedent to cite!

spite their great superiority in numbers, remained inside the fort. The attackers, seeing no hope of taking the fort, plundered the surrounding area and returned.

About the same time, however, they made other forays, with about two thousand men, to Farāh, where they captured the fort, and to Esfezār, which they also occupied. Again they appeared before Herat. This time the Uzbeg governor, Ḥājjī Bī, remained within the fort but sent a detachment of two thousand men, under Mollā Qarā and Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan, to chase them as far as Pol-e Mālān. An envoy was then sent from Herat to Yatīm Sultan at Esfezār, calling on him to cease this meddling and retire or prepare for battle. Yatīm Sultan's response was to march to Herat, and Mollā Qarā and Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan drew up their men for battle.

Before fighting had actually started, couriers arrived both from Balḵ and Bokhara bringing the news of the assassination of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. Ḥājjī Bī, who had heard of the Shah's impending expedition to Khorasan and saw no one from the ruling house of Transoxania capable of succeeding 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, decided to admit Yatīm Sultan to Herat and raise him to the position of khan. All the emirs of Khorasan rallied to him, seeing in this action their only hope of salvation. Mollā Qarā and Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan fled, fearing for their lives, and their troops joined Yatīm Sultan. Ḥājjī Bī, with the nobles and notables of Herat, met their new ruler, henceforth to be known as Dīn Moḥammad Khan, at Pol-e Mālān, knelt before him, and escorted him into the city.

Although the hour was inauspicious and the moon was darkened, Dīn Moḥammad decided to enter Herat forthwith lest something untoward should occur. He camped in the Bāḡ-e Šahr (city park), the seat of the rulers of Herat, and issued letters of appointment designed to win the support of *seyyeds* and notables throughout Khorasan, and of officers in command of forts and administrative districts. Since his grandfather, Yār Moḥammad Khan, was with him, having recently returned from the pilgrimage, Dīn Moḥammad recognized his seniority, according to Genghizid law, and had the *ḵoṭba* recited in his grandfather's name and his grandfather's name stamped on the coinage. After his election as khan, Dīn Moḥammad Khan forgot about the friendly overtures he had made to Shah 'Abbas and aspired to subjugate the whole of Khorasan. He appointed all the Uzbeg emirs and nobles to offices appropriate to their rank.

The news of the death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and the approach of the royal army had initially thrown the Uzbegs in Khorasan into a panic, and each had looked to his own interests. One of them, Soleymān *yasāvol,* governor of Marv-e Šāhījān on behalf of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, set up as puppet ruler a certain Qāsem Sultan, alleged to be the offspring of Janī Beg Khan and a kinsman of 'Abdollāh Khan, who was living in obscurity as a dervish. In his name, Soleymān *yasāvol* laid claim to the regions of Marv-e Šāhījān, Čahār-jū, Nesā, and Bāvard. When he heard that Dīn Moḥammad Khan had been proclaimed ruler at Herat, he regretted his action, pledged his allegiance to Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and forced Qāsem Sultan to do the same. Qāsem Sultan, who had been granted the name but not the substance of power, planned to get rid of Soleymān *yasāvol* and declare his independence. Dīn Moḥammad Khan sent his younger brother, Valī Moḥammad Sultan, to Marv-e Šāhījān with a letter to conciliate Soleymān *yasāvol* and full authority to settle the affairs of that region as he thought fit. He also had instructions to have the *ḵoṭba* at Marv-e Šāhījān recited in the name of his grandfather, Yār Moḥammad Khan.

When Valī Moḥammad Sultan neared Marv-e Šāhījān, Soleymān *yasāvol* went out to welcome him and forced Qāsem Sultan, against his will, to do the same. When they reached the bridge outside the city gates, however, Soleymān *yasāvol* executed that innocent wretch, Qāsem Sultan, and escorted Valī Moḥammad Sultan into the city with every mark of deference. The latter had hardly set foot inside the city when he received the news that the Shah's arrival was imminent, and also that Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the hereditary ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān, was on his way as well. Valī Moḥammad Sultan and Soleymān *yasāvol* decided they could not hold Marv-e Šāhījān and retreated to Transoxania by way of Čahār-jū.

The governor of Mašhad, Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī, hearing that the royal army had captured Nishapur, decided to defend Mašhad. The same night, he received the news of the death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and he thrashed around like a fish in a net. He hoped that, if the local notables and populace would support him, he could hold Mašhad until it became clear who had taken command of the Uzbeg armies. The next news he heard was that Farhād Khan, with a force of twelve thousand *qezelbāš,* had appeared before the fort of Dastjerd in the district of Rādekān. Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī, stupefied by the news, abandoned his idea of defending Mašhad. His Uzbegs were equally disconcerted, and declared that their luck had turned; since they had no paramount chief, it would be sheer folly to continue to try and retain possession of Khorasan, a province which had been in *qezelbāš* hands for a hundred years.

"Let us get out," they said, "while we have the chance." But some stupid fellows said, "Why should we leave the city in such a flourishing condition for the *qezelbāš*? Before we leave, let us sack the city and carry off the gold railing round the tomb of the Imam Reżā, the jeweled spike on top of the dome of the shrine, and anything else we can see in the way of ornaments." Mercifully, those *seyyeds* and scholars who were in Mašhad at the time succeeded in dissuading Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī from this course of action by instilling in him the fear of an uprising by the mob; by making him dread the ill repute he would incur; and by making him afraid of being subjected to an investigation by other Uzbegs greedy for a share of the loot. The Uzbeg emir in his turn managed to check the hotheads among his officers by well-considered arguments: they should not abuse the hospitality they had enjoyed for ten years from the people of Mašhad, he said, by molesting them and destroying their property.

As a quid pro quo, the Uzbeg emir charged the *seyyeds* and leading men of Mašhad to instruct the elders of the city wards to see that none of the urban mob molested any of his men or their families. He further charged them not to inform the *qezelbāš* of the impending Uzbeg evacuation until three days had elapsed, so that his men could withdraw without harassment. The same night, Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī sounded the stand-to, and all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, marched out of the Mīr 'Alī Āmū Gate and took the road to Saraḳs.

The moment the Uzbegs had left, the *seyyeds* and leading men of Mašhad sent a courier to Farhād Khan at Dastjerd. Farhād Khan marched the same hour to Mašhad, entered the city, visited the shrine of the Imam Reżā, and reported to the Shah, who had reached the region of Asbāḥī, in the district of Šoqān, and Jūrband. Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī and his men, who by this time had passed Saraḳs and reached Qūrābād, were summoned to Herat by Dīn Moḥammad Khan, who reprimanded them severely for having evacuated Mašhad. Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī defended himself, but Dīn Moḥammad Khan refused to listen and for three days denied him audience, until finally the Khan's principal officers interceded for him. Meanwhile, the Khan appointed as governor of Mašhad one of his own cousins, Seyyed

Moḥammad Sultan, and sent him posthaste with four hundred veterans in the hope of taking possession of the city before the *qezelbāš* got there. Dīn Moḥammad Khan also dispatched Šāhom Külta to garrison the fort at Ğūrīān.

Meanwhile, Seyyed Moḥammad Khan and his men had reached Torbat-e Jām, unaware that the *qezelbāš* had reoccupied Mašhad. The *kalāntar*[9] of Torbat at once informed Farhād Khan of the arrival of the Uzbegs, and the latter dispatched a contingent under the command of his brother, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan. The *qezelbāš* caught the Uzbegs in the act of mounting their horses; the Uzbegs, having no time to form up for battle, fled, pursued by the *qezelbāš*, who slew the majority of them and returned to Mašhad with about eighty prisoners. Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan returned crestfallen to Herat.

The Uzbegs still did not realize that the Shah had taken the field in person. They thought that Farhād Khan, and Ganj 'Alī Khan the governor of Kerman, had taken advantage of the death of 'Abdollāh Khan and the murder of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan to campaign in Khorasan and to try and link up with the *qezelbāš* emirs, such as Būdāq Khan, who still remained in that province. This misapprehension encouraged Dīn Moḥammad Khan to take the field against the *qezelbāš*. He marched out of Herat and camped in the Ḵāja Nūr gardens. But the Uzbeg emirs, chiefs, and elders were doubtful about the wisdom of giving battle to the *qezelbāš*, and held repeated councils of war.

Experienced Uzbeg commanders—men like Mīrzā 'Abdollāh Manqaṭ, who was descended from the royal house of Manqaṭ; Ḥājjī Bī; and Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī—said to Dīn Moḥammad Khan:

> Khorasan has been *qezelbāš* territory for a century, and at no time have the Uzbegs established themselves firmly there. Our territory has traditionally been Transoxania. It is not sound policy to leave our ancestral lands and expend great effort over Khorasan. Since we have no prince in Transoxania worthy of the name, it would be better for you to return there and devote your energies to the administration of that province. If you wish to retain some foothold in Khorasan, we suggest you leave in the citadel at

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[9] The *kalāntar* in many ways corresponded to the mayor of a town. One of his chief functions was to supervise the financial and other affairs of the guilds.

Herat your brother, Bāqī Moḥammad, with a garrison of several thousand men and provisions for a year; garrisons should also be maintained at Tūn, Qā'en, in Sīstān, and at other places west of Herat.

Since you have made friendly overtures to Shah ʿAbbas and have repeatedly sent letters to him assuring him of your devotion, you should inform him that the Uzbegs have now been delivered from the tyranny of ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan and have pledged their allegiance to you. You should tell him that we are now prepared to hand over to his officers the province of Khorasan and to withdraw to Transoxania, which is the seat of this dynasty. We have already handed over to his officers the cities of Mašhad, Nishapur, and Toršīz, and have evacuated a number of forts. It has not been possible so far to remove our families and dependents from Khorasan, and so you have left your own family, and the families of the Uzbeg emirs and nobles, in the care of your brother Bāqī Moḥammad at Herat. We have entrusted their honor to the Shah's officers; let them not fail in their duty.

You should continue: "After we, God willing, have consolidated our position in our original territory and ancestral lands, and our kingdom has been placed on a surer foundation, we will not refuse to hand over Herat as well, and the other places in Khorasan occupied by us, if the Shah so orders. But we are persuaded that the king of the *qezelbāš*, when he receives this offer of friendship, will demonstrate his chivalry and magnanimity by being satisfied with the recapture of Mašhad and the other places evacuated by the Uzbegs, and will not lay hands on Herat. After we have settled all our affairs in Transoxania, Turkestan, Balḵ, and Badaḵšān in conformity with our wishes, and order has been restored to government, if the Shah would like to come to Khorasan, we can settle all these matters together; if not, we will act as the occasion demands.

The majority of the Uzbeg elders supported these views and the idea of sending a letter along these lines to the Shah, and they undertook to stock the citadel at Herat with the necessary provisions. They arrested a number of the inhabitants of Herat and troop commanders whom they suspected of possible opposition. But some ignorant hotheads disagreed with this plan. "There is no sign of the Shah," they said, "and so far the *qezelbāš* forces that have appeared amount to no more than ten or twelve thousand men. Even so, they have advanced deep into Khorasan. To turn our backs on them would be a sign of weakness, and would not augur well for your reign. If we abandon Khorasan and retire to Transoxania as is suggested, valiant warriors will scorn us and accuse us of cowardice. In that event, you can easily imagine what the result will be. We do not know what is going on in Transoxania, or what the attitude of the emirs there is. Giving up Khorasan is like throwing away cash for the sake of credit; it is neither sensible nor courageous. Let us gird up our loins like men and go forth to fight the *qezelbāš*. If we are victorious, the prestige of the Khan will be enhanced, and everything will be arranged in accordance with our wishes. If we are defeated (which God forbid!), no one will reproach us."

Dīn Moḥammad Khan preferred the second proposal, which was supported by most of the hotheads who had held administrative posts in Khorasan and were loath to give up these delightful jobs. Dīn Moḥammad himself thought it an easy matter to defeat the *qezelbāš*, since during the lifetime of 'Abdollāh Khan he had fought several engagements against incautious *qezelbāš* emirs and had been victorious. The supporters of the first proposal were forced to keep their peace or risk being accused of cowardice. Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī, who had no intention of fighting the *qezelbāš* and who disliked the way things were shaping up, slipped away one night with his men from Dīn Moḥammad's camp, and put so much distance between himself and the Khan that the latter was powerless to do anything about it.

At this juncture, reports came in that the *qezelbāš* were retiring toward Iraq following the receipt of bad news from that direction. The Uzbegs forgot all their plans for the defense of the citadel at Herat and set out from the K̲āja Nūr gardens in hot pursuit. The further they advanced, the more confident they became of their ability to fight the *qezelbāš*, until Dīn Moḥammad Khan came face to face with Shah 'Abbas at the battle of Rabāṭ-e Parīān and was defeated.

The Beginning of the Tale[10] of the Reconquest of Khorasan

The Shah had marched from Isfahan on 3 Ramażān 1006/9 April 1598. He had stopped for a while at Kashan in order to arrange payment for the troops and to complete his preparations for the campaign. He had sent the army on ahead via Ḵār and Fīrūzkūh to Besṭām, with orders to await him there. He himself had gone to Māzandarān by the Sīāh-kūh[11] road for some hunting, taking advantage of the presence there of Farhād Khan. He had never seen this province, his hereditary domain, which had only recently been brought under the jurisdiction of his officers. Mobilization orders were sent out to all parts of the empire: The *qūrčībāšī* and his men were ordered to accompany the royal camp; Allāhverdī Khan and Ganj ʿAlī Khan, with the *ḡolāms* and troops from Fārs and the contingents from Kerman, respectively, were ordered to march via Yazd and Bīābānak[12] and to join the royal camp in Khorasan.

After his hunting expedition, the Shah had marched to Besṭām with Farhād Khan by way of Sāvar and Čahār Deh[13] in the Astarābād district. To the rendezvous at Besṭām came also Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ḵārazm, with his son ʿArab Moḥammad Sultan, and Nūr Moḥammad Khan the son of Abu'l-Moḥammad, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān, Nesā, and Abīvard, who, as previously reported, had been forced to flee from their territories by ʿAbdollāh Khan and had taken refuge with the Shah. On his arrival at Besṭām, the Shah reviewed his troops, with the exception of the contingents from Fārs and Kerman, which had not yet arrived. When news arrived that ʿAbd al-Mo'men Khan had executed Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, had crushed his rivals at Samarkand and Tashkent, had systematically put to death all the princes he thought might cause him trouble, and was marching on Khorasan with a large army, the more faint-hearted of the Shah's advisers urged him not to proceed to Khorasan, but to spend this year settling affairs in Astarābād. He should wait and see what ʿAbd al-Mo'men's intentions were before proceeding further.

The Shah, whose heart was set on the reconquest of Khorasan, scorned this pusillanimous advice, but he did turn his attention to the affairs of Astarābād. Since Astarābād was adjacent to Māzandarān, of which Farhād Khan was governor, the Shah made the latter governor of Astarābād too. The Shah also wrote conciliatory letters to the nobles and leaders of the Sīāhpūš tribe of Astarābād, each of whom was the master of some small district. Qarāmān Beg, a relative of Farhād Khan, was appointed *dārūğa* of Astarābād, and sent thither with three hundred Qarāmānlū and other troops. The Sīāhpūš chiefs, since they were at loggerheads with one another and since the royal army was encamped at Besṭām, saw no alternative but to accept the authority of the *dārūğa*.

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[10] A conscious echo of the style of the *Šāhnāma*.

[11] See Le Strange, p. 208.

[12] An oasis halfway across the Great Desert; see Le Strange, p. 325, and also article in *EI*².

[13] See Rabino, index *s.vv.*

At this juncture, the *qūšbegī*, the envoy of Yatīm Sultan, arrived at Besṭām. His master's message was as follows:

> My brothers and I were the protégés of 'Abdollāh Khan. To please him, we declined to give our support to his sons, and the latter has borne us a grudge for this reason and has declared his hostility toward us. Now that 'Abd al-Mo'men has succeeded his father on the throne, he is seeking to have his revenge on those who withheld their allegiance from him during his father's lifetime. This being so, I have no refuge save Your Majesty. Whenever Your Majesty's armies reach Khorasan, I will tender my submission to you.

The Shah was delighted by this message, and sent a friendly reply by the hand of Moḥammad Beg 'Arabgīrlū the *ešīk-āqāsī*, who had been on a mission to Herat the previous year. Moḥammad Beg set off in the company of the *qūšbegī*, and took with him a number of Arabian horses and other gifts for Yatīm Sultan.

The Shah sent Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan to Ḵārazm via the Astarābād road, and sent letters to the Ṣā'en-ḵānī Yaqqa Turkmans, who lived in the regions around the Gorgān and Atrek rivers and had traditionally been the subjects of the ruler of Ḵārazm, calling on them to give their support to Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan. The latter left his grandsons, Barandaq Sultan and Oloğ Mīrzā, in the royal camp, and set off with his eldest son, 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan, and his other sons.

The Shah then marched from Besṭām toward Jājarm, sending ahead as an advance guard, one day's march in front of the main body, Farhād Khan, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, and a number of other emirs with about ten thousand men. At this point, the Shah decided to send a letter to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and Rūḥollah Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, an aide-de-camp,[14] volunteered to take it. The letter, a mixture of exhortation and threats, read as follows:

> For a number of years you have annually invaded Khorasan, and since I was preoccupied with problems in Iraq and Gīlān, you seized the opportunity to occupy Mašhad and various other cities, and aspired to occupy still others. Every time I have made the long journey from Iraq in the hopes of meeting you in battle, you have run away, giving as your excuse that your father, the ruler of the Uzbegs, would not allow you to give battle to the ruler of the *qezelbāš*. As a result of this constant passage of armies, the people of Khorasan have suffered greatly. Now, you are the ruler of Transoxania, Turkestan, Balḵ, and Badaḵšān, and have disposed of all possible rivals. All the Uzbegs armies are under your control. This time, I have come to Khorasan with the intention of reconquering it, and I shall not return until I have accomplished this end.
>
> If you are prepared to listen to our words of advice, you will relinquish Khorasan, which from ancient times has been part of Iran and has been part of the realm of the Safavid house for a century. If you do this, declare your friendship toward men, and ask forgiveness for your past misdemeanors, I am prepared, for the sake of the displaced and suffering people of Khorasan, to abandon my desire for vengeance, to declare a truce, and to assist you, with money and troops, in consolidating your power.
>
> If, on the other hand, your ears are deaf to our exhortations,[15] if you close the door of friendship and persist in your hostility toward us, then do not employ cunning and guile and run away as you have in previous years; think of the effect on your prestige now that you are undisputed ruler of the Uzbegs. So

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[14] *Yasāvol-e soḥbat.* There were several grades of *yasāvol:* the *yasāvolān-e soḥbat* were highest in rank, and these offices were prestigious positions usually reserved for the sons of emirs (*TM*, p. 133).

[15] Lit.: "Stuffed with the cotton wool of heedlessness."

> stride on to the battlefield like a man; there is no room for more excuses. Choose your own site for the battle for which everyone has been waiting for years, so that God's will may be done and the ordinary people may be delivered from the passage of both our armies. Should you refuse, then, without caring what destruction may result to Khorasan, I shall pursue you to Balḵ and shall not draw rein until I reach Bokhara. In that case, God alone knows what havoc will be wrought by my armies in those regions.

This message was borne by Rūḥollāh Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, the aide-de-camp, and the Shah proceeded on his way to Mašhad. Deciding to take no risks, he sent his son and heir, Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā, back to Isfahan in the charge of Shaikh Aḥmad Beg, an *ešīk-āqāsī* of the harem.[16] The army marched after the 'Eyd-e Ażḥā,[17] and after camping at Kālpūš, began its victorious campaign. Its first success was the recapture of Nishapur.

When Shah 'Abbas approached Nishapur, the Uzbeg governor of the region, Sultan Aḥmad (a scion of the Uzbeg royal house), perceived clear indications that the local populace were on the side of the Shah, and realized that this made it impossible for him to hold Nishapur. On the other hand, he dared not retreat for fear of what 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan would do to him; he foresaw in addition that, if he withdrew, he and his men would be harassed and plundered by the scum of Nishapur. He therefore decided that his best plan would be to go on pilgrimage and to throw in his lot with the Shah. He left Nishapur with a handful of men, and the rest of his men dispersed, some going to Mašhad, others to Herat.

Hardly was Aḥmad Sultan clear of the city gates when the people of Nishapur beat the kettledrums in the name of Shah 'Abbas. As soon as the news reached Kālpūš, Emir Abu'l-Ma'ālī Nīšāpūrī was dispatched to take over the civil administration of the province; he was an eminent *seyyed*, a former *kalāntar*, and a power in the land in that region who had gone to Iraq after the Uzbeg occupation of Nishapur and had been constantly at the Shah's side. Moḥammad Sultan

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[16] On the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī-ye ḥaram*, the officer in charge of the *ešīk-āqāsīs* of the harem. See *TM*, p. 133.

[17] The sacrificial feast performed by pilgrims in the valley of Mīnā on the tenth of Ẕu'l-Ḥejja.

Bayāt, then governor of Sabzavār, was made governor of Nishapur. Aḥmad Sultan Uzbeg was given permission to perform the pilgrimage, but I have no information about what happened to him subsequently. The Shah then marched in the footsteps of Farhād Khan's advance guard, via Šoqān and Jūrband, to Mašhad. When he reached Asbāḥī, in the district of Šoqān, couriers arrived from Farhād Khan bringing news of the death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and the recapture of Mašhad.

The Shah prostrated himself in gratitude for God's mercies toward him (his primary reason for wishing to recover Mašhad had been the desire to visit the shrine of the Imam Reżā), and his troops threw their caps in the air and cheered lustily. The Shah marched from Nishapur, and on 24 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1006/28 July 1598 camped on the banks of the river at Ṭūs.

Farhād Khan and his emirs, together with the notables of Mašhad, went out to welcome the Shah and prostrated themselves before him. Farhād Khan and the emirs of the vanguard were ordered to march on Herat and recapture that city (reports of the accession of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, the mobilization of his forces, and his intentions, had not yet been verified).

The following day, 25 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1006/29 July 1598, Shah 'Abbas left Ṭūs to perform the pilgrimage to the shrine of the Eighth Imam. When the dome of the shrine came in sight, the Shah dismounted, prostrated himself with his forehead on the ground, and wept tears of joy. He then proceeded, barefooted and bareheaded, to the shrine. After he had completed the formalities of the pilgrimage, the Shah took stock of the shrine. He found it in bad condition, stripped of its gold and silver chandeliers. Nothing remained of the ornaments donated to the shrine during the Safavid period except the gold railing around the tomb itself. On the spot, the Shah appointed Budāq Khan Čeganī governor of Mašhad. He then retired to Čahār Bāğ, where the Uzbeg prisoners captured at Jām were brought before him and interrogated. From what they said, and from the report made by Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan, it was confirmed that Dīn Moḥammad Khan had come to the throne at Herat and intended to hold Khorasan. The size of his army was reported as twenty thousand men, but the local inhabitants denied this and said it did not amount to more than six or seven thousand. His experienced advisers thought the latter estimate more probable.

The Shah hoped that, by sending Farhād Khan and the vanguard to Herat immediately, he would catch the Uzbegs before they were fully organized and had had time to complete their preparations to defend the city. The Shah left at Mašhad a few of Dīn Moḥammad Khan's retainers. "Your Khan," he said, "has professed his loyalty to me, and has sent an envoy to me; if he is sincere in his professions, I will bestow on you robes of honor and equipment and send you to him wherever he may be." The remainder of the prisoners he put to death.

The Shah spent three days in Mašhad seeing to the affairs of the shrine. He appointed Qāżī Sultan Torbatī, an eminent *seyyed* from Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya, warden of the shrine; the latter had retired to Iraq when Mašhad fell into the hands of the Uzbegs, and was currently *dārūġa* of Isfahan. He was given Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya as his fief. The Shah detached a body of five hundred *qūrčīs* under the command of Būdāq Khan Čeganī and Šāhqolī Sultan Bayāt, and ordered them to proceed with Nūr Moḥammad Khan in the direction of Nesā, Abīvard, and Marv, his hereditary domains, to subjugate those territories and hand them over to him.

On 28 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1006/1 August 1598, the Shah marched from Mašhad. At Farhādjerd in the district of Jām, he was joined by Maḥmūd Beg Šāmlū, the brother of Eslām Beg the centurion. Maḥmūd Beg had fled to India when Herat was occupied by the Uzbegs, and had recently returned via Herat. He brought detailed information about the situation there. He reported that Dīn Moḥammad Khan had now set his heart on retaining control of Khorasan, and would not easily abandon this ambition; he further reported that some twelve thousand Uzbeg troops, plus two or three thousand men from the Hazāra tribes, had assembled at Herat. He said the Uzbegs were unaware that the Shah was present in person; they thought he was still at Besṭām, and were busily making their preparations to give battle to Farhād Khan and the advance guard. Dīn Moḥammad Khan's intention, if the Shah marched against him and if he did not have sufficient force to withstand him, was to leave his brother Bāqī Sultan to hold the citadel at Herat and retreat to Transoxania to levy more troops. He had no intention of relinquishing Khorasan. The Shah had great confidence in the reliability of Maḥmūd Beg's report, and pondered deeply on his best course of action in these circumstances.

The Shah then summoned a council of the principal officers of state, and addressed them as follows:

> The Uzbegs have a considerable force at Herat. It is not in our interests to allow them to fight a pitched battle with Farhād Khan and our vanguard, because their sovereign is with them, and there will therefore be no comparison between them and our emirs as regards tenacity and stubbornness of resistance; consequently, they may suffer a reverse that will raise the morale of the enemy. On the other hand, if I order Farhād Khan not to advance farther until we catch up with him, the Uzbegs will be able to complete the defenses at Herat at their leisure and then retire to Transoxania. If we are obliged to lay siege to the citadel, it will be a long business, since the fortifications are strong. My plan, therefore, is to send a courier to Farhād Khan, ordering him to retire a distance of one day's march and to spread the rumor that a crisis has arisen in Iraq and Azerbaijan and that the Ottomans have profited by my absence to invade our territory. He is to say that, on receipt of this news, I marched precipitately back to Iraq. When the Uzbegs hear this, I do not doubt that they will abandon their plan to defend Herat and march forth confidently to give battle to our emirs and reoccupy Mašhad. At this point I, having left behind all baggage and anyone who does not have a good horse, will take a body of troops, each man having a second mount, and ride by forced marches to join Farhād Khan without waiting for the arrival of the Fārs and Kerman contingents. If this plan succeeds, the enemy will not have time to put the citadel at Herat in proper shape to withstand a siege and, God willing, victory will be ours.

This plan was approved by all the Shah's advisers, and orders were immediately dispatched to Farhād Khan. Orders were also sent to Allāhverdī Khan and Ganj 'Alī Khan telling them not to wait for the full mobilization of their troops, but to bring such men as they had who had swift horses, and to join the royal camp in the vicinity of Ġūrīān. Finally, orders were given to the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, and to

Shah ʿAlī Sultan Mīr Čamešgezek to remain behind to guard the baggage train and to come on slowly toward Herat. Then, on 1 Moḥarram 1007/4 August 1598, in the forenoon, the Shah marched from Farhādjerd toward Jām, joining forces first with Farhād Khan who, following orders, had retired one day's march from the fort at Bāḡand. Then, at Sar-e Pol on the Herat River, he joined Allāhverdī Khan and Ganj ʿAlī Khan. The Shah covered ten days' journey in four and a half days and came upon the enemy on Wednesday, 5 Moḥarram 1007/8 August 1598, at the Sālār Bridge, four *farsaḵs* from the city of Herat. On the morning of 6 Moḥarram/9 August, a pitched battle was fought between the two armies at Rabāṭ-e Parīān.

The Shah's Victory over Dīn Moḥammad Khan

As already related, Dīn Moḥammad Khan had been deceived by the Shah's ruse and had advanced from Herat as far as the Sālār Bridge. There, an Arab of the Miš-e mast[18] tribe, who knew what the Shah looked like, came into the Uzbeg camp one night and said he had recognized the Shah at Sar-e Pol. When questioned about the size and composition of the Shah's army, he replied that the Shah had only a few men with him, but the main army was close behind. The Uzbeg emirs held a council of war. They were opposed to fighting a battle with the *qezelbāš*, and were in favor of retiring to Herat, negotiating with the Shah along the lines already agreed to, and then withdrawing to Transoxania while negotiations were in progress, leaving Bāqī Khan at Herat. It was absolutely not in their interests, they said, to give battle to the *qezelbāš*. Dīn Moḥammad Khan said that their views made sense, but time was short. "The *qezelbāš* are already here," he said, "and if we march back to Herat during the night, half our men will become scattered; there will be very little time in which to put the citadel in a state to withstand a siege before we have to leave and incur the ignominy of flight. It is better for us to fight like men. If we win, that is what we want; if we lose, there is no disgrace in being defeated by a powerful monarch." The Uzbeg emirs, not wishing to be accused of cowardice, prepared for battle.

The truth was that Dīn Moḥammad Khan's arrogance had increased to the point that his ambitions could not be driven from his head save by the sword, and on the morning of Friday, 6 Moḥarram 1007/9 August 1598, he drew up his men in battle array: On the right wing, he stationed his brother Bāqī Sultan, with Mīrzā ʿAbdollāh Manqaṭ and Ḥājjī Bī the governor of Herat. To the left of his center, he stationed a number of emirs with orders to make a general charge, in conjunction with the center, whenever they saw the *qezelbāš* attack faltering, and to do their utmost to rout the enemy. Dīn Moḥammad Khan stationed himself on the left with one thousand picked men. His plan was that, irrespective of whether the Uzbegs were victorious or defeated, this body of one thousand men should keep together and stand by him.

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[18] "Rutting ram."

By the time the Shah reached Sar-e Pol, many of his men's horses were tired, both as a result of the speed of their march from Farhādjerd and because of the great heat. The Shah had only some three or four thousand men with him, and the total number of men at his disposal, including those of Farhād Khan, did not amount to more than ten thousand. Nevertheless, placing his trust in divine favor and in his royal good fortune, he disposed his men in the following manner: Farhād Khan, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, and the other emirs of the vanguard were stationed in front with four or five thousand men; the Shah adorned the center by the kingly glory[19] of his presence, and the remaining emirs, *qūrčīs* and *ğolāms* were placed to right and left of the center.

The battle of Rabāṭ-e Parīān opened when the skirmishers of both armies met. The Safavid van charged in a compact body and routed the Uzbeg advance guard, and then the whole of the van pursued the enemy in their desire to demonstrate their prowess and bring back enemy heads and weapons. Farhād Khan was left exposed with only a handful of men around him. Bāqī Sultan, with the troops of the Uzbeg left,[20] at once led a countercharge that forced back the Safavid van, now scattered. Since Farhād Khan did not have with him his corps commander's standard, which would have provided a rallying point for the Safavid skirmishers, their retreat became a rout that threatened to throw the center into confusion as well. Farhād Khan entered the fray himself with the few men remaining with him, only to be wounded and retreat, and later to be accused by his peers of having fled from the field.

Shah 'Abbas, seeing the army of Azerbaijan routed, ordered the center and the right and left wings to advance, and a general engagement ensued with the Uzbeg left and right. Despite the presence of the Shah in the Safavid ranks, the Uzbegs fought stubbornly, but were eventually routed by repeated determined charges by the Safavid center led by the Shah. At this point, Dīn Moḥammad Khan led his one thousand picked men in a flanking movement around the Safavid right, intending to charge the Safavid center. Because of the clouds of dust in the air, this movement was not observed by the Safavids until Sultan 'Alī Čeganī, the son of Būdāq Khan, who was stationed slightly in front of where the Shah was standing with no more than two hundred *moqarrabs* and personal retainers, saw the gleam of the helmets, chain mail, and breastplates of riders advancing through a reedbed. He at once reported to the Shah, and a wave of panic went through the Shah's retainers. The Shah intuitively guessed that these men were led by Dīn Moḥammad Khan himself, and he shouted to his men, "Why are you just standing there? Think of the disgrace if you turn and run! Attack like men, for a valiant death is preferable to a life of shame!"

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[19] Farr; see my article "Iran, a 2500-year Historical and Cultural Tradition," in *Iranian Civilization and Culture* (ed. C. J. Adams), Montreal, 1972, pp. 78–79.

[20] The author previously stated that Bāqī Sultan was stationed on the *right* wing.

The first *qezelbāš* to spur his horse forward and cut down one of the Uzbeg warriors was 'Alī Beg, the master of the hunt, the son of Aḥmad Aqa Gerāmpa Ostājlū. He was followed by the other devoted youths stationed in front of the Shah. Each of them hurled from the saddle one of the enemy, so that forty or fifty of the Uzbegs were quickly slain. Dīn Moḥammad Khan kept his horse reined in, not daring to attack, and his men lost heart and turned to flee. The Shah wanted to pursue Dīn Moḥammad Khan and engage him in personal combat, but one of Ganj 'Alī Khan's retainers came up and told him that Dīn Moḥammad's center was close behind. The Shah therefore abandoned the idea, and allowed the Uzbeg Khan to rejoin his center. The *ḡāzīs,* however, continued to pursue the enemy from the field, inflicting further casualties on them, and Dīn Moḥammad Khan himself was wounded by a spear thrust.

Kalūl Beg the Georgian, one of the *ḡolāms* of the royal household, claimed the credit for this: "I thrust at him with my spear," he said, "and his hat[21] fell off. One of the other Uzbegs took off his own hat and placed it on the head of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, which made me realize it was indeed the Khan whom I had wounded." The hat had been picked up and brought in by a *ḡāzī,* and several Uzbeg prisoners affirmed that it was the Khan's, but others denied it. The result was that Kalūl Beg's claim was disallowed. To complicate matters, Pīrzāda Ṭāleš Abdāl Beg alleged that he himself had wounded the Khan. The author turned for information to Mowlānā Ebrahim Mašhadī, a former employee of Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī who, after the Uzbeg invasion of Khorasan, had gone to Herat and become the secretary of Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš; later, he had become secretary to Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and had been admitted to the Khan's council meetings. I asked him if he could give me personal details about Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and a description of the battle of Rabāṭ-e Parīān. This was his reply:

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[21] *Ṭāqīya:* a tall round hat, used either on its own or as a base around which to wind a turban. See R. P. A. Dozy, *Dictionnaire détaillé des Noms des Vêtements chez les Arabes,* Amsterdam, 1843, pp. 280ff.

"I was with the Khan," he said, "when he made his flanking maneuver with the intention of attacking the Safavid center. We emerged from the screen of reeds to find only a small force confronting us, although we could see another body of troops in the distance. The Uzbeg warriors all thought that this latter group was the Shah's corps; they stood in considerable awe of the élan of the Shah's corps, and so the Uzbeg elders laid restraining hands on the Khan's reins. 'Our forces have been defeated,' they said, 'and are streaming back toward the city. *Qezelbāš* block our path, both in front and in our rear. If we attack this small group ahead of us, the Shah's corps, the dense mass of which you can see in the distance, will advance and surround us, and not one of us will escape alive. The game is over. We should retire while you are still unharmed and before the situation gets any worse.' The Khan saw that his men had no stomach for further fighting, and was forced to leave the field."

"The Khan's men had not gone more than ten paces," continued Mowlānā Ebrahim Mašhadī, "before they lost discipline and scattered all over the place. Barely twenty men stayed at the Khan's side. Several times, *qezelbāš* charges penetrated our ranks, and in one of these the Khan received a spearthrust, but he concealed it from his companions. When we reached Čehel Doḵtarān, we saw blood pouring from his sleeve and down his side. He gave me leave to depart: 'You have a family in Herat,' he said; 'where do you think you are going? Turn back.' So I turned back, entered the city, and hid myself until things had quieted down a bit. Bāqī Sultan came galloping through the city with about thirty or forty men and took the road to Kohdastān, the way to Andeḵūd and Šoborḡān. They crossed the Oxus by the ford at Karkī and reached Bokhara, where Bāqī Sultan's fortunes later prospered."

In short, many men of note lost their lives in this battle. On the Uzbeg side, emirs like Ḥājjī Bī, the governor of Herat; Nājūlī Bahādor; Mīrzā ʿAbdollāh Manqaṭ; Moḥammad Morād Bī; and Moḥammad Yār-oğlān; of the other emirs, some were killed, others taken prisoner. Of the commanders of note, none escaped. The *ğāzīs* pursued the enemy to Gāzor-gāh and Kohdastān, slaying large numbers of them; the number of Uzbeg dead totaled four thousand. The Safavid pursuit could not be carried farther. Most of the horses had foundered as a result of the forced marches, the strenuous action, and the heat, and the onset of darkness also prevented pursuit. Those Uzbegs who survived the battle and had families in Herat removed their families and possessions from the city and retreated in the direction of Meymana and Fāryāb; those who had no encumbrances of this kind fled directly from the field.

The Shah entered the caravanserai of Parīān on the outskirts of Herat and, in gratitude for God's favor toward him, spared those he found there, mostly wounded, women, and children. The royal army camped across the main road into Herat. On the Safavid side, the only casualties among officers of note were Valī Beg Ostājlū the centurion and Qāsem Beg Šāmlū the groom; the total Safavid killed amounted to one hundred. The Safavid baggage train and the rest of the army, in the charge of the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, had reached Kārīz in the district of Bāḵarz when the aide-de-camp, Šāhverdī Beg Bāybordlū, brought them the good news of the victory at Rabāṭ-e Parīān. They then hastened to join the Shah. The people of Herat and the emirs of the tribes (Hazārajāt,[22] Qepčāq,[23] Teymūrī,[24] Ṭāherī, and Jamšīdī),[25] came forth to tender their allegiance to the Shah.

Before the Shah had reached Herat, Ḵāja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar, an inhabitant of Ḡūrīān, had taken a body of retainers and blockaded Šāhom Külta, the Uzbeg commandant, in the citadel there, and the Shah had ordered some of Ganj ʿAlī Khan's *qezelbāš* troops to assist him. When Šāhom Külta heard that Herat had fallen, he made a sortie, cut his way through a weak point in the besiegers' lines, and made good his escape. He was pursued and many of his Uzbegs slain, but he himself again escaped. However, he was out of luck;

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[22] Mongol tribes living in what is now the northwest corner of Afghanistan. See *TM*, p. 188, n.1.

[23] See *TM*, p. 187, n.3.

[24] See *TM*, p. 169. The Teymūrī tribes lived in the region of Ḡūr and along the present Afghan-Iranian frontier.

[25] See *TM*, p. 17.

near Zūrābād, he stopped by a melon field to refresh himself with the fruit. The watchman[26] came up and dealt him such a blow with his cudgel that Šāhom Külta rolled from his horse. While he was lying on the ground, temporarily stunned, some of the watchman's companions came up, recognized him, arrested him, and took him before the Shah.

At this juncture, the Shah received the news of the death of Dīn Moḥammad Khan. The manner in which he met his death remained obscure. Some say he was killed in the actual battle at Rabāṭ-e Parīān, and his body was among those found in the reedbed. But this version is contradicted by Mowlānā Ebrahim Monšī's account (which I have already given), to the effect that he (Mowlānā Ebrahim) accompanied Dīn Moḥammad Khan as far as Čehel Doḵtarān. As far as I can make out, what actually happened was that by the time the Khan reached Mārūčāq,[27] in the territory of the Qāqčī tribe, he was faint with loss of blood. His companions laid him down to rest while they went among the tribesmen to fetch him some food. The tribesmen, when they heard of the Khan's condition, fell on him and murdered him. He was buried on the spot by his companions. Another version of the story says that the Qāqčī tribesmen threw his corpse into the Morḡāb river.

Shah 'Abbas spent several days outside Herat, making a count of the enemy dead and of the captured weapons and equipment and investigating everybody's battle claims. Since he had promised before he left Iraq to make Farhād Khan governor of Herat, he kept his promise, although he felt considerable resentment against Farhād Khan for having fled from the field at Rabāṭ-e Parīān. Farhād Khan was also made *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, and his agents began their task of ordering the administrative affairs of the province. Most of his men found billets in the city. Suddenly, through an astonishing twist of fate, Farhād Khan was executed and Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, a *qūrčī* of the sword, was made governor of Herat and *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan.

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[26] *Daštbān;* a watchman posted to keep guard over cultivated fields, to drive off animals and other marauders.

[27] A village on the Morḡāb River, a few miles north of Marv al-Rūd. See Le Strange, p. 405.

The Execution of Farhād Khan and the Ordering of Affairs in Khorasan

It will not have escaped the notice of intelligent men that the spiritual element to be gained from propinquity to kings is mixed with blood, and the the realm of the mind of kings is a world apart. It therefore behooves the prudent man not to become too intoxicated with rank and power, and not to make any false move in his dealings with kings. Many are the men of sound judgment who have risen high in the service of princes but have deviated from the high road of faithful service and been struck down by fortune, consumed by the very fire of their intimacy with kings. Happy is the man who is guided by God in these matters, and who follows the precepts contained in the following quatrain, composed by myself:

O heart, do not become drunk with the wine of intimacy,
Do not lose your senses through quaffing the cup of
union;
Though you receive nothing but kindness from
the Beloved,
Be assiduous in your supplications, and do not remain
silent.

Farhād Khan had for years enjoyed royal favor and had been elevated above his peers, but his overweening pride caused his downfall. The ostensible cause of his fall was his habit of uttering vain boasts in the presence of the Shah—for example: "My ambition is to give my life in a battle at which Your Majesty is present." At the battle of Rabāṭ-e Parīān, not only had he himself been routed, but the rout of his men had endangered the Shah himself and hence the safety of the realm. For this reason he deserved to be punished, so that in the future those who owed their promotion to the Shah might give their lives in defense of their benefactor and stand their ground. The second cause of his fall was that the Shah had gradually come to suspect him of treachery; he had tested him several times, and his suspicions had hardened into certainty. Treachery on the part of such a trusted old retainer, a man of sound judgment who had experienced both hard times and good and had suffered the buffetings of fate, was repugnant to the Shah, who found his ingratitude particularly intolerable.

The Shah, having now sufficient proof of his guilt, decided to put him to death, and charged Allāhverdī Khan and a number of the emirs and *ḡolāms* with this task. These men went to Farhād Khan's house and carried out their mission. When Allāhverdī Khan removed Farhād Khan's dagger from his waist belt, the latter realized what the situation was. He just had time to exclaim, in Turkish, "Have things come to this pass?" His brother, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, the *amīr-al-omarā* of Azerbaijan, went in a panic to the royal palace and waited for execution, since he did not imagine he would be spared. But the Shah, mindful of the Koranic statement: "No one who bears a burden bears the burden of another,"[28] treated him with nothing but kindness. The same day, the Shah sent him a robe of honor, in order to set his mind at rest.

Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan demonstrated the purity of his devotion to his spiritual adviser and to the conduct expected of a Sufi by seeking to please the Shah. "Since my brother was judged deserving of punishment," he said to the Shah, "why did you not ask me to do the deed?" The Shah regretted the execution of Farhād Khan on two grounds: first, he regretted all the favors he had lavished on Farhād Khan over such a long period of time; second, he was afraid that people who were remote from the scene of power, and were ill-informed about the behavior of those close to it, might attribute his action to other motives.

As already reported, Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū was appointed governor of Herat. From among the junior officers, Bektāš Sultan Ostājlū was promoted to the status of emir and was sent to take possession of the citadel at Mārūčāq and the area of the Morḡāb generally. Bektāš Sultan repaired the citadel at Mārūčāq, brought the province of the upper Morḡāb under control, and exerted himself to restore its prosperity.

Further administrative appointments, covering the whole of Khorasan, were also made. Malek Jalāl al-Dīn Sīstānī appeared at court and was granted the province of Sīstān, which had been allotted to Ganj 'Alī Khan. Malek Jalāl al-Dīn Sīstānī, driven out of Sīstān by the Uzbegs, had taken refuge at the Shah's court; lately he had been residing at Kandahar. Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Ṭabas, also appeared at court and was loaded with tokens of royal favor and appointed governor of Ḵāf and Bāḵarz. On his way to court, he had laid siege to the Uzbeg garrison at Tūn, commanded by Allāh-

[28] Koran, 6:164, and several other places.

yār-oğlān. In the heat of the day, when the *gāzīs* had returned from patrol and were resting, the Uzbeg commander made a sortie from the fort and galloped off. Meḥrab Khan pursued him, slew most of his men, and brought Allāhyār a prisoner to the Shah.

The Installation of Nūr Moḥammad Khan and Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan in Their Hereditary Territories by Qezelbāš Troops, the Capture of Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan, and the Return of the Shah to Iraq

The detachment of *qūrčīs* under the command of Būdāq Khan, which, as already reported, had been instructed to escort Nūr Moḥammad Khan to Marv-e Šāhījān, reached Bāğbād. Bāğbād was held by Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan, who was the son of Tarsūn Moḥammad Sultan, a cousin of 'Abdollāh Khan through a paternal uncle and of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan through a maternal uncle; he was a handsome youth of eighteen years. When he learned of the confusion reigning in Khorasan and of the approach of Nūr Moḥammad Khan with a *qezelbāš* army, his first thought was to make his way to Marv and retire to Bokhara via Čahār-jū. The *qūrčīs* and Čeganī *gāzīs* were upon him like lightning, and surrounded him; after a brief resistance, his Uzbegs fled, and he was taken prisoner. Having brought under their control the districts of Nesā and Abīvard, the *gāzīs* proceeded toward Marv-e Šāhījān, where Soleymān *yasāvol* and Valī Moḥammad Sultan, the brother of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, scattered at their approach. Most of the tribes resident in the Marv region, and indeed the whole population of the area, demonstrated their support for Nūr Moḥammad Khan, their hereditary ruler.

Hearing that the Shah had already passed Mašhad and was advancing on Herat, the Uzbeg officers decided they could not go to Herat to join Dīn Moḥammad Khan; they therefore retreated to Bokhara via Čahār-jū. The people of Marv came out to welcome Nūr Moḥammad Khan, including the leaders of the Jalā'er tribe and of other Turkman tribes in the area. The news of the victory at Herat was celebrated by the sounding of kettledrums. At Marv, the name of Shah 'Abbas was included in the *ḵoṭba* and stamped on the coinage. Būdāq Khan duly installed Nūr Moḥammad Khan on the throne of his ancestors and sent the captive Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan to the Shah with an escort of *qezelbāš*. At Herat, he was treated with kindness by the Shah, who encouraged him to hope for marks of royal favor. He was placed in the custody of one of the *golāms* of the royal household, the Georgian Ṭahmāspqolī Beg. Reports came in that Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan had resumed full control of Ḵārazm, and the Khan expressed his unbounded gratitude to the Shah for his support.

The Shah spent several days in camp in the city park at Herat, dealing with administrative matters and answering petitions. He rewarded with grants, immunities, and robes of honor those inhabitants of Khorasan who, during the Uzbeg occupation, had demonstrated their loyalty, had striven mightily in defense of the faith and the realm, and had defended their forts; he also rewarded those who had abandoned their homes and traveled to Iraq.

After disposing of all civil and military administrative matters at Herat, the Shah left for Mašhad, where he spent a month dealing with the affairs of that region and particularly of the shrine of the Imam Reżā. He saw to it that the establishment of shrine attendants, teachers of theology, Koran reciters, and other employees and servants of the shrine was brought up to strength on the basis laid down by Shah Tahmasp. He also saw to it that food was provided for the poor and stipends for the pensioners, on the proper basis. The Shah supplied the shrine with jeweled chandeliers of gold and silver, candlesticks, magnificent Kerman and Jowšaqān carpets, and essential pots and utensils. During his stay, the Shah visited the shrine every morning and evening; usually he performed in person the various duties of the shrine, such as sweeping the carpets in the holy sanctuary, and acquired merit by so doing. When there was nothing further to detain him at Mašhad, he marched via Rādekān and Ḵabūšān toward Astarābād, making for the Baḥrīān plain.

The Shah's Hunting Trip in the Plain of Rādekān

When the Shah reached Rādekān, beaters were sent forth to drive into the appointed hunting circle all the game within a distance of several days' journey on all sides. The circle was still one *farsaḵ* in diameter when the Shah moved into it, his eye caught by a number of onagers, and he eventually dispatched them all with his bow and arrow and his sword. The Shah hunted from morning till noon, while there was still plenty of space within the circle; he had a few *moqarrabs* in attendance, but they were not allowed to hunt themselves. The grooms kept the Shah well supplied with arrows, and he bagged gazelle and other animals, the *moqarrabs* keeping a tally of the total bag, which amounted to one hundred and sixty-two. As the hunting circle had now become considerably smaller in circumference, the Shah gave permission to some of the emirs and *moqarrabs* to take their turn at hunting. A short time later, all the royal retainers, and the *qūrčī* and *ğolām* officers, were allowed to take their turn. Finally, the common soldiers got their chance. In the end, the gazelle were run to a standstill, and the infantry entered the circle and caught them on foot. No one was left without something to his credit.

Some two or three thousand gazelle were still within the circle, running around looking vainly for a way of escape. Then an astonishing thing happened. Some instinct guided the animals toward the place where the Shah was standing, and, after circling around him several times like pilgrims circumambulating the Kaaba, they all sought refuge near him and lay down around him, giving the Shah the appearance of a shepherd watching over his flock. When he saw this, the Shah gave orders that the animals should not be molested further.

When the sun set, the two or three thousand surviving animals were released and allowed to make their way across the open plain, no one daring to lay a hand on them. The next day, the Shah ordered that all the game should be brought before him for inspection, and a division was then made among the troops. The Shah then continued on his way, hunting as he went, by the Ḵabūšān and Samalqān road, and camped in the Baḥrīān plain. From there he proceeded toward Astarābād, intending to set the affairs of that province in order and to chastise the rebellious Ūḵlū, Göklen, and other tribes of the Ṣā'enḵānī group, who were constantly causing trouble in that region.

The Shah's Expedition to Astarābād, His Punitive Action against the Rebels, and His Restoration of the Fortress of Mobārakābād

Although I have already given some details of events in Astarābād in the course of my chronological narrative, at the risk of wearying my readers I will give a brief summary of the history of this province for the benefit of students of history and of the lives of great men.

The province of Astarābād is one of the fairest in Iran. It is bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea, and this produces a moderate climate both in spring and autumn. It is like part of the gardens of paradise, and its inhabitants are God-fearing men, second to none in their piety and self-denial. Nevertheless, this province, like other parts of Māzandarān,[29] is not without its rogues and scoundrels, in whose heads ideas of revolt from time to time arise. These people are known as the wearers of black *(sīāh-pūš)*.

During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, when the realm of Iran was secure and well established, the firm administration of the provincial governors caused these people to put out of their heads the idea of "the wearing of the black" and to conduct themselves like well-behaved subjects. During this period, some of the Ṣā'en-ḵānī tribes, such as the Ūḵlū, the Göklen, the Īlūr, and the Sālūr, who lived in the region of the river Atrek, which forms the border between Gorgān and Ḵ̌ārazm, and who were subjects of the ruler of Ḵ̌ārazm and were known collectively as Yaqqa Turkmans, migrated to the banks of the Gorgān River. They engaged in extensive cultivation there and paid cultivation tax to the Safavid governors of Gorgān. The latter, glad to have the land under cultivation, did not discourage them. In the course of time, however, these tribes began to show signs of revolt, and began carrying out raids into Astarābād province. The governors of Astarābād conducted punitive expeditions against them, and the border was usually in a state of turmoil. In order to pacify the region, Shah Tahmasp built the fort of Mobārakābād on the banks of the Gorgān River, and the governors of Gorgān took up their residence there instead of in the city so that they could keep more effective watch on this area.

After the death of Shah Tahmasp, Sultan Moḥammad Shah and the armies of Azerbaijan and Iraq were fully occupied with the Ottoman threat in the West, and the Khorasan emirs split into two opposing factions. As a result, for several years the *qezelbāš* were too preoccupied to tend to the administration of Astarābād, and the province was left without a governor possessing full authority. A group of Yaqqa Turkmans, in particular those led by 'Alyār Beg Īmūr, had the temerity to occupy the mint and the fort of Mobārakābād, only three *farsaḵs* from the city. They destroyed the fort, and camped there as calmly as you please. The contagion of their seditious behavior gradually spread throughout the province of Astarābād. In every district some ringleader would stir up revolt and keep alive the tradition of the wearing of the black. Each rebel would construct a fort in his own district and stock it with musketeers and archers, and would recognize no outside authority.

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[29] The term Ṭabarestān, or Māzandarān, was sometimes used to include the neighboring province of Gorgān.

As time passed, these local rebels and usurpers asserted their complete independence from the *qezelbāš*, assisted in this by the difficulty of road communications in the area and by the sanctuary afforded by the forests. They left the region along the banks of the Gorgān River and the neighboring plain under the control of the Yaqqa Turkmans. The latter, satisfied with this arrangement, spent both summer and winter on the Gorgān plain. They did not penetrate into the city, the forests, or other places which were difficult of access for fear of the wearers of black, and for a while they managed to live at peace with one another.

Toward the end of the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, about the time of the accession of Shah ʿAbbas, first Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk and then Badr Khan Afšār, the brother of Eskandar Khan, was appointed governor of Astarābād. But the wearers of black, relying on the support of the Yaqqa Turkmans, refused to submit to the authority of the *qezelbāš* governors. The governors' retainers were unable to approach within a mile of the city, the produce of the province was denied to them, and in the end the *qezelbāš* were obliged to withdraw in the most humiliating fashion. One of the boldest leaders of the wearers of black was Ḵāja Šaraf al-Dīn Sāvarī, who plundered all Morteżāqolī Khan's baggage, took from the *ḡāzīs* their horses and equipment, and sent them away naked. Not long afterward, the Uzbegs invaded Khorasan, overran the districts of Nesā, Abīvard, Darūn, and Bāḡbād, adjacent to the Kabūd Jāma district of Astarābād. ʿAbdollāh Khan Uzbeg subjugated Ḵārazm and expelled its ruler, Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan.

Shah ʿAbbas tried to conciliate the Ṣā'en-ḵānī chiefs because he was afraid they might make common cause with the Uzbegs and encourage them to invade Astarābād, with the result that revolt might spread to Māzandarān. As a policy of expediency at the time, he selected one of the Ṣā'en-ḵānī chiefs who seemed more reliable than the others, ʿAlyār Beg Īmūr, raised him to the rank of khan, and appointed him governor of Astarābād. ʿAlyār Beg had declared his willingness to tender his allegiance to the Shah, through the mediation of Mīrzā Beg, the son of Mīr Żīā al-Dīn Fendereskī, a loyal subject of the crown. However, the Sīāh-pūš leaders refused to accept his authority either; the most they would agree to was that his lieutenant should take up residence in the city and style himself governor, while 'Alyār Beg himself remained on the banks of the Gorgān River.

After the death of 'Alyār Beg,[30] his son Moḥammad Yār Khan visited the Safavid court and was appointed governor of Astarābād in his father's place, but he was opposed by the Ūklū tribe and eventually slain by them. His younger brother, Qelīj Khan, then went to court and received a letter of appointment in his turn, but he could make no headway either because of the hostility of the Ūklū tribe. Finally, in 1007/1598, Shah 'Abbas subjugated the province and, as already reported, made Farhād Khan governor of Astarābād. The latter appointed a *dārūġa* to administer the province for him, and the Sīāh-pūš had no option but to submit. They repaired to court to tender their submission, and accompanied the Shah on his victorious expedition to Herat. After the execution of Farhād Khan, Ḥoseyn Khan Zīād-oġlū Qājār was appointed governor of Astarābād.

When Shah 'Abbas decided to move against the Ūklū rebels and the Yaqqa Turkman insurgents, and to settle the affairs of Astarābād, he sent back to Iraq from his camp in the Baḥrīān plain all his baggage and the bulk of his forces, via the Besṭām road. He himself, with a body of picked retainers and great emirs, marched toward Astarābād. In order to allay the fears of the Ūklūs, he sent an envoy, Moḥammadqolī Beg Čaġatāy, the master of the horse, to Qārī Khan, the Ūklū chief, with letters designed to conciliate the Turkman tribes. The gist of his message was that, since these tribes had from ancient times been subject to the ruler of Ḵārazm, and since the ruler of Ḵārazm, Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, had taken refuge with the Shah, together with his sons, and had now been restored by him to his hereditary domains, they too should acknowledge themselves to be dependents of the Shah, for it was only logical that dependents of Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan should be dependents of the Shah too. Qārī Khan should therefore now accompany Moḥammadqolī Beg without fear and tender his allegiance to the Shah. If they returned to their former good behavior, they would receive nothing but kindness from the Shah. Meanwhile, the royal army, guided by the Sīāh-pūš chiefs, began to advance by the Kabūd Jāma valley road.

At first, Qārī Khan Ūklū treated Moḥammadqolī Beg with honor and promised to convene a meeting of the chiefs and elders of the tribe and urge them to tender their allegiance to the Shah; he also agreed to accompany him to prostrate himself before the Shah. Unfortunately, the more foolish elements among the tribe, because it was a long time since they had left K̲ārazm and had grown used to independence and were no longer loyal to their own ruler, were terrified by the approach of the royal army and too frightened to go to meet the Shah. They fled toward the Atrek River. In addition, a group of hotheads attacked Moḥammadqolī Beg's tent, inflicted several mortal wounds on him, killed several of his retainers, and looted his baggage before following the rest of the tribe.

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[30] 1005/1596-97.

On receipt of this news, the Shah marched at top speed in pursuit of the rebels. He caught up with them at night, and they abandoned all their tents and fled. It was a night dark as the pit of hell, and raining heavily. The Shah wanted to continue his pursuit of Qārī Khan and not to draw rein until he had overtaken him, but his advisers demurred. The Shah should not risk his life chasing this rebel in the darkness, they said; they advised camping overnight in the rebels' deserted camp. After all, they said, their primary object in coming to Astarābād was to purge the province of rebellious elements. The Shah took their advice. He left his supplies at the rebel camp in the charge of Bark̲ordār Beg Anīs, the commander in chief of artillery, and a detachment of musketeers. At first light, although it was still pouring with rain, the Shah rode off and overtook the retreating Ūk̲lūs near the Atrek River. Qārī Khan fled across the river in a panic with a few of his men, leaving the rest of the tribe at the mercy of the *ğāzīs*, who slaughtered the men, took the women and children prisoner, and plundered their flocks. Since they had no clue as to where Qārī Khan had fled in the trackless waste across the Atrek, they marched to the Gorgān River, near the mausoleum of Šams al-Ma'ālī Qābūs b. Wašmgīr,[31] and then to the fort of Mobārakābad.

The chiefs of the other Ṣā'en-k̲ānī tribes, the Īmūr, Göklen, Sālūr, and others, hastened to present themselves to the Shah and were graciously received. The Shah decided to repair the fortifications of the Mobārakābād castle. The work was divided among the emirs and their men, and completed within twelve days. The Shah realized there was no one left among the Sīāh-pūš chiefs who remembered the days when the province was firmly under the jurisdiction of *qezelbāš*

[31] Zīārīd prince who reigned in Ṭabarestān and Gorgān 367-402/978-1012.

governors. The young men who had now come upon the scene as the leaders of the Sīāh-pūš had not seen a Safavid governor for twenty-five years, and considered themselves the governors of the province.

The Shah considered it expedient to awaken them to reality and so, after the castle had been completed, he summoned them into his presence and admonished them as follows:

> For some years this province has been without a ruling hand and has been devoid of law and order. Each of you, in the pursuit of your own interests, has ceased to behave like a subject and has formed a private army. Out of fear of one another and of the Turkman tribes, you have mobilized the Sīāh-pūš and have also been guilty of improper actions against various *qezelbāš* emirs. Now that you have repented of your past sins, and have sought forgiveness and have submitted yourselves to me, I shall overlook the crimes you committed during the period of the troubles. As far as I am concerned, they never happened. Now, by virtue of God's favor and my own power, the whole of this frontier, comprising the provinces of Ṭabarestān, Gorgān, and Khorasan as far as the Morḡāb River, has been brought again under the jurisdiction of the officers of the Safavid state; the princes of Ḵārazm and Ūrganj are my vassals; and the Ṣā'en-ḵānī rebels have met their just deserts. Those who survived the sword have submitted to me, and a governor has been appointed to administer the affairs of that region. From now on, it is my hope that this region will be free from the oppression of such tyrants. This being so, there is no longer any need for you to have castles to protect your property. You must raze your castles, hand over to your local governor your weapons and equipment, to be stored at Mobārakābād in case of need, and bring your families to Mobārakābād to reside there and, as in former times, engage in the cultivation of the land. Let the practice of the wearing of the black be abandoned forever, so that the governor of the province may feel secure from you and you from him, and trust may exist between you.

The Sīāh-pūš chiefs had no choice but to do as the Shah said. The Shah entrusted a reliable *qezelbāš* officer with the task of collecting their weapons. He devoted himself to the task with zeal, letting it be known that if in the future so much as a sword or a spear were found in a person's house, his life would be forfeit. And so the Sīāh-pūš, who still today maintain an air of independence in the various districts of Astarābād, found themselves in an unforeseen situation and tendered their submission with the greatest unwillingness. In their folly, they started reproaching one another for this apparent act of submission, and dissension soon broke out among them. However, as agreed, they razed their forts and took several thousand muskets, pieces of chain mail, quivers, and bows, to the castle of Mobārakābād; the chiefs took their families to the fort.

One day, as the Shah was riding through the city, he heard the clamor of women and other defenseless persons who were raising their cries to heaven against the oppression and injustices of the Sīāh-pūš. During the time of the troubles, the Sīāh-pūš had committed many crimes against the people of Astarābād, who were mainly pious, ascetic, God-fearing folk. If the Sīāh-pūš suspected anyone of having any wealth, they took a band of thugs to his house at night, threatened him with death if he did not hand over everything he possessed, and raped his womenfolk. Ḵāja Šaraf al-Dīn Sāvarī was particularly notorious. On two occasions he had taken a large group of Sīāh-pūš to the women's bathhouse, dragged the women naked outdoors, and carried them off to Sāvar as though they were infidel or Frankish prisoners, selling them off individually to some master or other. Although these crimes were committed in anarchical times, it would not be consonant with the justice of kings, who are the shadows of God upon earth, not to demand retribution for them, nor would the minds of the poor and the oppressed be set at rest unless the malefactors were punished and the kingdom purged of such audacious men.

Shah 'Abbas therefore decided to visit retribution upon these evildoers. He summoned the Sīāh-pūš chiefs to an audience at which he was reviewing the cases of *seyyeds,* theologians, members of the religious classes generally, and holders of benefices; the Shah pretended he needed the chiefs to help him determine which members of these classes and their offspring had adhered faithfully to their calling, and which had joined the ranks of the Sīāh-pūš riffraff.

After the investigation was completed, the Shah innocently asked Ǩāja Šaraf al-Dīn Sāvarī for details concerning Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk. In the course of his narrative the Ǩāja, stupidly relying on the Shah's declaration that all his past crimes had been forgiven, related all the acts of injustice, humiliation, and ignominy he had inflicted on the *qezelbāš*, and he flattered the Shah, hoping thus to turn away his wrath. However, his soft words were not as effective as the sighs and supplications of the oppressed, and the Shah had all the Sīāh-pūš chiefs executed. Ǩāja Šaraf al-Dīn Sāvarī was cut into pieces; pieces were hung up in all the wards of the city, and a piece was suspended over the door of the women's bathhouse. Others were executed with the full rigor of the law, and their corpses were suspended upside-down over the city gates as a warning to all who beheld them. Still others had their eyes put out and were released to show themselves as examples to the people.

The people rejoiced at the punishment inflicted on these malefactors and prayed for the prosperity of the Safavid dynasty. After the Shah had left for Iraq, the governor of Astarābād, Ḥoseyn Khan, continued to ferret out rebels and to put to death anyone suspected of disloyalty. Moreover, he was so zealous in impounding all items of military equipment and offensive weapons that, if anyone was found wearing a drawing ring,[32] he would have his thumb cut off and the drawing ring confiscated. As a result, the Sīāh-pūš lost their desire for the wearing of the black, and the province of Astarābād became as quiet and peaceful as the other province of Iran.

The Capture of Alvand Dīv Māzandarānī and the Shah's Expedition to Māzandarān to Deal with Affairs in That Province

The Shah thought it might be necessary for him to spend the winter of 1598–99 in Māzandarān in order to deal with the rebel Alvand Dīv; at a season when the trees were bare of leaves, it might be easier to find him and his fellow rebels among the forests of Māzandarān. He swore not to leave the province until every rebel had been run to earth; he charged the nobles of Māzandarān to cooperate in finding Alvand Dīv, and he sent a detachment of troops on ahead to commence the search.

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[32] A ring of leather or bone worn on the finger to prevent the bowstring from cutting into it.

When Alvand Dīv heard of the Shah's intentions, he considered his only chance of salvation lay in asking for quarter and in presenting himself before the Shah. He accordingly sent an envoy to the Shah's paternal aunt, asking her to intercede for him. If she could obtain a promise of pardon for him, he would set out for the Shah's court. The Shah told Alvand that, if he came to court, his life, property and honor were safe; "but," said the Shah, "I shall not leave Māzandarān until all rebellion is at an end." On the basis of this assurance, Alvand Dīv came to court and was well received by the Shah. The Shah told him his past sins would be forgiven if he would renounce all claim to the government of Savād-kūh and live quietly in Iraq with his family. Overwhelmed by the Shah's generosity, Alvand Dīv accepted these terms and took up residence at Shiraz with his family and dependents. The Shah, his worries in regard to Alvand Dīv now over, spent a few days hunting in Māzandarān; he put to death some persons suspected of sedition, and moved others to Iraq.

This completed the pacification of the whole Caspian littoral, from Gorgān in the northeast, through Māzandarān, Rostamdār, Gīlān, Gaskar, and Ṭāleš, as far as the borders of Šīrvān in the northwest, an area that in previous generations had been divided among many princes and governors and as a result had never been free from turmoil and strife. The Shah led his army back to Iraq, skirting the slopes of Mount Damāvand, a difficult route at the best of times. At this season the snow was more than one spear's length in depth, and the men suffered great hardships. At one point the Shah dismounted, and for a distance of more than one *farsaḵ* himself led his horse forward ahead of his men, who followed single file in his tracks. They reached the small town of Damāvand safely and from there marched to Qazvin, where the people came out to give the Shah a great welcome; kettledrums were sounded to celebrate the victory in Khorasan. The Shah disbanded his troops and went to Isfahan, where he spent the rest of the winter.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred during the Year of the Shah's Campaign in Khorasan

Mīrzā ʿAlī Beg Garāmīllū, a Šāmlū centurion, was sent to India to bear the tidings of the victory over the Uzbegs to the Mogul emperor Akbar, and a similar letter was sent to the Ottoman emperor Moḥammad III. A signal event this year was the remission by the Shah, in gratitude to God for his victory, of taxes to the amount of approximately one hundred thousand Iraqi *tomān,* which were levied on the populace in the form of perpetual drafts assigned on the revenue.[33] The taxes remitted were as follows:

(1) The levy on flocks *(čūpānbegī).* This tax, levied on sheep, brought in about twenty thousand Iraqi *tomān* annually. In consideration of the fact that the people of Khorasan, throughout the period of Uzbeg occupation, had assisted with their property and their lives the troops of the royal army, their fellow Ḵorāsānīs, and all manner of official guests, and had suffered great hardship in so doing, the Shah remitted the tax on flocks and decreed that henceforth not one *dīnār* should be levied under this head.

(2) A reduction of five *dīnārs* for every *dīnār* of the commission levied by governors as their fee for collecting the taxes. Over the years, it had become customary in Iraq for governors to levy from the people five times the basic fee, payable in cash, in addition to the emoluments of fiefholders and the perquisites of *dārūḡas.*[34] Since this practice was contrary to the old tax assessment and also to the tax regulations of Shah Tahmasp, it was abolished. It was decreed that the governors should levy only the stipulated cash fee, plus the additional fees connected with it, and should not countenance the new fee-structure which had become customary. This meant a tax reduction of some fifty to sixty thousand *tomān.*

(3) A remission of all taxes levied on Isfahan for one year, amounting to about twenty thousand *tomān,* as a reward for the loyal services of the people of Isfahan.

These tax reductions were indeed magnificent gifts to the people. May God protect the Shah from all harm, so that he may continue to extend his justice to the poor and weak.

[33] *Hama-sāla* was a form of draft *(barāt)* permanently assigned on the same source of revenue. Obviously, they were preferable to the *yak-sāla* type of draft, which was valid for one year only.

[34] Minorsky *(TM,* p. 176 and note 3) assumes that the governors had been in the habit of levying *five times the total basic tax* in their area of jurisdiction. "Grammatically," he says, "this is the only possible meaning of *yakī-rā panj,* but the proportion of the additional levy (500 per cent) sounds exorbitant; no depreciation of money would account for it." I agree. We therefore have to look for an alternative possible meaning. I think the phrase *aṣl-e māl-e naqdī* refers not to the *total basic tax,* but to the *basic tax fee* levied by the governors for their services—in other words, the *'amalkard.* This interpretation ties in with the opening statement (not translated by Minorsky) that Shah 'Abbas reduced this fee in the amount of "five dinars for every dinar"; in other words, 'Abbas was returning to the *status quo ante.*

Another event that occurred during the Shah's expedition to Khorasan was the murder of Mīrzā Valī Khan, the son of 'Alīqolī Khan and the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan Šāmlū, who had been granted the signal honor of a marriage alliance with the Safavid house. He was murdered by a young Tabrīzī named Ṣāleḥ, a servant at court. Men of discretion are aware that there is an unwritten rule for persons who are in attendance at court in the service of kings—namely, that they should treat the other servants of their master as their brothers and sons, and be jealous of their honor. Anyone who looks disloyally upon another is, in the view of jealous persons, deserving of punishment.

Valī Khan Mīrzā had on several occasions, in his folly and indiscretion, declared to Ṣāleḥ his love and special attachment for him. One night, when the royal army was in camp near Jājarm, Valī Khan Mīrzā left a royal assembly stupefied by drink. Ṣāleḥ came up behind him and slew him with his sword. Ṣāleḥ at once went in to the Shah and confessed what he had done, and the Shah applauded him for defending his honor in this manner. The corpse of the murdered man lay where it had fallen until morning, none daring to move it for burial. In the morning, Valī Khan Mīrzā's servants were permitted to bury the body. His troops were transferred to his younger brother Ḥoseyn Khan Mīrzā, who, like his elder brother, was also a son-in-law of the Shah.

At the beginning of the year Moḥammad Yār Khan, the son of 'Alyār Khan Īmūr, who had been appointed governor of Astarābād in succession to his father, was treacherously murdered by a group of Ūkḷū and Yaqqa Turkmans; he was not yet twenty. His younger brother, Qelīj Beg, was appointed by Shah 'Abbas governor of Astarābād, but he was unable to establish himself firmly in his governorship. On the Shah's return from Khorasan, as already related, the province was brought firmly under Safavid rule and the Ūkḷū tribe was crushed. Qelīj Khan, together with his family and the dependents of his father and brother, moved to Iraq on the Shah's orders, and the rest of the Īmūr and Sālūr chiefs, such as Naẓar Beg, known as Naẓar Kūr, were ordered to support Ḥoseyn Khan, the new governor of Astarābād, and to install their families in the fortress there.

While the Shah was at Astarābād, he reappointed Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan governor of Azerbaijan, and gave him leave to depart to his post.

I trust that the continuing support of good fortune and of the scholars of the age will give me strength to record the events of the coming year also without flagging.

The Events of the Year of the Pig, Corresponding to the Year 1008/1599-1600, the Thirteenth Year of Shah 'Abbas's Reign

New Year's Day this year fell on Sunday, 23 Ša'bān 1007/21 March 1599. Shah 'Abbas gave a huge feast in the Naqš-e Jahān gardens at Isfahan and invited to it the emirs, *moqarrabs*, principal officers of state, people of Isfahan, and the various classes of persons present at court at that time. Cunningly fashioned pavilions, hung with lights, were erected in the garden, and the feasting went on for three days and nights.

This year, the Shah again planned to visit Khorasan. His object was twofold: first, he wished to make the pilgrimage again to the shrine of the Imam Rezā and to glean the latest information on the situation in Transoxania and the activities of the Uzbegs; second, he wished to go to the assistance of Nūr Moḥammad Khan, who was his protégé. After Shah 'Abbas had reinstalled Nūr Moḥammad Khan in his hereditary domains, the latter and the Nāīmān tribe regarded each other with mutual suspicion; the Khan had not forgotten that it was the Nāīmans who had rebelled against 'Abdollāh Khan, gone over to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and expelled him from his territories. The Nāīmans, for their part, saw too much of *qezelbāš* ways in his style of administration and remained hostile to him.

When the crops were ready for harvest, the Shah left Isfahan for Khorasan, not taking with him any of the emirs or troops from the provinces, but only those retainers who were always at his side. As he was leaving, an ambassador arrived from Pīr Moḥammad Khan and the emirs at Bokhara, escorted by one of Nūr Moḥammad Khan's men. He bore a letter pledging the sincere friendship of the Uzbeg chiefs and asking for the return of Moḥammad Ebrahim, a grandson of 'Abdollāh Khan and cousin of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, who had been captured at Bāğbād. The Uzbeg chief said he had heard that the Shah, with that innate magnanimity he had inherited from his immaculate ancestors,[1] had treated his captive with the greatest kindness. "Now that the throne of Transoxania has devolved upon me," concluded Pīr Moḥammad Khan, "I would deem it a personal favor if you would return Moḥammad Ebrahim, who is like a son to me."

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[1] An allusion to the Safavid claim to descent from the Seventh Shi'ite Imam, Mūsā al-Kāẓem.

However, the emirs at Bokhara had sent word to Nūr Moḥammad Khan that they had had to consent to the khanship of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, *faute de mieux*. Although the latter was of royal blood and in this sense fit to rule, they said, he was a dervish who preferred a quiet life of meditation to the hurlyburly of government and the cares of state. As a result, they said, the state already was in trouble; Bāqī Sultan had seized control of Samarkand and set himself up in opposition to Pīr Moḥammad Khan, while at Balḵ other problems had arisen. In this situation, they said, no one was more fitted to take charge of things in Transoxania and act as the lieutenant of the ruler whom they had chosen than Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan, both by virtue of hereditary right and capability. They therefore besought Nūr Moḥammad Khan to act as intermediary in putting their plea for the return of Moḥammad Ebrahim before Shah 'Abbas. In return, they pledged peace in their time between themselves and the dependent vassals of the Safavid king, and peace between the Uzbegs and the *qezelbāš*. The Shah agreed to these terms, and to sending Moḥammad Ebrahim, escorted by one of the great emirs, to Nūr Moḥammad Khan at Marv. If the Bokhara emirs were sincere in what they said, they should come to Čahār-jū and Marv to welcome Moḥammad Ebrahim, who would be handed over to them by Nūr Moḥammad Khan on receipt of satisfactory guarantees.

When the Shah reached Semnān, he received fresh news from Nūr Moḥammad Khan to the effect that war had broken out between Pīr Moḥammad Khan and Bāqī Sultan, and that Pīr Moḥammad Khan and most of his emirs had been killed by the latter. Ḳodāy Naẓar Bī, who had acted as kingmaker and placed Pīr Moḥammad Khan on the throne, had escaped from the battlefield and made his way to Marv; Bāqī Sultan had taken charge at Bokhara. The Shah ordered Ḳodāy Naẓar Bī to be sent to him so that he might question him in person about the situation in Transoxania, and he further ordered Nūr Moḥammad Khan to take whatever action seemed most expedient in regard to Moḥammad Ebrahim.

Events in Transoxania and the Accession of Bāqī Sultan

After Pīr Moḥammad Khan had been installed as ruler at Bokhara, Tavakkol Khan Qazāq, finding Transoxania without a strong hand at the helm, raised a huge army from the tribes of Turkestan and the Uzbegs of the steppes and invaded. He rapidly overran the provinces of Aḵsīkaṣ, Andejān, Tashkent, and Samarkand, as far as Mīān

Kāl. He left his brother, Īšom Sultan, at Samarkand with twenty thousand men, and marched on Bokhara with between seventy and eighty thousand men. Pīr Moḥammad Khan, who had no more than ten to fifteen thousand men at his disposal, ruled out the possibility of a pitched battle and prepared to resist a siege. Every day the defenders made sorties and inflicted casualties on the besiegers. Eleven days passed in this manner.

On the twelfth day, the defenders marched out of the city *en masse* and gave battle. Fighting raged all day, and in the end the Bokharan forces were victorious. Tavakkol Khan fell back on his camp, his men scattered in all directions. The Bokharans reentered the city and beat the kettledrums in triumph. Tavakkol Khan considered his position to be untenable; he lit large numbers of fires in his camp, and retreated under cover of darkness to Samarkand, where he was scornfully reproached by his brother for having fled from an enemy numerically far inferior; his action, said Īšom Sultan, might well provoke a revolt against them at Samarkand. Their best plan was to join forces and make a united attack on Bokhara.

When Tavakkol Khan fell back from Bokhara, Pīr Moḥammad Khan came out of the city to pursue him and to recover those places which had been occupied by the enemy. Reinforcements reached him from all parts of Transoxania, and a second battle was fought at Ūzūn Saql in the Mīān-kāl district. Prior to the battle, Pīr Moḥammad Khan was joined by Bāqī Sultan, who had been routed by the *qezelbāš* at Pol-e Sālār; he, like his brother Dīn Moḥammad Khan, had left the field with a few of his men and crossed the Oxus at the Karkī ford and made his way to Bokhara, arriving there shortly after Pīr Moḥammad Khan had left in pursuit of Tavakkol Khan. In default of instructions from Pīr Moḥammad Khan, the townspeople of Bokhara refused him admittance to the city, and Bāqī Sultan marched on past Mazār-e Ḵāja Bahā al-Dīn and joined Pīr Moḥammad Khan at his camp at Ūzūn Saql. There, following the practice of the princes of the house of Genghis, he prostrated himself before his brother.

Pīr Moḥammad Khan's emirs welcomed Bāqī Sultan with open arms and placed him in charge of operations against Tavakkol Khan. Bāqī Sultan fought a number of minor engagements against Tavakkol Khan, in most of which he was victorious. He executed 'Abd al-Vāse' Bī, formerly a trusted officer of 'Abdollāh Khan who had been party to the assassination of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, because 'Abd al-Vāse' Bī had turned traitor, joined Tavakkol Khan, and incited him to invade Transoxania. Skirmishes went on for about a month, and the whole of this time Bāqī Sultan fought courageously as the loyal supporter of Pīr Moḥammad Khan. Finally, Tavakkol Khan got tired of this indecisive fighting and launched a surprise attack on Pīr Moḥammad Khan. Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan, a relative of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, and Moḥammad Bāqī *atālīq*, the *dīvānbegī*, were both killed in this action. Tavakkol Khan was wounded and retired to Tashkent, where he fell ill and died.

Pīr Moḥammad appointed Bāqī Sultan governor of Samarkand as a reward for his services, and he was welcomed there as a liberator by the people. Through the good offices of the Naqšbandī shaikhs, a truce of sorts was concluded between Bāqī Sultan and the Cossacks, a condition being that the Cossacks be left unmolested at Tashkent. At Samarkand, Bāqī Sultan included in the *ḵoṭba* the name of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, and embellished his coinage with it. He established himself firmly at Samarkand, and also brought under his control various peripheral areas. This year, he remained loyal to Pīr Moḥammad Khan.

Gradually, however, he became intoxicated with the idea of still greater power, particularly since he considered himself more fitted to be supreme khan than Pīr Moḥammad, and was encouraged in this ambition by the ease with which he had assumed control of the extensive province of Samarkand. He began to hand out largesse with a lavish hand, and he distributed all the revenues of the province to his troops in the form of grants. As a result, large numbers of Uzbegs flocked to him, including Raḥmānqolī Sultan and 'Abbas Sultan, his cousins, his brother Tarsūn Moḥammad Sultan, and other relatives. He adopted the style of khan, and his men began to raid across the borders of his territory.

Several warnings were sent to Bāqī Khan by Pīr Moḥammad Khan's emirs and principal officers of state. When these had no effect, they decided on a punitive expedition against Samarkand. Bāqī Khan sent smooth-talking envoys to Pīr Moḥammad Khan, adducing as evidence of his loyalty the fact that no changes had been made in the *ḵoṭba* or on the coinage. He promised better behavior in the future, and said that his troops would not go beyond the confines of the province of Samarkand. The Bokharan emirs agreed to peaceful negotiation, and an insincere truce was concluded between the two parties. However, Bāqī Khan continued to give clear proof of his seditious activities. When some secret letters which he had written to various Uzbeg nobles, calling on them to transfer their allegiance to him, came to light, Pīr Moḥammad Khan's principal officers of state realized there was no hope of recalling Bāqī Khan to his allegiance.

At this point, Bāqī Khan abandoned all pretense and openly rebelled, since the revenues of the province of Samarkand no longer sufficed to provide fodder allowances and cash allowances for such a large army. With the intention of subjugating the province of Mīān-kāl, he marched first against the fortress of Dabūs and laid siege to it. Shah Kūček Dūrmen, the governor of Mīān-kāl, emerged from the Old Fort and submitted to Bāqī Khan, and together they captured the fort at Dabūs and put to death there Moḥammad Šarīf Sultan, a relative of Pīr Moḥammad Khan.

On receipt of this news, Pīr Moḥammad Khan mobilized his army and sent a courier to ʿAbd al-Amīn Khan at Balḵ to ask for help. The elders at Balḵ, since they knew the triumph of Bāqī Khan would mean the end of their own power, and since they were opposed to Bāqī Khan's assuming the office of supreme khan, decided to assist Pīr Moḥammad Khan. They sent a force of ten thousand men under the command of Shah Ḵ̆āja Naqīb, an eminent *seyyed* of that province, and also other reliable emirs. On receiving these reinforcements, Pīr Moḥammad Khan marched on Samarkand with forty thousand men. When Pīr Moḥammad Khan neared the city, Bāqī Khan repeated his earlier performance—abasing himself, begging for forgiveness, and so on—but Pīr Moḥammad Khan and his principal officers of state, having found his word to be false on the previous occasion, refused to trust him again. Bāqī Khan did not consider himself strong enough to risk a battle in the open field, and prepared to resist a siege. Pīr Moḥammad Khan's men camped around the city, but the Balḵ contingent, although it had come to the assistance of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, felt a little apprehensive of the Bokharans and kept itself apart.

The defenders sallied forth. With their rear protected by the fort, they engaged their attackers, and heavy fighting went on all day. The following day, Bāqī Khan led a strong force out of the Bokhara Gate, which was opposite the camp of the Balḵ contingent, and made fierce sorties against the latter. Pīr Moḥammad Khan sent most of his men to the Bokhara Gate to drive the Samarqandīs back, but at this juncture Dūstom Arḡūn, formerly one of 'Abdollāh Khan's great emirs, deserted Pīr Moḥammad Khan and went over to the enemy. Encouraged by this addition to their strength, Bāqī Khan's men stood their ground, and gradually the whole of the Balḵ contingent, and more and more Bokharans joined in the fray, leaving Pīr Moḥammad Khan's center depleted.

At this point, Bāqī Khan, sending his uncle Raḥmānqolī Sultan ahead with some skirmishers, suddenly emerged from the north gate with a picked body of about one thousand (certainly not more than fifteen hundred) men, and charged full tilt at Pīr Moḥammad Khan's center. The Bokharans, their morale already shaken by the desertion of Dūstom Arḡūn, broke at Raḥmānqolī Sultan's first charge. An unknown rider inflicted a severe wound on Pīr Moḥammad Khan and then, recognizing him, led him to Bāqī Khan, who at once had him put to death. When the news reached the rest of Pīr Moḥammad Khan's men, their rout became general. But the Balḵ contingent preserved some sort of order and kept together as they retreated from the field and went to Qaršī. There, they picked up Pīr Moḥammad Khan's infant son, Moḥammad Salīm Sultan, and proceeded to Balḵ.

After his victory, Bāqī Khan marched immediately on Bokhara. Some of Pīr Moḥammad Khan's emirs who had escaped unscathed from the battle, such as Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī, reached Bokhara ahead of him. But Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī saw no possibility of holding the city against him and fled the same night across the Oxus to Marv, to Nūr Moḥammad Khan. On the third day after the battle, Bāqī Khan entered Bokhara in triumph, and was welcomed with due ceremony by the notables of the city. He ascended the throne of 'Abdollāh Khan, and the Uzbeg tribes tendered their allegiance to him.

Of Pīr Moḥammad Khan's men who fell into their hands, any who were suspected of harboring opposition to Bāqī Khan were put to death, for instance, Gönültāš and his brother, Dūst Čohra-āqāsī, and others; the rest were granted amnesty. The newel posts of the pulpits and the face of the *dīnārs* were embellished with his name and titles. The neighboring princes, from Tashkent, Turkestan, Balḵ, Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, and Badaḵšān, sent ambassadors to congratulate Bāqī Khan on his accession. Bāqī Khan was a brave and intrepid youth, and a man of resolution and sound judgment in affairs of state—qualities which had raised him from vassal status to the position of supreme khan. Eventually, he extended his dominion also over the provinces of Balḵ, Badaḵšān, and Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, as I shall describe for my readers in due course.

The Shah's Visit to Mašhad and Events There

As previously related, the Shah received the news about Bāqī Khan when he reached Semnān, He accordingly postponed his plan to send Moḥammad Ebrahim to Transoxania and marched back to Mašhad via Kālpūš. When he reached Darra-e Mowżeʿ Ḵabās in the district of Kālpūš, he fell ill with a high fever and was forced to keep to his bed for a month. The physicians put forth all their efforts to cure him, and all persons in the royal camp, whatever their degree, vowed alms to the needy if the Shah recovered. Every man brought what he most cherished as a sacrificial offering to the Shah. In the end, through God's mercy, the Shah was restored to health and, after a period of convalescence, marched to Esfarā'īn via Šaqān and Jorbod. He spent twenty days there, purging himself on the doctors' orders.

While the Shah was ill at Mowżeʿ Ḵabās, Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī arrived from Marv. When the Shah recovered, he gave him a full report on affairs in Transoxania. From his account and that of other Uzbegs, it appeared that ʿAbd al-Amīn Khan, the putative son of ʿEbādollāh Sultan, who had been placed on the throne at Balḵ through the efforts of ʿEbādollāh Sultan's widow, Bānū-ye ʿOżmā, was an unknown who had been used as a pawn by the latter. This was widely rumored among the Uzbegs, and the Shah sought urgent confirmation of this report.

Meanwhile, since the Uzbegs had doubts about the legitimacy of ʿAbd al-Amīn Khan and Balḵ was in reality ruled by Bānū-ye ʿOẓmā, he decided to send Moḥammad Ebrahim, her nephew, to Balḵ. The Shah hoped everyone would flock to the support of Moḥammad Ebrahim, who might then proceed to the conquest of Transoxania. On the other hand, if Bānū-ye ʿOẓmā remained firm in her support of ʿAbd al-Amīn Khan, there was a possibility that they might form an alliance and launch a joint invasion of Transoxania to wrest their hereditary domains from alien hands. Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī approved this plan.

By a lucky coincidence, ambassadors arrived from Balḵ at this point, on behalf of Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā and the emirs there. Apparently, when Bāqī Khan extended his sway over Transoxania, they had become nervous and had made overtures to the Shah, asking that Moḥammad Ebrahim be sent to Balḵ. The Shah waited no longer; having conferred on Moḥammad Ebrahim the rank of khan and the title of son, he sent him in the care of Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī, who was appointed his guardian and *dīvānbegī*. With Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī, the Shah sent a letter designed to mollify 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, whom he also addressed as "my son." The kingdom of Transoxania, said the Shah, had from time immemorial been the domain of the sons of Jānī Beg Khan.[2] At the present time, there remained of the descendants of Jānī Beg Khan only himself ('Abd al-Amīn) and Moḥammad Ebrahim, both of whom he (the Shah) had honored with the style of "son." Since the Safavid house was noted for its beneficence and munificence, and since Moḥammad Ebrahim had actually been living at the Shah's court and 'Abd al-Amīn Khan had made overtures to him, he (the Shah), purely for the sake of acquiring a good name, had decided to forget past enmities and spare no effort to restore their house to its rightful place. The two khans should form a fraternal alliance for the purpose of reconquering their hereditary territories.

The Shah also issued orders and letters addressed to the Uzbeg emirs at Balḵ, urging them to recall the past benefits conferred on them by the house of Jānī Begī Khan and exhorting them to give their loyal support to these two scions of the house, and not to support any alien ruler, on pain of incurring dishonor. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan besought the Shah to grant him a royal diploma conferring on him the right to rule the whole of Transoxania, and the Shah complied. The author of this history drafted the royal diploma, with a suitable preamble, had it sealed with the *mehr-āṣār* seal,[3] and delivered it to the Khan. The Khan took his leave of the Shah at Esfarā'īn, and Būdāq Khan, the governor of Mašhad, was ordered to accompany him. At the last moment, the Shah had second thoughts. He decided it was more prudent to sound out Uzbeg opinion at Balḵ before letting Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan go; once he was satisfied that the Uzbegs were not contemplating any treachery against the Khan, he could send the latter to Balḵ when the royal army reached Herat, which was closer to Balḵ and therefore preferable in case of trouble.

[2] The grandfather of 'Abdollāh Khan. The Uzbegs had wrested Ḵārazm from the Tīmūrīds in 1447, and Transoxania in 1500.

[3] See *TM*, pp. 63, 202–03.

The Shah therefore decided to keep Moḥammad Ebrahim at Mašhad. He sent an aide-de-camp, Rūḥollah Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, to Balḵ with the Uzbeg ambassadors and all the letters of appointment. The royal army then marched from Esfarā'īn to Mašhad, and the Shah visited the shrine of the Imam Reżā. The Shah spent the winter at Mašhad. During his stay, he attended the shrine for prayer on the eve of saints' days and on other holy occasions, and himself performed the duties of chief attendant at the shrine, an office that was the personal prerogative of the Shah.

Events of the Year of the Rat, Corresponding to the Year 1009/1600-01, the Fourteenth Year of the Reign of Shah ʿAbbas

New Year's Day fell this year on Wednesday, 5 Ramażān 1008/20 March 1600.[1] The Shah celebrated the occasion by indulging in games of polo and archery competitions in the *meydān* at Mašhad. After the Nowrūz festivities, the Shah marched to Herat and camped in the city park. The governor of Herat, Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, came out with the nobles of the city to welcome him. The Shah sent orders to Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of K̲ārazm, and Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān, bidding them to come to Herat so that he might consult them about policy in regard to Transoxania. Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan answered the call, but fell ill on the way; for several stages on the journey, he had himself carried in a litter, but finally had to admit defeat and send his apologies to the Shah. Nūr Moḥammad Khan, however, made specious excuses for not coming.

At this juncture, Rūḥollah Beg returned from Balk̲ and reported that people there were divided in their loyalties, some supporting Moḥammad Ebrahim and others ʿAbd al-Amīn, their de facto governor; the latter faction was opposed to the Shah's idea of sending Moḥammad Ebrahim to Balk̲, seeing this as a threat to ʿAbd al-Amīn's position. ʿAbd al-Amīn Khan's supporters had held several meetings to decide on their response. Eventually, because they feared the Shah, they had unwillingly agreed to his plan, but only on the following conditions: Moḥammad Ebrahim was to recognize ʿAbd al-Amīn as an elder brother, and was to prostrate himself before him; Moḥammad Ebrahim was to be subject to ʿAbd al-Amīn Khan's orders; until such time as Transoxania should be reconquered, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan was to be satisfied with whatever territories ʿAbd al-Amīn Khan conferred on him by letters of appointment; after the reconquest of Transoxania, one of them would reside at Bokhara, and the other at Balk̲. ʿAbd al-Amīn Khan sent a conciliatory letter to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan, addressing him as "brother." Although the Shah did not like these terms, in the circumstances he decided it was expedient to accept them.

Since the Shah had full confidence in K̲odāy Naẓar Bī, he counseled Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan always to follow the advice of that emir. He further counseled him to maintain cordial relations with 'Abd al-Amīn Khan for the time being, and to conduct himself in a sensible manner. The Shah then equipped him in regal fashion and sent him off escorted by Būdāq Khan, the governor of Mašhad, and Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan Fīrūzjang. The Shah sent Emāmqolī Beg Pākīzā Torkmān ahead to Balḳ with conciliatory letters to 'Abd al-Amīn Khan and the Uzbeg nobles; if they wanted *qezelbāš* assistance in the reconquest of Transoxania, he said, they had only to ask for it. So Emāmqolī Beg rode off to Balḳ to bring the good news of Moḥammad Ebrahim's impending arrival to his paternal aunt, and to urge the people of Balḳ to go out and welcome him.

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[1] The 5th of Ramażān was on a Monday.

The nobles at Balḳ could not comply with this request without offending 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, who after all was the de facto ruler. But in the end, since Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā thought it expedient, a few nobles obtained permission to go out and welcome Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan. They met the Khan at Meymana and held long discussions with him. From the Khan's manner they soon realized he was not going to bend the knee to a youth of unknown parentage. Those of the Balḳ nobles who owed their rise to 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, and therefore wished him to remain the ruler, declared their hostility to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and returned to the city. Others declared there was no need for the *qezelbāš* army to march to Balḳ. "Hand over our prince," they said, "and we Uzbegs will do whatever is in the best interests of the state." Būdāq Khan and Ḳodāy Naẓar Bī refused to accept these terms, and so it was agreed that representatives of both parties should lay the facts before the Shah and implement whatever decision he might make. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and his supporters, not trusting the Uzbegs, fell back about two days' march in order to be nearer to the main *qezelbāš* army. The rest of the Uzbeg elders returned to Balḳ.

The two delegations met the Shah at Herat. Shah 'Abbas declared his ambition was that Moḥammad Ebrahim should lead an army against Bokhara and wrest Transoxania from the hands of the usurper, and he expected 'Abd al-Amīn Khan and the emirs at Balḳ to cooperate and participate in this operation. The Shah declared he had no designs whatever on Balḳ or any territory under the control of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan. If the Uzbegs were agreeable, both sides could enter into a sworn covenant; Būdāq Khan and Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan would then return and, with an escort of Uzbeg troops, deliver Moḥammad Ebrahim safely at Balḵ. Once more, Emāmqolī Beg set off for Balḵ to convey these new terms. Outwardly, in order to satisfy 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, the Balḵ nobles agreed to these terms, but they made a secret covenant with Emāmqolī Beg Pākīza. When Moḥammad Ebrahim reached Balḵ, they said, they would certainly prefer him to the man of unknown origin who had been foisted upon them.

Emāmqolī Beg, assured of their support, returned to Herat with sworn oaths to this effect in his pocket. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan was escorted to Balḵ with Ḳodāy Naẓar Bī, his escort this time not fearing any attack and marching without normal military precautions. When they neared Balḵ, the *qezelbāš* escort left him, and 'Abd al-Amīn sent a delegation to welcome him. The Uzbegs made obeisance to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan in the traditional manner, and when they noticed in him signs of breeding and observed his regal bearing, they agreed to serve him.

On the day on which Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan was due to enter the city, the Uzbeg nobles who remained there urged 'Abd al-Amīn Khan to go out and welcome Moḥammad Ebrahim, but the former, jealous of his dignity and superior status, refused. In the end, the nobles appealed to Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā: "If 'Abd al-Amīn Khan does not go out to welcome Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan," they said, "and does not greet him as a brother, all the Uzbegs will suspect you of ill-will toward your nephew." At this, Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā gave in, and 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, whether he liked it or not, rode out of the city with his nobles to greet Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan. He had been preceded by most of the population of Balḵ, who wanted to see Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and make their obeisance to him, and few people were left in the city.

The Uzbeg nobles had instructed 'Abd al-Amīn Khan that, when Moḥammad Ebrahim dismounted, he should dismount in his turn, go forward, and embrace Moḥammad Ebrahim warmly and greet him cordially. However, when the two men met, that poor ignorant simpleton 'Abd al-Amīn dismounted first. When he saw this, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan retained his seat, and ordered his men to bring 'Abd al-Amīn before him to make obeisance to him. It was a critical moment but, because most of the people of Balḵ wanted a change of regime, none of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan's supporters uttered a word in protest. 'Abd al-Amīn, thoroughly bemused, was led forward to make his obeisance. Moḥammad Ebrahim signed to his men to take charge of the horse 'Abd al-Amīn had been riding and his spare horses, and the poor wretch, after prostrating himself before Moḥammad Ebrahim, looked round in vain for a mount, and stood there bewildered, hemmed in by the horses of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's men. Finally, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan handed him over to one of his men, who took charge of him while the cavalcade proceeded toward the city.

Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan dismounted in front of the royal palace, where he was greeted by his aunt. Since matters had now passed out of her control, she greeted him affectionately and begged him to treat 'Abd al-Amīn well and not harm him. The same night, however, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, to show his loyalty to the new regime, murdered 'Abd al-Amīn Khan. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan thus secured the allegiance of all the Uzbeg tribes in the area, and the governors of Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān also indicated their willingness to submit to him.

After the murder of 'Abd al-Amīn, it was rumored that Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā went to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and said she had devised the plan of putting 'Abd al-Amīn on the throne only as a means of keeping the throne for him (Moḥammad Ebrahim), because the people of Balḵ had always been united in their support of Jānī Beg Sultan, the father of Bāqī Khan, and Jānī Beg's line had ceased to exist.[2] But Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan held his aunt in no great esteem, because of certain opinions she was alleged to hold and remarks she was alleged to have made (though God knows where the truth lies), and he equipped a retinue for her and gave her permission to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. She died on the way.

Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan sent a full report on events at Balḵ to Shah 'Abbas and affirmed his loyalty to him. The Shah reciprocated with a delegation bearing congratulations and gifts to the Khan. Bāqī Khan in Transoxania was disconcerted at the news. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's sway extended over Meymand, Fāryāb, Andeḵūd, Šoborḡān, and Balḵ and its dependencies, as far as the border of Badaḵšān. As long as the Shah remained in Khorasan, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan kept sending couriers to apprise him of daily events at Balḵ. Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī became *dīvānbegī* and took charge of the administration.

[2] No doubt the lack of logic in this argument was as apparent to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan as it is to the translator! Since Bāqī Khan was still alive, Jānī Beg Sultan's line was emphatically not extinct; in fact, Bānū-ye 'Oẓmā's line of argument merely supported Bāqī Khan's claim to be ruler of Balḵ as well as of Bokhara and the other regions he had already brought under his control.

The Shah's Expedition to Abīvard and Marv-e Šāhījān and the Capture of Nūr Moḥammad Khan

As previously related, Nūr Moḥammad Khan had made some rather insipid excuses for not coming to Herat as requested by the Shah, and the Shah had been vexed by this. Nevertheless, the Shah sent an aide-de-camp, Ḵosrow Beg, known as Čāryār, who was one of the *moqarrabs* at court, to assure Nūr Moḥammad Khan of continuing royal favor. Outwardly he gave the impression that he had accepted Nūr Moḥammad's excuses for failing to come to Herat. Secretly, however, he sent the following message to Nūr Moḥammad Khan:

> My sole purpose in making this expedition to Khorasan was to assist you, my brother. We have enjoyed each other's society night and day for so many years, and the desire to renew our acquaintance should have brought you to meet me at Damghan or Semnān without any urging on my part. Granted, until recently you had to keep a close eye on the revolt of Bāqī Khan. If, however, you neglect to visit me while I am still in Khorasan, now that Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan is safely installed at Balḵ and no trouble is anticipated from that quarter, people will think that we have broken off relations with each other and will imagine that you have become hostile to me. Those who, under the guise of loyalty to you, are preventing you from visiting me are in reality not acting in your best interests; quite the contrary. You should ignore their advice, come and spend a few days with me so that we may renew our mutual pledges to each other, and return with honor. In short, there is no way in which I shall be satisfied unless I see you. If you will not come, then act as host to me. I will come to Marv on the pretext of hunting, and will meet you there. Choose which alternative you will.

Ḵosrow Beg delivered these messages to Nūr Moḥammad Khan and urged the Khan to visit the Shah. The Khan repeatedly agreed to go, but on each occasion he was persuaded to change his mind by his principal adviser, Qāżī Nadr, and by his vizier, Mīr Ġīāṯ, and he kept making futile excuses. Finally, he sent Ḵosrow Beg back without the latter's having achieved his object. Sycophantic courtiers gave him the sort of advice that could only bring ruin on his house: "The Shah," they said, "wants to seize your territories. If you visit him, he will take you back with him to Iraq and hand over your domains to *qezelbāš* emirs." Ḥāfeẓak Sultan Ḵabūšānī, an old retainer, who had accompanied Nūr Moḥammad Khan to Iraq, urged him not to go against the Shah's wishes. "If the Shah had wanted to place this miserable province under the administration of *qezelbāš* emirs," he kept saying, "he would have done so when he first reconquered Khorasan, and he would not have given it to you. Put these mistaken ideas from your mind." Nūr Moḥammad Khan refused to listen to him, and finally put him to death.

At this point, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan forwarded to the Shah some letters Nūr Moḥammad Khan had written to 'Abd al-Amīn Khan. These letters showed that Nūr Moḥammad Khan had entered into a pact with 'Abd al-Amīn Khan and had urged the latter not to agree to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's coming to Balḵ and not to admit the *qezelbāš* into the city. The Shah's purpose in sending Moḥammad Ebrahim to Balḵ, he said, was to get control of Balḵ himself. This evidence that Nūr Moḥammad Khan had encouraged 'Abd al-Amīn Khan to adopt a hostile attitude further inflamed the Shah's anger, but still he bridled his wrath and outwardly maintained friendly relations with Nūr Moḥammad Khan.

The turning point came when Nūr Moḥammad Khan became mistrustful of his governor of Abīvard, Mīrzā Ḵ̌āja Kalān Čaḡatāy, who had never made any secret of his loyalty to the Shah, and decided to march against him. In a panic, Mīrzā Ḵ̌āja Kalān summoned Moršedqolī Sultan Jalāyer, the son of Ḵodāyverdī Khan, who was stationed at Pasākūh in the Mašhad district, not far from Abīvard, to take charge of the fort at Abīvard while he repaired to the Shah's court. Moršedqolī Sultan, who thought that the Shah and Nūr Moḥammad Khan were still on the best of terms, at first did not dare to make a move without orders from the Shah. But when Mīrzā Ḵ̌āja Kalān kept bombarding him with letters, and when he began to hear rumors about Nūr Moḥammad Khan's misdemeanors and the Shah's anger against him, he plucked up courage and took charge of the fort.

Mīrzā Ḵ̌āja Kalān rushed to Herat, where he prostrated himself before the Shah, poured out his story of Nūr Moḥammad Khan's revolt, and urged the Shah to march against him. Nūr Moḥammad Khan meanwhile had marched against Abīvard and had sent a courier to Moršedqolī Sultan to inquire why he had had the temerity to encroach upon his territory; "If you have an order from the Shah," he said, "show it to me. Otherwise, get out of this fort!" Moršedqolī Sultan replied, "I have no order from the Shah. I have come on my own authority. I have sent a report to the Shah, and will not leave the fort until I receive a reply. Just be patient for a few days!"

Unfortunately, a few days before Mīrzā Ḵāja Kalān reached Herat, a supply train had arrived there from Shiraz with a consignment of items for the royal household administration, and the Shah, following his usual practice, had sent Nūr Moḥammad Khan a string of mules as his share. Still more unfortunately, this gift, in the charge of Valī Beg Ev-oḡlū, a *qūrčī,* had arrived in the midst of the argument between the Khan and Moršedqolī Sultan. Nūr Moḥammad Khan rejoiced at this unexpected piece of good fortune and easily persuaded Valī Beg, who was a naive Turk, to go to Moršedqolī Sultan, tell him about the Shah's gift, and persuade him to leave the fort. Moršedqolī Sultan, partly through stupidity and partly through fear of the Shah's wrath if he did the wrong thing, left the fort and retired to Pasākūh. Nūr Moḥammad Khan entrusted the fort at Abīvard to Moḥammad Ṣādeq Beg Čapnī Čaḡatāy and Qāsem Beg Kabūtar-Bāz,[3] two of his most trusted officers. He himself, apprehensive of the Shah's power, moved a bit farther away from danger, to the Nesā and Bāḡbād region, taking with him seven or eight thousand men.

Meanwhile the Shah, in the hope of a meeting with Nūr Moḥammad Khan, left Herat as he had said he would, and moved along the road to Saraḵs. When he reached the small town of Čāhja, he learned that Nūr Moḥammad Khan had left the forts at Marv and Abīvard prepared to resist a siege, and had retired to the Nesā and Bāḡbād area, where there were a number of strong forts. Shah 'Abbas had made this move to test the Khan. Had he demonstrated his loyalty by presenting himself, he and the Shah could have spent a few days hunting together before the Shah returned to Iraq. Since he had proved to be rebellious, the Shah planned to bring him to his senses, and he decided that a punitive expedition was now essential. He dispatched a force to lay siege to the fortress at Marv: It consisted of Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan; Bektāš Sultan, the governor of Mārūčāq; Qanbar Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Ġūrīān; Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Saraḵs; and the chiefs of the tribes subject to the authority of the governor of Herat. The Shah himself marched to Abīvard, with no more than the four hundred and sixty men he had with him in his hunting party, and laid siege to the fort there.

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[3] Lit.: "He who places bets on racing pigeons."

When the news reached Nūr Moḥammad Khan, awe of the Shah struck fear in him and his men, despite their superiority in numbers, and some five thousand of his men, from the Jalā'er, 'Alī-īlī, and Ṣā'en-ḵānī tribes, promptly deserted him and went home. Nūr Moḥammad Khan returned to Marv via Čūl by forced marches, more men deserting along the way. He slipped into the city by night by the Ūrganj gate, and his arrival was reported to the great emirs who had already occupied the city. Bektāš Sultan Ostājlū and Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, with a detachment of *ġāzīs*, had gone out to try and intercept him, but Nūr Moḥammad Khan had bypassed them by using the Čāl road. The emirs marched rapidly back to the city, but Nūr Moḥammad Khan managed to take refuge in the citadel, although the emirs succeeded in seizing his livery[4] and some of his equipment.

When the Shah began the siege of Abīvard, he issued mobilization orders for reinforcements from Iraq, Fārs, and Khorasan. Būdāq Khan, the governor of Mašhad, and Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan Bayāt, the governor of Nishapur, were ordered to Marv to support Ḥoseyn Khan. Ḥoseyn Khan Qājār, the governor of Astarābād, was ordered to besiege Nesā, with the support of the governor of Esfarā'īn and others. Almost daily, the Shah received reinforcements at Abīvard, and pressed ahead with the breastworks and mines. Finally, the garrison, hearing of the dispersal of Nūr Moḥammad Khan's forces, sued for quarter. On the twenty-fourth day of the siege, the defenders handed over the fort on promise of quarter. Its commanders, Moḥammad Ṣādeq Beg and Qāsem Beg, entered the service of the Shah. Ebrahim Beg, brother of Ḥāfeẓak Sultan, was received in audience by the Shah and raised to the rank of emir, and then made governor of Jahān, in the district of Arġīān in Khorasan.

After the surrender of Abīvard, the Shah marched to Marv to join his officers in the siege of the citadel there. Nūr Moḥammad Khan saw no course open to him save repentance. He asked permission to negotiate with the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, and Besṭām Aqa Torkmān, and this was granted. The negotiators entered the citadel and censured Nūr Moḥammad Khan for the actions that had forced the Shah to move against him; they undertook to intercede with the Shah on his behalf, and encouraged him to hope for some employment in the service of the Shah. The troublemakers in his army, especially his vizier Mīr Ḡīāṣ and another of his principal officers, Qāżī Nadr, were opposed to his leaving the citadel, because they feared for their own lives. However, they had no choice but to allow him to leave, and the same day Nūr Moḥammad Khan was conducted into the Shah's presence by Ḥātem Beg and Besṭām Aqa. Despite all the crimes he had committed, the Shah pardoned him, assured him he had nothing to fear from the royal wrath, and that night conversed with him openly as he had formerly been accustomed to do. When it was time to sleep, the Shah proposed that the Khan return to the citadel, but the Khan wisely refused to do so.

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[4] *Rekābḵāna;* this term covers not only spare clothes, boots, etc., needed by a prince when traveling, but also blankets, cushions, prayer rugs and other accessories (see *TM*, p. 68).

The next morning, which was Friday morning, the Shah went to the Masjed-e Jāme' at Marv, and the *ḵoṭba* of the twelve Eṣnā 'Ašarī Imams was recited in the Shah's name. This was the first occasion on which the *ḵoṭba* in those regions contained the names of the Shi'ite Imams since the death of Shah Esma'il I, eighty years before.[5] The people of Marv, because of their difference of religion,[6] were nervous of the *qezelbāš*, but the Shah allayed their fears by forbidding his men to molest any of the local population on the ground of religious differences. Bektāš Khan Ostājlū, governor of Mārūčāq, was made governor of Marv, and amnesty and security of property were guaranteed to the garrison of the citadel and to the townspeople. All soldiers on the payroll were allowed to go wherever they wished, on condition that they handed in their weapons and equipment and left the citadel. The civilian population was allowed to go about its business without interference.

Turning his attention to the strengthening of the defenses of the fort, the Shah divided among the emirs and the men the work of digging a deep ditch around it, and of strengthening the towers and battlements. Orders were given that the fort be properly stocked and provisioned. Nūr Moḥammad Khan and his family were sent to Iraq and the Shah decreed that they take up residence in Fārs. The Khan was allotted a pension of ten thousand Iraqi *dīnārs* a day, the equivalent of one Tabrīzī *tomān* in the current coin of Iran. Generous treatment indeed considering the evil deeds he had committed! Ḥoseyn Khan Zīād-oğlū Qājār, the governor of Astarābād, captured the fort at Nesā. The governorship of Nesā, Abīvard, and Bāğbād was given to Melkīš Sultan, the son of Bektāš Khan.

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[5] Shah Esma'il I died in 930/1524, i.e., 79 lunar or 76 solar years previously.

[6] The area still contained many Sunnis.

Having set the affairs of the region in order, the Shah returned to Mašhad via Pasākūh. After visiting the shrine of the Imam Reżā, he returned to Iraq and spent a month at Qazvin. He then went to Isfahan for the winter. While he was there, he received the news of the death of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and the annexation by Bāqī Khan of Balḵ and its dependencies.

Events at Balḵ; the Death of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan, the Occupation of That Region by Bāqī Khan, and the Flight of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and Other Uzbeg Princes to the Shah's Court

After the installation of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan at Balḵ, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and some of the other Uzbeg nobles who had played a large part in placing him on the throne began a slander campaign against Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī, of whose power they were jealous. They succeeded in poisoning the Khan's mind against his chief ad-administrator; if Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī were got rid of, they said, the Khan's power would be increased. The Khan sent a number of letters to the Shah asking permission to dismiss him, but permission was refused. Finally, the Khan told the Shah it was impossible for Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī and the Uzbeg nobles to get on together, and that, if the former were not removed from office, there was a possibility of foul play. In his reply, the Shah said his primary concern was that Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's regime might increase in renown; to enable this to happen, he needed experienced advisers, and that was why men like Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī were essential to him. The Shah said he had pondered deeply on the matter, and that Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan was free to take whatever steps he judged best for the state.

Although this was in fact an interdict against taking action against Ḵodāy Naẓar Bī, Moḥammad Ebrahim gleefully interpreted it as license to kill him, which he did; in so doing, however, he laid the axe at the root of his own realm. By destroying this wise, prudent, and brave man, who would have stood by him in good times and bad, he fell into the clutches of ignorant fools. Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā succeeded as *dīvānbegī* and principal administrator. Factionalism became rife. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan spent his time in carousing and merrymaking, and devoted little time to the affairs of state. He became ill from excessive drinking, went down with a raging fever, developed symptoms of measles and smallpox, and died.

Bāqī Khan, at that time engaged in laying siege to Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, took advantage of the situation and marched like the wind to Balḵ, sending his brother Valī Moḥammad Khan on ahead. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's death had thrown the nobles at Balḵ into confusion. Some distrusted Bāqī Khan; these included Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, Šīr-afkan Mīrzā, and Shah Ḵāja Naqīb. After Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan established himself at Balḵ, these men gave their allegiance to a certain 'Obeydollāh Sultan, a descendant of the princes of the house of Jānī Beg, who was at Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān. This 'Obeydollāh Khan now came to Balḵ, and the group of nobles attached themselves to him and marched out against Bāqī Khan. The majority of the troops, however, and the senior officers of the army, who had been disturbed by Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's behavior, saw no point in offering opposition to Bāqī Khan. Secretly, they favored him, and they withheld their support from 'Obeydollāh Sultan, whose small force was easily routed by Bāqī Khan; 'Obeydollāh Sultan was probably killed on the battlefield.

Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and his friends now had no choice but to flee to Khorasan and seek refuge with the Shah. They were joined by various relatives of Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan, including Jahāngīr Mīrzā, the son of Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan, who was at Šoborḡān; Moḥammad Salīm the son of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, who was at Andeḵūd; and 'Arab Moḥammad *atālīq*. Valī Moḥammad Khan reported his victory to his brother, and Bāqī Khan came to Balḵ in triumph. He promised that there would be no retaliation against the Uzbeg troops at Balḵ; on the contrary, he led them to hope for royal favors. All the Uzbegs in that region then pledged their allegiance to him, and he thus annexed to his empire Balḵ, Andeḵūd, Šoborḡān, Meymana, Fāryāb and their dependencies, as far as the Morḡāb River. In addition, also as a result of this victory, he brought under his jurisdiction the regions of Qondoz, Baqlān, Ḵottalān, and Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, as far as the border of Badaḵšān—all this, of course, in addition to the central province of Transoxania.

The refugee princes (Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, Šīr-afkan Mīrzā, 'Arab Moḥammad *atālīq*, and their companions), reached Herat safely. After a few days rest, they proceeded to Isfahan, where they were received with great kindness by the Shah. Their subsequent history will be related at the appropriate place.

The Events of the Year of the Ox, Corresponding to the Year 1009-10/1601-02, the Fifteenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Saturday 16 Ramażān 1009/21 March 1601, and the Shah celebrated the holiday in the usual fashion. Shortly after the festival, the refugee Uzbeg princes reached Isfahan, their retinue numbering about three hundred in all. At the Shah's order, they were welcomed to the capital by all the emirs, principal officers of state, and the general populace; they were given a reception at the Naqš-e Jahān palace, and afterward allotted pleasant accommodations in the capital. The Shah also made them a cash grant of one thousand Iraqi *tomān* in gold, to cover their living expenses. On top of this, they were supplied with gifts in kind: sheep, cooking oil, rice, grain, and the like.

The following day, the Uzbeg princes presented their modest gifts to the Shah. Among them was a valuable diamond which had formerly been a votive offering donated to the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad. When the Uzbegs occupied Mašhad and looted some of the shrine ornaments, this diamond had been appropriated by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan; after the death of the latter, it had found its way into the possession of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, who now handed it back to the Shah. The Shah, recognizing that it was a votive offering, gave it to the *ṣadrs* and the *'olamā* to hold in trust for the shrine. The *'olamā* sanctioned the sale of the diamond, so that with the proceeds good lands might be bought and the revenue from these lands used for the benefit of the shrine. The diamond was therefore taken to Istanbul, priced by expert diamond merchants, and sold.

The Shah arranged for the Uzbeg princes to take up residence at Qazvin, and assigned them certain desirable properties in that area so that they might have some income to defray their expenses. The Shah hoped that, if it was the will of God, they might one day be restored to their territories with the assistance of Safavid officers.

An auspicious event which occurred this year was the birth of the Shah's second son, Esma'il Mīrzā.

The Shah's Solemn Pilgrimage to Mašhad

The Shah had vowed to make the pilgrimage to Mašhad from Isfahan, and this year he set out from the Naqš-e Jahān palace to fulfill his vow. The first day, he went as far as the village of Masjed-e Tūqčī, and from there to Dowlatābād-e Barḵ̌ār, a distance of three *farsaḵs* from the city. The Shah decreed that any of the emirs, principal officers of state, court attendants, and *moqarrabs* who wished to make the pilgrimage with him could ride; no one was compelled to walk, because the vow the Shah had made applied to himself alone. So the court attendants, *moqarrabs*, and footmen accompanied the Shah, organizing regular spells of guard duty for themselves. When they got tired of walking, they mounted their horses, but two or three of them walked the whole distance.

Two court attendants, Moḥammad Zamān Sultan Bāyandor Torkmān, known as Kāvolī, and Mehtar Salmān, the master of the royal wardrobe, and a group of Eṣfahānīs consisting of Mīrzā Hedāyatollāh, the grandson of Najm-e Ṣānī,[1] and three friends, measured out the road using a rope twelve thousand cubits, or one regulation *farsaḵ*, in length.[2] The chief astrologer attached to the royal household, Mowlānā Jalāl Yazdī, kept a tally of the distance traveled each day, so that the total distance from Isfahan to Mašhad might be accurately computed in regulation *farsaḵs*.

The procession then set off, the Shah going on foot. Pausing only for short rests, he reached Mašhad in twenty-eight days and performed the rites of pilgrimage. This done, he repaired to the royal palace in the Čahār Bāḡ. The chronogram of this event, composed by the author, is: "On foot from Isfahan to Mašhad."[3]

Since the advent of Islam, no prince has achieved such a feat—a feat that would be difficult for anybody to accomplish. The *Rowżat al-Ṣafā* tells the story of the pilgrimage on foot made by the Byzantine emperor Heraclius from his capital, Constantinople, to Jerusalem.[4] Heraclius was a Christian emperor who took no cognizance of the mission of the Prophet Moḥammad. He walked barefoot, but servants spread brilliantly colored carpets beneath his feet as he walked, and strewed flowers and aromatic herbs in his path. The emperor treated the journey as a pleasure trip. He was accompanied by his boon companions and walked only a short distance each day, so that it took him two months to cover a distance normally traversed in twenty days. The Shah, on the other hand, carried on with blistered feet, enduring all sorts of hardships, and did not depart from the customary stages along the way. What a difference between the two!

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[1] *Vakīl* under Shah Esma'il I. Killed at battle of Ġojdovān in 198/1512 (see Savory, "The Significance of the Political Murder of Mirzā Salmān," pp. 181-191.

[2] The length of the *farsaḵ* (Old Persian *parasang;* Greek Παρασάγγης) varied widely depending on time and place. It is reckoned today to be approximately equivalent to 4 miles.

[3] *Ze eṣfāhān pīāda tā be-mašhad,* which gives 1009/1600-01, the correct date.

[4] *In the year 7/628. Heraclius was celebrating his victory over the Persians the previous year at Nineveh.*

The Shah spent that winter at Mašhad, devoting himself to religious observances during the sacred months of Rajab, Ša'bān, and Ramażān 1010/December-March 1602. On the most holy days of these holy months, namely, on Thursday nights, the night on which Moḥammad received the call to his prophetic mission,[5] the Day of Opening,[6] the Day of Assignment,[7] and the Night of Power,[8] the Shah kept vigil from early evening until sunrise, performing various menial tasks at the shrine such as snuffing the candles.

Various Events Which Took Place in the Winter Quarters at Mašhad

Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan, the Shah's vassal at Balḵ, had died, and Bāqī Khan had seized control there without the Shah's having had any say in the matter. Since then, the Shah had secretly hoped he would be able to some extent to bring Bāqī Khan to his senses, and to install there the two Uzbeg princes who had taken refuge with him. At this point, Bektāš Khan, the governor of Marv, reported that Bāqī Khan had made friendly overtures to him, had declared his friendship for the Shah, and had asked for two Tūbčāq horses. Although the Shah was highly annoyed by Bāqī Khan's coup at Balḵ, he instructed Bektāš Khan to respond in a friendly manner, and he sent Bāqī Khan several fine horses and other gifts. Bektāš Khan, after getting the Shah's approval, named Beyrām 'Alī Ostājlū, an intelligent and eloquent young man, as ambassador to Bāqī Khan. Beyrām 'Alī Beg was received with great honor by Bāqī Khan at

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[5] 27 Rajab.

[6] 15 Rajab, on which day the gates of heaven, or the gates of the Kaaba, are said to be open.

[7] 15 Ša'bān. So called because it was the day on which assignments were made for subsistence allowances.

[8] Ramażān, the night on which the Koran is said to have descended from heaven.

Bokhara and sent back with suitable presents for the Shah.

The Shah decided to tell Bāqī Khan frankly what he had in mind, and he chose as his ambassador Jān Moḥammad Beg, the former *dīvānbegī* of Bāqī Khan's brother, Dīn Moḥammad Khan, who had been taken prisoner by Safavid forces at the battle of Tūn in 1001/1592-93, and had been an honored guest at the Safavid court ever since. The Shah instructed Jān Moḥammad Beg to talk to Bāqī Khan along the following lines:

> Everyone is aware that there has never been anything but conflict between the Uzbeg house of Jānī Beg and the Safavid house. When fortune willed that Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan should fall into our hands, we took no advantage of this but, in order to acquire a good name, changed our policy from enmity to one of friendship. We assisted the survivors of the house of Jānī Beg and installed Moḥammad Ebrahim at Balḵ; in return, he agreed to be our vassal. When Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan unfortunately died, you acted improperly in occupying Balḵ without consulting us. We emphasize that we have no territorial ambitions in Balḵ. But two scions of the house of 'Abdollāh Khan, kinsmen of Moḥammad Khan, survive and have taken sanctuary with us. I earnestly desire that Balḵ and its dependencies, the former domains of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan, be placed in their hands. You, your father, and your brothers owe much to the patronage of 'Abdollāh Khan. God has willed that the fortunes of 'Abdollāh Khan's house should be in disarray, and that the supreme power in Turkestan and Transoxania should devolve upon you. In consideration of the favors you have received from your former patron, 'Abdollāh Khan, and as an act of generosity and justice, you should extend your sympathy and clemency toward these scions of his house, should call them your sons and your brothers, should bestow upon them Balḵ and all districts this side of the Oxus, and should yourself be satisfied with Transoxania and Turkestan, which God has given you, and should thank God for this gift. You should not begrudge these princes your paternal and

> fraternal affection, so that they may regard you as their father or elder brother and may obey you accordingly.
>
> If you comply with my wishes in this regard, your action will be pleasing unto God and will bring you renown on earth. In addition, we shall regard you as our brother, and shall render you whatever assistance may be required in any particular circumstances. On the other hand, if you reject my friendly and well-intentioned advice, refuse to accede to this plan, and insist on opposing it, the matter is in God's hands, because I am resolved to assist these princes.

Jān Moḥammad Beg was well received at Bokhara by Bāqī Khan and was enrolled in the ranks of his trusted emirs. He wrote a letter to the Shah in which, after the usual formalities, he quoted Bāqī Khan's reply on the subject of the princes:

> Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and a group of nobles who were afraid of me laid hold of those princes and carried them off to Iran against their will. I have nothing but the most paternal feelings toward them. Whenever you care to send them to Transoxania, I will take them under my royal wing and will allot them fiefs in whatever place may be appropriate, as I have done in the case of my own brothers and sons.

Privately, Jān Moḥammad Beg reported to Bektāš Khan's retainers, who had accompanied him to Bokhara, that Bāqī Khan had no intention of handing over Balḵ to the princes. Bāqī Khan hoped the Shah would send the princes to Transoxania, so that he could provide for their subsistence and deal with them in whatever manner seemed in the best interests of his realm. Jān Moḥammad Beg further advised the Shah that Bāqī Khan was not to be trusted, and that it would be neither generous nor chivalrous to send the princes to Transoxania. The Shah decided to attack Balḵ; he issued mobilization orders, and summoned Shah Ḵ̌āja, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, and their companions from Qazvin.

The Conquest of Bahrain by Allāhverdī Khan

In former times, the kingdom of Qaṭīf[9] and Bahrain was ruled by

[9] The maritime district west of the promontory Al-Qaṭar.

independent Arab governors. Ḥamdollāh Mostowfī, the author of the *Nozhat al-Qolūb,*[10] wrote that Bahrain was a Persian island, a center of the pearl-fishing and coral industry, ten *farsaḵs* in length by five in width. The pearls gathered at Bahrain are said by experts to be superior to those fished in other oceans.[11] In the course of the centuries, this rich area fell into the hands of Tūrānšāh b. Salḡor Shāh, the ruler of Hormūz, and from that time the rulers of Hormūz always maintained a governor at Bahrain. In the reign of Salḡor Shah b. Tūrānšāh Ṣānī, in 922/1516–17, thirty-one years after the birth of Shah Esma'il I,[12] a force of Portuguese occupied the islands dependent on Hormūz. Hoodwinking the agents of the ruler of Hormūz, they got a foothold on the island of Hormūz itself and fortified the citadel at Kūt.

In the course of time, they strengthened their hold on this region and gained control of most of the trade in the area; the Frankish captain, who was the commandant and governor of this fort, became more powerful than the governor of Hormūz himself. As a result, the Portuguese intervened in Bahrain also, at a time when Farroḵšāh, the governor of Hormūz, had just died, and his son Fīrūzšāh was acting in his stead. Rokn al-Dīn Mas'ūd was governing Bahrain on behalf of his brother, Ra'īs Šaraf al-Dīn Loṭfollāh, who was the vizier of Hormūz and held the real power there. With the assistance of his brother, who was a trusted official of both the former and the new ruler of Hormūz, Rokn al-Dīn Mas'ūd had become virtually independent governor of Bahrain; afraid of the power of the Portuguese, he sought help from a relative of his in Fārs, Ḵāja Mo'īn al-Dīn Fālī. The latter sent a report to Allāhverdī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, who, since Bahrain was a dependency of Fārs and its present rulers were usurpers, decided to seize the opportunity to conquer the island. He therefore sent to Bahrain under the command of the Ḵāja a force of Fālī musketeers renowned for their bravery and marksmanship, ostensibly to aid Rokn al-Dīn Mas'ūd but in reality to take possession of the island.

One night, just before daybreak, Ḵāja Mo'īn al-Dīn Fālī and his cousin Ra'īs Manṣūr, with a group of men, burst without ceremony into the women's quarters of Rokn al-Dīn Mas'ūd's house and slew him and several of his relatives and retainers in one of the bedrooms. His men rushed to his defense but, finding the governor dead, did not press their attack, and Ḵ̌āja Mo'īn al-Dīn and his men were able to stand their ground. At this point they received unexpected reinforcements. Emir Yūsof Shāh, the brother of Emir Kamāl Barāngar, had been returning from the pilgrimage to Mecca when he had been set upon by brigands and robbed. Allāhverdī Khan had instructed him to take a detachment of Barāngar musketeers to Bahrain with the object of seizing the robbers and recovering his property and, incidentally, assisting Ḵ̌āja Mo'īn al-Dīn if the latter had managed to carry out a coup at Bahrain.

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[10] See Le Strange's translation, p. 135.

[11] Curzon, ii, p. 457, states: "Generally speaking, the Bahrein pearls are not so white as Ceylon pearls, but are larger and more regular in shape; while they are said to retain their lustre for a longer period.

[12] Deducting 31 (lunar) years from 922 gives 891. Shah Esma'il I was born in 892/1487.

Emir Yūsof Shah, making the search for his stolen property the pretext, set off for Bahrain with a group of Barāngar troops noted for their valor. He reached Bahrain at the critical moment when Ḵ̌āja Mo'īn al-Dīn and his cousin had killed the governor and were standing at bay against his troops, and he succeeded by various stratagems in getting inside the city and joining forces with Ḵ̌āja Mo'īn al-Dīn. With the help of these reinforcements, the men from Fāl and Asīr gained the upper hand over their adversaries. They slew a few of their leaders, but the rest were treated in a conciliatory manner and returned to their daily tasks. Thus this fair region, which exemplified the Koranic verses, "He had made the two bodies of water flow; they will meet . . . there came forth from them pearls and coral,"[13] became another jewel in the Shah's crown.

The news of the capture of Bahrain caused both the governor of Hormūz and the Frankish captain to send troops to recover the island, and several engagements were fought on land and on sea. Although both Ḵ̌āja Mo'īn al-Dīn and Mīr Yūsof Shah were wounded in these encounters and subsequently died, the troops of Fārs were eventually victorious, and the attackers abandoned their attempts. Allāhverdī Khan sent a governor to Bahrain to take charge of the administration and strengthen the citadel.

The Conquest of Lār This Same Year

As readers will know from the detailed histories of the kings of Iran, the governors of Lār are descended from a certain Gorgīn Mīlād, who was appointed governor of Lār in the time of the Kayānīd monarchs; his descendants have held hereditary sway over that

[13] Koran, 55:20, 23.

region since that time. At times when there was no effective central government, the governors of Lār increased their power and exacted tribute from neighboring regions. During periods of strong central government in both pre-Islamic and post-Islamic times, particularly during the Sasanid period, they were subject, after a fashion, to the central government; at other times, they did as they pleased.

The first Muslim governor of the area was Jalāl al-Dīn Īraj b. Key-Qobād, who became a convert to Islam in the caliphate of 'Omar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz.[14] Since the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, the governors of Lār have been tributaries of the Safavid shahs, with the title of *amīr-dīvān*. When Shah Tahmasp came to the throne, Nūr al-Dahr b. Ebrāhīm Ḵān b. Anūšīrvān, known as Shah 'Ādel, was governor of Lār. He died during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and was succeeded by his son, Mīrzā 'Alā al-Molk, whom Sultan Moḥammad Shah entitled Ebrahim Khan the Second. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, when the Shah marched to Fārs to deal with the rebellion of Ya'qūb Khan, Ebrahim Khan should have taken advantage of the proximity of the Shah to visit him, congratulate him on his accession, and pledge his allegiance to him. But, allowing himself to be persuaded by his *mīr-e dargāh* (minister of court), he failed to do so. The Shah was angered, and his anger was increased by Ebrahim Khan's subsequent procrastination and promises that were never fulfilled.

Finally, the ill-treatment meted out to the Shah's officials who had gone to Lār to collect the tribute, and the discovery that the Khan was levying extraordinary taxes on merchants and travelers passing through his territory, gave the Shah the excuse he needed. He ordered Allāhverdī Khan to lead a punitive expedition against Lār. When this force neared Lār, Ebrahim Khan hastened to apologize for his past sins and promise better conduct in the future. The Shah considered it expedient to recall Allāhverdī Khan. Ebrahim Khan behaved himself for the rest of the year, but the following year he resumed his former activities, making extraordinary levies on merchants and travelers, who protested strongly against the actions of his officials and agents and against his inability to check them.

The Shah sent Allāhverdī Khan a second time to punish those responsible and to return the money to the merchants. This time, on the approach of Allāhverdī Khan, Ebrahim Khan hastily gave the merchants their money back, and again begged for forgiveness. Allāhverdī Khan ordered him to demonstrate the sincerity of his profession of loyalty by coming to meet him; without this, he said, he could not return. Ebrahim Khan, not daring to come, looked to his defenses. Allāhverdī marched to Lār and blockaded the city. Qāżī Abu'l-Qāsem, a man of noble family at Lār, demonstrated his love of the Shah by coming over to Allāhverdī Khan with his brother. Ebrahim Khan, frightened by their defection, sent his commander in chief, Nowšād, with a few men to Allāhverdī Khan's camp to try and prevent the defectors from carrying out their plan. Allāhverdī Khan discovered that the envoys from Ebrahim Khan were wearing mail under their robes, and this evidence of treachery led him to arrest them. Ebrahim Khan's panic now increased. When Allāhverdī Khan succeeded in bribing many of his troops and the townspeople of Lār, he retreated from the city to a nearby fort built against the mountainside. Allāhverdī Khan occupied the city, and his men began to push forward breastworks up to the walls of the fort.

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[14] The caliph 'Omar II, 99-101/717-720.

Ebrahim Khan then sued for quarter, which was granted, and he and a number of dignitaries of Lār emerged from the fort and submitted to Allāhverdī Khan, who treated them hospitably and sent them on to the Shah. Allāhverdī Khan put to death a few ringleaders at Lār, but treated the rest of the populace with kindness. The garrison of the fort had no choice but to surrender. Allāhverdī Khan left the citadel and the city in the hands of his officers, and entrusted the civil administration to Qāżī Abu'l-Qāsem. Ebrahim Khan, his dependents, and the rest of his house were taken to Shiraz and relieved of their money and property.

The news of these two conquests, both in the same year, reached the Shah at Mašhad as he was preparing to make preparations for his attack on Balḵ. Allāhverdī Khan was richly rewarded and summoned to join the Shah at Mašhad with the army of Fārs. He joined the royal army early the following year at its mobilization area at Bādḡīs near Herat, bringing with him his prisoner Ebrahim Khan and the contents of the treasuries of Lār. One of the most valuable items was a crown, studded with pearls and rubies, known as the "crown of Key-ḵosrow," which was an heirloom of the rulers of Lār.

Lār originally had another name. The story goes that, when the Kayānīd monarch Key-ḵosrow appointed Gorgīn Mīlād governor of Lār, he renamed the city Lār after his son and heir, and gave Gorgīn the "crown of Key-ḵosrow," which was handed down by the rulers of Lār from that time onward. The story is also told that Gorgīn Mīlād, when he reached Lār, consulted the astrologers, both local experts and those with a national reputation, regarding an auspicious hour for him to enter the city. It is said that he waited seven years before the astrologers found a day which was compatible with his horoscope and free from all sinister astral implications. After waiting outside the city walls for seven years, Gorgīn Mīlād entered the city at the appropriately auspicious moment. Since then his line has ruled there for nearly four thousand years in unbroken succession. Lār has never been subjugated by foreign rulers, who have always been satisfied with tribute.

Yet another story alleges that some ancient Persian philosopher cast a spell on the place which has protected its soil from the tramp of alien armies. At all events, by divine decree this spell was now broken, and Lār became a province of the Safavid empire. Since the histories of the ancient kings of Iran are full of fabulous tales of this sort, I thought I would include the stories of the crown, the forecasting of the auspicious hour, and the spell, but I will not be answerable for the truth of any of them!

The Shah decreed that Ebrahim Khan should accompany him on the expedition to Balḵ, in the custody of Allāhverdī Khan. In the course of this expedition, Ebrahim Khan died of a sickness that affected many of the troops. He was an able youth of simple habits, a lover of poetry, well versed in all the customary sciences, an expert musician; but he lacked statecraft. In his early adolescence, he became an opium addict. He was thirty-five years old when he died, and with him died his ancient line.

The Beginning of the Year of the Tiger, Corresponding to 1011/1602-03, the Sixteenth Year of the Reign of Shah ʿAbbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Wednesday, 26 Ramażān 1010/ 20 March 1602.

Jān Moḥammad Beg had reported from Bokhara that Bāqī Khan would not surrender Balḵ without a fight, and this was confirmed by other persons arriving from Transoxania. Bāqī Khan had sent a force of Qepčāq and other tribes subject to the Uzbegs to the Jījaktū and Meymana region, and it was reported to the Shah that the Khan, in his assemblies, had uttered vain boasts about his intention to avenge his brother's death. These reports enraged the Shah and reinforced his resolve to attack Balḵ. He sent *qūrčīs* to deliver the mobilization orders, and gave orders that three hundred cannon and mortar, and ten thousand musketeers, were to accompany this expedition.

One army corps, under the command of ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū and Qarčaqāy Beg, a *ḡolām* of the royal household, was directed to the Meymana and Jījaktū region, an area in which the Uzbeg tribes traditionally spent their summers, with orders to ravage the area. After their departure, the Shah, after invoking the aid of the Imam Reżā and spending a few days hunting in the Mašhad area, marched to Herat. There he was met by ʿAlīqolī Khan and Qarčaqāy Beg, who had carried out their raid in the Jījaktū region, slaughtering any persons among the Uzbeg and other tribes who resisted them, and carrying off their women and children as captives. These officers presented the heads of the slain, the captured weapons, and several thousand prisoners to the Shah. After promenading in the gardens at Herat for a few days, the Shah moved to summer quarters at Bādḡīs, where for two months he waited on the mobilization of his army and the organization of the artillery. Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, Shah Ḵāja, and their companions arrived from Qazvin, and the Shah gave them whatever equipment they required. Jahāngīr Sultan was honored with the title of khan, and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā was named as his guardian *(atālīq)*. Jahāngīr Khan was equipped with royal letters of appointment conferring on him the governorship of Balḵ, and Yār Moḥammad Khan was instructed to send orders to the tribal chiefs in the area and arouse their expectations of receiving royal favors.

Finally, everything was ready: Three hundred cannon, with gun carriages, chains, and other equipment, were available, and the Shah marched from Bādḡīs toward Mārūčāq. He camped for a few days on the banks of the Morḡāb River, and then continued his march in the direction of Jījaktū. Qarčaqāy Beg was placed in command of the artillery and the musketeers; a regiment of *ḡolāms* of the royal household was placed at his disposal, and he was charged with the supervision of the artillery whenever the army pitched camp and struck camp. The vanguard was placed under the command of Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Herat, and of other Khorasan emirs such as Bektāš Khan, governor of Marv; Meḥrāb Khan, governor of Ḵ̌āf and Bāḵarz; Esma'il Khan Ālplū, governor of Farāh; Najafqolī Khan Šāmlū, governor of Qā'en; and so on. The vanguard (cavalry, infantry, and musketeers) numbered twelve thousand men, and it marched half a *farsaḵ* in front of the main body.

According to a daily roster, one of the emirs of the van led his men out on patrol. Immediately behind the vanguard came the artillery, with ten musketeers stationed between every pair of gun carriages, making in all a force of three thousand musketeers, who marched on foot behind the chains of the gun carriages. Behind the artillery again came its officer in charge, Qarčaqāy Beg, with the rest of the musketeers, ten thousand in all, marching in good order behind the guns. A number of *qezelbāš* emirs, such as Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī,* were also detailed to support the artillery. Behind the regiments of musketeers came the Shah and the main body; it was composed of high-ranking emirs such as Allāhverdī Khan; the *qūrčībāšī;* 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū; Nadr Khan, the keeper of the seal; and Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, with the troops of the royal bodyguard and the *ḡolāms* of the royal household forming the right and left wings. The whole army amounted to forty thousand regular troops and ten thousand musketeers—a total of fifty thousand men. In addition, the number of servants, camel drivers, commissariat personnel, and other hangers-on from all over the place was legion.

Because of its size and the abundance of horses and pack animals, so much dust was raised by the army on the march that each man could scarcely see his neighbor. Twelve trumpets sounded constantly from the rear, so that the troops of the royal bodyguard and the *ḡolāms* of the royal household could maintain station and not get separated from the center, where the Shah was positioned. A number of emirs guarded the rear from surprise attack. Since it was not prudent to march by night in hostile country, the army marched by day. But because of the extreme heat, neither men nor animals could travel more than two or three *farsaḵs* a day; the size of the supply train accompanying the army also precluded rapid movement.

When the army reached Qotleš territory near Andeḵūd, Meḥrāb Khan and his patrols brought in a number of Uzbeg prisoners, including the distinguished officer Qarāja Qīġan. Upon interrogation, they revealed that Bāqī Khan was encamped at Qaršī[1] with twenty thousand men, and that the Khan had called on his brother, Valī Moḥammad Khan, to evacuate Balḵ rather than risk being besieged by such a large army. Valī Moḥammad Khan, they said, had challenged his brother's orders on the grounds that it was not yet certain that the Safavid army was making for Balḵ. "In any case," said Valī Moḥammad Khan, "why should we abandon a province like this as soon as we hear a few rumors about the size of the enemy force?" After this exchange, reported the prisoners, Bāqī Khan had sent Qarāja Qīġan to Mo'men Bī, the governor of Andeḵūd, with orders to reconnoiter in the direction of Jījaktū and obtain information on the movements, size, and composition of the enemy army. While engaged in this reconnaissance, they had been taken prisoner by the *qezelbāš*.

The Capture of Andeḵūd and the Shah's March on Balḵ

The Shah marched from Qotleš to Andeḵūd, where Mo'men Bī, governor of the city on behalf of Bāqī Khan, strengthened the defenses and prepared to resist a siege. Some of the Shah's advisers counseled him not to allow himself to be diverted by the siege of Andeḵūd and other fortresses on the route, but to proceed at top speed to Balḵ; once Balḵ was in their hands, they argued, the rest of the forts would surrender. The Shah, however, disagreed; Andeḵūd, if it remained in enemy hands, would interrupt communications between Khorasan and Iraq. It was therefore better to take it. A majority of his advisers agreed with him, and the royal army camped before the fortress of Andeḵūd. The same day, the Shah divided among his emirs responsibility for the various aspects of the siege operations. Trenches were dug on all sides of the fort; mining proceeded apace; and ditches were dug to drain off the water from the moat. That night, the besiegers uttered their war cry, and three hundred cannon and ten thousand muskets opened fire. The next day, the besiegers went in to the attack and stormed across the moat to the foot of the walls. The defenders reported to Mo'men Bī their inability to resist the assault, and the Uzbeg commander sued for quarter. He begged his spiritual adviser and guide, a man known as 'Azīzān, to act as go-between. It is said that this moral exemplar, who numbered himself among the Men of God, had been made aware, in a revelation vouchsafed to him in the course of his wrestlings with his carnal soul, that the *qezelbāš* were destined to capture the fort.

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[1] Across the Oxus.

Mindful of the Koranic injunction, "Do not cast yourselves into destruction with your own hands,"[2] he decided it would be suicide to continue to resist this powerful enemy. First, he sent two of his trusted disciples to the Shah offering to surrender the fort in return for royal clemency toward Mo'men Bī and the garrison. The Shah promised the defenders quarter and wrote a conciliatory letter to Mo'men Bī, assuring him that his sole purpose in coming to Khorasan was to assist the Jānī Beg princes, that he had no territorial ambitions in the Balḵ area, nor had he any intention of interfering with anyone's faith or creed. The sincerity of this declaration, said the Shah, could be tested by reference to the people of the Nesā, Abīvard and Marv region. Since the day this area had come under Safavid control, declared the Shah, Sunnis and Shi'ites had been able to worship in the mosques and other places of worship without let or hindrance, each sect following its own rite; not one person had been molested, nor would he be. As far as Mo'men Bī and his men were concerned, wrote the Shah, they were free to stay and enter the service of the Jānī Beg princes, or to depart, as they pleased. The civilian population could return to its everyday tasks without fear of being molested by Safavid troops.

The envoys returned to report this joyful news to Mo'men Bī, and 'Azīzān, with a group of some thirty or forty nobles and Sufi disciples, then went as a delegation to the Shah. The Uzbeg princes were accustomed to treat the spiritual director of the tribe with the deference of disciples, and the Shah treated 'Azīzān in the same manner. 'Azīzān besought the Shah to stop the bombardment of the fort that night, and promised that the following day Mo'men Bī and other notables, bearing gifts, would come out of the fort. The Shah had given orders that night sappers would breach the walls in several places and this should be followed at first light by a general assault; these plans were far advanced. Since he did not trust the Uzbegs, he replied to 'Azīzān: "If Mo'men Bī is sincere, let him come out of the fort immediately; I do not need his presents. If he fails to comply, I shall attack in the morning."

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[2] Koran, 2:191.

The delegation rushed back to the fort in a panic, and Mo'men Bī immediately emerged from the fort with his Uzbeg nobles and prostrated himself before the Shah. The Shah greeted them kindly, set their hearts at rest, and bestowed on them robes of honor as tokens of amnesty. Mo'men Bī was permitted to return to the fort and spend the night there, on condition that he present himself to the Shah in the morning. The Uzbegs returned to the fort, happy that the bloodshed, plundering of their property, and violation of their womenfolk had been avoided. In the morning, the gates of the fort were flung open, and Mo'men Bī emerged with all the *seyyeds, qāżīs, 'olamā,* and notables of the city, and was received in audience by the Shah. Since the Andeḵūd region had belonged to Moḥammad Salīm Sultan, he was made governor of it, with 'Arab Bahādor as his guardian. The Shah delegated Moḥammadqolī Beg 'Arabgīrlū, as *ešīk-āqāsī,* with one hundred and fifty cavalry and musketeers, to accompany 'Arab Bahādor and garrison the citadel.

Mo'men Bī petitioned the Shah for permission to join Bāqī Khan, and the Shah granted this, praising him for his loyalty and bestowing upon him a special robe of honor, a turban jewel, and a jeweled belt. The rest of the Uzbegs were given the choice of staying with Moḥammad Salīm Sultan or of leaving. The same day, Mo'men Bī's men loaded all his baggage and set off toward the Oxus by the Karkī road. Mo'men Bī himself remained at court until midday. After the conclusion of the public audience, the Shah convened a private gathering, at which bumpers of wine were drunk and a convivial atmosphere was generated. Conversation ranged over many topics, and the Shah took the opportunity to impress various points on Mo'men Bī.

"Convey to Bāqī Khan," he said, "my good wishes for his welfare. Remind him that I previously conveyed friendly greetings to him by the hand of Jān Moḥammad the *dīvānbegī,* but my exhortations fell on deaf ears, with the result that I was forced to bring an army to Khorasan. My terms are still the same. In brief, everyone knows that the realm and throne of 'Abdollāh Khan today belong to these two young princes, the only survivors of his house. It is neither generous nor chivalrous that Bāqī Khan, the recipient of so many favors from the late 'Abdollāh Khan, should drive his descendants from their hereditary possessions and occupy their territories by force. The earlier history of the relations between the Safavids and the Uzbegs has been one of constant warfare. Today, because these two princes have sought sanctuary with me and have appealed to me for aid, I am prepared to overlook a century of conflict in order to assist them and thus acquire a good name with posterity. It is better that Bāqī Khan should give up his ambition to rule Balḵ and its dependencies, should hand this territory over to these princes, and should be satisfied with Transoxania and Turkestan, thanking God for His munificence and not perpetrating an injustice. These princes have inherited wide dominions. If, to provide them with a livelihood, they are prepared to be satisfied with such a meager portion of the whole, to deprive them even of that is rank injustice. If the Khan intends to deprive them permanently of their patrimony, then neither God nor man will approve of this act, and he will ultimately suffer the consequences of this act of injustice, which is tantamount to ingratitude toward the house of his patron. If, on the other hand, the Khan harkens to my good advice and treats these princes like sons, I will treat him like a brother, and will not be guilty of any shortcomings in this regard."

After communicating these home truths to Mo'men Bī, he loaded him with favors and sent him on his way intoxicated by the attention paid him by the Shah. After him, the Shah sent a silver wine flask filled with aromatic herbs beneficial in cases of a hangover, together with a goblet of gold and a brocade napkin. By this gift, the Shah made delicate allusion to the fact that it was designed to arouse from the stupor of negligence him who was drunk with power, and to make him who was alert even more clearheaded.

The people of Andeḵūd and the Uzbegs of the surrounding region contracted to pay to the supreme *dīvān* a large sum in consideration of their having been granted quarter.

Events After the Capture of Andeḵūd

The day after Mo'men Bī's departure, the royal army left Andeḵūd and camped at Ḵāja Dakka, one day's march from the city. After spending a day dealing with the petitions of the people of Andeḵūd, the

Shah continued his march, and camped two *farsaḵs* from Ḵ̌āja Dakka. There he heard that Bāqī Khan had crossed the Oxus with twenty thousand men and was making for Balḵ. The Shah, thinking that Bāqī Khan intended to give battle, ordered the call to arms. He then placed the troops—patrols and skirmishers, the left and right wings, the flankers *(bögrekčī)*, the reserve, the artillery, and the musketeers. The Shah's plan was to advance in battle order to be ready for action whenever the enemy forces might appear. It was reported to the Shah that on some stages of the journey water would be scarce, and that a force the size of the royal army, with so many horses, would suffer hardship while crossing this region. The Shah therefore sent on ahead Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and his companions, who were familiar with the terrain, to reconnoiter and report which route had the best supplies of water.

Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and the Uzbeg chiefs were of the opinion that it was not advisable to rush into battle. On the contrary, they considered that, in view of the size of the royal army and the excessive heat of the season, the Shah should advance slowly and postpone his plans for a pitched battle. The plan of the Uzbeg chiefs was as follows: Those Uzbeg tribes which had for years been loyal to the house of 'Abdollāh Khan had only joined Bāqī Khan to save their skins. If these tribes thought that the Shah had come to conquer Transoxania, they would rally to Bāqī Khan. But if they realized that the Shah had no territorial ambitions in Transoxania, that his sole purpose was to rehabilitate the house of 'Abdollāh Khan, and that the Uzbeg emirs would remain in control of these territories, they would desert Bāqī Khan and his army would gradually dwindle away. "With every day that passes, and every *farsaḵ* that we advance," they said, "groups of Uzbegs will join us, and you will achieve your objective without fighting."

Although the Shah did not like this plan, he acquiesced in it, partly because the Uzbeg chiefs urged it strongly, partly because some of the *qezelbāš* chiefs also supported it, and partly because he had received a report that Bāqī Khan was going to Balḵ not to give battle but to rescue his brother. The army accordingly advanced by easy stages. As luck would have it, the argument put forward by the Uzbeg chiefs was strengthened by the arrival of Mīrzā Moḥammad Beg, an Uzbeg noble and a relative of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, who came from Balḵ with ten to fifteen thousand men and joined the Uzbeg princes. Everyone now thought that the decision had been the right one and that further contingents would arrive daily. On behalf of Jahāngīr Khan, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā sent letters designed to win over various emirs to their cause, and everybody daily expected some development that would enable them to achieve their goal. Unfortunately, there were two serious drawbacks to this plan.

The first was that the slow rate of advance of the royal army (which was contrary to the Shah's wishes) caused the Uzbegs to lose their fear of the *qezelbāš* force. The second was that the army suffered from the oppressive heat and the brackish water; many men fell sick, and dysentery broke out. Despite everything, the army reached Balḵ in twenty days, but so many of his men were sick that the Shah was apprehensive about giving battle—and rightly so. The Shah always exercised the greatest caution even in trivial matters. It was only natural, therefore, that he would act with the great circumspection when it was a matter of a battle between the armies of Iran and Tūrān,[3] whose wars had since ancient times been the most celebrated events in history.

When Bāqī Khan crossed the Oxus and turned toward Balḵ, he was met by Mo'men Bī, who told him of events at Andeḵūd. Publicly, Bāqī Khan censured him for failing in his duty, but after questioning him privately, he realized that there was no way in which the Uzbegs could have held Andeḵūd against such a large Persian army. Bāqī Khan did not know whether to advance or retreat. But as the days passed and the royal army continued its snail-like advance, Uzbeg morale rose a little, and the Khan began to receive reinforcements from all sides. Despite this, he was afraid to try a pitched battle. He approached Balḵ and camped near a suitable fort in the cultivated area around the city, with the fort and walled areas protecting his rear. He had a ditch dug in front of his army, and behind it he stationed artillery and musketeers, intending by this means to defend the city. On one occasion there was a clash between Safavid and Uzbeg patrols; some twenty-four Uzbeg warriors of note were taken prisoner, and the remainder took refuge behind their defenses.

For about a month, the armies of Iran and Tūrān sat face to face, without any battle being fought. It became clear that Bāqī Khan had no intention of emerging from his defenses and fighting a pitched battle in the plain; it was equally obvious that it would be folly for the *qezelbāš* to get bogged down in fighting in the ditch or in the cultivated fields. On the other hand, a siege would probably take a long time, the incidence of sickness among the Safavid troops would increase, and food supplies would begin to run short. Such a situation could only ruin Safavid morale and boost that of the enemy.

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[3] Iran, the land of the Aryans, and Tūrān, the land of the Turks, were traditional enemies, and their legendary struggles are enshrined in the Persian national epic. The Oxus River was traditionally the boundary between the two lands.

The Shah held repeated councils of war with his emirs in which he reiterated that his purpose in bringing this expedition to Khorasan was to assist the Uzbeg princes and thereby acquire merit. If Bāqī Khan had come out to fight, as he had always boasted he would do, he would have engaged him. "Now that Bāqī Khan has refused battle," said the Shah, "and is acting with caution, why should we not also be sensible and move our men up, in the face of the enemy artillery and muskets, into the area of walled gardens and cultivated fields? However, sickness is on the increase among our troops; every day, a number die. If, driven by ambition and considerations of worldly honor, we stay where we are, our army will be destroyed, to the ruin of the state. The prudent course is for us to retreat; if Bāqī Khan pursues us, we will turn and fight; if not, we will continue on our way and get the sick to a place where they can recover their health, if God wills it."

On 9 Moḥarram 1011/29 June 1602, the royal army crossed the Ḵaṭab River and began its retreat from Balḵ. As the march began, it became evident that one-third of the men were sick, and another third were barely able to tend the sick, let alone fight. The Shah, surveying the sorry scene, realized that, had he delayed the return march for another week, it would have been too late. On 10 Moḥarram ('Āšūrā)/30 June, the army camped on the banks of the Ḵaṭab to celebrate the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn at Karbala, and the retreat was resumed on the 11 Moḥarram/1 July. The emirs who normally constituted the vanguard were ordered to the rear, with instructions to maintain constant guard and at night to camp half a *farsaḵ* from the main camp. They were not to relax their vigilance for a moment as long as they were in enemy territory. After the army had traveled three *farsaḵs* in this manner, the rear guard reported sighting a slowly approaching enemy force. The Shah gave orders that, if the enemy gave battle, they should engage them and report to the Shah. If the Uzbegs kept their distance, the rear guard should gradually close on the main body.

Shortly afterward, a further report came in to the effect that the

Uzbegs had come up at full gallop and that fighting was in progress with the Safavid rear guard. The Shah at once left the camp in charge of Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan and a number of the Čaḡatāy emirs, sent forward his artillery and musketeers, stationed seasoned troops to right and left of the center, unfurled his standards, and hastened to meet the foe, sending some emirs on ahead to the assistance of the rear guard. As the Shah neared the scene of the fighting, about one and a half *farsaḵs* from his camp, the *ḡāzīs* brought in an Uzbeg prisoner who reported that, when the *qezelbāš* army began its retreat, opinions were divided in the Uzbeg army as to the best course of action. Some, attributing the retreat to shortage of supplies, urged Bāqī Khan to seize the opportunity and pursue the enemy. Others with longer memories recalled the fate of Šāhī Beg Khan Özbeg at Marv, when the Uzbeg leader had been lured by a feinted retreat on the part of Shah Esma'il I into pursuing the *qezelbāš* and had been killed in the ensuing battle. "Perhaps Shah 'Abbas," they said, "intends to treat you in the same way." In the end, at the insistence of the more impetuous officers, a detachment had been sent in pursuit of the Safavid army.

Meanwhile, Bektāš Khan Ostājlū, at the head of the Safavid van, had made repeated charges against the Uzbegs and had driven them back across the river. Hearing of the Shah's approach, Bektāš Khan and Najafqolī Khan Šāmlū recrossed the river and joined the Shah. Fighting went on on the other side of the river until sunset. By then, the Safavid victory was complete. Just as the last light was fading, the *ḡāzīs* brought in the heads of the enemy dead and their prisoners. News of the victory was received when the torches were being lit in the Shah's camp. He at once sent orders to his emirs forbidding them to continue the fight on the other side of the river in the dark, and ordering them to recall their men to this side of the river. The Shah returned to camp, and spent two-thirds of the night inspecting the heads of the enemy and the captured weapons.

One of the Uzbeg prisoners was an emir of note, 'Abd al-Raḥman Bī. When he was brought before the Shah, he declared his name and lineage. It was a pleasant custom of Shah 'Abbas to treat as his guest any prisoner of note,[4] particularly those whose identity was not initially known. Accordingly, the moment the emir's identity was known, the Shah ordered his shackles to be struck off and his blood-stained clothing to be replaced. The rest of the prisoners were executed that night. The only *qezelbāš* officer of note killed in this action was Šarīf Khan Beg, the brother of Meḥrāb Khan Qājār. Some people aver that, had the Shah marched back to Balḵ after this victory, Bāqī Khan would not have dared to give battle again and would not have been able to hold the city. However, in view of the sickness in his army, the Shah decided to hold to his original plan. His strategic expertise and natural caution prevented him from being deflected from his course by the unwise advice of some of his officers, despite the decisive nature of the victory just won—and indeed no victory could have been more opportune. It was about midnight before all the emirs returned to camp from the battlefield and reported to the Shah, and were congratulated by him.

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[4] I have added these words, which the sense seemed to require in view of the fate of the rank and file!

The Shah resumed his retreat, maintaining the same order of march as before, and continuing to observe extreme caution. If any foot-soldier or any of the sick fell behind, they were collected up by the rear guard. Any who died were buried in unmarked graves. The Shah, not satisfied with the protection against surprise attack afforded by the rear guard alone, ordered groups of centurions and *qūrčīs* to act as flankers to right and to left of the main body, at a distance of about half a *farsaḵ*.

When the royal army reached Andeḵūd, the Shah rescinded his earlier strict orders against looting and taking prisoners. Raiding parties were sent in all directions, especially in the direction of Šoborḡān, and brought back to camp anything they could find. The Shah stopped at Andeḵūd only one day, but during that time he registered the names of all nobles, *qāżīs*, *moftīs*, and principal inhabitants of the town and ordered them to be transferred to Iraq. Each family was placed in the charge of a soldier, to be transported to Iraq along with their own baggage camels. In the twinkling of an eye, the flourishing town of Andeḵūd was transformed into a deserted place. The majority of the women and children were carried off, and few soldiers were without at least one captive.

I should comment here on a point I have mentioned before, but which can bear repetition. In earlier periods, when the Uzbeg rulers invaded Khorasan and the Ottoman sultans invaded Azerbaijan, either with the object of annexing territory or of plunder, they did not take captives from Shi'ite lands, nor did *qezelbāš* armies commit this heinous crime in Sunni territory. However, in the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Morād,[5] an Ottoman and Tartar army invaded Azerbaijan and Šīrvān and was guilty of this practice. When the Ottomans occupied Tabriz, many children of *seyyeds,* who were descendants of the Prophet himself, were carried off into captivity and sold to Frankish infidels in Istanbul. The Uzbegs adopted this practice during their invasions of Khorasan under 'Abdollāh Khan and his son 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. For instance, at Mašhad, they took captive many descendants of the Imam Rez̤ā, and many children of the nobility, of the *'olamā,* of ascetics and other honorable men, and of the military and civilians in general—several thousand altogether. These captives were sold in Turkestan and Transoxania, and even as far away as Kabul and India.

Because the heavens so decreed, the Shah was forced to overlook these crimes at the time; this world is a vale of woe, and revenge for these heinous acts could safely be left to the Lord of vengeance. At the urging of his commanders, however, the Shah allowed several thousand prisoners to be taken on this campaign and exiled from their homelands. Subsequently too, the Safavid governors of Astarābād on several occasions led punitive expeditions against rebel groups of the Ūḵlū and Göklen tribes, which were Muslim only in name, and many prisoners were taken on these occasions. But if impartial critics will take a searching look at the Shah's actions in this regard, they will discover that he has earned the approval of the religious authorities, because these prisoners were not taken into slavery but were treated as prisoners of war. Several thousand women and children were brought up in Shi'ite and God-fearing homes, and adopted the Shi'ite faith.

To return to my narrative. The homeward march was resumed from Andeḵūd, the army not relaxing its guard for an instant despite the heat. When the Safavid forces neared Qotleš, a group of Uzbeg raiders clashed with the Ostājlū *qūrčīs* who were the outriders on the left flank. The Ostājlūs, pursuing the enemy carelessly and in loose order, were suddenly attacked by another group of Uzbegs who had been detailed to guard the Šoborḡān region. Before the Ostājlūs had time to form up in proper order, several of their number were struck down by Uzbeg arrows. The Shah severely reprimanded the Ostājlū centurions and dismissed them from his service, together with their families and tribal dependents. For several years they remained under the cloud of the Shah's displeasure, until they eventually worked their way back into favor by their valorous exploits in the campaigns against the Ottomans in Azerbaijan and were reenrolled among the centurions. Nevertheless, these Ostājlūs are still blamed by their fellow officers for this breach of discipline.

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[5] Morād III (982-1003/1574-95). He broke the truce concluded with Sultan Moḥammad Shah in 1582 by invading Iran in 1584.

The army reached Jījaktū and razed the fort there, and then marched to Mārūčāq, where the fortifications were strengthened. Naẓar 'Alī Sultan Šāmlū, who had proved to be a failure as governor of Mārūčāq, was replaced by Yūsof 'Alī Khan, the governor of Mašhad. His brother, Beyrām 'Alī Sultan, was also given a fief in that district and instructed to support Yūsof 'Alī. The fort at Mārūčāq was stocked with weapons, equipment, provisions, and gold to pay the troops. Meḥrāb Khan Qājār was appointed governor of Mašhad. At Panjdeh, Bektāš Khan and his son, Melkīš Sultan, received permission to leave camp and return to Marv and their fiefs there. When the royal army reached Herat, the Shah heard that Bāqī Khan had sent a force to Jījaktū with orders to make incursions into Khorasan. The Shah at once dispatched a contingent to deal with this threat; it proceeded by forced marches, and the enemy force melted away at the mere sight of it.

The Shah himself had endured many hardships during this campaign, and his army had suffered greatly. Dysentery had carried off many men from every tribe. Ordinary soldiers, unable to transport their sick to the end of the day's march so that they might receive proper burial, buried them hastily, without the ritual washing and shrouding of the corpse, and sometimes before the man had drawn his last breath, in their fear that the Uzbegs might come upon the corpses and sever their heads. Those whose devotion to their benefactor was pure and without blemish accounted such an end to be the gateway to everlasting life. The effects of this campaign were not dispelled during the two or three weeks the Shah spent at Herat.

The Safavid casualty list in this campaign included the following well-known names: One was Seyyed Beg Kamūna, a *naqīb* from Najaf, who had been enrolled among the great emirs since the time of Shah Tahmasp, and was currently the keeper of the seal known as *šaraf-nafāẓ*.[6] His grandfather, Seyyed Moḥammad, had declared his "love for the Shah" at Baghdad in the presence of Shah Esma'il I and had been appointed governor of Ḥella. He had fought at Shah

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[6] See *TM*, p. 202, for a description of this seal.

Esma'il's side at the battle of Čālderān and had been killed. Seyyed Beg Kamūna, although he had been stripped of some of his fiefs and trappings of rank by Shah 'Abbas at the time of his accession, nevertheless still held the post of keeper of the seal and was apparently still close to the Shah. Ebrahim Khan, the governor of Lār, who was like an honored guest in the house of Allāhverdī Khan, died of dysentery. Qāsem Beg Šāmlū, the officer in command of the *yasāvolān-e qūr,*[7] who was a trusted officer of that tribe and held the rank of *moqarrab,* also died, as did Mīrzā Ya'qūb Dast-e Ğeyb, a *seyyed* from Shiraz who held the office of *moḥtaseb* in that province. He died from dysentery after his return to Herat. Mowlānā Qowsī Šūštarī, an eminent scholar, was buried at Andeḳūd. God have mercy upon their souls and upon the souls of all true believers!

The Shah's Return from Khorasan to Iraq and His Safe Arrival at the Capital

After completing his business at Herat, the Shah marched to Mašhad, where he spent several days dealing with petitions from the governors and notables of Khorasan. All were granted robes of honor and dismissed. The Shah also spent several days seeing to the affairs of the shrine of the Imam Reżā and dealing with petitions from the *seyyeds,* shrine attendants, and pensioners. He then continued his march to Iraq, stopping in the plain of Olang-e Rādekān for a few days' hunting and to review the *qūrčīs* and troops of the royal household. Here he rewarded with special grants those who had performed distinguished service in the recent campaign. He continued his march via Ḳabūšān, hunting as he went, and sent the baggage ahead to Heng-e Mağz in the district of Besṭām. He himself, with a few personal attendants, rode off to inspect the fort at Darūn. Šāhqolī Sultan, emir of the Čamešgezek tribe,[8] was promoted to the rank of khan and made commandant of the fort and governor of Darūn.

The Shah rejoined the main body at Ḳār, at which point the Uzbeg princes were given permission to leave camp and return to Qazvin. From Ḳār, the Shah turned southwest via Sīāh-kūh to Kashan, which the inhabitants illuminated to celebrate his arrival. After enjoying the lights and taking part in celebrations there for three nights, the

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[7] Officers who were "agents of the executive power" and had a variety of duties (see *TM,* p. 117).

[8] The Čamešgezek were a Shi'ite Kurdish tribe from eastern Anatolia, many of whom had entered Safavid service (see *TM,* p. 167). It is noteworthy that their own tribal chief had already been replaced by a *ğolām* of the royal household.

Shah went on to the capital, Isfahan, where he spent the autumn and winter.

While he was at Isfahan, he received an embassy from the governor of Kandahar, Šāhī Beg Khan, who belonged to the house of the Mogul emperor Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar. The ambassadors brought with them precious stuffs and other gifts; they were graciously received by the Shah and given gifts in return.

The Subsequent History of Bāqī Khan

When Bāqī Khan received the news of the Uzbeg defeat at the Ḳaṭab, his first thought was to flee that night to Transoxania. His senior advisers dissuaded him from taking action, and the following morning reports came in that the Shah was continuing his retreat because of the high incidence of sickness in his army. Bāqī Khan was overjoyed. Since his troops were mobilized, he decided to lead them on an expedition to Badaḳšān, where a revolt had broken out after the death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. The Čaḡatāys and people of Badaḳšān had crept out of their caves in the mountains, nominated as their leader a certain Badī' al-Zamān, and driven the Uzbegs out of the province. This Badī' al-Zamān was descended from the Aḥrār Ḳājas,[9] whose grandson in the female line, Shah Soleymān, had been independent governor of Badaḳšān. For several years Badī' al-Zamān and his Čaḡatāy supporters had been unmolested because of the schisms among the Uzbegs. When Bāqī Khan marched against him, Badī' al-Zamān shut himself up in a fort. But most of the people of Badaḳšān deserted him, and Bāqī Khan eventually took possession of the fort, put Badī' al-Zamān to death, and left the province in charge of one of his officers.

During this campaign, Bāqī Khan executed a number of emirs accused of having plotted against him at Balḳ when the Safavid army drew near to that city; their plan had been to murder him and place Jahāngīr Khan on the throne. The conspirators had canceled their plan when the Shah retreated from Balḳ, but one of their number had revealed it to Bāqī Khan. Having subjugated Badaḳšān, the latter summoned his emirs to a council after stationing a number of reliable men to seize the conspirators. In the course of the council meeting, he suddenly turned on the guilty men and accused them of

[9] Ḳāja 'Obeydollāh, known as Ḳāja Aḥrār, was a shaikh of the Naqšbandī Sufi Order founded in the 14th century A.D.

the plot. They denied his accusation. The renegade who had revealed the plot then confronted them with it face to face, and Bāqī Khan ordered them to be seized. They were executed on the spot, some thirty or forty emirs of considerable standing in all. Bāqī Khan replaced them by his own protégés, and returned to Bokhara pleased with the turn of events.

Once again, Bāqī Khan's affairs prospered. Kelerī Moḥammad Jān Qazāq, who had raised the banner of independence at Tashkent, made friendly overtures to him, urged on by his *'olamā* and counselors on the ground that an alliance between them would strengthen the Sunni faith. Ambassadors from Tashkent visited Bāqī Khan, who had always had his eye on that area and had pondered how he might wrest it from the Cossacks. Since he had seen with his own eyes the strength of the royal army at Balḵ and feared that the Shah might at any moment return to conquer Transoxania, he stopped uttering the empty boasts he had been wont to utter and decided that peace with the Cossacks was expedient. He also sent orders to his frontier emirs that they should make contact with the Safavid emirs at Marv, Mārūčāq, and Herat and develop friendly relations with them with a view to preventing incidents in the frontier regions and interference with trade caravans.

The Safavid frontier emirs reported these developments to the Shah, who issued similar orders to his officers forbidding them to molest merchants or other travelers, and exhorting them to strive for peace on the frontier until such time as he visited the area again. There was peace for several years, and neither side made incursions on the other's territory. The Shah, however, fully intended to lead a second expedition to Balḵ when his troops were rested and rehabilitated, in the hope of achieving his objective on the second try. Bāqī Khan was quite aware of this intention. But preoccupations with the Ottomans at Baghdad and in Azerbaijan diverted the Shah's attention, and Bāqī Khan was able to relax and live a life of pleasure until his death in 1013/1604-05.

Events of the Year of the Hare, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1011/1602-03 and Part of the Muslim Year 1012/1603-04, the Seventeenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on 7 Šavvāl 1011/20 March 1603. The Shah held the customary celebrations in the Naqš-e Jahān gardens at Isfahan, and the gardens were brilliantly lit. Military and civilians alike celebrated the festival for three days and nights. An event which added to the Shah's joy this year was the birth of his third son, named Emāmqolī Mīrzā in honor of the immaculate Imams. It is to be hoped that he will flourish under his father's tutelage and, by seeking to do his father's will, share in his felicity.

The Capture of the Fortress at Nehāvand

The fort at Nehāvand had been built by the Ottoman commander Jeğāl-oğlū early in the reign of Shah 'Abbas I. Nehāvand is a dependency of Hamadan, a province in which many of the *qezelbāš* tribes live. Jeğāl-oğlū installed a garrison at Nehāvand, and sent their pay and allowances from Baghdad. When peace was concluded between 'Abbas I and Sultan Morād, one condition was that each side should retain those regions which it occupied and not encroach on the territory of the other. The fort at Nehāvand had been in Ottoman hands for fifteen years, and there had been no truce violations. The *qezelbāš* governors, however, strongly resented the fact that about every ten days the Ottomans would march through their tribal territory and come and go freely to the fort, for Nehāvand was located at the heart of the province of Hamadan and, some might say, of the whole of Persian Iraq.

The *qezelbāš* emirs had made frequent representations to the viziers and principal officers of state. They had argued that the continued existence of this structure was, in the end, going to cause a violation of the peace, because some incident was bound to occur as a result of the action of one side or the other. If the Ottomans were sincere in their desire for peace, they should raze the fort; but the perfidious Ottomans refused to do this. After the death of Sultan Morād and the accession of his son, Sultan Moḥammad,[1] revolts broke

[1] Moḥammad III, reg. 1003-12/1595-1603.

out in many parts of the Ottoman empire, the rebel bands calling themselves Jalālīs. The frontier wardens and their troops also began to behave like the Jalālīs. For instance, at Baghdad the troops expelled the governor who had been duly appointed by the Ottoman Sultan and made a junior officer named Ūzūn Aḥmad their governor. The pay and allowances of the Ottoman garrison at Nehāvand were interrupted, and many of the garrison deserted in consequence. The rest remained in the fort but adopted a rebellious attitude and began to interfere more and more with the local populace.

The Safavid emirs informed the governor of Baghdad of these violations of the peace, and the Ottomans sent Moḥammad Aqa Qaba Soqol to Nehāvand to take command. But the mutineers there refused to recognize him; not only that, but they plundered his baggage, and the unfortunate officer appealed to the Shah for help! The Shah sent letters to the mutineers bidding them desist, and at the same time ordered the governor of Hamadan, Ḥasan Khan, and the emirs in that area to go to the assistance of Moḥammad Aqa. Before the Shah's order arrived, some of the local people, fed up with the iniquitous behavior of the mutineers, had taken matters into their own hands and tried to drive the Ottoman garrison out of the fort. Ḥasan Khan hastened to Nehāvand to deal with the situation and assist Moḥammad Aqa, but before he got there, the latter lost heart and left the scene. One of the garrison, a certain Valī Beg Vermezlār, had demonstrated his "love for the Shah" and his loyalty to the Safavid dynasty by admitting the attackers to the tower which was in his charge. After the leader of the mutineers and some of his men had been killed in the ensuing struggle, the fort fell into the hands of the attackers.

At this juncture, Ḥasan Khan arrived and gave quarter to the remainder of the garrison, who promptly scattered in all directions. On orders from the Shah, Ḥasan Khan razed the fort. The Shah, surmising that this incident would shortly lead to a renewal of hostilities with the Ottomans, abandoned his plan for a second expedition to Balḵ and prepared to march to Azerbaijan.

The Shah's Campaign in Azerbaijan and His Notable Victories There This Year

Once Shah 'Abbas had restored internal security in Iran, his thoughts turned to the recovery of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, two of the most important provinces in Iran which had been conquered by the Ottomans. The city of Tabriz had been the capital of rulers of Iran, and its recovery was of prime importance to the Shah. Whenever he talked of this ambition, however, his advisers reminded him of the power of the Ottoman sultans and the numerical superiority of their armies; they deemed it not in the interest of the state to try the majesty of the Ottoman empire. The Shah still nursed this ambition, but mindful of the injunction "Do not break your oaths after you have affirmed them,"[2] he did not break the peace, but bided his time.

The lawless activities of the Kurds and Ottomans in the frontier regions, where the Ottoman frontier pashas and governors had begun to behave like rebellious Jalālīs, gave the Shah his opportunity. Among the incidents which had angered the Shah was the action of Aḥmad Pasha, the governor of Vān, who, moved by greed, seized and executed a merchant in the employ of the royal household,[3] and expropriated a large sum of money belonging to the royal exchequer. In addition, the Shah's agents who had been sent to Dāḡestān to purchase mules and hunting animals had been seized by the Ottomans in Šīrvān and their belongings plundered. The Shah, though he had overlooked these incidents, made repeated protests to the Ottoman Sultan about the actions of his officers—but to no avail, since the latter ignored the orders they received from their sultan. Eventually these incidents became so serious that the Shah could no longer tolerate them.

At this point Ḡāzī Beg Kord, a descendant of Šāhqolī Balīlān, rebelled against the Ottoman *beglerbeg* of Tabriz and strengthened the fort at Qarnī-yarūq near Salmās. 'Alī Pasha, *beglerbeg* of Tabriz on behalf of Ja'far Pasha, mobilized the Ottoman troops in Tabriz, Erīvān, and Naḵčevān, and led a punitive expedition against him. Ḡāzī Beg sent his son, Khan Abdāl, to seek aid from the Shah. The Ottomans, he said, were suspicious of the *qezelbāš*, especially since the razing of the fort at Nehāvand; when they had the opportunity, they would turn on the *qezelbāš* and not accept any excuses for this action. It did not make sense, he said, for the Shah to leave Šīrvān and Azerbaijan in the hands of Jalālīs who were in revolt against their own ruler; the Shah had a golden opportunity to attack Tabriz while the Ottoman commander was absent from the city campaigning against the Kurds.

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[2] Koran, 16:93.

[3] *Tojjār-e ḵāṣṣa-ye šarīfa*. I am not sure of the meaning of this term. Perhaps it denotes merchants involved in some crown monopoly such as the silk trade.

The Shah consulted his loyal supporters and confidants.[4] Since the Shah's intuition told him that now was the time to strike, and since his intuition in affairs of state had always proved reliable, his advisers concurred. Mowlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Monajjem Yazdī was bidden to select an auspicious moment for this operation. To throw the Ottomans off guard, a rumor was spread that the Franks were attacking Bahrain and that the royal army was about to march south to meet this threat. Some four or five days later, a courier arrived from Allāhverdī Khan in Fārs to say that the Franks had abandoned their plans and there was no need for the royal army to come to his assistance! The Shah then announced that he intended to take those retainers who had assembled on a hunting expedition to Māzandarān. The only officers who knew his real plans were the vizier, Ḥātem Beg; 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū; Mahdīqolī[5] Qājār the *qūrčībāšī;* and Besṭām Aqa.

Strangely enough, on the very day the Shah was making his preparations for departure from Isfahan, Vakīl Pasha, who had been left as commandant of the citadel at Tabriz, was having an interview with the astrologer Mowlānā Ṣabūrī Tabrīzī. In the course of the interview, the Ottoman commander enquired what was the source of the rumor, current in Tabriz, that the Shah was marching on the city. The astrologer denied all knowledge of such a rumor and asked the commandant who had told him about it. Vakīl Pasha said he did not know its author. The two men discussed the matter for a few minutes, and then referred to a copy of the poems of Ḥāfeẓ, which happened to be lying there, for an augury. According to Mowlānā Ṣabūrī, at the top of the right-hand page was the following line (the last line of the poem):

> Oh Ḥāfeẓ! You have captured Iraq and Fārs
>   by your poetry;
> Now it is the turn of Baghdad and Tabriz!

At all events, the Shah, having resolved on the reconquest of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, left Isfahan on 7 Rabī' II, 1012/14 September 1603, at an auspicious hour. He spent the first night at the village of Dowlatābād, and the second at Kashan; from Kashan, he reached the Qazvin area by forced marches in three days. There, he revealed to his officers his intention to invade Azerbaijan, and sent orders to the *dārūğa* of Qazvin, Emir Gūna Beg Qājār, to join him with his *ğolāms* and *qūrčīs*. Orders were sent to the governor of Ardabīl, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, to march at full speed to join the Shah at Mīāna. The Shah entered Tabriz on the twelfth day after leaving Isfahan, having marched from Qazvin to Tabriz in six days. 'Alī Pasha had negotiated the surrender by Ğāzī Beg of the fortress of Qarnī-yarūq but was still absent. The surprise of the Safavid entry into Tabriz was so complete that a few Ottoman *rāhdārs*[6] on duty at the Šeblī caravanserai were cut down before they realized what was happening.

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[4] Lit.: those who had the privilege of access to the harem.

[5] I think this is a mistake for Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, who was appointed *qūrčībāšī* in 1000/1591-92, and apparently continued to hold this office until his downfall in 1021/1612-13.

When the Shah's troops were still three *farsaḵs* from the city, at the village of Fahvasfanj, the local people, as soon as they saw the *qezelbāš*, rushed to demonstrate their "love of the Shah" by donning their *tāj-e Ḥeydarī*,[7] which for fear of the Ottomans they had kept hidden in basements and other places during the Ottoman occupation. They slew any Ottoman soldiers they came across and rushed to greet the royal army, chanting the distinctive *qezelbāš* war cry of Allāh! Allāh!

From Fahvasfanj, the Shah sent a detachment ahead with orders to try and seize the citadel. Some of the garrison had already left the citadel and were busy making purchases in the market. When they heard the cheering of the people of Tabriz, they thought that a band of marauders from the frontier region, hearing of the absence of 'Alī Pasha, had come to the city in hope of plunder. Just as the Safavid vanguard was entering the city, the garrison rushed back within the walls of the citadel and closed the gates. The people of Tabriz swarmed into the streets to kiss the Shah's stirrup.

The city presented a desolate sight, because the populace had initially fled from the city at the time of the Ottoman occupation and the Ottomans had caused much damage to buildings and houses. During the twenty years[8] of Ottoman occupation, people had gradually trickled back into the city, many of them having lost all their possessions. But although the population had to some extent returned, the physical destruction remained; of every hundred houses, scarcely a single house was in even a third as good condition as formerly. No house could be found that was fit for occupation by the Shah, and so the latter retired to Šanb-e Ğāzān, where he was visited by people from the city and surrounding areas. Any Ottoman who was picked up anywhere around the city was taken before the Shah and executed. Some were killed on the spot by their captors because they feared that the Shah might spare their lives, and their heads were sent to the Shah. The Tabrīzīs were so implacable in their reprisals that, even in cases where an Ottoman soldier had taken a Tabrīzī girl into his house and had had children by her, the father, brothers, and other relatives of the girl would make no allowances but would drag the Ottoman off and kill him. Devotees of the Prophet's family and friends of the Safavid house, who had for years been forced to practice "prudent dissimulation,"[9] now openly revealed their affiliation.

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[6] The *rāhdārs* were officials charged with the maintenance of security on the highways who levied tolls on travelers for this service.

[7] The distinctive headgear of the *qezelbāš*, devised by Shaikh Ḥeydar, leader of the Safavid Order of Sufis from 1460 to 1488.

[8] Lunar years; Tabriz was occupied by the Ottomans in 993/1585.

The Shah's Victory over 'Alī Pasha and the Ottoman Forces at Tabriz

As already reported, the Ottoman garrison at Tabriz thought the city had been attacked by a band of marauders out for plunder, and they had sent a courier to 'Alī Pasha with a report to this effect. 'Alī Pasha, thinking the problem was a minor one, had allowed the Naḵčevān and Erīvān contingents to return to base when he reached Marand. One day's march from Marand, a second courier reached 'Alī Pasha with the news that Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, the governor of Ardabīl, was in the vicinity with his army, and 'Alī Pasha was therefore urged to proceed with all due caution. 'Alī Pasha consulted his principal officers, Ḵalīl Pasha and Maḥmūd Pasha, as to whether they should halt or proceed on their way to Tabriz. Since most of the Ottoman troops had wives and children and possessions in the citadel at Tabriz, and since they had little confidence in the ability of the garrison there to resist a siege, the consensus was that they should proceed to Tabriz; they did not attach great importance to the report about Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan.

'Alī Pasha had five thousand men with him. On the third day of their return march, a third courier arrived from Tabriz to say that the Shah was there in person, but 'Alī Pasha concealed this fact from his men and boldly and foolishly continued on his way, camping at

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[9] *Taqīya;* the doctrine by which a Shi'ite was allowed to conceal his religious beliefs in order to escape persecution.

Mowżeʿ-e Ṣūfīān, six *farsaks* from Tabriz. This fact, together with details of the size and composition of the Ottoman army, was reported to the Shah by his efficient intelligence service. The Shah was astonished at the Pasha's temerity, for even though the Shah's own army did not exceed five or six thousand men, it was the height of folly to take on the king of Iran and the inheritor of the throne of Jamšīd with only equal forces.

When he received the report of ʿAlī Pasha's arrival at Mowżeʿ-e Ṣūfīān, he marched the same night from Šanb-e Ḡāzān and camped at Ḥājjī Ḥarāmī, two *farsaks* from the city. The following morning, he made Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan leader of the vanguard and sent him on ahead. Although one of the great emirs would probably have been sufficient for the task in hand, the Shah, showing that prudence characteristic of men of wisdom, followed up with the main body, with himself stationed in the center. The air rang with the sound of trumpets, fifes, tympani, and kettledrums. The Ottomans, as was their custom, formed a circle with their gun carriages and stationed their gunners and musketeers in front. ʿAlī Pasha stationed himself in the center with Maḥmūd Pasha. The Ottomans then made contact with the Safavid van and launched repeated charges against it. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan sought to avoid getting too heavily engaged before the Shah arrived with the main body, but Eyūba Sultan, the son of Ūlāma, was killed in this initial fighting.

When the main body hove in sight, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan launched a general attack on the Ottoman positions. The sight of the royal standards caused the Ottoman resistance to weaken, and many turned to flee. The Shah ordered some of his men to engage the enemy. Both Ḵalīl Pasha and Maḥmūd Pasha were killed, and ʿAlī Pasha himself was taken prisoner by Sārū Beg Begdīlī, the brother of the *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* Moḥammad Beg, and led before the Shah, who treated him with magnanimity. The Pasha was extremely worried about his son, Moḥammad Amīn, thinking that he might have been killed in the fighting. But at that moment his son was brought in alive, and the Pasha praised the Shah for his generosity, which was not what he had expected. The routed Ottomans were pursued as far as Marand, few of them escaping the sword apart from a small number who hid in caves during the night and succeeded in getting away to Vān in the morning. Large quantities of booty fell into the hands of the Safavids.

The Shah's Recapture of the Citadel at Tabriz and Recovery of the Province of Azerbaijan

After this victory, the Shah marched back to Tabriz and called on the Ottoman garrison to surrender the citadel. Anyone who had any reason to stay in Azerbaijan, said the Shah, was welcome to enter his service at double the pay and allowances he had received in the Ottoman army. Anyone who wished to leave with his family and belongings was free to do so without molestation. 'Alī Pasha was sent to talk with the garrison and urge them to abandon their resistance. At first the defenders spoke up like soldiers and returned an abusive reply to 'Alī Pasha, showing no inclination to surrender. When the Safavids commenced the siege, digging trenches and constructing breastworks, the defenders had second thoughts about the advisability of continuing their resistance, since no relief could be expected from any quarter. They summoned a council of war, and consulted their *moftī* and *qāżī*. The latter reminded them of the Koranic injunction "Do not cast yourselves into destruction by your own hand,"[10] and urged them to save their life and property. The defenders then sent envoys to the Shah, offering to hand over the citadel on a firm promise of quarter.

The Shah, in order to avoid unnecessary bloodletting, had letters of amnesty written and sealed with the *mehr-āṣār* seal,[11] and delivered to the defenders. Thereupon the defenders opened the gates and emerged with their possessions. Some of them took advantage of the Shah's offer of double pay upon entering his service, and the rest departed. Maqṣūd Beg, the superintendent *(nāẓer)*, was ordered to make an inventory of the property of the Ottoman dead and of all the supplies and equipment in the citadel. Qarčaqāy Beg, left in charge of the citadel with a detachment of *ġolāms* of the royal household, was ordered to take charge and to guard the houses of Ottomans who had fallen in battle.

The Shah sent to all parts a letter announcing this victory. He received visits from various Kurdish emirs, including Ġāzī Beg, his brother Qūrčī Beg and the latter's sons, and Shaikh Ḥeydar b. Amīra Mokrī, who had operated against the Ottomans for years. The provincial governors sent envoys to offer their congratulations. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan was appointed governor of Azerbaijan; Jamšīd Sultan

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[10] Koran, 2:191.

[11] See *TM*, p. 202.

Donbolī,[12] who had been at court for some time and had served in the Balḵ expedition, was made governor of Marand; Ḡāzī Beg was given Ḵoy and Salmās; and Marāḡa was given to Shaikh Ḥeydar. Čerāḡ Sultan Gerāmpā Ostājlū was sent to the Aras River with a detachment of troops to guard Jolfā and to gather intelligence regarding the Ottoman forces at Naḵčevān. Emir Gūna Beg Qājār, who had not yet been promoted to the status of emir but was trusted by the Shah, was dispatched in the direction of Arasbār with a group of Söklen and Ṭavāleš tribesmen. His orders were to mobilize the tribes living in that area and to camp near the Aras to serve as a rallying point for any Qājār tribesmen or other Turkmans who might still be left in Qarābāḡ; he was further instructed to be on his guard against incursions on the part of the Ottoman forces in Šīrvān and at Ganja. ʿAlī Pasha was entrusted to Emir Gūna Beg's son Besṭām Aqa, who was instructed to treat the Pasha as his house guest. The Shah regarded him with favor because of his courage in opposing the royal army, and he allowed him to retain all his belongings from the citadel at Tabriz. Since the Pasha was sociable and an extremely witty man, he was admitted to the Shah's private gatherings and became his companion at private banquets.

The Shah's Capture of the Forts at Naḵčevān and Erīvān

After the recapture of Tabriz, the Shah, having resolved to recover the whole of Azerbaijan, marched in the direction of Naḵčevān and Erīvān. The Ottoman *beglerbeg* in that area was Moḥammad Pasha, known as Šarīf Pasha, and he had at his disposal twelve thousand men. These troops, who had left ʿAlī Pasha at Marand to return to their base at Naḵčevān, had hardly settled down there when they received news of the fate of the Ottoman forces at Tabriz and of the capture of ʿAlī Pasha. Since the fort at Erīvān was stronger than that at Naḵčevān, Šarīf Pasha marched to Erīvān, placing one of his junior officers, with one hundred and fifty men, in command of Naḵčevān. The fort at Erīvān was not large enough to house all Šarīf Pasha's men, who numbered some ten thousand, and so the Pasha gave orders for the construction of a second fort just south of the old one. All the troops, and the local inhabitants of Čoḵūr-e Saʿd, were set to work, and the new fort was completed and stocked with provisions for two or three years during the three weeks that the Shah was at Tabriz dealing with important matters there.

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[12] A Turkicized Kurdish tribe.

The Shah sent ahead toward Nakčevān Żu'l-Faqār Khan and other emirs, and dispatched Sardār Maḥmūd Čamešgezekī with three hundred desperadoes in the direction of Erīvān. Sardār Maḥmūd had for some time been engaged in brigandage, and had acquired a tremendous reputation among the Ottomans for valor; he had recently entered the Shah's service. However, while he was engaged in a drunken carousal not far from Erīvān, having neglected to post guards, a detachment of a thousand Ottomans fell on his camp, seized and killed him, and killed or captured a number of his companions. Żu'l-Faqār Khan and his men received a tumultuous welcome at Nakčevān, and the Ottoman commandant of the fort sued for quarter. This was granted by Żu'l-Faqār Khan, and the fort, which with its dependent territories is one of the most important in Azerbaijan, was handed over to Safavid officers.

The surrender of Nakčevān caused all the other Ottoman garrisons south of the Aras to withdraw and congregate at Erīvān. Čerāğ Sultan Ostājlū was appointed governor of Nakčevān, and the Ottoman prisoners from the fort there, most of whom had families at Erīvān, were left in the custody of Żu'l-Faqār Khan until the fate of Erīvān was settled. Moṣṭafā Beg Maḥmūdī, a leading Kurdish chief and governor of Mākū, visited the Shah's camp and was received with favor. The Shah continued his march toward Erīvān. When he reached Dīdī a mass of Sa'dlū and Pāzūkī tribesmen and others, who had lived in the Čokūr-e Sa'd area during Safavid times, demonstrated their "love of the Shah" by joining him, and all the local chiefs submitted to him.

The Shah camped one *farsak* from Erīvān. There, he issued orders for the recruitment of twelve thousand infantry from the Erīvān and Nakčevān areas to construct breastworks beneath the castle walls. The same day, a group of *ğāzīs* made a demonstration in front of the fort; the defenders made a sortie against them, there was a brief skirmish, and several men were wounded on each side. The next day the Shah advanced close to the fort; the Ottomans opened fire with cannon, mortars, and heavy siege guns, and the Safavid troops took up positions among the cultivated areas and walled gardens around the fort. Each group erected palisades on the side of their tents which faced the fort to protect them from this Ottoman fire.

The fortifications at Erīvān consisted of three forts: the oldest was the fort built by Farhād Pasha when he invaded the area in 991/

1583-84 during Sultan Moḥammad Shah's absence in Khorasan. This fort, built on the bank of the Zengī-čay River, was immensely strong, with a rampart and a deep ditch; the second fort was a small construction known as Gözçü (observation post). This was located southwest of the old fort, at a distance of several bowshots. The duty of the garrison of the Gözçü was to make sorties to assist the garrison of the old fort. The men in the Gözçü obtained their water supplies from the river and their provisions from the old fort. The third fort was the new one which had been thrown up at such speed after the fall of Tabriz, situated south of the old fort. There had been no time to construct a rampart or to excavate a ditch. The three forts, supporting each other and well-garrisoned with seasoned troops and amply stocked with provisions and supplies, constituted a formidable problem, especially as the Safavids, during their wars with the Ottomans, had rarely succeeded in taking a fortress by storm; in fact, to capture a fort from the Ottomans was usually reckoned to be an impossible task.

Nevertheless, the Shah applied himself to the task. The emirs, *qūrčīs, ḡolāms,* and the rest of the troops were allotted specific areas of responsibility: Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan was given the task of capturing the Gözçü, and Qarčaqāy Beg and the *ḡolāms* of the royal household, and all the various emirs, were assigned to their different stations. On several occasions the Ottomans made large-scale sorties from the forts, and battles were fought in an open space south of the new fort, casualties being inflicted on both sides. In one of these engagements, Shaikh Ḥeydar Mokrī hurled himself fearlessly against the Ottomans and was slain by a musketball. The Ottomans did not advance beyond the protection of the castle walls and their other defenses, whereas numbers of young and inexperienced *qezelbāš* galloped up to the walls and were shot down by Ottoman musketeers lying in ambush.

Seeing that he was losing men fruitlessly, the Shah ordered a narrow trench to be dug across the open space mentioned above, and he stationed there a detachment of troops, including musketeers of the royal stirrup,[13] with the object of preventing anyone from emerging from the gates of the fort. This move was completely successful. Meanwhile, the construction of breastworks proceeded apace, and Barḵordār Beg, the commander in chief of artillery, proceeded with the casting of cannon, using as his base the town of Erīvān, one *farsaḵ* from the fort. In addition, the Shah sent to Tabriz for a long-range siege gun and some other cannon which had fallen into Safavid hands at the capture of the citadel at Tabriz.

[13] Presumably a regiment of musketeers forming part of the royal bodyguard.

The Shah allocated the cannon and the gunners to Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan for use in bombarding the Gözçü fort, because until that fort was taken it was impossible to advance the breastworks in that direction. Moreover, protected by the Gözçü fort, the Ottoman troops from the old fort and new forts could come and go freely to the river bank and the gardens along the bank, whereas it was extremely difficult for the *qezelbāš* to establish a bridgehead between these two forts or to construct any breastworks there. After the bombardment had been in progress for several days, a lucky shot struck the tower in which the water storage jars were kept; the tower was destroyed and the water jars smashed. The same night, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, with great daring, led his men into the declivity between the forts, thus preventing the garrison of the Gözçü fort from replenishing their water supplies from the river. In the middle of the night, the garrison rushed out with drawn swords and cut its way through to the new fort.

This success led the attackers to redouble their efforts, but the weather had now become so cold that the men lost the effective use of their hands, and the ground became so hard that shovels would no longer penetrate it. The *ḡāzīs* were forced to content themselves with strengthening their breastworks and mounting guard on them night and day. The Ottomans launched attack after attack on these breastworks. Their assaults on those held by the Pāzūkī tribe and by the workmen of the royal household achieved a measure of success; but in their assault on the breastwork held by Qarčaqāy Beg and the *ḡolāms*, an Ottoman officer of note, Ḥoseyn Aqa 'Alī, was wounded twice by musketballs, and some fifty or sixty of his men were killed or wounded. Throughout the cold weather of the month of Dey,[14] this was the general pattern of operations. Artillery and muskets were in action on both sides; the Ottomans in particular kept up such a hot fire that every tent in the royal camp had been hit by ten or twelve thousand musketballs *(sic!)*. Some men were hit by musketballs or by shots from heavy siege guns and killed as they walked to or from the commissariat.

I will digress at this point to describe some events which occurred this winter during the siege of Erīvān.

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[14] The tenth month of the Iranian year and the first month of winter.

Events Which Occurred during the Siege of Erīvān, in the Winter of 1012/1603-04

While the siege of Erīvān was in progress, the Ottoman Sultan Moḥammad III died, after having had his eldest son, who was twenty-one years of age, strangled in the harem by the eunuchs at the instigation of some of the inmates of the harem who were hostile to the boy's mother. His son's death grieved him, and the news of the loss of Tabriz and of the troubles throughout the empire grieved him still more, and shortly afterward he died. As the Koran says: "For every people there is an appointed term; they cannot remain behind even for a single moment, nor can they get ahead of it."[15] Although the affairs of this world are at the disposition of the Eternal King, and in reality no earthly king can achieve any power without God's help, nevertheless the rulers of surrounding countries, and men everywhere, with their eye on mundane considerations, interpreted even this as an auspicious sign in regard to the fortunes of Shah 'Abbas, and as a sign of disturbance in Ottoman affairs. In particular, these events weakened the resolve of Ottoman garrisons everywhere. The viziers and principal officers of the Ottoman state sought feverishly for a successor to the dead Sultan. One of the Sultan's other sons, Moṣṭafā Sultan, was said to be insane, and so they put on the throne his other son, Aḥmad, who was sixteen years old.

The second important event which occurred that winter was the arrival of an embassy from the Mogul Emperor Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, in the person of Mīr Moḥammad Ma'ṣūm Khan Mokorī, the governor of the province of Mokor; with him came Manūčehr Beg the *ešīk-āqāsī*, a *ğolām* of the royal household who had been sent as ambassador to India seven years previously. Among the gifts brought by the Indian ambassador were a scabbard and coat of mail wrought of gold and studded with small diamonds and other costly jewels. The gift of a sword, coming at this particular time from a descendant of Tīmūr, who had always triumphed over his Indian and Afghan enemies, was hailed as a happy augury of the Shah's ultimate victory in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān. The Shah received the Indian ambassador and Manūčehr Beg in his camp beneath the walls of Erīvān. The gifts sent by the Emperor were piled on top of one another at the entrance to the royal pavilion, waiting for the Shah to have time to inspect them, but the Shah was too busy with the prosecution of the siege to look at anything except the sword, that portent of good fortune. The Indian embassy waited four months in the bitter cold of the Erīvān winter, keeping constant guard on their gifts in the royal pavilion. Finally, after the fall of Erīvān, when Šarīf Pasha and the other high-ranking Ottoman and Kurdish officers were brought to the Shah's camp, the presents from the Mogul emperor were finally presented to him, and the Shah distributed them among his officers and governors according to their rank.

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[15] Koran, 7:32, etc.

The third event of importance to occur that winter was the arrival of Alexander Khan b. Lavand Khan, the ruler of Kakhetia, who was a Safavid vassal. He, following his father and elder brother, had become ruler of Kakhetia in the time of Shah Tahmasp, and had remained a loyal subject up to the time of Tahmasp's death, faithfully remitting his instalments of tribute and tax. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and the Ottoman invasion of Šīrvān, an invasion that necessitated the passage of Ottoman troops across Georgia, Alexander Khan, who was a man of sound judgment and as wily as a fox, decided to throw in his lot with the Ottomans. Simon Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, remained loyal to the Shah. Alexander Khan therefore adopted a policy of noninvolvement with the various Ottoman commanders and pashas who passed through his territory, and sent them gifts. After the Ottomans subjugated Šīrvān and Azerbaijan, he agreed to pay tribute to them and declared his loyalty to the Sultan. When Sultan Moḥammad Shah suddenly sent a *qezelbāš* force against him, Alexander hastily sent his son, Kūstandīl (Constantine) Mīrzā, to Ḥamza Mīrzā as a pledge of his renewed loyalty to the Shah. Kūstandīl had been brought up among the *qezelbāš* and had become a close friend and companion of Ḥamza Mīrzā. Alexander Khan, while maintaining his allegiance to the Ottomans, kept an eye to the future by every now and then sending gifts to the Shah with protestations of loyalty, and received in return grants and other marks of royal favor.

When he reached Erīvān, Shah 'Abbas had sent Kūstandīl to bring his father to the Safavid camp, so that his father might ask forgiveness for his past sins and promise henceforth not to depart from the path of loyalty to the Shah which he had trodden in the time of Shah Tahmasp. Kūstandīl convinced his father that his best interest lay in allegiance to Shah 'Abbas, and brought him willy-nilly to Erīvān. At the Shah's orders, a group of emirs and principal officers of state went out to greet him. He was brought before the Shah, still travel-stained from the journey, and prostrated himself at the Shah's feet. The Georgian ruler picked up a gold tray, which had been engraved with the royal titles in his own country, and showered money from it over the Shah's head, a custom Georgians observe in regard to their own kings. The Shah greeted him informally, embraced him, and treated him with special favor in consideration of his great age; and he became a companion of the Shah at private banquets and gatherings.

The Shah sent a *ḡolām* of the royal household, Ṭahmāspqolī Beg the son of Malek Mozmen Somḵetī, who was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* of the court, to fetch Gorgīn Khan the son of Simon Khan, who had inherited his patrimonial lands in Kartlia after the arrest of his father. He also obeyed the summons and was honored by the Shah.

About this time, some two thousand families of the Sīl-süpür (clean sweepers) Turkman tribes of Asia Minor demonstrated their "love for the Shah" and pledged their allegiance to him. On their march through eastern Anatolia, they had lived up to their name and made a clean sweep of everything in their path. They were presented to the Shah before the walls of Erīvān. The Shah allotted them summer and winter quarters in the districts of Rayy, Sāva, Ḵ̌ār, and Fīrūzkūh, and sent them on to Iraq. Šamsī Pasha Qazāqlar, with a group of his tribesmen, former *qezelbāš* who had gone over to the Ottomans during the interregnum in Qarābāḡ, now presented himself to the Shah; while he was in Ottoman service, he had acquired the status of emir and pasha. Some other tribal groups that renewed their pledge of allegiance to Shah ʿAbbas were the Šams al-Dīnlū and Ḥājjīlar.[16] Once again, they donned the twelve-gored hat of the Es̱nā ʿAšarīs. Šamsī Pasha was raised to the rank of khan. Thus, with every day that passed, the Shah's strength increased and that of the defenders declined.

Allāhverdī Khan's Expedition to Baghdad

The previous year, an Ottoman officer at Baghdad named Ozūn Aḥmad Pasha had declared his opposition to the governor appointed by the Porte and had made himself governor of Arab Iraq. He had informed the Shah that he was ready to hand over to his officers the city and the fortress at Baghdad. When the Shah left for Azerbaijan, he had instructed Allāhverdī Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, to march to Baghdad via Šūštar and Ḥavīza. If he found Ozūn Aḥmad

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[16] Both clans of the Ẕu'l-Qadar tribe.

Pasha willing to keep his word, Allāhverdī's instructions were to take over the defense of that province; if not, he was to take whatever action circumstances might require.

Following orders, Allāhverdī Khan marched toward Baghdad by way of 'Arabestān and Lorestān with the armies of Fārs, Kūh Gīlūya, and Ḵūzestān. He was joined by Ḥasan Khan Ostājlū, the governor of Hamadan, and Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, with troops from the province of Hamadan. His total forces then amounted to twelve thousand men. Allāhverdī Khan sent on ahead as an envoy to Ozūn Aḥmad a certain Ebrahim Beg from Baghdad, who had declared his "love for the Shah" some time previously and been enrolled among the *ḡolāms* of the royal household. The envoy informed Ozūn Aḥmad that Allāhverdī Khan was on his way to Baghdad at the Shah's command and hoped Ozūn Aḥmad would carry out his promises. If he did, he would be well rewarded in the Shah's service; if not, whatever God willed would transpire.

Ozūn Aḥmad had made himself independent governor of Baghdad, and the Ottoman authorities, making the best of a bad job, had left him in the posts of governor of Baghdad and *amīr al-omarā* of Arab Iraq. Ozūn Aḥmad chose to hold on to the cash in hand rather than hope for future credit. He now decided to show himself to be a loyal servant of the Ottomans by displaying hostility toward the *qezelbāš* in the hope of strengthening his hold on the governorship of Baghdad. He violated the protocol concerning ambassadors by putting to death Ebrahim Beg, who was no more than a message bearer, and adopted a hostile attitude toward Allāhverdī Khan.

On the day the Safavid army arrived at Baghdad, Safavid skirmishers under Ḥasan Khan and Ḥoseyn Khan drove the Ottomans back on to the city with heavy casualties; the pursuit continued right up to the city walls, and some of the defenders were slain around the drawbridge itself. At this juncture the following letter arrived from the Shah: "If Ozūn Aḥmad has repented of his promises, and is hostile to you and preparing to resist a siege, do not get involved, but join me in Azerbaijan, where I am presently laying siege to Erīvān. I am determined to reconquer my hereditary provinces of Azerbaijan, Šīrvān, and Georgia, and it is quite possible that the Ottoman Sultan will send a large army to the relief of Erīvān; consequently, it is not wise to fight on two fronts at once." The Khan obediently beat the retreat and marched away from Baghdad.

On his march, he detached a contingent of troops to chastise the sons of Qobād, the son of Mīr 'Omar Kalhor,[17] who were provincial governors on behalf of the Ottomans. From their base at the fort of Zanjīr, they had molested groups of men who had been making their way to join Allāhverdī Khan. The punitive force overran Kalhor territory, plundering their property, and Mīr 'Omar, the son of 'Emād, who was the Kalhor leader, retreated to the fort at Zanjīr with Ḥasan Khan in hot pursuit. Ḥasan Khan was so close behind him that Mīr 'Omar had no chance to organize a defense; he continued his flight, but was captured almost immediately by Safavid forces. All his forts and territory fell into Safavid hands. The other Kalhor chiefs hastened to submit to Allāhverdī Khan and were enrolled in the ranks of his army; subsequently, however, they deserted.

Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, was granted permission to return to his seat of government, but Ḥasan Khan accompanied Allāhverdī Khan to Azerbaijan. Ḥasan Khan reached Erīvān while the siege was still in progress; Allāhverdī Khan arrived the day the fortress fell. Ḥasan Khan was ordered to ravage Āḵesqa, a district of the Meskhia province of Georgia, which was the fief of Manūčehr Khan, the son-in-law of Simon Khan. He carried out this commission in an exemplary manner, and brought back as prisoners many Georgian women and children.

Finally, this year the Shah gave orders that the citadel at Tabriz and the ancillary buildings which the Ottomans had constructed during their twenty years[18] of occupation be razed. These ancillary buildings consisted of bathhouses, shops, and rentable property of all kinds; although the Ottoman owners had mostly perished, their relatives were still strongly attached (in the way in which human beings become attached to worldly things) to the properties from which they had derived so much profit over the years. The Shah wished to wipe out all traces of the Ottoman occupation, and in a short time everything was pulled down—castle, hostelries, shops, bathhouses, and the like.

Mīrzā 'Alī Dowlatābādī was dismissed from his office of comptroller of finance *(mostowfī al-mamālek)* and was replaced by Mo'ezzā Ebrāhīmā Šīrāzī, who the previous year had accused the royal secretariat of certain malpractices.

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[17] The Kalhors were a Kurdish tribe (see *TM*, p. 171).

[18] The text has "thirty" wrongly.

Events of the Year of the Dragon, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1012/1603-04 and Part of the Year 1013/1604-05, the Eighteenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on Sunday, 19 Šavvāl 1012/21 March 1604. The Shah was still before the walls of Erīvān, the siege making little progress because of the extreme cold. With the first harbingers of spring, the siege was prosecuted with renewed vigor. Two huge siege guns, each firing shot weighing thirty Tabriz *man*,[1] were made ready, and the Shah gave orders that their fire be directed first against the new fort; if that could be taken, breastworks could then be advanced toward the old fort. Qarčaqāy Beg, with *ğolāms* of the royal household and a detachment of Ḵorāsānī musketeers, was ordered to push forward breastworks on the south side of the new fort, while Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and the Azerbaijan troops took over Qarčaqāy Beg's former duty of covering the north side of the old fort. One of these guns was placed in position to the east of the old fort, where breastworks had been erected by Maqṣūd Beg, the superintendent, and workmen from the royal workshops, and by Moḥammad Taqī Beg the *menbāšī*[2] of the Tabriz musketeers, with a detachment of musketeers from Bāfq.

Emir Gūna Khan, who had just arrived from Qarābāğ and had been appointed governor of Erīvān, was ordered to take up his position to the southeast, between the old and the new forts, opposite the White Tower, the tallest of the towers. Qanbar Beg Gözü-büyüklü, the chief swordbearer, was stationed east of the new fort. The sector between the large tower which was the key point of the southern side of the new fort and the gates of the fort was allotted to the *qūrčībāšī* and his men, and the other siege gun was placed there. Responsibility for all the areas surrounding both forts was allotted to various emirs, the only exception being the area to the west, where the Zengī-čay River made it impossible to push forward breastworks. All the Safavid commanders strengthened their positions by digging trenches. The soil excavated in this process was piled into mounds that were gradually pushed forward and piled up against the walls of the fort. Sappers were busy constructing mines beneath the base of the towers. The Janissaries and other troops in the forts suffered considerable numbers of casualties, and their position grew steadily more desperate.

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[1] 1 Tabriz *man* equals 2.97 kg. or 6.547 lbs. 30 Tabriz *man* would therefore equal 89.1 kg. or 196.4 lbs.

[2] "Commander of 1000 men, a 'chiliarch.'"

Finally, all was ready for an assault on the new fort, but still the Shah hesitated. Some of his principal officers of state, such as the *qūrčībāšī,* Besṭām Aqa, and others, were in favor of an assault; others were opposed. For ten days the debate went on. The Shah was worried about the casualties he would incur and the serious situation that would obtain if the assault were repulsed. During this time the Ottoman garrison of the new fort succeeded in moving inside the fort most of the earth the attackers had piled up against the walls. Eventually, the Shah decided to make a personal reconnaissance of the breastworks, to see the breaches for himself and then make a decision whether to order an assault or not. Although it is not prudent for kings to expose themselves to danger in this way, the Shah, secure in his belief that nothing occurred but by the will of God, took the risk. Clothed in the armor of God, he entered the trenches and saw for himself the results of the strenuous efforts made by his men. Satisfied with what he saw, he decided on an assault.

By Thursday 27 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1012/27 May 1604, the assault troops were in position in the trenches, which were filled to overflowing with men. The Shah gave orders that, when the assault on the new fort commenced, the men in the trenches facing the old fort should make as much noise as they could and fire off their muskets and cannon, but should not stir from their trenches, so that they would be in a position to cut off any attempt by the Ottomans in the old fort to come to the assistance of their fellows in the new fort. Orders were issued for an assault at dawn. That night, the Ottomans kept vigil even more closely than usual because of the activity and din going on in the Safavid camp.

About midnight, clouds gathered, and heavy rain began to fall. The Safavid trenches were rapidly transformed into a sea of mud, and movement became impossible. The Shah decided to postpone the assault for one day, and the following night, Friday 28 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja/28 May, the assault troops were once again in position. The Ottomans stood guard until midnight, but then there was every indication that most of the guards had left the towers and battlements and were asleep. At first light, the *qezelbāš* commanders readied themselves for action. First, trumpets sounded from the breastworks manned by the *qūrčīs;* then, with the war cry sounding on all sides, the assault began. In the direction of the old fort too, the war cry was raised and the kettledrums were beaten. In the new fort, the Ottomans rushed to their defenses; the crash of cannon, the crack of musket shots, and the sound of trumpets was deafening. The garrison was unable to withstand the impetuosity of the assault, and in a short time the *qezelbāš* had penetrated to the heart of the defenses. Many of the defenders abandoned the struggle and fled toward the old fort. Two thousand Ottomans were killed or taken prisoner, and their possessions plundered.

After the storming of the new fort, the Safavids began to push their breastworks forward toward the old fort..In three days, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan on the north side pushed his breastworks forward as far as the rampart, to which he set fire. On the east, the retainers of the royal household, the personnel of the royal workshops, the contingents of musketeers from Tabriz and Bāfq, and others also fought their way up to the rampart, the defenders of which fled within the fort. Emir Gūna stormed the White Tower and, after repeated assaults carried out with great bravery by the Qājār *ḡāzis*, captured it. The Ottoman commandant, Šarīf Pasha, decided to send the *čavošbāšī,*[3] Ḥasan Aqa, to beg for quarter. He stressed that the Ottoman resistance had only been consonant with their duty to their Sultan. If their lives were spared, they would surrender the fort. The Shah granted Šarīf Pasha's request and sent Mīrzā 'Alī Pornāk Torkmān, a centurion, to the fort with the necessary letter of amnesty.

Some of Šarīf Pasha's men, however, who had heard rumors that a relief force was on its way, gathered around Moḥammad Pasha the son of Ḵeżr Pasha, and prepared to fight. They detained Mīrzā 'Alī Beg in the fort for two days, and only released him on the third day to ask the Shah to grant a ten-day ceasefire so that the truth of the rumors might be determined. Since time is of the essence in siege warfare, the Shah rejected this request; his troops prosecuted the siege with even greater zeal than before, and the situation began to get desperate for the garrison. Safavid artillery succeeded in breaching the towers, and every day groups of Ottomans slipped out of the fort; declaring their "love of the Shah," they made their way to the Safavid lines. The trickle of deserters soon became a flood, until there were not enough men left to defend the fort properly.

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[3] Gibb and Bowen, p. 83, call this official the "Chief Pursuivant." For his duties, see Gibb and Bowen, index s.v. çavuş-başı.

On the eve of 'Āšūrā, 9 Moḥarram 1013/7 June 1604, performances of passion plays celebrating the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn were held in the Safavid camp. The men in the camp commissariat who were watching these performances created such a din that the Ottomans thought an assault was imminent. Those who had previously opposed negotiations now changed their minds; on the feast of 'Āšūrā, 10 Moḥarram 1013/8 June 1604, when the Shah, as was his custom, was wearing mourning and taking part in the 'Āšūrā ceremonies, Šarīf Pasha sent his envoy, Ḥasan Aqa the *čavošbāšī*, to the Safavid camp a second time. Invoking the holy names of Ḥoseyn and the other martyrs of Karbala, the Ottoman envoy pledged the surrender of the fort that very day. Although the Shah was reluctant, in view of the defenders' improper behavior, to grant their request, he decided to do so, since they had made the holy Imams their intercessors.

Qarčaqāy Beg, a *ġolām* of the royal household, was detailed to take charge of the citadel and of all stores and equipment that were the property of the Sultan. Šarīf Pasha was ordered to leave the fort and camp with his men in the plain outside. His men would have the option of remaining in Iran and entering Safavid service, or of returning to Anatolia. Ḥasan Aqa communicated these terms to Šarīf Pasha, and the garrison carried them out to the letter: The Ottoman officers, fiefholders,[4] *čavošes,* Janissaries, and other troops, most of them still in good battle order, left the fort and camped in the plain. Qarčaqāy Beg took possession of the fort, which is the key to the other forts in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān. The Ottoman troops, happy to escape with their lives, had resigned themselves to losing their possessions, but the Shah generously allowed them to retain these. In gratitude for this maganimous gesture, which they had not expected, the Ottomans voluntarily donated to the Shah the sum of twelve thousand Iraqi *tomān.* The Shah, since he had guaranteed their lives and property, would not accept this thank offering. The Ottoman officers thought he had refused it because it was too little, and they began to talk of raising the amount. But the Shah refused to accept any money.

Šarīf Pasha and Moḥammad Pasha the son of Ḵeżr Pasha brought before the Shah some horses, weapons, and other gifts, and the Shah, in order to gratify the Ottomans, accepted a few horses, several coats of mail, two Frankish swords, and a few other items. Šarīf Pasha was an Eṣfahānī by birth. As a young man, he had found himself in Ottoman territory, and had risen steadily in Ottoman service to the rank of pasha. He now professed his innate Shiʿism and declared his wish to end his days at Mašhad, near the shrine of the Eighth Imam. To achieve this, he was prepared to cut himself off from his family and property in Anatolia. The Shah granted his wish, and he set off for Mašhad with about one hundred men. Such was the Shah's magnanimity that he granted him an annual pension of three hundred Iraqi *tomān* in cash, and an allowance of five hundred camel *ḵarvārs*[5] of grain. On holy days, he was to perform duties at the shrine similar to those of the other attendants.

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[4] *Ze'āmā;* holders of the type of fief known as *ze'āma;* see Gibb and Bowen, index.

Moḥammad Pasha assumed command of the remaining Ottoman troops and departed for Anatolia. To prevent their being attacked and plundered by brigands en route, they were escorted as far as the fortress of Qārṣ, which was in Ottoman hands, by Ṣafarqolī Beg Čeganī and a detachment of *qūrčīs,* and by ʿAlī Khan Beg Rūmlū, an *ešīk-āqāsī.* Ṣafarqolī Beg and his *qūrčīs* returned safely from this mission, but ʿAlī Khan Beg was seized by the Ottomans at Qārṣ and held in custody there until Jeḡāl-oḡlū, the commander in chief, arrived.

Emir Gūna Khan was appointed governor of Erīvān, Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū was awarded the fief of Naḵčevān, and Nafas Sultan Saʿdlū that of Qāqezmān. Those Kurdish chiefs who had demonstrated their "love of the Shah" by coming to his assistance were awarded suitable fiefs. They included Ḡāzī Beg and his brother Qūčī Beg, the sons of Šāhqolī Balīlān Ḥakkārī; Qelīč Beg Donbolī; Jamšīd Sultan Donbolī; and Manṣūr Beg Maḥmūdī and his sons. Of the Georgian princes, Gorgīn Khan the son of Simon Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, was allowed to return home to deal with any possible incursions against his territory on the part of the Ottoman garrisons at Tiflis and Āḵesqa, and he departed, loaded with honors. Alexander Khan remained in the Safavid camp. After thus dealing with the affairs of Čoḵūr-e Saʿd, the Shah marched from Erīvān and camped at Qerḵ Bolāḡ.

Ḥoseyn Khan Moṣāḥeb Qājār's Campaign against the Ottomans in Qarābāḡ

The offices of governor of Ganja and *amīr al-omarā* of Qarābāḡ had been held by the Zīād-oḡlū clan of the Qājār tribe in the time of Shah Tahmasp. After the accession of Shah ʿAbbas, Ḥoseyn Khan of this clan rose in royal favor and was dubbed Qarābāḡī by the Shah. At the time he held the office of governor of Azerbaijan, Ḥoseyn Khan was dispatched in the direction of the Aras River to bring that region under Safavid control; he had orders to join the Shah whenever the latter reached the area. Before Ḥoseyn Khan went to Qarābāḡ, Emir Gūna Khan had gone there with a detachment of troops. After Ḥoseyn Khan's arrival, Emir Gūna Khan handed over to him and rejoined the Shah's camp.

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[5] The standard *ḵarvār* (lit., donkey load) equals 100 *man-e Tabrīz* equals 654.7 lbs. Presumably the camel *ḵarvār* was larger.

Emir Gūna Khan had boldly crossed the Ḵodā-āfarīn bridge and entered Qarābāḡ, where numbers of Qājārs, Otūz-īkī Turkmans,[6] and others, professing their "love of the Shah," flocked to his standards. Emir Gūna established a bridgehead across the Aras and sent out patrols. In clashes with the Ottomans, his men were uniformly successful. After Ḥoseyn Khan took over the military and civil administration of the region, he established his camp at Qūzlū-čāy. Ḥoseyn Khan was an exceedingly brave man, but arrogant and self-willed, given to acting without orders; he was also a man of changeable moods, sometimes adopting a proper and even humble manner toward his emirs, at other times treating them superciliously. Because he was arrogant, he underestimated the Ottomans and neglected proper military precautions, until events brought him to his senses to some extent.

On the Ottoman side, Da'ūd Pasha was *beglerbeg* of Qarābāḡ and governor of Ganja. While Shah 'Abbas was conducting the siege of Erīvān, in the winter of 1012/1604, Da'ūd Pasha mobilized the Ottoman troops in Qarābāḡ and marched from Ganja against Ḥoseyn Khan's camp at Qūzlū-čāy with seven thousand men, including a contingent from Šīrvān. When Ḥoseyn Khan's patrols reported the approach of the Ottoman force, the Khan left his women and children and baggage in camp and marched against Da'ūd Pasha without bothering to make a proper appraisal of the situation. Such a course of action required resolution and strong resolve. When he drew close to the Ottoman force, Ḥoseyn Khan, realizing he was outnumbered, modified his plans to the extent of calling a council of war. Some of his emirs said he should not take the risk of giving battle to the Ottomans without orders from the Shah. Others said it would have been a good idea to hold a council of war earlier; if they avoided battle now, it would look like a retreat. Their tribal allies would disappear, and their camp would be plundered. Nevertheless, Ḥoseyn Khan went back on his previous resolution and decided not to give battle; he gave his tribal auxiliaries permission to recross the river by the Ḵodā-āfarīn bridge and settle in a safe area. Anyone who had a poor horse should go on ahead; he himself, with his unencumbered troops, would retire slowly toward the Aras.

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[6] See *TM*, p. 167.

At this juncture, Ḥoseyn Khan discovered that a group of deserters from Qarābāḡ had treacherously guided the Ottomans, who were almost upon the *qezelbāš*. Since most of Ḥoseyn Khan's men had already begun to retire, panic broke out in his camp as they fled. Many of his auxiliary troops were unreliable. Thinking that the Ottomans would shortly plunder the Safavid camp, they decided to anticipate them, and in short order they looted the entire camp, including the possessions of the emirs. Ḥoseyn Khan, left with only a few men, saw the vanguard of the Ottoman army coming into view, marching in perfect order and drawn up in battle array.

Rostam Sultan Söklen said, "We should put our trust in God and the Shah, and stand and fight like men; to run away would bring upon us disgrace and the wrath of the Shah. If you agree, let us make one concerted charge against the enemy, inflict as much damage on them as we can, and then make a fighting retreat. In this way, we will not be charged with cowardice by the Shah or by our fellow *qezelbāš*." Ḥoseyn Khan's blood stirred in his veins, and he gave his consent. He dismissed from the battlefield, with orders to take themselves off to some safe refuge, all those who had doubtful mounts, and he prepared to charge seven thousand Ottomans with the four or five hundred men remaining to him. Rostam Sultan Söklen, a valiant young man, was engulfed by the enemy, and taken alive after suffering several severe wounds. By firing repeated volleys of arrows, Ḥoseyn Khan held off the Ottoman pursuit long enough to give his fleeing men time to escape; only then did he and his companions leave the field.

In this action, the *qezelbāš* lost only a handful of men. Their valor had made such an impression on the Ottomans that Da'ūd Pasha decided to return to Ganja rather than advance farther into Qarābāḡ. He treated Rostam Sultan with honor and instructed surgeons to see to his wounds. Ḥoseyn Khan reached the Aras River having lost all his baggage and supplies. The following day, when the Ottoman withdrawal was confirmed, his spirits rose, and he set about regrouping his scattered forces and searching for his plundered baggage. He gradually recovered most of the horses, camels, and tents, including his own personal headquarters tent and the tents of the emirs, but anything that could be hidden, such as money, gold and silver vessels, and the like, disappeared forever.

Ḥoseyn Khan sent a contrite report to the Shah and asked permission to attack Ganja in order to make amends. The Shah, who had had reports of Ḥoseyn Khan's intrepid conduct, wrote off the incident as an act of God and consoled Ḥoseyn on his defeat. In warfare, mistakes are frequently made, and God's disposition of affairs is often contrary to the best-laid plans of the wisest counselors. In battle, one is sometimes victorious, sometimes not; the outcome is ultimately not under human control. Since the royal army was still preoccupied with the siege of Erīvān, the Shah ordered Ḥoseyn Khan not to take any action until after the capture of the fort; in the meantime, he was to busy himself with the regrouping and reequipping of his forces.

The Expedition to Qarābāḡ Commanded by Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, the Qūrčībāšī

By the time Erīvān fell, the climate in Qarābāḡ had become very hot, and it was not suitable for the Shah to march there in person. Moreover, several small forts there were still held by the Ottomans, such as Šūra-gel and Maḡāzberd[7] which required the Shah's attention. There was also the possibility of a further Ottoman invasion. The Shah therefore decided to send an expeditionary force to Ganja with orders to give battle to the Ottomans if they emerged from the fort. If the enemy declined battle, the force was ordered to ravage the territory and destroy the crops of the tribes that had deserted and assisted the Ottomans, and to return to base. The Shah himself planned to subjugate the province in the autumn, after he had pacified the Erīvān frontier and was sure that an Ottoman invasion was not imminent.

The command of the expeditionary force to Qarābāḡ was given to the *qūrčībāšī*, Allāhqolī Beg Qājār; the force was to consist of a number of emirs, *qūrčīs*, and other troops, some fifteen thousand men in all. The *qūrčībāšī* marched to Ganja. The Ottomans made as if to give battle, and some fighting occurred with Safavid skirmishers.

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[7] "A fortress on the western Arpa-čay, near the ruins of Anī, the farthest northwestern point of Persian territory mentioned in the Turco-Persian treaty of A.D. 1639." (*TM*, p. 166).

When the Ottomans saw the size of the Safavid center, however, they retreated within their walls. The *qezelbāš* pursued them as far as the ditch around the fort, slew considerable numbers of them, and took some prisoners. One of the prisoners was Kücük Ḥasan, a man of some note, who had fled to Ganja from Tabriz.

Since the *qūrčībāšī* had no orders to lay siege to the fort, he pitched camp in a suitable place. For three days his men ravaged the surrounding countryside, bringing in quantities of horses, camels, sheep, and household articles. Many women and children were taken prisoner. The *qūrčībāšī* then marched back to the royal camp at Qerḵ Bolāğ, which he reached while the Shah was still there. The heads of the slain, the captured weapons, and the prisoners were paraded before the Shah, who expressed his approval. However, since the carrying of Muslims into captivity constituted a reprehensible act according to the religious law of Islam, the Shah released all the captives. A few Safavid troops who had concealed the fact that they had captives were executed. When the news of the Shah's magnanimity reached Qarābāğ, people who had had a relative taken captive streamed to the royal camp to claim their kinfolk. The rest of the booty was distributed among the troops according to principles of strict equity. Kücük Ḥasan was entrusted to the care of Nadr Khan, the keeper of the seal, who treated him like a guest. When Jeğāl-oğlū, the Ottoman commander in chief, marched toward Iran, Kücük Ḥasan escaped from the royal camp in the region of Qārṣ and rejoined the Ottomans.

The Invasion of the Province of Hamadan by Ozūn Aḥmad and Ottoman Troops from Baghdad and His Defeat at the Hands of the Qezelbāš Emirs in That Area

While still in summer quarters at Qerḵ Bolāğ, the Shah received the news that Ozūn Aḥmad had invaded Hamadan with an Ottoman army from Baghdad, but this was followed by the good news that the Safavid forces stationed on that sector of the frontier had defeated the enemy and captured Ozūn Aḥmad.

Apparently when Allāhverdī Khan and the other emirs returned from Baghdad, they subjugated en route the territory governed by Mīr Qobād b. Mīr 'Omar Kalhor, who was a provincial governor under the governor of Baghdad, and rejoined the royal camp. Since the governor of Hamadan, Ḥasan Khan, was absent at court, Ozūn

Aḥmad resolved to profit from his absence to ravage the province of Hamadan, intending by this means to get his revenge on the *qezelbāš* and hoping that he might draw off some of the Safavid forces presently engaged in operations in Azerbaijan. In this way, he hoped to gain some credit with the Ottoman Sultan to compensate for his past misdemeanors. Accordingly, he left in charge at Baghdad his son Moḥammad Beg, who had recently been promoted to the rank of pasha, and marched toward Hamadan with a force of ten thousand men, composed partly of Ottoman regulars and partly of Lors and Kurds, whose object was plunder. The *qezelbāš* emirs in the area were Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū Afšār and Shah 'Alī Sultan Ḵodābandalū, the governor of Harsīn.[8] They reported the approach of the Ottomans to Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, who immediately marched to their aid at top speed with a force of one thousand Lors. Together, the emirs marched to Māhīdašt,[9] sending out summons as they went for every man among the tribes who had a serviceable horse to join them. About three thousand men, Lors, Afšārs, and others, answered this call.

The emirs held a council of war in which the decision was taken to give battle, despite the Ottoman superiority in numbers. The two armies met at Ẕohāb. The emirs' plan was to attack at once, without waiting to form in proper battle order, to prevent the enemy from forming an accurate estimate of the size of their force. The Safavid force advanced in two squadrons, one composed of *qezelbāš* under the command of Qāsem Sultan with Shah 'Alī Sultan in the van, and the other of Lors under the command of Ḥoseyn Khan. The Ottomans, formed up with infantry, cavalry, musketeers, and archers in their proper stations, stood ready to meet them. When the Sīāh-Manṣūr tribesmen in the Safavid ranks caught sight of the enemy, they charged them at full gallop, as had been agreed. This first charge shattered the Ottoman ranks, and the enemy turned to flee. Ozūn Aḥmad tried in vain to rally them. Since Ozūn Aḥmad was a tall, strongly built man, he was unable to leave the field unobserved and was taken prisoner. Some two thousand of his men were slain, and the Lors had a field day with the Ottoman supply trains.

As a result of this victory, peace returned to the area, and the emirs sent Ozūn Aḥmad, the heads of the enemy dead, their prisoners, and the choicest items of the booty to the Shah, who received them at his

[8] 20 miles southeast of Kermānšāh; see Le Strange, p. 192.
[9] The plain west of Kermānšāh (see Le Strange, p. 192).

camp at Qerk Bolāğ, a summer station in the neighborhood of Gökča Deñiz.[10] Ozūn Aḥmad was paraded before the Shah with a few choice gifts, including several stallions and Arabian mares of Bedouin stock, each of them handsome and swift. The Shah at once gave orders for Ozūn Aḥmad's hands, which had been lashed together with a bowstring in a painful manner, to be freed. He then addressed the Ottoman officer as follows:

> You claimed you had seized possession of Baghdad for me, and you promised to hand the city over to whomever I might delegate; in return, I promised that, if you demonstrated the sincerity of your avowal, you would bask in my favor. You changed your mind and failed to carry out your part of the bargain. Nevertheless, I am still prepared to carry out my promises, despite your insolence and temerity, and to reinstate you as governor of Baghdad.

Ozūn Ḥasan replied, "In return for such clemency and generosity, for the rest of my life I will be your faithful servant. I will hand over Baghdad to whomever you command, and I and my sons will come to court to be in attendance upon you." The Shah conferred on him signal marks of royal favor, and placed him in the care of Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, Qāsem Sultan, and others who had distinguished themselves at the battle of Ẕohāb, and conferred on them robes of honor. Ozūn Aḥmad, however, fell ill and died at Zenjān, and the Shah gave orders that he be buried in consecrated ground there. The Shah sent a letter of consolation to his son, Moḥammad Beg, and offered him some degree of favor he had lavished on his father.

After the battle of Ẕohāb, the Ottoman fugitives reached Baghdad, made Moḥammad Beg governor of the province with the rank of pasha, and reported the capture of Ozūn Aḥmad to the Sublime Porte. The Porte deemed it expedient to accept the fait-accompli, and provided Moḥammad Pasha with official letters of appointment. As the latter consolidated his rule at Baghdad he began to adopt a hostile attitude toward officers of the Safavid crown; in addition, he was apprehensive in regard to the Porte, as both he and his father had been guilty of taking matters into their own hands. Moḥammad Pasha imposed heavy taxes on the wealthy of Arab Iraq and took great precautions to protect his life, surrounding himself with a bodyguard of

[10] Lit.: blue lake. The northeastern boundary of greater Armenia.

royal household troops, Ottoman regulars from the Baghdad army, and troops of the special corps known as Seğmen,[11] but he did not live long.

Various Events Which Took Place in the Summer of 1013/1614

The Shah spent the summer at the beautiful summer station of Gökča Deñiz, a region rēnowned for the pleasantness of its climate, its abundance of springs, and its verdant countryside, which is the result of the adequate rainfall in the area. The Shah spent much of his time hunting. While at this summer camp, he received an embassy from the Emperor of India led by Moḥammad Ma'ṣūm Khan Bakrī. He granted permission to the various Kurdish chiefs such as Ğāzī Beg Ḥakkārī and Moṣṭafā Beg Maḥmūdī, who had assisted him in the Azerbaijan campaign, to return to their own lands. The Shah was also visited by the sons of Da'ūd Khan, the son of Alexander Khan. Da'ūd Khan had deprived his father of power and had taken his place, but after only a short reign he had died a natural death, leaving two sons. These boys, the elder named Ṭahmūras̱ and the younger Kašīs, were brought to court by some of the women of this royal Georgian house, and they entered the service of the Shah.

This year, too, the Shah sent Allāhverdī Khan with an expeditionary force against Aḥmad Pasha Jalālī. The latter had been an officer in the service of Ja'far Pasha, the governor of Tabriz; Ja'far Pasha had furthered his career and had gotten him appointed governor of Vān. When Shah 'Abbas opened his campaign in Azerbaijan, Aḥmad Pasha had been dismissed from his post. But he refused to obey his Sultan's order to relinquish the governorship of Vān. He began to make incursions on neighboring areas, and seized control of Aḵlāṭ, 'Ādeljavāz, and Albestān. He had gathered together a large army, with which he ravaged areas over which he could not establish permanent control. The loot he acquired he distributed among his soldiers and freebooters, and travelers through the area reported that he had as many as twelve thousand men under his command.

After the death of Sultan Moḥammad III and the accession of Sultan Aḥmad I (1603), Aḥmad Pasha had pretended to tender his allegiance to the new Sultan. The principal officers of the Ottoman state had considered it expedient at that time to ignore his misconduct and to encourage him to hope for royal favors. This had merely increased his already overweening conceit and insolence, and he had begun, in his greed for money, to molest subjects of the Shah and to lay hands on Persian merchants passing through his territories. The Shah had made a mental note to mete out suitable punishment to him whenever opportunity offered.

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[11] Originally a district corps; though amalgamated with the Janissaries by the time of Sultan Moḥammad II (1451-81), they retained their own regimental names (see Gibb and Bowen, I/1, pp. 59; 314-15; etc.).

While the Shah was still in summer quarters at Gökča Deñiz, he received a report that Aḥmad Pasha was laying siege at Arjīš to Moḥammad Pasha the son of Zāl Pasha, who had not tendered him the degree of obedience he considered fitting. It is six or seven days' journey from Erīvān to Arjīš,[12] but it is possible to cover the distance in three days by forced marches. The Shah decided to send a detachment of troops against him; even if they failed to capture Aḥmad Pasha himself, at least they could scatter his supporters, who had caused so much mischief. Allāhverdī Khan was detailed for the job and succeeded in reaching Arjīš in three days, only to find that Aḥmad Pasha had fled. Since the Shah's ability to make forced marches was celebrated, Aḥmad Pasha had taken the precaution of posting guards on the Erīvān road. When these reported seeing a cloud of dust which heralded the approach of the Safavid force, Aḥmad Pasha had fled precipitately, not drawing rein until he reached the plain of Mūš,[13] and his men had scattered. He remained in that area until the arrival of Jeğāl-oğlū. Allāhverdī Khan did not have orders to advance beyond Arjīš, and so returned to camp. Although he was passing through enemy territory, his men did not pillage the countryside either on the outward march or the return journey, and no peasant was molested.

Another event which occurred this summer was the capture of the fort of Šūra-gel in Čoḳūr-e Sa'd, which had been occupied by the Ottomans. The Shah pitched his camp on the lush grass of the plain, which was dotted with poppies, and sent forward a detachment of Eṣfahānī musketeers. The latter reached the walls of the fort the first night and refused to be dislodged. The attackers made several breaches in the walls, and the defenders retreated to a church, constructed of black rock, which was located within the fort and, because of its strength, used as a citadel. This refuge too was breached by the attackers and stormed. All the defenders who were taken alive had their stomachs

[12] On the northern shore of Lake Vān.
[13] West of Lake Vān.

slit open and were then suspended from the battlements as an example to others. At the Shah's orders, members of the service corps razed the fort, but they did not succeed in totally destroying the church, which was built of blocks of stone so cunningly fitted together by the masons that the walls appeared to be one solid piece of stone. The Shah then marched to Qārṣ.

A further incident which occurred this year was the arrival at the royal camp of Soleymān Beg Maḥmūdī, the governor of Ḱosāb and Qarā Ḥeṣār, a provincial governor subject to the Ottoman *beglerbeg* of Vān. He now transferred his allegiance to the Shah, in the customary manner of Kurdish emirs, who always give their allegiance to whichever party is in the ascendant. But the expressions of fealty he uttered did not derive from any loyalty of heart. The Shah, although he had no illusions as to the worth of professions of loyalty by Kurds, accepted Soleymān Beg's protestations at their face value (it is usually advisable for rulers to do this), loaded him with robes of honor, and raised him to the rank of khan before giving him permission to return to his own territory.

Yet another occurrence this year was the arrival of ambassadors from Spain and Portugal, accompanied by about fifty armed retainers. They were received by the Shah near Qārṣ, presented their gifts, and were given leave to depart soon afterward.

At this point, the spies whom the Shah had sent to Istanbul reported that Jeğāl-oğlū, who had a great reputation among the Ottomans both for valor and statesmanship, and who had held in Europe the position of *qaptan*, the term used by the Ottomans to denote their lord high admiral, had been recalled to the capital and appointed grand vizier and commander in chief. He had organized an army of *qapı-qolūs* (slaves of the Porte)[14] and Janissaries for the invasion of Iran. Messengers were dispatched to mobilize additional troops in Anatolia, from the provinces of Borsā (Brusa) and Qarāmān, and also from Syria, Aleppo, Tripoli, Trebizond, Dīār Bakr, Erzerum, Vān, and Kurdestan. Jeğāl-oğlū had then marched from Istanbul and camped in the plain of Mūš.

After verifying this report, Shah 'Abbas sent troops to the Qārṣ and Zarnešād districts to burn the crops and pastures, with the object of denying supplies to the Ottomans for a period of several days as they marched through that region. The inhabitants of the area, who were non-Muslims, were forcibly evacuated to other regions; any who showed support for the Ottomans, or who were unwilling to leave, were attacked and plundered. The Safavid troops ravaged the countryside as far as Ḥasan Qal'a, between Qārṣ and Erzerum, and did a thorough job of burning the crops. Between two and three thousand Armenian families and tribesmen who traditionally spent the summer in the area were transferred to Iraq; large numbers of animals of all kinds were seized by the Safavids. In all, some twenty thousand non-Muslims were taken captive and embraced Islam in *qezelbāš* custody.

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[14] See Gibb and Bowen, index. The *qapı-qolları* were non-Muslims drafted into Ottoman service who embraced Islam as a means of rising to high office in either the civil or military branches of the administration.

It is well known that it is the custom of the Ottomans to terminate their campaigns in the field on the 13th of Esfand/8th November, a day the Turks call Qāsım-günü,[15] that is, the day on which the rams are allowed to join the flocks of ewes. On this day, Ottoman armies traditionally begin their march back to base, so that they may reach the latter by the time the sun enters the sign of Capricorn, which marks the beginning of winter and onset of severe cold and snow. So that no changes have to be made in the plan of march, Ottoman troops never depart from this practice. If the Sultan is present on Qāsım-günü, the Janissaries, who are infantry and therefore cannot march as fast as the other troops, remove their standard, which is planted in front of the Sultan's pavilion, and reerect it to the rear of his tent. This gives notice to the Sultan that the appointed day for departure has arrived, and the following day the army marches; this custom is invariable. If this custom is enforced on the Sultan, the reader will readily see that it is even less possible for any commander in chief to defy it! If a commander wishes to halt for a few days to achieve a certain military objective, the Janissaries refuse to allow it; they cut his tent ropes with their swords so that the tent collapses about his ears! In short, no one can prevent them from continuing their march.

The purpose of this digression was to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the Safavid army was still in camp in the open plain long after the usual season; the Ottoman Qāsım-günü was near and there was still no sign of Jeğāl-oğlū, still encamped on the plain of Mūš. The Shah decided to winter at some suitable spot and mobilize his forces again in the spring at some summer station of his choice. He therefore sent on leave all his troops except a number of emirs, *qūrčīs, ḡolāms,* musketeers, and others. No sooner had the Shah disbanded his troops than he received persistent reports that Jeḡāl-oḡlū was on the march.

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[15] 8th November. "Popularly reckoned the beginning of the winter period ending on the 5th of May" (Sir James Redhouse, *Yeni Turkçe-İngilizce Sözlük*, 1968, p. 614).

Jeḡāl-oḡlū's March on Azerbaijan, and His Retreat from Naḵčevān without Accomplishing His Objective

Senān Pasha (or Jeḡāl-oḡlū as he was known, since his father's name was Jeḡāl), was of the Frankish race; he had made a name for himself in Ottoman service by his bravery and wisdom. His knowledge and the excellence of his counsel were proverbial and, if a crisis occurred, he was invariably called upon to handle it. To repel the onslaught of the Franks, he had been appointed *qaptan* and sent to guard the frontier between the Ottoman empire and the European Powers. Since Sultan Aḥmad attached prime importance to the struggle against the *qezelbāš* and to the recovery of the territory and forts lost to Shah 'Abbas, he appointed Jeḡāl-oḡlū grand vizier and commander in chief of the Ottoman forces in the east. As already mentioned, Jeḡāl-oḡlū had lost no time in mobilizing and equipping an army, and marching to Erzerum. From there, he sent conciliatory letters to Aḥmad Pasha encouraging him to hope for the governorship of Azerbaijan, and ordering him to report to his camp. Aḥmad Pasha, who had been extremely apprehensive of his reception in view of his misdeameanors, was reassured and hastened to join Jeḡāl-oḡlū with a band of soldiers of fortune. Jeḡāl-oḡlū was also joined at Erzerum by troops from the provinces of Erzerum and Āḵesqa. He then marched without pause from Erzerum to Qārṣ.

The Shah called a council of war and received all kinds of advice. He pointed out that the Ottomans had been making their preparations for a long while and had brought a large army, while he had just disbanded the greater part of the *qezelbāš* army. This fact, he said, ruled out the possibility of a pitched battle. But the emirs continued to breathe fire. Finally, the Shah decided to move aside from the Ottoman line of march and wait for a few days to see if Jeḡāl-oḡlū crossed the Aras. If he did, the situation would be reviewed. In any case, it would be beneath the Shah personally to engage in battle with the Sultan's officers. The Shah therefore marched to Aḡča Qal'a and sent out patrols to find out which point Jeḡāl-oḡlū was aiming at.

A few days later, reports came in that Jeḡāl-oḡlū was marching in the direction of Erīvān and Nakčevān. The Shah gave orders that all the inhabitants of those regions should be moved to safer areas where they would not be molested by the Ottomans. The *qezelbāš* were ordered to remove all supplies of food they could transport, and to burn the rest. The Shah then sent his baggage off to Alanjaq, and the *qezelbāš* took up positions flanking the Ottoman line of march, ready to fall on the enemy if they crossed the Aras and got into difficulties because of lack of provisions for men and horses. Emir Gūna Khan was placed in charge of moving the civilians from the Erīvān region; he sent them toward Qarāja-dāğ. Not many people escaped his net except those lurking in mountain defiles and remote spots. The Shah moved from Ağča Qal'a to Ūč Kalīsā.

Meanwhile, Jeğāl-oğlū had reached Qārṣ, where he interviewed 'Alī Khan Beg, the *ešīk-āqāsī* who had escorted back to Ottoman territory those troops who had been granted quarter at Erīvān, and who was now seeking leave to depart. In the course of his conversation with him Jeğāl-oğlū had inquired, "Why did the Shah bring an army to Azerbaijan and disturb the peace?" The Safavid envoy had made a suitable reply, at the end of which he said, "Why did Sultan Morād, after the death of Shah Tahmasp, break a treaty of peace which had been cemented by the sworn covenants of his forebears, throw out of the window a peace of such long duration, cast the land into confusion, and lay his hands on territories which are the hereditary domains of the Safavid dynasty?" Jeğāl-oğlū vastly enjoyed this unanswerable rejoinder, and sent 'Alī Khan Beg on his way with a somewhat arrogant letter addressed to the Shah. Back came the reply: "Be resolute! The *qezelbāš* will not run away from you, but will give battle whenever they consider the moment ripe."

When Jeğāl-oğlū reached Erīvān, the Shah was camped near the Dādī River. From there he dispatched Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū, the governor of Nakčevān, to move the civilian population of the Nakčevān area to Qarāja-dāğ and Dezmār. Ṭahmāspqolī Beg, a *ğolām* of the royal household, were sent to transfer the population of Jolfā to Isfahan. The inhabitants of Jolfā had long resided there, but now, to protect their lives and property, they were willy-nilly moved to Isfahan.[16] There they were allotted land along the banks of the Zāyanda-rūd, and houses with small gardens gradually grew up there; the properties were exempt from extraordinary taxes. Today, there are three thousand families living there, safe from the vicissitudes of fortune; the beauty of their new home has caused them to forget their former one.

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[16] This is not the real reason. The inhabitants of Jolfā were Armenians, many of them skilled craftsmen, and Shah 'Abbas wished to make use of their skills in his new capital.

The Shah stationed squadrons of cavalry in front and on each side of the advancing Ottomans to furnish him with up-to-date information on their movements; his men were also instructed to wipe out any groups of Ottomans who went foraging. When the Shah reached Naḵčevān, hoping to stay there one day, he sent men out to look for provisions. But the city itself had lost its former prosperity, and the neighboring hamlets and fields had fallen out of cultivation, with the result that there was nowhere suitable for the Shah to camp. Persons skilled in astrology, especially Mollā Moḥyī al-Dīn Anār-o-pīāzī of Kerman, had interpreted a conjunction of planets which occurred this year to mean that it would be a year of turmoil and wars; Azerbaijan had been particularly affected, and Naḵčevān and certain other places had been ruined.

The next day, the Shah crossed the Aras at the Jolfā ford and found a suitable spot to camp in the valley beyond. If the Ottomans crossed the Aras, the Shah planned to attack them at the entrance to a narrow defile. Meanwhile, the patrols he had sent out to gather information and booty returned, bringing with them some Ottoman horses whose thinness was evidence that they were already suffering from lack of fodder. A few days later, the Shah received reports that Jeğāl-oğlū had been forced by lack of provisions to retire toward Vān. Apparently the Janissaries and "slaves of the Porte" had invaded his tent and shouted, "You have broken the rule by marching against the enemy after Q̣āsım-günü. Our horses are exhausted, and the Safavid king is ready for battle the other side of the Aras. We are in no fit state either to fight or to stay where we are."

After holding consultations with his officers Jeğāl-oğlū decided to retire to Vān the nearest stronghold, for the winter (1013/1604-06). Due to the lateness of the season, many of the passes were already blocked by snow, and he lost many men and animals on the way. After arriving at Vān, Jeğāl-oğlū quartered himself and the "slaves of the Porte" in the city and neighboring townships, and his other troops dispersed in all directions. The Kurdish emirs, following their usual reprehensible habit of keeping in with both sides, kept coming to Jeğāl-oğlū at Vān and tendering their allegiance, even though it was obvious to any person of intelligence that the Ottoman commander had suffered a setback and that it was not wise for him to remain at Vān, only six days' march from Tabriz, with such a small force. Because the Shah had acted with caution and had prudently retired a few stages before the Ottoman advance, Jeğāl-oğlū, failing to understand the Shah's tactics, arrogantly held the *qezelbāš* army in low esteem.

The Shah marched back to Tabriz for the winter. He saw to the needs of those who had been transferred from the frontier regions, using funds from the state treasury to furnish them with supplies of food and whatever else they needed for the winter. But since it was God's will to destroy the Armenians of Erīvān, many of the latter died in exile this winter. The survivors were moved to Isfahan in the spring and allotted plots of cultivable land and seed (or money was advanced to them to enable them to buy seed); about two or three thousand *tomān* from the state revenue were spent in this way.

Emir Gūna Khan, the governor of Erīvān, with Maqṣūd Sultan, the governor of Naḵčevān, and the other officers under his command, wintered at Alanjaq. Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, was ordered to winter at Marāğa, and the rest of the emirs were given leave to depart to their fiefs on the understanding that they would report for duty again in the spring. The elders of each tribe were ordered to make detailed lists of the families in their tribe resident in Azerbaijan and Iraq so that, as required by religious zeal, every group might have ready for service the number of *yasāqī*[17] troops compatible with its means, whether they were actually called to the colors or not. All these men were to report for duty early in the spring, and the *qūrčīs* were instructed to see that these orders were carried out.

Kūstandīl Mīrzā, the son of Alexander Khan, had been designated *amīr al-omarā* and governor-elect of Šīrvān. This winter, Alexander Khan petitioned the Shah to send his son to him so that they might together attack Šīrvān, taking advantage of the fact that no help could reach the Ottoman garrisons in Šīrvān during the winter; once the province was conquered, he said he would deliver it to the Shah as an earnest of his good faith. Although the Shah knew Alexander Khan was lying, he considered it politic to believe him. He allocated to Kūstandīl, who had been designated *amīr al-omarā* of Šīrvān with the rank of khan, a number of officers who merited promotion to the

[17] *Yāsāqī:* levies providing their own arms and equipment.

rank of emir, and fiefs in Šīrvān were allotted to these men. Kūstandīl was sent to Ardabīl with orders to organize his force there and then proceed toward his objective. The Shah issued orders calling on the tribes in the Ardabīl, Aršaq, and Ṭavāleš areas to join Kūstandīl. Alexander Khan was summoned to the Shah's presence and granted an expensive robe of honor, a *qezelbāš tāj*, a turban jewel, a jeweled sword belt, and other items. His grandson Ṭahmūraṣ was kept at court, but his other sons and the women of the Georgian royal house who were at the Shah's court were allowed to accompany Alexander and Kūstandīl.

The emirs detailed to serve Kūstandīl Khan on this campaign included Šāhmīr Khan, who was descended from the former rulers of the province of Šakkī. He had demonstrated his loyalty in Safavid service and as a reward was designated governor-elect of his native province. Šamsī Khan Qazāqlar was another. He had remained in Qarābāġ with his followers and attained the rank of pasha in Ottoman service, had visited the Shah when the latter was encamped before Erīvān and pledged his allegiance. He had been granted royal favor and raised to the rank of khan. In addition, there was 'Alī Khan Movāfeq, an Ottoman subject from Qarābāġ, who had met Kūstandīl in Qarābāġ when the latter was on his way from the Safavid court on a visit to his father and rendered him all sorts of assistance. 'Alī Khan Movāfeq, who was dubbed 'Alī Khān Monāfeq (the hypocrite) by the Ottomans, had also visited the Shah at Erīvān, had been made an emir with the rank of khan, and had been enrolled among the Šāmlūs. He was now allotted a fief in Šīrvān and was sent with Kūstandīl Khan. (Although some of these events have been referred to before, I have not shrunk from mentioning them again here, since this is the more appropriate place.) The fourth emir designated for service in Šīrvān was Bektāš Sultan, the son of Moḥammad Khan Mowṣellū Torkmān, who was connected by marriage to Kūstandīl Khan; at the instance of the latter, he had been made an emir with the rank of soltan. Other emirs ordered to Šīrvān were Tīzrow Sultan Moqaddam; Akī Sultan Jāgīr; 'Alī Khan Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū; the son of Sardār Maḥmūd; and 'Alī Sultan Arešī.

A detachment of royal musketeers were also placed at Kūstandīl's disposal. This force had to cross the Kor near Ganja, by the Qūmīn Ūlamī ford, and the Shah ordered two *qezelbāš* emirs to cover the crossing against possible Ottoman attack: Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū, from Ardabīl, and Ḥoseyn Khan Zīād-oġlū, from Arasbār. The crossing went off without incident, and the Šīrvān force marched first to Ardabīl, where the leaders made the pilgrimage to the tombs of the Safavid shaikhs and invoked their aid. At Ardabīl their escort was dismissed, and they continued on their way from there with some two or three thousand men. Kūstandīl's plan was to proceed to his father's domains in Georgia and then, reinforced by Georgian troops, invade Šīrvān.

When the Shah was not preoccupied with the cares of state affairs, the planning of the Šīrvān operation, and the administration of justice, he passed his time in various forms of amusement. He also gave orders for some of the troops of the Khorasan army to report to Azerbaijan in the spring to take part in the coming campaign.

Since Jeğāl-oğlū had failed to achieve anything the previous autumn and had sent some rather untruthful reports of his activities to the Ottoman Sultan, he thought it worthwhile to see if the Shah were minded to talk of peace. He chose as his go-between Soleymān Beg Maḥmūdī, the governor of Ḳosāb, who had presented himself at the Safavid court and been promoted to the rank of khan. Soleymān Beg wrote letters to the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, and to other principal officers of the Safavid state, suggesting that peace be arranged on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya (1555). Shah 'Abbas would return to Iraq, and there would be no reprisals on either side for actions committed during the present hostilities.

This was a thoroughly unrealistic suggestion, but it was taken up with enthusiasm by a number of short-sighted, mean-spirited fellows who were willing to do anything for a quiet life. They suggested that Tabriz and all places south of the Aras River, should remain in Safavid hands; everything north of the Aras would remain Ottoman. Alas! The passionate advances of the lover are often rebuffed by the beloved! And so it turned out in this case, for the Shah was determined to recover all those territories which had formed part of the realm of Shah Tahmasp, within the boundaries agreed upon by Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Sülaymān; not one half-meter of that territory would he leave in foreign hands. A reply in these terms was sent to Jeğāl-oğlū. The Ottoman commander ordered Soleymān Beg to make a second attempt, and this time the reply came back that none of the Shah's officers or those close to him would dare to even broach the matter with him. These overtures on the part of Jeğāl-oğlū led the Shah's advisers to think that Jeğāl-oğlū's reputation for sound judgment and diplomatic skill was undeserved. It was childish to make a suggestion like this to a powerful prince who had set his heart on recovering his hereditary dominions. Thus the Ottoman peace feelers came to nought, and the outcome was left in God's hands.

The Acquisition of the Fort of Bost in the Zamīn Dāvar, Garmsīr, and Kandahār Region

As previously reported, the Safavid princes at Kandahar, the sons of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, had left their post because of the Uzbeg threat and taken refuge with the Mogul Emperor, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, who had appointed Šāhī Beg Khan Čağatāy governor of Kandahar. Up to now Shah 'Abbas, because of the strong ties of friendship between the Safavid dynasty and the house of Tīmūr, and in particular the house of Bābor, had taken no steps to recover the province of Kandahar, even though prior to 1591 it had been in Safavid hands for a century.

In the year in which the Shah led his expedition to Balḵ, he was met at Herat on his return journey by Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn the grandson of Mīr 'Abd al-Ḥoseyn, who held a position of eminence in the Garmsīr district of Kandahar. Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn had become weary of the excesses of the fiefholders in that province, and abandoning his children and dependents, had left his ancestral home and sought refuge with Shah 'Abbas. The Shah had placed him in the care of Ḥoseyn Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, and had chosen a place of residence for him in the province of Farāh. Šāhī Beg Khan, the Mogul governor of Kandahar, had seized his family and held them as hostages in the fort at Kandahar, where they had languished for ten years.

Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn was much troubled in his mind in regard to his sons. Ḵosrow Beg, a *ğolām* in the service of Ḥoseyn Khan, was in Farāh to collect road taxes. Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn whispered in his ear and incited him to attack Zamīn Dāvar and seize the fortress of Bost. At the same time, some old retainers of the Mīr 'Abd al-Ḥeyy dynasty sent word from Zamīn Dāvar that the custodians of the fort at Bost, Ḥasan Beg and Ḥoseyn Beg, sons of Ḵānom Bahādor Mоğal, were extremely slack in their duties; if he brought a force to Bost, he could seize the fort. Ḵosrow Beg, giving a headstrong and stupid action the name of valor, gathered together some subordinates and marched on Bost with Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn, without any orders from Ḥoseyn

Khan. After marching for forty *farsaḵs,* they arrived before the gates. Finding the guards asleep, they placed ladders against the walls and entered the fort.

The garrison, awaking from its sleep, put up some resistance; Ḥoseyn Beg was cut down and Ḥasan Beg fled. With such ease fell the famous fortress of Bost, which in Ĝaznavīd times had been held by Nāṣer al-Dīn[18] Sebüktegīn. As soon as Šāhī Beg heard the news, he dispatched an army under Zala Khan the governor of Qalāt, Orūs Bahādor the governor of Zamīn Dāvar, and a number of fiefholders from the area to Bost; the army was equipped with war elephants and siege equipment. Ḥoseyn Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, was furious when he heard of Ḵosrow Beg's action; he was pondering how he could reprimand him and hand Bost back to the officers of the Mogul Emperor. Before he had reached a decision, he received a report that Šāhī Beg Khan had sent an army against Bost. Ḥoseyn Khan grew even angrier because he had expected Šāhī Beg Khan to send an envoy to him to ask him to deal with the matter in a friendly way. Instead, Šāhī Beg had launched an army against Bost without even a word to him.

Ḥoseyn Khan's pride and sense of honor as a *qezelbāš* now caused him to abandon his earlier thoughts concerning Ḵosrow Beg and decide to help him. He sent a force of Šāmlū *ĝāzīs* and tribal emirs, together with Malek Shah Sīstānī, who happened to be at Herat. He also ordered Esma'il Khan Ālplū, the governor of Farāh, to assist them. The latter marched at full speed from Farāh, hoping to secure the crossing of the Hīrmand River for the rest of the *qezelbāš* forces. They pressed on, although barely three hundred of their number had crossed the river before the seasoned Čaĝatāy army of more than five thousand men was upon them. The first *qezelbāš* charge routed the enemy; Zala Khan and many of his officers were taken prisoner and Orūs Bahādor was killed, together with more than five hundred men of the Čaĝatāy army. The triumphant *qezelbāš* installed as commandant at Bost Moḥammad Zamān Sultan Šāmlū, one of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's retainers who had returned from India a long while ago and entered Ḥoseyn Khan's service; he was selected because he was familiar with the area. Before leaving, the *qezelbāš* made sure he had adequate supplies of food and munitions.

After the *qezelbāš* had left, Šāhī Beg in person organized another army, again equipped with war elephants and siege weapons, and led it against Bost. He attempted to storm the fort, his men driving the largest elephant against the walls. At the height of the struggle, when the elephant, its trunk raised, was battering itself against the gates and wall of the fort, a shot from one of the defenders' cannons struck it in the mouth and killed it. This broke the morale of the attackers, many of whom were killed by musket fire from the fort. Šāhī Beg Khan abandoned the attempt and returned to Kandahar.

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[18] His correct *laqab* was Nāṣer al-Dowla.

The province of Garmsīr thus came under the control of officers of the Safavid state, and the *seyyeds* and inhabitants returned to cultivating the land and restoring the prosperity of the area. Ḥoseyn Khan sent a full report to the Shah, along with the captive Zala Khan. The Shah, however, refused to take advantage of this unexpected windfall. If his men were going to rupture the friendly relations with the Mogul empire, he considered, they might as well have gone for Kandahar as sully their hands with the capture of Bost. At all events, since the Shah had important matters on hand in Azerbaijan, he handed Zala Khan over to 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Rayy, for safe custody, intending to return him and the other prisoners to their native land as soon as the campaign in Azerbaijan was over.

Toward the end of this year, Mo'ezzā Ebrāhīmā Šīrāzī, the chief comptroller, either from negligence or the arrogance of office, allowed certain errors to creep into the accounts from Gīlān, with the result that large sums were lost to the state treasury. This incompetence was reported to the Shah by the vizier of Gīlān, Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān, and the Shah dismissed the comptroller. At the beginning of the Year of the Serpent (1014/1605-06) the office of chief comptroller was given to Mīrzā Qavāmā, the son of Mīrzā Ḥasan Kafrānī Eṣfahānī, who came from a family with a distinguished record of public service extending over several generations. At the time of his appointment, Mīrzā Qavāmā was vizier at Herat. He was a skilled accountant, having been a pupil of a former comptroller, Aqa Shah 'Alī Dowlatābādī, who was a master accountant.

Events of the Year of the Serpent, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1014/1605-06, the Nineteenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Monday, 1 Ẕu'l-Qa'da 1013/21 March 1605. The usual festivities were held. At the New Year's levée the emirs, *ṣadrs*, viziers, *moqarrabs* of the court, and senior army officers presented to the Shah gifts appropriate to their rank. The frontier emirs and governors were paraded before the Shah and received marks of royal favor. The same day, there arrived at Tabriz some retainers of Emir Gūna Khan Qājār, who was stationed at Alanjaq in the district of Nakčevān. They brought some choice samples, a few horses and several muskets, such as were fit for a king, of the booty taken in their battle with the Ottoman provincial governor Moḥammad Takkalū.

Moḥammad Takkalū considered himself to be one of the bravest men of the age. He had been promoted to the status of emir by the commander in chief; he had under his command troops from Erīvān and Gökča, and he had instructions to harass the *qezelbāš* forces in the area whenever opportunity offered. Qajer Pasha and Moṣṭafā Pasha, meanwhile, had moved into the Nakčevān area with a force of Kurds from Vān, with the intention of attacking Emir Gūna Khan. Emir Gūna Khan led his Qājārs and the emirs under his command to the banks of the Aras River, and his determined stand dissuaded the Ottomans from attacking. While he was away, however, Moḥammad Takkalū thought it a good moment to ravage the Alanjaq area, and he came to Nakčevān with a band of freebooters and soldiers of fortune.

Emir Gūna Khan was on his return march to Alanjaq; his main force, encumbered with baggage, had gone on ahead, and he was bringing up the rear with a small group of men. However, since he knew Moḥammad Takkalū, who was not to be trusted, was in the area, he had patrols out toward Erīvān to look for a sign of the enemy. The Ottomans clashed with one of his patrols, and although it is contrary to the accepted rules of warfare to engage enemy patrols in strength, Moḥammad Takkalū did so. The Safavid patrols cunningly kept the enemy engaged as they fell back, until the Ottomans surrounded them and overwhelmed them. Some were slain; others, though wounded and exhausted, made their way back and reported to Emir Gūna Khan, with the Ottomans hard on their heels. Although

Emir Gūna Khan had no wish to give battle at the moment, since most of his men had gone on ahead, taking with them all the spare mounts, honor demanded that he do so. When the battle was joined, Moḥammad Takkalū's first charge scattered the Safavid skirmishers. Emir Gūna Khan then led his men in a countercharge, but the Ottomans fought hard and many *qezelbāš* were wounded, including Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū. Emir Gūna Khan's horse was wounded several times, and things looked serious for the Safavids.

At this juncture, the Safavid troops were attended by a manifestation of that royal good fortune which is always at hand to assist the servants of the dynasty. Some of Emir Gūna Khan's men who had gone on ahead, worried at the nonappearance of their leader, had turned back to see if he was in trouble. Hearing that he had moved toward Erīvān, they pressed on, and arrived when the battle was at its height. Just as Emir Gūna Khan's horse was on the point of collapse, a groom reached his side with a fresh horse, and the Qājār chief promptly led the new arrivals in a charge which routed the enemy, most of whom were hunted down in the subsequent pursuit and slain, though Moḥammad Takkalū himself escaped. This was the hardest-fought battle in which Emir Gūna Khan had been involved, and his name became a watchword for valor among both friend and foe alike.

The Incursion of a Combined Ottoman and Kurdish Force in the Direction of Ḵoy and Marand and the Shah's Countermoves against This Attack

Early in the year, a combined Ottoman and Kurdish force invaded the Ḵoy and Marand area. The attack had been ordered by the Ottoman commander in chief, Jeḡāl-oḡlū, and the force consisted of Kurdish provincial governors under the command of Moṣṭafā Pasha. Moṣṭafā Pasha, having very much in mind the Shah's reputation for making forced marches, and conscious of the fact that Marand, normally three days' march from Tabriz, could be reached by the Shah in one day, prudently stayed behind at Ḵoy himself and sent the Kurds on ahead to Marand under the command of Soleymān Beg Maḥmūdī, the governor of Ḵošāb. Jamšīd Sultan Donbolī, the governor of Marand, reported the approach of the enemy to the Shah, who immediately dispatched Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, the *qūrčībāšī*, with a force of *qūrčīs*, to meet this threat. The Kurds reached the outskirts of Marand, carried off a few cattle and other animals, took a few peasants prisoner, and retired.

Thinking he could easily deal with this situation himself, and not stopping to reflect whether the enemy might have forces in reserve, Jamšīd Sultan sallied forth from Marand with three hundred men and pursued the Kurds for six *farsaḵs*. When he caught up with them, the Kurds abandoned their booty and fled. Jamšīd Sultan, failing to exercise that caution which is an essential part of successful generalship, and with the rashness of youth not yet tempered by the buffetings of fortune, pursued them for another three *farsaḵs*. At that point, he ran into Moṣṭafā Pasha and Soleymān Beg, who were waiting for him. Despite the huge discrepancy in the size of the two forces, he still proposed to give battle. It was only when he was told that the enemy were not only in front of him but on both flanks as well that he decided to make a fighting withdrawal. His brother was taken prisoner, and some of his men were killed and wounded. The rest succeeded in making their way back in disorder to Marand, where their arrival coincided with that of the *qūrčībāšī*. The *qūrčībāšī* reprimanded him, and not seeing that there was anything he could usefully do at Marand, returned to Tabriz.

While the Shah was playing polo in the Meydān-e Ṣāḥebābād, a letter from Emir Gūna Khan was handed to him informing him that Qajer Pasha and Moṣṭafā Pasha, who earlier had made an abortive feint in the direction of the Aras River, were once again marching against him. It occurred to the Shah that, if he proceeded at once by forced marches to cut off the Ottomans, he might catch them in a trap between his army and that of Emir Gūna Khan and win a signal victory. His only hesitation concerned the truth of the report, but since in military matters delay is fatal, he decided to take it at face value and marched like the wind to Ṭasūj and Salmās. There he learned that the pashas had emerged from Vān, but after marching only one stage had changed their minds and returned to Vān, being apprehensive of the Shah's ability to make rapid marches and considering it unwise to go so far away from their base and commander in chief.

Since the Safavid army was now in the field, the Shah decided to send a detachment under the *qūrčībāšī* against the province of Albāq, held by an Ottoman provincial governor. He himself spent several days in the area hunting before returning to Tabriz. The *qūrčībāšī's* men succeeded in crossing high mountain ranges which, two months after Nowrūz, were still covered with snow, and pillaged the Albāq region. They took captive about a thousand women and children belonging to Christian infidels who had fought the Muslim forces and who had therefore forfeited their right to protection as non-Muslim peoples under Muslim rule; their being taken as prisoners of war was consequently quite legal. The Safavid troops returned in triumph to the Shah with their booty.

Events in Georgia and Šīrvān and the Victory of Kūstandīl Khan over the Ottomans

It will be recalled that, the previous year, Kūstandīl Khan had been designated governor of Šīrvān and had been sent to Georgia with his father, Alexander Khan, and a force of Safavid troops, with the object of reconquering the province of Šīrvān. But whenever Kūstandīl raised the matter of invading Šīrvān, his father procrastinated. His brother, Gorgīn Mīrzā, who had been made heir-apparent, also tried to prevent their father from taking any action in Šīrvān. Gorgīn Mīrzā did not like the idea of having Kūstandīl Khan as a powerful neighbor, in view of the fact that he had become a Muslim. Eventually, the delay exceeded all reasonable bounds, and the *qezelbāš* contingents became impatient and despaired of being able to render any assistance. They suspected that Alexander Khan and Gorgīn Mīrzā were not going to commit themselves to any action in Šīrvān until they knew the outcome of this year's campaign between the Ottoman commander in chief and the Safavid forces.

Finally, Kustandīl Khan, in the company of the *qezelbāš* emirs, descended on his father's residence one day, demanded that his brother be present too, and in strong language insisted that they should march on Šīrvān. His father repeated his previous excuses for inaction, and got up, left the room, and went to his private apartments. Gorgīn Mīrzā, following his father's example, left the room and went toward his own residence. Kūstandīl, his patience exhausted by his behavior, chased after his brother and started to abuse him in Georgian. His brother stopped and answered him back in kind. When Kūstandīl caught up with him, he drew his sword, struck his brother, and killed him. Kūstandīl then went storming back to his father's private apartments, accompanied by Šāhmīr Khan and 'Alī Movāfeq Khan; Bektāš Sultan Mowṣellū Torkmān waited outside with a group of *qezelbāš*. Kūstandīl spoke to his father in Georgian, and his father unwisely began to abuse him.

At this juncture, he was informed of the murder of Gorgīn Mīrzā; he uttered a cry, and gave the signal to his Georgian nobles to kill the *qezelbāš* emirs. 'Alī Khan Movāfeq drew his sword and struck Alexander Khan, and Šāhmīr Khan finished him off; several Georgian nobles who went to his assistance were also killed. The *qezelbāš* troops rallied to Kūstandīl Khan and the emirs, and the Georgian nobles, realizing that the four or five hundred Georgians who were present were not enough to deal with Kūstandīl Khan, submitted to him. Kūstandīl took possession of his father's and brother's treasuries and commenced to rule in Georgia. Issuing pay and allowances to his troops, he made preparations for the invasion of Šīrvān. He entered Šīrvān with a combined *qezelbāš* and Georgian force of some ten thousand men, and most of the inhabitants of Šīrvān submitted to him.

Šāhmīr Khan, the governor of Šakkī, who was in the van with some of the other emirs, clashed with Moḥammad Amīn Pasha near Qabala (of which the latter was governor), and defeated him. The Ottomans who survived the battle shut themselves up in the fort, where they were besieged by Kūstandīl's forces. Meanwhile, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, Maḥmūd Pasha, who was Jeğāl-oğlū's son, had mobilized his forces and marched from Šamāḵī with his artillery. Kūstandīl left a small force to continue the siege of Qabala and marched to meet him.

The battle was fought near the Āq-sū River. The Ottomans attacked with a fine nonchalance, driving back Kūstandīl's skirmishers and both his left and right wings and reaching his center. The day was almost lost when the *qezelbāš* staked all on a desperate charge. As they galloped past the men of the left and right wings, which were in full retreat, these men swung their horses around and joined in the charge, with the result that Maḥmūd Pasha was defeated, his men routed, and many of them slain in the pursuit. In the course of the fighting, Kūstandīl and Maḥmūd Pasha came face to face; Kūstandīl guessed the identity of his adversary and came close to giving him a spear thrust. But Kūstandīl himself was weak from an arrow wound and his horse was tired, so Maḥmūd Pasha escaped unscathed from the battlefield. Seeing that Kūstandīl was wounded, the *qezelbāš* abandoned their pursuit of the enemy and fell to gathering up the booty. The defeated Ottomans retreated within the fort at Šamāḵī and hastily began strengthening the defenses.

The *qezelbāš* detachment which had been left at Qabala had abandoned the siege and marched to the battlefield at Āq-sū, arriving just as the Ottomans were in full flight. Some two thousand Ottoman troops were killed in this engagement. The Ottoman garrison at Qabala evacuated the fort and fled when they heard of the *qezelbāš* victory, and the commandants of the other Ottoman-held forts in the area also left their posts and retreated to Šamāḵī. Thus, the only forts remaining in Ottoman hands were Šamāḵī, Bākū, and Darband.

After his victory, Kūstandīl allotted fiefs to his emirs in the manner laid down by the Shah and brought the whole of Šīrvān under his control. He sent a full report on events in Georgia and Šīrvān to the Shah, and on the heels of this report, a group of retainers bearing the heads of the slain, twelve Ottoman standards, and several prisoners. Kettledrums were beaten at Tabriz in celebration of this victory. At the Shah's order, a detachment of Georgian and Circassian *ḡolāms* went out to meet Kūstandīl's men and escorted them to the Meydān-e Ṣāḥebābād at Tabriz, where the spoils of victory were reviewed by the Shah. The Shah sent gifts and presents for Kūstandīl and his emirs, including jeweled *qezelbāš* hats, jeweled dagger belts, jeweled swords, and Arabian horses.

After resting for a few days until his wound was healed, Kūstandīl laid siege to Šamāḵī. Since he did not have adequate equipment for this purpose, he asked the Shah to send him materials for casting cannon, lead, gunpowder, and a number of gunners. In response, the Shah sent a gunner named Abū Torāb Beg, with a team of workmen and the necessary materials.

The Construction of the New Fort at Tabriz and the Shah's Visit to the Shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī at Ardabīl

My learned readers will be aware that it was the common practice of the Ottoman sultans to secure their conquered territories by means of fortresses. In every city and town of any size in all the provinces that came under their sway, they built a fort and provided it with a commandant and a garrison. In Ottoman eyes, the construction and maintenance of forts constitute an important part of government; until a region possesses a fort, they do not count it as Ottoman territory. Readers will recall that when Shah 'Abbas recovered Tabriz, he gave orders for the fort which had been built there by the Ottomans to be razed, together with its ancillary buildings; his reasons for doing this were in part the fact that no fort had existed at Tabriz in Shah Tahmasp's time, and in part the desire to erase all traces of Ottoman occupation.

Shah 'Abbas now heard there was a rumor going around among the Kurds and Ottomans to the effect that, had the *qezelbāš* intended a permanent reoccupation of Tabriz, they would not have razed the fort. The destruction of Erīvān and Naḵčevān, and the return of the Shah to Iraq, were seen as corroboration of this viewpoint. Such rumors lowered the morale of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan and shook the confidence of the people of Tabriz. The Shah accordingly decided to rebuild the fort at Tabriz, to give the lie to these rumormongers. On 28 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1013/17 May 1605,[1] a date picked by the astrologers as being auspicious, the Shah personally superintended the beginning of the work, and laid down the dimensions of the fort and the height and thickness of the walls. The walls were measured off in cubits, and work on specific sections was allotted to various emirs and other senior officers, *ḡolāms*, *qūrčīs*, and other ranks and civilians. While the work was in progress, the Shah decided to make the pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn at Ardabīl, and he left Tabriz the following day, 29 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja/18 May.

On arrival at Ardabīl he gladdened the hearts of the shrine officials by many marks of royal favor, and bestowed gifts and alms on deserving persons. Returning to Tabriz via Ahar and Meškīn, he visited the shrine of Šehāb al-Dīn Aharī and reached Tabriz on 22 Moḥorram 1014/9 June 1605. During the three weeks he had been away, the emirs and principal officers of state had labored mightily and had completed the fort. A ditch as deep as the subtle thought of intellectuals had been dug around it, and it had been stocked with two years' supply of provisions and munitions, including cannon, muskets, lead, gunpowder, firewood, naphtha, wheat, and the like. The construction of this fort served notice on the Ottomans and Kurds, and people both near and far, that the *qezelbāš* had a firm commitment to Azerbaijan and would not relinquish it without a struggle.

Many ingenious chronograms were fashioned to mark the date of this event. One, "Tabriz was made secure,"[2] was devised by the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, himself. The author of this history stayed awake all night trying to think of a better chronogram and finally came to the conclusion that the vizier's effort could not be improved upon. The only thing that did occur to me was that if the words "Tabriz was made secure" came at the end of the hemistich, rather than at the beginning, it would be better stylistically—at least, this is the opinion of masters of

[1] The author gives 1014, incorrectly.

[2] The Persian words, *Amn shod tabrīz*, yield the correct date, 1014/1605.

this art. So I composed an occasional poem in praise of Shah 'Abbas, in the course of which I included these words at the end of a hemistich. Whether 'Tabriz' is recognized or not as a legitimate rhyme, this practice has been allowed in the occasional poems and odes of many master poets; for instance, there are many examples of it in the collected works of Kamāl al-Dīn Esma'il.[3]

The Dispatch to the Vān Region of a Qezelbāš Army under the Command of Allāhverdī Khan and His Campaign against the Ottoman Commander in chief, Jeḡāl-oḡlū

The Shah was dissatisfied with the inconclusive nature of the campaigns of the previous year. Jeḡāl-oḡlū was still encamped at Vān, only six days' journey from Tabriz. The Shah therefore decided to send an army against Vān to lay siege to the city or to force Jeḡāl-oḡlū to retire. Either way, the prestige of the Ottoman commander in chief would be damaged. Allāhverdī Khan was placed in command of his force, and Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan; Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman; and Ḥasan Khan the governor of Hamadan were placed under his orders. The whole army, *qūrčīs* and *ḡolāms,* numbered some thirty thousand men.

Jeḡāl-oḡlū ignored the departure from Tabriz of the Safavid army and remained at Vān, intending to resume operations in Azerbaijan as soon as he had received the reinforcements that were on their way to him. He neglected ordinary military precautions to such an extent that, although the Safavid army took twenty days to march from Tabriz to Vān, it was within a day's march of Vān before the Ottoman commander in chief was aware of its approach. In fact, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and his men, who were in the Safavid van, captured a number of Ottoman stableboys and seized some of their horses, which were grazing in the meadows along the road. Allāhverdī Khan was joined at this point by a Kurdish emir, Šīrāzī Sultan Maḥmūdī, and several of his nephews and other relatives. The rest of the Kurdish emirs, however, as usual played a waiting game and contented themselves with sending messages to the Safavid commander. The latter decided to overlook this and not to insist on their presenting themselves before him.

The following day, Allāhverdī Khan drew his men up for battle and waited to see if the Ottomans would come out and fight. At that moment, Jeḡāl-oḡlū only had some ten or fifteen thousand men at his disposal, so he decided to prepare to withstand a siege. But some of his pashas determined to engage the Safavid army, their rear protected by the city walls. A brisk engagement was fought not more than two miles from the city. The Ottomans fought vigorously until they heard the trumpets and fifes of the Safavid center, which now came into view; they then lost courage, and the Safavid vanguard broke their ranks with a charge at full gallop. Caring nought for the Ottoman muskets and cannon, the *qezelbāš* pursued the enemy right up to the walls of the fort and actually took some prisoners on the drawbridge itself and on the edge of the ditch. The Ottomans lost some two thousand men killed in this engagement, and some officers of note were taken prisoner, such as Ḵandān Aqa, the *motaferreqabāšī*,[4] with one of his sons.

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[3] Kamāl al-Dīn Esma'il of Isfahan, a panegyrist at the court of the Ḵārazmšāhs, killed by the Mongols ca. A.D. 1237.

After their victory, Allāhverdī Khan and his emirs pitched their tents around the city. The next day, they received reports that Moḥammad Pasha Šešgāh was marching from Sīvās with two thousand men to aid Jeḡāl-oḡlū. Allāhverdī Khan sent Qarčaqāy Beg, with a force of *ḡolāms* and *ḡāzīs*, to intercept him, and Qarčaqāy Beg overwhelmed Moḥammad Pasha's force about six *farsaḵs* from Vān. Some Ottomans were killed, but the majority were taken prisoner. Moḥammad Pasha himself was mortally wounded.

The Ottomans at Vān, seeing Qarčaqāy Beg march away, had thought that the bulk of the Safavid army had gone out to look for plunder, leaving Allāhverdī Khan relatively unattended. They therefore issued forth from the fort and stationed Janissaries behind the walls of the gardens which lay in front of the city walls, so that they could fire volleys at any Safavid troops who dared to advance. Allāhverdī Khan, whose men had maintained ceaseless patrol activity, sent a detachment of *qezelbāš* against the Ottomans which drove the enemy back again against the city walls and the fort. Since not all the Ottoman troops could get through one gate at the same time, some of them ran along the edge of the ditch, seeking entry at another gate. The *qezelbāš*, despite a hail of fire from the towers of the fort and the walls, took their chance and annihilated a large part of this group. Members of the Safavid commissariat hunted down some forty or fifty Ottomans among the gardens and ruins where they had taken refuge and brought them in to camp, where they were put to death. No Safavid officer of note was lost in this action, and Safavid casualties were light.

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[4] See Gibb and Bowen, p. 362.

The Ottomans were now penned within the fort at Vān, and Jeḡāl-oḡlū debated what to do. He realized that it had been a mistake to stay at Vān. He did not want to find himself besieged by the Safavids, so he slipped away secretly across Lake Vān with a few men. Allāhverdī Khan sent a full report on all these events to the Shah.

Various Events Which Took Place While the Shah Was in Summer Quarters at Ḵ̌oy

When they learned that Jeḡāl-oḡlū had escaped across Lake Vān, Allāhverdī Khan and the emirs went in pursuit of him and scoured the 'Ādeljavāz and Arjīš region north of the lake, but without success. They then joined the Shah at his summer quarters at Sokmanābād in the district of Ḵ̌oy. Shah 'Abbas, after spending a few days hunting, decided to visit Čālderān, the site of the famous battle between Shah Esma'il I and Sultan Selīm. There, the heads of the Ottomans slain at Vān and the weapons captured there, were paraded before him. He spared the life of Ḵandān Aqa the *motaferreqabāšī* and his son and, because of the close friendship between Ḵandān Aqa and the ruler of the Crimea, Ḡāzī Gerāy Khan, he placed them in the custody of the governor of Qarābāḡ with instructions that they be treated as honored guests and sent to Ḡāzī Gerāy Khan.

The Shah decided to build a fort at Ḵ̌oy to protect the inhabitants of the region from the depredations they had suffered because they lived on the frontier. Ḵ̌oy, by virtue of its climate, the purity of its water, and the greenness of its pastures and gardens, is one of the most pleasant towns in Azerbaijan. Qanbar 'Alī Beg Ostājlū, the *salīḥdārbāšī*, was placed in charge of the construction of the fort, and Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, and a number of others were detailed to assist him. The fort was completed within a short time and stocked with provisions and munitions. Seyyedī Sultan Ḵabūšlū was appointed its commandant and granted the district of Ḵ̌oy as a fief.

A cautionary event which occurred at this time was the execution of Shaikh Aḥmad Aqa, a member of the Šaraflū clan of the Ostājlū tribe. A man of modest background, Shaikh Aḥmad Aqa had come to court just after the accession of Shah 'Abbas and had brought himself to the Shah's notice by his faithful attendance there twenty-four hours a day. First, he was placed in charge of the palace gates; because he discharged these duties well, he was later made *dārūğa* of Qazvin, the capital. He was a hard-hearted man and, as *dārūğa* acquired a reputation for harshness and bloodthirstiness. He formed a private army of two or three hundred cutthroats and extended his authority well beyond the confines of Qazvin. His men, who sported scarlet turbans, soon became a sight familiar to the *qezelbāš*. For fear of the king's anger, not even the great emirs dared to disobey orders brought by one of Shaikh Aḥmad's retainers. His punishments were so severe that he had a number of thieves impaled on iron spits and roasted over a fire in the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād at Qazvin. In short, it had pleased God to place in authority over evildoers a man who was even more evil than they. His actions were not compatible with justice, but they terrified the criminal elements at Qazvin, and the Shah used to entrust to him any unpleasant task which had to be carried out. In other words, he became the public executioner. He was promoted to the office of *ešīk-āqāsī* of the harem and finally raised to the status of emir. But his acts of injustice had exceeded all bounds, and the Shah warned him to desist.

Shaikh Aḥmad was present in the Shah's camp at Ḵoy. A Ẕu'l-Qadar *qūrčī*, a kinsman of Baraḥ Beg Eymūr who had received his education in the royal household,[5] had a quarrel over a grain store with one of Shaikh Aḥmad's servants, and the story got back to Shaikh Aḥmad. The latter, who was arrogant by nature inclined to inflict harsh punishments, at once had the *qūrčī* killed. The young man's relations complained to the Shah, who said: "When I first appointed him to a position of authority, I overlooked the severity of his actions because it was necessary to punish wrongdoers and restore law and order. It is some time, however, since I told him that these practices must cease. How has he had the nerve to kill, without cause and on his own authority, a man who was enrolled in the ranks of the *qūrčīs*?" Court officials summoned Shaikh Aḥmad before a tribunal and he arrogantly confessed his guilt. The interrogators kept on asking him which of his retainers was responsible for the murder, but he insisted that he himself had committed the crime. When this was reported to the Shah, he ordered Shaikh Aḥmad to be handed over to the relatives of the murdered man, who were seeking blood revenge. No one thought they would dare to apply *lex talionis*, but they immediately put him to death. His son, Taḵta Beg, was given command of his troops, and placed in charge of appropriate duties.

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[5] *Evčī-zāda (Evčī-oğlū)* normally refers to *ğolāms* trained and educated in the royal palace. The use of this term in regard to a *qezelbāš* is unusual, and perhaps indicates that the man in question was a *yasāvol-e soḥbat* (see *TM*, p. 133), i.e., the son of an emir educated in the palace with the royal princes.

While the Shah was still in camp at Sokmanābād near Ḵoy, he received a report of the death of the ruler of Transoxania, Bāqī Khan Özbeg. His younger brother, Valī Moḥammad Khan, had been placed on the throne at Bokhara with the consensus of the Uzbeg emirs.

The Shah's Punitive Expedition against the Maḥmūdī Kurds in the Mākū Region and Related Events

When the weather began to get a little cooler, the Shah decided to lead a punitive expedition against the rebel Kurdish emirs of the Maḥmūdī tribe who held the forts of Mākū and Pasak and had failed to present themselves at court. One section of the tribe (related to the sons of Manṣūr Beg), which belatedly declared its allegiance to the Safavid house, was transferred to Iraq. The Shah then sent a detachment against the tribes under the jurisdiction of the governor of Pasak, and himself marched to Mākū. Moṣṭafā Beg, urged on by some habitual troublemakers, relied on the strength of the fortress at Mākū, which was situated in a valley at the foot of a mountain and had hitherto proved impregnable, to enable him to defy the Shah. He placed his baggage under guard in the fort of Dāmankūh, which was his normal place of residence. The Shah first sent a detachment of Qarādāğlū and Moqaddam[6] tribesmen against the fort of Dāmankūh, and these troops stormed the fort at the first assault. The Shah himself commenced the bombardment of the main fort and rapidly succeeded in breaching the walls. The garrison was massacred, and noncombatants found within the fort were plundered of all their possessions.

After this success, the Shah sent a raiding party to ravage Maḥmūdī territory. He gave orders that no attempt should be made to capture the fort of Mīān-kūh, which could not be easily subdued; if the Maḥmūdīs came out to fight, then the raiding party was to teach them a lesson; if not, their homes were to be plundered. As it happened, few Maḥmūdī tribesmen were in the fort of Mīānkūh, partly because of the lack of space and partly because of the shortage of water. In consequence, the tribe suffered heavily at the hands of the

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[6] See *TM*, p. 17.

Safavid troops, and all their livestock, both in the Pasak and the Mākū areas, was looted—all as a result of the obduracy of Moṣṭafā Beg and a few of his fellow tribesmen. So many animals were seized that one could buy a good sheep in the royal camp for half a *derham,* the equivalent of fifty Iraqi *dīnārs,* and a cow for two *derhams* (two hundred Iraqi *dīnārs*). Many Maḥmūdī women and children were carried off as captives. The Shah's troops ravaged the area for ten days, and not even those tribesmen who had fled to the mountain tops escaped their fate.

The Shah then decided to move to Naḵčevān and camp near the Aras River, and thus be in a position to check Ottoman troop movements between Erzerum and Vān. If the Ottoman commander in chief succeeded in mobilizing fresh forces and taking the offensive again in Azerbaijan, the Shah would be well-placed to intercept him. If no Ottoman force appeared, the Shah planned to winter in Qarābāḡ and proceed to the capture of the fortress of Ganja and the subjugation of Šīrvān. The Shah crossed the Aras at the ford of Yazdābād near Naḵčevān, and pitched camp near the Ḵayyām River. Emir Gūna Khan was ordered to repair the fort at Erīvān, and men were placed at his disposal for this purpose. At this point, the Shah received repeated reports that Jeḡāl-oḡlū was advancing from the direction of Albāq and Salmās. The Shah therefore decided to leave the restoration of the fort at Erīvān for the time being and to march back toward Ḵoy.

The Revolt of the Georgians against Kūstandīl Khan and the Latter's Retreat from Šīrvān, Defeated and in Evil Plight

My readers will be well aware that since all earthly authority derives from God, any ruler in this world who, tempted by the Devil, yields to the promptings of his own lusts or selfish self-conceit and commits evil acts will suffer a rapid decline of his fortunes. The gravest of the acts displeasing to God of which a ruler may be guilty and to which he may be driven by ambition and his attachment to worldly things is enmity toward his parents. As the Koran says: "But the one who says to his parents, 'Fie on you both!' . . . are among those upon whom the sentence of punishment was due."[7] History shows that, since the advent of Islam, and also in pre-Islamic times, no prince or ruler who, for the sake of acquiring worldly power, was hostile toward his father achieved the goal of his ambition; moreover, no ignoble son who has slain his father has remained on the throne for more than six months after the event. Learned biographers and chroniclers have recorded that, before the advent of Islam, Šīrūya the son of Ḵosrow Parvīz[8] was guilty of this crime and enjoyed kingly power for less than six months after the murder. In more recent times, the Tīmūrīd ruler Mīrzā Oloḡ Beg, a learned and just prince, was put to death by his son Mīrzā ʿAbd al-Laṭīf,[9] who after enjoying a brief period of power was himself slain by a sudden blow of fate. In my own lifetime (at the time of writing I am fifty-four years of age,[10]) I have seen several instances of the same thing.

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[7] Koran, 46:18-19.

As previously related, Kūstandīl Khan, the son of Alexander Khan, had killed his father and his brother, taken over the throne, and invaded Šīrvān and laid siege to Šamāḵī. Kūstandīl Khan was a brave and intrepid youth, but he became inordinately arrogant as a result of the royal favor shown to him and did not treat with proper respect and consideration the *qezelbāš* emirs who had been detailed to accompany him to Šīrvān. These emirs, for fear of the Shah's wrath, endured Kūstandīl Khan's arrogant behavior, but the Georgian emirs did not take to him for two reasons and soon became disenchanted with his rule and began to plot against him.

The first reason was the difference of religion. Kūstandīl Khan was a Muslim, and the Georgian emirs wanted a Christian ruler. The second reason was the difference in the protocol of court behavior. Relations between Alexander Khan and his nobles had always been conducted on a personal basis. The Georgian nobles were unaccustomed to lieutenants and chamberlains, and to being kept at a distance from their ruler by *yasāvols* and *ešīk-āqāsīs*. They were used to being able to march into Alexander Khan's private quarters without having to get permission from a chamberlain. Now, they did not always succeed in obtaining an audience with the Khan even at the public levée held every ten days. In short, they disliked his regal behavior and conspired together to murder him, when opportunity offered, in revenge for his slaying of his father. Kūstandīl Khan had with him two grandsons of Alexander Khan, and these princes the conspirators planned to take back with them to Georgia.

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[8] The Sasanid king, reigned A.D. 590–628.

[9] Oloḡ Beg was put to death in Ramażān 853/October–November 1449. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf was assassinated by his emirs in Rabīʿ I, 854/May 1450.

[10] The bulk of the *Tārīḵ-e ʿĀlam-ārā* was completed in 1025/1616. If we suppose that this particular passage was written a few years earlier, we can arrive at the author's generally accepted date of birth, ca. 968 or 969 A.H.

Although one of the conspirators informed Kūstandīl of the plot, he was so sure of himself he did not take any decisive action in the matter. Nevertheless, he wanted to do away with a number of Georgians who were at the bottom of all the trouble, and so he consulted his vizier, Ḵāja Żīā al-Dīn Kāšī, who had formerly been the vizier of Alexander Khan. The vizier ill-advisedly declared there was no truth in the rumor of a plot against him and persuaded the Khan to drop the matter. The vizier advised him that, if he had one of the conspirators executed, he would frighten the rest into precipitate action. The vizier took council with the principal emirs and admonished them. The conspirators declared that the Khan was their benefactor, and that they had absolutely no complaint against him. The truth of the matter was, they said, that they were tired of the prolonged campaign in Šīrvān and could not bear to stay there any longer. The vizier agreed that the emirs in question should be released to return to Georgia after a further one month's service in Šīrvān, and he urged the Khan to approve his agreement. The simple-minded Khan thought he was now secure against conspiracy, but the admonition had had no effect on the conspirators. On the contrary, they were more firmly resolved than ever.

One night about midnight, when the Georgian nobles were on guard duty, they surrounded the Khan's tent with drawn swords and started shouting. Qarā Pīrī, a *ḡolām* of the royal household who had been delegated by the Shah to attend the Khan woke him, and the latter slashed an opening with his sword in the rear of his tent and rushed into the quarters of 'Alī Khan Movāfeq. The Georgian rebels meanwhile had stormed into the Khan's tent and cut to pieces two young attendants who were sleeping there, thinking one of them was Kūstandīl. Other conspirators ran to the tent where Alexander Khan's grandsons had their quarters and seized them. Kūstandīl himself succeeded in making his way unharmed to 'Alī Khan Movāfeq's tent. Everyone thought the Georgian nobles had planned this in collusion with the Ottomans, and so 'Alī Khan had the trumpets sounded. The *qezelbāš* who were manning the breastworks and trenches came running to his tent, and the camp was in an uproar for the rest of the night. The conspirators, hearing the trumpets and realizing that Kūstandīl was unharmed, set off for Georgia in haste, taking the princes with them. Kūstandīl went in hot pursuit, hoping to take his revenge on the conspirators or at least to recover the princes. Foolishly, he left most of his troops behind at the fort.

At sunrise, Kūstandīl overtook the Georgians. The men he had with him still outnumbered his opponents. The Georgians turned to fight, shouting "You are a Muslim. We must have a Christian governor. We did not trust you even when there was no point of dispute between us. How can we possibly trust you after recent events? If you attack, we will fight to the last man."

Since the Georgians constituted a formidable force and it would not be prudent to attack them, the great emirs dissuaded Kūstandīl from offensive action and abandoned the enterprise. They did not dare rejoin the forces besieging Šamākī, but dispersed then and there, abandoning their baggage, and not drawing rein until they reached the Kor River. Tīmūr Sultan Moqaddam had remained behind in the camp at Šamākī because he was wounded and unable to ride. Some of his men brought the news of the flight of Kūstandīl's emirs and, in their anxiety to be gone, they lashed Tīmūr Sultan on the back of a camel and left.

This caused complete panic to break out in the camp; in their fear of the Ottomans, the men abandoned their possessions and looked to their own safety. Large quantities of stores belonging to merchants and the camp commissariat were abandoned where they lay. The ironic thing was that the Ottomans thought it was a ruse and did not stir from the fort. Finally, an artisan from Kūstandīl's camp who was sick and had been unable to join in the general exodus from the camp, since he was afraid some one might come along and kill him, dragged himself to the city gates and begged for admittance. Those on duty admitted him and learned from him the whole strange story. Once they had assured themselves of the truth of his story, the Ottomans emerged from the fort and appropriated all Kūstandīl's stores, which effectively ended their food shortage. Kūstandīl's emirs meanwhile had crossed the Kor, and gradually their men from the camp at Šamākī trickled in. When the emirs learned from them that the Ottomans had been unaware of the dispersal of Kūstandīl's force they regretted their action, but it was a bit late for regrets.

In short, Kūstandīl, because of his foolish arrogance and poor planning, suffered a major defeat without a shot having been fired. Kūstandīl went to Ardabīl and began to think how he could retrieve the situation. Meanwhile, Qarā Pīrī had ridden at top speed to Mākū to inform the Shah.

Kūstandīl Khan's Second Expedition to Georgia and His Subsequent Fate

Kūstandīl also sent a report to the Shah and asked for his help. Since the Shah was still uneasy about possible moves on he part of the Ottoman commander in chief, he asked Kūstandīl to come to court, encouraging him to hope that, once Jeḡāl-oḡlū's intentions became clear, the Shah might take the field in Qarābāḡ and send a detachment of troops to assist him in subjugating Šīrvān, which had been allotted to him. Affairs in Georgia would be settled in the light of his advice and in the best interests of the Safavid state.

Kūstandīl, however, either because he had enjoyed a few days of independent command and this had affected his loyalty to the Shah, or else because he hesitated to expose himself to the reproaches of his peers after his shameful defeat, disobeyed the Shah's order and declined to come to court. Further, without the Shah's permission, he decided to go to Georgia, and exacted a large sum in taxes from the merchants of Ardabīl in order to recruit an army. Then, together with emirs who had been allotted to him, he set off for the conquest of Šīrvān. He had been allotted Šīrvān, not Georgia, by the Shah, and since he was acting on his own authority in invading Georgia and against the wishes of the Shah, fate was against him and his expedition failed.

About this time, letters reached the Shah from Georgia complaining of Kūstandīl's conduct, and asking that Ṭahmūraṣ (Taymūraz) b. Da'ūd Khan, who was at the Safavid court, be appointed ruler of Georgia. It was clear to the Shah that there could be no reconciliation between Kūstandīl Khan, who had adopted Islam, and the Georgians, who adhered to the Christian faith. The Shah realized that if he named Kūstandīl ruler of Georgia, the sole result would be constant revolt on the part of the Georgians. Since the Shah had important plans in the making, he wanted to keep the Georgians quiet by encouraging them to hope for royal favor. He therefore wrote conciliatory letters to the nobles and the women of the Georgian royal house who had influence in state matters, and dispatched these letters by the hand of Ḥoseyn Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, the herald; he also informed Kūstandīl Khan of the action he had taken.

After the Shah had sent the herald, he learned that Kūstandīl had decided to take matters into his own hands. Wiser people, who had had their rough edges rubbed off by hard experience, predicted nothing but failure from this enterprise, for Kūstandīl's murder of his aged father had been not only futile, but had had ambition as its motive and so was unacceptable to God or man. Furthermore, Kūstandīl had not been appointed governor of Georgia; his efforts to secure Georgia for himself did not meet with the Shah's approval and therefore did not succeed. On the contrary, Kūstandīl met his own death within six months of his father's murder.

Meanwhile, Kūstandīl had marched on Georgia with a motley army composed of Lezgīs, Šīrvānīs, and Otūz-īkī tribesmen, he was also joined by Šāhmīr Khan from Šakkī. The news of his approach caused consternation in Georgia, and those Georgian nobles who were the leaders of the opposition to Kūstandīl Khan removed Alexander Khan's grandsons and the women of the Georgian royal house for safety, and took them to the Sīdemlū[11] district, a region of great natural strength by virtue of its lofty mountains and narrow paths. Kūstandīl occupied the city of Zagam, the seat of government of that part of Georgia, and began to bestow his favors impartially on the people of that region, whether friend or foe, soldiers or civilians. Most Georgians of note hastened to present themselves before him and tender their allegiance. Any who proffered allegiance to him found it accepted and his hostile acts overlooked. Kūstandīl sent conciliatory letters to the women of the royal house and especially to Dīdīfāl (Dedopali), Ṭahmūraṣ's mother, who had played a very important role in state affairs. He told her he wanted only the heads of the four nobles who had conspired to murder him; no one else would be harmed. Her sons would be treated with nothing but kindness. He might even spare the lives of his would-be murderers if the latter used her to intercede for them and if they tendered their allegiance to him. If they hesitated to approach him directly, they should send a reliable emissary so that binding covenants could be arranged.

When Kūstandīl's envoy reached Dīdīfāl, Ṭahmūraṣ's mother, he was received with apparent friendliness, but Dīdīfāl and her party were waiting for a reply to the request they had made to Shah 'Abbas. Finally, the Shah's letters of appointment, issued in the name of Dīdīfāl and the great nobles of Georgia, arrived; they made it clear

[11] I cannot identify this place.

that Kūstandīl's attempt to obtain the throne of Georgia did not have the Shah's approval. This news raised the morale and strengthened the resolve of Dīdīfāl's party, and they marched out to do battle with Kūstandīl.

The two armies met at the river Māzū Keyvolān[12] in the Sīdemlū district on Saturday, 9 Jomādā II, 1014/22 October 1605. Kūstandīl drew up his men in full battle array, with right and left wings and skirmishers out ahead, and cannon and musketeers stationed at suitable points. He himself took up his position in the center with Šāhmīr Khan, the governor of Šakkī, who was an experienced veteran of many battles, and some other emirs. Kūstandīl's initial charges shattered the Georgian ranks, and some of them turned to flee. Victory seemed near for Kūstandīl; leaving Šāhmīr Khan, 'Alī Khan Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū, and other emirs in the center, he himself moved over to the right wing, where Qarčaqāy, one of the *ḡolāms* he had raised from servitude to the status of emir with the title Qarčaqāy Sultan, was being pushed back in considerable disorder against the center.

Kūstandīl charged to Qarčaqāy's assistance without waiting for any of his men to catch up with him. Some of the Georgians who were fleeing from the battlefield recognized him as they passed, and shouted in Georgian to their fellows, "It's the Khan!" Seeing that the Khan was alone, a group of Georgians made for him. The Khan in his folly and pride (or, as others would have it, impelled by his sense of honor, which would not permit him to turn and run from a small group of the enemy), engaged them. But he received several spear thrusts against his chain mail which knocked him from his horse, and the Georgians immediately finished him off.

At first, neither side realized that Kūstandīl had been killed. The first people to be aware of it were some Georgians who had supported Kūstandīl and were fighting in his ranks. They sent a messenger to inform Dīdīfāl and the Georgian nobles to encourage them to stand fast, but the latter thought it was a trick and kept their distance. Finally, the men who had slain Kūstandīl arrived and confirmed the joyful news. Meanwhile, the *qezelbāš* emirs in the center were fighting on, convinced that victory was theirs. In the end, a number of his *moqarrabs* and trusted retainers, who normally never left his side in battle, went looking for him and found his body, smeared with mud and stained with blood, in a corner of the battlefield. When they informed the emirs of the center, the latter wanted to keep the news quiet and to fight on in the hopes of wresting the Georgian princes from the grasp of Dīdīfāl's faction, but it was not to be.

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[12] Dorn, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kaukasischen Länder und Völker, III,* 373 n.2, suggests Matsis tzkali, i.e., R. Matsis.

At this juncture, the Georgians sent an envoy to the *qezelbāš* emirs proposing that, since Kūstandīl had entered Georgia without permission from the Shah and was now dead, both sides should break off the engagement. The Georgians added that they had not contravened the Shah's orders, but were loyal servants of the Shah. Unfortunately, as the news spread among the *qezelbāš* that the Khan was dead, individual soldiers broke ranks and fled, and the emirs were no longer able to maintain order among their men. As a result of this disorderly flight, some of the *qezelbāš* lost their lives in the forests, and others lost their horses, their uniforms, and their equipment in the course of their escape. Most of the *qezelbāš* stores were abandoned to the enemy, who also plundered the belongings of the merchants who had accompanied Kūstandīl but who thus failed to make their expected profit. Some of the emirs recrossed the Kor; others returned with Šāhmīr Khan to Šakkī. The news of this debacle reached the Shah when he was too busy to pay any attention to it, for Jeḡāl-oḡlū had advanced from Salmās to Ṭasūj with the intention of invading Azerbaijan. The Shah had marched from Ḵoy and Marand to bar his passage, and had camped in a valley one *farsaḵ* from the village of Ṣūfīān in the district of Tabriz.

Jeḡāl-oḡlū's Expedition to Azerbaijan, His Subsequent Rout, and Other Related Events

Readers will recall that Jeḡāl-oḡlū had escaped from Vān by boat across the lake, had camped in the plain of Mūšābād, and had sent *čavošes* in all directions with mobilization orders. Pashas, *beglerbegs,* and Ottoman and Kurdish *mīr-sanjaqs* responded to his summons; among their number were Mīr Šaraf, the governor of Jazīra;[13] Maḥmūdī, Behesnī, and Ḥakkārī chiefs; the sons and brothers of Zakarīā Khan, and all the other tribes in the area except the Barādūst. The Ottoman commander in chief marched in the late autumn of 1605 and reached Salmās via Albāq. The same day he received the news, the Shah crossed the Aras and marched via Čors[14] to Ḵoy, where he camped. From Ḵoy, he sent the governor of Tabriz, Pīr Būdāq Khan, along the road to Tabriz with orders to remove to safe places in the mountains the inhabitants of all villages that lay in the path of the probable Ottoman advance and to destroy all food stocks that could not be removed. On arrival at Tabriz, his orders were to evacuate the civilian population and see to the defense of the fort.

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[13] This is Jazīra b. 'Omar, on the east bank of the Tigris south of Lake Vān (see Le Strange, pp. 93–94).

Pīr Būdāq Khan proceeded to carry out his orders. At Tabriz he had a little trouble from unruly elements, and some of his troops were also guilty of disorderly conduct. Pīr Būdāq Khan executed a number of ruffians who had laid their hands on property belonging to merchants and other citizens, and had their heads impaled on pikes and paraded around the city. This effectively stopped the disorders. He then entered the fort with Barḵordār Beg, the commander in chief of artillery, and the musketeers, and set about putting the battlements, towers, and batteries in proper order.

From Ḵoy, the Shah also sent out patrols to determine the strength and composition of the Ottoman forces. On the basis of their reports, he estimated the size of the Ottoman army as one hundred thousand men, and this was confirmed by a few prisoners who were brought in for interrogation. In the Ottoman camp, Jeḡāl-oḡlū let it be known that he planned to occupy Ardabīl and spend the winter at Qezel-Āḡāč, which was close to Šīrvān and was governed by his son, Maḥmūd Pasha. He then marched rapidly along the road to Ṭasūj. Since there were no provisions to be had along this route because of the passage of the Ottoman army, the Shah marched to Marand via Čaman-e Aḵtāḵāna, intending to intercept the Ottomans at whatever point seemed best.

The Shah would not be satisfied until he had personally verified the size of the Ottoman army, and so he climbed a mountain from which he could observe the whole enemy force as it marched past. Shah ʿAbbas detached some men from his main body and placed them under the command of Allāhverdī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, a man who stood head and shoulders above his peers in regard to soundness of judgment, administrative skill, and valor. The Shah himself took charge of the center. Ẕu'l-Qadar Khan, Ganj ʿAlī Khan, Nīāz Sultan, and Mīr Moqaddam were detailed to act as vanguard. On the right wing, he stationed Emir Gūna Khan and other emirs; on the left, a number of other trusted emirs. All these groups were ordered to march separately from the main body and to exercise extreme caution as they advanced; the officers were ordered to keep a tight rein on the high-spirited men under their command, lest foolish behavior or overconfidence lead them into trouble. After making these dispositions, the Shah marched to Ṣūfīān.

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[14] North of Ḵoy; see *TM*, p. 164.

The two armies were now close to each other. Although it was not appropriate for the Shah to engage in battle in person with a mere Ottoman commander in chief, nevertheless the following day, Tuesday[15] 24 Jomādā II, 1014/6 November 1605, the Shah kept himself in reserve to assist any of his army groups which, though supported by the celestial hosts, might need in addition the shelter of his kingly umbrella. The Shah accordingly formed his men up in proper battle order. They consisted of *qūrčīs*, *ḡolāms*, musketeers, and court retainers attached to the Shah's personal service. He stationed his men on a commanding height overlooking the Tabriz road, and keenly observed the movements of his various divisions. He detailed for special duties Qarčaqāy Beg, who had at an early stage given evidence of his intelligence and ability; the Shah now gave him a detachment of *ḡolāms* of the royal household and musketeers and ordered him, after battle was joined, to assist the Safavid advance guard at whatever point he judged necessary. He was further instructed to keep watch on all sectors of the front. Qanbar Beg Gözübüyüklü, the head sword keeper *(salīḥdārbāšī)*, a valiant young officer of the Ostājlū tribe, was in turn given a detachment of household troops and ordered to give support to Qarčaqāy Beg and his musketeers should they appear in danger of being overwhelmed by the enemy.

The Ottomans meanwhile had advanced from Šabestar and camped near the village of Sīs, only six *farsaḵs* from Tabriz. They constructed a circle with their gun carriages and chains on the side facing the *qezelbāš*, and following their usual practice, stationed their Janissaries between the gun carriages. The Ottoman army contained many distinguished officers—for example, Kösa Ṣafar, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, whose name was a byword among the Ottomans for bravery; 'Oṣmān Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Syria; and 'Alī Pasha Zanjīr-qīren. When they and the other pashas learned of the approach of the royal army, they were so confident of their strength that they marched out from their camp and formed up in battle array facing the Safavid army. The Shah was afraid that the enemy might be too powerful for his army, and so he sent a detachment of Qājārs from the *qūrčībāšī*'s regiment to occupy some rising ground between the two armies. They were ordered not to attack the enemy; their function was to draw off some Ottoman troops and thus weaken the main Ottoman body.

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[15] 24 Jomādā II, 1014, fell on a Sunday.

I heard from some of the staff officers close to the Shah that His Majesty did not intend to risk everything on one decisive battle, but planned rather to cause attrition of the enemy's strength by daily, limited, engagements. He planned to use these tactics until the enemy entered Tabriz. If they then laid siege to the fort, the plan was to seal off their retreat and, when the onset of the winter snows and a shortage of provisions began to make themselves felt, to launch a general attack both from within the fort and from outside the city. If the enemy, having failed to capture the fort, moved (as they had said they would) toward Ardabīl and Qezel-Āğāč, the Shah, after invoking the aid of the Imams and the Safavid shaikhs, planned to risk a decisive engagement between Sarāb and Ardabīl.

The whole of that day, the Shah kept sending couriers to Allāhverdī Khan cautioning him to watch for his opportunity, not to be in a hurry to give battle, and to advance with circumspection. However, fate willed otherwise. Qarčaqāy Beg and his musketeers had breasted a hill and discovered that they were overlooking the main Ottoman army. Mindful of the Shah's stern prohibition against precipitating a major battle, Qarčaqāy and his men promptly turned around and descended the hill again. The Ottomans, attributing this action either to weakness or cowardice, at once launched a general attack on the Safavid vanguard, which was thrown into disorder. Most of the emirs in the van were wounded. Seeing this, Qarčaqāy Beg and Qanbar Beg formed their men up, dismounting from their horses and using them as protection against the musketballs flying in all directions; the Safavid musketeers then briskly returned the Ottoman fire.

Qarčaqāy Beg sent a courier to Allāhverdī Beg to inform him that the Ottomans had overhwelmed the Safavid vanguard and had begun a general action. "If we are not very careful," he said, "the Ottomans will order a general assault, and there will be no hope of deliverance for any of us, even in our places of ambush." At the same moment, Malek 'Alī the chief herald, who had been sent by the Shah to see what the position was, came up to Qarčaqāy's men and at once galloped back with an eye-witness report for the Shah.

The Shah, having received Malek 'Alī's appraisal of the situation, set his troops in motion. At the same time, he sent orders to Allāhverdī Khan to advance slowly, to exhort the remnants of the vanguard to stand their ground and not yield an inch to the enemy, and to inform them that the Shah's regiments were in motion and would shortly be in action. Malek 'Alī was sent back to give Qarčaqāy Beg this welcome news. The Ottomans were now leaving their camp regiment after regiment and troop after troop, and entering the field. The Shah decided to move some of his troops over to his left, near the Ottoman camp, again with the idea of forcing the Ottomans to send men to deal with this threat and thus prevent them from concentrating overwhelming strength in any one sector. 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *dīvānbegībāšī*, who was stationed on the right with his Šāmlū *qūrčīs* ready for action, was detailed for this job, and the *qūrčībāšī*, Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, was ordered to support him.

When it appeared that 'Alīqolī Khan was getting the upper hand, the Shah, who had been watching the situation closely, sent all the rest of the Šāmlū regiment, under the command of the *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū, a leading Šāmlū chief, to support him; with the Šāmlūs the Shah sent several trumpeters and another detachment of troops from the right wing. Reinforcements were also dispatched to the assistance of Qarčaqāy Beg and the emirs of the vanguard. At regular intervals the Shah sent into action regiments from both wings of his army, constantly reinforcing different sectors of the front with fresh troops advancing in strict formation, as need arose. I was at the King's side during this battle and, setting aside for a moment the historian's conventional phrases and rhetoric, which are devoid of the reality which lies at the heart of the matter, I would like to say that Shah 'Abbas displayed outstanding generalship in this battle. His tactical moves were uniformly successful. If Emir Tīmūr Gūrakān,[16] whose name is a byword for valor and whose military leadership and tactics have been taken as a model by many subsequent rulers, were alive today, in the opinion of the writer he would be an officer in the service of the Shah and would be learning from him the arts of government and generalship. But if I say any more on this subject, I shall become tedious.

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[16] The celebrated Muslim conqueror known in the West as Tamerlane (died A.D. 1405).

The Shah now advanced with the troops of the center and ascended a small hill from which he could survey the whole battlefield. Qarčaqāy Beg and the emirs of the vanguard, confident of support, were fighting on, and 'Alīqolī Khan and the *qūrčībāšī* were engaged in fierce combat with the Ottomans on their sector. The cleverness of the Shah's tactics now became apparent. The Ottoman commanders, seeing clouds of dust arising and a fierce struggle going on in the direction of their camp, thought the Shah himself was leading an attack on the camp of their commander in chief. In their alarm, they decided to order their right wing to the aid of their fellows fighting near the camp, and themselves left the rising ground on which they were drawn up to march slowly in the direction of the camp, keeping a sharp lookout in both directions as they went.

No sooner had they begun to move away from their positions than there arose on all sides the rousing war cry "Allah! Allah!" which was characteristic of the *qezelbāš*, as the latter flung themselves on the enemy from all directions. Caught on the move, the Ottoman formations were broken, and men turned to flee. The Ottoman commanders, still on the rising ground, held their positions for a short time in the hope that their men would rally, but their hope was vain. Since their line of retreat to their own camp was now closed, they fled in the direction of Ṭasūj and Salmās. The Safavid victory called to mind the Koranic verses: "We have granted you a clear victory . . . that God may assist you mightily."[17]

The slaughter of the fugitive Ottomans now began, and the hilly plain was soon covered by additional mounds as the dead bodies piled up. Most of the Ottoman commanders were either killed or taken prisoner. Among the prisoners of note were Kösa Ṣafar Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, who was constantly boasting of his military prowess; Moṣṭafā Pasha, the son of Rażīa Ḵātūn, who was the second vizier and had at times been acting grand vizier; Šīr Aḥmad Pasha, the governor of Qārṣ; and Qūčī Khan Kord, the brother of Ḡāzī Khan, a renegade who had left Safavid service and thrown in his lot with Jeḡāl-oḡlū. Of these, Kösa Ṣafar Pasha was executed because of his previous unacceptable conduct. Officers of note who lost their lives included 'Alī Pasha Zanjīr-Qīren; 'Os̱mān Pasha the *beglerbeg* of Syria, and some sixty or seventy officers of lesser rank —Ottoman emirs and pashas, and *sanjaq-beys* and emirs from Kurdish tribes were either killed or captured. There is little to be gained from a recital of all their names.

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[17] Koran, 48:2, 4.

This famous victory was complete by nightfall, but the pursuit of the Ottomans continued relentlessly even after dark. Those who escaped that night by hiding in the woods were hunted down and killed by peasants next day. Troops of the household regiments collected the heads of the slain and cast them at the feet of the Shah's horse, and the prisoners and captured weapons were paraded before the Shah. Torches were lit, and the Shah dismounted to carry out his inspection of these items and to discharge his obligation to those who had fought valiantly on this field.

The Safavid emirs, *moqarrabs,* and court attendants were summoned to a victory feast at which, by order of the Shah, handsome Ottoman captives and Frankish and Russian *ğolāms* who had been brought in as booty by the *ğāzīs* acted as cupbearers. Wine flowed freely, and minstrels and singers contributed to the conviviality of the scene. Of the prisoners, those who possessed rank and status were kept in custody; the rest were sent to join their fellows. By a twist of fate, Moḥammad Beg, the elder son of Ḵandān Aqa the *motaffereqa-āqāsī* (Ḵandān Aqa and one of his younger sons had been captured at Vān and their lives had been spared), was taken prisoner unharmed in this battle, and he too was treated with favor by the Shah.

A strange incident occurred during this feast, as a result of which the Shah narrowly escaped serious injury; as the Koran says: "An evil plot encompasses none but the authors thereof."[18] In brief, an Ottoman of huge physical stature had been brought low in the course of the battle by a spear thrust from a small, lean Ostājlū *qūrčī,* who had taken the man prisoner and led him before the Shah. Because of his youth and inexperience he had omitted to bind the prisoner's hands behind his back as was the usual practice. The Shah asked the man to state his name, lineage, and tribe. The prisoner replied that he was of the Mokrī tribe. Since a number of Mokrī tribesmen had held honored positions in the Shah's service, perhaps that miscreant thought he would save his life through the intercession of the latter. At all events, Rostam Beg, one of the chiefs of that tribe, said brusquely, "There is no kinship between my family and his; on the contrary, there is long-standing enmity and blood feuds between us." The Shah said to the *qūrčī,* "Hand the prisoner over to Rostam Beg; he can do what he likes with him." But the Shah did not utter the words "death" or "blood revenge." However, Rostam Beg refused to take the prisoner, saying he had sworn a vow that he would not take revenge on a helpless enemy, and he could not therefore kill a bound prisoner.[19]

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[18] Koran, 34:44.

The Shah's temper became frayed by this exchange, and, although initially he had not specified that the prisoner be put to death, his aversion to the latter was now so great that he signaled to the *qūrčī* to execute him. The *qūrčī* seized the prisoner's belt, intending to drag him out of the Shah's sight before dispatching him. The prisoner, hearing the word "death" mentioned, suddenly drew a dagger and hurled himself at the Shah. The Shah grabbed his wrist, pulled his arm down, and knelt on it. Those near the Shah drew their swords but were afraid to strike because the Shah and his assailant were locked in a fierce struggle and it was difficult to tell which was which, particularly as the prisoner happened to be wearing chain mail and jerkin of the same color as those of the Shah. They stood by helplessly for a considerable time while the Shah grappled with his assailant; finally, the Shah succeeded in wrenching the dagger from the prisoner's grasp, and the man was seized by some of the *ğolāms*, dragged away, and killed. People were in a panic, fearing that some harm had come to the Shah. The writer of these words, who was present at this terrifying incident, was literally paralyzed until he heard the Shah's voice; I then breathed again with relief, and all those present gave thanks to God for the Shah's safety.

Jeğāl-oğlū's Retreat and the Fate of Those Ottoman Troops Who Survived the Battle of Ṣūfīān

The day following his victory at Ṣūfīān, Wednesday[20] 25 Jomādā II, 1014/7 November 1605, the Shah marched forth in full battle order to survey the field. He discovered that the Ottoman commander in chief, Jeğāl-oğlū, had not moved from his camp, and he received a report that Ottoman reinforcements, five thousand men under the command of Jān Pūlād-oğlū, were on their way and had already reached Ṭasūj. Some fainthearted and short-sighted people, who during the time of Sultan Moḥammad Shah had seen the huge size of the Ottoman armies and had been intimidated by the great mass of nameless camp followers who, according to Ottoman custom, accompanied their armies to carry on trade,[21] now uttered cowardly and weak-minded opinions. The Shah, having always in mind long-term strategy, and acting always with that caution and circumspection which is the hallmark of great generalship, was in no hurry to launch an attack on the Ottoman camp, protected as it was by gun carriages and musketeers. Wise men do not undertake even a small matter without reflection and deliberation; in matters of great moment, such as battles, the outcome of which may have grave consequences and which involve loss of life on both sides, there is no room for mistakes. The Shah therefore sent a detachment to intercept Jān Fūlād-oḡlū, intending to postpone a decision as to how to deal with Jeḡāl-oḡlū until he knew the outcome of the former operation.

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[19] Overlooking the fact that this man was *not* bound!

[20] 25 Jomādā II, 1014 fell on a Monday.

[21] *Gedīk:* a license to trade; the right to exclusive exercise of a trade in a particular area.

At this juncture, a Kurdish prisoner was brought in. He was one of the retainers of Mīr Šaraf, the governor of Jazīra. Mīr Šaraf was one of the most powerful Kurdish chiefs in terms of the number of tribes under his control, and was a vassal of the Ottomans. On this campaign he had accompanied Jeḡāl-oḡlū, and at the battle of Ṣūfīān had been stationed close to the commander in chief and had taken no part in the fighting. Since Mīr Šaraf had been associated with the Safavid court for a number of years,[22] the Shah released the prisoner and sent him back to Mīr Šaraf with this message: "So far, because of the physical distance between us, there has been no contact between *qezelbāš* troops and your men, and bloodshed, which aggravates hostility, has been avoided. In consideration of your former loyalty to the Safavid house, I have even abstained from putting to death any of your men who have been taken prisoner. If you can, come and join me; if this is impossible, then withdraw with your troops to Jazīra, so that no harm may befall you or your men." The bearer of this message was taken to the Ottoman lines by an escort of Sīāh-manṣūr troops. Upon receiving this message, Mīr Šaraf managed to think of a scheme to enable him to retire with his men in the direction of Jazīra, although he had to abandon all his baggage.

The Ottoman commander in chief Jeḡāl-oḡlū, on the morning after the battle, uttered words of encouragement to his Janissaries

[22] Mīr Šaraf b. Šams al-Dīn Ḵān b. Šaraf Ḵān was born in 949/1543, and was brought up in Shah Tahmasp's harem, where he spent three years (958–61/1551–54). He remained in Safavid service for the remainder of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and under Shah Esma'il II was made chief adviser to the Shah on Kurdish affairs. *Qezelbāš* jealousy led to his being accused of plotting against the Shah, who exiled him from court to the governorship of Naḵčevān. There, he succumbed to the blandishments of Ḵosrow Pasha and the Ottoman commander in chief, Moṣṭafā Pasha, and entered Ottoman service (986/1578); *Šarafnāma*, i, 455–56).

and other troops, and set them to strengthening the gun-carriage defenses, seeing to the ordering of the artillery and of the right and left wings. The camp servants, called by the Ottomans *at-oğlānı* (grooms), were encouraged to hope for officers' privileges, and, until noon, Jeğāl-oğlū managed to keep his men happy with various old soldier's ruses of this sort which were designed to deceive the rank and file. In the afternoon, however, Mīr Šaraf's defection became general knowledge, and the weakness of Jeğāl-oğlū's position became apparent to all.

Jeğāl-oğlū vacillated between one plan and another, unable to make up his mind. At this point, a report reached him that Jān Fūlād-oğlū, who had reached Ṭasūj on the day of the battle of Ṣūfīān, had turned tail and marched back to Vān when he had met fugitives from the battle. This news merely increased the panic in the Ottoman camp, and men began to slip away in twos and threes and then in platoons and companies. Jeğāl-oğlū was forced to abandon the various military deceptions he had been practicing and to take counsel with his officers, *qāżīs*, and *moftīs*. They all voted for retreat under cover of darkness. Everyone waited fearfully for nightfall, and at sunset chaos broke out in the Ottoman camp, as the troops, concerned only with saving their own skins, abandoned their possessions and left their commander in chief to fend for himself.

From the annals of mighty kings of old, we learn that it is incompatible with the chivalrous conduct expected of kings to bar the line of retreat of an enemy army; furthermore, it is usually in the best interests of the state not to prevent them from leaving. The Shah therefore sent ʿAlīqolī Khan to verify the reports that the Ottomans were decamping. As torches were being lit all over the Safavid camp, ʿAlīqolī Khan reached the Ottoman camp and discovered that the only people left in it were a few of the sick. By the time his report to this effect reached the Shah, one watch of the night had elapsed. It has never been the policy of princes to pursue an enemy at night, and the Shah had no intention of authorizing a pursuit on this occasion. However, some of the baser sort of men, and even some rascally *qezelbāš*, set off in pursuit in the hope of obtaining loot. They caught up with a number of poor wretches who had not been able to bring themselves to abandon their mules and camels, and slew the men and carried off their animals.

Some five hundred Ottoman fugitives lost their way in the darkness, and found themselves in the morning among the gardens surrounding the small town of Ṭasūj. They offered gold to one of the locals to guide them to safety, but this man, being a loyal supporter of the Safavid house, led them straight into the central square of Ṭasūj and aroused the townspeople, who set upon the Ottomans. The Ottomans were so exhausted that a single civilian, without any military weapons and armed only with a cudgel or a blacksmith's hammer, was able to overcome three or four fully armed Ottomans, disarm them, and kill them. In this way, the people of Ṭasūj completely wiped out this group of Ottomans, and appropriated all their belongings. The Kurds harassed the retreating Ottomans all the way to Albāq and Salmās; if they spared their lives, they stripped them of their clothes.

By midnight, the whole *qezelbāš* army realized that the Ottomans had flown, and they poured into the Ottoman camp to plunder. They were busy looting until morning, and those who penetrated furthest into the Ottoman camp reported that they had found tents still fully carpeted, with treasure chests still in place, camels still lying in front of the tents, and horses still in the stables. These were the property of those who had been killed or captured in the battle, or had fled from the battlefield, and the Ottomans in the camp had been too preoccupied with the problem of their own survival to think of touching them. They had taken with them whatever they could of their own stock of cash and precious articles and abandoned their other possessions.

Pīr Sultan Qazāqlū entered the Ottoman commander in chief's tent early in the evening and sent the following report back to the Shah: "In the commander in chief's private tent I found a quantity of gold and silver coins which he had dropped there, and his ring lying at the side of his bed, and a jeweled sword, of the type worn by emirs, which he had left behind. I went on into his treasury tent, which was large and lofty; treasure chests, covered with velvet and brocade cloths, were piled all round the sides of the tent, and most of them were still locked. I opened one or two, and found them full of personal belongings and fine linens. Since I had only one man with me, we brought a string of camels from the stables and loaded fourteen chests on to them, without knowing what was inside the chests. I then left the tent, carrying the sword I mentioned above." After Pīr Sultan left, men poured into the camp from all sides in search of plunder; someone seized the commander in chief's personal standard, which was embellished with gold and precious stones and lapis lazuli; to it was affixed a silk pennant on which the Ottoman secretaries had inscribed a suitable exordium, Koranic verses, and traditions; the man who had grabbed it took it to show to the Shah.

Since most nobles keep in their treasure chests letters and other documents which are a source of family pride, the fact they abandoned these is an eloquent indication of the panic in which the Ottomans departed. Enormous quantities of booty were carried off by the rank and file of the Safavid army without anyone's having any tally of it. Some of the Safavid officers who brought their loot to the Shah for inspection were allowed to keep it all. Pīrī Sultan Qazāqlū was one of them. Barḵordār Beg Anīs, the commander in chief of the artillery, was ordered to take charge of the Ottoman artillery, and about one hundred pieces of all kinds were captured.

After this victory, the Shah sent his heavy baggage to Tabriz and marched toward Salmās. Moṣṭafā Beg Maḥmūdī, who had adopted a rebellious posture at Mākū, now presented himself to the Shah with a sword slung round his neck and was pardoned. Another of the Kurdish rebels, Zeynal Beg Maḥmūdī, the kinsman of Soleymān Beg and governor of Ḵošāb, was also received with favor and given a royal decree conferring on him the district of Ḵošāb. Emir Khan Čūlāq Barādūst, who was a protégé of the Shah's, came from his fief at Orūmīya and prostrated himself. The Shah, in the interest of placating the rest of the wild Kurds, as a matter of military expediency overlooked the fact that he had failed to assist him in the recent campaign. Zakarīā Khan Ḥakkārī sent envoys to the Shah's court to congratulate him on his victory and to renew his pledges of allegiance, but the envoys were given a rough reception by the Shah, who said he would believe Zakarīā Khan's protestations of fealty only when he came to court in person, freely and of his own accord, without any ideas of getting more land grants. Zakarīā Khan, frightened by this brusque reply, decided there was no alternative but to go to court; he set off for Salmās in considerable trepidation.

Since the Shah had already spent twenty days at Salmās and had dealt with all urgent matters there, and since the weather was turning colder, he decided to depart for Tabriz, leaving some of the great emirs at Salmās with instructions to welcome Zakarīā Khan and bring him to Tabriz. Zakarīā Khan was duly received by the Shah at Tabriz, delivered his gifts, and was welcomed with marks of royal favor. For several days he was admitted to the Shah's private banquets and gatherings, and was then given permission to leave, loaded with gifts from the Shah which included magnificent robes of honor; dagger and sword belts of gold, studded with pearls and rubies; pedigreed Arabian horses with jeweled saddles and bridles; fine linens and precious stuffs; gold decanters and goblets; and the like. His nephew, Ḥasan Beg, the governor of Albāq, was also at the Shah's order awarded robes of honor and sent on his way contented.

After his precipitate retreat, Jeḡāl-oḡlū reached Vān with a handful of men. But hearing of the Shah's march to Salmās, he retreated farther to Dīār Bakr. On the way, he met Jān Fūlād-oḡlū; one day, in the course of conversation; Jeḡāl-oḡlū upbraided him for his delay in coming to his assistance and, at a signal from the commander in chief, some of his men fell on him, killed him, and threw his head into the camp of the Aleppo contingent, which was mainly composed of soldiers of fortune devoid of breeding and lineage. These men promptly panicked and set off for Aleppo. After this incident, a band of men gathered around his son and became rebels, and their subsequent history will be given in the section on Jalālīs, Jeḡāl-oḡlū proceeded to Dīār Bakr, whence he sent a report to the Ottoman Sultan; he died there shortly afterward.

The Dispatch from Nak̲čevān to Khorasan and Ḡarjestān of an Expedition under Jahāngīr Khan, Moḥammad Salīm Sultan Özbeg and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā

The reader will recall that Bāqī Khan's annexation of Balk̲ had caused a number of Uzbeg princes and emirs to seek sanctuary with Shah 'Abbas: Jahāngīr Khan, the son of Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan; Moḥammad Salīm Sultan, the son of Pīr Moḥammad Khan Özbeg; Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, formerly *dīvānbegī* and chief minister at Balk̲; Shah K̲āja; Šīr-afkan Mīrzā; 'Arab *atālīq;* and others. The reader will also recall that the Shah's expedition to Balk̲ in 1010/1602 ended in failure.

This year, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā put the following plan before the Shah: He suggested that he, in the company of the Uzbeg princes, should proceed to Khorasan, and that those places and forts in Ḡarjestān held by dependents of the Safavids should be made over to Jahāngīr Khan. With the help of the Khorasan emirs, they would then proceed to the conquest of the rest of Ḡarjestān, which was Uzbeg-occupied territory and contained many strong forts. Once they had secured Ḡarjestān as their base, they would attempt to recapture Balḵ. The Shah, however, who had committed himself to the reconquest of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, did not want to get involved at that time in operations on the borders of Khorasan; he wanted to postpone the implementation of this plan until after the successful conclusion of his campaign in the west.

Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā insisted that they would never have a better opportunity, because Bāqī Khan had just died and his brother, Moḥammad Khan, had not yet succeeded in establishing himself as ruler. The latter was fully occupied with dealing with problems in Transoxania, and it was not yet clear whether he would succeed in establishing himself at Balḵ and other places this side of the Oxus. At the moment, Balḵ could easily be recovered, but the opportunity would soon pass. Since these arguments seemed to be sound and the plan not unrealistic, and since Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā was well informed about what was going on in Transoxania, the Shah acquiesced and fitted the princes out with what they needed for the expedition. Orders were sent to Ḥoseyn Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, and to other emirs in the region, instructing them to place themselves at the service of the Uzbeg princes and to hand over to them all the forts held by the Jamšīdī tribe and other dependents of the Safavids.

The Uzbegs took their leave of the Shah on the banks of the Aras near Naḵčevān. One of their companions, Shah Ḵ̆āja, wished to remain at the Shah's side, and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā gave his consent to this because it would be useful for his party to have a friend at court. His party was still at Qazvin when they received news of the Shah's victory at Ṣūfīān. Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and his companions left their womenfolk at Qazvin and rode to Herat, where they were detained for a while by Ḥoseyn Khan until he had made all necessary preparations for their expedition. At the beginning of the Year of the Horse (1014/1606), when the Shah opened his campaign in Qarābāḡ and laid siege to Ganja, Ḥoseyn Khan equipped the princes with a force consisting mainly of Šāmlūs and sent them off to Ḡarjestān. The takeover of the forts in Ḡarjestān proceeded according to plan. All the elders and chiefs came to visit Jahāngīr Khan, and most of the commandants of forts and chiefs of the local tribes, the Hazārajāt and Ṣadajāt, tendered their allegiance to him. Jahāngīr Khan's strength gradually increased to the point that Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā determined to march against Balḵ.

The Shah's Campaign in Qarābāḡ and the Capture of Ganja

The campaigning year 1014/1605 had been a long and hard one, though crowned with the great victory at Ṣūfīān, and the men naturally longed to see their families and their homes, but not one of the emirs or Shah's personal attendants dared to broach the subject of leave, for the Shah's mind was inexorably set on the reconquest of Qarābāḡ and nothing would deflect him from this course.

The Shah marched from Tabriz in the depths of winter, when mountains and plains were white with snow, when ice prevented the animals from getting a grip on uneven ground, and when people were thinking of their firesides and cozy winter quarters, and no one dreamed of the possibility of military operations. Allāhverdī Khan was sent to Fārs to raise an army for service in the spring. The troops from Khorasan were sent on leave, and some other units, whose equipment was deficient because of the length of the campaign, had to be sent on leave with orders to report for duty in the spring. Ḥasan Khan Ostājlū, the governor of Hamadan, who had been sent to guard the frontier in the Baghdad area, was recalled, and made his way to the Shah's camp, men and animals plunging and stumbling through snowdrifts the whole way.

On arrival at Ardabīl, the Shah visited the tombs of his ancestors and invoked their aid. At the beginning of Ramażān 1014/January 1606, the Shah moved to Kalḵ̌orān, the burial place of Sultan Jebrā'īl,[23] where he stayed several days to deal with urgent matters. One of these concerned the maladministration of Khorasan. The Shah had received reports that local governors and tax collectors in Khorasan had been levying more than the statutory amount of taxes and embezzling the difference. The Shah appointed an experienced civil servant to the post of *vazīr-e koll*[24] of Khorasan, with full authority to check these abuses. The man chosen for this job was Ḵ̌āja Moḥammad Šafī', the *vazīr-e koll* of the province of Gīlān; he was a distinguished vizier, and was styled Mīrzā 'Ālamīānī. He held his new appointment in addition to his other positions and made a full inquiry into the financial administration of Khorasan, appointing and dismissing tax collectors and *kalāntars* as he thought fit.

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[23] The father of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn; died 656/1258.

[24] Principal vizier—i.e., taking precedence over other officials in Khorasan holding the rank of vizier (see Savory, "Some Notes on the Provincial Administration of the Early Safavid Empire."

There was a general shortage of food this year on the borders of Azerbaijan; in Qarābāḡ, agriculture had been interrupted by the military operations conducted by the *qezelbāš*, and no crops had been sown. To guard against any shortage of supplies of grain for the army, the Shah ordered the officials of the supreme *dīvān* to indent for twenty thousand *ḵarvārs*, each of one hundred *man*, to be provided by those areas of Azerbaijan which had an abundance. This grain was to be transported to the royal camp by peasants using their own donkeys, and the price was fixed at five thousand Shah 'Abbas *dīnārs* per *ḵarvār*. In addition, in view of the distance involved, each peasant was to receive one Iraqi *tomān* per *ḵarvār* to cover the cost of transportation. Special collectors were appointed and dispatched to see to this task.

From Kalḵorān the Shah moved to Arasbār, on the Aras River, where he lodged at the house of Ḵalaf Beg the tailor in order to observe the fast for the remainder of the month of Ramażān. From Arasbār, he sent letters to the pasha, *qāżī, moftī,* and garrison of Ganja; he called their attention to the fact that Azerbaijan and Šīrvān were his hereditary territories, which the Ottomans had overrun after the death of Shah Tahmasp, thereby breaking a peace treaty confirmed by the most solemn oaths and covenants. "Now," continued the Shah, "I have resolved to retake these provinces, and nothing will shake this resolve. So far, my efforts have been uniformly successful. Jeḡāl-oḡlū and his great army have been put to flight. You cannot expect any reinforcements to reach you this year. In the circumstances, it is not only your legal duty but only common sense to cease hostilities and not to defend the fort. Anyone who has dependents in this province and wishes to stay here can come to my court without fear, and I will extend my mercy to him. Anyone who wishes to leave and take his family and possessions with him may go in peace, without fear of being molested by my men. On the other hand, if you resist, no quarter will be granted after I capture the fort. Whatever calamity you suffer will be upon your own heads." The Shah then crossed the Aras, advancing slowly and hunting as he went, to give the garrison at Ganja time to accept his terms. But the Ottomans refused to heed his advice and put the fort in a state of defense.

Toward the end of this year, the governorship of the Kakhetia region of Georgia was awarded to Ṭahmūraṣ, the grandson of Alexander Khan. When the Shah was in camp at Kürek Čay, he had been visited by the Georgian nobles who had opposed Kūstandīl Khan and who now offered their allegiance to the Shah and asked forgiveness for their shortcomings; in addition, they besought the Shah that Ṭahmūraṣ b. Dā'ūd Khan b. Alexander Khan, who was at the Shah's court, be appointed ruler of Kakhetia, and they pledged themselves to serve Ṭahmūraṣ. In return, they undertook to bring to the Shah's court two other grandsons of Alexander Khan then in Georgia, to demonstrate the genuineness of their protestations. On receipt of these two princes, the Shah had agreed to give Ṭahmūraṣ Khan permission to return with them to Georgia.

To set the Georgians at ease, the Shah had summoned the great emirs and the principal officers of state to a royal fete, at which Ṭahmūraṣ was officially proclaimed ruler of Kakhetia with the style of khan. It is the custom of the Georgians, whenever one of their princes enters into his royal inheritance, to perform the following ceremony: A monk (who in the Christian religion is equivalent to a spiritual guide [*moršed*]) and a group of Georgian elders spread out a brocade rug and seat their prince on it. Each man carries a tray of gold and silver coins and, while the prince stands on this carpet, flings handfuls of the coins to the assembled company. They then kneel before him and offer him a drinking cup, which he in turn offers to those present.

On this occasion, when the Georgians reached the point in the ceremony at which the trays of money are distributed, the Shah, after inquiring about the significance of the custom, intervened to announce that he would first distribute largesse himself. He had trays of gold and silver containing gold and jewels brought for him to distribute. The emirs and others present then followed suit and distributed largesse commensurate with their rank. After this, the Georgian nobles distributed gold and silver coins and circulated the drinking cup in accordance with their tradition. The Shah, in order to divert his guests, devoted the whole day to merrymaking with the Georgians, whose songs and speech were not devoid of strange expressions. They then departed, replete with royal favors.

Toward the end of February 1606, the Shah reached Ganja and camped near the tomb of Shaikh Neẓāmī.[25] He ordered the commander in chief of artillery, Barḵordār Beg Anīs, to start casting cannon, using the molds which had been constructed at Bargošāṭ. Qarčaqāy

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[25] The celebrated 11th-century Persian poet.

Beg and some of the other emirs were ordered to reconnoiter the area of the fort and to determine a suitable place for the royal camp and sites for the breastworks. First of all, in order to deny the enemy ingress and egress, the Shah had a blockhouse built facing the main gates of the fort, and stationed there 'Alī Khan Movāfeq and Qanbar Beg the chief swordbearer, with a detachment of *ḡolāms* and musketeers. While the Shah was still waiting for the gun molds to arrive and for sufficient material for the breastworks to be collected, the year came to an end.

Another event which occurred this year was the death of the Mogul emperor, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar. Akbar had fallen ill at his capital, Agra, and the labors of his physicians had been without success. As the Koran says, "When their time is come, they cannot delay it or anticipate it by a single minute."[26] His son Salīm was on his way to Agra from Allahabad but failed to reach there before his father died. The majority of the Mogul emirs and nobles preferred Sultan K̲osrow, Salīm's son and a favorite of Akbar's, as the new emperor, but Shaikh Farīd Bak̲šī, a leading emir, and a few of the other principal officers of state opposed this choice. They went to Salīm and proferred their allegiance to him. The other emirs then realized that to put Akbar's grandson on the throne while his eldest son was alive would cause certain difficulties, and so they abandoned the idea.

K̲osrow, who had ambitions in regard to the throne, fled from Agra toward Lahore and the Punjab when he saw which way the wind was blowing, and Salīm marched in pursuit of him at top speed. On arrival at Lahore, K̲osrow collected a force of some twenty thousand men composed of Čaḡatays, Hazāras, Afghans, Rajputs and others. Shaikh Farīd, who led the vanguard of Salīm's forces, joined battle with K̲osrow; after hard fighting, K̲osrow's troops broke and ran as more and more of Salīm's troops came up and entered the fray. The Rajputs alone stood their ground, and were virtually annihilated. K̲osrow fled across the Lahore River, but was recognized by the boatmen, who informed Qelīj Khan, the governor of Lahore. Qelīj Khan gave K̲osrow assurances of good treatment and presented him to his father when the latter reached Lahore. Salīm then returned in triumph to Agra and ascended the throne. The poet Seyyed Moḥammad Kermānī composed the following chronogram to mark his accession:

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[26] Koran, 10:50, etc.

"In the place of the Emperor Akbar sits his son, Salīm."[27] Ḵāja Šo'eyb Jowšaqānī devised another chronogram: "The death of the Emperor Akbar"; although this gives the year 1015 instead of the correct date, 1014, the poet gives the reader a clue in the preceding hemistich as to how to arrive at the correct date.

I have it on reliable authority that a large number of Ḵosrow's men who were taken prisoner were hanged, and that Shah Salīm told his son to go to the place of execution and amuse himself by arranging his men in order. Sultan Ḵosrow replied that it was he who was to blame, not these innocent men, and that if anyone were hanged, it should be himself, and he begged his father to release him from his shame and tribulation. His father spared his life but ordered him to be blinded by having a red-hot iron passed before his eyes. Salīm took no revenge on those of his father's emirs and principal officers of state who had supported Ḵosrow. Ḵosrow himself was placed in the custody of the officers of the harem. Apparently the prince's sight was not damaged by the red-hot iron.

Although the events related above have no direct connection with the history of Iran, which is my primary objective, nevertheless, since the events themselves are important, and since the Mogul dynasty has a long tradition of diplomatic relations with the Safavid dynasty, it is not really so inappropriate to relate these events; the author will not, he hopes, incur criticism for so doing.

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[27] The Persian text, *be-jā-ye akbar šāh pādešāh-zāda salīm*, yields the correct date-1014/1605.

Events of the Year of the Horse, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1015/1606-07, the Twentieth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas; These Events Include the Capture of the Fortress at Ganja

New Year's Day this year occurred on Saturday, 15 Ẕu'l-Qa'da 1014/24 March 1606.[1] The Shah was in Qarābāğ, a region whose damp climate keeps it green and springlike both summer and winter. Having celebrated the New Year festival in his camp near the tomb of Neẓāmī, he marched to Ganja. The task of constructing breastworks was allocated, and each section of the army was allotted the task of digging trenches for itself. Fresh detachments of troops began to arrive, and the gunners busied themselves with casting cannon. Meanwhile, the defenders directed constant fire on their attackers from cannon, muskets, and heavy siege guns. In order to preclude the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the *qezelbāš*, and thus to compel their men to exert themselves to the maximum, the Ottomans put to death Rostam Sultan Söklen Ẕu'l-Qadar, a prisoner of war who had been held at the fort for two years, and also executed an innocent Māzandarānī *seyyed,* a kinsman of the Shah's maternal grandfather, Mīr Bozorg, who resided in the city of Ganja and was much esteemed there. None of these strategems had any effect, however, because God willed otherwise.

By the time the cannon had been cast, the breastworks had been pushed forward to the edge of the ditch where the guns were to be placed, and protective earthworks were constructed. The struggle went on for several months. On one occasion, an Ottoman sortie against the sector held by Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan surprised his men, who suffered some casualties. On several other occasions, the Ottomans attacked the sector held by Ḥoseyn Khan Ostājlū but were thrown back. In the fourth month of the siege, a number of heavy siege guns went into action and began to make an impression on the towers and walls. At this juncture, Allāhverdī Khan arrived with the army of Fārs and took up his position on the east side of the fort. He pushed forward breastworks from that side too. Meanwhile, *qūrčīs, ğolāms,* and others had been active in digging mines under the walls of the fort, starting from the ditch. They had succeeded in excavating about five hundred cubits of the actual foundations of the fort and in shoring up the wall with timbers. They then set fire to the timbers, and the wall above came crashing down. The defenders rushed to repair the breach, but fire from Safavid musketeers prevented them from doing so.

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[1] For once, our extraordinarily accurate author seems to have slipped up. The year 1013 was a leap year, so New Year's Day 1014 would have fallen on 13 Ẕu'l-Qa'da/22 March 1606. Incidentally, 15 Ẕu'l-Qa'da was a Friday, and the 13th a Wednesday.

A group of *qūrčīs* made a determined assault on one of the strongest towers in the fort, known as the Čahār Ṭāq tower, and swarmed up it despite the hail of musketfire from the defenders, who also hurled down pots of naphtha and gunpowder on the heads of the *qūrčīs*. Some of the latter had their faces and hair burned to such an extent that it was impossible to distinguish a formerly bearded man from a beardless youth; others were killed. But the *qūrčīs* continued to press their assault undeterred, and in the late afternoon a few intrepid fellows succeeded in getting a foothold at the top of the tower. Shah 'Abbas was concerned at the casualties suffered by his crack troops, the *qūrčīs,* in this dauntless attack; he saw no need for such haste and reprimanded the *qūrčībāšī* for ordering the assault, saying that one *qūrčī* was worth more than ten towers. Despite the losses they had suffered from artillery and musketfire and from naphtha pots, the *qūrčīs* hung on to the tower and claimed to have wounded one hundred and fifty Ottomans and killed seventy or eighty others. Following this success, the *ğolāms* of the royal household made an assault from their positions, stormed several towers on the rampart, and began to make breaches in the wall of the citadel itself.

The Ottoman garrison, which had received no aid during the months of the siege, realized that its position was desperate. The commandant, Moḥammad Pasha, exhorted his men to further efforts, but the attackers passed beyond the towers of the ramparts and pressed their attack on the inner citadel. The *ğāzīs* and *ğolāms* stormed several of the main towers, and the garrison cried for quarter and sent an envoy to the Shah to negotiate, but the Shah refused to listen, since their case had already been decided. The next day, Monday[2] 28 Ṣafar 1015/5 July 1606, the Pasha and his officers came out of the fort and prostrated themselves before the Shah.

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[2] 28 Ṣafar was a Wednesday.

They were allowed to return to their quarters that night, but they left the keys of the fort with the *ġolāms* of the royal household, and no guard was mounted on the walls. Qarčaqāy Beg and a detachment of *ġolāms* entered the fort that night and mounted guard there. The following day, the names of all the members of the garrison were recorded and the prisoners were paraded before the Shah. Each batch of prisoners was handed over to a regiment of *qūrčīs* or *ġolāms*, who stripped them of their possessions and divided these among themselves, according to their rank.

Moḥammad Pasha, the commandant, had entered Ottoman service as a young man; he was a protégé of Aḥmad Pasha, the governor of Vān, who had raised him to the rank of pasha and given him a governorship. Since he was a Tabrīzī by birth, the inhabitants of Tabriz asked the Shah to hand him over to them for execution. The sons of Rostam Sultan Söklen also petitioned the Shah to allow them to put him to death in retaliation for the Pasha's murder of their father. The Shah, however, gave priority to preserving the personal inviolability of *seyyeds*, and handed Moḥammad Pasha over to the Māzandarānīs for execution as prescribed by the religious law, in retaliation for his murder of the Māzandarānī *seyyed*. A few Ottomans who had declared their "love for the Shah" and had left the citadel before the final assault were pardoned. The rest were massacred to a man, since some of them were renegades, natives of that region who had entered Ottoman service, and the Shah's wrath against the whole garrison was implacable. The camp at Ḥasan Čāy was piled high with heaps of corpses, two thousand five hundred in number. A few men of lowly status, who had acted as camp servants, were spared. The poet Żīā-ye Nūrollāhī, the grandson of Mīrzā Aḥmad Kofrānī Eṣfahānī, devised the excellent chronogram: "The capture of Ganja is the key to Šamāḵī."[3]

Miscellaneous Events: The Capture of the Forts of Lori, Tiflis, and Tūmānūs; Events Subsequent to the Capture of Ganja and the Subjugation of Qarābāġ

The governor of Qarābāġ, Ḥoseyn Khan Qājār, was dismissed from his post for improper conduct, after complaints had been received from the people of Qarābāġ. He was replaced by Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oġlū Qājār.

[3] The words "the key to Šamāḵī" yield the date 1015/1606.

After the capture of Ganja, the Shah turned his attention to the forts at Lori, Tiflis, and Tūmānūs. When he reached Aḥsanābād, the commandants of these forts abandoned all thought of resistance. First, Moḥammad Pasha Qazāqlū, the commandant at Lori, hitherto a loyal servant of the Ottoman Sultan, was obliged to offer his submission to the Shah through the mediation of Moḥammad Beg Begdelū Šāmlū, an officer who was close to the Shah. If the Shah would forget his past, he said, he would come and prostrate himself. The Shah, convinced of his sincerity, sent his officers to bring him to court, where he was presented by the emirs and *moqarrabs*. The Shah loaded him with gifts—royal robes of honor, a *qezelbāš tāj*, jeweled swordbelt, a horse with a jeweled ṣaddle, and more. Moḥammad Pasha handed over the keys of the fort at Lori, and the Shah sent men to take charge of the fort and of the cannon and other equipment there.

Next, the Shah received humble supplications from the garrison at Tūmānūs to the effect that, if the Shah would spare their lives, they would surrender the fort. The Shah granted their request and decreed that anyone who wished to remain in Qarābāğ should receive double the pay and income from fiefs[4] which they had received from the Ottomans; on the other hand, anyone who wished to leave was free to depart unmolested with his family and possessions. The garrison accepted these terms joyfully, and hastened to present themselves at court. Those who opted to leave were allowed to depart in peace; those who opted to stay found their highest expectations fulfilled.

Third, when the Shah reached the Alget River on the borders of Georgia, 'Abd al-Laṭīf Pasha, the governor of Tiflis, and his senior officers, having noted well the distinction between the Shah's wrath and the Shah's mercy, as shown by the contrast between his treatment of the garrison at Ganja and the garrisons at Lori and Tūmānūs, followed the example of the latter and tendered their submission. The Shah sent letters by the hand of the chief herald, Ḥoseyn Beg Qūr Ẕu'l-Qadar, granting them an amnesty. Although the Pasha and his officers were well aware that the Shah never broke his promises, and that persons to whom the Shah granted amnesty would not be molested by the *qezelbāš*, nevertheless, mindful of the Koranic verse "[I ask this] that my heart may be set at rest,"[5] in order to set at rest the minds of their troops and in order to preserve their own honor and to obtain recognition of the fact that the status of the fort at Tiflis was superior to that of the other forts, asked the Shah to send a high-ranking emir to take the fort and escort them to court.

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[4] *Tīmār*, a category of small fiefs the revenues from which were used to pay Ottoman troops (see Gibb and Bowen, pp. 47ff.).

[5] Koran, 2:261.

The Shah detailed ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū for this task. When the latter neared Tiflis, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Pasha and his officers came out to receive him. They handed the fort over to him, and spent several days purchasing mules to transport themselves and their belongings. ʿAlīqolī Khan stationed a detachment of Šāmlūs and musketeers in the fort and escorted the Pasha and his fellow officers to the Shah's camp at Alget-čay, where they were received with great favor and awarded gifts commensurate with their rank. Some of the officers elected to stay and were given excellent postings. The Pasha and other officers who elected to return to Ottoman territory were escorted to the frontier. The Shah then visited the fort in person and made a thorough examination of its strong and weak points.

The fortress of Tiflis stands on the slopes of a high mountain, which rises to the heavens behind the fort. The Kor River, which for most of its course maintains a generally west-east alignment until it joins the Aras in Šīrvān and the two rivers debouch into the Caspian Sea, in the vicinity of Tiflis alters its direction and runs north-south; it flows south of the fort at Tiflis and then adopts an easterly course. Within the precincts of the city and the fort, the course of the river is flanked by a high stone wall; where the river meets the mountain on the slopes of which the fort stands, it is spanned by a strong bridge that carries the highroad to the interior of Georgia. The city of Tiflis is situated to the west of this bridge. From the mountain, there issues an abundance of springs, some seventy or eighty of which are hot springs. In former times, both Muslim rulers and infidel Georgian princes built domes over these hot springs, and these now constitute the public baths for the inhabitants of Tiflis. Some of these bathhouses are situated within the fort, but the majority are outside. Today, some thirty or forty of these bathhouses are actually in operation, and others could be brought into use.

The fort has always been considered to be impregnable because it is protected on three sides by the mountain, and on the remaining side by the waters of the Kor. Its physical surroundings are such that there is no suitable camp site within the environs of the city or the fort. That this fort, which is the key to the control of the provinces of

Georgia and Šīrvān, should be captured with such remarkable ease can be attributed only to God's help and the good fortune of the Shah. The inhabitants of the city of Tiflis are mostly Christians, Armenians, and Georgians, with a small Muslim minority. There are many ancient Christian churches and places of worship in the city and the surrounding area.

While the Shah was engaged in his campaign in Georgia, there occurred the death of Gorgīn Khan, the son of Samā'ūn Khan, the ruler of Kartlia. A number of Georgian nobles visited the Shah to report this to him, and the Shah appointed Gorgīn's son, Lūārsāb Khan, ruler of Kartlia, and styled him "my son." The Shah sent splendid gifts to the new ruler and to the women of the royal household, and he instructed one of the *moqarrabs*, Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū, to go to Kartlia and see to the welfare of the dependents of the deceased. Moḥammad Beg returned within a few days, bringing with him a number of princes and Georgian nobles who were overwhelmed by the tangible marks of the Shah's generosity and returned to their own country happy and contented. Additional gifts were also sent to Lūārsāb Khan.

The governorship of Tiflis, and the post of commandant of the fort, were given to Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū, known as Delī Moḥammad, who was allotted a detachment of musketeers from troops of the royal household. All supplies of weapons, equipment, and munitions from the forts at Lori and Tūmānūs were removed and taken to the fort at Erīvān. The Shah then proceeded to Erīvān, with the intention of repairing the fort there as a preliminary to the reconquest of Šīrvān, provided the Ottomans sent no reinforcements to their garrisons there. The Shah marched from Tiflis to Gökča Deñiz[6] in ten days, over a route of formidable difficulty through the Aḳtābād[7] Mountains; the route lay through forests so dense that the light of day hardly percolated through.

One of the administrative changes this year involved the dismissal from the *ṣadārat* of Emir Abu'l-Valī Enjū Šīrāzī, and the appointment in his place of Qāżī Khan the son of Mīrzā Borhān, an eminent Sab'ī Ḥasanī *seyyed* of Qazvin and a descendant of Qāżī Jahān, the vizier of Shah Tahmasp. Some of Emir Abu'l-Valī's employees had, without the *ṣadr's* knowledge, been guilty of embezzlement of funds belonging to the shrine at Mašhad; they had been emboldened to commit this crime by the *ṣadr*'s dislike of unpleasantness and his consequent tendency to keep himself aloof from the actual administration of the shrine revenues. Some important districts, such as Isfahan, Qom, Yazd, and Kashan, were constituted as a separate jurisdiction, and the office of *ṣadr* in these areas was conferred on Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan Ṣalā'ī Eṣfahānī, a learned *seyyed* from the metropolitan district of Isfahan, whose forebears had had a distinguished record of public service under the Safavid dynasty.

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[6] The large lake lying east of Erīvān.
[7] See *TM*, p. 167.

The Restoration of the Fort at Erīvān and Various Incidents Which Occurred before the Ṣhah Decided to Subjugate Šīrvān

On his arrival at Gökča Deñiz, the Shah kept with him Allāhverdī Khan and some of his personal retainers and *moqarrabs*, and sent all the rest of his troops, under the command of Allāhqolī Beg, the *qūrčībāšī*, to Erīvān to repair the fort there. The Shah himself marched in leisurely fashion toward Naḵčevān via Sīsḥān, hunting as he went.

About this time, the Shah received representations from Samā'ūn Khan, the former ruler of Georgia who had been carried off to Istanbul by the Ottomans. A Georgian woman named Golčehra had been in the service of dependents of the Safavid house during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, had returned with Samā'ūn to Georgia after the death of Tahmasp, and had been sent with Samā'ūn to Istanbul by the women of the Georgian royal house. Golčehra, by dint of knowing her way around and how to conduct herself as a servant, had insinuated herself into the service of Vāleda Sultan, the mother of the Ottoman Sultan Moḥammad III, who had great political influence. After she had been at Istanbul for a considerable time, a group of Ottoman viziers and principal officers of state, at the instigation of Darvīš Pasha the grand vizier, sent her and a *čavoš* to the Shah on behalf of Samā'ūn Khan, with the following message: "Just rulers have also placed the security and welfare of the people of the world above their material aspirations. Enmity and strife between two powerful kings causes destruction to their realms, disrupts the lives of the common people, and causes needless bloodshed." The message went on to appeal to the Shah to terminate his hostilities against the Ottoman Sultan so that he might acquire renown in this world and reward in the next. In return, the Ottoman officials, and in particular Darvīš Pasha, pledged themselves to work for peace.

The Shah in his reply reminded Samā'ūn Khan and the Ottoman senior officials that a lengthy period of peace had existed between Shah Tahmasp and the Ottoman Sultan Süleymān II and his successor Selīm II. This peace had been broken after the death of Shah Tahmasp by the Ottomans, who had seen their opportunity to take advantage of Iran's internal problems and to occupy Iranian territory. The Shah said he was now merely seeking to recover that territory. If the Ottoman Sultan was prepared to make peace on the basis of the *status quo ante* as regards borders, he was ready to conclude peace for the benefit of God's servants. Otherwise, he would continue to wage war until he had achieved all his objectives.

Another event which occurred this year was a raid by Emir Gūna Khan's troops into Ottoman territory as far as Vān and 'Ādeljavāz in retaliation for the incursion by the Ottomans the previous year into the Gökča Deñiz area and their plundering of several villages belonging to the Emir. A considerable number of local chieftains visited Emir Gūna Khan both to demonstrate their loyalty and to obtain various objectives they had in mind, and Emir Gūna Khan, acting as their intermediary, took them to meet the Shah at his camp near Naḵčevān. They included various Kurdish chiefs of the Maḥmūdī tribe, such as 'Abdollāh Beg, governor of Ḵ̆ošāb; Zeynal Khan, governor of Qarā Ḥeṣār; Moṣṭafā Beg, governor of Mākū; Zeynal Beg, governor of Čors; and ambassadors from the Ottoman vassal governors in the area, such as Mīr Šaraf, governor of Jazīra; Żīā al-Dīn Khan, son of Šaraf Khan, governor of Tiflis; and Zakarīā Khan Ḥakkārī.

Emir Gūna Khan was ordered to join the other emirs at Erīvān, and the various chieftains were received graciously by the Shah. Zeynal Beg was confirmed as governor of Čors, and Moṣṭafā Beg as governor of Mākū; the latter received a cash bonus of two hundred royal Iraqi gold *tomān*. The case of 'Abdollāh Beg presented greater difficulty. 'Abdollāh Beg, after the death of his brother Soleymān Beg, had assumed the position of head of the tribe and governor of Ḵ̆ošāb. His cousin Zeynal Khan had been hostile toward Soleymān Beg, and had wrested Qarā Ḥeṣār from the latter by force. This Zeynal Khan, after the Shah's victorious campaign against Jeḡāloḡlū, had presented himself to the Shah at Salmās and had been favored by the Bāyandor sultans[8] and allowed to maintain his position as independent governor of Ordūbād. After the accession of Shah Esma'il I, because of the slanders of envious men and persons with an ulterior motive, he went into voluntary exile to Egypt. Eventually, Shah Esma'il happened to pass through Ordūbād[9] and inquired why the magnificent residences he saw there were in such a state of decay. Ḥoseyn Beg Lala, one of the Shah's close companions, told him the whole story. He also mentioned that Malek Bahrām was a kinsman of the secretary K̲āja 'Atīq who, when Esma'il emerged from Gīlān to make his bid for power, was the first man to affix his endorsement to Esma'il's letters of appointment. This information increased the Shah's interest in the case, and he wrote a friendly letter to Malek Bahrām, calling on him to return to his native land. Malek Bahrām did so and set about putting his affairs in order.

Under Shah Tahmasp, Malek Bahrām was regarded with even greater favor, and was appointed *kalāntar* at Ordūbād. Shah Tahmasp was very much attached to Ordūbād, so much so that he had the finest artists embellish the portico of the Čehel Sotūn palace at Qazvin with a landscape painting of the area. The Shah frequently went fishing in the waters of the Aras, and on such occasions he used to stay at Ordūbād at the home of Malek Bahrām, who entertained him royally and consequently rose still higher in the Shah's favor. The late Mīrzā Kāfī,[10] the secretary, because he was a relative of Malek Bahrām, was appointed *monšī al-mamālek* (state scribe)[11] by Shah Tahmasp, and for some years was the confidant and close companion of the Shah. In short, by virtue of their excellent service to the Safavid dynasty, the Ordūbādīs usually had one of their number in this high office.

Malek Bahrām, when he was well into his eighties, decided to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina and the resting places of the Imams, but he died en route between Damascus and Medina. His son Adham Beg, who was with his father, buried Malek Bahrām where he died, at a place called Qal'a-ye Ḥeydar. When Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī later went on a pilgrimage (976/1568),[12] Malek Bahrām's eldest son Mīrak Beg was in the emir's retinue, and he removed his father's body and had it reinterred at Medina.

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[8] The Aq Qoyūnlū dynasty, at the height of their power in Iran, 1467-78 (see Savory, *Struggle).*

[9] On the Aras River, southeast of Nak̲čevān.

[10] Died 969/1561-62. He was a native of Ordūbād.

[11] See *TM*, p. 132.

[12] For his career, see Savory, Principal Offices II, pp. 75-76. He was killed in mysterious circumstances in 976/1568 while crossing Ottoman territory en route to Mecca and Medina.

At the time of his death, Malek Bahrām had five sons living, and I knew them all. Although biographical details about them are not strictly relevant to my history, nevertheless, as I indicated at the beginning of this section, my deep friendship for and devotion to this family compel me to give them. Malek Bahrām's eldest son was the Mīrak Beg mentioned above. When the latter first left Ordūbād, he entered the service of Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, under whom he held the offices of secretary *(monšī)* and army scribe *(laškar-nevīs).*[13] He eventually rose to the rank of vizier, a post in which he enjoyed full independence for a number of years. When Ma'ṣūm Beg, shriven as he was for the holy pilgrimage, was slain by the Ottomans, Mīrak Beg took charge of the martyred emir's dependents and looked after them. Finally, Mīrak Beg was appointed *majles-nevīs* (secretary of state)[14] at the court of Shah Tahmasp, and was thus able to continue to care for their welfare. While still in office, he died at Qom.

The second son of Malek Bahrām was Adham Beg, who was also a man of ability. After his father's death, Adham Beg completed the rites of the pilgrimage and then returned to court, where he began his training in bookkeeping. He was subsequently appointed *mostowfī* (accountant) in the financial administration of Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā,[15] and finally became the latter's vizier. When Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā was put to death by Shah Esma'il II in 984/1576, Adham Beg was out of a job for some time. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he was appointed *kalāntar* of Tabriz, an important post. But he left this office because of the arrogant and self-opinionated behavior of Emir Khan Torkmān and his financial officials, and retired to Ordūbād. When Emir Khan Torkmān was dismissed by Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā (992/1584) and subsequently executed, and 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū Ostājlū was made governor of Tabriz, the latter invited Adham Beg to resume his former position, and he ultimately became vizier to the governor.

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[13] See *TM*, pp. 141–42.

[14] See *TM*, p. 121. The *majles-nevīs*, also called *vāqe'a-nevīs*, was possibly the most important official in the bureaucracy after the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, and was sometimes termed *vazīr-e čap* in contradistinction from the latter, who was termed *vazīr-e rāst*.

[15] The fifth son of Shah Tahmasp; born ca. 964/1556–57, put to death by Shah Esma'il II in 984/1576.

After his accession, Shah 'Abbas executed 'Alīqolī Khan Fatḥ-oğlū Ostājlū, and Adham Beg was appointed vizier to Aslams Khan Tātī-oğlū Ẕu'l-Qadar, the keeper of the seal. Finally, he tired of worldly office, and turned his mind more to the acquiring of merit in the life to come. He retired for a while to the Ardabīl shrine, but after his eminent brother had expressed the wish to see him, he visited him in Iraq and decided to take up residence at Shiraz, where he received an annual pension, amounting to one hundred royal *tomān,* in the form of a tax immunity assigned on the revenues of Qaṣr al-Dašt near Shiraz. From Shiraz he again performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, and on several occasions performed the pilgrimage to Mašhad. He died at Shiraz in the Year of the Fowl, 1017/1608–09.

Malek Bahrām's third son was Ḥātem Bèg, who presently holds the office of vizier with the title of *e'temād al-dowla.* He succeeded his father as *kalāntar* of Ordūbād and discharged his duties admirably despite his youth. But he voluntarily left this post in disgust after disputes with a number of envious people. He went to the Shah's court and, some time afterward, became the vizier of Delī Būdāq Rūmlū, the governor of Ḵoy. After the dismissal of the latter, Ḥātem Beg was unemployed for a year or two, and lived at Ordūbād. After the accession of Shah Esma'il II, he took up residence near the Ardabīl shrine. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he was appointed vizier to Valī Khan Afšār, the governor of Kerman. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, Valī Khan came to court, and the governorship of Kerman devolved upon his son, Bektāš Khan; at the behest of Valī Khan, Ḥātem Beg had no choice but to remain at Kerman as vizier to Bektāš Khan.

As the reader will recall, the arrogant behavior of Bektāš Khan led to trouble between him and Ya'qūb Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar, the governor of Shiraz, himself not a model of humility. Eventually Ya'qūb Khan marched against Bektāš Khan, who was defeated and killed in a battle near Yazd. As a result of this incident, Ḥātem Beg's possessions were plundered, but Ya'qūb Khan, after he had met Ḥātem Beg, treated him with honor and took him back with him to Shiraz. When all this was reported to the Shah, and the royal army reached Isfahan, Shah 'Abbas sent a *qūrčī* to summon Ḥātem Beg to court. The Shah's intention was to rehabilitate Ḥātem Beg, but Ya'qūb Khan foolishly thought that the Shah had summoned him in order to make inquiries into what had happened to Bektāš Khan's treasuries and other possessions, and he could not decide whether to send him or not. But ultimately he had no alternative.

At the time when Farhād Khan marched from Shiraz to Kerman to deal with the revolt of Yūsof Khan Afšār at Kerman (998/1590), Ḥātem Beg went with him, since he had years of experience of affairs at Kerman and was trusted by the Afšār tribe. Ḥātem Beg played a large part in the settlement reached at Kerman. He returned to Shiraz and was received in audience by the Shah, who appointed him to the office of *mostowfī al-mamālek* (comptroller of finance). After holding this office for six months, during which he did most of the work of the vizier's office as well, he was appointed vizier of the supreme *dīvān* on New Year's Day 1000[16] (the Year of the Hare)/21 March 1591. Although I have said a few words in praise of Ḥātem Beg in the exordium to this history, I cannot forbear to repeat myself here.

In the course of his tenure of office as vizier, Ḥātem Beg rendered oustanding service to the Safavid dynasty. His concern was for the welfare of all men, and he brought security into the lives of Iranians. The pernicious system of fines, which former viziers had sanctioned as one of their perquisites of office and which bore heavily upon the people, was found by Shah 'Abbas to be incompatible with royal justice, and was abolished. Ḥātem Beg was a model for all in regard to the administration of justice, his knowledge of accounting procedures, and his organization of *dīvān* affairs. On several occasions he was given special missions by the Shah which necessitated his absence from court, and he fulfilled these tasks to the Shah's satisfaction. These are related in their proper chronological sequence, and I will not weary the reader by repeating them here. In the Year of the Dog, 1019/1610-11, Ḥātem Beg was sent to subdue the rebel Emir Khan Barādūst and capture the fort of Domdom. One night, in his camp before the castle walls, he was suddenly taken ill and died, to the great sorrow of all. His son, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, succeeded him as vizier of the supreme *dīvān*. At the time of writing, 1025/1616-17, the latter still holds this post. May he long continue to prosper in the Shah's favor!

The fourth son of Malek Bahrām was Abū Torāb Beg, and the fifth was Abū Ṭāleb Beg; both were skilled in the secretarial art and in bookkeeping, and both were present at court in the time of Shah Tahmasp. Abū Torāb Beg was for some time an accountant *(mostowfī)* at Mašhad. From the time of Shah Esma'il onward, he was vizier to the governor of Mašhad, Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, until his death. Abū Ṭāleb Beg was the accountant of the governor-general of Herat, 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, to whom he was related. In 1587, 'Abdollāh Khan Özbeg invaded Khorasan and laid siege to Herat. After enduring a protracted siege,[17] the situation for the defenders became desperate, and 'Alīqolī Khan sent a small delegation, consisting of Abū Ṭāleb Beg and a few of his exhausted Šāmlūs, to the Uzbeg Khan in the forlorn hope of obtaining truce terms. But the latter, in violation of all accepted protocol regarding the treatment of envoys, slew them all by having them fired from cannons in the direction of the fort.

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[16] New Year's Day of the Year of the Hare fell on 25 Jomādā I, 999.

It is now time to return to the main theme of my discourse. When Shah 'Abbas proposed to visit Ordūbād, Ḥātem Beg's retainers hastened to make all necessary preparations for his visit, and the inhabitants turned out in force to demonstrate their loyalty and welcome the Shah. In a relaxed and happy mood, the Shah lodged at residences belonging to the vizier's family. The vizier organized a feast worthy of such a guest. Bowls of wine were circulated freely by handsome youths and rosy-cheeked girls, and the vizier's retainers exerted themselves to the utmost to supply the guests with food, drink, and fruits of all kinds. For several days the vizier entertained his guests, comprising all the emirs and principal officers of state, and all the Shah's personal officers and the *moqarrabs* of the court. In addition, as the emirs who had been busy restoring the fortress at Erīvān completed their tasks, they began to arrive at Ordūbād. A number of the nobles, in accordance with their means, distributed lodging allowances and other gifts to these men, and the servants and entertainers were rewarded with robes of honor, cash payments, and lavish compliments.

After a few days at Ordūbād, the Shah expressed the wish to be taken on a tour of places of interest in the surrounding area. One such place was the flourishing village of Vanand, situated on the slopes of a mountain, with a valley running through it. Both sides of the valley were covered with gardens and orchards, and watered by countless springs. Some of the Naṣīrīya family have their residences here too, and here again the vizier made provision for his guests. The Shah then moved to the small town of Kalīs, where most of the inhabitants are Christians, but where some Muslims also live.

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[17] 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, whose rival Moršedqolī Khan Ostājlū deliberately delayed sending him assistance, was forced to surrender Herat after putting up a heroic resistance against the Uzbegs for nearly a year (August 1587–summer 1588).

After visiting these places, the Shah returned to Ordūbād to make his plans for the invasion of Šīrvān. An extremely difficult road, known as the Darra-ye 'Alī route, runs from Ordūbād across Qarābāğ. The Shah ordered his army to take this route, and to rendezvous in the lush and level plains near Čoldūr and Bargošāṭ. In view of the arduous nature of the route, the Shah and his party gave the main body ten days' start. They remained at Ordūbād for this period as guests of the Naṣīrīya family, who continued to entertain them on a scale that won plaudits even from their detractors. Shah 'Abbas again expressed satisfaction with his reception, and conferred robes of honor on all the family. The fort at Erīvān being now restored, the Shah moved there for safekeeping all stores and his officers' personal belongings. Emir Gūna was made commandant, and the Shah marched to join the main army.

The Shah's Successful Expedition to Šīrvān

Not one of the leading officers of the Safavid state approved of the plan to invade Šīrvān. The army had been in the field for four years, and for nearly two of these years Azerbaijan had suffered from a crop shortage. The price of wheat had soared, and the ordinary soldiers, for want of fodder for their animals, lacked mounts and were obliged to go on foot. The officers only kept their horses going by allowing them to graze the thin grass of the plains, and the animals were weak and lacking in stamina as a result. The men's equipment was also in poor shape as a result of the length of time they had been in the field. On top of all this, the Shah's advisers were of the opinion that the Ottomans, since they had not put a fresh army in the field this year, would undoubtedly do so in the spring. If the Safavid army were to campaign in Šīrvān now, it would be in an even sorrier state by the spring and would be unable to withstand a fresh Ottoman invasion. They therefore counseled the Shah to return to Iraq and reequip his army to meet this probable threat.

The Shah, however, had had premonitions of victory, and was not going to miss the chance to invade Šīrvān while the Ottoman garrisons there could not hope to receive any reinforcements. He therefore gave the order to march. He also sent Moḥammad Beg, the son of Kūr Ḳolafā Rūmlū, who was one of the officers attached to his person and was an experienced, sensible, and able officer, to Aḥmad Pasha, the *beglerbeg*, and the other Ottoman officers at Šamāḳī with a letter similar in terms to that which he had sent to the Ottoman garrison at

Ganja. The gist of the letter was as follows:

> Since I opened my campaign for the recovery of my hereditary provinces of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, my efforts have been uniformly crowned by victory, and I have captured the forts in my path. No new Ottoman army has taken the field this year, and no help can reach you till next year. Consider your probable fate (bearing in mind the fate of the garrison at Ganja) if you continue to resist; contrast the amnesty granted to the garrisons at Tiflis and Tūmānūs. The purpose of this letter is to warn you that, if I am forced to take the fort by storm, no quarter will be granted, and the blood of your men will be upon your heads.

While waiting for a reply, the Shah filled in time hunting.

On receiving this letter, Aḥmad Pasha took counsel with his officers. They usually followed the advice of Šams al-Dīn Pasha, who was descended from the shaikhs of Šīrvān but had risen high in Ottoman favor through his services to them and had been rewarded with the status of emir and pasha. On this occasion, Šams al-Dīn Pasha behaved like a fraudulent and hypocritical shaikh. By specious arguments he seduced the garrison from the path of security and safety, and he tried by trickery and deceit to delay the approach of the *qezelbāš* army. Using hypocritical speech which lacked the ring of truth, he replied to Moḥammad Beg as follows. It was true, he said, that the province of Šīrvān belonged to the officers of the king of Iran. "However," he said, "it will be impossible for us to leave in the depths of winter, since we all have our families here with us. Let us ask the Shah for three or four months' grace, during which time he can amuse himself by hunting in the Arasbār region. In the spring, when once again it becomes possible to move freely, if our actions do not suit the Shah, we will leave the outcome to God."

At this juncture, some people in Šamāḵī who had relatives in the Safavid camp sent a message to the Shah outlining the Ottoman plans: Aḥmad Pasha, they said, had sent Šams al-Dīn Pasha to Istanbul to obtain help; pending the arrival of reinforcements, Aḥmad Pasha intended to withdraw from Šamāḵī to Darband, which was an even stronger fort with the strong defensive terrain of Dāgestān behind it, and spend the winter there.

Šams al-Dīn Pasha returned via Kaffa bringing letters of appointment from the Ottoman Sultan to the Ottoman governors in Šīrvān and to the people of Šīrvān. Several thousand Janissaries were on their way and had already reached Kaffa; a major Ottoman army would take the field at the beginning of spring, and Ğāzī Gerāy Khan, the ruler of the Crimea, would lead a Tartar force to Šīrvān. The Sultan urged Aḥmad Pasha to defend Šamāḵī and to abandon his plan to retire to Darband. Finally, in an allusion to his illuminatory insight and miraculous powers, he declared that the saints and the *aqṭāb*[18] had informed him that the *qezelbāš* forces would not succeed in their attempt to subjugate Šīrvān, and that no harm would befall the fort at Šamāḵī or its garrison.

The Ottoman garrison at Šamāḵī was deceived by the lying words of their Sultan, who was as hypocritical as 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ,[19] and determined to defend the fort at Šamāḵī, hoping to hold the *qezelbāš* off until the arrival of reinforcements in the spring. When the Shah realized what their plan was, he marched from his camp at Khan Arḵī in the Arasbār district and reached the Kor River on 3 Ramażān 1015/2 January 1607. The Ottomans had destroyed the bridge at Javād,[20] and there was no other crossing point nearby. The Shah therefore crossed over with his men by boat, leaving the baggage to be floated across later on rafts constructed of wood and reeds. The horses and camels were driven into the river and forced to swim across.

The next day, the Shah continued his march north of the river, camped at Qara Sū, and then proceeded toward Šamāḵī via the Māsāmāl Pass. It was ten days before the rest of his troops and the commissariat personnel succeeded in crossing the river and joining him. The crossing of the river at such a season was in itself a tremendous feat; indeed, it was thought by many to be impossible. Chunks of ice and mounds of snow filled the river and made navigation hazardous for the boatmen. The weaker horses, camels, and donkeys, unable to cope with the current and the ice and snow, were drowned in midstream. Many of the stronger animals were terrified by the ice floes and turned back; on reaching the southern bank, they were once again driven into the water, where they stayed afloat for a while but finally drowned. Those animals which were not terrified by the ice floes but swam on changed course every time they found their passage blocked by ice, and swam along with the stream until they found a gap in the ice. In this way, some of them finished up half a *farsak̲*, and some as much as a *farsak̲*, downstream before they made their way to the northern bank. In short, the Safavid losses in animals were very high.

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[18] *Aqṭāb:* plural of *qoṭb:* the *qoṭb* is at the top of the Sufi hierarchy of saints whose unseen presence is a powerful influence in preserving the order of the universe.

[19] The celebrated Muslim general who conquered Egypt in 19/640. The reference here is to his mission to Abyssinia in 616. Before his own conversion to Islam, he was one of two envoys sent from Mecca to try and persuade the Abyssinian Negus to surrender a number of Muslims who had taken refuge with him from persecution by the Meccans.

[20] Just east of the confluence of the Aras and Kor rivers.

Meanwhile, the Shah had crossed the Māsāmāl Pass, and, on 10 Ramażān 1015/9 January 1607, he set his troops in proper order and marched on Šamāk̲ī. He chose as a site for his camp a spot about a mile to the west of the fort, flanked by two mountains. The Ottoman garrison, consisting of about four thousand men, looked to the defense of the fort.

The Siege of Šamāk̲ī

No sooner had the Safavid army settled into camp than heavy rain began to fall; this transformed the ground into a sea of mud, and made it difficult for the men to move from the main camp to the commissariat section either on foot or on horseback. More serious was the fact that the army was cut off from the outside world; food supplies in the camp began to run low, and prices rose correspondingly. Barley and straw were particularly scarce. To alleviate the situation, the Shah ordered that all horses and transport and riding donkeys not needed for the siege were to be sent to the alluvial plain of the Kor River, a warmer region where both dried and fresh grass was always available. For two or three months the Safavid troops sat it out in camp: The weather was uniformly bad; the sky was constantly overcast; and it rained nearly every day and sometimes incessantly, day and night.

As soon as Ramażān was over, the Shah proceeded with the siege, despite the weather. My learned readers will be aware that the city of Šamāk̲ī is situated astride the highway along a valley. The oldest part of the town, which contains the residential quarters of the ordinary people, lies to the south on the lower slopes of a mountain. The residences of the governors and princes of bygone times are adjacent to the mountain to the north, on higher ground overlooking the rest of the city. The Ottomans had constructed citadels in each quarter and connected them by defense works. The northerly citadel, standing on higher ground, has lofty masonry towers, too high to scale and too strong to be breached by sappers' tools. In addition, because of the lie of the land, the construction of breastworks to the north would be a difficult task.

Having completed his appraisal of the Ottoman position, the Shah divided up the work of digging trenches. The sector to the north fell to Allāhverdī Khan; to the west, the sector in which the royal camp lay, and which faced the whole length of the city and the two forts, the work of constructing breastworks was divided between the *qūrčībāšī* and the *qūrčīš;* Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and the army of Azerbaijan; Qarčaqāy Beg with the *ḡolāms* and musketeers; and Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman. In the southwest corner was stationed 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*. The rest of the emirs were instructed to assist wherever they were needed; no troops were stationed east of the Ottoman position.

There were no materials at hand for the construction of breastworks, and neither camels nor donkeys were available to get through the mud to fetch any. So the Shah, who had had the advantage in his youth of learning the arts of war from experienced veterans, ordered his men to start digging trenches, commencing at a point a considerable distance from the fort. Every few yards the Shah ordered a tower-like structure to be erected, with a ditch around it, and in these defense points he stationed musketeers, archers, and crack troops to protect the men who were digging the trenches. In this way, the trenches were pushed forward.

The work went on steadily, despite the incessant rain. At first, the Ottomans would march out boldly to the south and east of the citadels, where no Safavid troops were stationed, and draw themselves up in battle array on the slopes of the mountain; sometimes they came closer, and there was some skirmishing. The Safavids were unable to deliver a cavalry charge, which would have taught the enemy a lesson, because most of their horses, not needed in siege warfare, had been sent off to the pasture grounds mentioned earlier. The Ottomans daily grew bolder, intercepting Safavid troops as they moved about the camp and attacking them. Finally, the Shah discovered that some men had sent their horses off to pasture although they had sufficient supplies of fodder to keep them in camp. He reprimanded them, and told them to get their horses back forthwith. When they got them back, they charged the Ottomans on several occasions and drove them back behind their defenses.

By this time, the palisades were creeping closer to the walls, the breastworks were being strengthened, and the Ottomans were penned more and more within the four walls of their forts. Several times they launched attacks on the breastworks, but were repulsed. The besiegers now began mining operations, and the Shah ordered the heavy siege guns that had been used at Ganja to be transported to Šamāḵī. Since it was advisable that the Shah, in order to protect the weak and the lower classes in Šamāḵī, appoint a governor before the capture of the forts so that the latter could assume his responsibilities immediately, he appointed Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū̦ governor of Šamāḵī and *amīr al-omarā* of the whole province of Šīrvān. I will digress at this point to give details of other victories which took place during the siege of Šamāḵī.

The Capture of the Forts at Bākū and Darband

I do not have to tell my readers that, with God's help, the most astonishing feats can be achieved by man—for example, the capture of the great fortresses at Bākū and Darband, which are protected on the one side by the Caspian Sea and on the landward side by earthworks of immense size and strength. The fort at Darband, also known as Bāb al-Abvāb and Alexander's Bastion, has an extremely high keep, and the city walls actually extend into the sea. At the time that the garrison at Šamāḵī was thinking of withdrawing to Darband, it did not enter anyone's head that the fortress at Darband might be captured. When the garrison at Šamāḵī allowed itself to be trapped there, however, only a token force of some two or three hundred men was left at each of the other two forts—and these men were mostly locals who had been enrolled by the Ottomans and who received fodder allowances and assignments.

After the Shah had been camped before Šamāḵī for a few days, some local notables at Bākū decided to demonstrate their loyalty to him by gathering together a band of men and attempting to seize the commandant and take possession of the fort. Their plot was discovered by the Ottomans, and so the conspirators decided to strike first. They seized the commandant and rounded up his men one by one, killing any who resisted arrest. A number of locals who had thrown in their lot with the Ottomans and who had received trading licenses and assignments on the revenue from them did not resist the coup but hid themselves. The news of this patriotic act reached the Shah, and was followed shortly afterward by the arrival of the prisoners and the heads of the slain. The conspirators were rewarded with robes of honor, cash payments, tax immunities, and all the property and possessions of the enemy in Bākū.

When the news of this loyal act reached Darband, the inhabitants there conceived the idea of demonstrating their loyalty too, even though most of them had entered Ottoman service and had been enrolled in the military. The leader of the coup was the son of Ḵ̌āja Moḥammad Darbandī. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, his father had performed distinguished service in Šīrvān and had been a faithful servant of the Shah. It so happened that the Shah had appointed Ūsmī Khan Qeytāq governor of Darband when the latter had visited him in his camp near Ganja, and Ūsmī Khan had left the royal camp at Algetčay bearing in his hand the royal mandate appointing him to the governorship of Darband. The leaders of the conspiracy now summoned Ūsmī Khan, who marched to Darband with two or three hundred men from Qeytāq. The townspeople declared for the Shah and opened the gates to him. The Ottoman commandant Ḥasan Pasha, known as Kör, in great alarm retreated inside the keep with some sixty or seventy Ottomans of whose loyalty he could be certain.

The son of Ḵ̌āja Moḥammand Darbandī then visited the Shah with a group of notables from Darband and a number of Ūsmī Khan's retainers. The Shah praised them for their fine achievement and conferred on them robes of honor, cash bonuses, and jeweled weapons. He declared the income from their estates to be free of tax, and remitted all *dīvān* dues to the townspeople. He sent a letter to Ūsmī Khan, congratulating him and exhorting him to show concern for the lower classes of society. Manūčehr Beg, a *ḡolām* of the royal household, who had demonstrated his competence, was sent to take charge of Darband with a detachment of Čaḡatāy, Ḵorāsānī, Iraqi, and Bāfqī musketeers; his orders were to guard the roads and to capture the keep. Several other emirs were ordered to support him: Shah Naẓar Beg Tükelī,[21] who had recently been promoted to the rank of khan and appointed governor of Mašhad; Šahqolī Sultan Mīr Bayāt; Ne'matollāh Sultan Mīr Ṣūfī; and others.

These emirs joined Ūsmī Khan at Darband and besieged the keep.

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[21] A Čaḡatāy tribe (see *TM*, p. 17).

Palisades were pushed up close to the walls, mines were sunk beneath the towers, and the situation looked black for the defenders. Kör Ḥasan sued for quarter; if he and his men were spared, he said, he would hand over the keep and would present himself to the Shah and offer his services to him. The emirs transmitted his request to the Shah, who granted it. Kör Ḥasan surrendered the keep and was enrolled in the Shah's service.

In this way the mighty bastion of Darband, its one side resting on the slopes of the Alborz Mountains, its other side joining the Caspian Sea, fell into Safavid hands. All the traffic between Šīrvān and the Ḳazar and Qepčāq steppes and the steppes of southern Russia is channeled through one gate in this bastion, known as the Bāb al-Abvāb. The *ṣadr,* Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan Ṣalā'ī, composed the following chronogram: "Auspicious was the capture of imperial Darband."[22] I heard a story from an elderly citizen of Šīrvān about a caravan which reached Darband from the north after nightfall and was obliged to camp outside the walls. In the morning, when the gates were opened, there was no trace of the caravan. It was discovered that the caravan had managed to squeeze by close to the walls of the fort on the ocean side, where the water is comparatively shallow at certain states of the side.

The Shah now ordered Qanbar Beg Gözü-büyüklū, the chief swordbearer, to repair the towers and strengthen the old bastion at Darband. Masons and engineers were detailed to carry out this work. In particular, the men were instructed to extend the walls into deeper water, if this was possible, so that it might not be possible for animals to bypass the fort even at low tide. The plan was to construct a new tower out in the water, to link this to the existing tower by a stout wall, and to station alert guards on all the towers. This work took a long time, but was eventually completed by Qanbar Beg and his master craftsmen. I was told that, at the spot where the new tower was built, the engineers succeeded, by use of cunning techniques, in draining all water from the site. When this was done, the foundations of an old tower, dating from pre-Islamic times, were revealed; they were solidly built of stone, kiln-dried brick, and iron bars. The structure had either collapsed in the course of time under the incessant pounding of the waves, or else the rulers of former times had destroyed it to prevent the passage of foreign armies[23] and it had not been rebuilt by those who subsequently controlled the area. Jānī Beg Khan, the ruler of the Qepčāq steppe,[24] invaded Azerbaijan by this route during the time of Malek Ašraf Čūbānī, and Tīmūr marched north from Iran by this route against Toqtameš Khan.[25] But God knoweth best what really happened!

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[22] This chronogram appears to yield the date 1017, whereas Darband presumably surrendered in 1015 or 1016/1607.

It is the common belief that the "bastion of Alexander the Great" mentioned in the Koran[26] is this same Bāb al-Abvāb. But this is impossible, because Alexander's bastion was constructed of brass and iron and lead, at the farthest northeastern limits of the world, to form a barrier between mankind and Gog and Magog. The bastion at Darband, however, was constructed by Ḵosrow Anūšīrvān to protect his subjects from the ravages of the people of the steppes, who bore no resemblance to human beings except the human form. Since it is the practice of the common people to attribute everything to God, perhaps for this reason Bāb al-Abvāb has been identified with Alexander's bastion. Perfect knowledge belongs to God alone! Glory be to God! What am I saying, where am I going, and what am I talking about?

The fall of these two great fortresses (Bākū and Darband) adversely affected the morale of the garrison at Šamāḵī. At this juncture, Ḥājjī Beyrām arrived as ambassador from Ğāzī Gerāy Khan, ruler of the Crimean Tartars; he was accompanied by the centurion Ṭāleb Beg Ev-oğlū, a kinsman of Abu'l-Qāsem Beg, who had earlier been sent with letters of friendship from Shah 'Abbas to the Tartar Khan. The Tartar envoy brought gifts from his master and a letter in which the Tartar Khan expressed his loyalty to the Shah and declared himself to be a devoted servant of the Safavid house. In his letter, the Tartar Khan recalled his imprisonment at Alamūt and his release through the kindness of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, an episode which I related in the first book of this history. The refusal of the Tartar Khan to come to their assistance further dispirited the Ottoman garrison at Šamāḵī, which had been led by the false assurances of Šams al-Dīn Pasha to hope for relief from this quarter.

[23] I do not follow the argument here. I would have thought that the tower would better have prevented the passage of foreign armies if left standing.

[24] Khan of the Blue Horde in southern Russia and western Qepčāq 741-58/1341-57.

[25] Khan of the White Horde in Siberia and eastern Qepčāq, 778-797/1376-95; reunited the White and Blue Hordes as the original Golden Horde 780/1378, and sacked Nizhni Novgorod and Moscow in 784/1382; the archenemy of Tīmūr, who ultimately expelled him from his domains.

[26] Koran, 18:94ff.

Events of the Year of the Sheep, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1015/1606–07 and Part of 1016/1607–08, the Twenty-First Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Wednesday, 22 Ẕu'l-Qa'da 1015/21 March 1607. The Shah was still camped before the walls of Šamāḵī. The rain and continual cloud of the preceding three months gradually gave way to sunshine with the onset of spring, and the fields and plains around Šamāḵī became green with new growth. The mud dried out, and tradesmen were once more able to come and go freely.

The spirits of the troops rose accordingly, and they redoubled their efforts to take the fort. Ḥoseynqolī Beg Qājār, the brother of Emir Gūna Khan, who had been charged with bringing the heavy siege guns from Ganja, crossed the Kor without mishap and delivered the guns and gun carriages to the royal camp; one cannon was placed by Allāhverdī Khan's breastwork, and another at that of Qarčaqāy Beg. Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, obeyed the Shah's summons and reported with his troops. After he had kissed the supports of the Shah's throne, he was directed to take up his station east of the fort, where there were no Safavid troops at the moment, and to push breastworks forward on that side. On every side, the breastworks ringed the fort ever more closely, and sappers drove their tunnels ever closer to the walls. Then the siege guns began hurling large boulders at the fort.

It will be recalled that Shah 'Abbas had acceded to the Georgian request to make Ṭahmūras̱ Khan ruler of the Kakhetia district, and the party supporting that prince had pledged its submission to the Shah and promised to make amends for its past shortcomings. Shah 'Abbas now called on Ṭahmūras̱ Khan to honor this pledge and to report for duty with his men before Šamāḵī. But Ṭahmūras̱, who constantly allowed himself, in his folly, to be seduced from the straight path by troublemakers, procrastinated. He begged to be excused from presenting himself for service in person, and promised he would send what troops he could under the command of his mother, Dīdīfāl, who in fact managed the affairs of state.

The Shah replied that he had no objection to this, but warned Ṭahmūras̱ that more literal-minded people might interpret his failure to come in person as disaffection, if not rebellion. His example might be followed by other frontier governors. The Shah advised him that his best course was to present himself in person at court to demonstrate his loyalty, and then to return to Georgia and send his mother with an army. Ṭahmūras̱ merely made more unacceptable excuses, and a few days later his mother arrived at Šamāḵī with a Georgian force numbering not more than one thousand men, and some of those of doubtful quality. The Shah, although he was incensed by Ṭahmūras̱'s behavior, received his mother with great respect and introduced her to the members of the royal harem. The Georgian troops, however, were not detailed to carry out any duties during the whole of the time they were in the Shah's camp.

At this point, the governors of Dāḡestān and the princes of Circassia began to visit the Shah's camp: the brothers of Rostam Khan, Ūsmī Khan Qeytāq, 'Alī Beg Zāḵorī, Ma'ṣūm Khan the governor of Ṭabarestān, and the like came and tendered their submission to the Shah. The people of Dāḡestān are wild beasts in human form who have been reared in the wilderness, deprived of any social graces or human intercourse. The said Ma'ṣūm Khan, having for no reason at all become apprehensive of something, suddenly departed for Ṭabarestān without taking leave of the Shah, who sent robes of honor and letters of appointment after him to reassure him.

An astonishing incident occurred on Sunday, the 'Eyd-e Ażḥā (10 Żu'l-Ḥejja 1015/8 April 1607).[1] The Shah was standing in a portico which master carpenters had erected on wooden pillars at the side of the royal audience hall; the portico was roofed with reeds. He was participating in the ceremonies of the festival. A throne seat had been placed for the Shah's use at the upper end of the portico, and the *ṣadrs, 'olamā,* emirs, viziers, and principal officers of state were gathered at the entrance awaiting their turn to kiss the royal throne seat and congratulate the Shah. About noon, the time the Shah was due to leave, it had been arranged that all the rest of the courtiers, those at court, such as the royal princes from Dāḡestān, representatives from Šīrvān, and *qezelbāš* nobles, should assemble in the portico. After all those at the Shah's levée had been seated, they would be shown to their proper places, in accordance with their rank, by the *ešīk-āqāsīs.* About one-third of these personages had still to

[1] The day of sacrifice.

take their places when a tremor brought the roof of the portico crashing down. The Dāgestān contingent, who were sitting to one side, saw what was happening and managed to get out in time, but the *ṣadrs* and *'olamā,* who were less capable of rapid movement, were buried by plaster and wooden beams.

Fortunately, a squad of gardeners of the royal household had started work on a garden in front of the portico, and they immediately rushed in with their shovels and began removing the rubble and dragging out the bodies one by one. Shah Qavām al-Dīn Ḥoseyn, the son of 'Allāmat al-'Olamā'ī Mīrzā Ebrahim Hamadānī, and Šīr Aḥmad Pasha, were both killed; the latter was the Ottoman governor of Qārṣ, who had been taken prisoner in the battle with Jeğāl-oğlū, and had been pardoned by the Shah and accorded a place of honor at court. Those who were injured but were hauled out from under the rubble included the *ṣadr* Qāżī Khan; the *ṣadr* Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan; the *qāżī-ye mo'askar* Mīr Seyyed Moḥammad, the son of Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn the *mojtahed;* Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn Moḥammad 'Alavī, the *moḥtaseb al-mamālek;* Mīr 'Abbās Gīlānī, a member of the *'olamā;* and Ḥājjī 'Enāyat Tabrīzī. The majority of the injured, however, lay with their limbs contorted and their faces so blackened that it was impossible to recognize them. The Shah ordered phlebotomists to come and bleed the injured who, after they had been bled, revived a little. The next day, Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn 'Alavī, whose liver had been crushed, died. Others remained bedridden. On Thursday evening, 8 Rabī' II, 1016/2 August 1607, the *ṣadr* Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan was afflicted by stomach cramps and diarrhea and died after being confined to his bed for three months as a result of the injuries he received. The rest of the injured recovered.

After examining the Shah's horoscope, the royal astrologers had predicted that at midday on the day in question there would be a threat of danger to the Shah's person, but the influence of the auspicious stars which were at that moment dominant in the Shah's horoscope would mitigate the effect of this threat, and there was hope that no harm would come to the Shah's person. The astrologers had therefore held the Shah in conversation in his private audience hall to prevent him from making any movement until the moment when the danger was at its height had passed. This was why the Shah was a little late in rising to leave the hall, and it was at this point that the disaster had occurred. However, Vaḥīd al-Zamānī Mowlānā 'Alī Reżā the calligrapher, who was a close companion of the Shah, told me personally that the Shah had told him that, at the time he was due to leave the hall, he had involuntarily gone into a dreamlike trance and was still in this trance when the disaster occurred, and this was why he was late leaving the hall. Truly, if God's protection is shielding you, what harm can befall you? If God's grace is bestowed upon you, what influence can the stars have on your fate?

The news of this calamity caused consternation among the troops manning the breastworks. The emirs rushed to the court in a panic, but saw the Shah, who had remained where he was in order to reassure people, alive and unharmed. The emirs prostrated themselves before him in thankfulness, and went about their business. There are various other happenings this year which I must relate before returning to events at Šamāḵī.

The Capture of Several Forts by Emir Gūna Khan and His Victories in the Erīvān District

Some of the victories I am going to describe happened last year and some this year, but I have brought them together in order to maintain the cohesiveness of my discourse.

As previously related, the fort at Erīvān had been repaired and provisioned, and Emir Gūna Khan and his followers, who in the past few years had seen service at Alanjaq, Ordūbād, and Naḵčevān, were stationed there. The area had been completely devastated by the fighting, and there was hardly a serviceable habitation to be seen. Emir Gūna Khan garrisoned the fort with his own emirs and men he could trust, and billeted the rest of his men in neighboring villages, which were also largely in ruins. He also attacted to Erīvān numbers of Turkman tribesmen from various parts of Azerbaijan. The men of the Aqča-qoyūnlū clan of the Qājār tribe and the Mūsā-oğlū Bayāt tribe, who had come from Iraq on orders from the Shah and had been placed under the command of Emir Gūna Khan, were all allotted winter camping grounds in the Šarūr and Erīvān districts.

It had been deliberate policy to leave the Erīvān region uncultivated until such time as Azerbaijan was once more firmly under Safavid control, in order to deny food supplies to Ottoman armies operating in that area. Emir Gūna Khan asked the Shah for permission to plant crops around the fort to provide fodder for the men's horses. If he heard of the approach of an Ottoman army before the crops were ripe, he said, they would be destroyed; but if the crops ripened, they would be harvested and at once brought within the fort to supplement the men's rations. After obtaining the Shah's permission, Emir Gūna Khan brought a large area under cultivation, using oxen looted from enemy territory across the border, and employing his tribesmen and *qezelbāš* to till the soil. Some of the peasants of the Erīvān district who had not been able to flee to Iraq and had gone into hiding, hearing of cultivation in progress, came out. Wherever there were groups of two or three houses still standing, they sowed crops roundabout. By good fortune, the Ottomans were unable to send an army to Erīvān the following spring, the crops were harvested, and life became easier for the *ğāzīs* of the garrison. Emir Gūna Khan carried out incessant raids into enemy territory and established his superiority over enemy forces along the frontier.

The first success he scored was the capture of the fort of Mağāzberd,[2] situated between Erīvān and Qārṣ. As a result of his raids, which extended from the area of Qārṣ and Ḥasan Qal'a as far as Erzerum, movement had become difficult for the garrison at Mağāzberd. The commandants at Qārṣ and Erzerum were in a weak position themselves and unable to send any help. The commandant at Mağāzberd therefore sent an envoy to Emir Gūna Khan and declared his "love of the Shah." After some negotiation, in the middle of the Year of the Horse (1014/1606), the commandant, 'Alī Beg, known as 'Alī Beg Mağāzberdī, and his officers surrendered in person to Emir Gūna Khan; his men dispersed in all directions, and the fort was occupied by Safavid troops. When Shah 'Abbas returned to Tabriz at the conclusion of his campaign in Šīrvān, these Ottoman officers were paraded before him. Each was given pay and fiefs commensurate with his rank and ordered to serve under Emir Gūna Khan's colors.

The second fort to fall into Safavid hands in the Čokūr-e Sa'd area was that of Mejengerd; its garrison, weary of being stationed there and of the nonarrival of its pay and allowances, surrendered as soon as a Safavid force appeared on the scene.

The garrison at Qārṣ, however, showed fight. Having asked for reinforcements from Erzerum, the commandant marched toward Erīvān by the Mağāzberd road with about three hundred men, and camped in a valley near Mağāzberd. There, a *qezelbāš* patrol came upon them, much to its own surprise. The *qezelbāš* at once charged at full gallop; the Ottomans, caught by surprise, seized whatever horse happened to be nearest in an effort to meet the attack, and about one hundred of them rode out to meet the *ḡāzīs*. They were scattered by the *qezelbāš* charge, and most of them were killed; the survivors fled back to Qārṣ. The *qezelbāš* sent the heads of the slain and the captured weapons to the Shah at Šamāḳī, and were suitably rewarded with gifts. This reverse made even the Ottoman garrison at Erzerum nervous, and its commander made conciliatory gestures toward Emir Gūna Khan.

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[2] See *TM*, p. 166.

This was also the year of the defection of Alvand Beg Rūzakī and Moṣṭafā Beg Maḥmūdī, the governor of Mākūya and Qal'a-ye Bāyazīd. The former was the *vakīl* of Żīā al-Dīn Khan b. Šaraf Khan the governor of Betlīs, who had declared his "love of the Shah" in the year when Allāhverdī Khan marched against Vān, had returned to court with the Safavid commander, and had been honorably treated by the Shah; the latter, despite his rebellious behavior, had constantly been the recipient of royal favor. Both men now defected from Tabriz and joined the enemy. Emir Gūna Khan sent a detachment of troops against the Maḥmūdī tribesmen who supported Moṣṭafā Beg, and the latter surrendered the forts of Mākūya and Bāyazīd to Safavid officers. A detachment of Bayāt *ḡāzīs* was left to garrison them.

Following these successes, the fortress at Qārṣ was also captured by Safavid troops. Qārṣ is a province of Lesser Armenia[3] and lies between Erīvān and Erzerum; the area is now known as the province of Erzerum. The author of the *Nozhat al-Qolūb* states that the whole of Lesser Amenia was part of Iran.[4] At the time when the Turkman dynasties were in power, Qārṣ was a dependency of Čoḳūr-e Sa'd. After the Ottomans annexed Erzerum and Arzenjān, the province of Qārṣ became a bone of contention between the governors of Čoḳūr-e Sa'd and those of Erzerum. When Sultan Sülaymān was on the throne, the Ottomans had the intention of strengthening the fort at Qārṣ and annexing the province. Since the province of Qārṣ was adjacent to the districts of Šūra-gel and Āḡča-Qal'a in the province of Čoḳūr-e Sa'd, Shah Tahmasp disapproved and moved to prevent the completion of this scheme. For some years Ottomans and Safavids fought it out for control of Qārṣ, as I related in Book I. As a result, the whole province was devastated and the fort destroyed.

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[3] See *Nozhat al-Qolūb*, p. 100.

[4] Ḥamdollāh Mostowfī, *Nozhat al-Qolūb* (ed. Moḥammad Dabīrsīāqī), p. 117, said: "Lesser Armenia does *not* really form part of Iran"!

When peace was concluded between the Ottoman and Safavid empires,[5] one of the terms of the treaty was that the fortress at Qārṣ should be left in ruins and the province in its existing state of desolation; neither side was to occupy this territory. When Sultan Morād broke the peace, one of his first actions was to send troops to restore the fort at Qārṣ. Peasants were brought from all parts of Armenia to rehabilitate the villages and bring the fields under cultivation again, and a permanent garrison of three hundred men was installed at the fort under the command of a pasha. This year (1015/1606-07) it is exactly thirty years[6] since the Ottomans restored and garrisoned the fort at Qārṣ. In the Year of the Dragon (1012/1603-04) Shah 'Abbas, after the capture of Erīvān, once more devastated the province of Qārṣ and sent his troops to burn the crops and remove all the inhabitants, both Muslims and Armenians. Some were transferred to Iraq, others were taken into captivity. Because of the lack of supplies, 'Oṣman Pasha, the commandant at Qārṣ, eventually retired to Erzerum, leaving his junior officers to stick it out at Qārṣ without prospect of reinforcement.

In the main *qezelbāš* troops controlled the area; on the one occasion when the Ottomans came out to fight, they were soundly defeated by the army of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, as already related. Without provisions, the plight of the survivors at Qārṣ grew daily worse and men began to desert, until no more than fifty or sixty were left in the fort—about two or three hundred persons counting their servants and families. Finally, in the middle of the Year of the Sheep, when Emir Gūna Khan marched against them, they sued for quarter, which was granted, declared their "love of the Shah," and marched to Erīvān. On orders from the Shah, the fort at Qārṣ was again razed, as it had been in the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and all munitions (cannon, mortars, muskets, lead, and gunpowder) were removed and taken to Erīvān. The Shah received the news of the fall of Qārṣ on 9 Rabī' II, 1016/3 August 1607. Of those in the fort, a number who were employed as servants and were native to the area were registered as employees of the *dīvān* and allotted wages; others preferred military service. Emir Gūna Khan, as a result of this victory, obtained complete mastery of the frontier region, and kept the Ottoman garrison at Erzerum penned within their four walls.

This year the son of a Safavid defector returned to Iran. This was

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[5] By the Treaty of Amasya, 1555.

[6] Lunar years, of course, which dates the reoccupation of Qārṣ to 985/1577-78.

Mahdīqolī Beg Sa'dlū. His father, 'Alīqolī Sultan Sa'dlū, had been one of the emirs of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, and had held the governorship of Qāqezmān; when the Ottomans took over the area, he defected to them and still holds office under them. This year his son, who had an innate "love of the Shah," came to Erīvān. He was received by the Shah, granted an appropriate rate of pay and a fief, and placed under the command of the *beglerbeg* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd.

The Unsuccessful Expedition of Jahāngīr Khan and Moḥammad Salīm Sultan from Ġarjestān to Balḵ, and the Death of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā

The Uzbeg tribes, especially those this side of the Oxus, had gradually gathered around Jahāngīr Khan, Moḥammad Salīm Sultan, and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā in Ġarjestān. When their number reached twelve thousand, the three leaders marched on Balḵ, as they had been hoping to do for some time. The guardians of Nadr Moḥammad Sultan, the younger son of Yatīm Khan, who was the governor of Balḵ, barred the gates against them, and the Ġarjestān contingent settled down to a siege.

Valī Moḥammad Khan, the brother of Bāqī Khan, who had become ruler of Transoxania and Turkestan after the death of his brother, happened to be at Qaršī at the time. He at once sent twenty thousand men, under the command of Moḥammad Bāqī Qalmāq, Šaqāl Mīrzā, and Qūzī Mīrzā, to the relief of Balḵ. This army crossed the Oxus at Termeẓ and marched to Balḵ. The Ġarjestān army halted siege operations and drew itself up for battle. When the armies neared each other, a body of five hundred picked cavalry under Šaqāl Mīrzā and Qūzī Mīrzā rode out ahead of the army of Transoxania and confronted the troops led by Jahāngīr Khan, but Jahangīr Khan's men charged them and almost annihilated them. This initial success caused many of the Uzbeg tribesmen to desert from the army of Transoxania and join Jahāngīr Khan. In view of this, the Transoxania commanders decided to dig in where they were. At their rear they had the Oxus River, and they protected their front with palisades.

Among the Uzbegs, very few, except the most valiant, seek the command of armies. For the majority, the supreme act of bravery is to make an individual charge against the enemy with drawn sword, to achieve a few feats of individual valor, and to ride back from the battlefield. The warriors who had rallied around Jahāngīr Khan began to talk wistfully of this sort of thing, and to sing the praises of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā. The latter was a young, brave, and intrepid warrior; either because of his pride and inexperience, or as the result of the taunts of people who were envious of him, he now suddenly decided to make an individual charge against the enemy in the traditional Uzbeg manner. He rushed out with drawn sword, and charged the enemy around the palisades and trenches, wounding several of them. As he was riding back, he saw an enemy footsoldier fitting an arrow to his bow and taking aim at him. Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā at once swung his horse around and galloped at him, intending to cut him down with his sword; but before he reached him, an enemy musketeer, also on foot, fired at him and brought down his horse. According to another version, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā's horse fell as it was leaping a trench.

At all events, the prince fell from his horse and was taken prisoner; none of his men was there to help him because Jahāngīr Khan's lines were a long way off, and he had been extremely negligent about looking where he was going. Moḥammad Bāqī Qalmāq and the other Transoxanian emirs thought it best not to send him alive to Valī Moḥammad Khan, and put him to death on the spot.

When Jahāngīr Khan's men heard of this disaster, they broke up and scattered in all directions: Šīr-afkan Mīrzā retired with his men to Badaḵšān; another group fled in another direction, taking Moḥammad Salīm Sultan with them, and the latter's ultimate fate is unknown. Jahāngīr Khan, stunned by this sudden reversal of fortune, returned to Ḡarjestān with some three thousand men who had remained loyal to him. Valī Moḥammad Khan sent his men across the Oxus to raid Khorasan.

The Attack on Khorasan by the Army of Transoxania and Its Withdrawal, Discomfited

The army of Transoxania assembled in the area of Mārūčāq and Bādḡīs for the invasion of Khorasan, and some three thousand men were sent to ravage the province of Marv and return to Bokhara via Čahār-jū. The main force reached Qal'a-ye Ḥowż-e Khan, and for three days camped before its walls. Ḥowż-e Khan is a reservoir which 'Abdollāh Khan had built at the junction of the roads to Bādḡīs and Herat; at this time it had a fortification and was garrisoned by a detachment of musketeers and other troops sent by the *beglerbeg* of

Herat. The Uzbegs decided not to attack the fort. Some moved off to ravage the Zūrābād region, and others decided to plunder the tribes living in the Bādḡīs area. Ḥoseyn Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, had been forewarned of the Uzbeg incursion, and had sent couriers to all the outlying posts under his command to warn them to man the forts with plenty of musketeers and to be ready for action. Ḥoseyn Khan busied himself with mobilizing his troops and awaited orders from the Shah.

At this point, the raiders were forced to turn back by a heavy and unexpected snowfall and by the onset of a spell of extremely cold weather. Many lost their lives in the drifts in the valleys round Bādḡīs. The Uzbegs were even forced to leave behind the plunder they had accumulated. As they passed Mārūčāq on their retreat, Q̣azāq Khan the son of Ḥoseyn Khan issued from the fort and attacked them, and slew some seventy or eighty of them near the Morḡāb River.

The Uzbegs who had gone in the direction of Marv ravaged the area, and set off back to Čahār-jū with their booty, which included personal property and animals. Bektāš Khan Ostājlū, the governor of Marv, left three hundred of his men to guard the fort and set off in pursuit of the Uzbegs with twelve hundred men, three hundred of whom he sent ahead as the vanguard. As soon as they spotted the Uzbegs, the *qezelbāš* vanguard charged them, and most of them fled without having had time to form up for battle. However, the Uzbeg officers and some four or five hundred veterans disengaged themselves from their booty and formed up for battle. Bektāš Khan arrived with the main body at this moment, and a fierce struggle ensued; the Uzbeg veterans fought to the limits of their endurance, but eventually the survivors fled from the field, abandoning their booty. Bektāš Khan judged it prudent not to pursue them, and set his men to gathering up the loot.

About four hundred Uzbegs were killed or taken prisoner in this engagement. On Wednesday, 1 Ẕu'l-Q̣a'da 1015/28 February 1607, a courier from Bektāš Khan reached the Shah's camp before Šamāḵī. He brought with him an Uzbeg prisoner, who narrated for the Shah's benefit the story of the battle, and confirmed that three hundred Uzbegs had been killed and eighty taken prisoner. Bektāš Khan returned to Marv and restored the stolen property to its owners. Twelve Uzbeg prisoners of note were sent to the Shah's court with an escort of *ḡāzīs* who had distinguished themselves in this action. When the prisoners and their escort reached Mīān-sarāy in Ḳalḳāl, riding in separate groups because of the narrowness of the path, one of the Uzbeg prisoners managed to get his hands free. He freed several of his fellows who were walking along yoked together, and they seized the sword from the belt of one of the Khan's retainers and slew him and wounded several others. They then released the rest of the Uzbeg prisoners, and all fled into the mountains.

The rest of Bektāš Khan's men, who had been riding on ahead, warned the villagers of the Ḳalḳāl district about the escaped prisoners, and went in search of them. They caught seven of them, but the rest hid in caves during the night and got away. The prisoners whom they finally delivered at the Shah's camp were all warriors of note, but the Shah, instead of treating them with his habitual clemency, had them executed on the spot for their audacity in trying to escape. One of the prisoners was a handsome youth whose beard had not yet grown, and the executioners did not want to put him to death, but the youth adjured them in the name of Almighty God to let him join his fellows, and so they did. I will now return to the siege of Šamāḳī.

The Capture of the Fortress of Šamāḳī and Other Events in Šīrvān

The fire of the heavy siege guns, which projected a shot weighing thirty *man*,[7] was beginning to make breaches in the walls and towers of the fort at Šamāḳī and to damage the battlements. The sappers had penetrated beyond the ditch, and had tunneled under the walls themselves. The Ottomans tried in vain to prevent the progress of this work. The besiegers had everything ready for the assault, and merely awaited the Shah's command. The Shah, although he had sworn not to grant quarter to the garrison, was innately averse to bloodletting and hesitated to order the assault. In the general sack that follows the storming of a castle, no distinction is made between military and innocent civilians. The rules governing the storming of castles and conquest permit killing and plundering, and in fact it is impossible to prevent it. In a general assault, good and bad alike are consumed in the fire of war. The Shah kept hoping, therefore, that he could achieve his ends by some other means, and his emirs did not dare to act in this delicate situation without a command from him.

On Thursday, 25 Ṣafar 1016/21 June 1607, a party of *ğolāms* from

[7] About 196 lbs.

the breastwork commanded by Qarčaqāy Beg saw their opportunity to scale a tower that had been cracked and breached by artillery fire. The rest of the Safavid troops thought this was the signal for a general assault and leapt from behind their breastworks, but Qarčaqāy Beg, terrified of the Shah's anger, stopped the attack and made the men who had scaled the tower come down and go back to their tents. Several good men were lost in this aborted attack to no purpose, for God had willed that, of those within the fort, neither soldier nor civilian should be spared. Whatever man proposes, it is powerless to alter the course of the divine will.

The following day, Friday, 26 Ṣafar/22 June, about the middle of the morning, two of the besieged who had reached the end of their tether because of the hardships of the siege emerged from a tower facing the breastwork of Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and shouted that they had been the only two Ottomans in the tower, which was now empty. By a coincidence, several feet of wall not far from this tower had collapsed of its own accord a few days previously, and a breach had been formed. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan's men, without waiting for orders, charged at the breach, and about one hundred and fifty of them forced their way inside. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, who had just learned what was happening, realized that not a moment was to be lost if he was to save the lives of those hundred and fifty men; already the inhabitants of the town and the defenders of the fort were stirring themselves to meet the threat. He was forced to order the rest of his men to attack, and he himself mounted the tower and blew his bugle.

Qaračaqāy Beg, hearing the din of the fighting, and learning that Ẕu'l-Faqār's men were within the city walls, also refused to wait any longer and ordered his *ḡolāms* to attack. They stormed the tower that had been damaged by artillery fire. Trumpets, tympani, and kettledrums contributed to the general din, as all the other Safavid emirs sent their troops into action. The Ottomans, unable to hold the walls and battlements, tried to find hiding places in the city, but were hunted down and killed. Three or four thousand people perished in the assault on the city and the sack that followed, while the attackers lost no more than three or four men.

The situation in the upper fort, where Allāhverdī Khan and the *qūrčībāšī* had their stations, was different. Here, the Ottomans had been more vigilant in defense; the attackers had suffered a number of casualties from Ottoman musketballs, and no breaches had so far been made in the towers, which consequently could not yet be scaled. The two Safavid commanders therefore kept their men in their stations and did not order an attack, since they had no orders to do so.

After the fall of the city, Ahmad Pasha and the other senior officers tried to hold on in the upper fort, but their efforts were like the convulsions of a dying man. They held on for another five or six days, but in vain. The attackers who had overrun the city approached the upper fort under cover, by dint of boring holes through the walls of adjacent houses, and finally were able to undermine the fortifications. The *qūrčīs,* mindful of their reputation as crack troops, labored night and day at the tunnel which ran from their breastwork, and succeeded in extending it to the ditch. Once they reached the ditch, in one night they constructed a covered shelter beneath the walls, and within a few days had excavated an area underneath the tower. The siege guns meanwhile were playing constantly on the tower, which showed some slight signs of damage, but not enough to render it easy to scale.

On the fifth day of the siege of the upper fort, one hundred and fifty intrepid young men, who considered it the supreme act of devotion to the Safavid house to lay down their lives in its service, holding their shields above their heads, rushed at the tower. The defenders, who knew they had to hold the tower if they valued their lives, rained down a hail of arrows, musketballs, naphtha pots and other incendiary objects which they had prepared for just such an occasion. Allāhverdī Khan sent his troops from the army of Fārs to their support. The struggle was one of extreme ferocity. Finally, some *qūrčīs,* with drawn swords and shields held over their heads, succeeded in scaling the tower—heaven knows how—and engaged the defenders in hand-to-hand combat. The Ottomans were forced to evacuate the tower, but continued to fire on the *ḡāzīs* from the roofs of the houses. The *ḡāzīs* who had stormed the tower fixed up a sort of screen to protect themselves from the enemy fire. All the Ottoman efforts to dislodge the *ḡāzīs* from the tower were unsuccessful, and more *ḡāzīs* were swarming up the tower to join their fellows all the time, until the tower was completely under their control; they did not, however, leave the tower and enter the interior of the fort, for fear that the Ottoman treasuries and other property might be plundered.

Many of the defenders, realizing that the fort was lost, gave up the struggle. Aḥmad Pasha kept urging the Janissaries and slaves of the

Porte and other troops to further efforts, but the men refused to follow his orders and sent an envoy to Allāhverdī Khan to ask for quarter. The Pasha himself, with a group of his personal retainers and *seğmens*,[8] climbed on the roof of a palace that used to be the residence of the rulers of Šīrvān in former times, and maintained a steady fire on the *qūrčīs* and *ğolāms*. But eventually this fire too slackened. Since the Pasha had originally elected to fight rather than negotiate terms, he fought on to the bitter end.

A reliable source told me that Aḥmad Pasha used to say, "I had a slave, bought with gold, who was so bashful and polite he never dared to speak to me. During the time he was with me, he served me devotedly and bravely. When the *qezelbāš* gained control of the tower, he and I had two muskets; he loaded one while I fired the other. During a lull in the fighting, he turned to me and said: 'I have doubts about your sanity when I see you risking your life in this way. Everyone else has given up the struggle, and is resigned to the inevitable. Why are you kicking against fate? What can we two do to alter the situation? Save your life tonight and wait to see what the morrow will bring forth. So saying, he turned his head away from me, and refused to hand me the musket which he had reloaded. When I saw that even my faithful slave had had the audacity to disobey my orders, I realized that the game was up. I discharged the musket I had in my hand, and then submitted to my fate. I shouted to the *qezelbāš* on the tower to cease firing, because I had surrendered, and the fort was the Shah's." At all events, the Pasha kept firing as long as he had an arrow left in his quiver, and then he too sent an envoy to Allāhverdī Khan, asking that the *qezelbāš* not be let loose to sack the fort that night; the next day, he said, he would submit to the Shah's will, whatever it might be. Allāhverdī Khan and the *qūrčībasī* transmitted his request to the Shah, who ordered his troops to hold off that night, but to mount close guard to prevent anyone from slipping out of the fort.

On the morning of the sixth day after the fall of the lower fort, Wednesday 2 Rabī' I, 1016/27 June 1607, the court chamberlains convened a royal assembly, and the Shah, having returned thanks to Almighty God, took his seat upon the throne, and kettledrums were beaten in the camp to celebrate the victory. Qarčaqāy Beg and his *ğolāms* were ordered to take charge of the fort and place guards at the gates. Ḥoseyn Beg Qūr Ẓu'l-Qadar, the chief herald, was sent into the fort to summon Aḥmad Pasha and Šams al-Dīn Pasha with his brother and young son (these men were responsible for the Ottoman resistance), together with Küčük Ḥasan and several others. Aḥmad Pasha procrastinated and said to the chief herald, "I am guilty of such misdeeds against the Shah's servants that I deserve execution; I am therefore not worthy to enter a royal assembly. I hope the Shah will order one of his retainers to come into the fort and execute me here." After the Shah had given him an assurance that his life would be spared, Aḥmad Pasha entered the royal assembly and prostrated himself contritely before the Shah. Since he was an intelligent man, he uttered expressions appropriate to the circumstances.

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[8] Originally an independent corps, the *seğmens* later became a division of the Janissaries (see Gibb and Bowen, pp. 314ff).

The Shah, despite the anger which dominated him that day, spoke gently to Aḥmad Pasha and did not upbraid him, but Sams al-Dīn Pasha felt the rough edge of his tongue as the Shah began to enumerate his crimes. Küčük Ḥasan thought to ingratiate himself with the Shah by joining in the condemnation of Šams al-Dīn Pasha: "You knew that the garrison was not strong enough to withstand the Shah. The garrison would have abandoned Šīrvān and gone to Darband, but you would not permit it. You yourself destroyed the drawbridge and encouraged us to stay and fight. You claimed to be in mystical communion with God and to possess miraculous powers. You said that the saints and the *aqṭāb* had told you no harm would befall the fort at the hands of the *qezelbāš*." Malek 'Alī Beg the herald, who was a wit and was allowed considerable license to exercise his talent at court, said to Šams al-Dīn Pasha, who sported a long beard, "I am surprised that you continue to wear a shaikh's beard, since your claim to mystical and miraculous powers has proved to be false, and the promise of divine assistance which you made to the garrison has not been fulfilled. In view of this, I think it is desirable to shorten your shaikh's beard a little." So saying, after receiving the Shah's consent, he grasped Šams al-Dīn Pasha's beard and began to pull out the hair in handfuls.

The Shah's wrath against Šams al-Dīn Pasha could only be assuaged by the meting out to him of extreme penalties, and so he, his brother, his young son, and several other people whose words and actions had aroused the Shah's anger were tortured in various ways. After being deprived of their sight, they were taken to the commissariat area and cut to pieces. A certain Morād, a Šīrvānī by birth, who had grown up among the Ottomans and was a trusted retainer of theirs, considered himself an outstanding warrior and a champion archer. He inscribed his name on all his arrows, and boasted of his valor. One of the officers of the royal court, whose brother had been killed by one of this man's arrows, asked permission to kill him in blood revenge. Permission was granted, and he went immediately to the fort, cut off Morāl's head, and brought it to the Shah. Although the whole Ottoman garrison deserved to be put to death, the Shah allowed them to depart on condition that they hand over all their possessions to the *ḡāzīs* as blood money.

One of those captured in the fort was the brother of Ḵāja Ḥosām al-Dīn Gīlānī, the vizier of Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of Gīlān. This man had held the position of *qūrčībāšī* to Khan Aḥmad. When Khan Aḥmad fled to Šīrvān and thence to Asia Minor, this man had remained in Šīrvān and had continued to style himself *qūrčībāšī*. He was noted for his wealth, and was highly regarded by the Ottomans for his ability. The Shah had regarded Ḵāja Ḥosam al-Dīn and his brothers with great disfavor, since he held them responsible for the troubles in Gīlān and the revolt of Khan Aḥmad, and he had already executed at Qazvin one of the brothers, Ḵāja Šams al-Dīn. This particular brother had remained loyal to the Ottomans throughout the siege, and had been their adviser on important matters. When he was brought before the Shah, he began to talk smoothly and utter lying words, as is the habit of Gīlānīs. He agreed to satisfy the demands of the *dīvān*, and undertook to deliver to the Safavid troops a large sum obtained from the property of the Ottoman garrison. In this way, he saved his neck for a short time. Initially, he talked of delivering the sum of fifty thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*.

Although the Shah knew he was not to be trusted, he decided it was expedient to give him a chance to prove himself. He bestowed gifts on him and cheered him by telling him he might appoint him vizier of Gīlān—or even of Isfahan and Māzandarān. The *"qūrčībāšī"* summoned the Ottoman clerks and, on the basis of their registers, made a list of all the men who drew pay and allowances during the siege, taking no account of whether they were alive or dead. Against the name of each he put a sum of money, in every case beyond the man's means; if the man was dead, the sum was entailed on his heirs. He fixed another sum of money to be paid by the aldermen[9] and inhabitants of Šamāḵī who had collaborated with the Ottomans and who had been in the upper fort during the siege; this sum was to be regarded both as a fine and as a ransom for their lives. When he had added all this up, it still did not come to more than thirty thousand *tomān*.

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[9] *Kadḵodās* were either the leading men of urban wards, or the heads of guilds.

The total sum to be levied was divided between the *ğolāms, qūrčīs*, officers at court, and musketeers who had served at the siege of Šamākī, and each detachment of troops was allotted a certain number of people on the register from whom they could collect the appropriate sum. If anyone complained that the sum was too much or too little, the "*qūrčībāšī* of Gīlān" would reach a settlement with him in conformity with the computation of the account. By various ruses and subterfuges, the "*qūrčībāšī*" maintained his position as consultant and person of influence among the garrison and townspeople for several days, while the business of extracting the money from people waxed fast and furious. From persons of means, the full amount of the fine was collected, but from others, they managed to extract only a half, a third, or even a quarter. Of the share charged to persons now dead, they collected very little. The total sum accruing to the *ğāzīs* came to no more than five or six thousand *tomān;* the rest was uncollectible.

The falsehood of the promises of the "*qūrčībāšī* of Gīlān" being now apparent, he was deemed deserving of punishment for his past sins, and was handed over to the dunners. Upon interrogation he confessed that he had unlimited wealth stored away in Gīlān, and the dunners took him there and began the expropriation of his property. Most of what he said was lies, and he kept making absurd excuses. One day, on the pretext of performing his ablutions, he went to the bank of the Safīd River and threw himself into the water, hoping to escape by swimming across. But he was weighed down by his crimes and drowned. Glory be to God! My pen has once again led me away from the main theme of my discourse! My justification is that the subject of this digression was connected with the siege of Šamākī, and was therefore not entirely irrelevant.

Aḥmad Pasha, with a few servants, was handed over to 'Īsā Khan Beg, the grandson of Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, who was connected with the Safavid royal house and subsequently became *qūrčībāšī*. After spending a few days as the guest of 'Īsā Khan, Aḥmad Pasha was sent to the fortress-prison of Qahqaha and was not heard of again.

Among the Ottoman garrison were a number of Šīrvānīs who had entered Ottoman service and become fiefholders.[10] The interests of the Safavid state dictated that no punitive action should be taken against these persons at that time, because this might cause disturbances among the inhabitants of Šīrvān in general, who had been under Ottoman rule for years and had given their support to them. The royal favor was therefore bestowed upon a number of these Šīrvānīs, each of whom was granted two or three localities as a fief or had their revenues granted to him in the form of a tax immunity. The Shah also decreed that the sons and brothers of these persons should be enrolled in Safavid service in Iraq. However, Safavid governors gradually assumed control of areas granted to these Šīrvānīs, because of their fear of possible revolt on the part of the latter.

The rest of the Ottoman troops had lived for years among the people of Šīrvān, and had formed friendships and intermarried with them. The Shah decreed that these Ottomans should be handed over to their friends and kinsmen among the people of Šīrvān, who would provide them with travel expenses and send them on their way to wherever they wished to go. The people of Šīrvān realized that they were under a cloud for having collaborated with the Ottomans, and they were looking for some way of clearing their name. They hit on the plan of murdering all the Ottoman soldiers, thereby demonstrating their enmity toward the Ottomans and their "love for the Shah," and one night they disposed of the lot. The only Ottomans to survive were a few servants and other ranks who were fortunate enough to escape the swords of the Šīrvānīs.

About this time Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan committed a dastardly act that later brought him ill fortune. His elder brother, Rostam Khan, who had been driven out of his seat of government by a revolt on the part of the emirs of Ṭāleš, had crossed the Kor and, with his brothers and supporters, gone to live in Šīrvān. For a while he had established a modus vivendi with the Ottomans, but ultimately the Ottomans had become suspicious of him and had thought it advisable to put him out of the way. Rostam Khan, with several of his brothers and their followers, had been put to death; Farhād Khan, the younger brother of Rostam Khan, and two other brothers younger than himself, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and Alvand Sultan, escaped from the Ottomans and fled to Azerbaijan.

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[10] Holders of *ze'āma* or *tīmār;* the distinction between the two types of fiefs was simply one of value (see Gibb and Bowen, I/1, pp. 47ff.).

When Shah ʻAbbas came to the throne, he put to death any *qezelbāš* who defied his authority, and brought security and order back to the country. The refugees thought they were safe from their enemies and came to court, where they rose to high office. I have already related part of their story in the appropriate place. A foster-sister of theirs and two other daughters of Rostam Khan, in addition to a number of servants, were still in Šīrvān in Ottoman hands. All three women had been married by Ottoman nobles, and the honor of the family had been thus preserved. There had been both male and female issue of these marriages. When Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan was appointed governor of Šīrvān just before the fall of Šamāḵī, the husbands and their sons turned to him for help, relying on their kinship with him through Rostam Khan. The Shah, who was apprised of this, ordained that the husbands, their sons, and their followers should be entrusted to the custody of Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, and that no one should molest them.

As a result, the sum which the "*qūrčībāšī* of Gīlān" had set against their names as part of the fines levied on the Ottomans was left for Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan to pay, so that no alien tax collector should call at their houses. But Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, jealous of the family honor and heedless of the eventual consequences of his action, put to death all three women, their husbands, their children (both male and female), their sons-in-law, and their servants, between twenty-seven and thirty people in all. The victims are said to have been mudered in one night, but there are differing accounts on this point. The Shah expressed his loathing of the deed, which was condemned by all. Since Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan had violated the bonds of kinship and murdered innocent women and children, it was not long before divine retribution brought his own life to a close.

After these events, the province of Šīrvān was divided among the *qezelbāš* emirs: The districts of Darband and Šāberān went to Čerāğ Sultan Gerāmpā Ostājlū, and Shah Naẓar Beg Tükelī was ordered to give him assistance; they replaced the troops currently in the Darband area. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan entered the city of Šamāḵī and set about repairing the damage done to the fort. The tunnels and trenches dug by the Safavid forces were filled in. The weather now being uncomfortably hot, the Shah moved to summer quarters in the nearby mountains.

The Dāğestānī and Circassian emirs and governors, both those who had come in person to court and those who had professed their loyalty to the Shah by sending representatives, were given leave to depart after receiving robes of honor and gifts of money, and Rostam Khan Dāğestānī received suitable honors. Ma'ṣūm Khan, the ruler of Ṭabarsarān, still felt guilty about having left the royal camp without the Shah's permission, and was kept in a perpetual state of anxiety by the continued presence of the Shah in the area. The Shah therefore sent Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Beg, the vizier of Šīrvān, on a mission to him with yet more gifts, and special indulgences on the part of the Shah. Ma'ṣūm Khan's anxieties were finally stilled, and he was exalted above his peers by these gifts. He sent some of the inmates of his own harem for service in the royal palace, and once more entered the ranks of the Shah's loyal servants.

The Shah's Return from Šīrvān to Tabriz and His Visit to the Shrine at Mašhad

Once the decision to strike camp at Šamāḳī and march back to Iraq had been taken, 'Alī Khan Beg Javānšīrī was sent on ahead to Javād to construct a bridge across the Kor. When this was ready, the Shah struck camp, crossed the Kor, and set off for Tabriz via Darraverd. He sent the emirs, principal officers of state, and the tents via Ahar, while he himself, with a few personal attendants and *moqarrabs,* visited the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī at Ardabīl before rejoining his troops at Tabriz. At Tabriz, the Shah spent some days seeing to the needs of the emirs and nobles of Azerbaijan, and ordering the affairs of that frontier. He welcomed ambassadors from Mīr Šaraf, the governor of Jazīra, and Zakarīā Khan and the other Kurdish emirs, congratulating him on his victory at Šamāḳī and on the conquest of Šīrvān; they were loaded with gifts and sent on their way.

Ğāzī Gerāy Khan, the chief of the Crimean Tartars, had asked the Shah to release Ḳandān Aqa, the *motaffereqa-āqāsī,* who had been taken prisoner at Vān and was a close friend of his. The Shah accordingly released from imprisonment at Qahqaha Ḳandān Aqa and his two sons, one of whom had been taken prisoner with his father at Vān, and the other in the battle with Jeğāl-oğlū. Ḳandān Aqa was a wise and experienced officer, and he now offered to leave his sons with the Shah as hostages and, together with Ğāzī Gerāy Khan, make overtures to the Ottoman Sultan with a view to negotiating peace on the same terms as those of the Treaty of Amasya.

The Shah gave his approval to this suggestion, and sent Ḳandān

Aqa on his way accompanied by Abu'l-Qāsem Beg Ev-oğlū the centurion, who had been nominated ambassador to the Khan of the Crimean Tartars and carried with him a friendly letter from the Shah. As the party crossed Circassia, they heard of the death of Gāzī Gerāy Khan, and at the same time they were attacked by a certain Circassian governor named Ūtīya who bore a long-standing grudge against Ḳandān Aqa. Ḳandān Aqa, who had become separated from Abu'l-Qāsem Beg, was killed. Abu'l-Qāsem Beg fought valiantly against the Circassians and was wounded; Ūtīya, after looting all his baggage, eventually sent him back safe and sound because of his fear of the Shah's wrath. After the death of Ḳandān Aqa, his sons remained in an honored position at the Shah's court for a time, but later showed their ingratitude by fleeing from it, as will be described shortly.

The whole of the Shah's hereditary territories of Šīrvān and Azerbaijan, which had been under Ottoman occupation for nearly twenty-five years, was now back in Safavid hands. All the forts in these two provinces, which had been well garrisoned by the Ottomans and stocked with provisions and munitions, had been recaptured. The whole area had been swept clean of Ottoman troops, but it had taken almost five years of continuous campaigning to achieve this. Not since the time of Tīmūr, two hundred and fifty[11] years ago, had any ruler kept his armies in the field for five continuous years and achieved such an uninterrupted run of victories. After spending several days reviewing his troops at Tabriz, the Shah sent his men on leave. Since the Shah attributed his victories to the assistance of God and the infallible Imams, especially the Eighth Imam, he decided to make the pilgrimage to the shrine at Mašhad and gain spiritual refreshment after the rigors and hardships inseparable from military campaigns.

At Qazvin, the local notables prepared illuminations in the markets and the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād, and celebrations went on for several days. At the conclusion of these festivities, the Shah set out for Mašhad with a small party of personal attendants. He was received at Mašhad by the governor, Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Herat, and most of the emirs of Khorasan. After completing the ceremonies of the pilgrimage, the Shah returned to Isfahan, which he entered on 26 Rajab 1016/16 November 1607. The city, the bazaars, and the

[11] The figure is approximate; Tīmūr first invaded the Iranic world in 1380–81.

Qeyṣarīya[12] were gay with decorations, and several days were devoted to popular festivities.

The emirs, when they reviewed their men at Tabriz, had, at the Shah's command, faithfully recorded the names of those under their command. Men who had served continuously for the last five years without a break were singled out for special reward. Those who had distinguished themselves by particular acts of heroism in the field—and their name was legion—had the details of circumstances recorded under their names so that they might be suitably rewarded. These muster rolls had been delivered to the comptrollers of finance, the men had been sent on leave, and the emirs had been given permission to return to their fiefs. The vizier, Ḥātem Beg, was given permission to return home to Ordūbād to lay the foundations of certain buildings he had in mind, and I accompanied him on this trip, since I was usually in attendance upon him. Although I had not seen my loved ones and children for five years, I could not bear not to be at the vizier's side. Since the vizier strongly urged me to go with him, I decided that the advantages to be gained by accompanying him took precedence over my own wishes, and agreed to his request. Although the details of this trip have no place in my history, strictly speaking, I devoutly hope that by giving them I will not incur censure from my learned readers.

My Trip to Ordūbād with the Vizier, Ḥātem Beg, and Our Return to Isfahan

When Ḥātem Beg left Tabriz for Ordūbād, he had the following traveling companions: (1) Seyyed Nāṣer, the son of Seyyed Mobārak Khan the ruler of Ḥavīza. Seyyed Nāṣer, from his early youth, had been brought up by the vizier as his own son, and had mastered many branches of learning. (2) Moṣṭafā Pasha, a distinguished Ottoman emir who held the status of vizier. He had been taken prisoner at the battle of Ṣūfīān. He was a man of genial temperament, a good conversationalist, and a man of secretarial cast of mind. He had been placed in the custody of Ḥātem Beg by the Shah, and the vizier treated him like a friend and invited him to all his gatherings. (3) Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Tafrešī, a most learned man, skilled in the secretarial art, and possessed of the most excellent taste as regards inventing new expressions and metaphors. For some years he had been the tutor of Mīrzā Ṭāleb Khan. (4) Mīr 'Abd al-Ğanī Tafrešī, a relative of the above, a *seyyed* of congenial disposition. Both he and Moḥammad Ḥoseyn had been fellow students attending the classes of 'Allāmat al-'Olamā'ī Mīrzā Ebrahim Hamadānī. Mīr 'Abd al-Ḡanī was also no mean poet. (5) Mowlānā Moṭrebī Qazvīnī, an outstanding singer of his age, and a specialist in the singing of rounds. In both the composition of lyrics and in playing he is the envy of his fellow artists. He is an extremely witty man an excellent companion. (6) Ostād Ḥeydarqolī 'Ūdī,[13] a dexterous and melodious wielder of the plectrum, who was attached to the court.

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[12] The royal bazaar.

Ḥātem Beg's other companions, such as your humble servant, were privileged to be constantly in attendance at his private parties with the distinguished people mentioned above, and contributed to the general enjoyment by composing poetry, narrating history, and telling stories and anecdotes.

First, we went to Dū-zāl and Kor-dašt, two villages in the Dezmār district on the southern bank of the Aras River. We stayed for three days in these delightful spots, whose gardens abound with every kind of fruit, especially sweet pomegranates that are preferred by connoisseurs to those of Yazd, Abarqūh, Šāhvār in the Sāva district, or Qom; excellent grapes are also cultivated in great variety. The yield of fruit crops in this area is extremely heavy, particularly in the case of pomegranates, which are produced in sufficient quantity to supply the whole of Azerbaijan, Šīrvān, Arrān,[14] and Georgia.

Mūsā Beg Dezmārī is related to the Naṣīrīya Ṭūsīya family, and also comes of the same line as Elyās K̮alīfa, one of the Qarāja-dāg̮ *k̮alīfas*, a distinguished and influential family. Elyās K̮alīfa had been appointed governor of that region by Shah 'Abbas, and had provided extremely pleasant accommodation at Dū-zāl for travelers, to whose needs he catered to the best of his ability. We were entertained royally by Elyās K̮alīfa and by the son of Mūsā Beg, especially by Šāhrok̮ Beg, a talented and clean-living young man who is an excellent calligrapher and who now holds the office of vizier of the *qūrčīs*,[15] and by his brother Ḥeydar Beg, who holds the rank of centurion. Ḥātem Beg gave suitable gifts to the *k̮alīfa*, his sons, and all the members of his family.

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[13] I.e., the lute player.

[14] I.e., Qarābāg̮.

[15] Each of the four principal corps of the Safavid army in the time of Shah 'Abbas (*qūrčīs, g̮olāms, tofangčīs, tūpčīs*) had its own vizier. On the function of the vizier of the *qūrčīs*, see *TM*, p. 72.

From Dū-zāl, we proceeded contentedly on our way to Ordūbād, where we lodged in houses that had belonged to the vizier's family for generations. Everyone, high and low, came out to welcome the vizier and to express their joy at seeing him. The vizier treated all sorts and conditions of men as his friends and brothers, and behaved with the generosity expected of one of his station, bestowing gifts on all dependents of the Naṣīrīya Ṭūsīya family. All, down to artisans and craftsmen, were recipients of his bounty, and holy men, dervishes, and deserving women were not forgotten. We stayed at Ordūbād for twenty days, and every day there was a feast of noble proportions. The vizier visited Vanand and Kalīs for a few days, and the whole time he was in an excellent humor.

In the midst of the gardens of this region there is a hill called Naẓāra (lookout point), a favorite place for excursions. From it, one obtains a beautiful view over the gardens and orchards on the slopes of the hill, and of the Aras which flows through them from the west. The vizier had had water led down from higher up the mountain in order to install fountains at Naẓāra, and he had built there an octagonal pleasure house, each side having a portico. On top of the building, a cistern had been constructed so that water could be distributed around the house. In front of each portico was a pool. On the southern side of Naẓāra, ten cubits[16] below the level of the building, there was a plot of ground some three or four *jarībs*[17] in area. The vizier planned to level it and to construct on it a large pool, surrounded by gardens. In the middle of this pool were to be fountains, and the jets of water were designed to rise to a height of ten cubits after the manner of those at the Taḵt-e Ṣefr at Herat, which are one of the wonders of the world. Unfortunately, the vizier's plans had not fully materialized before his death. I hope that his son and successor in the office of vizier will be able to have the work completed.

We left this refreshing place at the beginning of Rajab 1016/end of October 1607, and our hosts accompanied us to the farthest limits of the district of Dezmār. We then proceeded to visit the shrine of Shaikh Šehāb al-Dīn Aharī at Ahar, and from there we went to Ardabīl, where we lodged in pleasant accommodations, situated near the river, which were placed at our disposal by the vizier of Ardabīl, Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā. As I was writing this, it occurred to me that I ought to say something about this personage.

[16] Approximately 17'6".

[17] A *jarīb* is 10,000 square meters.

K̲āja Moḥammad Reżā is an amateur poet, a lover of jest but withal a thoughtful man. He was born at Joveyn, a district of Qazvin, where his family had lived for generations. His father, K̲āja Malek, had been skilled in bookkeeping and the secretarial art, and held various posts in Khorasan as secretary to emirs. He had left Khorasan at the time of the troubles there, having lost all his possessions, and retired to his native place, where he died. His son, however, was too ambitious to be satisfied with village life, and he aspired to office; in pursuit of this ambition, he was put through the usual mill that all aspirants for office have to endure. He entered the service of Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū and rose steadily in the latter's esteem, eventually becoming his vizier. After proving himself in this office for several years, he was transferred to the supreme *dīvān* and enrolled in the ranks of the viziers and bureaucrats there, and was subsequently appointed vizier of Azerbaijan. On the Shah's expedition to Georgia, he performed services of such outstanding merit (they will be described in the events under the head of the appropriate year) that he was honored by the sobriquet *fedavī* (devoted servant), and was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* of the court. At the time of our visit he was in Ardabīl on official business, but during his stay there he made friends with the local poets and did everything in his power to assist them. He is a gentleman of ascetic temperament, but a wit and a genial companion. Witticisms and elegant jests were constantly being generated by his harmonious genius, and in his *ḡazals* he has many verses of genuinely mystical content.

Ḥātem Beg stayed at Ardabīl for three days, during which he visited the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn and the tombs of the other Safavid shaikhs. During his stay, K̲āja Moḥammad Reżā spared no effort to oblige his guests, and the two viziers extended courtesies to each other. When Ḥātem Beg left for Iraq by the K̲alk̲āl road, K̲āja Moḥammad Reżā escorted him for several stages of his journey. On his arrival at Qazvin, Ḥātem Beg took up residence at a house on the K̲īābān-e Bāḡ-e Sa'ādat. After three days in Qazvin, he traveled to Sāva, where he was the guest of Seyyed Nāṣer, the son of Seyyed Mobārak, who was the governor of that region. From Sāva the vizier went to Qom, where he visited the shrine of Fāṭema and bestowed gifts on the *seyyeds,* clients, and attendants of the shrine. When the townspeople of Qom brought him some juicy pomegranates, he produced some of the ones he had brought from Dezmār, and appointed some judges to adjudicate between them. The pomegranates from Dezmār were judged to be juicier and their flesh more delicate. The people of Qom refused to accept this verdict, but by so doing they were committing an injustice against the Dezmār pomegranates!

After spending a day at Kashan, the vizier reentered the capital on 8 Šaʻbān 1016/28 November 1607. The whole way from Ordūbād to Isfahan, it had been the practice of the vizier to summon his companions after they had recovered from the fatigue of the day's journey. Everyone would talk and listen to the singing and playing of the artists in their party. The trip had been unalloyed pleasure from beginning to end. The members of the party had enjoyed the company of the vizier, and reckoned that short trip to be the epitome of a lifetime. The same day that the vizier reached Isfahan, he was received in audience by the Shah, who welcomed him with great kindness.

When I started this narrative, I apologized for doing so; however, since I was a member of the vizier's party on this trip, it seemed to me that I had an obligation to describe it in detail, in gratitude for the many kindnesses which were lavished upon me in the course of it. My object was twofold: to express my gratitude for the hospitality I received, and to hope that this praiseworthy custom of entertaining guests may be emulated by all the great men of the age. I now return to my central theme.

Shah 'Abbas, after spending some time at the Naqš-e Jahān palace at Isfahan, and after he had rested from his travels and social activities and hunting, and seen to the administration of justice and the ordering of affairs in Iraq, expressed the wish to go hunting in Māzandarān. He left Ḥātem Beg the vizier, the *ṣadrs,* the emirs, and the other principal officers of state at Isfahan to carry on the business of the *dīvān,* and set off with a small party of *moqarrabs* and personal attendants. He spent the whole of the winter of 1607-08 and the spring of 1608 in Māzandarān. Māzandarān in the autumn, and in the spring when the ground is carpeted with tulips, narcissus, and all manner of flowers, is one of the best places in the world.

Miscellaneous Events

This year an estrangement occurred at Mašhad between Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān and Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Mašhad. The quarrel had its origin in the impatient and arrogant behavior of Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān, and was fanned by troublemakers. Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, as a result of the Mīrzā's hostility and obstinacy, stopped treating him with the unfailing courtesy he had hitherto extended toward him, and began being rude to him. Since the governor was a military commander, with troops at his disposal, Mīrzā-ye ʿĀlamīān, though he had no reason to be afraid, took sanctuary at the shrine of the Eighth Imam and sent couriers in all directions to mobilize a force of musketeers. Both parties to the dispute sent their version to the Shah. In the Shah's opinion, Mīrzā-ye ʿĀlamīān had been behaving like a madman, and he summoned him to court and took him with him to Māzandarān, where, as a matter of deliberate policy, he paid little attention to him, because it was highly desirable to take him down a peg in view of the fact that his insane behavior had its roots in arrogance.

Another event this year was the promotion of K̮ᵛāja Moḥammad Reżā, of whom I have already spoken, to the post of vizier and *momayyez* of Azerbaijan; this appointment was made when the K̮ᵛāja visited the Shah's court in Māzandarān and was received with favor because of his past record of service and his capable financial administration.

Finally, on the death this year of Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan Ṣalāʾī, who had held the post of *ṣadr* of Iraq and Māzandarān, this post was given to his nephew, Mīrzā Rażī.

The Shah's Constituting His Private Estates and Personal Property as a Vaqf (Benefaction) in Favor of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones[18]

This year, the Shah received the inspiration to constitute all the personal estates he had legally acquired over the years (a fair market price for which would be more than one hundred thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*, and which, after payment of agricultural subsidies, would yield an average income of about seven thousand *tomān*), together with the hostelries, the Qeyṣarīya market, the stores around the Naqš-e Jahān Square in Isfahan, and the bathhouses in that city, as a benefaction to the Fourteen Immaculate Ones. Having ascertained what the minimum income from this property was, the Shah divided it into fourteen shares of declining magnitude, the largest share going to the Prophet Moḥammad. The Twelfth Imam was allotted a special share; in addition to the share allotted to each of the Imams, he received as a further benefaction several places the income from which, after payment of agricultural subsidies, could be as large as the original share.

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[18] The Prophet Moḥammad, his daughter Fāṭema, and the twelve Imams. On these benefactions in general, see J. A. Pope, *Chinese Porcelains from the Ardabil Shrine*, Washington, 1956, pp. 7ff.

The management of these trusts remained in the Shah's hands during his lifetime and was then entrusted to his successors, on conditions set forth in the trust deed, which was drawn up by the *mojtahed* Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn Moḥammad. The disposition of the trust funds was at the discretion of the manager. After a sum had been set aside as a management fee, the trust income was to be used as the occasion demanded for administrative expenses and subsistence allowances for the employees at each location, and for subsistence allowances for those living in the neighborhood of these locations, for pilgrims, scholars, pious men, and students of theology. The spiritual reward for these acts was consigned to the spirits of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones.

At the same time, the Shah gave orders for fourteen signet rings, each inscribed with the name of one of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones, to be made at Isfahan under the supervision of the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, and the *ṣadr,* Mīrzā Rażī. The same inscriptions which were considered blessed and were used on signet rings in the lifetime of each of the Immaculate Ones, as recorded by learned doctors of religion in biographical and hagiological works relating to members of the Prophet's house, were now inscribed on these rings at a propitious hour. The rings, affixed to straps studded with rubies, were entrusted to the *ṣadr,* Mīrzā Rażī, so that the documents relating to all transactions connected with every branch of the trust administration might be blessed by being sealed with one of these signet rings. The *ṣadr* was designated the Shah's deputy in all matters concerning the administration of these benefactions, and this important function was conferred on him in addition to the office of *ṣadr.*

Shah 'Abbas also constituted his personal property into a trust. He was so zealous in the execution of this policy that he was frequently heard to say, "Every item in my household, and every item which it is possible to tax, is covered by the terms of this benefaction, even the two rings which I am wearing. The only condition is that the revenues accruing from this benefaction shall be used according as I, who am the manager of the trust, shall dictate, and shall be expended in the interests of religion and the state." In this way, Shah 'Abbas donated to the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad his library copies of the

Koran and scientific books in Arabic—works on jurisprudence, commentaries on the Koran, traditions, and the like. His Persian books—historical works, collected works of poets, and the compositions of Persian authors in general—were bequeathed to the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn at Ardabīl, together with his collection of Chinese porcelain, including large dishes, celadon ware, wine cups, and other Ǧūrīd and Chinese bowls which were in the royal china store. The Shah's jewels, jeweled weapons, and bowls of gold and silver; his studs of horses (Arabian chestnuts, pure-bred Ottomans, Bayāts, Georgians; Aleša horses from Ḥeṣār, Badaḵšān, and Transoxania, the equal of which could not be found in the stables of any other monarch; and his herds of camels, and flocks of sheep and goats, in number beyond computation—all this was included in the benefaction, and each item was allocated to some specific purpose. The value of the Shah's personal property described above is impossible to calculate.

My learned readers will admit that the generosity of this benefaction is beyond the comprehension of human beings, wedded as they are to material possessions, particularly in view of the fact that the acquisition of such possessions is normally an ambition of kings. It is true that in former ages kings have made pious bequests, but never on such a scale, nor without the ruler's renouncing the things of this world and living as a recluse. Although an act of this nature seems improbable to those whose horizons are limited by worldly considerations, thoughtful people will realize that it is not surprising in a man who is the ninth lineal descendant of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn, since the Shaikh and his descendants have maintained in due order the chain of spiritual direction, have been received before the throne of God's unity, and have traversed the stages of asceticism and self-denial. God be praised that the Shah, immersed though he is in the problems of this world, has, like his ancestors, followed the path of self-denial and, while still in this earthly world, has laid the foundations of his life in the hereafter. God be praised that the Shah, though he has inevitably been forced, like all princes, to drink the intoxicating draughts of power and ambition, has yet retained his senses and, in the midst of the desolation of this phenomenal existence, has tried to cultivate the world of the spirit. It is my confident hope that, as a reward for these munificent acts, he will succeed in attaining his objectives in this world. May his reign be coterminous with the second coming of the Lord of the Age![19] May his subjects rest secure in the shadow of his majesty and justice on earth, and in the next world, through his mediation on the day of resurrection, quaff the waters of paradise!

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[19] I.e., the Twelfth Imam, or Mahdī.

Events of the Year of the Monkey, Part of Which Corresponds to the Muslim Year 1016/1607-08, and Part to the Muslim Year 1017/1608-09, the Twenty-second Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Thursday, 3 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1016/20 March 1608. The Shah, still in Māzandarān, remained there until the weather began to get uncomfortably hot, and then he began to think of hunting in the Isfahan region. With all his emirs and nobles, he moved to the summer quarters of Kahrīz-olang and Farīdūn. While he was there, he received some joyful news from Baghdad which gave rise to the hope that that province would be reconquered. But it was not to be, for all things have their seasons and the time appointed for the reconquest of Baghdad had not yet arrived.

After the death of Ozūn Aḥmad, his son, Moḥammad Pasha, had declared his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, and the principal officers of the Ottoman state had taken Ozūn Aḥmad's sons under their wing as a reward for his faithful service and as compensation for his being taken prisoner. They set his sons' minds at rest in regard to their father's former actions. Moḥammad Pasha was appointed governor of Baghdad; the *sanjāq* of Ḥella was given to his brother, Moṣṭafā Pasha; and both men were urged to be loyal to the Ottoman house. Moḥammad Pasha discharged his duties loyally and brought the whole of Arab Iraq under his control. However, in order to maintain his position vis-à-vis the army at Baghdad, he gathered together a personal bodyguard of Janissaries of the corps known as *segmen*, and nearly all the profits and occasional revenues of Baghdad were consumed to defray the pay and allowances of these men.

As a result, there was insufficient income left to meet the demands of the regular troops at Baghdad who had assignments on the revenue. The regular officers turned against him, but were unable to take any open action because of the size of his bodyguard and the power he had acquired. They therefore incited one or two of the pages to murder him. The latter eventually saw their opportunity and dispatched him in his private apartments in the keep. The *segmens* then rallied around his brother, Moṣṭafā Pasha, and proclaimed him governor of Baghdad. Moṣṭafā Pasha's first step was to carry out a purge of those he suspected of being involved in the murder of his brother and divide their property among the *segmens*. As a result, his power became even greater than that of his brother, and the regular troops were terrified of him. However, some people came forward to mediate between them and the governor, and an uneasy truce was patched up.

Morād Pasha had been *amīr al-omarā* of Qarāmān during the sultanate of his grandfather, Sultan Morād III. He had accompanied 'Oṣmān Pasha when the latter invaded Iran, had taken part in the campaigns in Azerbaijan against Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, had been taken prisoner, and had been incarcerated at Qahqaha for six years. When Shah 'Abbas came to the throne and peace was concluded with the Ottomans, Morād Pasha had been released as part of the mutual exchange of prisoners that occurred at that time. After his return, he had from time to time held the governorship of some province. Because of his great ability and experience, he was now appointed by Sultan Aḥmad I to the offices of grand vizier and commander in chief. His charge was to deal with the critical problems facing the Ottoman empire: the growing challenge from the Franks in Europe, the Jalālī revolt, and the insecure state of the frontiers in the east resulting from the *qezelbāš* counteroffensive. Morād Pasha, who had pitched camp near Aleppo, hearing of events at Baghdad and of Moṣṭafā Pasha's seizure of power there, appointed as governor of Baghdad Maḥmūd Pasha the son of Jeğāl-oğlū. He wrote conciliatory letters to the army at Baghdad and to the chiefs of the Arab tribes in the rural areas of Iraq and Jazīra, calling on them to support Maḥmūd Pasha, who meanwhile marched to Iraq and camped at Old Baghdad.

As soon as the officers and men of the regular forces at Baghdad heard of Maḥmūd Pasha's arrival, they renounced their allegiance to Moṣṭafā Pasha and came out openly in opposition to him. Moṣṭafā Pasha barricaded himself in the keep of the fortress at Baghdad with his *segmens* and appealed to Shah 'Abbas for assistance. He wrote letters to the Shah and to the frontier emirs. He sent to the Shah as his envoy Beyrām Khan, the son of Sūlāğ Ḥoseyn Takkalū, who had gone to Baghdad during the Ottoman occupation and had remained there. If the Shah would march on Baghdad, said Moṣṭafā Pasha, and send one of his emirs with a detachment of troops to the fort, he would surrender it to the Shah's officers and declare himself to be the Shah's servant.

On receiving Moṣṭafā Pasha's letters, Ḥasan Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Hamadan, and Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū Afšār had marched to the banks of the Māhīdašt River and halted there, awaiting orders from the Shah. Beyrām Khan and Moṣṭafā Pasha's other envoys were received by the Shah in his summer quarters at Farīdūn. The Shah treated them kindly, sent robes of honor for Moṣṭafā Pasha, and exhorted him to hold the keep, for he (the Shah) was on his way; at the same time, he sent orders to his frontier emirs to be ready to attack Baghdad and, as soon as his own forces approached the area, to go on ahead. The emirs carried out their orders, and skirmishes took place daily between them and the *seğmens*. Although Maḥmūd Pasha had been informed of all these developments, he did not dare to advance, though urgently requested by the regular troops at Baghdad to do so.

One day, the *seğmens* issued from the fort and charged through the city, killing and plundering. The regular troops, spreading the rumor that Maḥmūd Pasha was on his way to support them, engaged in fierce fighting in the streets with the *seğmens*. They gained the upper hand and slew many of them; the survivors retreated within the fort. The news of their success encouraged Maḥmūd Pasha to move to their support. Reinforced by Emir Nāṣer b. Mohannā 'Arab, he crossed the Tigris, entered Baghdad, and laid siege to the fort. Moṣṭafā Pasha was alarmed by the turn of events: Most of his men had been killed and he, remembering what had happened to his brother, no longer felt confident of the loyalty of his troops. Accordingly, he did not stay to await the arrival of the *qezelbāš* army, but opened negotiations with Maḥmūd Pasha and concluded a truce on the following terms: He would be pardoned and allowed to return to his governorship at Ḥella; he would hand over Baghdad to Maḥmūd Pasha; and there would be no retaliation by either side. Some time after his return to Ḥella, Moṣṭafā Pasha took refuge at the Shah's court, but this will be related under next year's events.

The news of Maḥmūd Pasha's occupation of Baghdad reached the Shah at his camp at Āq Ölang near Hamadan, and the Shah decided not to pursue the attempt to capture Baghdad at that time, since the hot season was at hand. Before he left the Hamadan and Dargozīn area, the Shah dealt with various matters, including the execution of various Lors and Kurds who had been practicing highway robbery. The event that finally put the whole scheme for an expedition to Baghdad in abeyance was the Jalālī revolt.

The Origins of the Jalālīs, together with a Description of Their Battles with the Ottomans and of the Coming of a Group of Them to the Shah's Court

As my learned readers will be aware, I have stated repeatedly in the course of this history, and especially in the foreword, that my object is to record the history of Iran and the Iranians. However, I have from time to time been forced to dwell on extraneous but relevant matters which have temporarily diverted me from my original purpose; these digressions have been essential to a proper understanding of events in Iran. I therefore turn now to an account of the Jalālīs.

The term Jalālī is used by the Ottomans for any group which is in revolt against the reigning sultan and engages in plundering and devastating the countryside. The only reason which occurs to my feeble intelligence as to why such people are called Jalālīs is that they are manifestations of divine majesty *(jalāl),*[1] since there is no compassion or forgiveness in their nature. At all events, the first person in the Ottoman empire to stir up rebellion during this epoch became known as a Jalālī. He was a low-grade clerk named Qarā Yāzījī (scribe), who started a revolt in the Amasya and Tūqāt region during the sultanate of Sultan Moḥammad Khan b. Sultan Morād.[2] By dint of lavish donations of other people's property and money which he had acquired by highway robbery and the looting of travelers and merchants, he gathered around him a band of ruffians and scoundrels, and his reputation as a brave and generous leader spread throughout that province. The ranks of his followers were swelled by the improvident, the idle, and the adventurous, all attracted by the prospect of money. Qarā Yāzījī was constantly moving his base, and from time to time he would ravage a certain area. He had four or five thousand men under his command when he suddenly died.

He was succeeded as leader of the Jalālīs by his brother Ḥasan Beg, who was also dubbed Yāzījī because the name was by now so celebrated. Ḥasan Beg soon caused even more uproar and disturbance than his brother had done, and achieved some remarkable feats. At first, the principal officers of the Ottoman empire and the provincial governors, disinclined to take Yāzījī seriously, had been slow to take action against him. When Ḥasan Beg succeeded him as leader of the Jalālīs, however, and when his reputation for daring, bravery, and

[1] *Jalāl* is one of the attributes of God, and is usually rendered as "majesty."

[2] Moḥammad III (1003-1012/1595-1603).

generosity came to exceed that of his brother, men with disordered minds and ill-starred persons from every class, if they had no family ties, joined him. The Jalālīs began systematically to attack and kill regular Ottoman troops and to plunder their belongings, and their appetite increased with every success. Unlike his brother, Ḥasan Beg rarely molested merchants and civilians generally, but any Ottoman soldier who fell into his hands was a dead man. Caravans of merchants and travelers, by seeking him out and identifying themselves, could obtain a *laissez-passer* and proceed toward their destination unmolested, though he expected a modest gift in return. Similarly, any district could purchase immunity from his depredations by sending him gifts. On the other hand, if any opposed him he pillaged their territory without mercy. Provincial governors and pashas, finding themselves unable to travel freely about the territories under their jurisdiction, confined themselves to their castles, powerless to take offensive action against him. The inhabitants not only of rural areas but of urban districts too were obliged to submit to him. The number of Jalālīs had now increased to between ten and fifteen thousand men.

Ultimately, Ḥasan Beg's writ ran in most of the provinces of Anatolia, and any draft he wrote to the financial agents, clerks, and residents of these provinces was invariably honored. Wherever he went, he used to collect protection money from the local inhabitants. On one occasion, the emirs and pashas made an attempt to deal with him, but Yāzījī scattered their forces without trouble and acquired much booty as well. Next, the officers of the central Ottoman administration appointed Ḵosrow Pasha commander of a force of Janissaries and *qapı-qolları*, but this force too was defeated and retreated to Malāṭīya. After his defeat of Ḵosrow Pasha, Yāzījī began to act like a de facto governor, appointing his own men as emirs and *bölükbāšīs*.[3] Next, an imposing army consisting of the governors and pashas of Erzerum and Arzenjān, together with Šarīf Pasha the *beglerbeg* of Erīvān, a most experienced officer, was dispatched against Yāzījī under the command of Ḥasan Pasha, the son of Moḥammad Pasha. Moḥammad Pasha had been grand vizier under Sultan Sülaymān, and Ḥasan Pasha had made a name for himself among the Ottoman emirs by virtue of his valor, his great wealth, and his connection by marriage with the Ottoman royal house; at this time he was *beglerbeg* of Baghdad.

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[3] The *čavošes* were divided into fifteen companies of forty-two men, each commanded by a *bölükbāšī*.

Ḥasan Pasha marched from Baghdad toward Tūqāt, leaving his heavy baggage to come on more slowly; he was joined by various contingents of regular troops on the way. Yāzījī, supremely confident of his ability to defeat Ḥasan Pasha as he had defeated other Ottoman armies, sent his emirs and *bölükbāšīs* to give battle near Tūqāt. But they were defeated with heavy losses. Informed of the rout of his men, Yāzījī marched out from Tūqāt to engage the Ottomans, but when he came to grips with them, he realized that he was not strong enough to withstand them, and fled to a remote and mountainous area with some three or four thousand men who were still with him. Ḥasan Pasha camped at Tūqāt and decided not to pursue the Jalālīs; he was indifferent to their fate, being confident they were not capable of further activity.

Yāzījī, however, was far from being finished, and in his mountain hideout he was gradually reinforced by fugitives from Tūqāt. He now operated in a clandestine manner, taking care that there should be no visible sign of himself or his men in the area. He sent spies to Tūqāt to find out what the situation was and discovered that Ḥasan Pasha, with a few of his personal attendants, was living in the castle; the rest of his men were billeted in houses in the town. The wealthier soldiers were living a comfortable life, but most of the men, having only meager resources, had scattered in all directions to find provisions for themselves and fodder for their horses. When Yāzījī's spies reported how negligent the Ottoman commander was, the Jalālī leader determined to make a surprise attack on Tūqāt, to place a guard on the gates of the castle to prevent anyone from leaving, and to massacre all the troops he found in the city. Accordingly, he marched on the city with all his forces, which now numbered seven thousand men.

The first piece of luck he had was to fall in with Ḥasan Pasha's supply train which, it will be recalled, was following on behind the Ottoman commander and making for Tūqāt. This supply train contained all Ḥasan Pasha's baggage and treasure chests, and was accompanied by about one thousand camel drivers and one thousand *sepāhīs* (regular Ottoman cavalry). Yāzījī surrounded the supply train, massacred the *sepāhīs*, took prisoner all the women, girls, and good-looking boys, and took possession of all the treasure chests and other property, including jeweled weapons, which represented the accumulation of years. Yāzījī then marched like the wind on Tūqāt. Ḥasan Pasha was so overwhelmed by the disgrace of what had happened that, despite all his years of experience, he lost his head completely, was quite unable to rally his men and prepare for battle, and could think of nothing but trying to hold out in the castle despite the lack of provisions there.

Yāzījī took control of the city and surrounded the fort. When Ḥasan Pasha was killed by a chance musketball, his men obtained the promise of quarter from Yāzījī and handed over the fort to him. The Jalālīs were now wealthy as a result of the booty they acquired from the Ottomans. Yāzījī, with a view to spreading his fame and renown throughout Anatolia, had Ḥasan Pasha's corpse suspended by the neck at the castle gates, and left it hanging there for a number of days. Tūqāt now became Yāzījī's base. Another version of the story has it that Ḥasan Pasha, who was an extremely proud man, committed suicide by taking poison because of the disgrace he had incurred, and that Yāzījī subsequently hanged his corpse on a gibbet, but the author considers this version less reliable.

After this triumph, Yāzījī was once again in a position of power. However, a change came over him; he repented of all the depredation, bloodshed, and strife for which he had been responsible in the course of furthering his ambitions, and decided to turn over a new leaf and ask the Ottoman Sultan to pardon his crimes and give him the job of guarding one of the frontiers of Islam, so that he could spend the rest of his life raiding infidels. He accordingly sent a representative to the Ottoman court to state his requests. The principal officers of state, who were wondering how they could suppress his revolt, considered this offer a godsend, and promptly appointed him governor of a province in Rumelia on the borders of Frankish territory. They sent him a robe of honor and a mace and assured him of a pardon from the Sultan. Yāzījī gave up his lawless ways and took up his new post. Some of his freebooters chose to go with him, others left him at this point.

Yāzījī spent several years raiding infidels in Europe. Someone told me that he died on board ship as he was proceeding by sea to make one of his raids. One of his men, Jān Fūlād, who had remained in Anatolia, assumed the leadership of the Jalālīs there and began causing a disturbance in the Aleppo region. He carried on the Jalālī tradition, and a lot of ruffians and knaves joined him. A rival bandit chief named Qarāqāš also appeared briefly on the scene in the Erzerum region.

At this juncture (1012/1603), the Ottoman Sultan Moḥammad III died and was succeeded by his son Aḥmad I. The new Sultan, as already related, appointed Senān Pasha, known as Jeḡāl-oḡlū, grand vizier and commander in chief, and dispatched him to the Persian frontier. Jeḡāl-oḡlū succeeded in persuading Qarāqāš to cease his lawless behavior and return to his allegiance to the Sultan. Qarāqāš met Jeḡāl-oḡlū at Erzerum and, with some of his men, accompanied the Ottoman commander on his expedition to Iran. In the Aleppo region, however, Jān Fūlād increased his influence and extracted from persons of rank in that province, from merchants, and from both Muslim and European travelers large sums of money with which he paid his troops.

The following year, when Jeḡāl-oḡlū was driven out of Vān by the *qezelbāš*, and retreated to the Mūš plain, he managed to bring Jān Fūlād back to his allegiance to the Sultan by dint of appointing him governor of Aleppo and its dependencies. In return, he asked his assistance against the *qezelbāš*, and Jān Fūlād promised to join him with an army. On the day that Jeḡāl-oḡlū and the *qezelbāš* army fought their great battle not far from Tabriz, Jān Fūlād had reached Ṭasūj with three thousand men. As already related, after Jeḡāl-oḡlū's defeat, Jān Fūlād retired from Ṭasūj, an action that later led Jeḡāl-oḡlū to quarrel with him and put him to death. Jān Fūlād's son occupied Aleppo and went back to the old Jalālī ways; some twenty thousand men rallied to him, and he came out in open revolt against the Ottoman Sultan.

Yet another Jalālī outbreak occurred when Moḥammad Pasha, known as Qalandar-oḡlū, rebelled against the Sultan. Moḥammad Pasha was a haughty and ambitious officer who had been enrolled in the ranks of the *čavošes*, and had been appointed governor of Ḥemṣ by Jeḡāl-oḡlū. The previous governor refused to yield his authority to him, and even made an attempt on his life. Moḥammad Pasha thought that Jeḡāl-oḡlū was behind this, and for this reason he rebelled and became a Jalālī. After Jeḡāl-oḡlū's death in Dīār Bakr, Moḥammad Pasha's power rapidly increased, and he began to plunder and devastate the area. He carried his raids as far as Borsā, the capital of the early Ottoman sultans, despoiling the tombs of the sultans and carrying off the coverlets of the coffers, the gold and silver candelabra, and the ornaments and decorations of the Ottoman mausoleum, which he distributed among his men. Many other outrages of this sort were committed by his followers without any reprisals on the part of the Ottoman authorities. A force was once dispatched against him from Istanbul, but it achieved nothing. There was still another outbreak of revolt between Aleppo and Dīār Bakr on the part of a cavalry officer named Ṭavīl.

Thus, the whole of Anatolia, from Borsā to Erzerum, was ravaged by the Jalālīs, who caused much devastation. Sultan Aḥmad and his principal officers of state thought the suppression of enemies at home should take precedence over other matters, and they pondered what should be done. Morād Pasha, who had been made grand vizier and commander in chief, had been sent to Europe to take charge of operations against the Franks. When he received reports of events at home, he opened peace talks with some of the Franks and imposed tribute on others; in this way he quieted the European front and then returned to Anatolia, where a huge force was assembled to take the field against the Jalālīs. It consisted of troops from Rumelia, Anatolia, Mentešā, Qarāmān, Tripoli, and other Ottoman provinces, as well as troops of the royal household.

This army marched first to Aleppo against Jān Fūlād-oḡlū, who came out to give battle with twenty thousand men. Morād Pasha was an experienced officer who had demonstrated his ability to deal with both the rough and the smooth in life. To begin with, he declined battle and opened negotiations with the Jalālī leader. The latter saw this gambit as evidence of the weakness and cowardice of the Ottoman army, and neglected to take the precaution of forming up his men for battle. The Ottoman commander meanwhile appeared on the battlefield with his men in proper battle array. Jān Fūlād-oḡlū, in a panic, got his men in order and engaged the Ottomans. A great battle was fought in which the Jalālīs were defeated with heavy losses, and Jān Fūlād-oḡlū retreated to Aleppo, where he barricaded himself in the castle and set to work strengthening the defenses. Most of the Jalālī fugitives from this battle joined Ṭavīl. Morād Pasha camped within sight of Aleppo and proceeded to lay siege to and capture the fort, and to wipe out Jān Fūlād-oḡlū and the rest of his men. Having cleared the whole of this province of Jalālīs, Morād Pasha turned his attention to the remaining groups of rebels.

At this moment Ṭavīl, the Jalālī leader in Dīār Bakr, died. Two or three thousand of his men rallied around his brother Moḥammad Beg, who was still a beardless youth, and with him joined Mohammad Pasha Qalandar-oḡlū. The latter was also joined by a certain Qarā

Saʿīd, a desert Arab who had become a Jalālī and whose valor was renowned in Asia Minor. Moḥammad Pasha thus became the focal point for all the Jalālī groups, and his power increased accordingly. He took whatever he wanted from every town and district which lay in his path, and similarly from every fort he chanced upon, neither soldiers nor civilians being able to deny him anything. Morād Pasha wintered in the Aleppo area and made no move against the Jalālīs that year.

This year, the Year of the Monkey (1016/1607–08), Morād Pasha took the field against the Jalālīs, and Qalandar-oḡlū marched to meet him with his emirs, *sardārs*, and *bölükbāšīs*, the chief of whom were Qarā Saʿīd ʿArab, the brother of Ṭavīl, Kord Ḥeydar, Āḡā Jeden Pīrī, Kekeč (the stutterer) Moḥammad, Ḥoseyn Beg Arnāūt, Qarā Ḥoseyn, Tūmāl ʿĪsā, and others. Since Qalandar-oḡlū had repeatedly defeated superior Ottoman forces, he was supremely confident of success on this occasion too. When the two armies met, Morād Pasha, apprehensive of the intrepidity and dash of the Jalālīs, drew up his men on some rising ground and stationed his gun carriages, linked by chains, on the slopes of a hill overlooking both armies; his plan was to bring his forces into action gradually and by cunning tactics break up the enemy forces into separate groups. Qalandar-oḡlū interpreted these maneuvers as pusillanimity, and hurled all his twenty thousand men into action at once. Morād Pasha gave his men strict orders not to break ranks and descend the hill.

As a result, the horses of the Jalālīs were exhausted by the time they reached the Ottoman lines, and Morād Pasha brought his artillery into action and shattered the Jalālī ranks. Morād Pasha then gave the order to advance, and his cavalry swept into action on horses that were still fresh. The Jalālīs fought hard and stubbornly, but were eventually defeated with heavy losses. At the end of the day, the Jalālī commanders withdrew their men from the battlefield. The Ottomans did not pursue them, but retired to their own camp. The Jalālī commanders now regretted their impetuosity; they knew they could not risk another encounter with this Ottoman army, which next day would move in for the kill. During the night, therefore, they abandoned camp, leaving behind their baggage and supplies, and set off for Erzerum unencumbered, covering ten *farsaḵs* that night; there were about ten thousand of them.

The next day, Morād Pasha, discovering that the enemy had struck camp, marched down from the hill, camped in the plain, and allowed his men to pillage the Jalālī camp. He sent Ebrahim Pasha, known as Ekmekčī-oğlū (the baker's son) in pursuit of the Jalālīs with twenty thousand men. Ebrahim Pasha overtook the Jalālīs and fought two engagements with them on the way to Erzerum. In the first encounter, the Jalālīs got the upper hand, but Ebrahim Pasha, knowing that their horses must be tired and that the men had not slept all night, pressed his pursuit, and came to grips with them again near Erzerum. The Jalālīs had no stamina left. Large numbers were killed in Ebrahim Pasha's first charge, and the rest made a fighting retreat from the field and made for the Persian border. The Ottomans then called off their pursuit. The Jalālīs sent a courier to Emir Gūna Khan at Erīvān to inform him that they were coming, and the Jalālī *sardārs* and *bölükbāšīs* set off for Erīvān, followed a little later by Moḥammad Pasha himself and his personal retainers.

Moḥammad Pasha sent one of his commanders, Ḥoseyn Beg Arnāūt, to the Shah, to profess his "love of the Shah"; he declared that love of the Shah had been the sole motive for his revolt against the Ottomans. The Shah bestowed gifts on the Pasha's representatives, issued letters of appointment in the names of the Pasha and his commanders assuring them of his favor, and sent an emir to meet them and escort them to his court.

The Mission of the Vizier, Ḥātem Beg, to Escort the Jalālīs to Isfahan

Since the Shah did not have full information about the intentions of the Jalālīs and prudence dictated that he should not place full confidence in men who had become accustomed to a life of banditry, rebellion, and plunder, he decided to send one of his most experienced and courageous statesmen to meet the Jalālīs and see what the situation was. He further decided to allot the Jalālīs winter quarters in Azerbaijan and to summon to court Moḥammad Pasha, his commanders, and his nobles. After reviewing the list of his emirs and principal officers of state, the Shah chose the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, for the job, since he considered him to be possessed of all the necessary qualities. As the Jalālīs were his guests, the Shah allotted them twelve thousand sheep and twenty thousand *ḵarvārs* of grain for their subsistence. He provided the vizier with confidential requisition orders,[4] sealed with the *mehr-āṣār* seal, authorizing him to issue orders for whatever he deemed necessary in the circumstances; I was instructed to accompany him. A body of troops was placed at the disposal of the vizier, consisting of *qūrčīs, ḡolāms,* and Aqa Sultan Moqaddam, the governor of Zenjān. The vizier left the Shah's camp near Hamadan and departed for Tabriz.

When the Jalālīs neared Erīvān, Emir Gūna Khan sent some of his emirs and other officers to meet them. He instructed them to camp at Ūč Kalīsā, three *farsaḵs* from the fort at Erīvān, and he sent them as a gift whatever supplies he could spare. In an open space outside the fort he set up ceremonial tents and brocade canopies, covered the ground with gaily colored carpets, and invited the Pasha and his senior commanders to a feast. When he met them, he excused himself for not having come in person to receive them; his orders, he said, forbade him to leave the fort which was in his charge and which was, in effect, a royal dwelling. Two or three thousand men sat down at the feast, which was on a scale that elicited favorable comment from all. At the conclusion of the feast, Emir Gūna Khan bade the Pasha, his senior commanders, and the three hundred retainers he had with him to erase the memory of the hardships they had endured and the battles they had fought. He then conducted the senior officers to his own tent; the *bölükbāšīs* were made the guests of his officers and emirs. In his own tent, he held court for the senior officers and conversed with them in royal fashion. The following morning, after they had bathed, he had sets of clothing appropriate to their rank brought to the bathhouse for them, and the other hosts emulated their commander in entertaining their guests.

It is the custom of the Jalālīs to devote most of their time at their assemblies to bragging about their exploits, each seeking to outdo the others in this respect. This is their sole topic of conversation. During the reception in Emir Gūna Khan's tent, Moḥammad Pasha and Qarā Saʿīd had been boasting drunkenly of their valorous deeds, and Qarā Saʿīd had forgotten himself and had called the Pasha a coward. When they left the Emir's tent, the two Jalālī leaders challenged each other to a duel and attacked each other with javelins. The Pasha wounded Qarā Saʿīd before Kord Ḥeydar and Āḡā Jeden Pīrī suc-

[4] *Ṭavāmīr-e bayāż; ṭūmār* (plural *ṭavāmīr)* normally means "rolls, schedules." I am not sure what *bayāż* means in this context. The normal meaning of *bayāż* is "fair copy," but it may mean "confidential" because the document was folded so that its contents could not be seen and was therefore blank *(bayāż)* on the outside (See *TM*, p. 203, n. 2).

ceeded in parting the combatants. As a result of this incident, the Jalālīs split into several factions: Qarā Sa'īd and the brother of Ṭavīl and their supporters; Moḥammad Pasha, his retainers, and a number of the *bölükbāšīs;* and Kord Ḥeydar and Āġā Jeden Pīrī and their supporters. After resting at Ūč Kalīsā for several days, each faction made its own way individually to Tabriz.

The Jalālīs were received at Tabriz by Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor, and by Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of Azerbaijan. Each group was billeted in suitable quarters and allotted sufficient provisions to meet their needs; in addition, each of the Safavid officials feasted them for one day. Some of the Jalālī commanders and their men had already left Tabriz and set off for Iraq when word came from the Shah that the vizier was on his way to Tabriz. The Pasha and his senior officers, who were still at Tabriz, accordingly waited for the arrival of the vizier, and their needs were met every day.

After receiving his commission, Ḥātem Beg had gathered together the necessary supplies of clothing, food, drink, and so on, and had set off for Tabriz. He began handing out food and gifts on a scale that exceeded all expectations. If I were to give a detailed description of his largesse it would take too long, so I will content myself with mentioning what I actually saw with my own eyes.

As soon as the vizier's party left the Shah's camp at Hamadan, the vizier every day invited a large group of the emirs, *qūrčīs, ġolāms,* and *yasāvols* (aides-de-camp) to an assembly, and handed out as rations food, drink, and sweetmeats in quantities greater than the recipients needed. Along the way, the vizier's party was joined by some groups of Jalālīs who had already set out from Tabriz: At Ḵord-čāy, Qarā Ḥoseyn met him with a hundred men; at Zenjān, Kekeč Moḥammad with five hundred men; at Nīk Pey, 'Alī Beg Donyā'ī with three hundred, Qolī Beg Kord with a hundred and forty, and Kord 'Alī with three hundred; and at Mīānaj, Yāzījī the *bölükbāšī* with forty. Ḥātem Beg gave a feast for each group, and gave to each leader and his men gifts such as cloaks, topcoats, kerchiefs, and turbans appropriate to their rank and status. Each group was allotted camping grounds for the winter, and *qūrčīs* and *yasāvols* were appointed officials hosts *(mehmāndārān)* to each group to look after their needs at the Shah's expense. It was agreed that, after Nowrūz, each leader should leave his men in their winter quarters and, accompanied by two or three servants, make his way to court for an audience with the Shah.

When Ḥātem Beg's party reached Fahvasfanj, a village near Tabriz, Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of Azerbaijan, came out to welcome him, and the following day Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, marched out with banners flying to meet him. Ḥātem Beg then proceeded into the city with a large crowd of emirs, centurions, *qūrčīs, ḡolāms,* aides-de-camp, and household retainers; people flocked from the city and surrounding areas to meet him, and a huge throng gathered at the end of the main avenue in Tabriz, completely blocking the road. The whole of the way to the center of the city, a distance of about two miles, Jalālīs lined the street on both sides with infantry and cavalry, and they came forward, company by company, to greet the vizier and pay their respects to him. The vizier greeted their leaders warmly, and welcomed them on behalf of the Shah.

The total number of Jalālīs in the city, both infantry and fully armed cavalry, was about ten thousand men. Although everyone was a bit nervous at the idea of the vizier's placing himself at the mercy of ten thousand turbulent and headstrong Jalālīs, who could not be trusted whether they were friend or foe, the vizier rode calmly into the city at their side and took up residence at the Jahānšāhīya palace. Since he had received reports that Ebrahim Pasha Ekmekčī-oḡlū had come in pursuit of the Jalālīs with twenty thousand men and was still hovering around near the frontier hoping for a military success of some sort, the vizier dispatched Pīr Būdaq Khan and his men to guard the frontier in the Ḵoy and Salmās region and to keep watch on any enemy movement from the direction of Vān; the frontier in the region of Erīvān was already adequately guarded by Emir Gūna Khan. A few days later, it was reported that Ekmekčī-oḡlū had retired, and Pīr Būdāq Khan returned to Tabriz.

The day after his arrival at Tabriz, Ḥātem Beg received in audience Moḥammad Pasha, the brother of Ṭavīl, Qarā Sa'īd, and the rest of the Jalālī leaders, and exchanged formal courtesies with them. These concluded, he summoned the official secretaries attached to the Jalālīs and instructed them to make complete lists of the names of the men, so that provision might be made for their needs in conformity with their status. Not counting those who had gone on ahead, the count came to thirteen thousand, six hundred and five serviceable troops; of these, exactly ten thousand men were musketeers and fully-armed cavalry, and the rest were servants and grooms. The vizier planned a huge feast, and set a day for a public audience at which the whole of that army should be his guests, and at which all the Jalālī commanders, *bölükbāšīs*, and anyone of rank among them should receive robes of honor. After that, he planned to hold private audiences daily to which different groups of Jalālī commanders would be invited.

The festivities began with the public banquet in the Bāḡ-e Jahānšāhī. For several days, the chefs labored to prepare the food for it; about one hundred and twenty cooks and butlers were busy preparing all kinds of dishes, desserts, fruit and nuts, and preserves. Prodigious quantities were prepared. A vast area of the garden, where two thousand people could sit down to the feast, was set aside, and tents were erected and carpets laid. The sixth day after the vizier's arrival in Tabriz was set as the date of the feast. The vizier decided that, in addition to the Jalālī commanders and *bölükbāšīs*, from every hundred of their men twenty should be selected to receive a robe of honor. Thus, of the total ten thousand Jalālīs, two thousand received robes.

The robes of honor conferred on Moḥammad Pasha comprised a brocade cloak; a velvet topcoat with gold embroidery; a kerchief all of gold, and a square embroidered with gold thread; a jeweled turban brooch; and a fine horse and saddle—gifts to the value of thirty *tomān* in all. The brother of Ṭavīl received gifts similar to those of the Pasha, but of lesser value. Qarā Ḥoseyn, Kord Ḥeydar, Āḡā Jeden Pīrī, Ḥasan-e Kadḵodā, the *vakīl* of the brother of Ṭavīl, and the rest of the *bölükbāšīs* received comparable gifts appropriate to their station. Of the remaining ranks, upper, middle, and lower, the upper ranks received cloaks of brocade or shot silk, velvet topcoats, either embroidered or plain, and kerchiefs of various colors, and some received squares in addition; the middle ranks received cloaks of *mīlak*, *moṭabbaq*,[5] or *na'lband* cloth, velvet jerkins, and yellow turbans; the lower ranks received cloaks of cotton or red silk and turbans.

The whole two thousand men, wearing their robes of honor, then took their appointed places at the feast, and the rest of the ten thousand Jalālīs sat on the ground, company by company, outside the banqueting area. A Georgian prince, 'Aṭā Beg Khan, the son of Manūčehr Khan the ruler of Meskhia, who had chanced to arrive in Tabriz at that moment with a party of priests and Georgian nobles and was on his way to seek audience with the Shah, was also invited to the feast. The Georgian party also received robes of honor and and travel expenses, and other forms of hospitality were bestowed upon them. Some details of the feast: After the guests had partaken of the great variety of dishes provided, servants took around cups of coffee, and about three hundred trays of sweetmeats, some of them wondrous examples of the confectioner's art, and trays of every kind of fruit, on which sugar had been sprinkled. Following this, a thousand bowls of dessert were brought in—one bowl between every two guests. Huge piles of fruit had been placed in front of the guests—canteloupes, watermelons, grapes, and other fruits. When the principal guests had been fed, those who had been sitting around the edges came forward company by company and took their turn. One thousand dishes of food were served at the banquet, and one thousand dishes were served to those outside the main feast. My pen admits its inability adequately to describe all the details of this great feast.

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[5] Dozy, ii, 26, gives *étoffe d'un tissu serré*.

The vizier of Azerbaijan, Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā, and the other officials at the provincial court had waited upon their guests at the banquet. When they were released from these duties, they turned their attention to the task of allotting the Jalālīs suitable winter quarters and of appointing official hosts to escort them. The Pasha and *bölükbāšīs*, at the discretion of Ḥātem Beg, were allowed to retain a few personal servants and retainers, about five hundred men in all. The rest of their men were dismissed to their winter quarters, the intention being that they should all reassemble in the spring and be presented to the Shah at his summer quarters. All these matters were settled within three days, and the Jalālīs marched off to their appointed stations. On the tenth day Ḥātem Beg left Tabriz and camped at Šamsābād for two days before continuing his journey back to court. The whole cost of the subsistence of the Pasha and his entourage, five hundred men, on their journey from Tabriz to Isfahan, was paid by the vizier. Every day, in addition to the free meals provided at the vizier's assemblies, a variety of other dishes and desserts was supplied by the vizier and sent to the tents of the Jalālīs, as a formal memento of their journey. On top of that, every day a string of mules, laden with whatever was available in the way of preserves, sweetmeats, nuts, and fruit, was provided so that they might refresh themselves on the road. Since the Shah, once he was satisfied about the security of the frontier, had returned to the capital, the vizier traveled to Isfahan in twenty-two stages, with only one stop en route, at Kashan, and then only for one day. At Kashan, he again sent to the bathhouse a fresh set of clothes for the Pasha and his officers. In short, the vizier omitted not even the smallest detail in providing hospitality for the Jalālīs.

In the Bāḡ-e Tājābād at Naṭanz, the vizier had convened a formal assembly and a serious discussion had taken place. As all were mounting their horses at the conclusion of the assembly, some of the Jalālīs who bore a grudge against the Pasha started brawling with some of his servants, and several people were wounded. When the Pasha was informed, he emerged from his tent in an equally contumacious mood to take his revenge on those responsible for the attack on his men. Within the twinkling of an eye, as is the discreditable habit of the Jalālīs, the supporters of both parties had rushed out to join in the fray, and had started laying into one another with their swords. At this point the vizier and a handful of his retainers who happened to be at hand rode fearlessly between the combatants and kept them apart, lashing some with their tongues and belaboring others with cudgels. They censured the Pasha for his folly and surly irascibility, and prevented what threatened to be a very ugly situation from developing.

From Naṭanz, the vizier reached Dowlatābād in two stages, and Aqa Kamāl Dowlatābādī acted as host. The following day, 3 Ša'bān 1017/12 November 1608, the vizier entered Isfahan. The emirs, principal officers of state, *moqarrabs,* and other court officials, at the Shah's order, came out to welcome him and escort him into the city. The Jalālī officers had the privilege of kissing the Shah's stirrup in the audience hall of the Naqš-e Jahān palace. The Shah received them graciously and they, after kissing the supports of the Shah's throne and expressing their satisfaction with their treatment at the hands of the vizier, broke up and went off to the quarters allotted to them; provisions and lodging allowances were supplied to them by the royal exchequer. The Shah praised the vizier highly for his conduct. The Shah remained in Isfahan during the winter of 1608-09, and the Pasha and his officers were generally invited to his private gatherings—a display of royal favor that overwhelmed them. The Shah's object was to get to know each of them personally and to form his own opinion as to their trustworthiness. He found the Pasha to be more sincere and friendly in his attitude toward him than the other officers, and the Shah accordingly treated him with greater honor and esteem.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year

When the Shah heard that the Jalālīs were coming with Ekmekčī-oḡlū in pursuit of them, as a precaution he had sent a detachment of a thousand musketeers from the musketeers of the royal stirrup to Tabriz, under the command of Lāčīn Beg, a *ḡolām* of the royal household; the men spent the winter at Tabriz.

Ǧāzī Gerāy Khan b. Dowlat Gerāy Khan, the chief of the Crimean Tartars, died this year. His line, descended from Jočī the son of Genghis Khan, had for generations held sway over the Tartar tribes of the Qepčāq steppe, with their seat of government at Bāḡča-sarāy. I gave the earlier history of this dynasty in book I. After Ǧāzī Gerāy Khan had been made ruler of the Crimean Tartars by Sultan Morād III, he had become a loyal servant of the Ottomans. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad III, Ǧāzī Gerāy Khan had been ordered to take part in operations in Europe, and had fought in many major battles there. One year, he had wintered at a place on the frontier called Szombor, and had lived up to his name of "raider" *(ḡāzī)*.

After the accession of Shah 'Abbas and the conclusion of a truce of sorts with the Ottomans, Ǧāzī Gerāy Khan had written a friendly letter to the Shah by the hand of Ḥāfeẓ Qarāqāš Tabrīzī, who had been a friend of his at Tabriz and had gone with him to Turkey. The Tartar Khan had acknowledged his debt to Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā and the Safavid house during the time he had been a prisoner in Iran, had professed his loyal devotion to the Safavid house, and had requested that Beyrāmqolī Beg Qūčīlūy Ostājlū, who had been his jailer at the prison-fortress of Alamūt and had treated him well, be sent to him. In his reply, the Shah had expressed his friendship for the Tartar Khan and his regrets that, after the Khan's release from prison, the *qezelbāš* nobles, because of their preoccupation with the Ottomans, had not fostered the sort of relationship with him that they should have done. The Shah had sent gifts with his reply, in the course of which he had declared that, as far as he was concerned, the former hostility between them had been forgotten. He invited the Tartar Khan to ask for whatever gifts he wanted from Iran without any false modesty. Beyrāmqolī Beg had traveled to Kaffa disguised as a merchant and had made his way to the Khan's court.

On receipt of the Shah's letter, the Tartar Khan was overjoyed at its friendly tone, and sent Beyrāmqolī Beg back laden with honors.

He also took the Shah at his word and wrote in his own hand requesting that certain items be sent to him as gifts. This time, the Shah had sent the centurion Abu'l-Qāsem Ev-oğlū with a letter and the articles requested, and from then on diplomatic relations had been maintained. In the Year of the Sheep (1016/1607-08), when Shah 'Abbas was engaged in the conquest of Šīrvān, the Tartar Khan had sent Ḥājjī Beyrām as an ambassador, and hard on his heels Abu'l-Qāsem Beg Ev-oğlū had returned bearing another friendly letter for the Shah. The Ottomans, of course, had come to hear of Ḡāzī Gerāy's activities, and they had encouraged Salāmat Gerāy, one of Dowlat Gerāy's sons, who was in Istanbul, to hope to obtain the khanship of the Tartar tribes. When Shah 'Abbas had begun his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan the Ottoman viziers and principal officers of state had ordered Ḡāzī Gerāy to take an army to Šīrvān to assist the Ottoman forces there which were engaged with the *qezelbāš*, but Ḡāzī Gerāy Khan had made various excuses for not going and shortly afterward had died.

The Tartar emirs had chosen as his successor Toqtameš Gerāy Khan, but the principal officers of the Ottoman state were determined to exclude Ḡāzī Gerāy's sons from the succession because of their father's rapprochement with the Safavids. They therefore conferred on Salāmat Gerāy the title of Khan and sent him to Kaffa urging the Tartar chiefs, with a mixture of blandishments and threats, to accept him. The emirs, for their own safety, considered it expedient to obliterate all memory of the years of Ḡāzī Gerāy's cordial relations with the Safavid court; they prevented Ḡāzī Gerāy's sons from opposing the succession of their cousin, Salāmat Gerāy, and gave their allegiance to the latter.

This year, the Year of the Monkey (1017/1608-09), Salāmat Gerāy is still firmly established on the throne and is a loyal servant of the Ottoman Sultan. When he was in Istanbul, he had promised the Ottoman Sultan that he would lead an army to Šīrvān and, with the assistance of the Ottomans, drive out the *qezelbāš*. But after he acceded to the throne, the elders of the tribe dissuaded him from this foolish action. "War with the *qezelbāš*," they said, "has never had happy results for your house; when Moḥammad Gerāy Khan took an army to Šīrvān, he left his brothers there: of these, 'Ādel Gerāy was taken prisoner by the *qezelbāš* and subsequently executed; the other, Ḡāzī Gerāy, was also taken prisoner and spent several years in jail. Do not make yourself the third. Remember the saying, 'calamities always come in threes!'" Salāmat Gerāy heeded their advice, and did not go in person, but he promised the Ottomans to send ten thousand troops to Anatolia via Kaffa and to Tripoli, to serve under Ottoman command. He actually sent about six or seven thousand men, and they accompanied Morād Pasha in his campaigns against the Jalālīs. At the conclusion of this campaign, Morād Pasha had sent them to Georgia, to the districts of Meskhia and Āḵesqa. Some of them died there as a result of the attrition of war; others returned home. About two thousand men remained in Āḵesqa under the command of Jīl Pasha. Their ultimate fate, and the death of Jīl Pasha, will be related (God willing!) under the events of the Year of the Dog (1019/1610–11), when Morād Pasha marched on Tabriz.

Ḡāzī Gerāy Khan had reigned for twenty-five years.[6] He was an able, talented, and warlike ruler. He wrote both Turkish and Persian in a polished, secretarial style, and he also composed poetry in both Turkish and Persian, under the pen name of Ḡazā'ī.

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[6] He had actually reigned, with only a brief interregnum, from 996/1588 to 1016/1608, a period of twenty years.

The Events of the Year of the Fowl, Corresponding in Part to the Muslim Year 1017/1608–09, and in Part to the Muslim Year 1018/1609–10, the Twenty-third Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Saturday, 14 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1017/21 March 1609. The Shah as usual held a big celebration in the Naqš-e Jahān park at Isfahan. A stream that runs through the middle of the park feeds a huge pool as big as a small lake. At the side of this pool, and on the upper reaches of the stream, former kings, especially Shah Esma'il I, had constructed pleasant residences, so that the whole effect was reminiscent of the gardens of paradise "beneath which streams flow."[1] Space along the banks of the stream was allocated, on the basis of rank and status, to the distinguished citizens of Isfahan and its rural districts, and to the citizens of Khorasan, property owners of Tabriz, and merchants and members of guilds who happened to be in the capital, so that each group could congregate in its own allotted place. The area around the pool was reserved for the use of the viziers and other officers of state, and for *moqarrabs* of the court. In front of each group's plot of ground a pavilion[2] was erected; carpenters and engineers exerted their skill to fashion different designs and all were decked with lights. The whole night long the stars of the firmament looked down with envy at the brilliantly lit scene. Every night, the Shah would wander through the park, stopping to talk with whichever group he pleased; sweet-voiced singers and dexterous musicians banished everyone's cares, and rosy-cheeked girls passed the wine and kept the revelers in a happy mood. The celebrations went on for three days and nights. For most of this time, Moḥammad Pasha and the Jalālī emirs enjoyed the company of the Shah.

It will be recalled that Moṣṭafā Pasha had patched up a truce with Maḥmūd Pasha, had surrendered Baghdad to the latter, and had retired to Ḥella. There, he learned that the Ottomans planned to do away with him because he had made overtures to the Shah and had offered to hand over Baghdad to Safavid officers. Moṣṭafā Pasha accordingly came to distrust even his closest confidants, and asked to be transferred to the governorship of Karkūya, one of the districts of Šahrazūr, in order to get farther away from Baghdad. His agents and retainers divined that his object in asking for a transfer to Karkūya was to give him a chance of escaping to Persian territory, and they began to plot against him. In fear of his life, Moṣṭafā Pasha abandoned his possessions, considering life more valuable than them, and fled to Persian territory with a few companions. His agents and men appropriated his possessions and went to Baghdad. Moṣṭafā Pasha, passing through Hamadan, reached Isfahan during the New Year's Day celebrations. He was received by the Shah and granted gifts both in cash and in kind—a horse and saddle, a jeweled turban brooch, a dagger belt, and a sum of gold in cash, and was awarded the fief of Sonqor in the province of Hamadan.

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[1] Koran, 43:6, etc.

[2] The *čahār-ṭāq* is a building consisting of a roof resting on four supports, and open at the sides.

After the conclusion of the Nowrūz festivities, the Shah decided to send the Jalālīs, under the command of a number of *qezelbāš* emirs, on a punitive expedition to Kurdestan. This seemed a good plan for two reasons: first, the Kurds were constantly causing trouble on the frontier; second, the Jalālīs only stopped fighting among themselves if they were able to sink their differences in the face of a common foe. The Shah, who had nominated Moḥammad Pasha the *amīr al-omarā* of the Jalālī army, had frequently exhorted the Jalālīs to cease fighting among themselves and to acknowledge Moḥammad Pasha as their leader. He took covenants and pledges of their good behavior from them before they left for their summer quarters at Marāḡa, where they were to join forces with their own men who had been in winter quarters in Azerbaijan, and with the *qezelbāš* emirs detailed for this expedition. The Shah gave them cash grants, made them a present of their equipment, and sent them from Isfahan.

When the Jalālīs reached Qazvin, Ḥasan Khan Ostājlū, the *beglerbeg* of Hamadan, received orders to proceed to Marāḡa to join Moḥammad Pasha with one thousand of his men and the following emirs: the other emirs of Hamadan province; Eskandar Sultan Mīr Moqaddam with a thousand of his tribesmen; Ne'matollāh Sultan Mīr Ṣūfī, in command of four hundred men; Ḵosrow Sultan, chief of the Bebevī, dependents of the Pāzūkī tribe, with seven hundred men; Qabān Sultan Begdīlū Šāmlū, governor of Gāvrūd and Sārū-qarḡān, with four hundred men; and Ḵalīl Sultan, chief of the Sīl-süpür, with three hundred men. On the arrival at Marāḡa, Ḥasan Khan was to take with him Qobād Khan Mokrī, the governor of Marāḡa, and to move into Kurdestan and Dīār Bakr. In the case of those Kurdish chiefs who submitted and joined him with their men, their territory was not to be ravaged; in the case of those who opposed them, the area inhabited by their tribes was to be plundered, and their territories were to be seized and given to Jalālī chiefs. The punitive expedition was then to move on to Erzerum and join Emir Gūna Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, and the emirs who had been ordered to carry out raids in that region. Emir Khan Barādūst was appointed governor of Orūmīya by the Shah, with instructions to act as guide to the expedition, since he was thoroughly familiar with the situation in Kurdestan and with the terrain through which the expeditionary force would have to pass. If he discharged his duties loyally and faithfully, the Shah would show even greater favor toward him. The adventures of this expeditionary force will be described later.

The Dispatch of an Ambassador to India

It was three years since the Mogul emperor Akbar had died (1014/1605) and had been succeeded by his eldest son, Moḥammad Salīm. Since friendly relations had always existed between the two dynasties, the Shah had long resolved to send a distinguished *qezelbāš* officer as an ambassador to India to offer his condolences on the death of Akbar, and to congratulate his son on his accession; his preoccupation with the campaigns in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān had prevented him from carrying out his resolution until now. The Shah chose as ambassador Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ṭāleš, an emir and a *qezelbāš*, the grandson of Ḵalīfat al-Ḵolafā, who had been governor of Baghdad during the reign of Shah Esma'il I. Yādegār 'Alī was noted for his eloquent and persuasive tongue.

The Shah wrote a letter for him to take to the Mogul Emperor, and Yādegār 'Alī set about making the preparations for his mission. He was given an escort of fifty officers, all of whom had spare horses and splendid equipment, including turban jewels and sword belts. The gifts the embassy was taking for the Emperor included fifty Tūpčaq, Arabian, Georgian, and Bayāt horses from the royal stables; it is doubtful whether any other monarch could boast even one horse of the quality of these. In addition to the horses, there were brocade and velvet horse blankets, and three black, long-haired Russian fur coats, the value of each estimated at between eighty and ninety Iraqi *tomān*, because the black fox skins used to make them were extremely rare. There were also one thousand five hundred pieces of precious stuffs—

brocaded velvets, both with gold thread and silver thread; silks, both with gold and silver threads; brocade squares; European and Chinese satins and velvets; precious stuffs from Yazd and Kashan; and other gifts too numerous to mention, but all of a quality compatible with the status of the two parties.

Various Successes Won by Safavid Arms This Year

The first success to be mentioned is the capture of Moḥammad Pasha the son of Zāl Pasha, who was the Ottoman governor of Arjīš and 'Ādeljavāz. This Moḥammad Pasha was an extremely arrogant man, always boasting of his valor, and he wanted to achieve some notable exploit on the Persian frontier that would bring him renown; with this in mind, he was always causing incidents along the frontier. This year, Salmān Sultan Donbolī the *sūbāšī*,[3] who was governor of Čors on behalf of the Shah and was the Safavid officer nearest Moḥammad Pasha, sent in a full report on the latter's misdeeds to Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz and *amīr al-omarā* of that frontier zone, and asked for his assistance.

Pīr Būdāq Khan sent two hundred Turkman *ğāzīs* from his own establishment, and a hundred men in the service of other emirs, under the command of one of his experienced officers. With this reinforcement, Salmān Sultan led his forces, five hundred in all, by forced marches to Arjīš, which was Moḥammad Pasha's base. On arrival there, Salmān Sultan detailed two hundred men to attack the castle; stationed one hundred men in ambush ready to fall on the Pasha if he made a sortie against his attackers; and led the remaining two hundred men on a plundering expedition in the surrounding countryside. As soon as the first forty or fifty of his men had reached the fort, Moḥammad Pasha sallied forth to attack them with the men he had at hand. The *qezelbāš* defended themselves vigorously. When the rest of their comrades reached the scene, they began to get the upper hand. Seeing this, Moḥammad Pasha entered the fray in person and engaged a Turkman in hand-to-hand combat, but his adversary hurled him from his saddle with a thrust of his spear and leaped down, ready to give him the coup de grâce. The Pasha hastily shouted his name, whereupon he was taken prisoner. His men fled, but most of them were cut down before they could regain the safety of the castle. The *qezelbāš*, after plundering the area, returned in triumph, and Pīr Būdāq Khan sent the Pasha on to court.

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[3] An officer in the regular Ottoman army ranking below the *alay-beyī* (see Gibb and Bowen, I/1, p. 51). Presumably this officer had received this rank in Ottoman service.

Before the prisoner arrived there, the sons of Ḵandān Aqa, who were honored guests at the Safavid court, had frequently mentioned his name to the Shah and lauded his ability and valor. The Shah, by virtue of his natural inclination to clemency, and having regard for customary practice governing the treatment of such prisoners, treated Moḥammad Pasha as an honored guest, admitted him to his private assemblies, and invited him to his private banquets. This courtesy, however, merely increased the Pasha's natural arrogance. He made a number of unfortunate remarks at the Shah's assemblies and told a number of stories that had been better left untold. Finally, he asked the Shah's permission to send one of his men to Anatolia to tell his family and retainers that he was alive and well. Permission having been granted, the Pasha sent one of his servants, a eunuch, with a letter which he showed to the Shah for approval. The Shah, who had taken his measure, sent instructions to the frontier emirs that they were to detain the servant on the pretext that they could not let him proceed without obtaining confirmation from the Shah; they were to impound the letters he was carrying and send them, with the seals unbroken, to him. When the letters reached the Shah, he discovered that the Pasha had made additions to the draft he had submitted for approval: He had added unprofitable remarks about the *qezelbāš*, and had given various bits of useful information to the enemy. His treachery being plain, the Shah, when he marched to Qarābāḡ, left him at Tabriz in the hands of Pīr Būdāq Khan, and he died in custody.

The second success along the frontier this year is the capture of the pashas at the battle of Āḵesqa and the slaying of the Tartars in Georgia. As I stated in book I, when peace was concluded between Shah Tahmasp and the Ottoman Sultan Sülaymān, the frontiers between the two empires were demarcated: The Meskhia district of Georgia, the ruler of which was the father of Manūčehr Khan the son-in-law of Simon Khan, was included in *qezelbāš* territory, and the provinces of Āḵesqa and Qarāča Ardahān, adjacent to Erzerum, formed part of Meskhia. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, when Lala Pasha invaded Iran, he marched by this route to Šīrvān; first, he annexed the province of Āḵesqa and its dependencies and put the forts there in a state of defense. As long as Manūčehr Khan was alive, he and Simon Khan continued to resist; but after his death, the Ottomans consolidated their hold on the province. The daughter of Simon Khan, who was Manūčehr Khan's widow and a spirited woman, took to the forests with her young son and a few of her husband's retainers who owed their position to that dynasty.

During the twenty-five years that the whole of Georgia was subject to the Ottomans and paid tribute to them, this widow sought to get the Ottomans to treat the province like the other provinces of Georgia, in which they had left the local rulers in place and exacted tribute from them; in Meskhia, of course, she hoped they would leave her son, Atābeg, as the ruler. The Ottomans, however, refused. They gave Atābeg and his mother a fief in the province of Āḵesqa, and he eked out a precarious existence from this. When Shah 'Abbas invaded Azerbaijan and laid siege to Erīvān, Shah Yūsof Pasha, an emir's son from Āḵesqa who had become a Muslim and had been raised to the rank of pasha by the Ottoman Sultan, was made governor of parts of Meskhia; about that time, the province was raided by a force of *qezelbāš* under Ḥasan Khan Ostājlū. After the defeat and retreat of Jeğāl-oğlū, Emir Gūna Khan established himself in control of the area and sent his raiding parties as far west as Erzerum. Qarāča Ardahān and Āḵesqa were frequently raided during this period, and the fortunes of Shah Yūsof Pasha and the Ottomans in the area declined.

At this juncture, Atābeg's mother appealed to the Shah for assistance in recovering her hereditary domains, and the Shah instructed the Šams al-Dīnlū, Qazāqlar, and other emirs from Tiflis, Zagam, Aḵtābād, and Lori to go to her aid. In the Year of the Sheep (1016/1607-08), when Shah 'Abbas invaded Šīrvān, that intrepid woman girded herself for action and marched against Shah Yūsof Pasha with a detachment of *qezelbāš*, took him and a hundred and fifty of his men prisoner, captured the fortress of Āḵesqa, one of the most important in the region, and brought most places in the area under her control. She and her emirs reported to the Shah at Šamāḵī on Sunday, 4 Rabī' I, 1016/29 June 1607,[4] and Atābeg Khan, then sixteen years old, was left to govern the province with the aid of his mother.

The *beglerbeg* of Erzerum reported these events to Morād Pasha just after he had been appointed commander in chief and was preoccupied with the Jalālīs. After Morād Pasha had dealt with the Jalālīs, he sent Jīl Pasha, the commander of the Tartar army which Salāmat Gerāy, as already related, had sent to serve under Morād Pasha, to Meskhia; with him went Farhād Pasha and the son of Moḥammad Pasha, a Georgian prince from Meskhia who had become a Muslim, had been educated among the Ottomans, and had been raised to the rank of pasha and awarded a governorship. Jīl Pasha and

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[4] 4 Rabī' I was a Friday.

Farhād Pasha reached Āḵesqa toward the end of the Year of the Monkey (1017/1609) and expelled Atābeg Khan and his mother, who took refuge in Kartlia with Atābeg Khan's cousin. His mother stayed on with her nephew, but sent her son, who was of outstanding beauty, to the Shah's court.

Early this year, the Šams al-Dīnlū and Qazāqlar emirs and others, together with some Georgian troops, followers of Lūārsāb Khan the ruler of Kartlia, raided Āḵesqa and brought back a large number of prisoners. Jīl Pasha sent against them a force of two thousand Tartar horse under Farhād Pasha and the son of Moḥammad Pasha, with orders to ravage the Kartlia region of Georgia. The Tartar force plundered the area and started back, but found itself trapped in narrow defiles in the forests between the *qezelbāš* and the troops of Lūārsāb. Both Pashas were taken prisoner. Their men scattered in every direction, abandoning their booty when they found the roads barred against them. The Georgians hunted them down and killed some seven hundred of them. The remainder, many stripped naked by Georgian peasants, made their way back to Āḵesqa after suffering great hardships. The Pashas were taken to the Safavid court; Farhād Pasha was pardoned at the request of the Georgian princes, but the son of Moḥammad Pasha was executed.

The Engagement between Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and the Army of Šīrvān, and the Men of Ṭabarsarān

During the disorders in Šīrvān, the men of Ṭabarsarān had taken advantage of the situation and annexed a portion of Šāberān contiguous with Ṭabarasarān. While the Ottomans occupied Šīrvān, the *qezelbāš* had been unable to recover this territory because the Ottomans had supported the men of Ṭabarsarān. After the Safavid reconquest of Šīrvān, the people of Ṭabarsarān had refused to hand this territory back to the governor of Šīrvān, and the governor's men found it extremely difficult to enter the area because of the hostility of the people. The Shah, who always looked to the future in the midst of the problems of today, decided to construct a fort in the area. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, was instructed to carry out this task, to stock the fort with provisions and munitions, and to garrison it with a force of *ḡāzīs* and musketeers; in this way, the Shah hoped to keep the men of Dāḡestān out of the area, so that both *qezelbāš* and the inhabitants of Šīrvān might travel without hindrance.

Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan proceeded to carry out his orders. First, he sent a message to Ma'ṣūm Khan, the ruler of Ṭabarsarān, to explain what he was doing and to assure him that he had nothing to fear. But Ma'ṣūm Khan refused to allow him to build the fort without a fight, and marched against him with ten thousand men, mixed cavalry and infantry, after Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan had picked the site and started work on the fort. Since the ruler of Ṭabarsarān had a channel of communication open at court and had always at least professed to be a servant of the Shah, and since Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan had no orders to give battle to him, Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan sent a number of messengers warning Ma'ṣūm Khan of the consequences should he persist in preventing him from carrying out his orders. But all in vain; Ma'ṣūm Khan forced a battle on the Safavid commander. His men, however, dispersed after the first charge by the Safavid skirmishers, and a thousand Ṭabarsarānīs fell within a few minutes. Ma'ṣūm Khan fled from the battlefield, and Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan forbade his men to kill and plunder the fleeing Ṭabarsarānīs. He was afraid that, since he had had no orders to fight a battle with the Ṭabarsarānīs, the incident might not be to the Shah's liking. Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan completed the fort and sent a report to the Shah. Although Ma'ṣūm Khan had been the aggressor, since the Shah had already pardoned him on a previous occasion and had given government posts to some of his relatives, he expressed himself as being unhappy about this incident, and ordered Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan to send an envoy to Ma'ṣūm Khan to console him. The Safavid commander did as he was told, and Ma'ṣūm Khan repented of his action and was once again forgiven.

The Expedition Led by Emir Gūna Khan, at the Orders of the Shah, to Qarāča Ardahān to Plunder the Georgians of That Region

Emir Gūna Khan disliked the presence of Jīl Pasha and the Tartar cavalry in Āḵesqa, which bordered on Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, and he had sent a report to the Shah urging the advisability of a preemptive strike. The Shah therefore sent all the emirs of Azerbaijan, together with household musketeers whom he had sent to Tabriz the previous year, to report to Erīvān. Under the command of Emir Gūna Khan, they were to proceed to Qarāča Ardahān and the region of Erzerum and to devastate the land and repulse the Tartars. Two thousand Jalālīs, under the command of Qarā Sa'īd and Āḡā Jeden Pīrī, also formed part of this expedition. In compliance with the Shah's orders, Pīr Būdāq Khan from Tabriz and Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū Qājār from Qarābāğ marched with the Jalālīs from Marāğa to Erīvān. After Emir Gūna Khan had extended hospitality to the great emirs and the officers from the court for several days, they marched off in good order. The Ottomans and Tartars did not consider themselves strong enough to withstand this army, and they withdrew into their castles.

The Safavid troops entered Georgia, plundered the area, took prisoner many Georgian women, and rendered the region unusable by the enemy. Emir Gūna Khan heard meanwhile that an Ottoman army was assembling on the plain of Mūš, and so he took the troops from Erīvān, marched in that direction, and dispersed them. Of the Georgian prisoners, those who were suitable for service in the royal household were sent as a tithe to the Shah in the custody of 'Alī Khan Beg Javanšīr. The *qezelbāš* were now in even more complete control of the Erzerum frontier region than before, and none of the Ottoman *beglerbegs* and pashas dared come out into the open and fight them.

The Shah's Visit to Azerbaijan, and his Dispatch of an Expeditionary Force of Jalālīs to Kurdestan

The Shah had spent some time at Isfahan dealing with urgent matters; since the weather was now turning hot, it was time to move to the summer quarters of Farīdūn. A few days after his arrival there, the Shah ordered his emirs and principal officers of state to take the heavy baggage and, keeping to the high ground for the sake of coolness, proceed to Solṭānīya. He himself returned to Isfahan with a few *moqarrabs* and close companions and performed the ceremony of the sprinkling of the water in the Čahār Bāğ. This ceremony is an ancient custom of the kings of Iran, and Shah 'Abbas considered it an auspicious omen. The Shah then went to Qazvin by the Kashan road and stayed at the palace there for about six weeks. When his baggage train reached Solṭānīya, the Shah joined it and camped there.

At this juncture, an ambassador arrived from the Ottoman Emperor in the person of the *čavoš* Ḳeyr al-Dīn; he was accompanied by Moḥammad Beg, the son of Ḥoseynqolī Ḳolafā-ye Rūmlū, who was returning from an embassy to Turkey. The Ottoman ambassador was introduced at court by the great emirs. He presented the Shah and the principal officers of the Safavid state with letters from Morād Pasha, the grand vizier, and other principal officers of the Ottoman state. The letters talked about the possibility of concluding peace on the terms that had been discussed before through the good offices of Simon Khan.[5] The Ottoman ambassador's object was to obtain a personal interview with the Shah, discover what was in the Shah's mind regarding the possibility of concluding peace and what terms would be acceptable to him, and return with this information. The Ottoman officials pointed out that the Shah's previous ambassador, Moḥammad Beg, had not been the bearer of a letter from the Shah to the Ottoman Sultan; they urged the Shah, if he was serious about peace negotiations, to send such a letter next time. They pointed out that it had not been compatible with the Sultan's dignity and prestige to discuss peace terms while the Shah was busy reconquering provinces which had been conquered by Sultan Aḥmad's grandfather, Sultan Morād III, and had been in Ottoman hands for a generation. The Shah had in the process seized possession of all the Ottoman guns and equipment in the forts he had captured, and had inflicted thousands of casualties on the Ottomans, both military and civilians.

If the Shah continued his campaigning, this would only postpone the chances of peace; and hostilities, which caused hardship to all Muslim people, would inevitably continue. Such a situation would only weaken the Muslim forces engaged in the struggle with the Frankish princes, who were in a constant state of war against the Muslim world, and would produce malicious joy among Christians and other infidels. There were many instances in history of rulers who had given the welfare of mankind precedence over their own ambitions. If the Shah would begin peace negotiations, and would give in a letter some indication of a serious desire for peace, this would at least open the door to further discussions and give those Ottoman officials who wanted peace a chance to begin talks to that end.

The Shah treated the Ottoman ambassador, Ḵeyr al-Dīn, with honor, expressed himself in friendly fashion toward the Ottoman Sultan, and sent a cordial message to the principal officers of the Ottoman state in the following terms:

> The lamp of the Ottoman empire's prestige has shone with particular brilliance as a result of the holy war and the raids it has conducted against the infidel. In addition, the Ottoman Sultans are the guardians of the holy places of Mecca and Medina, a fact which distinguishes them among other Muslim rulers and

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[5] In 1015/1606-07 (see above).

> makes it incumbent upon all Muslims to assist them. However, as I have repeatedly stated, Sultan Morād III, taking advantage of our weakness at the time, deliberately and without cause broke the peace which had been concluded by our ancestors and reaffirmed generation after generation by the most binding covenants, and occupied some provinces which belong to me by right of inheritance. Now, with God's help, I have obtained my rights, and intend to defend them. If the Ottoman Sultan will relinquish his claim to this territory, I am ready at any time to discuss peace for the benefit of all Muslims. What could be better than that Muslim rulers should live together in peace and harmony, and thus frustrate the designs of the enemies of the faith?

The Shah decided to send a letter as requested by Morād Pasha, the grand vizier, and the other Ottoman officials who desired to get peace talks started. I will describe the contents of this letter and the dispatch of an ambassador to the Porte under the events of the following year.

After a short stay at Solṭānīya, the Shah marched via Mīānaj to Ardabīl, where he visited the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn and the other Safavid shaikhs and stayed there a few days. He then visited the tomb of Shaikh Zāhed-e Gīlānī.[6] After that, he spent a few days hunting in the Qezel Āğāč area and then returned to Tabriz. From Tabriz, he visited Ordūbād, and then proceeded by way of 'Alī Darra to Qarābāğ, where he spent the winter.

An extraordinary incident occurred this year. As everyone knows, Shah 'Abbas is excessively fond of hunting, and often goes off hunting with a small party of *moqarrabs* and close friends. When the Shah was in Ḵalḵāl district, on his way to Ardabīl, some crazy lost soul decided to pass himself off as the Shah. He gathered together a group of people even madder than himself, equipped himself with some animals designed to look like a hunter's bag, retired to a remote corner of Ḵalḵāl where the people had never seen the Shah in person, and took up residence at the home of some local headman. He gave each of his crazy followers the name of one of the Shah's *moqarrabs*, and they addressed him in the *qezelbāš* fashion, using the phrases "My king! My king! May I be your sacrifice?" The simple-minded, loyal villagers were overjoyed at the presence of the "Shah" among them, and exerted themselves to serve him. People from neighboring districts started flocking in to kiss his stirrup, and to bring him gifts and votive offerings. The "Shah" and his "attendants" spent their time enjoying themselves, heedless of the future.

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[6] The leader of the Zāhedīya Sufi Order and the spiritual director *(moršed)* of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn. On Shaikh Zāhed's death in 1301, Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn assumed the leadership of the Order, which henceforth became known as the Ṣafavīya Order.

As soon as the news spread to surrounding districts, a detachment of *ḡolāms* of the royal household was dispatched under the command of the centurion Yūsof Beg. They came upon the pseudo-Shah and his followers just when the latter were beginning to realize the full enormity of their crime and were thinking of riding off. One or two who had already mounted their horses fled into the mountains and disappeared; the pseudo-Shah himself and a few of his companions were arrested. Since it was essential that people who had the temerity to behave in this way should be severely punished as a warning to others, they were executed. Glory be to God! To what lengths man will go when he is under the influence of his carnal soul, and what dangerous actions he will commit, heedless of the consequences, when Satan whispers in his ear! God preserve us from Satan the accursed! Although this was not a very edifying incident, I felt I should record it as a warning to other improvident, idle men.

While the Shah was at Ardabīl, Żu'l-Faqār Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, came to court; he accompanied the Shah on his pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh Zāhed, and on his hunting expedition in Qarā Āḡāč, before returning to his post.

After the Shah had sent the Jalālīs to Kurdestan, he judged it wise to send a detachment of troops under the command of Emāmqolī Khan, an emir of the *dīvan* and the son of Allāhverdī Khan, in the direction of Salmās, which is adjacent to Kurdestān, to keep an eye on them.

Another event which occurred about this time was the death of Kord Ḥeydar, one of the Jalālī emirs and commander of a thousand men. Inordinately proud of his strength and bravery, he frequently behaved in a rude and arrogant manner toward Moḥammad Pasha, who was afraid of him, and whose fear and suspicion of him increased in the course of the Kurdestan expedition. One day, Moḥammad Pasha held an assembly in his tent, and he noticed that Kord Ḥeydar was not drinking much and was uttering all sorts of threats. This increased Moḥammad Pasha's anxiety to the point that he ordered his *īč-oġlāns* (pages)[7] to murder Kord Ḥeydar. They at once drew their swords and cut him and two of his men to pieces. The rest of his men at once gave up all idea of mutiny. The Pasha attached them to his own command, divided Kord Ḥeydar's possessions among them, and sent in a report to the Shah, who applauded his action.

While the Shah was at Ardabīl, there was reported to him the revolt of Emir Khan Barādūst, who had opposed Ḥasan Khan and Moḥammad Pasha and had shut himself up in his fort. The vizier Ḥātem Beg was instructed by the Shah to take charge of this operation, with full authority to deal with the matter as he thought fit. Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, was instructed to accompany the vizier with a detachment of gunners and musketeers, to lend support if needed. The author was ordered to accompany the expedition, and so I will give an eyewitness account which I will endeavor to avoid making too long.

The Rebellion of Emir Khan Barādūst, the Expedition under the Command of the Vizier to Orūmīya, and the Siege of the Fort of Domdom

The story of Emir Khan Čūlāq is a cautionary one. Gentle reader, listen to my tale a few brief moments, and learn the circumstances of this affair. Emir Khan was of the Kurdish tribe of Barādūst. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, a certain Qarā Tāj of that tribe declared his "love of the Shah" and was enrolled among the servants of the Safavid state. Shah Tahmasp allocated to the Barādūst tribe the districts of Targavar and Margavar in the province of Orūmīya and Ošnūya.[8] After the death of Shah Tahmasp, when the Ottomans began to encroach on Kurdestan and many Kurds transferred their allegiance to them, a certain Barādūst chief named Moḥammad Beg was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan as chief of the tribe and governor of the Barādūst district. Emir Khan withheld his allegiance from Moḥammad Beg and served successively a number of leading Kurdish chiefs. For a time, he served 'Omar Beg the governor of Sohrāb. In one of 'Omar Beg's many fights with his enemies, one of Emir Khan's hands was severed at the wrist; as a result he became known as Emir Khan Čūlāq (the one-handed).

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[7] See Gibb and Bowen, index. Eskandar Beg says "*īč-oġlāns,* also termed *kīč-oġlāns.*" I have not been able to find any authority for the latter form.

[8] Roughly west of the southern tip of Lake Orūmīya.

In the year that Shah 'Abbas opened his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan and marched on Naḵčevān and Erīvān, Emir Khan came to court and declared his "love of the Shah." The Shah received him with favor, made him chieftain of the Barādūst tribe, and granted him the districts of Targavar and Margavar with the rank of khan; in addition, he granted him the districts of Orūmīya and Ošnūya, which in Shah Tahmasp's time constituted a *qezelbāš* governorship. The Shah commanded his master goldsmiths to fashion an artificial hand out of gold, embellished with rubies and other jewels, and the Shah showed him the highest degree of favor in consideration of his loyalty and bravery. For a time Emir Khan remained at court; when he returned to his governorship, he stood higher in the royal favor than any of his peers. He annexed the territory of a number of Kurdish chiefs who had gone over to the Ottomans and acquired a great reputation in Kurdestan. Many Kurdish chiefs sought to gain favor with the Shah by entering Emir Khan's service, and it was not long before the latter began to get inflated ideas of his own importance.

In the year that Jeḡāl-oḡlū invaded Azerbaijan and was defeated outside Tabriz, Emir Khan failed to present himself at court. But he later put in an appearance at the Shah's camp near Salmās, and his dereliction of duty was overlooked. In order to reassure him that this was really the case, and in order to reassure the rest of the Kurdish chiefs (who are among the wilder specimens of the human race), Emir Khan was not held in custody at court, but was allowed to return to his post on the pretext of carrying out some duty or other. However, whether he felt an antipathy against the *qezelbāš* on religious grounds, or whether it was merely his own evil nature, he began to act in a hostile manner toward the *qezelbāš* frontier emirs and to harbor ideas of independence. He conceived the idea of building a castle, and wrote to the principal officers of the Safavid state as follows: "The old fort at Orūmīya is in ruins and beyond repair; it cannot be relied upon. I need a castle for the protection of my property and family. If you grant me permission, I will construct a fort at some suitable spot." On receiving permission, he laid the foundations of a fort some three *farsaḵs* from Orūmīya, on a high hill just inside the Targavar district. There is a Kurdish tradition that there used to be a fort there in pre-Islamic times, known as Fort Domdom, which had fallen into ruin in the course of the centuries.

Pīr Būdāq Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Tabriz, who was a shrewd and experienced officer, observed signs of rebellion on the part of

Emir Khan and reported to the Shah that Emir Khan had laid the foundations of a lofty castle which would stand him in good stead in case of need. Pīr Būdāq did not consider this to be in the best interests of the state. The Shah replied that Pīr Būdāq was the *amīr al-omarā* in charge of that frontier; if he thought the construction of this fort was not in the best interests of the state, he should send an officer to Emir Khan to tell him to desist. The *amīr al-omarā* did so, and his subordinate delivered this message:

> You are enrolled in the ranks of the Shah's great emirs, and you are the Shah's protégé. You profess your devotion to the Shah. Although the Shah trusts you and believes this profession of devotion to him, if you build this castle, slanderous tongues will start wagging. If your reason for building the fort is fear of the Ottomans, even if the Ottomans re-invade this region, as long as the forts at Erīvān and Tabriz are in our hands, there is no need for a fort here. If you are nervous about your fellow Kurdish chiefs, we servants of the Shah, whose duty it is to guard this frontier, will come to your assistance without delay. The old fort at Orūmīya is quite adequate to protect you and the Barādūst tribe for a few days. It is better that you cease building this fort and thereby avoid slanderous imputations against you. I urge you to accept this friendly advice, which is consonant with your own best interests, and not to lay yourself open to charges of rebellion.

This was friendly advice indeed, for the construction of this castle caused Emir Khan's ruin.

Emir Khan not only paid no heed to this advice, but put Pīr Būdāq Khan's messenger to death. He completed the new fort, which he made impressively strong, stocked it with provisions and munitions, and transferred his men there from Orūmīya. He began acting in a way quite contrary to his professions of single-minded devotion to the Shah. For example, he gave sanctuary to Khan Abdāl Mokrī, the brother of Shaikh Ḥeydar, who was in a state of revolt against the Shah and had been driven out of his hereditary camping grounds by Safavid troops. Khan Abdāl Mokrī took refuge with Emir Khan with twenty of his men, and the latter gave him quarters in the castle and made them welcome. He then sent messengers to the Shah craftily making out that he had apprehended the rebels and representing this as an act of devoted service on his part.

When the Shah sent a combined Jalālī and *qezelbāš* force to Kurdestan, Pīr Būdāq Khan had initially been placed in supreme command of this force. Hearing this, Emir Khan Barādūst wrote to the principal officers of the Safavid state as follows: "There is a feud between me and Pīr Būdāq Khan, and the latter has made various accusations against me. It is therefore quite impossible for me to cooperate with the force which is under his command." To placate him, the Shah replied that he had replaced Pīr Būdāq with Ḥasan Khan, an officer of the Iraq establishment and a man of the utmost integrity. If Emir Khan's own affairs prevented him from joining Ḥasan Khan in person, said the Shah, he should send one of his sons or one of his senior chiefs, with a detachment of two or three hundred men. This would demonstrate his solidarity with the other Kurdish chiefs, and no false construction could be placed on his behavior.

Despite the fact that the Shah had gone to such lengths to placate him, Emir Khan remained stubbornly rebellious. When Ḥasan Khan and the other *qezelbāš* emirs joined forces at Marāḡa with Moḥammad Pasha and the Jalālīs and set off on their mission to Kurdestan, they called on him to act in accordance with the Shah's instructions; if he could not come in person, he should send a number of reliable officers who were well acquainted with the Kurdish scene and with the terrain, whose advice would be most useful, and who could act as guides for the expeditionary force. Emir Khan made various excuses for not coming in person: The Jalālīs, he said, were a self-willed, unruly, and improvident lot. Even though they were accompanied by detachments of *qezelbāš* troops, he said, he could not bear to be part of an army which had seven or eight thousand Jalālīs in it. Let them take whatever route they wished, he said, and he would send some men along later. The emirs strongly disapproved of this disobedience at the very outset of their mission, and they determined, since their path lay across his territory, to bring him to heel by whatever means they could. If Emir Khan, who professed to be loyal to the Shah, could behave like this, they reasoned, what might they expect from the rest of the Kurdish emirs? They therefore sent a cordial message to Emir Khan telling him that they would be camping for a few nights in his neighborhood and asking him to act as their host. They could then take counsel together, they said, and follow whatever course of action he advised.

Emir Khan, however, paid not the slightest attention to the message of Ḥasan Khan and the emirs. When the advance guard of the expeditionary force reached his area, the Barādūst tribesmen engaged the Jalālīs, killing two of them and wounding others. Ḥasan Khan ordered his men to retire and not retaliate; he then approached to within half a *farsaḵ* of the castle and camped in a suitable spot. The Kurds entered the fort and began firing on the *qezelbāš* camp with artillery and muskets. Ḥasan Khan again sent a messenger to Emir Khan and asked him for an explanation of his behavior. Despite all Ḥasan Khan's efforts to establish friendly relations, Emir Khan persisted in making unacceptable excuses and rejected his overtures. The Kurds started making sorties from the fort, attacking and plundering any groups of Jalālīs or *qezelbāš* they encountered in the course of bringing provisions into the camp. Hostility between the two sides increased, and Moḥammad Pasha, determined to avenge the death of his men, kept leading men up to the walls of the fort and engaging in skirmishes with the Kurds who came out against him; both sides suffered in these encounters. The time for negotiations had now passed, and warfare began in earnest.

At this point, a group of Jalālīs who were fearful of Moḥammad Pasha defected and joined Emir Khan, an action that confirmed Emir Khan in his rebellious attitude and increased Moḥammad Pasha's anger; the renegades consisted principally of three or four hundred men under the command of Moḥammad Beg, the brother of Ṭavīl. In accordance with the Shah's *farmān* governing the operations in Kurdestan, the Safavid forces assumed control of Emir Khan's territory, and Ḥasan Khan sent a report on the situation to the Shah. This report reached the Shah at Ardabīl and, as already related, he appointed the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, to take charge of the situation. If Emir Khan showed any sign of being prepared to return to his allegiance, he was to be offered a royal pardon, and the Jalālī troops were to march away from the castle and be allotted winter quarters on the same basis as in previous years. Ḥātem Beg was given the sum of five thousand *tomān* in cash, in gold coin of the realm from the royal treasury, to defray the expenses of the Jalālīs. If Emir Khan persisted in his rebellion, Ḥātem Beg was to take punitive action against him and divide up his territory among the Jalālīs, so that the latter might devote their energies to subduing other Kurdish rebels.

The Vizier's Siege of the Castle of Domdom

The vizier, on receiving this commission, went from Ardabīl to Tabriz and assembled a force consisting of Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz; Barḵordār Beg Anīs, the commander in chief of artillery; detachments of musketeers from Isfahan, Khorasan, Tabriz and Bāfq; and two thousand Jalālīs who had just returned from the raid on Qarāča Ardahān. At Salmās, he was joined by Khan Emir, the son of Ġāzī Beg Kord, the governor of Salmās, and by Owlīā Beg the son of Kūr Seyf al-Dīn, the governor of Anzal and Ṣowmāy who were the Shah's appointees. On Tuesday, 26 Ša'bān 1018/24 November 1609, the vizier's army reached Ḥasan Khan's camp at Orūmīya. He and his men were welcomed by Moḥammad Pasha, Ḥasan Khan, and the other emirs.

The next day, the vizier sent an envoy, in the company of Malek Aqa Moḥammad Ṭasūjī, who was an acquaintance of Emir Khan, asking for a meeting within the confines of the fort. The vizier wished to learn what was in Emir Khan's mind, and try to remove the causes of his rebellious behavior and calm him down. Emir Khan agreed, and the vizier went to the rendezvous with a few men and entered into wide-ranging discussions with Emir Khan. Emir Khan, concealing his trickery and guile under a cloak of loyal submission, told the vizier he had taken refuge in his castle because of the lawless behavior of the Jalālīs and because of his lack of confidence in Ḥasan Pasha's ability to check them and protect him. Moḥammad Pasha, he alleged, had designs on his territory, and had accused him of opposition to the Shah. Emir Khan asked that the vizier undertake to plead his case before the Shah, and that no action should be taken against him that winter; he undertook to send one of his sons to court with gifts for the Shah, and to appear himself at court in the spring when the Shah moved to his summer quarters.

The vizier agreed to present Emir Khan's case at court, on condition that he carried out his side of the bargain. It was further agreed that, since the news of Emir Khan's revolt and his taking refuge in his castle was by now general knowledge, he should make public demonstration that his disloyalty was a thing of the past, should come out of the fort with his troops and mingle freely with the *qezelbāš* emirs. For one day he and his men would be the guests of the vizier, and the following day the vizier and the emirs would be his guests at the castle. Each side would treat the other in an appropriately friendly manner, so that reports of a reconciliation would succeed those of the hostility between the parties.

Emir Khan agreed to be the guest of the vizier the following day, and the vizier set about making the necessary preparations for a reception to which all the *qezelbāš* emirs were invited. Since Emir Khan still wished to keep his distance from Moḥammad Pasha and the Jalālīs, the latter were not invited. The next day, the vizier waited the whole day for Emir Khan to appear, but there was no sign of him. The vizier sent Aqa Moḥammad Ṭasūjī back to the fort to tell him that they were all waiting for him. After endless discussions between Emir Khan and Aqa Moḥammad, Emir Khan finally sent a blunt answer: "The Barādūst elders," he said, "do not feel secure from treachery either on the part of the Jalālīs or of the *qezelbāš*. They do not feel confident that the vizier would be able to protect them, because the vizier is a Persian and a 'man of the pen,' and they have therefore prevented me from coming. In short, I will not put my neck at your mercy. If I consider it expedient, I will send my son to court with gifts. If the *qezelbāš* have any other course of action in mind, I shall have no option but to defend the fort against them."

The vizier realized that all the negotiations had been fraudulent and that Emir Khan, relying on the strength of his fortress, was set upon rebellion. The vizier took counsel with his emirs. There was general agreement that to show further leniency toward Emir Khan would not be in the interests of the state. For the principal minister of the Safavid state to come to the foot of the castle walls and then return without attaining his object would lead to all kinds of mischief. There was therefore a unanimous vote in favor of laying siege to the castle. The vizier reported this to the Shah, and began to make preparations for the siege.

At the beginning of this episode, I asked forgiveness from my readers for going into this affair in such detail. In order to set the scene properly, I must give some description of the fort of Domdom. It is situated on top of a high hill, the peak of which consists of a single long, narrow mass of rock, wider at one end than the other. On two sides, the ground falls away steeply into deep valleys, and an approach from either of these directions would be unthinkable without the use of ladders; in fact, the drop is so precipitous that the Kurds had not bothered to build defenses on these two sides. Of the other two sides, across the width of the rock, the east side is on rising ground which runs into the mountains; it is fortified with a blockhouse and lofty towers, and has a gateway. On the western side, where the altitude is less, two strong blockhouses had been constructed, and there was a gate south of the second blockhouse. A path, hewn out of the rock, runs from this gateway to the ground below; the path is extremely narrow, and it is difficult for even one horseman to negotiate it. It is impossible to carry forward breastworks except on the east and west sides. On the east side, the ground for the distance of a bowshot is solid rock, in which neither trenches nor tunnels can be dug. Nevertheless, to preclude the possibility of tunneling activity, another tower had been built on this slab of rock, overlooking a valley. This tower was a veritable small fort in itself, and no besieging force could hope to advance breastworks toward the main fort until it had gained possession of it.

For their water supply, the garrison defenders relied on rainfall, the rainwater being stored in a huge cistern. There was also a spring in the valley north of the fort that provided a little water. Emir Khan had had this spring cleaned out and a cistern constructed that filled up in the course of a night and provided one day's supply of drinking water for the officers of the garrison. The cistern was covered by a domed roof flush with the level of the ground to make it as invisible as possible. This cistern was called the *ṣūloq* (water container). For the protection of this water supply and of those carrying the water to the fort, a tower had been built adjacent to the wall of the fort and connected with it. To the south of the fort, again adjacent to the wall, was an ice pit, which filled with ice and snow during the winter. Beneath the pit was another cistern, in which water collected as the ice and snow melted in summer, and this water came in handy during periods of drought and excessively hot weather. The ice pit was also protected by a miniature fort, garrisoned by archers and musketeers. This ice pit was called either the *būzloq* or *qarlıq;* as in the case of the *ṣūloq,* the access route to it was concealed from prying eyes.

In other words, the fortress of Domdom consists of five separate forts: the main fort; the lower fort; the *ṣūloq;* the *būzloq;* and the tower outside the eastern gate. Each is of outstanding strength.

At this juncture, the vizier received reinforcements in the form of five hundred Māzandarānī musketeers from the royal camp, and a force of Čeganī *qūrčīs* under the command of the centurion Ṣafarqolī Beg; Ganj ʿAlī Khan was on his way from Tabriz with his troops.

Ḥasan Khan and the emirs in his force, together with the musketeers from Isfahan under the command of Mīr Fattāḥ, took up positions east of the fort. The west side, that is, on the side of the lower fort, was allotted to Pīr Būdāq Khan and his men, together with the musketeers from Khorasan and Bāfq. Morād Khan Sultan Čapnī, Ḵalīl Sultan Sīl-süpür, and Moḥammad Taqī Beg the chiliarch *(men-bāšī)*, commander of the Azerbaijan musketeers, were stationed to the south of the fort, opposite the *būzloq*. Ganj ʿAlī Khan's task was to guard the gateway at the southwest corner. The Māzandarānī musketeers, and Ṣafarqolī Beg and the Čeganī *qūrčīs*, were stationed to the north of the fort, opposite the *ṣūloq*.

Barḵordār Beg Anīs was ordered to cast two heavy large cannon and one exceptionally heavy siege gun *(balyemez)*. Qabān Sultan Begdīlū was ordered to supervise the artillery and give general assistance to the gunners. A small cannon which had been found in the fort of Gowgar-Čīnloq (it had been transported by boat across the Black Sea) was placed in Ḥasan Khan's breastwork opposite the eastern tower. Moḥammad Pasha, who was suffering from a heart condition, was excused all duties, but the Jalālīs were stationed in support positions at various points. The five thousand *tomān* in gold coins which the vizier had brought with him were distributed among the Jalālīs in proportion to their status. Every unit was allocated winter quarters, and the Safavid army settled down for the winter, each detachment going about its business.

Emir Khan was alarmed by these preparations and repeatedly sent envoys professing submission, hoping once again to wriggle out of the trap, but since his earlier protestations had proved false, no notice was taken of them on this occasion, and Emir Khan was forced to defend himself. Several chieftains' sons from the Barādūst tribe escaped from the fort and declared their "love of the Shah." Both they and all other enemy soldiers who left the fort unanimously asserted that the garrison was suffering from a shortage of water. It had been a dry year and there was not much water in the cistern; such water as there was, was fetid and could only be used for the animals. The garrison was therefore completely dependent on the *ṣūloq* for its drinking water, which was brought in in bowls and distributed among the officers. If the *ṣūloq* were occupied, said these informants, the garrison would have no choice but to sue for quarter and surrender the fort. The *ṣūloq*, they added, could easily be seized by resorting to tunneling.

This plan commended itself to the vizier, since forcing the garrison to surrender was preferable to incurring the losses of an assault. At his orders, master welldiggers began tunneling operations. On the eastern side, Ḥasan Khan and his fellow emirs divided up the task of constructing breastworks and digging trenches. As far as the soil extended, they dug trenches; when they reached the area of solid rock, they wove baskets and, dividing the night into two shifts, carried soil from a considerable distance, filled the baskets, and stacked them on top of one another to form a protective avenue of approach to the fort. On the western side, Pīr Būdāq Khan proceeded in the same manner, even though the approach on this side was uphill. From dusk until dawn, these approach works came under heavy attack from the Kurds, who inflicted casualties on the *ğāzīs* with shots from their bows and their muskets. On several occasions, the Kurds launched heavy daytime attacks, but the *qezelbāš* held their ground, both sides incurring casualties in this fighting. On one occasion, the Kurds attacked the breastwork held by Ne'matollāh Sultan Ṣūfī and caused a breach in it, but the Sufis defended it so fiercely that, though five men were killed one behind the other, the Kurds were unable to force an entry. As each man was killed, another hero took his place, and the Kurds were eventually forced to retire. In this struggle, the *qezelbāš* lost seven or eight men killed and ten or fifteen wounded; the Kurds lost twenty with thirty or forty wounded.

Meanwhile, the small cannon installed at Ḥasan Khan's breastwork had been playing on the eastern tower. After bombarding it for three weeks or perhaps a month, some cracks appeared in the walls, but they were not large enough to enable anyone to scale the tower. Since this tower blocked the way to the main fort, Ḥasan Khan, in his impatience and without consulting the vizier, ordered an assault toward the end of the day. About a dozen intrepid youths succeeded in reaching the top of the tower; several of them were wounded and crashed down from the top; this discouraged others from following, and the rest of the assault group was forced to scramble down again. Ḥasan Khan then stationed two hundred of his men at the base of the tower with orders to start undermining it. About midnight, the Kurds made a sortie against these *ğāzīs,* who were forced to retire with the loss of a number of fine men because the heavy musket fire the Kurds maintained from the top of the tower prevented any help from reaching them. As a result of this setback, Ḥasan Khan was ashamed of his impulsiveness. The vizier consoled him, because reverses like these are inevitable in siege warfare.

After the welldiggers had been working for several days, the Kurds got wind of what they were doing. The reason for this was that the welldiggers, in order to maintain the correct alignment of their tunnel, made a hole through to the surface every few paces and inserted a marker. In a panic at the thought of losing their water supply, the Kurds launched attacks against the tunnel every night, and clashed with the Māzandarānī musketeers and Ṣafarqolī Beg and his Čegānī *qūrčīs,* who had been detailed to guard the tunnelers. As a result of these ceaseless attacks, the tunnelers were unable to proceed with their work. For three months, Ramażān-Ẕu'l-Qa'da 1018/November 1609-February 1610, the struggle went on in this way. On several occasions, large numbers of civilians, women and children, left the fort; they amounted to nearly a thousand persons in all. They were all suffering from thirst, and they hurled themselves upon the nearest source of water.

The besieged were well aware that the spring was their lifeline, and they defended the *ṣūloq* with desperation. Although the Safavid forces strove their utmost, they made no progress toward it during these three months. Since the water of life was hidden,[9] the vizier thought of another plan. The scheme was to construct a breastwork around the domed roof of the spring and then make a hole in the roof. He ordered the heavy cannon and the monster siege gun to be brought up and directed at the wall of the stairway that led down to the spring, so as to deny access to it to the Kurds. Meanwhile, work on the tunnel was to continue. Mīr Ṣūfī, Mīr Pāzūkī, and Mīr Moqaddam were withdrawn from their respective positions and given the job of constructing the breastwork around the spring; Ḥasan Khan was directed to leave reliable officers in charge of his breastwork and to supervise operations at the spring. At the same time, Pīr Būdāq Khan was ordered to begin carrying forward a breastwork toward the *ṣūloq* from his position west of the fort. The vizier's own troops, who were particularly diligent in their conduct of sieges, moved from their own lines and took charge of the gun positions, and for twenty-one days they maintained a steady fire from morning till night and saw to the protection of the breastworks. At night, they inspected the work that had been done during the day by each of the emirs, and if any had been derelict in his duty, he was reprimanded.

The Kurds were greatly alarmed at these new developments. Every night, a few hours after darkness had fallen, they made a sortie in the direction of the *ṣūloq*. The Safavid musketeers, aiming by the light of torches, repelled them; every night there were casualties on both sides. There was a cave in the mountainside that overlooked the roof of the *ṣūloq*, and the Kurds were busy constructing a tunnel designed to come out inside the cave; from this cave, they would be able to fall upon the breastworks around the *ṣūloq*, scatter the *ğāzīs*, and be in a position to prevent any further operations in that area. When the emirs learned of this plan, they decided to try and forestall it by occupying the cave. About thirty young *qezelbāš* daredevils and musketeers volunteered for this duty.

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[9] A nice allusion to the legend of Ḳeżr, who discovered the hidden source of the water of life and so became immortal.

One morning, when the sun was just up, these volunteers sprinted across the open ground between their breastworks and the cave; they came under heavy fire from the fort, but not more than one man was hit. The emirs mounted guard on their breastworks until midnight, but after midnight, the Kurds issued from the castle in two columns. One column made for the breastworks around the *ṣūloq* and kept the Safavid troops there fully occupied; the other made for the cave by a path beneath it and rushed the entrance. As long as the *qezelbāš* had bullets and arrows left, they held on grimly to the cave. When they had no ammunition left and ten of their number had been killed, they drew their swords and tried to hew their way to safety. Of the twenty who charged out of the cave, eight, though wounded, succeeded in breaking through, but the rest perished. Two of the wounded, one an Eṣfahānī musketeer and one a Pāzūkī tribesman, were taken prisoner and hauled off to the castle. Emir Khan, impressed by their valor, refused to allow them to be put to death; on the contrary, he had physicians see to their wounds, and after they had recovered he sent them back to the Safavid lines.

In the light of the dawn, the bodies of the slain *qezelbāš* could be seen lying around the mouth of the cave, and *qezelbāš* morale suffered a slight shock. The vizier was strongly affected; he severely reprimanded the Moqaddam, Pāzūkī, and Ṣūfī emirs, and even uttered threats against them. But the emirs, regarding the setback as being all in a day's work and desirous of preventing the enemy from enjoying their triumph, shrugged the incident off and redoubled their efforts. The very same day, forty Ostājlūs came forward from Ḥasan Khan's regiment and volunteered to occupy the cave. The vizier was of two minds as to whether he should sanction their going in view of the disaster the previous night, but Ḥasan Khan pressed him to grant permission and swore that this time he would himself take three hundred men to give support to the men in the cave.

The vizier reluctantly gave his consent, stipulating that Qabān Sultan Begdīlū and Emām Sultan Ājorlū should also take their troops out that night in support of Ḥasan Khan. At the insistence of the other emirs, ten additional volunteers were chosen from their men, making fifty men in all to go to the cave. This commando group, taking all necessary weapons and equipment, and rations for several days, at once went up to the cave at the double and in good order. The Kurds were astonished by their bravery and audacity. When night fell, the Kurds emerged from the fort earlier than they had the previous night, and engaged them. A severe struggle took place. Ḥasan Khan and the other emirs and musketeers from outside, and the commando group from within the cave, fought on until daybreak. The Kurds, despite all their efforts, were unable to dislodge them; they retired dispirited to the fort, while the *ğāzīs* mounted guard on the cave.

Every night, the Kurds lost a few men as they went to and fro between the fort and the *ṣūloq* to fetch water, as a result of the fire from the heavy siege guns and muskets. The breastworks had now been pushed forward to the edge of the cistern, and the roof covering it had been pierced. Through the hole, the *qezelbāš* could see the course of the water and trace it to the spring. The Kurds sought to remedy this situation; every day they sent patrols that fought the enemy in the tunnel and interrupted the work of the tunnelers. On 18 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1018/14 March 1610, about noon, the emirs stuffed straw in the hole in the roof of the *ṣūloq* and set fire to it. The Kurds guarding the cistern fled back to the castle because of the smoke, and the *ğāzīs* descended and occupied the *ṣūloq*. They then blocked the access staircase for a distance of ten steps above them with rubble. This success caused a strong reaction from the defenders, who strove to regain control of their water supply, but without success. Māzandarānī musketeers were stationed on guard at the *ṣūloq*, and the emirs retired to their respective breastworks. The vizier's troops also left the gun positions and returned to their original posts.

After the occupation of the *ṣūloq*, Emir Khan and his officers hung on for ten or fifteen days by dint of using the water from the *būzloq*, while his men had to make do with the fetid water from the storage tank in the fort. At this critical point in the siege, the garrison was saved by the onset of the spring rains. Unlike the previous year, this time they were heavy and continuous. By the will of God, which is beyond human understanding, it rained incessantly for nearly a month, giving the garrison six months' water supply. All the efforts of the previous three months on the part of the besiegers to gain control of the *ṣūloq* were thus wasted, and the garrison was encouraged to continue its resistance even more stoutly. At this juncture, those unreliable Jalālīs began to disperse.

The Defection of the Jalālīs and the End of Moḥammad Pasha

Morād Pasha, who had been given the task of extirpating the Jalālīs from Ottoman territory, had been carrying out his mission with ruthless efficiency, putting to death anyone who had ever had the slightest connection with the Jalālī movement, and the Ottoman Sultan was well satisfied with his efforts.

Nevertheless, some of his enemies set out to destroy his work. They attributed the escape of the Jalālīs to Iran to poor tactics on the part of Morād Pasha, and told the Ottoman Sultan that Morād Pasha's actions in dealing with the Jalālī problem had not been in the best interests of the state and were not calculated to restore order within the empire. The result was that Sultan Aḥmad I told Morād Pasha that, although he had tried hard to suppress the Jalālīs, things had not turned out well, since twelve thousand of the rebels had joined the *qezelbāš*. "What you should have done," said the Sultan, "was to have offered the rest of the rebels amnesty after you had defeated the main body of them. Even if a few of their leaders had not trusted the promise of amnesty and had defected, undoubtedly the rank and file, if assured that their lives would be spared, would not have left their homeland." The upshot was that Naṣūḥ Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr and one of Morād Pasha's chief enemies, who had been acting in a high-handed manner along the frontier, wrote placatory letters to the Jalālī emirs urging them to return to Ottoman territory. Moḥammad Pasha and Qarā Sa'īd, who in view of their past activities had no hope of saving their necks, did not respond, but the rest, lured by the distant magic of the Ottoman spell, resolved to return. One factor in their decision was that, in the Ottoman empire, they had become accustomed to a lawless way of life and to doing as they pleased, whereas in Iran the king's justice restricted their activities.

The first Jalālī to return to Turkey was Āğā Jeden Pīrī, who with his five hundred men slipped away from his winter quarters of Ošnū toward Karkūya in the district of Baghdad. As a result of his defection, the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, distrusted the rest of the Jalālīs and consulted Moḥammad Pasha about them. Moḥammad Pasha said that Kekeč Moḥammad, who had seven hundred men, was unreliable and a troublemaker; if he could be removed from the scene, he (Moḥammad Pasha) would answer for the loyalty of the remainder. The vizier reported this to the Shah, who wrote a friendly letter to Kekeč, encouraged him to hope for royal favors, and summoned him to court. Kekeč set off thither with a group of his men. The Shah then issued a second order, in the name of all the rank and file of the Jalālīs: The Jalālīs were foreigners who had come to his kingdom, said the Shah, and were consequently his guests; as long as they were in his realm, it was incumbent upon him to treat them as such. If at any time they wished to leave, even though it was usual for guests to express the wish to come and to ask permission to leave, he would not insist on the latter requirement being carried out, since it was not compatible with the code of gentlemanly behavior to cause vexation to one's guests. However, said the Shah, there was no need for the Jalālīs to incur the disgrace of running away and by this action to give the *qezelbāš* the reputation of having treated their guests badly. Let them leave openly and escorted by the frontier emirs; he would do nothing to prevent their leaving.

When the Shah's letters arrived, the vizier called together all the Jalālī leaders and read them the contents of the Shah's letter. They all with one accord vowed that they had no intention of leaving. "Since we came to this land," they said, "and sought protection in the shadow of the Shah's clemency, we have no longer gone in fear of our lives. We have been overwhelmed by the Shah's munificence, and we have no worries. Why should we want to leave? We are ashamed of our disloyal colleagues who have run away." They talked a lot in this vein, but secretly they felt considerable trepidation about staying in Iran, and all ranks made plans to leave. Moḥammad Pasha, distracted by his illness, spoke to them harshly and ill-temperedly.

Only a few days later, some of his own personal *bölükbāšīs* defected with two thousand men, and made for Dīār Bakr to join Naṣūḥ Pasha. After they had left, Moḥammad Pasha left the vizier's camp and went to Orūmīya for purging and other forms of medical treatment; he was now too weak to carry out his duties. Next to leave were a thousand of his personal retainers, by the Salmās road. Less than two days later, Ebrāhim Aqa, the Pasha's *vakīl* and right-hand man, left by the same route, taking with him the Pasha's private stable. When the Pasha heard this, despite his illness and weakness, he set off in pursuit of them with some two or three hundred men who had remained loyal to him. When he caught up with them, the renegades sent a messenger to him to tell him that, since they had eaten his salt, they were reluctant to fight him; it would be better, they said, for him not to trouble them or himself, but to go back. If he did not, they would fight. The Pasha, who did not have the strength to fight them, with a heavy heart resigned himself to the loss of his horses, and went back. This group of Jalālīs committed all sorts of crimes on their return journey, appropriating the property of any peasant, *qezelbāš*, or traveler they chanced to meet. They committed the unpardonable crime of eating salt and then smashing the salt cellar.[10]

After the defection of the Pasha's men, the vizier's subordinates thought it better not to leave the Pasha at Orūmīya, in case the Jalālīs who remained plotted some treachery against him, and so they brought him back to the camp. He was suffering from some liver complaint and from stomach pains. He refused to have anything further to do with doctors, but pinned his faith on some popular Turkish remedies, dismissing his mortal disease as "a touch of the spleen." He had a strong desire to live, and refused to consider the possibility of death. However, at the end of Ṣafar 1019/May 1610, he died. His death destroyed what cohesion there remained in the Jalālī ranks; a number of his *bölükbāšīs*, some three hundred in all, were taken into the Shah's service and provided for. Since the Pasha had no heir, the Shah granted his belongings, comprising his horse, his mules and camels, his equipment, jeweled weapons, and cash in silver and gold, to the value of about three thousand *tomān* in all, to Qarā Sa'īd. The rest of the Pasha's troops were also transferred to his command. By this time, not more than five hundred Jalālīs remained in Iran, counting those who had entered the Shah's service, and the men under the command of Qarā Sa'īd, Kekeč Moḥammad, and the other *bölükbāšīs*.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year

Shah Naẓar Sultan Tükelī Čağatāy, the governor of Jām, who had been appointed commandant of the fort of Darband in Šīrvān, was made governor of Mašhad as a reward for excellent service.

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[10] I.e., accepting hospitality and then behaving treacherously and disloyally.

Deaths

Maryam Sultan Begom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, who had been the wife of Khan Aḥmad the ruler of Gīlān, died at Isfahan. The Shah and the women of the royal family received the news in his summer quarters at Āq-Ölang near Hamadan, and the news occasioned much sorrow. Qāżī Sultan, the warden of the shrine at Mašhad, who happened to be in the royal camp, was charged with bearing the body to Mašhad and burying it within the sanctuary of the shrine.

Mīrzā 'Alamīān Mīrzā Moḥammad Šafī'. I have already related some details of his career. He was descended from a family of shaikhs from Kadkan in the district of Nishapur. As a young man, he had learned the art of secretarial composition at Mašhad from the secretaries in the governor's office, and had entered the service of Kāẓemqolī Khan Pornāk. After the latter's death, he had been appointed vizier to Ebrahim Khan Torkmān. When the latter was dismissed from office, Mīrzā 'Alamīān was for a while out of a job. In the Year of the Hare, 1000/1591-92, when Farhād Khan marched to Nishapur, Mīrzā 'Alamīān presented himself to the Khan and asked him for a job. Because he was a Nīšāpūrī, he was given the job of writing official documents and allowed to accompany the Khan on his campaign. Gradually, his talents won recognition, and his influence grew with his experience, until finally he was appointed vizier.[11]

The esteem in which he was held increased steadily, and Farhād Khan frequently used to sing his praises to the Shah. After the execution of Farhād Khan, Mīrzā 'Alamīān was appointed *vazīr-e koll* of Gīlān, and performed well in this office—so well, in fact, that he was given the honorific title of Mīrzā 'Alamīānī and was made vizier of Qazvin in addition to his other appointment. In the Year of the Horse (1015/1606-07), he was appointed *vazīr-e koll* of Khorasan in addition to his two other offices. He had full authority in administrative and financial matters, with power to appoint and dismiss financial officials and *kalāntars* as he thought fit. Unfortunately, he was not a big enough man to cope with all this power. As previously related, he began behaving in an improper manner toward some of the emirs of Khorasan, especially the governor of Mašhad, Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, and his behavior eventually suggested that he was mentally unbalanced. He was recalled by the Shah, who was then in Māzandarān with his court, and for a time was out of favor and debarred

[11] Of Khorasan, not of the central administration.

from royal assemblies. He fell ill at his summer quarter in the Isfahan area and went to Qazvin, where he died at the beginning of this year. The chronogram of his death is "I am eternal; all else perisheth."[12] Among the financial and other officials appointed by him are Behzād Beg Astarābādī, the vizier of Gīlān; Aṣlān Beg, the vizier of Qazvin; Mīr Abu'l-Qāsem, a kinsman of his, the vizier of Māzandarān; and Ḵāja Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥoseyn, the vizier of Mašhad.

Bektāš Khan, the governor of Marv; he belonged to the Dānālū clan of the Ostājlū tribe. He had started his career as the *vakīl* of Moršedqolī Khan Yakān in Khorasan, and in Iraq he had acted as his *dārūḡa* at Isfahan. After the execution of Moršedqolī Khan, Bektaš Khan, at the Shah's bidding, was for a time in charge of some of the rural districts of Isfahan. But, after his dismissal from this position, he was for a time in straitened circumstances. In the Year of the Dog, 1006/1597-98, when Khorasan was reconquered, Bektaš Khan was raised to the status of emir and appointed governor of Mārūčāq, where he served with distinction and played a large part in the pacification of that frontier. In the Year of the Rat, 1008/1600, when Moḥammad Khan Özbeg was removed from office as the penalty for rebelling, the governorship of Marv-e Šāhījān was given to Bektaš Khan. He fought many battles against the Uzbegs along the frontier and was uniformly successful in these engagements. This year, in his tenth year in this office, he died, and his governorship was given to Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Mašhad.

Moḥammad Zamān Sultan Bāyandor, who came from a family of Bāyandorī Turkman emirs which had a record of loyal service to the Safavid house. He came to court from Yazd, which was his family seat, and entered the service of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. At the time of the civil war between the Turkmans and the Takkalūs, since his sister, Āḡā Jān Ḵānom, was married to 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū and was responsible for the upbringing of the young prince 'Abbas, Moḥammad Zamān Sultan went to Herat on the pretext of wanting to see his sister. After the loss of Khorasan to the Uzbegs, he returned to Iraq and lived for a time at his native city, Yazd. During this period, he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. On his return from the Ḥejāz, he was taken into royal service and enrolled among the *moqarrabs* and close companions of the Shah at court, where he remained in favor until the time of his death, although the Shah sometimes reprimanded him for his habit of making cutting remarks and of being unpleasant to people in a subtle way. He was a witty conversationalist and a connoisseur of poetry, but was not devoid of military skills, which he had inherited from his forebears. To begin with, he was noted as a dispenser of charity, but after his return from the pilgrimage, he was guilty of various misdemeanors—either because this sort of behavior reflected his true nature, or because he had been seduced by love of power and worldly goods. May God pardon him for these shortcomings!

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[12] This chronogram yields the correct date, 1017/1608-09.

Ḥoseynqolī Beg Qājār, the brother of Emir Gūna Khan, was stabbed to death one night while he was asleep by one of his servants, a youth from Gīlān, who feared that the Khan might make advances to him. His murderer was executed.

Ḥājjī Adham Beg, the brother of the vizier Ḥātem Beg, died at Shiraz. I gave some account of his career under the Year of the Horse, 1015/1606-07, and so I do not need to repeat it here. This year, he returned to Shiraz after making the pilgrimage to Mašhad, and died after a short illness. He was a capable and honest official who, after his retirement from public office, lived a life of quiet piety at various holy places. His brother and his son, Mīrzā ʿAbd al-Ḥoseyn, received the news at Ardabīl; his son held the high office of *monšī al-mamālek*. The Shah offered his condolences to his family, to each of whom he sent a suitable robe of honor.

This concludes my account of the events of the Year of the Fowl.

The Events of the Year of the Dog, Corresponding in Part to the Muslim Year 1018/1609–10, and in Part to 1019/1610–11, the Twenty-fourth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Sunday, 25 Ẕu'l-Ḥejja 1018/21 March 1610, was New Year's Day. The royal court had wintered in Qarābāḡ, and the Shah spent the early spring hunting and dispensing justice to the people. The *moqarrab al-hażrat* Qarčaqāy Beg was sent to Šīrvān when some of the local governors of Dāḡestān and the wild men of Ṭabarsarān, who persisted in thinking that the construction of the fort by Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan already referred to was a prelude to their own subjugation, entertained vain thoughts and went astray. Qarčaqāy Beg took a force of *ḡolāms* and *qezelbāš* to Šīrvān, with instructions to join up with Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, proceed to Šābarān, and, as a first move, send placatory letters to the governors of Dāḡestān. Any who demonstrated their loyalty were not to be molested; their sons, brothers and other kin were to be brought to court and enrolled among the retainers of the royal stirrup. Appropriate action was to be taken against those who showed signs of resistance.

A cautionary event which occurred this year was the execution of Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, which had been ordered by the Shah. Qarčaqāy Beg told Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan that he had secret orders from the Shah which they must open in private in their tent and then act upon. Qarčaqāy Beg went to Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan's tent; after formal greetings had been exchanged, the tent was cleared. By previous arrangement, a number of Qarčaqāy Beg's *ḡolāms* then rushed in with drawn swords and killed Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan. The governorship of the province of Šīrvān was given to Yūsof Khan, the master of the royal hunt *(mīr-šekārbāšī).* Of Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan's personal retainers, those who belonged to the Qarāmānlū tribe were enrolled in the ranks of the *qūrčīs;* the rest of his troops were transferred to Yūsof Khan's command. The local governors of Dāḡestān, who had feared Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan, were reassured by his execution, and flocked in happily to tender their submission to Qarčaqāy Beg; they sent their relatives and appropriate gifts to the Shah. After ordering the affairs of Šīrvān, Qarčaqāy Beg returned to court.

Superficially, it appeared that the execution of Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan had been ordered by the Shah in order to gratify the governors of Dāğestān; in other words, the only reason for it was that the interests of the state required it. However, it was clear to more perceptive and intelligent observers that there could be only one reason for the execution of such a powerful khan—namely, that the Shah had some doubt about his loyalty. The Shah needs intelligent and prudent servants, who grow in wisdom as their power and authority increases, who do not become puffed up by pride, and whose thoughts do not stray from the path of prudence.

The Shah had heard that the 'Emādīya and Sohrān Kurds had asked for assistance from Naṣūḥ Pasha, who was in Dīār Bakr, and were on their way to Orūmīya to relieve Emir Khan. As a precaution, the Shah at once sent additional forces to Orūmīya under the command of Emāmqolī Khan, the governor of Lār; the force was a composite one of *qezelbāš*, *qūrčīs* and *ğolāms*, similar to the one which had been sent to Salmās the previous year. Emāmqolī Khan's instructions were to give assistance to the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, if he should need it. If the reports of movements by the Kurds turned out to be false, he was to pitch camp in the area and keep his eye on the frontier in the region of Vān. The weather in Qarābāğ was turning hot, and the Shah was thinking of moving into summer quarters, when he heard of the sudden death of Ḥātem Beg. The Shah was grieved by the death of such a wise and beneficent vizier, without equal in his age. In recognition of his outstanding service as vizier over a period of almost twenty years, the Shah conferred the office on his son, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb. Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, despite his youth, was his father's equal in practical matters, and his superior in learning. The Shah marched from Qarābāğ to summer quarters near Tabriz; from there, fearing that the death of the vizier might have caused some relaxation of the siege, he sent the *moqarrab al-hażrat*, Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū, who stood close to him, to Orūmīya to cooperate with the emirs in the vigorous prosecution of the siege and, it was to be hoped, the capture of the castle.

The Capture of the Fortress of Domdom, the Killing of Emir Khan and His Followers, and Events Both Preceding and Following the Death of the Vizier, Ḥātem Beg

Readers will recall that the effect of the capture of the *ṣūloq* had been nullified by the onset of heavy and prolonged rains. It was decided that the only thing left was to try and take the fort by storm; in order to get the troops close enough for an assault, all the emirs were ordered to push forward their breastworks by means of avenues of baskets. The vizier, Ḥātem Beg, moved his men from their positions to the sector commanded by Ḥasan Khan, and he and the troops of the royal household took over a breastwork commanded by Ṣafarqolī Beg Čeganī. Night and day men worked to bring up materials, and the basket weavers worked flat out to produce more baskets. Other men fetched earth and clay to fill the baskets, carrying it considerable distances. A thick screen, faced with iron and mounted on a gun carriage, was constructed so that the workmen could continue without danger from enemy bullets and mortars; in this way, working at night and standing guard during the day, they inched their way forward. Even so, never a night passed without several men being killed by enemy fire.

Finally, Ḥasan Khan, Elyās Ḵalīfa Qarādāğlū, and Mīr Fattāḥ, chiliarch of the Isfahan musketeers, carried their avenues of baskets up to the walls of the large tower that stood outside the walls on the north side of the fort. Qarā Beg, the *vakīl* of Emir Khan, and a group of Kurds were charged with its defense. The sappers went to work on the walls, exposing the wooden beams that had been set in the mud brick to reinforce them and setting fire to them; this so weakened the structure that, about noon one day, when the sappers had left their excavations and were on their way to the valley to one side of the tower to eat lunch, part of the wall collapsed, and some of the defenders crashed down with it into the valley below.

When this was observed by the Safavid forces, the vizier said to Ḥasan Khan, "What are we waiting for? We must attack the tower." Ḥasan Khan at once ordered his men to the assault. The first man who reached the top of the tower killed Qarā Beg with a musket shot and cut off his head; his name was Pahlavān Moḥammad, of the Ḵūzānī Eṣfahānī regiment of musketeers. Close behind him were about a dozen more musketeers, who cut down about seven or eight Kurds they encountered at the top. Emir Khan's nephew, a handsome youth, managed to scramble down the tower without doing too much damage to himself, but he was set upon by some idiot of a Čapnī guard in the valley below and killed. The vizier, upset by this incident, reprimanded the man responsible and did not give him the reward he had expected when he brought in his victim's head.

The tower was now fully under Safavid control, most of the guards having been killed. Its capture represented the turning of the tide for the Safavid forces. Once it was in their hands, their task became easier, and in ten days they pushed the avenues of baskets up to the walls of the fort itself. The heavy siege guns were then brought up. One was trained on the upper fort and one on the lower fort, near the breastwork of Pīr Būdāq Khan. Things now began to look black for the defenders; Emir Khan was in a panic, and his Kurds had given up hope. Since some of his chief allies had been killed in the fighting, the morale of the rest of the garrison declined, and every day groups of ten or twenty Kurds or Jalālīs left the fort, made their way to the breastworks, and declared their "love of the Shah." They were warmly greeted by the vizier and given gifts and cash grants. It seemed likely that the fort would be captured within the next few days, when the vizier suddenly died.

Ḥātem Beg had spent the day in Ganj 'Alī Khan's quarters. He had returned to his own quarters toward the end of the day, inspecting the artillery positions on the way. Early in the evening, he entered his audience tent. After performing the obligatory religious duties, he engaged in convivial conversation with his companions until late in the night, as was his wont. Finally, he retired to sleep. I had not yet reached my own tent when a messenger overtook me and summoned me to return. I was surprised, and wondered what the cause of the summons might be. While I was on my way back, a second man ran up and said that the vizier had had a stroke and was dead. Everyone was filled with consternation. The great emirs were summoned, and word was sent posthaste to the Shah. The same night, the vizier's body was washed and wrapped in a burial shroud; the next morning, it was sent to Tabriz. The emirs sent a messenger to summon Emāmqolī Khan from Salmās.

The death of the vizier slowed up the prosecution of the siege at a moment when success was close at hand. The defenders took heart, and ceased to hand themselves over to the Safavid forces. However, with the arrival of the new commander in chief, Moḥammad Begdīlū Šāmlū, all bent themselves to their tasks with renewed vigor. Within a few days, breastworks had been pushed forward to the walls of both the upper and lower forts, which had been so shaken by the bombardment of the heavy siege guns that cracks were beginning to appear. In the direction of the upper fort, assault troops gained possession of several towers. On the western sector, Pīr Būdāq Khan's Turkman *ġāzīs* had carried their breastworks up to the towers of the lower fort, the officer in charge of which was Emir Khan's eldest son. The garrison of the lower fort abandoned their positions and retreated to the upper fort. The Safavid forces then set about destroying the wall between the lower and upper forts. The guards at the *būzloq* sent a messenger to the Safavid emirs to ask for quarter, and they handed over the *būzloq*.

Three of the five defensive positions that constituted the fort complex at Orūmīya had thus been captured, and the morale of the Kurds had been broken. They all repaired to Emir Khan's quarters, which had been made into a keep, to decide what to do. By this time the *ḡāzīs* were swarming all over the upper fort, and all the fortifications except Emir Khan's own quarters were in their hands. Emir Khan told his men to lay down their arms and sent a messenger to Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū asking him to come to the fort with his Šāmlūs to protect him from Ḥasan Khan and his troops, of whom he was apprehensive because of the blood that had been shed in the course of the siege. He asked Moḥammad Beg to escort himself, his sons, and his dependents in safety to the Shah.

At this point, Khan Abdāl Mokrī left the fort with a number of his men and surrendered; they were placed in the custody of Elyās Qarādāḡlū, as his guests; next came Moḥammad Beg, the brother of Ṭavīl, and his Jalālīs; they were divided into groups and placed in the custody of various emirs. After this, Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū acceded to Emir Khan's request and entered the fort, where he received the surrender of Emir Khan, his eldest son, a group of Barādūst tribesmen and others—a hundred men in all, all clad in chain mail and carrying their muskets and full equipment. About two hundred other Kurds were left in the fort. Moḥammad Beg placed a guard on the fort with orders to prevent any looting of the Kurds' houses. He then took Emir Khan and his group to his own quarters, had tents and a large pavilion erected apart for them, and summoned Ḥasan Khan and the other emirs to come and meet Emir Khan and decide how to deal with him in the light of the best interests of the state.

Moḥammad Beg and his brothers were sitting with Emir Khan and his companions and performing their duties as hosts when Ḥasan Khan approached the tent and sent one of his men to summon Moḥammad Beg outside. When Ḥasan Khan failed to appear and Moḥammad Beg left the tent, the Kurds became extremely nervous. Meanwhile, Ḥasan Khan was arguing violently outside with Moḥammad Beg:

"Have you taken leave of your senses?" he said. "You and your brothers are mad to trust these rebels, who have got nothing to lose, and to sit down among them in this way. The best course is to separate them into several groups. You should keep Emir Khan, his son, and several of his kinsmen in your own custody, and break up the rest in small groups among the emirs, so that we can deal with them later in whatever way the Shah orders." Moḥammad Beg was persuaded by this argument, and sent a man to Emir Khan to tell him that it was not practicable to keep him and so many of his men together; he, his son, and other relatives should remain where they were and take their ease. Emir Khan agreed, but his companions demurred; "You are all right," they said, "because the emirs would not dare to kill you on their own authority. But they will not leave one of us alive. You and we have sworn to stand together in good times and bad. You are apparently now ready to desert us for the sake of winning a few extra days of life, but we will not desert you. If we are to die, we will fall together." They sent this answer back to Moḥammad Beg.

While all this had been going on, uproar broke out in the quarters of Elyās Ḵalīfa. It turned out that, at the moment when Khan Abdāl Mokrī was sent to Elyās Ḵalīfa's quarters, the latter was absent at the breastwork which was in his charge. His servants busied themselves with entertaining the Khan and brought him cooling drinks. At this point Elyās Ḵalīfa, who was an unsophisticated Sufi, arrived with a few of his men and greeted his guests formally. He began to chide his servants because they had not made his guests comfortable in the great heat by removing their weapons and equipment. A servant came forward to relieve them of the burden of their equipment, but Khan Abdāl and his fellow Kurds, putting a sinister interpretation on this action, at once leaped up and drew their swords, wounded Elyās Ḵalīfa several times and also wounded a number of his kinsmen and retainers who were in the tent unarmed. The Qarādāḡlū *ḡāzīs* then rushed in with drawn swords, saw Elyās Ḵalīfa and two of his kinsmen lying there dead and others wounded, and immediately launched themselves at Khan Abdāl and his followers and cut them down.

When Ḥasan Khan heard of this incident, he lost all faith in that treacherous crowd, and his *ḡāzīs* began to kill all those, both Kurds and Jalālīs, who had emerged from the fort that day prior to Emir Khan, because one could no longer credit their professions of submission. Hearing the uproar, and seeing *qezelbāš* troops running up and surrounding their tent, Emir Khan and his companions made holes in the felt of the tent and began firing their muskets. The *qezelbāš* returned their fire and, when about thirty of the Kurds had been hit, the remainder rushed out of the tent with drawn swords and fought till they dropped. The *qezelbāš* were by now so roused that they even killed and plundered a number of Kurds who had surrendered and declared their "love of the Shah" some six months previously; wheat and chaff were consumed together. The Kurds who remained in the keep also surrendered and submitted to their fate.

According to some of the Kurds, Emir Khan and his companions, since they thought it extremely unlikely that the *qezelbāš* would leave them alive, had devised the following plan: They would leave the fort fully armed and, when all the emirs had assembled to greet them, would draw their swords and kill the emirs inside the tent before help could reach them from outside; if not, they would die like men. According to this account, this was why Khan Abdāl Mokrī had behaved the way he did and had had the temerity to kill Elyās Ḵalīfa. God knoweth best!

After the massacre of the Kurds, the younger sons and other dependents of Emir Khan were sent to court, and the possessions of the Kurdish garrison were distributed among the *qezelbāš*. The Shah received this news at his camp at Gāvdūl near Marāḡa. He ordered Ganj 'Alī Khan to mount guard on the fort for a while with a detachment of musketeers, and the rest of the emirs to report back to the royal camp; they rejoined the Shah at Qarāčūq. Qabān Khan, the brother of the *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū, was made governor of Orūmīya and allotted the sum of three thousand *tomān* in gold to purchase whatever was necessary for the fort and to pay his troops. All the emirs and governors of the districts of Sārū Qorḡān and Gāvrūd as far as Salmās were ordered to answer his summons and not to act contrary to his orders. Qabān Khan proceeded to Orūmīya and began to repair the fort, and Ganj 'Alī Khan and his musketeers returned to court.

The Shah's Punitive Expedition to Marāḡa and the General Massacre of the Mokrī Tribe

The Mokrī tribe, who were subjects of the Safavid state, inhabited the Gāvdūl district of Marāḡa, Soldūz, and Mīāndūāb. In the time of Shah Tahmasp, a certain Amīra Beg was emir of the tribe. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, when the Ottoman Sultan violated the peace and invaded Iran, the frontier region was thrown into disorder and troublemakers had a field day. The above-mentioned Amīra rebelled, declared his allegiance to the Ottomans, and began to plunder and kill the inhabitants of Soldūz and Mīāndūāb. He attacked the Qarāčūq stud farm, which was Shah Tahmasp's private stud and famed throughout the world, slew many of the workmen and guards, and took possession of the stud. He was a constant thorn in the flesh of the *qezelbāš* emirs who were governors of Marāḡa, killing and plundering and carrying off into captivity women and girls. After the death of Amīra Beg, Shaikh Ḥeydar was made chief of the tribe by the Ottomans, and acquired even greater influence among the tribe than his father.

After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad III, Shaikh Ḥeydar rebelled against Ja'far Pasha, the Ottoman *beglerbeg* of Tabriz, and on several occasions sent envoys to the Safavid court to declare his loyalty to the Shah. When Shah 'Abbas launched his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan, Shaikh Ḥeydar presented himself to the Shah, who forgave the Mokrī tribe for its past misdemeanors and made Shaikh Ḥeydar governor of Marāḡa, a post which in the past had always been held by a *qezelbāš* emir. Shaikh Ḥeydar was killed in battle against the Ottomans before Erīvān. In recognition of his services, the Shah made his son, Qobād Khan, governor of Marāḡa, though he was still a child. The elders of the clans of the Mokrī tribe were made recipients of royal favor, and were adjured to obey Qobād Khan. Until he came of age, the elders were instructed to obey the orders of his mother, an intelligent woman who was the daughter of a *qezelbāš* noble.

In order to give this arrangement a chance to work, the Shah removed from the area Emir Khan Beg, a brother of Shaikh Ḥeydar, and gave him a fief in the Garmrūd region; another brother, Khan Abdāl, who had ambitions to be chief of the tribe, rebelled when his young nephew was made chief. Troops were dispatched against him on several occasions and finally, as already related, he took refuge with Emir Khan Barādūst. Ultimately, all the clans of the Mokrī tribe came under the sway of Qobād Khan, but there were still elements which harassed the *qezelbāš* who had fiefs and private estates in the Marāḡa area, and refused to allow the landowners undisturbed enjoyment of their hereditary private estates. Qobād Khan, when he reached the age of discretion, allowed himself to be swayed by these seditious elements. In defiance of the Shah's command, he sequestrated the private estates and fiefs of Safavid officers and acted in an unseemly manner toward the *qezelbāš*.

At first, Shah 'Abbas had overlooked Qobād Khan's sins for the sake of his father's memory. However, Qobād Khan eventually exceeded all reasonable bounds of behavior. As already related, he had disobeyed the Shah's express command to go to the assistance of the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, at the siege of the fortress of Domdom. Since Qobād Khan realized that the Shah would march to the Marāḡa region the following spring to set affairs in order there, he hastened to visit the Shah at his winter quarters in Qarābāḡ. The Shah had decided to show no more leniency toward the Mokrī tribe, who had revealed themselves to be seditious rebels in whom it was impossible to have confidence, and he had resolved to visit condign punishment upon them. As a matter of practical politics and everyday common sense, however, the Shah for the time being continued to show favor to the Mokrī chief.

When the Shah moved toward his summer quarters and camped near Marāḡa, he learned that Qobād Khan and the elders of the Mokrī tribe, suspecting that the Shah would demand the restitution of the Qarāčūq stud, had sent the horses, all picked beasts, to a place miles away, and had substituted for them a number of poor-quality Kurdish nags. If there was any talk of handing over the stud, they intended to send these nags to the Shah! In addition, the Shah discovered that Qobād Khan was still in communication with Ottoman commanders and other enemies of the Safavid state, and had tendered his allegiance to the Ottomans. Further, he oppressed the poor, the townsfolk, and the Shi'ites of Marāḡa because of his religious bigotry. In a word, people were at the end of their tether as a result of his tyrannical behavior and financial exactions. It had become imperative for the Shah to deal with Qobād Khan and his supporters, who were Muslims only in name.

When the Shah reached Gāvdūl, Qobād Khan's seat of government, Qobād Khan entered the royal camp with one hundred and fifty men. In the late afternoon, he was admitted into the royal presence with a few of his kinsmen. They entered the audience tent and, while they were still taking off their boots, were seized by the *ḡolāms* and dispatched before they had the chance to make a move. Their bodies were thrown into the passageway at the back of the tent. In order to prevent any harm coming to any of the *ḡolāms* or court attendants, the Shah ordered the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*, 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, to stand at the door of the tent and admit the rest of the Kurds one by one, so that the *ḡolāms* could dispatch each man as he entered and throw his body behind the tent to prevent those still to come from realizing what was going on.

After some twenty or thirty Kurds had been dealt with in this way, the rest of the lineup began to get a bit suspicious. Finally, one of those who entered the tent, seeing blood all over the place and no sign of Qobād Khan or the others who had gone before, shouted at the top of his voice, whipped out his dagger, and wounded Moḥebb 'Alī Beg Šāhī-sevan Šāmlū. The men immediately behind him turned around and tried to get out of the tent, but were slain by the *ḡolāms* and *qūrčīs* in the vestibule. Those still outside, now alerted, rushed for their horses; some were cut down in front of the tent, others as they fled through the camp. The Shah entered that awesome assembly, immediately mounted his horse, and rode off toward the castle of Gāvdūl, sending detachments of *qezelbāš* in all directions to ravage and kill the Mokrī tribe.

The Shah reached the castle about two hours after dark, before the garrison had heard what had happened in the royal camp. The royal troops entered the castle and slew all whom they came across. 'Alīqolī Khan was sent against another fort in the area. He brought back some fifty or sixty prisoners, yoked together and with their hands tied, and these were immediately slaughtered by the *ḡāzīs*. Many of the tribesmen who were brought in by the *ḡāzīs* had their skulls smashed by the royal gardeners and other servants with blows from spades, clubs, and hammers. Emir Khan Beg, the brother of Shaikh Ḥeydar, was at Garmrūd with about fifty horsemen; Esfandīār Beg *evčībašī* 'Arabgīrlū[1] skillfully lured them into his net and destroyed them all. Shaikh Ḥeydar's nephew, Ḥoseyn Sultan, was at Orūmīya, and Ḥasan Khan and other emirs were sent to deal with him.

In short, the Shah ordered a general massacre of the Mokrī tribe. All prisoners brought in while the Shah was encamped at Gāvdūl were put to death. In addition, members of other tribes, such as the Bebe'ī and Urīād who had taken up residence in Mokrī tribal districts, were brought in and put to death on the grounds that they had chosen to live with enemies of the Safavid state, and had not left the area and joined the *qezelbāš* at the time of the Ottoman occupation. The women and girls of the Mokrī tribe were taken into captivity and servitude and thus obtained their just deserts. After a few days, the violence of the Shah's anger abated. He summoned a certain Šīr Beg, who had professed his loyalty to the Shah, and whose brother, Maqṣūd Beg, was an *ešīk-āqāsī* at the Shah's court, and proclaimed that the lives and property of any members of the Mokrī tribe who rallied to Šīr Beg would be safe. A few survivors of the massacre gathered around Šīr Beg. The Shah then moved to the pastures of Qarāčūq, where he spent several days inspecting the horses of the Qarāčūq stud farm. The region of Marāḡa was conferred upon Aqa Sultan, the chief of the Moqaddam tribe.

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[1] A clan of the Šāmlū tribe.

While the Shah was still at these pastures, he was visited by Sekandar Sultan Bāna'ī,[2] a Kurdish chief of the Bāna tribe. At the time of the Ottoman occupation, he had declared his "love of the Shah," had come to court, and had served there for a number of years. After the Safavid capture of Erīvān, Sekandar Sultan had been allotted the district of Bāna, a dependency of Marāḡa. But such is the seditious and evil nature of all Kurds, he had subsequently shown signs of revolt; from the time of his appointment as chief of the Bāna district, he had neglected to come to court and remained aloof from the Shah. At this moment, when the Shah's anger against the Kurds was still at fever pitch, Sekandar Sultan came before him bearing a sword and a shroud, and prostrated himself. Despite the fact that there would have been a number of advantages to be gained by removing him from the scene, the Shah was so struck by his temerity in coming before him at such a time that he overlooked his misdemeanors and addressed him as follows: "Although you deserve death for your improper behavior, and sparing your life will probably cause me all sorts of trouble, nevertheless, since you have come in person at such a moment, I will not put you to death this time. But if I see any sign of disloyalty from you in the future, prepare to die, for you will surely be shriveled up by the royal wrath." The Shah then gave him a robe of honor and allowed him to depart. Sekandar Sultan went in fear and trembling, and his terror was such that he had no desire to visit the Shah's court again. In the end, however, he paid for his disloyalty, and did not prosper.

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[2] On Bāna, see *TM*, pp. 104, 172.

The Arrival of an Embassy from Valī Moḥammad Khan, the Ruler of Transoxania and Turkestan

This year, the ruler of the lands of Tūrān, Valī Moḥammad Khan, in order to cement the bonds of friendship between himself and Shah 'Abbas, sent Shah Moḥammad Mīrzā Özbeg, his treasurer, as ambassador to the Shah.

While his brothers, Dīn Moḥammad Khan and Bāqī Khan, had been on the throne, there had been continual hostility and warfare between the Uzbegs and the Shah. Dīn Moḥammad Khan had fought a battle at Herat with Shah 'Abbas, and had died of wounds received in this battle. In the Year of the Tiger, 1011/1602-03, Shah 'Abbas had marched on Balḵ and had taught Bāqī Khan a lesson. After Bāqī Khan had died a natural death, his younger brother, Valī Moḥammad Khan, succeeded him on the throne of Transoxania and Turkestan. In the Year of the Sheep, 1015/1607-08, Jahāngīr and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā had marched against Balḵ, but Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā had been killed and Jahāngīr Khan had fallen back in disorder to Ġarjestān. The Shah had been preoccupied with his campaign in Šīrvān, and Valī Moḥammad Khan had sent a large army to ravage Khorasan, but had been repulsed with considerable losses. Valī Moḥammad Khan had then decided that his best interests lay in negotiating a pact of friendship with the Shah, and had accordingly sent envoys to the *beglerbegs* of Khorasan with this end in view. The Shah had made reciprocal gestures of friendship, and had sent as his ambassador to the Uzbeg Khan the centurion Mīrzā 'Alī Beg Torkmān. It was in response to this latter embassy that Shah Moḥammad Mīrzā now arrived at the Shah's court and was admitted to audience. After he had presented his master's gifts, the emirs and other principal officers of the Safavid state, at the Shah's command, gave the Uzbeg ambassador a state banquet in the Qarāčūq meadows. Each day, the Uzbeg ambassador was a guest in the house of one of the *moqarrabs* of the court.

Another visitor to the Shah's camp in the Qarāčūq meadows was Lūārsāb Khan, the grandson of Simon Khan, the ruler of the Kartlia region of Georgia; he was accompanied by his mother Dīdīfāl—a name which, in the Georgian vernacular, means "mother of the king." The Shah sent Moḥammad Amīn Beg, the brother of Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā the vizier of Azerbaijan, to meet him and escort him stage by stage to court. He was received in audience by the Shah, who bestowed on him marks of special favor. In recognition of his father's loyal service, the Shah conferred on him the province of Tiflis, which had been wrested from his father by the Ottomans and, after its conquest by the Safavids in 1015/1606-07, had been governed by a *qezelbāš* officer, Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū. At this time, Lūārsāb was a handsome youth of seventeen years. All the Georgian princes, and indeed most of the Georgian people, both men and women, are noted for their beauty, which derives from the pleasantness of the climate and is superior to that of the inhabitants of other regions. They are also noted for the elegance of their speech and the excellence of their manners. Although Christianity prevails in Georgia and the Georgians consequently are strangers to the true religion, still, when one considers the beauty of the inhabitants, the agreeable nature of the climate, and the verdant character of the country, one might prefer it to most other regions of the world. Lūārsāb, his mother, and the other women of the Georgian royal household stayed at court for six months, returning to Georgia after the departure of Morād Pasha. Morād Pasha's advance on Azerbaijan occurred at the end of the year, and there are one or two more things I must mention before I describe this.

The Dispatch of Moḥammad Beg, the Son of Kūr Ḵolafā-ye Rūmlū, as an Ambassador to the Porte, in the Company of the Čavoš Ḵeyr al-Dīn

As already related, last year the *čavoš* Ḵeyr al-Dīn had been sent to Iran with the returning Iranian ambassador Moḥammad Beg Rūmlū, with peace proposals. The same two envoys were now given leave to return to Istanbul. At the suggestion of the grand vizier, Morād Pasha, the Shah had written a letter to the Ottoman Sultan, Aḥmad I; in this letter, the Shah said that, whenever the Sultan showed a desire for peace and friendship, he would reciprocate. Moḥammad Beg Rūmlū, an excellent diplomat, was instructed to press for peace on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya.

The envoys accordingly went on their way. When they reached Dīār Bakr, they heard of the approach of Morād Pasha, and they proceeded to Morād Pasha's camp in the company of Naṣūḥ Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr. They met Morād Pasha near Erzerum and delivered the Shah's letter addressed to him. Morād Pasha explained that he had moved his forces to Erzerum in response to an appeal for help from the *beglerbeg* of that province, who had reported that a *qezelbāš* force was laying siege to the fortress of Erzerum. "That necessitated my coming here," said Morād Pasha. "Now that the Sultan's treasure has been spent on mobilizing this army, I have approached the frontier. In order to protect the reputation of the Sultan and to give validity to the peace talks, I must complete my mission, but I hope that, when I near the frontier, reliable negotiations from both sides can meet and decide what shall be done in the best interests of both parties." Morād Pasha then marched in the direction of Azerbaijan, taking the two ambassadors with him.

The Dispatch to Erzerum of an Army under the Command of Emir Gūna Khan Qājār, the Beglerbeg of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, and the Battle between the Ḡāzīs and Ḥasan Pasha and the Ottoman forces in That Area

When the Shah's spies reported that Morād Pasha, the Ottoman commander in chief, had marched out from Istanbul and was mobilizing an army at Eskūdar, since this action was at variance with his previous actions and was contrary to what had been said by Ḵeyr al-Dīn, the Ottoman ambassador, about the Sultan's desire for peace, the Shah decided on a precautionary measure so he sent a force in the direction of Erzerum to burn all the crops along the probable line of the Ottoman advance, and to ensure that there should not be one *man* of wheat, straw, or hay to be had within a distance of ten days' march of Erīvān. Emir Gūna Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, who had acquired a great reputation along that frontier for valor, was given this task, and Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, and the other emirs in that area were ordered to assist him. In addition, 'Alī Khan Beg Javānšīr was ordered to take a detachment of musketeers of the royal stirrup and join him.

This Safavid force duly assembled and proceeded in good order toward Erzerum. They discovered that Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, was marching to meet them with a force of ten thousand men, and had reached Ḥasan Qal'a; the Ottoman force consisted of the emirs and pashas of that region, in particular Türkča Bīlmez[3] and 'Oṣmān Pasha, and other fiefholders, with their troops. According to the reports of several men who were present at this battle, I learned that the Safavid force hastened to give battle, but the Ottomans for two days hesitated to engage them; each time the Safavid army advanced, the Ottomans fell back. On the third day, only two *farsaḵs* from the city of Erzerum, the Ottomans formed up for battle, with Ḥasan Pasha in the center and Türkča Bīlmez and ʻOṣmān Pasha out in front. The skirmishers on both sides came to grips, and the Safavid skirmishers were forced by an Ottoman charge to yield ground. Emir Gūna Khan, although Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū and the army of Qarābāḡ had not yet reached the scene, decided to launch an attack with the thousand men he had with him in an attempt to stabilize the situation. He led his men in a furious charge against the troops of Türkča Bīlmez, the most valiant of the enemy commanders, and hurled them back.

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[3] Literally, "he does not know Turkish"—a proverbial expression for a person not very quick in the uptake.

The impetus of his charge was such that he broke through to where ʻOṣmān Pasha's men were stationed, shattered their ranks also, and penetrated to the Ottoman center. Although it is not normal military practice for a commander in chief to lead his men into battle in person, Emir Gūna did so on this occasion because he feared that, owing to the slowness of the army of Qarābāḡ in reaching the scene, his own forces might suffer defeat. He urged on his *ḡāzīs* to greater efforts and, trusting in the Shah's propitious fortune, launched his men against on the Ottoman center. The Ottomans realized, from the intrepid nature of the Safavid attack, that Emir Gūna Khan must be leading his men in person. Ḥasan Pasha was unable to stand his ground, and gave the order to retire. Moḥammad Khan, coming up with the army of Qarābāḡ, ordered his men to fan out and pursue the enemy right up to the walls of their fort. The army of Erzerum was virtually annihilated in this battle, and the *ḡāzīs* acquired large quantities of booty. The victorious *qezelbāš* camped on the spot and remained there for three days while they carried out their mission. Emir Gūna Khan was inclined to blame Moḥammad Khan for his slowness in bringing up his men, but others rejected this imputation, saying that Moḥammad Khan had acted with no more than the normal amount of caution essential in battle, for it is imperative that those in the forefront of the battle have a strong force in support.

The Mutiny of the Prisoners at the Prison-Fortress of Qahqaha

An extraordinary event which occurred this year was the mutiny of the inmates of the prison-fortress of Qahqaha. Qahqaha is situated in the Yāft district of Qarāja-dāḡ,[4] on top of a high hill and built on solid rock. From the entrance of the fortress, a narrow path runs up the mountainside for a distance of about half a *farsak̲;* this path is so narrow that even a single horseman has difficulty in making his way along it, and one musketeer could hold it against an army.

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[4] See *TM*, p. 164.

During the time of Shah Tahmasp, when the Ottomans repeatedly invaded Azerbaijan and the whole area was in a state of disorder, the royal treasuries were moved there for safety. At various times the royal princes Esma'il Mīrzā, Alqāṣ Mīrzā, and Sām Mīrzā were imprisoned there with their families. No foreign ruler ever attempted to capture this impregnable fortress, the commandant of which was always a trusted emir of high rank.

The actual commandant at this time was Elyās K̲alīfa Qarādāğlū, the governor of Qarāja-dāğ, a Sufi devoted to the Safavid house and the foremost of its loyal disciplines. Elyās K̲alīfa was absent, taking part in the siege of the fortress of Orūmīya, and one of his officers, Moẓaffar Beg Qarādāğlū, was in charge. The prisoners held in custody at the time included a number of Kurdish and Ottoman prisoners of war; the most important of these were Moṣṭafā Pasha, Aḥmad Pasha, Kūr Ḥasan, and two sons of Ğāzī Khan Kord: Šāhqolī Beg and K̲āled Beg, together with their cousin, Qūčī Beg. These men conspired together and willynilly brought into their plot a number of Turkish and Iranian political prisoners incarcerated there, including two sons and a brother of Ḥasan Khan Afšār, formerly the governor of Kūh Gīlūya. This whole group, about twenty men in all, suddenly mutinied, murdered the commandant, seized his weapons and those of his men, expelled from the fortress a number of his retainers, and assumed control of the fortress. Elyās K̲alīfa's men gathered around the fortress and tried by various stratagems to gain access, but without success, and they were forced to report the situation to the Shah.

This coup, coming as it did at a time when the Ottoman commander in chief was reported to be on his way to Azerbaijan with an army, could bring only dishonor and disgrace to the Shah, and to tolerate the situation would be to invite further serious trouble. It was unlikely that the Kurds and Ottomans who had engineered this coup would be amenable to reason. The conspirators' first idea had been to try and get away. Finding their path of escape blocked, they hoped to be saved by the arrival of the Ottoman commander in chief. For two months they guarded the fortress, never once opening the gates. The Shah hit upon the idea of sending to the fortress K̲̆āja

Maqṣūd ʿAlī, who hailed from Kūh Gīlūya, had formerly been a secretary in the employ of Ḥasan Khan Afšār, and knew Ḥasan Khan's brother and sons extremely well. Ḵ̌āja Maqṣūd ʿAlī's present job was supervisor of the royal kitchens. The Shah's plan was to try and split the conspirators by offering Ḥasan Khan's relatives a pardon. The Ḵ̌āja managed to make his arrival at Qahqaha secretly known to Ḥasan Khan's relatives through some of Elyās Ḵalīfa's men. Since the Ottomans held the key to the fort, Ḥasan Khan's relatives secretly hauled the Ḵ̌āja over the walls on the end of a rope, and the Ḵ̌āja gave them the good news of the Shah's offer of a pardon and the promise of royal favor.

Ḥasan Khan's brother and sons, who came from a long line of Sufis loyal to the Safavid house, received the Ḵ̌āja's news joyfully, pledged their obedience to the Shah, and put their heads together to devise a scheme to get rid of the Ottomans. The Ottomans heard what was going on and started quarreling with the Safavid faction; after a lot of argument, words turned to blows. A few of the other prisoners also declared their "love of the Shah," and the two factions set to in earnest. The Kurdish-Ottoman faction, which consisted of seven or eight men, fought for their lives, but in the end were all slain by those loyal to the Shah. Ḥasan Khan's brother and sons were escorted to court by Ḵ̌āja Maqṣūd ʿAlī and enrolled in the ranks of the *qūrčīs*, and the Ḵ̌āja was congratulated by the Shah on his achievement. In consideration of Elyās Ḵalīfa's outstanding services to the crown and his sterling efforts before the walls of Domdom, the Shah forebore to visit his wrath upon his men at Qahqaha for their gross negligence. He appointed his son, Borhān al-Dīn, *ḵalīfa* in his place, and enrolled him among the *ḵalīfas* of Qarāja-dāḡ. The governorship of Qarāja-dāḡ was conferred on his kinsman, Maqṣūd Sultan, and the Qarādāḡlūs were allowed to continue as custodians of the fortress of Qahqaha as before.

The March on Azerbaijan by Morād Pasha, the Ottoman Commander in Chief and Grand Vizier, and His Retiring from Tabriz without Achieving His Object

I have already described Morād Pasha's hopes of achieving fame by being the principal agent in the negotiation of peace between the Ottoman and Safavid empires, and of preliminary moves in this direction culminating in his meeting with the Ottoman and Safavid ambassadors and his taking them with him to Erzerum. The Shah had decided that an Ottoman advance on Azerbaijan this year was improbable in view of the lateness of the season; he himself had left his camp at Qarāčūq near Marāḡa and returned to Tabriz with just a small party of his personal attendants, and he had ordered his emirs to conduct a review of their troops at Qarā Čaman in the Mīānaj district and then return to Iraq. The emirs had carried out their orders and had proceeded one day's march in the direction of Iraq when they received reports of the approach of the Ottoman commander in chief. The Shah at once countermanded his orders and summoned them back to Tabriz. A force was sent to Marand with instructions to determine the route by which Morād Pasha was approaching and to take whatever action seemed best in the circumstances.

From Qārṣ, Morād Pasha sent a *čavoš* with a letter to the Shah: His sole object, he said, in approaching the Iranian frontier was to continue his attempts to negotiate a peace settlement, in which matter the Sultan had given him full authority; he informed the Shah that he had kept the Safavid ambassador with him, intending to take him with him to Istanbul after the conclusion of the preliminary peace talks. The Pasha also remarked that it was not conducive to friendly relations to send an ambassador without providing him with suitable gifts. The *čavoš* was admitted to audience with the Shah, who sent the following reply to the Pasha's letter:

> Since the distinguished vizier first broached the idea of peace negotiations, I have signified my willingness to let these proceed, out of my concern for the welfare of God's servants, and I sent a friendly letter to the Sultan as suggested by you. My terms remain the same as those communicated to you by Moḥammad Beg. If the Porte is willing to conclude peace on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya, a treaty which was affirmed by binding covenants, I am willing to terminate hostilities; if not, God's will be done. As for your remark about gifts, since no truce has yet been agreed upon, it is not appropriate to send gifts while fighting is still going on. However, since you think it advisable for me to do so, and since I do not want to wreck your efforts for peace at the very outset, I am sending you forthwith a perfumed pomander of grey ambergris weighing one thousand eight hundred *meṣqāls,* in a filigree bowl

> cunningly fashioned by Indian goldsmiths from eight *man* of red gold, a gift to me from the Mogul Emperor Salīm. It is not a usual gift, for it is rare to find a piece of raw, unrefined grey ambergris of such a size; such a piece will not be found in the treasuries of kings and princes. I send it now to the Ottoman Sultan so that my letter may not be devoid of content. If I perceive any hint of amity and concord on the part of the Ottoman Sultan, and if genuine negotiations for peace are entered into, from that time onward my ambassadors shall not set out emptyhanded.

The Shah dispatched the *čavoš* with this message.

Meanwhile, Morād Pasha, who had been advancing from Qārṣ, had swung off the Erīvān road to Čālderān; when he reached Ḵoy, he passed by the fort there at a distance of about one *farsaḵ*, and marched on to Salmās. According to travelers, the Pasha's object in turning aside from the usual road was to get to Tabriz without having to fight a battle with *qezelbāš* forces; once at Tabriz, the Pasha intended to make the fact that peace talks were in progress his excuse for withdrawing, so that he could not be accused of cowardice.

Once the route by which the Pasha was advancing was confirmed, since such a rapid advance precluded any thoughts of peace talks, the Shah recalled his troops from Marand, summoned Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū and the emirs of Qarābāğ, and Emir Gūna Khan and the army of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd. He instructed them to leave the fort at Erīvān in safe hands, and he himself set about strengthening the fort at Tabriz. All the Turkman and Takkalū *ğāzīs* who were in the Shah's escort, whether they were *qūrčīs* or belonged to other regiments, were detailed to put the fort in a state of defense under the direction of Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz. In addition the Shah fortified the complex of buildings at Šanb-e Ğāzān, which he thought the Ottomans might think of using as an artillery post from which to bombard the fort; this complex, dating from the time of the Īlḵān Ğāzān,[5] comprised theological seminaries and convents grouped around the tomb of the Īlḵānīd ruler; the dome over the tomb is of a height surpassed only by the dome of Haromān. This key point was stocked with cannon, muskets, munitions, and provisions, and a detachment of reliable musketeers was sent to garrison it.

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[5] Reigned 694-703/1295-1304.

The Shah then sent couriers out in all directions to move the rural population out of harm's way; his officers had instructions not to leave any food supplies on the Ottoman line of march. Any peasant who was not able to remove his own supplies of grain was instructed to leave them to be transported into the fort, and to draw payment for the grain from the *dīvān* at the current market price. Since the Pasha was now only two or three days' march from Tabriz, the civilian population evacuated the city, taking with it all stocks of food. The Shah left the city and, going by way of the pass of Mount Sorḵāb, camped on the banks of the river Ājī where he waited for his troops to assemble and for the Pasha to show his hand before deciding on his own course of action.

At this point, another ambassador arrived from the Pasha and his son-in-law, 'Alī Pasha the *beglerbeg of* Rumelia. "Our primary object in coming to Tabriz," they wrote, "is to lay the foundations of peace, taking advantage of the proximity of the Shah. We have no thought of giving battle to the *qezelbāš* army. As proof of the genuineness of this statement, we point to the fact that, in the course of our march, we have passed several forts held by *qezelbāš* garrisons and have not molested any of them." It seemed advisable, they said, to replace Moḥammad Beg, who had been away on his mission for a long period of time, by a new ambassador, and to send with him suitable presents. Privately, the Ottoman commanders had instructed their ambassador to urge the Shah to restrain his troops from offensive action against him, since they themselves had no intention of giving battle.

After apprising himself of the gist of the various letters brought by the Ottoman ambassador, the Shah replied in the same vein as before: "My terms are still the same," he said. "My ambassador, Moḥammad Beg, is a trusted *qezelbāš* officer and has my full confidence. If the Ottoman Sultan wants peace on the terms I have repeatedly laid down, I am willing to conclude peace on those terms. If not, the fate of both parties is in God's hands. In regard to your hope, expressed to me verbally by your ambassador, that I will restrain the *qezelbāš* from offensive action, my comment is that no *qezelbāš* would dare to wear arms without my permission, so how could he fight? However, I have instructed some of my emirs to take all necessary steps to protect the civilian population. If your men go out in search of loot, or to find supplies of food, there will inevitably be clashes with my troops. If you wish to avoid such encounters, confine your men to camp. In regard to your remarks about sending presents, God willing, when peace is achieved, I will do whatever is compatible with the dignity of both parties."

Some villagers had still not left their homes and moved out of reach of the Ottomans, notably the rural population of the Mīānkūh region, on the Ottoman left, and in the direction of Ḵosrow Shah, on the Ottoman right. The Shah therefore sent Ḥasan Khan Ostājlū, the governor of Hamadan, with a force of regulars and of Čaḡatāy and Ḵorāsānī musketeers under the command of Mahdīqolī Beg Čaḡatāy, the master of the king's horse, to take up positions on the Ottoman left. 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū and Emāmqolī Khan the son of Allāhverdī Khan, with another force, were to take up positions on the Ottoman right. Ganj 'Alī Khan Zīg, with the army of Kerman, was stationed in the vicinity of the city itself. These emirs had orders to lie in ambush for any Ottomans who might leave their camp looking for plunder.

On 24 Ša'bān 1019/11 November 1610, Morād Pasha came close to the city and camped on the other side of the Ājī. Across the river, the Safavid troops were steadily arriving at their rendezvous from Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, Qarābāḡ, and elsewhere. Every day, skirmishes occurred between the *ḡāzīs* and Ottoman foragers, and a steady stream of Ottoman prisoners and captured weapons was brought in. Every Ottoman who left his camp was either killed or taken prisoner by the *qezelbāš*. Morād Pasha, who was a wise and experienced commander, had meanwhile received full reports on the size of the *qezelbāš* army, the freshness of their horses, and the preparations made to defend the city. He did not want to fight a battle, and he was not equipped to undertake a siege. His only thought now was how to extricate his army safely from Tabriz, and he was fearful that, when he began his withdrawal, the *qezelbāš* might change their minds about wanting peace and attack him.

He therefore sent yet another envoy to the Shah, in the person of 'Alī Aqa, an officer in the Rumelian contingent, representing 'Alī Pasha. 'Alī Aqa brought the following message: "Morād Pasha is the deputy of the Sultan in these negotiations, and the Shah is requested to appoint a deputy with full powers to discuss matters such as the terms of the peace and demarcation of frontiers." (Moḥammad Beg had already sent a dispatch to the Shah about this.) The Shah replied that there was no change in his position, but the vizier, he said, had been at pains to preserve the honor of both parties in his search for an agreement, and he (the Shah) would stand by the pronouncements he had made on numerous occasions.

The Clashes between the Ottoman and Safavid Troops, the Death of Jīl Pasha, and the Withdrawal of Morād Pasha

During the few days that the Ottoman army lay before Tabriz, on several occasions groups of pashas and *sanjāq-beys* marched out in full battle order with detachments of *at-oḡlāns* (grooms) in search of provisions. On the first of these occasions, a forage party went in the direction of Ḵosrow Shah. When they were about one or two *farsaḵs* from the camp, 'Alīqolī Khan, Emāmqolī Khan, and their men sprang out of their hiding places and rushed at the foragers, who scattered in flight in all directions, pursued by the *ḡāzīs* as far as the Ājī. Many were killed; a number were taken prisoner; and horses and other booty fell into the hands of the *ḡāzīs*. On the second occasion, Jīl Pasha, the commander of the Tartar brigade, which was famed among the Ottomans for its bravery and élan, was sent in the direction of Mīān-kūh, with a detachment of Ottoman regulars and large numbers of packhorses and donkeys. Jīl Pasha rashly penetrated into various valleys and other dangerous places, and collected large quantities of provisions. On his way back, however, he was suddenly attacked by Ḥasan Khan and the musketeers. Ḥasan charged the Ottoman vanguard and swept it aside, while Mahdīqolī Beg, the master of the royal horse, led his musketeers against their center. Jīl Pasha rushed into the fray in person in his usual intrepid manner, but was killed by a shot from one of the Safavid musketeers. His men fled, most of them being cut down before they could regain their camp. Jīl Pasha's head and the heads of the other Ottoman dead, together with the prisoners and captured horses, mules, weapons, and equipment, were paraded before the Shah.

The death of Jīl Pasha caused panic in the Ottoman camp, and the officers were unanimously in favor of withdrawing from Tabriz to a position of safety. They began to pull out on the fifth day of their stay at Tabriz, without waiting for the return of their ambassador, 'Alī Aqa, who was on his third mission to the Shah. As soon as the news of their withdrawal reached the Safavid camp, all the *qezelbāš* emirs went to the Shah and begged to be allowed to take their revenge on the Ottoman army for daring to march on Tabriz and for all the damage and loss of life and property it had occasioned. "Let us pursue them," they said, "and give battle at the appropriate place, and strive to annihilate the enemy. We hope that, by divine favor, and Your Majesty's propitious fortune, which we have experienced on so many occasions, we shall defeat the enemy. In their present demoralized state, they are no match for Your Majesty's troops. If, with God's help, we wipe out this army, the Ottomans will not be able to put a force of comparable size in the field for several years."

The Shah, with that magnanimity and chivalry he had inherited from his eminent ancestors, replied to his loyal subjects as follows:

> It is true that the Ottomans are notorious for trickery and guile. Nevertheless, Morād Pasha from start to finish has talked of nothing but peace; he has knocked on the door of friendship and concord, and has apparently been trying to avoid a battle. With an eye to the stability of the dynasty, I have therefore ignored the fundamental evil of the Ottoman nature and have shown my willingness to discuss peace proposals. I do not deem it fitting for me to contravene what I have said and written. Moreover, the month of Ramażān is upon us,[6] and warfare is forbidden during Ramażān. If these two great armies come to grips, I do not have to tell you how much blood will be spilled. I do not wish to have this blood on my hands during the holy month of Ramażān.

However, in case the Ottomans attacked the fort at Ḳoy as they withdrew, the Shah sent the governor of Ḳoy with a detachment of musketeers to guard it. Furthermore, he set the royal army in motion and marched in the wake of the Ottoman withdrawal for several stages, though he ordered his men not to attack or molest the Ottomans or to take booty. Despite this, at the end of each day's march, bodies of unidentified men hung around the rear of the Ottoman army and brought back heads, prisoners, and captured weapons. In the course of his withdrawal, Morād Pasha sent back to the Shah's camp, decked in robes of honor, a number of the men who had been harassing the Ottomans in this way and had been taken prisoner by his troops, and with them he sent one of Moḥammad Beg's retainers, with the following message: "I trust that Your Majesty will not distress yourself too much on account of the unruly conduct of these men; all they have done is to cool the ardor of some stupid and arrogant Ottomans who have never suffered any buffets from fate and are ignorant of the ways of the world. I hope that peace will be signed on terms acceptable to Your Majesty."

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[6] 1 Ramażān 1019 fell on 17 November 1610, the day after Morād Pasha began his withdrawal.

The Shah responded by releasing some forty of fifty Ottoman prisoners, all Janissaries, who had been captured during the withdrawal, and he in his turn equipped them with robes of honor. The Safavid troops who escorted the Janissaries back to the Ottoman lines reported on their return that the Ottoman army was in a state of great nervous tension, and that the Shah's leniency toward them had done little to reassure them. At the end of each day's march, they said, a shout went up, "The *qezelbāš* are coming!" and chaos broke out in the Ottoman camp.

In short, the Ottoman army returned from this expedition in extremely poor shape, having lost many men and countless horses and mules. When the Ottomans passed Albāq and neared Vān, the Shah ceased to shadow them, and marched back to Tabriz via Ṭasūj and Šabestar. On arrival at Tabriz, he devoted his energies to restoring conditions to normal there, and the displaced inhabitants from the city and surrounding areas returned to their homes and resumed their normal occupations. Those persons who had suffered loss as the result of enemy action had the regular *dīvān* taxes remitted for both the current and the following year. The Shah then reviewed his troops, who had been under arms for two years, and sent them on leave to their homes and their fiefs, after settling any claims they might have.

The Construction of a Fort in the Rašīdīya Quarter of Tabriz, the Demolition of the Old Fort, and Various Other Events Which Occurred This Year

As is well known, the Ottomans are skilled in the construction and defense of castles. 'Oṣmān Pasha, who had captured Tabriz during the reign of Sultan Morād III, as I related in book I, had built a wall around the city and had selected the site of an old palace for a fort. This site was generally considered by expert opinion to be a suitable one, and Shah 'Abbas concurred with this view. However, he frequently used to point out that the Mehrān River, which flows down into the city from higher ground, and which passes the fort, could be dammed in such a way as to direct the water against the walls of the fort, and this would probably cause them to collapse. In view of this, said the Shah, too much reliance could not be placed on the fort, and another site was selected in the Rašīdīya quarter,[7] on the slopes of Mount Sorḵāb.

The demolition of the old fort and the construction of the new had had to be postponed because of the approach of the Ottoman army under Morād Pasha. After the Ottomans had withdrawn, the Shah delegated the task of constructing the new fort to Manūčehr Beg the *ešīk-āqāsī*, a *ḡolām* who had been in the service of Shah Tahmasp and was an experienced officer. The Shah gave orders that all necessary building materials should be collected by the spring from demolished buildings in Tabriz, and particularly from Šanb-e Ḡāzān, which was in a state of ruin, and be transported to the Rašīdī quarter. Master builders and masons and construction workers were ordered to report to Tabriz from Iraq and other places, so that the new fort might be built as rapidly as possible. Manūčehr Beg proceeded with the work, including the towers and water-storage tanks, and the governor and inhabitants of Tabriz helped. Within the precincts of the fort, a bathhouse and mansion were built, and the governor of Tabriz transferred his residence there. After the completion of the new fort, the old fort was demolished. Once he had reviewed his troops and put in motion the plans for the new fort, the Shah began his return journey to Iraq, and traveled to Ardabīl by the Ahar road.

About this time, Ṭahmūraṣ Khan, the ruler of the Kakhetia region of Georgia, who had come to court because he had had heard reports of the approach of Morād Pasha, was received in audience by the Shah. Ṭahmūraṣ told the Shah of his suspicions in regard to certain Georgian nobles, and the Shah turned his attention to his problems and also those of Lūārsāb Khan, the ruler of the Kartlia region of Georgia, who was already at court; the two rulers were then loaded with favors and given leave to depart.

The Shah spent several days at Ardabīl, attending prayers at the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī, and then traveled to Qazvin via Ḵalḵāl and Ṭārom; from Qazvin, he proceeded to Isfahan and took up residence for the winter at the Naqš-e Jahān palace.

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[7] See Le Strange, p. 162.

Morād Pasha wintered in Dīār Bakr. He sent a *čavoš* to Istanbul with Moḥammad Beg and the following message for the Sultan: "Since Shah 'Abbas has ceased hostilities, and has made friendly overtures to us, and since he has not so far violated the frontiers as demarcated by the Treaty of Amasya, it is in the best interests of the Ottoman empire that we, too, should substitute peace for war and conclude peace on the terms of that treaty." Moḥammad Beg was received in audience by the Sultan, and delivered to him the Shah's letter and the pomander in its gold container. The Sultan replied to Morād Pasha: "We gave you full authority in this matter, and we will support any course of action you think advisable. Act as you think fit in the best interests of the state." Sultan Aḥmad also wrote to the Shah in the same vein, saying that whatever decisions Morād Pasha took would have his support. Moḥammad Beg returned from Istanbul and reported to Morād Pasha, who sent one of Moḥammad Beg's retainers to report to the Shah, since he wanted to retain Moḥammad Beg himself to help him decide the problems of the demarcation of the frontiers; he planned to send him back to Iran after the terms of the peace treaty had been drawn up. Both envoys were received by the Shah when he reached Isfahan and reported on the progress of the peace negotiations.

Deaths

That incomparable vizier Ḥātem Beg, who died of a stroke on Thursday,[8] 6 Rabī' I, 1019/29 May 1610 before the walls of the fortress of Domdom. His body was taken to Tabriz, and thence to Mašhad, where it was buried in a vault he himself had restored, situated below the tomb of the Imam Reżā. Since I have already said something about the vizier's admirable qualities, I hesitate to repeat myself here.

Moḥammad Pasha Jalālī, who fell ill at Domdom and died toward the end of the same month.[9] His career has already been described.

Moḥammad Sultan Bayāt, governor of Nishapur. He was the son of Bābā Elyās, whose family had for generations been chiefs and elders of the Qarā-bayāts, a Čagatāy tribe.[10] Ever since the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, this tribe had supported it loyally. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, when Moršedqolī Khan was proconsul in Khorasan, his brother, Moḥammad Beg, was made emir of the tribe with the title of sultan. During the Uzbeg occupation of Khorasan, Moḥammad Beg, some of his brothers, and many other relatives and members of the tribe were killed, but Moḥammad Sultan made his way to court with a few of his followers. In recognition of the heroic resistance of the Qarā-bāyāts, the whole tribe was absolved from payment of *dīvān* dues and enrolled as regular soldiers in the Safavid forces. Moḥammad Sultan held successively the posts of governor of Esfarā'īn, Sabzavār, and Nishapur; he had held the last of these posts for twelve years at the time of his death. His relative, Beyrām 'Alī Sultan, succeeded him as emir of the tribe and governor of Nishapur.

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[8] 6 Rabī' I was a Saturday.

[9] *TAAA*, ii, 802 states that Moḥammad Pasha died at the end of the preceding month, Ṣafar 1019/May 1610, and not Rabī' I.

[10] See *TM*, p. 17.

Mīr Feyżollāh, the vizier of the *ḡolāms.*[11] He was a Mūsavī *seyyed* of Mašhad. His father, Mīr Maqṣūd, was a witty conversationalist. Mīr Feyżollāh came to Iraq during the troubles in Khorasan and entered royal service. He had an outstandingly good voice and played the *tonbūr* (a kind of guitar) exceptionally well. These talents gained him admittance to the Shah's assemblies and brought him favorable notice. As a consequence of the special affection the Shah felt for the people of Khorasan, and in particular for the *seyyeds* and other inhabitants of Mašhad, Mīr Feyżollāh was appointed to the office of *majles-nevīs*[12] (secretary of state). He held this office for some time, and continued to hold it when he was promoted to the position of vizier of the *ḡolāms,* which is an important position these days. He succeeded in the latter office his kinsman Mīr 'Abd al-Qāder, who was killed by the Ottomans in the battle between the Shah and Jeḡāl-oḡlū, and he rose steadily in royal esteem and trust.

He died in the middle of this year of a stroke, at the royal camp at Qarāčūq. Mīr Feyżollāh had just mounted his horse and was riding toward the royal audience tent when he collapsed and died without even having time to dismount. His offices were conferred on the *moqarrab al-ḳāqānī* Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṭanzī, an eminent *seyyed* from Barzrūd in the Naṭanz district; he was a descendant of Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn, an attendant of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn, and this family had continued to serve the Safavid state faithfully generation after generation. Abu'l-Ma'ālī himself had entered royal service at an early age, and had been appointed superintendent of the royal stables and storehouses.

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[11] On the duties of this official, see *TM*, p. 73.

[12] *Majles-nevīs* equals *vāqe'a-nevīs;* see *TM*, p. 121.

The Events of the Year of the Pig, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1020/1611-12 and to Part of the Year 1021/1612-13, the Twenty-fifth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year occurred on Friday,[1] 6 Moḥarram 1020/21 March 1611. Since 'Āšūrā, the day on which Shi'ites and friends of the house of the Prophet commemorate the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn, fell within the period of the traditional New Year festivities, the latter were not held until after the conclusion of the period of mourning. The Shah then ordered a great feast to be prepared in the Bāḡ-e Naqš-e Jahān to which all classes of society were invited; emirs, viziers, *moqarrabs* of the court; people from various parts of the Shah's dominions who happened to be at court, merchants, and members of craft guilds. Each group was allotted its own particular place in the park, and gold tents and canopies of silk and Chinese brocade were set up. Booths, embellished in various remarkable ways and illuminated with lamps, were erected in front of each group. Pages plied the assembled gathering with cheering draughts, and the merrymaking went on for several days.

At this juncture, a courier arrived from Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Marv, to announce that Valī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Transoxania and Turkestan, had been driven from his throne and, on 8 Moḥarram 1020/23 March 1611, had crossed the Oxus at Čahār-jū and entered the district of Marv with the intention of going to see the Shah. The courier delivered a friendly letter to the Shah from the Uzbeg ruler, and the Shah hastened to respond in similar vein and to issue orders to his emirs and governors to supply the Uzbeg Khan with everything he needed at every stage of his journey, to give him suitable gifts—in short, do everything in their power to please him. 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*, one of the greatest emirs at court, was sent to welcome the Uzbeg ruler at Semnān and to escort him and act as his host on the rest of the journey to Isfahan. The remainder of the Nowrūz festivities were held over until Valī Moḥammad Khan arrived in the capital. Orders were given for the decoration of all the bazaars, the Qeyṣarīya, and the shops around the Naqš-e Jahān Square. I will devote a separate section to an account of the Uzbeg Khan's arrival in Isfahan and the reasons why he had been forced to leave his kingdom.

[1] 6 Moḥarram was a Monday.

About this time, too, the messengers from Morād Pasha, already mentioned, arrived in Isfahan to report on the progress of the peace negotiations. But before they could return to Dīār Bakr with the Shah's reply, Morād Pasha died, and as a result, the negotiations were held in abeyance.

Also about this time, the Shah decided to repair the fort at Nehāvand, and he delegated the *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* Mahdīqolī Beg Čağatāy, the master of the royal horse, to see to this task.

The Construction of Masjed-e Shah at Isfahan

This year, Shah 'Abbas conceived the idea of building a great mosque adjacent to the Naqš-e Jahān Square in Isfahan—a mosque which would be without equal in Iran and possibly in the entire civilized world. Shah 'Abbas had made the city of Isfahan like a paradise with charming buildings, parks in which the perfume of the flowers uplifted the spirit, and streams and gardens. He had already built a mosque and a theological seminary on the eastern and northern sides of the square, respectively, but he was dissatisfied with these. Just as the city of Isfahan was the envy of other cities in respect of its residential buildings, its Qeyṣarīya, its *caravanserais,* and its markets, and called to mind the Koranic verses: "Eram, possessor of lofty buildings, the like of which have not been created in these regions,"[2] the Shah wanted its mosques, seminaries, and pious foundations also to be the finest of their kind in Iran, and to rival the temple at Mecca and the mosque at Jerusalem.

The site selected by the Shah for the new mosque was the south side of the square, where stood a large caravanserai. This was demolished, and at a propitious hour determined by the astrologers from an examination of the royal horoscope, skilled architects and engineers, each of whom claimed to be without peer in the science of engineering, laid the foundations of the mosque and the sanctuary and the master craftsmen set to work. By an extraordinary coincidence, a marble quarry, the existence of which had previously been unknown, was discovered near Isfahan. The hand of providence must have kept it hidden from prying eyes so that it might be available for use in this mosque. Its discovery is a clear sign and manifest indication of the strength of the Shah's faith, and of his standing in the eyes of the Heavenly Architect. It enabled blocks of this marble, of a size, length, breadth, and color rarely seen anywhere in the world, to be used to adorn this second temple of Mecca. Indeed, the chronogram for the laying of the foundation of this mosque is "A second Kaaba has been built."[3] I pray that this great mosque may be completed in accordance with the plans of its founder, and that the people of this realm may for years to come worship in it under the protection of this great king. May he be rewarded for this act both now and in the hereafter, and may it bring him long life and the stability of his kingdom, and may he be spared to perform other beneficent works and to establish other pious foundations. In the name of the Prophet, and of 'Alī, and of the holy family of the Prophet, Amen, O Lord of the Worlds!

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[2] Koran, 89:8-9.

The Downfall of Valī Moḥammad Khan, the Uzbeg Ruler, and the Reason for His Leaving His Country and Traveling to the Court of Shah 'Abbas

I warned readers repeatedly in the introduction to this section that, in order to make my history of Shah 'Abbas intelligible, I would be obliged from time to time to include reference to events in the Ottoman empire which, strictly speaking, form no part of the history of Iran. In the same way, I must give some background to the sudden arrival of the Uzbeg ruler at the Safavid court.

Valī Moḥammad Khan b. Jānī Beg Sultan, the nephew of 'Abdollāh Khan, ascended the throne of Transoxania and Turkestan after the death of his brother, Bāqī Khan. The princes of the blood royal agreed to his accession, the Uzbeg emirs and military commander tendered their allegiance to him, and he consolidated his power as an independent ruler. According to what I have heard from travelers coming from those parts, he treated his brothers and other relatives with love and compassion: He gave the province of Samarkand to his nephew Emāmqolī Sultan b. Dīn Moḥammad Khan; and the province of Balk̲, Andek̲ūd, and S̲oborg̲ān, and other districts west of the Oxus, to another nephew, Nadr Moḥammad, the brother of the aforementioned Emāmqolī Sultan. He appointed a guardian for each of them, and for a while the two princes remained loyal to their paternal uncle.

Gradually, however, Emāmqolī Sultan, who was the elder of the two brothers, driven by his own ambition and urged on by seditious men who had gathered around him, showed signs of rebellion and put his guardian to death. Valī Moḥammad Khan was grieved by his nephew's rash and headstrong action; his attitude toward his nephew changed, and he marched on Samarkand to chastise him and disperse the troublemakers there. Emāmqolī Sultan did not wait for him to arrive, but crossed the Oxus and joined his younger brother at Balḵ. Nadr Moḥammad followed his elder brother's example and put to death his own guardian, and the two brothers resolved to stand together and defy their uncle.

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[3] This chronogram yields the date 1021/1611-12.

First, they sent an envoy to their uncle and, by way of excuse for their actions, putting forward various reasons, asked forgiveness for their actions. Emāmqolī Sultan alleged that he had been incited by a number of evil mischief-makers at Samarkand to commit these crimes; he had left Samarkand because he had detected some change in his uncle's attitude toward him. It would be obvious to their uncle, they said, that the income of the province of Balḵ would be insufficient to meet the expenses and pay the troops of both. Emāmqolī Sultan therefore asked his uncle to leave him in control of Balḵ, and to give his younger brother the province of Ḥeṣār-e Šādman, Qondoz, and Baqlān and their dependencies, which were close to Balḵ.

Valī Moḥammad Khan, scenting rebellion in the behavior of his two nephews, and being unwilling to allow Emāmqolī Sultan to acquire more power and wealth, rejected his request and conferred the province on an Uzbeg emir named Gowhar Ṭāher, who stood high in his favor because of his exceptional devotion to him. This exacerbated the mutual distrust and hostility between the Khan and his nephews. For several years, their relationship alternated between animosity and outward amity. Valī Moḥammad Khan overlooked the serious crimes they had committed and contented himself with admonishing them as though they were his own sons. His nephews, especially Emāmqolī Sultan, kept producing plausible excuses for their actions, and concealed their real intentions. Gradually, Emāmqolī Sultan attracted to him numbers of ambitious young Uzbegs who had given up hope of gaining preferment from Valī Moḥammad Khan.

At this point, Valī Moḥammad Khan began to declare himself to be a loyal supporter of the Shah, and there was an exchange of ambassadors, as already reported, the Shah sending a Turkman centurion to Transoxania and the Uzbeg Khan sending a return embassy led by his treasurer, Shah Moḥammad Mīrzā. At the instigation of mischief makers, Emāmqolī Sultan began to talk to people about this situation, sometimes discussing it openly, sometimes making veiled allusions to it. As a result of this whispering campaign, Valī Moḥammad Khan began to distrust some of his emirs and made efforts to distinguish those who were loyal to him from those who were not. The only result of this was that most of his emirs began to feel insecure, and any emir who felt he was under a cloud secretly sent a courier to Emāmqolī Sultan urging him to come out in revolt against his uncle and march to Transoxania. Finally, some of these emirs wrote to Emāmqolī Sultan pledging their support if he would march to Bokhara and overthrow his uncle.

One of the conspirators informed Valī Moḥammad Khan, who sent men to intercept the messenger, and he gained possession of the letter with the seals of all the conspirators affixed to it. Some of the conspirators were in Bokhara, others had gone to Samarkand. The Khan issued orders to summon those who were absent, intending to hold a judicial enquiry into the whole matter when they returned. However, he was too impatient to wait for their arrival. Fearing that news of the affair would leak out, he summoned those conspirators who were in Bokhara on the pretext of calling them to a council meeting and accused them of plotting against him. They strenuously denied the accusation, whereupon the Khan produced the letter and showed each of the conspirators his seal on it. The conspirators maintained their denial, and alleged that their enemies had forged their seals. Valī Moḥammad, refusing to accept this excuse, had them all executed.

He then sent trusted men to bring in the conspirators who were absent. The latter, forewarned, fled for their lives, with their families and relations, to Balḵ, where they conferred the title of khan on Emāmqolī Sultan and began to address him as "My king! My king!" Emāmqolī Sultan's head was turned by this flattery. He began to see himself as a mighty king and, coming out openly in revolt against his uncle, he marched on Bokhara with seven thousand men. When he reached Qaršī, Valī Moḥammad Khan marched out to give battle to him. He had with him nearly three thousand Uzbeg emirs and nobles, but he no longer had confidence in them, even those closest to him.

Emāmqolī Sultan did not have the strength to meet his uncle in the field, and so he fell back to a defensive position, with his rear protected by the Oxus, and began to dig in. He sent messengers to his uncle to convey various protests and complaints, and various conspiratorial emirs began all sorts of behind-the-scenes maneuverings. Emāmqolī Sultan learned from people who came across from his uncle's camp that Valī Moḥammad Khan at heart was anxious to avoid a showdown, and was willing to allow Emāmqolī Sultan to continue in power at Balḵ if he would only show contrition for his behavior, dismiss the troublemakers he had gathered around him, and pledge his fealty to his uncle.

As luck would have it, one night a few wild boar emerged from a reedbed near Valī Moḥammad Khan's camp and started charging around among the tents. Some of his men rushed out of their tents, yelling and shouting, and started attacking the boar. The din woke the Khan, who asked what was going on. Some stupid, ignorant babblers told him that Emāmqolī Sultan was making a surprise attack on the camp. Since men, prompted by Satan, are only too ready to believe rumors, this report spread through the camp in a flash, and the Khan's men began buckling on their equipment and making for his tent. Valī Moḥammad Khan, who distrusted his emirs, thought this might be a plot on the part of some conspirators to surround him in his tent, and so he took some reliable men he had with him and rode off to one side as a precaution, taking up his position on some rising ground in an effort to see what was really going on in the camp. By this time, his men had reached his tent and could find no sign of him; some thought he had fled, others thought he had been kidnapped by conspirators who supported Emāmqolī Sultan. Merely on the basis of these conjectures, group after group of his officers marched to Emāmqolī Sultan's camp and saluted him as king.

Valī Moḥammad Khan remained standing on his little hill till daybreak, when he was able to see that his army had vanished and joined Emāmqolī Sultan. He still did not know what had actually happened; whether this was some quirk of fate, or whether it was all part of some deep-laid plot among his own officers. He was inclined to think it was the latter; that most of his officers had betrayed him, invited Emāmqolī Sultan to assume the throne, encouraged the latter to assemble an army and to march on Bokhara, and that everything that had happened was the work of these traitors who, had he not been alert and left his tent, would doubtless have murdered him. Anyway, Valī Moḥammad Khan went sadly back to Bokhara with the handful of men he had with him.

When the governor of Bokhara, who resided in the citadel, saw the Khan returning in this sorry state, he stayed in the citadel and procrastinated in regard to presenting himself and making his obeisance to the Khan. He sent a message to Valī Moḥammad Khan to the effect that Emāmqolī Sultan would be at Bokhara within a few days with his army; Valī Moḥammad Khan, he said, did not have enough men either to fight a battle or endure a siege; it would therefore be best for all of them if he left the city and did some hard thinking about the realities of his situation. Valī Moḥammad Khan, pondering in bemused fashion on the tricks of fate and the treachery of men, asked for and received some of his womenfolk who were in the citadel, and set off a few days later for Samarkand, accompanied by his son, Rostam Moḥammad Khan, and a number of other dependents and about four or five hundred men. However, since he feared further treachery either on the part of his own men or on the part of the people at Samarkand, he changed his mind about going there and decided to go to Iran and seek help from Shah 'Abbas. He crossed the Oxus at Čahār-jū and reached the fort there. He sent his son Rostam Moḥammad Sultan with a few trusted men to Herat via the Saraḵs steppe, intending to follow later himself. He also sent a courier to the governor of Herat, Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, to inform him of the situation.

Meḥrāb Khan counseled him to travel to Herat via Marv, and Valī Moḥammad Khan, leaving his dependents at the fort at Čahār-jū in the charge of one of his officers he could rely on, traveled to Marv with the remainder of his companions (the most important of whom was Ḵājom Bīrdī *atālīq*, three hundred men in all. Meḥrāb Khan received him with honor, and at once sent a report to the Shah together with an affectionate letter to the Shah from the Uzbeg Khan. After entertaining him in appropriate style for several days and conferring suitable gifts on the Uzbeg Khan, Meḥrāb Khan sent him on to Mašhad, where he camped in the Čahār Bāḡ and was entertained by Mīrzā 'Arab, the brother of Shah Naẓar Khan Tükelī, who was acting as *dārūḡa* there on behalf of his brother. After about three weeks there, recovering from the fatigue of his journey, he set off for Iraq, entertained at every stage by the emirs along his route. When he reached Beṣṭām, he was met by the governor of Astarābād, Farīdūn Khan, acting on orders from the Shah. Farīdūn Khan presented him with gifts, escorted him as far as Čašma-ye Alhāk, eight *farsaḵs* from Beṣṭām. The whole of the way to Ḵār and Semnān, which falls within the jurisdiction of Iraq, the Uzbeg Khan was in the care of agents of Farīdūn Khan. At Ḵ̌ār, he was welcomed by the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī,* 'Alīqolī Beg Khan Šāmlū, who had come to meet him from Isfahan at the Shah's command.

After formal greetings had been exchanged, 'Alīqolī Beg asked permission to entertain the Uzbeg Khan and his men at a feast the following day, at which more gifts were presented to them. They then resumed their journey to Isfahan, entertained in appropriate fashion at every stage of their journey. At Kashan, the inhabitants decorated the main square with lights, and the Uzbeg Khan rested there for several days before proceeding to Isfahan. I obtained all the above information from travelers; if there are any inaccuracies in my account, they should be attributed to discrepancies in the reports I received, and I should not be accused of telling lies. "The responsibility for the accuracy of the report rests with the transmitter!"

The Arrival of Valī Moḥammad Khan at Isfahan and His Reception by the Shah

Twenty thousand musketeers, drawn from the city of Isfahan and the rural districts around it, were detailed to welcome Valī Moḥammad Khan at Dowlatābād, three *farsaḵs* from the city. The shops on all sides of the Naqš-e Jahān Square, the Qeyṣarīya, the caravanserais, and the coffee shops were gaily decorated. On the day on which the Uzbeg Khan actually entered the capital, the Shah himself rode out to welcome him, accompanied by his emirs and principal officers of state, such as Allāhverdī Khan, Allāhqolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī,* Nadr Khan the keeper of the seal, and others. Such was the Shah's magnanimity and generosity that he waived all formal protocol and did not insist on his royal prerogatives, but rode out as far as Dowlatābād. Finding the Uzbeg Khan on horseback, he embraced him with the utmost warmth and made all sorts of friendly inquiries of him. The *qezelbāš* emirs, not to be outdone, added their greetings.

Aqa Kamāl Dowlatābādī had requested the Shah that his honored guests should visit for a few moments his humble dervish cell, and Shah 'Abbas and the Uzbeg Khan complied with the Shaikh's request and went together to his home. The Shaikh had spread on the ground outside his house suitable floor coverings, and he busied himself with offering hospitality to his guests. He presented them with gifts he thought suitable. The Shah's party then remounted and rode toward the city. The whole way from Dowlatābād to the Naqš-e Jahān Square, the ground had been covered with floor coverings of elegant cloth supplied from the royal household stores, and the route was lined on both sides with musketeers. The throng of spectators pressing on all sides was so great that the escort, following behind, was not able to keep up with the Shah. The Shah therefore engaged the Uzbeg Khan in conversation and they went slowly forward together, stopping from time to time to quaff draughts of wine and to continue their conversation. When they reached the city gates, the Shah gave orders for the gates to be kept closed for a while, to give his party a chance to make its way through the streets and the markets.

After they entered the city, the Uzbeg Khan was allotted accommodation in some pleasant buildings that had been designed as residences for the Shah. ʿAlīqolī Khan continued his duties as host, and every day all Valī Moḥammad Khan's needs were supplied by the royal household administration. Poets devised various chronograms to commemorate this event. One of these was by Ḵāja Šoʿeyb Jowšaqānī, who was a vizier and officer of the *dīvān* and also no mean poet. His chronogram ran: "The moon has become the guest of the sun at a banquet."[4] This chronogram yields the number 1019, whereas the Uzbeg Khan actually arrived at Isfahan early in the year 1020/1611. However, it is possible to obtain the number 1020 if one takes into account the words of the preceding hemistich, and takes the "lighting of the candle" at the royal assembly metaphorically, in which case the "candle" could be held to signify the number 1. My own nephew, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, composed another chronogram which yields the figure 1020: "The king of Tūrān has come."[5]

The following day, the Shah visited Valī Moḥammad Khan at his residence and continued his friendly conversation with him. If the Shah perceived from time to time some signs of melancholy on the part of the Khan as he reflected on the way fate had treated him, he would banish such cares by the warmth and expansiveness of his manner. The Shah arranged a private banquet in his own apartments and invited the Khan and a few of his close companions. The Shah himself, with complete lack of formality, supervised the arrangements for the banquet, and rosy-faced pages circulated the wine. Dexterous musicians and melodious singers banished care from all hearts, and beautiful girls from Iraq and Khorasan delighted the guests by their dancing.

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[4] The Persian words *māh šod mehmān-e bazm-e āftāb* yield the number 1019.

[5] The Persian words *āmada pādešāh-e tūrān* yield the number 1020.

Valī Moḥammad Khan was amazed at this splendid sight, and displayed the greatest pleasure at the entertainment. The Shah employed the kind expressions of condolence with which one customarily soothes grieving hearts. He praised the men who had accompanied the Khan for their loyalty and steadfastness, and promised them handsome rewards. The banquet continued through the small hours. If I were to attempt to list all the facilities and services and requirements which were provided by the Shah, all worthy of such a guest and of such a host, in the way of cash, clothing, household necessities, and so on, I would become tedious. Since the Shah's usual recreations were watching polo, archery competitions, and firework displays in the Naqš-e Jahān Square, these forms of entertainment were also provided for the Khan. After the archery and the polo, master craftsmen provided fireworks displays the like of which had never been seen before. Fireworks were lashed to one of the royal elephants, and when these were ignited and cannon were fired, the huge beast performed strange antics and made terrifying charges, to the great amusement of the Khan and other spectators. Crowds were packed on all sides of the square to see the show. After the spectacle was over, the Shah and his guests walked around the square to admire the illuminations on the shops, the Qeyṣarīya, and the caravanserais. Convivial private parties were going on all sides. The Shah became momentarily more unbuttoned, and radiated even a greater degree of geniality and hospitality than before, and kept talking about other celebrated festive occasions held in the Naqš-e Jahān Square.

When the sun enters the sign of Cancer, there takes place the old festival of the Sprinkling of the Water, and the Shah and the Khan went together to the Čahār Bāğ to watch this ceremony. That day, more than one hundred thousand people, from every class of society, packed into the Čahār Bāğ to sprinkle water on each other. So many people took part that the Zāyanda-rūd was drained dry. This ceremony certainly is an astonishing sight!

After all the junketing, the Shah and the Khan got down to the serious business of state and discussed how the Khan's fortunes might be repaired. Although the ordering of men's affairs is in the hands of God, the Shah considered that he and all the *qezelbāš* had an obligation to assist the Uzbeg Khan. He thought that the Khan should be equipped with a large force and dispatched to Transoxania, and that he himself should take an army to Khorasan so as to be in a better position to lend support to the Khan in case of need. "However," said the Shah, "the Ottoman commander in chief last year penetrated as far as Tabriz; he has retired to Dīār Bakr for the winter and is talking about peace, but one can place no reliance on the word of Ottomans, and I have therefore decided to go to Azerbaijan in the spring to keep an eye on matters there. If I do not go, a major disaster may occur. I suggest, therefore, that you regard my house as your own, and that you stay in whatever part of my dominions you choose and relax for a while. If the vital problems of the northwest frontier are solved this year, next year, God willing, we will take the field together in the east."

Valī Moḥammad Khan admitted that the Shah could not change his decision to go to Azerbaijan this year. "However," he said, "I have been talking with the elders and officers who have accompanied me, and they are of the opinion that it is imperative for me to return to Transoxania this year. The situation, in their opinion, brooks no delay. They have pointed out that the majority of the Uzbeg emirs and governors in Transoxania are still my appointees, and so far they have not gone over to Emāmqolī Khan, but are looking for my return. They say I must strike while there are still people who have not submitted to Emāmqolī Khan, and before he has consolidated his position, because the task will be more difficult later on. In addition, they do not like the idea of my going back at the head of a *qezelbāš* army; the sight of *qezelbāš* troops, they say, may cause people to flee in terror, and they may not rally around me as we hope. Up till now, every Uzbeg and Čağatāy prince who has sought help from the Safavid house has achieved his ends. My object in coming here was that, through meeting you, my affairs might prosper, and my resolve be strengthened. I trust that you will not deny me your aid, both material and spiritual, and that you will be my friend and ally. I hope that, as a result of having turned to you for help, and assisted by your material favors and spiritual support, I shall regain my kingdom. If matters go badly and the hopes of my friends do not materialize, the troops you have in Khorasan will be sufficient for the job. May I ask you to instruct the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan to stand by to assist me should I require it, and to send troops with my son, Rostam Moḥammad, who is presently at Herat?"

The Shah's view was that, since the Uzbeg Khan had sought his assistance, they should spend some considerable thought in order to arrive at the best means of restoring his fortunes in Transoxania, which was no easy matter, and should not rush into hasty action, because relations between the Khan and the rest of the Uzbegs had broken down and too much reliance should not be placed on them. However, at a number of subsequent council meetings the Khan held with his elders, they put intense pressure on him to return at once, without *qezelbāš* support. From Khorasan too, reports came in that large sections of the Uzbeg army were awaiting the Khan's return. Finally, the Khan gave way and took his fate in his hands. The Shah gave him whatever he needed in the way of cash, clothing, horses, mules, camels, tents, stores, equipment, and so on.

On the day the Shah had chosen as being propitious for the commencement of his campaign in Azerbaijan, he had his campaign tent and equipment assembled on the banks of the Zāyanda-rūd and brought into the city. He then summoned Valī Moḥammad Khan, and they spent the night in private conversation together. The Shah gave the Khan a lot of friendly advice on government, on how to win over both friends and enemies, on forgiving the shortcomings of troops if these occur in situations beyond their control, and on having knowledge not only of everyday realities but also of supernatural events. Then, after the Shah had taken sworn covenants from his officers, especially Ḳ̌ājom Bīrdī *atālīq*, in which they pledged their loyalty to the Khan, the Shah and the Khan said farewell to each other. Zeynal Khan Beg Šāmlū, a Šāmlū officer of high standing, was instructed to be at the service of the Khan as long as he was in the Shah's dominions, and to see that all his needs were supplied. The Khan spent two more days in the capital and then set out. During their stay in Iran, some of his men were guilty of misdemeanors which were overlooked by the Shah because they were his guests.

Valī Moḥammad Khan's Expedition to Khorasan and Transoxania and His Restoration to the Throne

Valī Moḥammad Khan traveled from Isfahan to Sīāh-kūh in the district of Kashan, accompanied by Zeynal Khan Šāmlū, and once again at every stage on his journey he was received with honor by the local emirs. As a historian, I must now bring my readers up to date with events in Transoxania, based on information I have obtained from people coming from those parts. After Valī Moḥammad Khan's army defected to him, Emāmqolī Khan marched to Bokhara and established himself on the throne. He issued coinage stamped with his name and had his name included in the *ḵoṭba*. The commandant of the citadel at Bokhara presented himself before him and handed over the keys of the citadel and its treasure houses. Emāmqolī Khan confirmed his brother, Nadr Moḥammad Sultan, in the governorship of Balḵ and its dependencies. Then, hearing that Valī Moḥammad Khan had left his dependents and an infant son in the fort at Čahār-jū, he sent a detachment of troops there. The commandant of the fort had no choice but to surrender. Valī Moḥammad Khan's dependents and retainers were taken to Bokhara, and one of Emāmqolī Khan's officers was made commandant of the fort at Čahār-jū.

After meeting Valī Moḥammad Khan's womenfolk, Emāmqolī Khan declared he felt a passionate attachment to one of his uncle's wives, Āy Ḵānom, and wanted her to live with him, but that chaste woman refused. Emāmqolī Khan turned to the *qāżī* and the *moftī* for assistance in getting his way in this matter. According to my informants, the jurists of Bokhara refused to have anything to do with the case, but the worldly *qāżī* of Bokhara, casting his religion to the winds, complied with his request and issued a *fatvā* to the effect that, since Valī Moḥammad Khan had shown himself in the colors of heresy,[6] he was no longer to be considered as a Muslim and his wives were to be considered as having been divorced. It was therefore lawful for anyone else to marry them. Emāmqolī Khan, having overcome Āy Ḵānom's scruples by giving his action an air of legality, married her, an act obnoxious in the sight of both God and man. Evil is the condition of a man who acts thus and reckons his action to be compatible with religion and the law!

Some of the princes of Turkestan took advantage of the deposition of Valī Moḥammad Khan to extend their territories; they occupied Tashkent and marched on Samarkand. Emāmqolī Khan marched to meet them, arranging that his brother Nadr Moḥammad Sultan should bring his troops from Balḵ and meet him at Samarkand. When Emāmqolī Khan reached Samarkand, he opened negotiations with the Qazāq princes and conceded Tashkent to them as the price of purchasing a temporary truce. Because the Transoxanians did not trust the Qazāqs they remained at Samarkand, but neither side molested the other.

At this point, the news of his mother's illness reached Emāmqolī

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[6] *Rafża*, a useful "smear" word rather like "Communist" today. Valī Moḥammad Khan had, of course, laid himself open to this charge by consorting with Shah 'Abbas.

Khan at Samarkand, and the Khan was also seized by the desire to see his new wife. He left his emirs and troops at Samarkand and traveled to Bokhara with a few personal retainers. There he visited his ailing mother and disported himself with his uncle's wife. The news of the approach of Valī Moḥammad Khan threw him into a state of consternation, and he left Bokhara three days before Valī Moḥammad Khan entered the city. Taking with him his wife and mother, he moved in the direction of Qaršī.

When Valī Moḥammad Khan reached Mašhad, he was in two minds whether to go to Herat, collect his son, and march on Balḵ with *qezelbāš* help, or go to Marv and march on Bokhara via Čahār-jū. He decided on the latter course on the basis of reports he received from a succession of his supporters from Bokhara who came to see him at Mašhad. They reported that the bulk of Emāmqolī Khan's troops were at Samarkand, and they therefore hoped it would be easy for Valī Moḥammad Khan to occupy the capital. Once the news got around that he was securely reestablished on the throne, his opponents' forces would begin to disperse. Valī Moḥammad Khan accordingly marched to Marv. The governor, Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, was opposed to the idea of his setting out without *qezelbāš* support, but the Uzbeg elders managed to assure him that it was not necessary, so Meḥrāb Khan contented himself with entertaining them in appropriate fashion.

A group of Uzbegs, of whom there were many in the Čahār-jū area, especially Kamāl Ḵāja, who knew all about the situation at the fort there, undertook to capture it. Valī Moḥammad Khan sent them, with the blessing of Meḥrāb Khan, by forced marches to attack the fort, and he himself followed on behind. Meḥrāb Khan escorted him for several *farsaḵs,* and then, because he did not want him to be entirely without *qezelbāš* support, sent with him a force of about five hundred *qezelbāš* and musketeers, with orders to go with Valī Moḥammad Khan wherever he wished, and to return when he no longer needed them.

The Uzbegs who had gone on ahead reached the fort at Čahār-jū early one morning, swarmed up the walls where there was a fissure they knew of, and took possession of the fort and the town by surprise. When the *qezelbāš* detachment arrived, the governor of Čahār-jū, who was in the citadel, had no option but to surrender. Valī Moḥammad Khan stationed some of Meḥrāb Khan's musketeers in the fort and marched rapidly toward the Oxus, sending Kamāl Ḳāja on ahead. Crossing the Oxus at the fort at Čahār-jū, he pushed on toward Bokhara, being joined by groups of Uzbegs on the way. Hearing of Emāmqolī Khan's flight from Bokhara, Valī Moḥammad sent Ḳājom Bīrdī *atālīq* ahead to the city, which he himself entered on Wednesday,[7] 16 Jomādā II, 1020/26 August 1611, and all the populace came out to welcome him.

The following day, 17 Jomādā II/27 August, Valī Moḥammad seated himself once more on his throne, had his name inserted in the *ḵoṭba,* and coinage minted in his name. The *seyyeds, 'olamā,* and other notables of Bokhara came to prostrate themselves before him, and demonstrated their joy at seeing him again. Valī Moḥammad Khan, however, did not feel as happy as he should have on this occasion, because the fate of his wife had cast a cloud over his joy. He peremptorily summoned the *qāżī* who had declared him to be an infidel and legalized the marriage of his wife to Emāmqolī Khan. The *qāżī* took refuge in all sorts of unacceptable excuses, saying that he had been bullied by the Khan and had been terrified of what would happen to him if he refused, and so on. Valī Moḥammad Khan's rage mounted steadily as he demanded the death penalty for the *qāżī.* The wretched man was spared at the intercession of the *seyyeds* and *'olamā* and because the Khan did not want to affront men of learning, but he was totally disgraced. Valī Moḥammad Khan then sent summons to all the Uzbegs and notables of Bokhara who had conspired against him. He treated them extremely severely, not showing the tolerance and flexibility that are desirable—nay, essential—characteristics in a ruler.

Most of them were arrested and heavily fined, and this harsh treatment caused all persons who thought they might be under suspicion to be terrified of his vengeance. As a result, the Uzbegs, although they outwardly swore allegiance to him, under the surface remained as disaffected as ever. In his presence, they were ready to swear that black was white and to urge him to take all sorts of actions that were against his interests. In the end, their hypocrisy and perfidy were his undoing.

Valī Moḥammad Khan's March from Bokhara to Samarkand, His Battle with Emāmqolī Khan, and His End

When Valī Moḥammad Khan was restored to his throne, his faded hopes revived as men flocked to Bokhara from all sides to offer him their felicitations. There was no indication as to where Emāmqolī Khan had gone. Some shortsighted sycophants, hoping to ingratiate themselves with him, asserted that Emāmqolī Khan had left the province, since he had no *pied-à-terre* left there. He would not have gone to Balḵ, they said, for fear that his younger brother might oppose him. The only other place he could go to was Kabul, and thence to India. No other possibility existed. As for the troops in Samarkand, as soon as they heard of Emāmqolī Khan's flight and of the approach of Valī Moḥammad, they would, they assured the Khan, in a short space of time flock to his colors and tender their allegiance.

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[7] 16 Jomādā II was a Friday.

Valī Moḥammad Khan allowed himself to be diverted from the proper course of action by the specious arguments of these so-called loyal advisers. Imagining himself to be already undisputed king, he wrote to the Shah telling him that he was firmly established on the throne with full independence, that Emāmqolī Khan had fled, and that the Uzbegs had submitted to him. He retained a small detachment of *qezelbāš* troops for intelligence purposes; the rest he sent home. Demonstrating his complete lack of patience, every day at Bokhara he breathed fire and slaughter against those who had been disloyal to him, and the latter were quite terrified of him.

At this juncture, word came that Emāmqolī Khan was at Qaršī. Valī Moḥammad Khan, his mind now at rest, marched against him with seventeen thousand men, intending to lay siege to Qaršī, if his rival was still there, and take him prisoner. If he had fled from Qaršī too, it would mean that he could not be trusted at all. After Valī Moḥammad Khan had marched a few stages, however, his officers and elders told him that it would be a much better plan to go first to Samarkand, win over the troops there, and add them to his army, before tackling Emāmqolī Khan. Valī Moḥammad Khan then consulted the *qezelbāš* group who were with him, and in particular Būdāq Beg Qājār, and they agreed with his plan. Since Emāmqolī Khan was at Qaršī, with only a handful of men, and the main body of his supporters was at Samarkand, the best course was to march to Qaršī as rapidly as possible and deal with Emāmqolī Khan, because their task would be much more difficult if he succeeded in rejoining his men at Samarkand.

Valī Moḥammad Khan, strive as he might to get to Qaršī as fast as possible before the bird had flown, was frustrated by the Uzbeg elders, who opposed this scheme and were adamantly determined to go first to Samarkand. Finally, the Khan gave in and agreed to this mistaken plan, which the Uzbegs had an ulterior motive in pressing for, and sent ahead conciliatory letters to the Qazāq princes.

When the emirs at Samarkand had received the news of Valī Moḥammad Khan's restoration to the throne, opinion in the first instance had been divided, some being for submitting to him and asking for pardon, and others, who had cause to be afraid of him, hovering uncertainly between hope and fear. When the news arrived that Emāmqolī Khan was at Qaršī and that Valī Moḥammad Khan was marching against him, the two factions became more sharply divided in their allegiance. Some of Emāmqolī Khan's supporters rode like the wind to Qaršī, told him of the situation, and brought him back with them to Samarkand by a little-used route. When he rejoined his troops, Emāmqolī Khan's hopes of regaining power revived, and he resolved to do battle with his uncle; the pro-Valī Moḥammad Khan faction was thereupon thrown into confusion.

Valī Moḥammad Khan, ignorant of these developments, was now being counseled by his elders to proceed slowly toward Samarkand, and lead the emirs there to hope for royal favors, because a rapid advance would cause them all to flee. Once again, Valī Moḥammad Khan concurred, and moved slowly forward, momentarily expecting to be met by some of the emirs from Samarkand. The nonsense which had been fed to him by the Uzbegs had had such an effect on him that he thought everything in the garden was lovely, and it did not enter his head that he had any enemies left to contend with. At this point, however, news of the real situation at Samarkand reached him, and he partially awoke from his daydreams. He railed against those who had frustrated his plan to go to Qaršī and thus released Emāmqolī Khan from the trap, but these same men turned aside his wrath with smooth words. "How could a handful of men from Samarkand dare to try conclusions with your royal army?" they said. "They will shortly bring in Emāmqolī Khan as a prisoner, to atone for their misdeeds; or else a group of those who fear you may flee with him to Mongolia." Valī Moḥammad Khan kept sending patrols ahead to find out the strength and disposition of the enemy. They reported that Emāmqolī Khan's army was about ten thousand strong, and had dug in in defensive positions. Valī Moḥammad Khan took counsel with his emirs. It was agreed that, since their own forces outnumbered those of the enemy, they should attack without delay.

At this moment, Valī Moḥammad Khan received word that the Qazāq princes, two brothers, were on their way to assist him with five thousand men. The Uzbeg emirs said with one voice, "Emāmqolī Khan and his faction were hoping for the support of the Qazāqs. This development will fill them with dismay." They advised delaying battle until the Qazāqs should arrive. By this time, Valī Moḥammad Khan was nearing Samarkand, and battle was imminent. On Wednesday, 6 Rajab, 1020/14 September 1611, as Valī Moḥammad Khan was making his preparations for battle, he was informed that one of the Qazāq princes had arrived, and he sent a detachment of troops to welcome him. One of the brothers had arrived with three hundred men; after saluting the Khan, he explained that he had pressed on by forced marches, and that his brother would arrive next day with the rest of the troops. Valī Moḥammad Khan embraced the Qazāq prince warmly, and his elders suggested that, since the prince was fatigued after long forced marches, they should entertain him at a banquet and postpone battle until the next day.

The following day, Thursday 7 Rajab/15 September, Valī Moḥammad Khan's patrols reported that Emāmqolī Khan's camp was in an uproar, and that his troops were putting on their weapons and mounting their horses. Although Valī Moḥammad Khan's emirs were still making stupid remarks to the effect that those who feared Valī Moḥammad Khan would flee and the rest would join them, Valī Moḥammad Khan thought it prudent to order his men to put on their armor and to draw themselves up in battle array. Up to this point, the Khan and his officers still thought their forces were too strong for the enemy to dare to attack; but as the minutes passed and patrols kept sending in reports that the enemy was indeed making ready for battle, Valī Moḥammad Khan's confidence began to ebb. Since the reports he had received from Uzbegs had frequently been conflicting, the Khan sent Būdāq Beg Qājār, one of Meḥrāb Khan's retainers and a veteran soldier, together with one of his elders, to make a careful estimate of the enemy strength.

A reliable source told me that Būdāq Beg had told him that he had gone forward with the elder and taken up a position on some rising ground. They saw below them some twenty thousand men, advancing in good order. "I said to the elder," related Būdāq Beg, "your cause is lost. May your king banish you from his sight, for you have deceived him! During the whole of this campaign, you have not given him one word of sound advice on which he could reflect and make a proper decision." The elder retorted, "We never imagined things would be like this. Now that they are, if we tell the truth, the army's morale will be destroyed." "So the elder went back," related Būdāq Beg, "and told a pack of lies, but I went back and told Valī Moḥammad Khan the truth. I said, 'These people have deceived you. If only you had not dismissed the *qezelbāš* troops! Even though there were not many of us, we would have guarded your person during the battle and, if we had suffered defeat, we would with God's help have escorted you in safety from the field. At least keep the handful of us who are here at your side; do not give us any other duties.'" "The Khan," related Būdāq Beg, "was much disturbed by my plain words, and gave orders that the *qezelbāš* detachment should not stir from his spare mounts."

As the two armies neared each other, a ruined fort came into sight on the Khan's left. His elders counseled against advancing further, in case there were a group of the enemy hidden there who, if they advanced beyond the fort, could attack their center in the rear. It would be better, they said, to send a detachment of five hundred men to guard these ruins. The Khan gave the necessary orders. "Now," said the Khan's military advisers, "send the *qezelbāš* detachment along with them, since most of them are musketeers, and *qezelbāš* troops are better at defending fortified positions than Uzbegs." The Khan refused. They insisted, and finally the Khan once again gave way and dispatched Būdāq Beg and his men, who numbered no more than two hundred, to the ruined fort. The *qezelbāš* left their horses at the foot of the walls and climbed up on foot. Hardly had they arrived when the enemy sent two thousand men to occupy the ruined fort, and heavy fighting ensued. The *qezelbāš* musketeers drove the enemy off with heavy losses. A second wave of attackers, between two and three thousand strong, was also repulsed.

At this moment, Valī Moḥammad Khan received the shattering news that the other Qazāq prince, who had been on his way with five thousand men to reinforce him, had instead joined Emāmqolī Khan. He had taken this action at the instance of a Naqšbandī shaikh; the Naqšbandī shaikhs are the spiritual directors of the Qazāqs, and the Qazāq rulers account themselves their disciples. Valī Moḥammad Khan, seeing the strength of the enemy forces and the dissensions and poor morale among his own men, was in a state of great agitation. He recalled Būdāq Beg and his men from the fort, but the Uzbegs in the fort refused to let them go; "If you leave," they said, "the

Uzbegs will be encouraged, and will overwhelm us and wipe us out." Būdāq Beg reported the situation to the Khan, who then ordered Būdāq Beg to join him with about eight of his men.

Būdāq Beg found the Khan greatly disturbed and full of regrets. Suddenly a Qazāq horseman rode up, spoke to the prince, and rode back to the enemy lines. The prince said to Valī Moḥammad Khan, "My brother says that, as he was approaching the battlefield, he found his way barred by Emāmqolī Khan's army. He could discover no way of getting around it, and was forced to fall in with the enemy. The moment battle is joined, he says he will break ranks and join you." The prince asked Valī Moḥammad Khan for permission to move forward so that, if the Uzbegs pursued his brother when he broke away from their lines, he could go to his defense. Valī Moḥammad Khan knew this was another pack of lies, and he consulted his elders. Since by this stage it made little difference whether the Qazāq prince was with him or not, and little advantage was to be expected from his presence, he gave him permission, and the prince moved his men off to one side. As soon as he was clear of the Khan's lines, he led his men hell-for-leather to the enemy lines.

His action caused a disturbance in Valī Moḥammad Khan's ranks right across the whole front, and Emāmqolī Khan chose this moment to order fifteen thousand men to charge. Valī Moḥammad Khan, unable to contemplate the disgrace of flight, drew his sword and went to meet the enemy. But most of the officers and men who were with him in the center turned and fled. As a result, Valī Moḥammad Khan flung himself against the enemy with no more than two or three hundred men, and he and they were soon swallowed up in the swirling clouds of dust. One of the enemy recognized Valī Moḥammad Khan, who was lying on the ground wounded and unable to defend himself. The enemy soldier immediately seized the Khan and hauled him before Emāmqolī Khan, and the Uzbeg emirs, who had been responsible for this civil war, hastened to kill him.

Since most of the Uzbegs on each side had kinsmen in the other army, they fraternized with one another, and no more than two or three hundred men on both sides were killed in the battle. Būdāq Beg and his handful of men, despairing of the lives of the rest of the *qezelbāš* who were still at the fort, made a fighting retreat from the field and rode until nightfall. After dark, they changed their uniforms for civilian clothes, and pressed on, riding at night and hiding by day, until they reached Bokhara. There they made friends with a merchant from Marv, and traveled with him to Marv disguised as merchants. Gradually, some thirty of forty *qezelbāš*, of those who had been in the fort, trickled in, after employing all sorts of ruses in order to escape. There was no trace of the remainder.

On arrival at Tabriz, Būdāq Beg made a full report of the facts as stated in my narrative. The Shah, deeply grieved, sent a messenger bearing gifts to the Khan's son, Rostam Moḥammad, at Herat, to offer his condolences. Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, was instructed to provide him and his retainers with whatever they needed, and to assure him that the Shah would not fail to support him to the utmost of his ability. It was not long before Emāmqolī Khan and the Qazāq princes fell out. In the ensuing fighting, most of the traitorous and rebellious emirs were killed.

The Shah's Expedition to Azerbaijan

This year, the Shah spent the three spring months at Isfahan. Then he marched toward Azerbaijan by way of the summer stations of Farīdūn and Āq-Ölang. At Āq-Ölang, he detached his heavy baggage and sent it on to Solṭānīya, while he and a few close companions went to Nehāvand to inspect the fort, which was in process of being restored under the supervision of Ḥasan Khan and Mahdīqolī Beg Čağatāy, the master of the royal horse. After a holiday traveling and hunting in the beautiful regions of Nehāvand and Tuīsarkān, he joined the royal camp at Solṭānīya. Allāhverdī Khan arrived with the army of Fārs, and was received in audience.

When all his troops were assembled, the Shah marched toward Owjān in the Tabriz district. He and a small group of chosen companions and *moqarrabs* turned aside from the line of march to visit the Safavid shrine at Ardabīl before rejoining the camp at Owjān. He was expecting some word from the Ottoman commander in chief as to whether the future held peace or war, and intended to formulate his plans accordingly. Some time previously he had heard of the death of Morād Pasha and of the appointment of Naṣūḥ Pasha, the governor of Dīār Bakr, as the new commander in chief and vizier.

Shortly after his arrival at Owjān, the Shah received an envoy from Naṣūḥ Pasha in the person of a distinguished member of the Ottoman *'olamā*, the *qāżī* of Mārdīn. This envoy announced that

Naṣūḥ Pasha had been granted the full powers to make decisions in regard to peace or war which had previously been held by Morād Pasha. It was the desire of Naṣūḥ Pasha, he said, to acquire fame and distinction among Muslims by being the person responsible for bringing to an end the warfare between two such great monarchs, and for negotiating a peace on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya. To this end, said the envoy, Naṣūḥ Pasha requested that Moḥammad Beg, the duration of whose term as Safavid ambassador was now a long one, be replaced as the principal Iranian negotiator by a high-ranking *qezelbāš* emir, and that the person chosen be dispatched to him with a letter of friendship; Naṣūḥ Pasha would then accompany the Iranian plenipotentiary to Istanbul.

The Ottoman envoy, in consideration of his learning and scholastic distinction, was lodged in the house of the *ṣadr*, Qāżī Khan al-Ḥasanī. At the beginning of the month of Rajab 1020/September 1611, the Shah moved from Owjān to Tabriz, where he was welcomed by the townspeople. On arrival at Tabriz, the Shah appointed Qāżī Khan, who held the high office of *ṣadr* and was the leader of the "possessors of the turban" in Iran and a wealthy and powerful man, as the chief envoy to the Porte. He was given an allowance by the Shah for the journey of about one thousand royal Iraqi *tomān* in gold, besides necessary clothing and equipment. Several men were named to accompany him on this mission: Qāżī Mo'ezz Eṣfahānī and Mowlānā Sultan Ḥoseyn Nadūšanī Yazdī, both leading scholars; Qāżī Mo'men, formerly *qāżī* of Isfahan; and Ḥakīm 'Abdī Ṭabīb Ardabīlī. They were furnished with gifts and a letter to Sultan Aḥmad I; the gifts were in the care of Darvīš Beg, an eminent Mar'ašī *seyyed* from Qazvin, and included silken stuffs, cloth woven with gold thread and silver thread of many different kinds, and other precious articles from Iran. They also carried letters from the Shah to *qāżīs* and jurists at the Ottoman court, to the following effect:

> Since God has called all Muslims to follow the path of the religious law of Islam and of the faith of the people of Moḥammad, and has appointed kings to guard the frontiers and protect the lives of Muslims, both parties to the present dispute should abandon their animosities and work for a reconciliation of their differences, for such a policy is ordained by the religious law, will strengthen Islam, will smash the banners of unbelief, and will ameliorate the situation of Muslims.

The *ṣadr,* having made all preparations for his mission, set off with an escort of one hundred retainers and a number of other companions, both Turks and Persians.

The Shah spent the months of Šaʻbān and Ramażān 1020/October-December 1611 at Tabriz. After he had dealt with the business of state and the administration of justice, and with petitions from both the military and civilians, he would relax playing polo, or hunting, or taking archery practice. After the end of Ramażān, he spent several days reviewing his troops (regulars, household troops, and men on the reserve), and then sent them on leave. The new fort in the Rašīdī quarter of Tabriz now being completed, the Shah ordered the demolition of the old one. The work was completed in ten days, and the river was then diverted over the site, with the result that, in the direction of the old palace, there was soon no sign left of the various buildings which had been constructed over the years. The Shah ordered the officers of the *dīvān* to proceed to Isfahan and see to it that the troops got their pay and allowances. The Shah himself, with a few personal friends, set off to Gīlān and Māzandarān by the Ahar and Ṭavāleš road, with the intention of going hunting.

The Shah's Visit to Māzandarān and His Construction of the Palace at Faraḥābād

The Shah proceeded in leisurely fashion toward Māzandarān. At each place he reached in Ṭavāleš and Gīlān, he lingered for a few days' hunting. The Shah was in a jovial mood, and treated the members of his hunting party (close friends, *moqarrabs,* drinking companions, entertainers, *qūrčīs,* and other court retainers) as his guests, supplying all their needs at his own expense. As a result, the whole party was in an expansive mood when it reached Māzandarān, and continued hunting and enjoying itself as it traveled across the province to Faraḥābād.

At Faraḥābād, formerly Ṭāhān, on the shores of the Caspian, the Shah and his party stayed at the attractive residences in the beautiful gardens which were the product of the Shah's fertile imagination. The location had deserved to be developed because of its natural beauty. The waters of the Tejīna-rūd flowed through it on their way to the Caspian Sea. Shah ʻAbbas had added to the royal palace on the banks of the Tejīna and, since he was always in a happy mood when he was there, he renamed the place Faraḥābād (place of joy).

Each year, Shah 'Abbas made additions to the buildings there, and constructed a marketplace, bathhouses, mosques, and caravanserais. From Faraḥābād to Sārī, a distance of four *farsaḵs,* he had had a highway constructed. Because the heavy rainfall, which is common to all the Caspian provinces and is heaviest in Gīlān, frequently turns the ground into a sea of mud, the Shah had this highway built in the form of a stone causeway. The houses of the emirs and principal officers of state were built along the highway and along the banks of the river. Over the years, there was considerable migration to Faraḥābād from other parts, as people from all classes of society took up residence there and built houses, *tālārs,*[8] and whole districts on one side of the river or the other. The river exactly bisected the town and was spanned by a fine bridge.

At the time of writing (1025/1616-17), this flourishing town, by reason of the multitude of its buildings, gardens, and orchards, and the size of its population, is the envy of all. Nor was this Shah 'Abbas's only development in Māzandarān. At Āmol, Sārī, and Bār-forūš, all beautiful locations, he constructed fine buildings and laid out charming gardens. At every stage along the road, accommodation was provided for the Shah's overnight stops. Camels had never been able to make their way along the paths in the Caspian provinces, because of their narrowness and uneven surface and because of the denseness of the forests. As a result, the inhabitants of those parts had never before seen one of these strange beasts, one of God's curious creations: "Do they not look at the camel, how it is created?"[9]

While the Shah was in his winter palace at Faraḥābād, the place was a hive of activity, as troops, petitioners, and merchants made their way to and fro, and many camels and pack animals were lost either in the mud or on the hazardous tracks over the mountains. The Shah therefore resolved to widen the Savād-kūh highway, which is the major highway through Māzandarān, and placed Mīrzā Taqī, the vizier of the province, in charge of this work. He was empowered to hire the necessary workmen and to defray the cost from *dīvān* funds. The vizier accordingly set to work, aided by a team of *ḡolāms,* and completed this task, which many thought impossible, in 1031/1621. The materials required for the construction of the highway—stone, lime, bricks, and sand—were transported over long distances, and strong masonry bridges were built over all the streams that crossed the highway. By a happy coincidence, the words "a work of benefaction"[10] yield the date of its completion. Royal orders were issued to all landowners in the Caspian provinces, particularly Māzandarān, to assist in this work. Although I should more properly have described the completion of this highway under the year 1031/1621, now that I have started I might as well finish. In short, the highway was successfully completed, and the mud drained by means of ditches and sloping banks of sand. Today, camel trains move along this highway day and night. The inhabitants of the region live in peace in the shadow of the Shah's justice and are grateful to him for these benefactions.

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[8] Houses built on wooden pillars to preserve them from damage by flood water, etc. Such houses are a common sight in the Caspian provinces.

[9] Koran, 88:17.

Notable Deaths

Malek Beg, the vizier of the *qūrčīs,* who was afflicted by an inflammation of the bladder and died after suffering a great deal of pain. After passing several stones, he was afflicted by diabetes; nevertheless, he continued to perform his duties regardless of his weakness. On the way back from Tabriz, the jolting from riding his horse increased the pain; he was unconscious by the time he reached Mīānaj and died at Rabāṭ-e Nīk-pey. He was descended from the local *maleks* of Asadābād near Hamadan. As a young man, he had gone to Khorasan and, after many vicissitudes, had entered the royal secretariat and been appointed *mostowfī* of the *qūrčīs.* After the death of Moršedqolī Khan, he had been promoted to the office of vizier of the *qūrčīs.* He was a humane man of genial disposition, and had considerable acquaintance with both Turkish and Persian poetry. A year or two before his death, he had traveled to the Ḥejāz and had performed the pilgrimage. His body was taken to Mašhad and buried in the shrine precincts.

Aqa Abu'l-Fatḥ Eṣfahānī, a leading member of the secretarial profession and a scrupulously exact accountant; he was comptroller *(mostowfī)* of the royal household. He had accompanied the Shah on his trip to Māzandarān, but had fallen ill at Lāhījān in Gīlān and had died. His office was given to Ḵāja 'Alī Akbar Eṣfahānī, who is descended from a family of shaikhs from Andalān near Isfahan. His ancestors had built a convent there; they claimed descent from the Ẕu'l-Nūnīya line of shaikhs. He was a man of integrity, greatly esteemed in office.

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[10] *Kār-e ḵeyr.*

Šāhverdī Khan Kord of the Maḥmūdī tribe, the governor of Bon Fahl in the district of Kīj and Makrān. This year he came to court from Bon Fahl, but fell ill near Isfahan and died. His brother, Šīrāzī Sultan, was appointed governor of Bon Fahl in his place. The Shah decreed that Ganj 'Alī Khan Zīg, with a detachment of the army of Kerman, should proceed to Bon Fahl, wrest the castle there from the hands of some Makrānī rebels, and hand it over to Šīrāzī Sultan.

Events of the Year of the Rat, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1021/1612–13, the Twenty-sixth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on Tuesday,[1] 16 Moḥarram 1021/19 March 1612, and found the Shah still in Māzandarān. When the weather began to turn hot, the Shah had a mind to see the traditional Gīlānī festival of dancing, which takes place each year during the five supplementary days which are added to the Iranian calendar at the end of the three months of spring, in accordance with the computation of astrologers. In the rest of Iran, this is the time of the "sprinkling of the waters" ceremony. Men and women, young and old, go down to the seashore and spend the five days feasting and merrymaking. Everyone strips off his formal clothes, goes into the water with his family, and disports himself in the sea. Truly, an astonishing sight!

Accordingly, the Shah traveled to the small town of Rūda-sar in the Rānekūh district, where the festival was being held this year. While he was in Gīlān, the Shah dismissed the vizier of the province, Behzād Beg, who had been guilty of various misdemeanors. He was arrested and punished. The task of collecting the arrears of taxes and verifying the *dīvān* revenue accounts pertaining to his period of office was given to Šahverdī Beg Bāybordlū, an aide-de-camp, and Loṭf 'Alī Khan Beg the *davātdār* (keeper of the inkholder).[2] The Shah then traveled to Qazvin by a narrow track across the mountains and stayed there for some time, residing mainly at a mansion known as the New Building, which he himself had had built. He played polo and practiced his archery in the Meydān-e Sa'ādat.

The governorship of Qazvin had been conferred that year on Salmān Khan Ostājlū, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā Ostājlū, who was the son of Shah Tahmasp's sister; and he himself was connected by marriage with the Safavid royal house. Salmān Khan, at the urging of grasping officials, farmed out the job of collecting taxes and meddled in all sorts of matters in every branch of the administration. It was not long before people began to complain of the malpractices and avarice of his tax collectors, and the governor was arrested, fined, and spent two years in jail in chains. From Qazvin, the Shah traveled to Damāvand, and then via the summer stations of Lār and Fīrūzkūh to Mašhad.

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[1] 16 Moḥarram was a Monday.
[2] See *TM*, p. 89.

The Enlarging of the Main Courtyard of the Shrine at Mašhad, the Construction of Streets and Buildings, the Provision of a Water Supply, and Other Projects

After performing the pilgrimage ceremonies at the shrine of the Imam Reżā, the Shah resolved to increase the prosperity of the shrine's fiefs and other lands, to restore the buildings and dwellings, and to enlarge the main courtyard of the shrine, because he considered the existing one unimpressive. The Mīr 'Alīšīr portico was the entrance to the shrine; it was situated on the south side of the courtyard, facing north, but it was extremely badly located in the corner of the courtyard. The Shah's plan was to demolish some older buildings lying east of the courtyard and already in ruins, and to incorporate the land thus acquired within the courtyard in such a way that the Mīr 'Alīšīr portico would then be located in the center of the southern wall. He also planned to construct a second portico in the north wall, facing south and opposite the Mīr 'Alīšīr portico, and two other porticos in the east and west walls, respectively. An avenue would then be constructed from the west gate of the city running east to the shrine; on reaching the shrine, it would circle around it, passing by all four entrance porticos.

Both the inhabitants of Mašhad and pilgrims to the shrine suffered from the lack of water in the city. The city's water supply derives from the Golaš spring. The Shah had new *qanāts* dug, and the water was led down the middle of the new avenue into a large cistern in the middle of the courtyard; from the cistern, the water flowed in an easterly direction past the tomb of the Imam. Skilled architects and engineers set to work, and the Shah's plans soon materialized under the supervision of the governors of Mašhad. Today, the city of Mašhad, by virtue of the twin blessings of the grace of the Imam and the benefactions of Shah 'Abbas, is the most prosperous city in Khorasan. Next, the Shah turned his attention to the restoration of the shrine of Ḵ̌āja Rabī' al-Ḵos̱eym, situated one *farsaḵ* from Mašhad, and he had a beautiful building erected over the tomb.

The Shah also restored the Qadamgāh shrine at Nishapur, which is so well known as not to require description. Since the Qadamgāh lies on the slopes of the mountains and water reaches it from above, the Shah had fountains installed and a tree-lined avenue constructed for the benefit of the public for half a *farsak̲* from the gates. When I visited this spot on my way to perform the pilgrimage at Mašhad, words failed me adequately to describe the beauty of the site and its buildings. Anyone who tries to do so will get bogged down in high-flown and hyperbolic phrases, and so I will leave the task to other visitors to the site. May the Shah obtain his reward for these works in the form of long life and the stability of the realm, Amen, O Lord of the Worlds!

The Shah spent nine days at Mašhad, performing the rites of pilgrimage at the shrine and ordering the officials of the *dīvān* to deal with the requests of petitioners. On the tenth day, the Shah left. Not far from the city, he encountered Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, who had ridden with a few companions from Herat to seek audience with the Shah; after spending a few days at the Shah's side, he returned to Herat.

K̲ǎja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar Ğūrīānī, one of the most notable men of his age, was appointed *vazīr-e koll* of Khorasan, having commended himself to the Shah by his integrity and his administrative ability.

The Shah proceeded to Astarābād via the Baḥrīān plain, where he indulged in some hunting. At Astarābād, he busied himself with the administration of justice and dealing with petitions. The governor, Farīdūn Khan, exerted himself in a fitting manner to entertain the Shah. Leaving Astarābād, the Shah returned to Faraḥābād for the winter.

The Founding of the Town of Ašraf in Māzandarān

At the small town of Ašraf in Māzandarān, formerly known as Panj-hazār, situated not far from Astarābād, the Shah laid the foundations of another palace, with all necessary ancillary buildings such as bathhouses, workshops, and houses. Mowlānā Maḥmūd Behešti Gīlānī devised the chronogram "the bliss of Ašraf" to mark this event.[3] Ašraf lived up to its name in every respect; the Shah devoted an increasing amount of attention to it, and laid out gardens and parks in

[3] The chronogram yields the date 1021/1612-13. The words "*dowlat-e ašraf*" could also be taken to mean "royal felicity," and so the chronogram constitutes a nice literary conceit.

which nestled attractive residences, each equipped with a cistern. In the midst of each cistern fountains played, the water for them being brought down from the higher slopes of the mountains. The fountains were fashioned with cunning artistry, some taking the form of flames, others the shape of the cascade which firework makers make from gunpowder. Since Ašraf has become the Shah's favorite retreat in Māzandarān, most of the *moqarrabs* and other court officials have built themselves residences there, with the result that Ašraf is now a large city and, as a result of the Shah's patronage, a celebrated one.

Miscellaneous Events

One of the events which occurred this year was the murder of Moḥammad Khan Qazāqlar, the governor of Lori, and several of his retainers, by Georgian nobles of the Kartlia district, subjects of Lūārsāb Khan. The Qazāqlar tribe had traditionally raided across the Georgian frontier, either openly or by stealth, and had carried into captivity Georgian women and children and ravaged the area. As a result, the Georgians had a long-standing feud with the Qazāqlar. During the Ottoman occupation, when Ja'far Pasha led an army from Tabriz against Simon Khan, Naẓar Sultan, Moḥammad Khan's father, became a renegade, went over to the Ottomans, and was made a pasha. His men, who knew every inch of ground in that area, were used as scouts by the Ottomans, while Naẓar Sultan was the man who tracked down Simon Khan and handed him over to the Ottomans. The hatred between the Georgians and the Qazāqlar was handed down to the next generation.

Readers will recall that Moḥammad Khan Qazāqlar had been received in audience by the Shah and been given a royal pardon. The Qazāqlar and the Georgians had undertaken to bury their differences and to keep the peace, but Lūārṣāb Khan invited Moḥammad Khan and some of his leading officers to a banquet and had them all murdered. Although Moḥammad Khan richly deserved this end—he had a treacherous nature and was totally lacking in integrity, and had maintained a clandestine correspondence with the Ottomans—nevertheless, Lūārsāb Khan and the Georgian nobles incurred dishonor by this act of treachery. Shah 'Abbas decided to accept the *fait accompli*, and appointed the murdered Khan's brother, Moṣṭafā Beg, emir of the Qazāqlar tribe with the rank of khan.

The second of these miscellaneous events to occur this year was the expedition against the Bāna Kurds led by the governor of Sārū Čorqān, Sārū Sultan Begdīlū. Readers will recall that Eskandar Bāna had been received in audience by the Shah at his camp at Qarāčūq but had gone straight back to his tribe and resumed his seditious ways. Sārū Sultan therefore led a detachment of Šāmlū troops on a punitive expedition against him. The Bāna tribesmen, after initial resistance, fled, and Sārū Sultan captured Eskandar's castle and put to death about seven hundred miscreants. Those who survived the sword scattered in all directions.

The third of these miscellaneous events was the secret departure of Rostam Moḥammad Khan, the son of Valī Moḥammad, from Herat toward Čarjestān without the permission of Ḥoseyn Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan. A number of rascally, treacherous Uzbegs had gathered around Rostam Moḥammad at Herat; Ḥoseyn Khan, as a precaution, had allotted them quarters outside the city, but the Uzbeg prince had refused to be separated from his men, who on several occasions had expressed the desire to go to Čarjestān. Ḥoseyn Khan, who did not trust the Uzbegs, refused to allow them to take the prince with them, and he did not dare, without the Shah's permission, to allot them a *qezelbāš* escort. One night, the Uzbegs succeeded in spiriting Rostam Moḥammad away, and rode like the wind toward Čarjestān. Ḥoseyn Khan was perturbed, fearing that the Shah's wrath might be visited upon him because of his negligence. However, when the prince reached Čarjestān, he was welcomed by the people there, who had received orders from the Shah to serve him. After he had led a raid against a group of people subject to the governor of Balḵ who had opposed him, and had brought back quantities of loot and sent some of this as a gift to Ḥoseyn Khan, good relations between him and the *beglerbeg* were restored.

Rostam Moḥammad reasserted his allegiance to the Shah and declared his gratitude for the favors he had received from him. He asked forgiveness for his abrupt departure, excusing his behavior on the ground that he had been unable to resist the importunate urgings of the Uzbegs, a people traditionally impatient for action. If he should suffer any reverse, he said, he would again seek refuge within the Shah's dominions. Ḥoseyn Khan, reassured, sent a report to the Shah. An account of Rostam Moḥammad's expedition to Balḵ will be given under the head of next year's events.

The next miscellaneous event was the killing of ʿAlī Khan Beg

Javānšīr and his brother, Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg. The Javānšīr, a Turkman tribe from Qarābāg̈, are made up of thirty-two clans, and are accordingly known also as the Otūz-īkī;[4] the Javānšīr family has held the leadership of the tribe for generations. During the Ottoman occupation, Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg submitted to the Ottomans but remained with his tribe and family in Qarābāg̈. A few years later, his younger brother, 'Alī Khan Beg, visited the court of Shah 'Abbas and was enrolled among the *moqarrabs*. When the Shah opened his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan, Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg in his turn came to court. Since it was not the moment to sit in judgment on his past conduct, the chieftainship of the tribe was again conferred upon him.

A feud developed between the two brothers—it was a feud which had a number of causes, but the principal one was rivalry over the leadership of the tribe. Eventually, 'Alī Khan Beg was commissioned to repair the fort at Ganja. One day, when the governor of Ganja, Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū, was away from the city on a trip, 'Alī Khan Beg saw his opportunity to kill his brother, and he led a band of Javānšīr tribesmen to Zīād-oḡlū's house, where Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg was staying. The latter fled in a panic into the women's quarters of the house, but 'Alī Khan Beg, showing scant respect for the honor of the harem, pursued him there with the intention of killing him. A number of Zīād-oḡlū *ḡāzīs*, appalled at the disrespect shown to their Khan's harem, tried to prevent 'Alī Khan Beg from going on, but without success; they then, led by Sarāy Beg, attacked the Javānšīr group and slew all sixty or seventy of them, including 'Alī Khan Beg. The latter was a self-willed and excessively proud man who intended to murder his brother, but met the retribution for his crime before he had committed it. When Moḥammad Khan returned, he thought it expedient to put Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg to death as well, since he had been guilty of seditious activities during the Ottoman occupation and he saw no point in preserving his life. No official inquiry was made into either of these deaths, since it was in the interest of the state to have both men out of the way.

The next cautionary event I wish to record occurred at the end of the year; it is the execution of the *qūrčībāšī*, Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, who was arrested at Faraḥābād by Pīrī Beg, known as Qarā Pīrī Qarāmānlū. Allāhqolī Beg, relying on the unusual degree of favor the Shah displayed toward him and on his excellent services to the crown, frequently used to make impudent remarks in the presence of the Shah, and to make jests of a kind which are not appropriate to distinguished officers of the state, even though they have permission to make them. He ignored the old adage about a subject needing to keep his place even though he is apparently in favor with the king. The Shah used to react to his jibes jovially and good-naturedly, not standing on his dignity, and derived a great deal of enjoyment from them. Everyone, when they heard the news, thought that Allāhqolī must have gone too far and that his insolence had been the cause of his downfall; but the Shah himself, after his arrest, repeatedly mentioned his ingratitude and his evil nature as being the reasons for his fall from favor.

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[4] Turkish for "thirty-two."

Allāhqolī Beg, although he was an experienced officer, was extremely worldly and avaricious in regard to the accumulation of money, property, and estates, and he had amassed a fortune amounting to twenty thousand *tomān*. His fear that something might disturb the even tenor of his life and prevent him and his sons from enjoying this fortune led him to entertain foolish thoughts and harbor suspicions regarding his spiritual director and benefactor. The money on which he had set his heart had corrupted him, and on several occasions he collected taxes and divided the money between his *ġāzīs* and his cronies. Since the Shah had decided to destroy his whole family, he and his sons were blinded and subsequently died under the blows of the dunners' cudgels. Thus he did not live to enjoy any of his wealth or estates, and he had no good works as his memorial.

He was succeeded as *qūrčībāšī* by 'Īsā Khan, the son of Seyyed Beg the son of Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī. 'Īsā Khan was connected by marriage to the Shah himself, and had risen from the rank of centurion to the position of governor. He was a courteous young man, endowed with many praiseworthy qualities, shrewd and of a pleasant disposition.

Deaths

1. Nūr Moḥammad Khan Özbeg, the son of Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan, the son of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, the son of Alūš Khan, of the line of Šībān b. Jočī b. Čengīz Khan. As previously related, he was living at Shiraz on a pension of one gold royal Iraqi *tomān* a day; he died in the course of this year.

2. The eminent jurist and *mojtahed* Mowlānā 'Abdollāh Šūštarī,

who had come to Iran from Najaf a number of years ago and resided at Isfahan. The Shah always showed great favor toward him. He fell ill on Friday,[5] 24 Moḥarram 1021/27 March 1612, but the illness did not seem serious. On the Saturday, his son-in-law Mīr Moḥammad Bāqer and Shaikh Loṭfollāh Meysī 'Āmelī, who had often had violent arguments with him on theological matters and problems of *ejtehād*,[6] went to visit him, and he embraced them warmly and chatted gaily with them. Early on Sunday morning, the 26th of Moḥarram/29 March, the Mowlānā, after performing his early morning prayers and supererogatory acts of worship, went out to look at the weather. On his return, he collapsed and died without being able to utter a word.

The Mowlānā was a man of outstanding spiritual accomplishments: pious, continent, eschewing the pleasures of this world. As for food and drink, he made do with the bare minimum, and fasted much of the time; he would break his fast with a bowl of broth without any meat in it. He lived at Karbala and Najaf for about thirty years, as a student of the late *mojtahed* Mowlānā Aḥmad Ardabīlī. It is said that Mowlānā Aḥmad gave him authority to conduct the Friday prayers, to gather around him pupils of his own, and to instruct them in problems of *ejtehād*. He was greatly mourned; because of the press of people in the old congregational mosque of Isfahan, it was not possible to give his body ritual ablution from the water of the well there, and Mīr Moḥammad Bāqer and the other scholars and theologians conducted the burial service where they stood. His body lay for a few days in the Imamzada-ye Esma'il, and was then taken to Karbala for burial. Various attractive chronograms were devised to mark his death: One was, "Alas! Alas! the exemplar of the Shi'ites has gone!" Another was "Alas for the exemplar of Iran, alas!" And Shaikh Maḥmūd 'Arab Jazā'erī produced "The *mojtahed* of the age is dead!"[7]

3. Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū, a *moqarrab* at court and a member of the Shah's assemblies. He fell ill in Māzandarān and was attended by the physician Ḥakīm Salmān Šīrāzī, but he did not carry out the treatment prescribed by the latter. When he was absent, Moḥammad Beg followed the advice of Turkish physicians. He ate un-

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[5] 24 Moḥarram was a Tuesday.

[6] The solution of theological problems on the basis of analogical reasoning, precedents being derived from the Koran, the *ḥadīs*, and the consensus of the community, according to conditions laid down in the works of authorities on the religious law.

[7] The last two chronograms give the correct date (1021/1612), but the first one yields 1022.

suitable food, and too much of it. His illness gradually became worse, and he died at the beginning of winter. The Shah took charge of the burial arrangements, and sent his body to Mašhad for interment; he also looked after his dependents. The deceased was a wealthy man, but had constituted his personal estates as a pious endowment. Since he had no heir, his effects, according to religious law, went to his brother, Ḥeydar Sultan the *ešīk-āqāsī* of the harem.

Events of the Year of the Ox, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1022/1613–14 and Part of the Year 1023/1614–15, the Twenty-fifth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Wednesday[1] 27 Moḥarram 1022/ 19 March 1613. On that day the sun, after a duration of nine hours, ten degrees, and twelve minutes, left the sign Pisces and entered the sign Aries, and thus marked the beginning of spring. On Friday,[2] 29 Moḥarram/21 March, the Shah left Faraḥābād and traveled to Isfahan, where he received a great welcome. The artisans, craftsmen, and merchants of the city decorated the bazaar, the Qeyṣarīya and the stores around the Meydān, and the Shah held a traditional New Year's festival in the Naqš-e Jahān palace. As a token of his satisfaction with the services of the people of Isfahan, the Shah waived for a period of three years, throughout the whole province, the taxes payable by both landlords and peasants; he also distributed in the form of cash grants to the landlords, peasants, and cultivators of state lands one-tenth of the revenues accruing from these lands, amounting to more than fifteen thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*. This bounty, coming on top of the Shah's other acts of generosity, led all the inhabitants of the province to pray for his welfare.

The Capture of the Fort of Bon Fahl in the Province of Kīj and Makrān

Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, had been ordered to capture this fort, as readers will recall. He marched to Bon Fahl with troops from the army of Kerman and contingents from the tribes in the region. On arrival there, he laid siege to the fort, and made raids into the surrounding countryside as opportunity offered. Malek Šams al-Dīn, the son of Malek Dīnār, the ruler of that region, together with the rest of the besieged, soon abandoned the defense of the fort. The Zīg *ḡāzīs* occupied it and took prisoner Malek Šams al-Dīn and his sons and dependents, and sent them to court. Apparently most of the population in that province are Sunnis of the Šāfe'ī rite. Malek Šams al-Dīn, since he claimed to be a *seyyed* and a Shi'ite and a friend of the Imams, was pardoned by the Shah and allowed to return to Kerman and live peacefully with his family and dependents in that province. However, on arrival at Kerman, he died.

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[1] 27 Moḥarram was a Tuesday.
[2] 29 Moḥarram was a Thursday.

The *maleks* of Kīj and Makrān knew nothing of the rulers of this world except their names, and had never traveled outside their own province. They had remained untouched by the vicissitudes of the times, and in their ignorance thought that the province of Kīj and Makrān was the choicest spot in the civilized world. They thought their line of kings were mighty princes with whom the other rulers of the world could not compare; in keeping with this, the inscription on Šams al-Dīn's signet ring was "king of kings."

One of their ancestors, the late Malek Dīnār, who was the ruler of the whole of the province of Makrān and Kīj, seemed to be a little more modest when he had inscribed on his signet ring:

> Had the Lord of the World not possessed so many
> realms,
> He would not have given away Kīj and Makrān
> for the price of a *dīnār*.[3]

Even then, literary men will perceive that these words, too, are an allusion to the magnitude of the province and the greatness of its ruler!

The Arrival of an Embassy from Europe Consisting of Ambassadors and Christian Fathers at the Shah's Court

This year a number of European ambassadors and Christian fathers (scholars and monks) arrived at the Shah's court, sent by the King of Spain, the most powerful of the rulers of Europe. The embassy was received by the Shah at the Naqš-e Jahān palace, delivered its gifts to the Shah, and was welcomed with great favor. Friendly relations were customary between Shah 'Abbas and the Christian princes of Europe, and diplomatic exchanges had regularly taken place. Thus, a few years ago, the Shah had sent Dengīz Beg Rūmlū, a smooth-tongued centurion, on a mission to Europe, and this envoy now returned to Iran with the foreign embassy. The Shah had received reports from Europe that his ambassador, as a result of his grasping and avaricious nature, had committed various acts displeasing to the Shah; indeed, they had so angered him that, the moment Dengīz Beg entered the court, the Shah handed him over to the executioner without giving him a chance to make excuses for his sins. He was put to death[4] by being suspended upside down from a gibbet, and died miserably and in disgrace.

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[3] Or, "to a dīnār," a word play on his own name.

One of Dengīz Beg's crimes was that, when he reached Cadiz, at the insistence of Būzra, who was the governor of the city and the admiral in charge of the Frankish ports, he broke the seal on the Shah's letter to the King of Spain, read the letter, and revealed its contents to the governor. The sacrilegious act of breaking the royal seal is considered by kings to be a serious crime, and to divulge to another the secret communications of kings is a heinous crime. Another source of complaint against Dengīz Beg on the part of the Shah was his manner of dress in Europe. It is the custom for ambassadors, when they are sent on missions to foreign lands, to continue to wear the style of dress which is usual in their own country, and at no time in history have kings permitted their ambassadors to do otherwise. When Dengīz Beg reached the Spanish court, he found the court in mourning for the Queen, who had just died.[5] In order to flatter the King, he bought himself black mourning robes and appeared in them, whereas he should have continued to wear his ordinary costume. If requested to wear mourning, he should have replied, "Praise be to God! My king and benefactor is in good health; what need is there for me to wear mourning?" This would have been a fitting excuse for not wearing black, and one which would have been applauded.

Yet another ground for complaint was the letter which the Shah had written to the Pope at Rome, who is so to speak the Christian caliph, and the vicar of the apostles of Christ. The letter had been given by Dengīz Beg to some merchant or other, and this merchant had paid him a sum of money for the privilege of calling himself Dengīz Beg and having the excitement of delivering the letter to the Pope. Again, this was completely unacceptable behavior on the part of the ambassador. If there really was some reason why he could not deliver the letter in person, he should have brought the letter back and explained the circumstances to the Shah. Instead of doing this, he showed disrespect for his benefactor's letter by virtually selling it to some unknown merchant and thinking nothing of it. The greatest of his crimes, however, was that he treated the fellow members of his mission so badly that several of them embraced Christianity as a means of escaping from his clutches, and remained in Europe. The honor of Islam demanded the death penalty; as the poet has it, "Only oppression causes a man to change his religion."

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[4] The verb used, *ṣala kardan*, is usually used only of judicial executions under *lex talionis*. Its use in this case therefore suggests that Dengīz Beg had been guilty of murder in Europe.

[5] This was Margaret, queen-consort of Philip III, who died in 1611.

The Return of the Ṣadr, Qāżī Khan, from His Embassy to the Porte, the Arrival of the Ottoman Ambassador with Peace Proposals, and the Flaws in These Proposals in the Eyes of the Shah

Qāżī Khan returned from Istanbul with the new Ottoman ambassador, Moṣṭafā Pasha, known as Enjīllū Čavoš. Qāżī Khan related that, according to orders, he had traveled to Istanbul with Naṣūḥ Pasha, who had been received in audience first by Sultan Aḥmad I, had described the negotiations so far, and had laid emphasis on Qāżī Khan's rank and lineage. The following day, all the Ottoman pashas, emirs, and nobles, together with a large crowd of ordinary folk, had gone out to meet Qāżī Khan and escort him into the city with great honor. Qāżī Khan and his colleagues had then asked for an audience with the Sultan through the good offices of the grand vizier, as was the custom, stated the object of their mission, and presented their gifts.

The *ṣadr* was treated with greater esteem by the Sultan than had been the lot of previous ambasadors. During his stay in Istanbul, he had been visited by viziers, pashas, *moftīs*, *'olamā*, *qāżīs*, and jurists, who had discussed with him the prospects for peace, and there were some spirited arguments on both sides. After a lot of discussion, peace on the basis of the treaty between Sultan Süleymān and Shah Tahmasp was agreed to, and Enjīllū Čavoš was appointed ambassador and dispatched, bearing suitable gifts, in the company of Qāżī Khan.

The Shah received Qāżī Khan and the Ottoman ambassador with favor. The Ottoman Sultan had given Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Vān, full powers in the matter of demarcating the frontiers of Azerbaijan, and Maḥmūd Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Baghdad and son of Jeğāl-oğlū, full powers regarding the frontiers of Arab Iraq, with orders to demarcate these boundaries as they had been at the time of the Treaty of Amasya, in consultation with the Safavid plenipotentiaries. Shah 'Abbas appointed Emir Gūna Khan, the *beglerbeg* of

Čokūr-e Sa'd, his plenipotentiary for Azerbaijan, and the *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* Mahdīqolī Beg Čağatāy, the master of the king's horse, his plenipotentiary in the Baghdad region.

Since a long time had elapsed since the Treaty of Amasya, many changes had taken place in the frontiers in the interim: For example, the Meskhia region of Georgia and the forts in the Āḵesqa district, which under the treaty had been defined as Safavid territory, had in the meantime been occupied by the Ottomans and were still in their hands. On the other hand, some forts in the direction of 'Arabestān and Baghdad which had been defined as Ottoman territory were now in Safavid hands. It was clearly going to be hard for either side to surrender the territory it had occupied, and so it seemed easier for each side to keep the territory actually in its possession at the time of the signing of peace. In this way, neither side would begrudge the other the territory it held, and instructions were given to the plenipotentiaries to this effect. It was hoped that this procedure would remove all grounds for conflict, and that the larger objective, peace, would not be lost sight of as a result of haggling over details. Emir Gūna Khan marched in good order to Salmās and met Moḥammad Pasha, and for two months discussion went on before all the details were settled. Then, one copy of the boundary settlement, sealed by Moḥammad Pasha, the frontier *sanjaq-begs*, and other nobles, was handed to Emir Gūna Khan, and he gave Moḥammad Pasha another copy to which he and the other emirs in the region had affixed their seals.

In the 'Arabestān and Baghdad regions, however, Maḥmūd Pasha had a much more difficult job, since there had been greater changes in the frontier, and it proved impossible to demarcate the boundary here. In the end, peace did not materialize because of frontier incidents caused by troublemakers among the Georgians and the Kurds, and fighting between the Ottoman and the Safavid empires broke out once more.

Rostam Moḥammad Khan b. Valī Moḥammad Khan's Expedition to Balḵ, and His Being Routed and Retreating in Disarray and with a Bitter Taste in His Mouth

This year, Emāmqolī Khan, the Uzbeg ruler at Bokhara, marched toward Samarkand intending to campaign against the Qazāqs who had seized possession of Tashkent and were conducting raids along the borders of the province of Samarkand. He summoned his brother, Nadr Moḥammad Sultan, from Balḵ to assist in this campaign, but the latter demurred, pointing out that Rostam Moḥammad Khan was in Ǧarjestān, just waiting for his opportunity to seize Balḵ. Emāmqolī Khan kept insisting that he send troops, and finally Nadr Moḥammad Sultan gave in, sent a large army to assist his brother, and himself also crossed the Oxus. As soon as Rostam Moḥammad Khan heard of his departure, he marched at top speed to Balḵ with the three thousand men who had gathered around him.

The officer in charge at Balḵ was not strong enough either to repulse him or man the fortifications of the city, and so he retreated into the citadel and abandoned the city. He sent a conciliatory message to Rostam Moḥammad Khan, saying his men had their wives and families in the citadel and were therefore honor-bound to defend them; apart from that, he said, the whole place was his, and there was no cause for dispute between them. Nadr Moḥammad Sultan's mother, who was a Reżavī *seyyed* and the sister of Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī Mašhadī, was terrified that Rostam Moḥammad Khan might assault the citadel, and so she kept sending messengers to the latter, appealing to him like a mother appealing to her son, and promised him her daughter in marriage. She also urged the cousins to make peace with one another, and suggested that the realm, presently divided into two parts, should be divided into three. The three brothers, she said, could then live together in peace—a state greatly preferable to war.

Rostam Moḥammad Khan allowed himself to be deceived by her, and remained quietly at Balḵ without taking any particular precautions. Those in the citadel, however, had sent envoys for help in all directions, and were waiting for the arrival of troops. Rostam Moḥammad Khan's men scattered all over the district, engaging in various commercial dealings and extorting money from the local inhabitants.

Without warning, some of Nadr Moḥammad Sultan's troops arrived. Rostam Moḥammad Khan's men, with no time to assemble, looked each man to his own safety. Rostam Moḥammad Khan fled toward Mārūčāq with some twenty or thirty men but on the way some of his supposedly friendly Uzbegs planned to seize him and take him to Bokhara. Others, however, remained loyal to him, and fighting broke out between the two factions; eventually those loyal to him overcame the traitors. Rostam Moḥammad trailed back toward Herat with only ten men. Soon after his arrival there, news came in that the princes of Transoxania had been routed by the Qazāqs near Tashkent, and on Tuesday, 14 Rabī' II, 1022/3 June 1613, a courier from Ḥoseyn Khan reached Isfahan from Herat with this news. Since the Shah was not wedded to the cause of Rostam Moḥammad Khan, he did nothing to assist him in this campaign, preferring to leave the outcome to fate.

Miscellaneous Events that Occurred This Year

This year, ambassadors were sent to the Deccan. The rulers of the Deccan had long been devoted friends of the Safavid house; 'Ādelšāh, the ruler of Bījāpūr, had sent an embassy to the Shah in the person of Mīr Ḵalīlollāh Ḵošnevīs (the calligrapher), a distinguished *seyyed* from Bāḵarz in Khorasan and unequaled in his time as a writer of the *nasta'līq* script, who happened to be in the Deccan at his court. Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh, the ruler of Golconda, had sent as ambassador Malek 'Anbar, a general descended from the Neẓāmšāhī house. The object of these embassies was to seek help from the Shah against the Čaḡatāy army which, on orders from the Mogul Emperor, was troubling their borders.

The Shah's problem was that friendly relations had always existed between the Safavid house and the Mogul Emperors, and the reigning Emperor, Salīm Shah, had demonstrated even more strongly than his predecessors the desire to live on good terms with him. The Shah, as a first move, wrote to the Mogul Emperor, telling him of the petition of the princes of the Deccan, and the Emperor, to please the Shah, ceased hostilities against them. This year, the Shah sent ambassadors to the Deccan: Ḥoseyn Beg *qeyčačī* Tabrīzī was sent as an ambassador to the Qoṭbšāh, Darvīš Beg Mar'ašī to the Neẓāmšāh, and Malek 'Anbar and Šāhqolī Beg Zīg to 'Ādelšāh. To each prince he sent a friendly letter and appropriate presents, including horses and other wonderful gifts. In the interval between the departure of the ambassadors from India and their return, Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh had died and been succeeded by his nephew and son-in-law, Sultan Moḥammad, and so the ambassador to the Qoṭbšāh was instructed to offer condolences on the death of the former ruler and congratulations to his successor. The ambassadors were given leave to depart from Isfahan, together with Mīr Ḵalīl. Darvīš Beg died en route at Shiraz, and his son, Moḥammadī Beg, was nominated ambassador in his place. Moḥammadī Beg and Ḥoseyn Beg both reached their destinations, but Šāhqolī Beg spent some time at Shiraz, waiting for a propitious moment to travel, with the result that he missed the season during which it was possible to make the sea voyage to India; Mīr Ḵalīl Ḵošnevīs, the envoy sent by Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh, returned to court from Shiraz; his subsequent history will be related later.

Another event which took place this year was the marriage of Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā, the blind[6] son of Shah Tahmasp, to Kābolī Begom, the daughter of Moḥammad Ḥakīm Mīrzā b. Moḥammad Homāyūn, the Mogul Emperor. Kābolī Begom had previously been married to Šāhroḵ Mīrzā, the grandson of Shah Soleymān b. Sultan Oveys Mīrzā, known as Khan Mīrzā, b. Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā b. Sultan Abū Sa'īd b. Sultan Moḥammad b. Mīrzā Mīrānšāh b. Emir Tīmūr, who was the ruler of Badaḵšān. Šāhroḵ Mīrzā had died in India, and his widow set off for the Ḥejāz with his corpse, intending to bury it there. However, because of her fear of the desert Arabs, she never reached her destination, but entrusted her husband's body to some Arab camel drivers and herself returned to Baṣra. From there she traveled to Shiraz, where she was received with honor by Allāhverdī Khan and sent on to Isfahan. There, she was received by the members of the royal harem, and the Shah married her to his uncle, Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā, but no rapport developed between them, and they treated each other coldly.

Also this year Seyyed Nāṣer b. Seyyed Mobārak Khan was sent to 'Arabestān, and Aḥmad Khan b. Holow Khan Ardalān to his hereditary province of Kurdestan. Seyyed Nāṣer, sent as a child to the Safavid court by his father, had been brought up there and treated with special favor by the Shah. For some time, Seyyed Nāṣer had been petitioning the Shah to allow him to go to 'Arabestān to visit his aged father and stay with him, during which time one of his brothers could be sent to court, but the Shah had not hitherto permitted this. This year, it was reported that Seyyed Mobārak's elder sons, Seyyed Badr and Seyyed Baraka, had died, and that his surviving sons were still infants. The Shah therefore now consented to the return to 'Arabestān of Seyyed Nāṣer, who was getting on in years, to prevent any dynastic disturbances there.

[6] Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā was the eighth son of Shah Tahmasp. He had been blinded by Shah Esma'il II (the *Aḥsan al-Tavārīḵ* wrongly states that he was murdered by the latter). His probable date of birth is 970/1562-63, which would mean that in 1022/1613-14 he would be about fifty or fifty-one years of age.

Khan Aḥmad Ardalān had also been brought up from childhood at the Safavid court, and the Shah devoted a great deal of attention to his education, so that he could take his father's place eventually as chief of the Ardalān tribe. The Shah now sent him to his father with the following message: "Since you are now an old man, and have no helpers among the tribe, I am sending your son to remain at your side."

Both men were dispatched from the Shah's camp at Ganja when he was en route to Georgia with a punitive expedition.

Shah 'Abbas's Punitive Expedition against the Georgians

Ṭahmūraṣ b. Dā'ūd Khan b. Alexander Khan, the ruler of Kakhetia, and Lūārsāb b. Gorgīn Khan b. Samā'ūn Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, were both protégés of Shah 'Abbas. In the Year of the Dog, when Morād Pasha came to Tabriz, both princes had been at court. When they left, they had begged the Shah to let them know whenever he was going on a hunting expedition to Māzandarān, because they would very much like to accompany him. They agreed that, whenever the Shah sent a courier to summon them, they would come at once. Accordingly, the Shah had summoned them the previous winter, which he spent in Māzandarān, but the princes had detained his courier, the groom Amīrqolī, and had procrastinated, each saying he would go if the other went. They delayed their departure so long that spring, the hunting season in Māzandarān, passed, the weather began to get hot, and the groom returned without accomplishing his mission.

The two princes, at the instigation of certain Georgian troublemakers, particularly a certain Šarmazān, then formed an alliance with each other against the Shah. They convenanted with each other to be allies, as their fathers had not been; as far as possible not to leave their respective territories; and not to submit to the *qezelbāš*. By concluding this alliance, they caused the destruction of their realms. The Shah was so angered by their conduct that words and excuses could not appease him, and he decided to lead a punitive expedition against them. He would give them a last chance; he would march to Qarābāğ and, if the princes presented themselves before him, apologized for their behavior, and made amends for it by worthy service at the Shah's side, he would forgive them; if not, he would punish them severely.

The weather continuing hot, the Shah remained for a while in his summer quarters at Farīdūn and Parjīš. When the weather turned cooler, he returned to Isfahan and marched from the capital on Thursday, 2 Ramaẓān 1022/16 October 1613. Since the business of the demarcation of the frontiers had not yet been completed and the boundary commissioners had not yet returned, the Shah instructed the Ottoman ambassador to remain at Isfahan until he returned from the Georgian expedition; once all the boundary problems were settled, he would send him on his way in a fitting manner. The Shah marched slowly toward Ardabīl, being joined at intervals by contingents of Safavid troops; at Ardabīl, he spent a day visiting the Safavid shrine.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Amasya, Georgia had been divided between the Ottomans and the Safavids as follows: the districts of Meskhia, Kartlia, and Kakhetia belonged to Iran, and Bāšī-Āčūq, Dādīān, and Gūrīāl to Turkey. The Shah, anxious that his expedition to Georgia not be misinterpreted and not constitute an obstacle to the peace negotiations now in progress, a development that would be injurious to the welfare of Muslims, sent a courier, Moḥammad Beg Ṭāleš, to explain to Naṣūḥ Pasha the reasons for his expedition.

Since Ṭahmūraṣ Khan had made his decision to renounce his allegiance to the Shah and trusted in the natural strength of the mountains and forests of his land, he did not present himself to the Shah. Shah 'Abbas planned a pincer movement against him: Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, was ordered to start combing the country from the direction of Tiflis, the western[7] limit of the Kakhetia district, using as scouts Delī Moḥammad Šams al-Dīnlū and his men. This emir was from Qarābāğ, which bordered on Georgia, and knew the topography of the region. The other arm of the pincer consisted of Yūsof Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, which lies to the east of Kakhetia. The Shah himself crossed the Kor at Qūmīn-ūlamī, and camped near the Qabrī River.

When Ṭahmūraṣ heard of the Shah's approach, his complacency was slightly shaken; he mobilized his cavalry and infantry and constructed a strong defensive position in the forests, making barricades of tree trunks. The Shah was reluctant to lose one of his protégés without one last attempt to bring him back to his allegiance, and so he sent Ẓāker Āqā *qūščī* (royal falconer), who had been close to

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[7] The points of the compass are transposed in the text.

Ṭahmūraṣ while the latter was at the Safavid court, to urge him to present himself to the Shah and to warn him that this was the only way in which he could save himself. Ṭahmūraṣ claimed he was too terrified of the Shah's wrath to come in person, but he sent his mother and his two infant sons, with a delegation of Georgian nobles, priests, and monks, to intercede for him with the Shah. He asked the Shah to overlook his conduct and return to Iraq; when he was assured of the Shah's pardon, he would come in person. The delegation reached the Shah's camp on the banks of the Qabrī River, and was received with honor.

The Shah was prepared to accept the pleas of Ṭahmūraṣ's mother, when Bogrāt Mīrzā, the nephew of Lūārsāḇ the ruler of Kartlia, who had always served as a member of the Shah's retinue and was a *moqarrab* at court, partly from loyalty and partly from fear of being found out if he concealed it, showed the Shah a letter in the Georgian language which Ṭahmūraṣ had written to him. In the course of this letter Ṭahmūraṣ made various remarks which gave the lie to what his mother had been saying and were singularly inappropriate at that particular moment. The Shah was infuriated, and the efforts of those who were interceding for Ṭahmūraṣ no longer had any hope of success. Ṭahmūraṣ's mother and two children were sent to Iraq, and the Georgian nobles placed in the custody of reliable officers. The Shah marched against Ṭahmūraṣ, who abandoned his defensive position and fled toward Kartlia by little-used paths with his family and dependents and a few supporters—some five or six hundred persons in all. He joined Lūārsāb in Kartlia, and the two fled together over the Ottoman border into Bāšī-Āčūq, where they took refuge with Gorgīn Khan, the ruler of that region, who was an Ottoman vassal.

Deaths

1. This year, when the Shah was at his summer quarters of Farīdūn and Parjīš, his son Esma'il Mīrzā, who was twelve years of age, fell ill at Isfahan and died on 29 Jomādā II, 1022/16 August 1613. His body, after lying at the Imamzada Esma'il shrine in the Golbār district of Isfahan, was transferred to Mašhad when the weather turned cooler and buried within the precincts of the shrine. May his father live forever, and his fortunes be untouched by the hand of fate! I ask this in the name of Moḥammad and his descendants.

2. Allāhverdī Khan. The Khan, who had come on a visit to Isfa-

han, reached the city at the same time as the Shah returned from Māzandarān, and was received in audience. The Khan was slightly indisposed, and the Shah had a premonition, deriving from the insight he possessed by virtue of the saintly authority, the supranatural powers and the function as spiritual guide he had inherited from his ancestors, that the Khan was going to die, and he so informed those around him. A few days later, the Khan became seriously ill, and on Monday, 14 Rabī' II, 1022/3 June 1613, the fourteenth day of his illness, he died. The Shah himself, with all his emirs and nobles, escorted the bier to the place appointed for the ritual washing of corpses, and saw that all the preparations for burial were made with the utmost reverence and respect. His body was sent to Mašhad for burial in a vault which had recently been completed near the sanctuary.

By a strange coincidence, the official who had supervised the construction of this vault had happened to come to Isfahan a few days previously, and Allāhverdī Khan had asked him how the building was getting on and had questioned him about its decoration. The simple-minded Turk had replied that the vault and portico of the tomb had been finished and were beautifully decorated, and were just waiting for the Khan to set foot in them! Those present rebuked the fellow for speaking foolishly, but the Khan said, "His utterance was based on some power of clairvoyance," and the Khan's health began to deteriorate from that moment, which proves that many a true word is spoken in jest! The same day his father died, Emāmqolī Khan, the governor of Lār and an emir of the *dīvān*, was appointed governor of Fārs in his father's place, in addition to his previous governorship. The next day, the Shah visited Allāhverdī Khan's house and offered his condolences to the bereaved. Allāhverdī Khan was one of the most powerful emirs to hold office under this dynasty. During his lifetime, he was responsible for the construction of many public buildings and charitable foundations. He was a man of great forbearance, modest and chaste.

3. Šāhverdī Beg Bāybordlū, an aide-de-camp and one of the *moqarrabs* of the court, a man very close to the Shah. He had fallen ill the previous year in Gīlān, and had been taken to Māzandarān. When the Shah left Māzandarān for Isfahan, he had been too ill to accompany him, and he died at Faraḥābād early this year. He was a man of great wealth, which passed to his heirs. The story goes that, while he was in Māzandarān, some weak-minded, demented dervish

visited him and made an abusive remark to him. Šāhverdī Beg, who was a proud man, punished him severely, whereupon the dervish consigned him to God; the same day, Šāhverdī Beg was taken ill. The only result of all this was that the faith of the people of Gīlān in this crazy dervish was mightily increased.

Events of the Year of the Tiger, Corresponding in Part to the Muslim Year 1023/1614-15 and in Part to the Year 1024/1615-16, the Twenty-eighth Year of the Reign of Shah ʿAbbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Friday,[1] 10 Ṣafar 1023/22 March 1614. On Thursday, New Year's Eve, the royal army crossed the Qānoq River, which is third only to the Tigris and Oxus in size, and reached the Qeseq district, which was the fief of Šarmazān. The following day, the traditional New Year's feast was held in that delightful spot, and the Shah conferred the governorship of Kakhetia on ʿĪsā Khan b. Gorgīn Mīrzā b. Alexander, the nephew of Ṭahmūraṣ. ʿĪsā Khan had been at the Safavid court since he was a child, and had become a convert to Islam. The Shah appointed Dā'ūd Beg, the greatest of the Georgian nobles in those parts, to be his *vakīl*. Following Georgian tradition, ʿĪsā Khan was seated on a throne and gold was distributed by way of largesse, and the *qezelbāš* emirs and nobles, at the command of the Shah, followed suit and distributed gold and silver coins, gold goblets, and silver trays.

The majority of the Georgian nobles, with the exception of the few who had chosen to go into exile with Ṭahmūraṣ, rallied around ʿĪsā Khan. The Shah's authority was such that the property and possessions of the Georgian population were absolutely secure, and no rascal dared lay his hands on even a piece of straw belonging to a peasant. A few ignorant fellows who, in the course of the march through Georgia, had come across deserted houses belonging to Christians and had plundered them, had their stomachs ripped open and were paraded round the camp. This had a salutory effect, and the Georgians, who fearing the depredations of the *qezelbāš* had scattered in all directions, heard of the Shah's justice and gradually returned to their homes.

From Qeseq, Shah ʿAbbas marched to the town of Gīram (Grem), which is the seat of the Georgian rulers of Kakhetia. He camped for a time in this delightful spot, resembling the gardens of Eram,[2] which the Christians had made their abode in this world; indeed, "this world is a prison for the believer, and a paradise for the unbeliever!" There is a magnificent church, beautifully decorated, at Gīram. It is not clear whether, ever since the advent of Islam, the call to Islam has ever been heard in these parts, or whether the inhabitants of the region have seen any men of religion in this church but Christian monks, who are immersed in error. Most of the inhabitants are Christians; there are a few Jews, and none has heard more of Islam than its name. Accordingly, Shah 'Abbas, the Defender of the Faith, went to the church, and had sweet-tongued muezzins utter the Muslim call to prayer. At every church and convent he reached, he made the heavens ring with the cry, "There is no god but God, and Moḥammad is His Prophet."

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[1] 10 Ṣafar was a Saturday.

[2] Fabulous gardens said to have been devised by Šaddād b. ʿĀd in imitation of the gardens of paradise.

The Shah reached the church at Alaverdi, one of the largest and most important Christian churches in Georgia—a truly magnificent building. There, the Shah heard of the existence of a fort at Ṭarāḡāy (Torḡa), in the extreme north of the country; he heard that this fort was held by a group of Georgians who had not submitted to 'Īsā Khan, and that some of Ṭahmūraṣ's possessions were stored there. The Shah dispatched a contingent of troops under the command of Moḥammad Taqī Beg Tabrīzī, a chiliarch of the Azerbaijan musketeers. After a brief resistance the garrison fled, abandoning the fort. Among the booty found by the *qezelbāš* was a crown, encrusted with pearls and rubies, which was worn by the priest in charge of the church at Alaverdi at services on holy days and major Christian festivals, and was regarded by the congregation as a sacred relic. Expert jewelers valued it at five hundred royal Iraqi *tomān*. The Shah decided to make the church a stronghold; he had fortifications constructed around it, and stationed a detachment of two hundred Azerbaijan musketeers there to defend it, under the command of the *tofangčībāšī*[3] Esma'il Beg. The work of building the fortifications was divided among the emirs and various regiments of the army. Even though supplies of stone and lime were nonexistent in the area and had to be brought from a considerable distance, the work was completed within three weeks.

Shah 'Abbas was enraged by the fact that both Ṭahmūraṣ and Lūārsāb had taken refuge in the rugged mountain region of Bāšī-Āčūq, which was ruled by an Ottoman vassal. He vowed to pursue them wherever they fled, and not to turn back until he had taken them captive. He therefore marched from Kakhetia to Kartlia by routes so steep and narrow that the Georgian princes had never succeeded in traversing them with cavalry, particularly in the spring time, when it rained incessantly and the dense foliage of the trees shut out the rays of the sun. Officers and men thought the task of crossing such terrain difficult, if not impossible, but the march was accomplished in three days, though not without considerable loss of pack animals and members of the commissariat. On the fourth day of his march, the Shah reached the headwaters of the Qānoq and Qabrī rivers, where the ground was carpeted with poppies and other wildflowers.

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[3] This is not the commander in chief of all the regiments of musketeers, who was called *tofangčī-āqāsī*. *Tofangčībāšī* presumably denotes a rank in a regiment of musketeers.

The Arzād and Tayānāt regions of Kakhetia were ravaged by the *qezelbāš* in retaliation for the fact that the inhabitants had spirited Ṭahmūraṣ out of the country, guiding him along little-known paths, had known about his escape, had concealed him from the *qezelbāš* troops who were searching for him, and had not notified them of his whereabouts; and also in retribution for the refusal of the Georgian chiefs in those regions to tender their allegiance to 'Īsā Khan. The *qezelbāš* troops marched off into the forests, company by company, and brought back about thirty thousand captives and forty thousand sheep and cattle. After the Shah's tithe of one-fifth had been set aside, the remainder was distributed among the troops. Thirty thousand infidels were obliged to become Muslims, and this great feat will undoubtedly bring the Shah long life in this world and its reward in the next.

When the Shah reached the Aragvi River, the boundary between Kakhetia and Kartlia, he sent a message to Gorgīn Khan, the ruler of Bāšī-Āčūq:

> Peace negotiations are well advanced between myself and the Ottoman Sultan, and one of the conditions of peace is that neither party should give sanctuary to vassals of the other party. It is therefore your clear duty to extradite the two Georgian princes Ṭahmūraṣ and Lūārsāb, both of whom were brought up at my court and who have foolishly fled to your territory, and not to commit any act which might endanger the peace negotiations now in progress. If they are returned, they will be treated with royal clemency; if

> they are not returned, my troops will come and fetch them, and something untoward may occur which will give rise to regret later.

Ḵ̆āja Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of Azerbaijan, volunteered to take this message. He met Gorgīn Khan and the two princes and, by dint of employing every form of argument in the diplomatic armory, succeeded in persuading them to express a willingness to return to their allegiance. Gorgīn Khan treated Ḵ̆āja Moḥammad in a friendly manner and did his best to assist; he said that it had been impossible for him, in view of his kinship with the fugitive princes, not to admit them to his territory, but he now asked that their sins be forgiven. The Ḵ̆āja replied that this could only be achieved if the two presented themselves to the Shah. The princes said they were willing to do this if they were sure their lives would be spared. The Ḵ̆āja accordingly returned to court to make his report to the Shah, taking with him representatives of the two princes.

The Ḵ̆āja was warmly greeted by the Shah as "my devoted servant" for having performed this delicate and dangerous mission among people who, although they possessed human form, had behaved like untamed and rebellious wild beasts. The Shah instructed the royal secretaries henceforward to include the title "devoted servant of the Safavid house" among the Ḵ̆āja's official titles. To Gorgīn Ḳhan and the other princes he replied that the situation was exactly as they had been informed by his devoted servant; if Ṭahmūraṣ and Lūārsāb presented themselves at court, they would be received by him.

The Shah then decided to raid the pillage and district of Ruisi, the inhabitants of which were Christians and nominally subject to the ruler of Bāšī-Āčūq but who, relying on their mountain fastness, paid scant regard to his orders. The Shah sent a detachment of troops there under the command of Begverdī Beg Gorjī, an officer in the service of the *beglerbeg* of Fārs. These troops made their way with difficulty across mountains and through valleys deep in snow. Any who opposed them were cut down; those who fled into the mountains and forests had their dwellings plundered. Nearly five hundred captives and two thousand cattle and sheep were brought back from this expedition. The Shah decided to build two forts in Kartlia: one at Sūrān near Āḵesqa and Bāšī-Āčūq; and the other near Gori, the ancient seat of government of the rulers of Kartlia. Both forts were completed in a short space of time.

Lūārsāb's Coming to Present Himself to the Shah, and the Shah's Return from Georgia to Māzandarān

When Ṭahmūraṣ and Lūārsāb still hesitated to come to the Shah's court, the ruler of Bāšī-Āčūq and his wife, who played a considerable part in the political and financial administration, sent the following message to the Shah via Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā: "Since Lūārsāb rebelled at the instance of Ṭahmūraṣ, and his word is not to be relied upon, we suggest that you extend your patronage to our son, enroll him among the *ḡolāms* at your court, and allocate to him that portion of Kartlia which is adjacent to Bāšī-Āčūq." The Shah approved this plan, and sent Ya'qūb Khan Beg Qarāmānlū, a *qūrčī* of bow and arrow, a simple-hearted, loyal Turk who was one of the Shah's close companions, to Bāšī-Āčūq to warn Lūārsāb that, if he did not hurry to the Shah's court, Gorgīn Khan's son would be appointed governor of the whole of Kartlia and would return with him to court. This message shook Lūārsāb out of his complacent attitude, and he hastened to express his regrets to Ya'qūb Khan Beg. The latter gave him some sound advice, and Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā wrote him a letter urging him to stop following the advice of troublemakers and thus alienating himself from the Safavid court, lest all sorts of calamities befall him.

Lūārsāb accordingly put on an outward display of loyalty, but retained that black and evil heart and capacity for intrigue characteristic of Georgians. Leaving his mother and other dependents in Bāšī-Āčūq, he accompanied Ya'qūb Khan Beg to the Shah's court and, on 13 Ramażān 1023/17 October 1614 was received in audience. He was received with great honor by the Shah, but a few days' march along the road to Gori, he fled by night from the royal camp. Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā, who had been placed in charge of him, went in pursuit, found him in the vicinity of the camp, and brought him back to his quarters early in the morning. Although this behavior must have destroyed the last vestiges of any confidence the Shah may have felt in him, the Shah once again overlooked his conduct and, in order to cover his embarrassment, agreed to let him send a messenger to summon his mother and dependents. In secret, however, Lūārsāb told the latter not to come to the Safavid court, no matter how importunate the messages he might send requesting them to come.

His treachery and deceit were reported to the Shah by some of Lūārsāb's fellow countrymen, of whom there were many, both men and women, in the service of the court, including a number of Kartlian nobles who were enrolled among the *ḡolāms* and officers of the court. The Shah therefore refused to allow him to return to Kartlia, although he continued to treat him with honor and keep him at the royal stirrup. The governorship of Kartlia, as before, was left in the hands of his agents and appointees. Aqa Sohrāb Lārījānī was made commandant of the fortress of Tiflis and given a garrison of three hundred Rostamdārī musketeers. The subsequent history of Lūārsāb will be given under the events of next year.

Meanwhile 'Īsā Khan, who had embraced Islam, had been repudiated as ruler of Kakhetia by the Georgian population because he had failed to show proper respect for the cross and for Christian monks. Fearing that, once the Shah left the area, his Christian subjects would get rid of him, 'Īsā Khan abandoned his governorship and fled to Ardabīl. As a result, Bektāš Beg Torkmān was dispatched with a contingent of *qūrčīs* in the direction of Zagam to maintain order in that region. Dā'ūd Beg, the *vakīl,* was left in charge of the administration of Kakhetia, in the hope that Ṭahmūraṣ Khan would return to his allegiance, be pardoned, and take up his position again as a ruler. If he did not, the Shah would reconsider the situation, but in the meantime, he did not appoint another independent governor.

The Shah then marched from Tiflis toward Qarābāḡ, where he enjoyed himself hunting quail and francolin. His troops were sent in all directions to round up the game, and to organize a battue on the Āḡča Bodī plain. Stags with fat flanks, gazelles the envy of the gazelles of China, and all sorts of other wild animals were caught within the hunting ring. The Shah went out with his personal attendants and *moqarrabs* to hunt; when the circle became smaller, the members of the Shah's hunting party began to seize the gazelle in such quantity that there was fresh meat in camp for ten days' march. 'Īsā Khan, who had fled to Ardabīl, joined the Shah while he was engaged in hunting; his excuses for his failure were accepted by the Shah, who enrolled him again as an attendant at the royal stirrup.

The Shah camped for a few days near the Aras River and dealt with petitions from his troops before sending them on leave. He himself, intending to spend the winter in Māzandarān, traveled via Qezel Āḡāč and Āstārā along the shore of the Caspian Sea. When he reached Gaskar, he lodged at the residence of Morteżāqolī Khan, the son of Amīra Sīāvoš, the local governor. The Shah was indisposed for a few days, but recovered his full vigor, thanks to the prayers of ordinary people who lived in peace and security under the protection of his justice. The Shah went to Rašt, hunting as he went, and the main square at Rašt was hung with illuminations in his honor. He took part in wild boar hunts, of the type known as bell hunts, described earlier in my work, which are a specialty of Gīlān.

From Rašt, the Shah proceeded to Lāhījān, where the people came out to welcome him. To celebrate his visit, the local people had constructed a summerhouse, surrounded by a garden, on an island in the middle of a small lake known as Jahūd Kelāya, which was situated in the foothills; around the summerhouse booths had been erected and hung with lights. Access to the island was by boat, and the whole lake was dotted with small boats filled with beautiful women who had been gathered from the city and the surrounding area. The Shah spent a week at Lāhījān before proceeding to Māzandarān; he reached Faraḥābād on 4 Ṣafar 1024/16 March 1615, and spent the rest of the winter hunting.

Miscellaneous Events

While the Shah was on campaign in Georgia, his ambassador to the Porte, Moḥammad Beg Ṭāleš, returned and reported that the Shah's detention of the Ottoman ambassador, Enjīllū Čavoš, and his campaign in Georgia had been deliberately misinterpreted by troublemakers along the frontier and represented as a breach of the peace negotiations. He further reported that Ṭahmūraṣ and Lūārsāb had both sent a communication to the Sultan assuring him that they counted themselves servants of the Ottoman house. The Ottomans, he said, were accusing the Shah of bad faith and of breaking his covenants. The Shah decided he had to release the Ottoman ambassador and send him back with another embassy of his own designed to explain the whole situation to the Sultan and rebut the charge of bad faith, for the Koran says: "Do not break your oaths after making them firm."[4]

The Shah accordingly dispatched Ḥoseyn Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar the *mehmāndār* to Isfahan to summon Enjīllū Čavoš, and he hastily sent Ẕāker Aqa the falconer on a mission to the Porte with a letter which, after the formal opening phrases, read as follows: "Since I had resolved to raid and conduct a holy war against some of the infidels of

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[4] Koran, 16:92.

Georgia who from time immemorial had been tribute-paying vassals of the Safavid house, but had rebelled against me, I marched against them solely for the purpose of exalting the banners of Islam and punishing the rebels. Many Christian churches and other places of worship were converted into mosques." As gifts to the Sultan, the Shah sent a sample of the spoils of Georgia, including the crown described above.

Enjīllū Čavoš had meanwhile reached the Shah's camp in Georgia, and was sent on to Istanbul in the company of Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān. A communication had been received from the Sultan expressing the hope that the Ottoman prisoners would shortly be released, especially Moṣṭafā Pasha the son of Rażīya Ḳātūn, an old and faithful servant of the Ottoman house, and Moḥammad Amīn Beg, the son of Moḥammad Pasha the former grand vizier, who was the stepson of 'Alī Pasha and the foster-brother of the Sultan himself. The Shah therefore released these two high-ranking officers and sent them, suitably equipped, in the company of Enjīllū Čavoš. At the same time, the Shah issued orders for the release of all the Ottoman prisoners of war, numbering some thousand men; some were in the royal camp, others were in different parts of the empire. All prisoners who wished to return were sent with the Ottoman ambassador. None of the conditions laid down in the preliminary peace treaty now remained unfulfilled. The Shah also brought to the attention of the Ottoman ambassador the reports of the boundary commissioners on the results so far achieved, and sent copies of these reports along with the ambassador.

At this juncture, the Shah received word that Naṣūḥ Pasha's enemies had succeeded in getting him executed on various charges, and that Moḥammad Pasha, known as Öküz Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Egypt, had been made grand vizier.

One of the events which occurred this year was the flight of Moḥammad Beg and Yūnos Beg, the sons of Ḳandān Aqa, the Ottoman *moteferreqa-āqāsī*. I mentioned previously that these two young men had been taken prisoner in action, had attracted the Shah's notice, and had been made *moqarrabs* at court. The Shah lavished so many favors on them that they became the envy of all. They were allotted pleasant residences at Isfahan, and both of them married there and had children. There was no end to the gifts heaped on them by the Shah—Arabian horses, jeweled weapons, vessels of gold and silver, and similar luxury items. They were on good terms with most of the other *moqarrabs* and nobles at court, and no one suspected them for a moment of flight, treachery, or rebellion.

During the Georgian campaign this year, when the Shah was in camp at Gori in Ramażān 1023/October 1614, he had gone hunting with a number of his retainers and trusted Ottoman attendants. The two men had suddenly left the hunting party and fled, taking with them their stirrups, their ice chests, their jeweled weapons and other precious articles, their items of silver and gold, and their spare mounts, but abandoning the rest of their possessions, their baggage, their wives, and their children. They reached Āḵesqa, and from there made their way to Anatolia. The news of their flight caused great astonishment at court next day. The Shah, such was his natural clemency and kindness to foreigners, ordered that the servants and workmen attached to their household should continue to serve their dependents, and 'Īsā Khan, the chief falconer, who was a great friend of those two untrustworthy men, was ordered to take care of their children; any time they wished to leave, he was to send them on their way.

Another event which occurred this year was the arrival at court of Šāhīn Gerāy Khan b. Sa'ādat Gerāy, the ruler of the Crimean Tartars. Šāhīn Gerāy had been at the Ottoman court; after the death of his uncle Salāmat Gerāy, he had been promised the chieftainship of the Tartars. The Ottoman authorities, however, had had second thoughts, and had transferred their support to Jānī Beg Gerāy b. Mobārak Gerāy b. Eslām Gerāy b. Dowlat Gerāy; Salāmat Gerāy had died without an heir, but had married Jānī Beg Gerāy's mother, and so Jānī Beg Gerāy was his stepson. The Ottoman authorities had planned to arrest and imprison Šāhīn Gerāy, but he had discovered their plan and seized his opportunity to escape to Iran. He was received with honor by the Shah at his camp near Gori. The Shah embraced him like a brother, and gave him a place in his retinue.

During the Ottoman occupation of Šīrvān and Qarābāḡ, many of the inhabitants of those provinces had taken refuge in the Kakhetia region of Georgia and had settled there, having been given sanctuary by Alexander Khan. The Shah this year issued orders that, since these people were not natives of Georgia, all those who were Muslims, Jews, or Armenians should be transferred to Māzandarān. In addition, the loyalty of all inhabitants of Šīrvān and Qarābāḡ, including tribes resident in these provinces, who had either elected to enter Ottoman service or who had collaborated with the Ottomans and had held privileges from them or held office under them, was suspect, and the Shah decided it was not in the interests of the state to leave them in these frontier areas. Such persons were accordingly transferred to Faraḥābād in Māzandarān. Esfandīār Beg *evčībāšī* 'Arabgīrlū was put in charge of moving the Šīrvānīs, and Laṭīf Khan Beg Qājār in charge of moving the people from Qarābāġ. In all, nearly fifteen thousand families were transferred to Faraḥābād, an act which led to the development of that area. Thus exile was their punishment for disloyalty to the crown. One of the tribes of Qarābāġ, the Aḥmadlū, obstinately refused to leave, and the Shah, in his anger, sent troops among them to kill and plunder. By contrast, those who had moved to Faraḥābād lived there in peace and prosperity.

This year there occurred the execution of Farhād Beg Čerkes the falconer, who was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* and had been promoted to the office of *amīr-šekār* (master of the king's hunt).[5] He was charged with treachery, with forming a seditious relationship with the Shah's eldest son, Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā, which was displeasing to the Shah, and with encouraging him to commit various disloyal actions of the sort that lead to revolt. His disaffection was reported to the Shah by impartial informants who had observed his secret meetings with the prince. He was arrested at a royal assembly and delivered bound to the prince, who ordered his men to put him to death and expropriate his possessions.

Also this year, a number of the *ḵalīfas*[6] and Sufis of Qarāja-dāġ were executed. A number of the inhabitants of Qarāja-dāġ had from the early days of the Safavid movement been loyal supporters of the Safavid dynasty; during the period that the future Shah Esma'il I was at Lāhījān in Gīlān, hiding from his enemies, Sufis from Qarāja-dāġ maintained frequent contact with him, and the descendants of these men are known today as "veteran Lāhījānī Sufis," and by virtue of this honorable title take precedence over other Sufis. When Esma'il left Gīlān, seized the throne, and established the Safavid dynasty, these Sufis were rewarded with various kinds of tax immunities.

When the Ottomans occupied Tabriz and left Ja'far Pasha there with a garrison, one of the descendants of these *ḵalīfas*, Šāhverdī Khan the son of Ḵalīfa-ye Anṣār, who was governor of Qarāja-dāğ, turned traitor and exchanged his *qezelbāš tāj* for an Ottoman turban. He sent his son to Ja'far Pasha, and the latter's emissaries went to Qarāja-dāğ to take the oath of allegiance from Šāhverdī Khan. Šāhverdī Khan forcibly assembled most of the Sufi leaders and bade them take the oath of allegiance; some of them obeyed. The path of discipleship, and the rules governing the relationship between spiritual director *(pīr)* and disciple *(morīd)*, require that true devotees do not relinquish the hand of their perfect spiritual director *(moršed-e kāmel)* in good times or bad, but endure patiently every kind of hardship. They are required to put obedience to their perfect spiritual director before their own worldly ambitions. As already related, Šāhverdī Khan received his deserts for this dastardly crime.

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[5] See *TM*, p. 51; the falconers and officials in charge of the royal kennels were under his jurisdiction.

[6] See Savory, The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids, pp. 497–502.

This year, the Shah ordered the governor of Qarāja-dāğ, Maqṣūd Sultan, together with Moḥammadqolī Ḵolafā-ye Rūmlū, who held the position of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*, to conduct an inquiry and to purge all other traitors who had followed the example of Šāhverdī Khan. They discovered that most of the Sufis in Qarāja-dāğ who had been guilty of this crime had already died, but a number of *ḵalīfas* and other Sufis who were still alive were executed. The Shah, by ordering this purge, wished to indicate that this group from now on was no longer to be included within the circle of Sufis, and to make a clear distinction between Sufis and non-Sufis.

Another event this year was the execution of Moṣṭafā Khan Qazāqlar at the hands of Delī Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū, which took place at the small town of Šamkūr in Qarābāğ on the Shah's return march from Georgia. Moṣṭafā Khan's father, Naẓar Sultan, had gone over to the Ottomans with the whole of the Qazāqlar tribe, and had risen to the rank of pasha in Ottoman employ. After Shah 'Abbas's reconquest of Azerbaijan, Moḥammad Khan, Moṣṭafā Khan's brother, had held the fort of Lori for several years and had defied the *qezelbāš*. When the *qezelbāš* captured Ganja and the other forts in that area, Moḥammad Khan was forced to submit and present himself at court. Although he was favorably treated by the Shah and his past sins forgiven, signs of seditious behavior were frequently observed from him; eventually, as already reported, he met his end at the hands of the Georgians. His brother, Moṣṭafā Khan, was also considered unreliable, and the Shah resolved this year that the untrustworthy Qazāqlar and Donūk tribes should henceforth not be left in the frontier regions.

After the execution of Moṣṭafā Khan, the chieftainship of the Qazāqlar tribe was given to Šamsī Khan Qazāqlar, who had demonstrated his loyalty by coming to court as soon as the Shah launched his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan, even before the capture of Erīvān. At the Shah's orders, Šamsī Khan transferred his tribe from Qarābāḡ to Fārs, where it was allotted fiefs.

On his return march from Georgia, when he reached the Aras River, the Shah received an ambassador from India, Moḥammad Amīn, known as Mīr Jomla, who had come from the Deccan. He was a distinguished *seyyed* from Isfahan and was the uncle of the *ṣadr*, Mīrzā Rażī. He had emigrated to the Deccan some years previously, and had elected to enter the service of the Qoṭbšāhī ruler of Golconda. Because of his efficiency as an administrator, he had been promoted to the post of vizier, called *mīr jomla* in those parts, and had become wealthy and powerful. The Qoṭbšāh, Moḥammadqolī, died, and was succeeded by his nephew and son-in-law, Sultan Moḥammad. Mīr Jomla did not get on with the new ruler and was not accorded the same freedom of action in office as previously. Mīr Jomla told me that love of his native country and the desire to return to Iran and the delights of Isfahan, and to kiss the feet of the Shah, had overcome him. He had willynilly given away his possessions as gifts, and had obtained leave to depart; on arrival at Bījāpūr, he had also given gifts to Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh, and had left India.

At all events, he had enough jewels and other possessions left to make suitable gifts to the Shah, and he stayed for some time at court. His overweening ambition led him to make remarks displeasing to the Shah; for instance, he let it be known that he would be satisfied with nothing less than the positions of vizier of the supreme *dīvān* and *vakīl-e nafs-e homāyūn!*[7] He did not succeed in these objectives, and left the Shah's court in Māzandarān and went to Isfahan. Although in his native city he possessed excellent houses, attractive private estates, and everything he needed to live like a gentleman, he still hankered after high office, and so he decided to emigrate again. He left his children and other dependents in Isfahan and traveled to the court of the Mogul Emperor Shah Salīm. The Shah, who was glad to see him go, looked after his children.

The most astonishing event to take place this year was the execution of the Shah's eldest son, Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā, which took place at Rašt in Gīlān. For some time, a number of court sycophants and place seekers had been trying to poison the Shah's mind against his son by accusing the latter of holding secret meetings with seditious persons and plotting against his father. The Shah had attached no importance to the stories of these informers and had not raised the subject with his son, either openly or by allusion. He decided to leave the matter to God, and courageously ignored the whole affair.

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[7] Mīr Jomla had obviously got out of touch with developments in Iran during his stay in India! The office of *vakīl-e nafs-e [nafīs-e] homāyūn* had been in abeyance for many years. See Savory, Offices II.

However, when the Shah was on campaign in Georgia, these sycophantic destroyers of the Safavid house, who pretended to be loyal servants of the Shah, produced a number of the prince's servants, dependents, and retainers who on several occasions made secret reports to the Shah which convinced him of the truth of their accusations. The result was the execution of Farhād Čerkes, which I have already reported, but the Shah still refused to suspect his son and exercised his royal discretion in the matter. A Čerkes *ḡolām*, Behbūd Beg, planned to murder the prince in order to demonstrate his devotion and gratitude to the Shah. On 3 Moḥarram 1024/2 February 1614, Behbūd Beg met the prince, either by accident or design, as the latter was on his way alone to the palace to see the Shah. Without warning, the *ḡolām* attacked him and inflicted several mortal wounds. Terrified of what he had done, he took shelter[8] as other criminals had done before him, in the royal stables, which are recognized by supporters of the Safavid house as constituting sanctuary. He sent a message to the Shah saying that, since the prince had been heard to make treacherous remarks about his benefactor, he had murdered him as a mark of his fidelity and to clear the Circassian *ḡolāms* of suspicion.

The same night, the Shah ordered the *ṣadr*, Mīrzā Ražī, to arrange the funeral ceremonies. The prince's body was taken to Ardabīl for burial within the precincts of the Safavid shrine. Since the *ḡolām* had acted out of loyalty to the Shah, and since the prince's death had a number of objective and subjective advantages which will be readily apparent to persons of intelligence, the Shah pardoned the murderer and did not order any judicial inquiry. Behbūd gradually became confident that no action would be taken against him. The inner meaning of this incident was concealed from the common people, who see only the externals of this phenomenal world and know nothing of the underlying causes. However, the actual facts are as I have reported them, and I can assert this without fear of con-

[8] See Savory, article *Bast*, in *EI*², Vol. I.

tradiction. Scholars who delve deeply into the matter will see nothing but God's grand design to preserve the sacred person of His Majesty from all harm, so that God's servants may live at peace under the shadow of his justice. Amen, O Lord of the Worlds!

The last of these miscellaneous events this year was the attack on Khorasan by the Uzbegs. Taking advantage of the lengthy campaign in Georgia, which tied down the *qezelbāš* forces in that area, Yānaltegīš Bahādor crossed the Oxus with twenty thousand men. Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Marv, sent out *ğāzī* patrols to reconnoiter. The latter made contact with Uzbeg patrols and drove them back, but were forced to retire when the main Uzbeg army came on the scene. Some *ğāzīs* were killed, but the rest made a fighting retreat to Marv. Meḥrāb Khan, apprised of the strength of the Uzbeg army, strengthened his defenses at Marv and stationed musketeers at strategic points on the battlements and towers. Yānaltegīš reached Marv, camped outside the city, and sent groups of his men to ravage the surrounding countryside. These marauders penetrated as far west as Pasākūh in the Mašhad district, plundering the tribes living in the area. On hearing that Shah 'Abbas had returned from Georgia and was wintering in Māzandarān, the Uzbeg commander retired across the Oxus, taking with him many peasants from the Marv area; the rest of the inhabitants gradually trickled back to their homes.

Deaths Which Occurred on the Georgian Expedition

1. Šāhrok̠ Beg b. Ganj 'Alī Khan the governor of Kerman, one of the most powerful emirs of the Safavid state. While the *qezelbāš* were negotiating a pass between Kakhetia and Kartlia, he fell from his horse and rolled into the valley below; he died as a result of injuries to his liver.

2. Malek 'Alī Beg Tājī-büyük, the herald, who persisted in following the royal expedition to Georgia even though he was a sick man; he died in the same pass as Šāhrok̠ Beg. An Eṣfahānī by birth, Malek 'Alī Beg was an extremely witty man. He never allowed the fact that he was in pain to dominate him; on the contrary, he would raise the spirits of any whom he saw depressed with a cheerful word and a merry jest. Whenever it fell to his lot to make a proclamation about some matter, he would embellish the official announcement with striking phrases and amusing gestures. If he was ordered to

execute some criminal, he would laugh and joke with the condemned man all the way to the place of execution, so as to make the execution seem like a game for the victim. Despite all his jocularity, he could inspire awe; on occasions when he placed on his head the unique jeweled headgear which was his special perquisite, and wore his jeweled earrings dangling on both sides of his face, and came to court with his Tājī-büyük retainers, all of whom were clad in special and unusual costume, everybody trembled. The Shah mourned the loss of such an incomparable servant, and as a token of his gratitude for all his years of service, gave his office to his son, Ṣafīqolī Beg, an able young man who unfortunately did not turn out well, as will be related in due course.

3. Ṭahmāspqolī Beg Šāmlū, a veteran *qūrčī* of the sword, who was enrolled among the *moqarrabs*. He fell ill in Georgia and died there. He had no heir, so his office was conferred upon Qarā Khan Beg, a kinsman of his.

4. Shah Naẓar Beg the *yasāqčībāšī,*[9] who died on the Georgian campaign; his office was given to Yādegār Beg, his kinsman.

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[9] This office is not mentioned in *TM* but, based on the meaning of *yasāq*, it would seem that the *yasāqčībāšī* was the officer in command of troops in reserve.

Events of the Year of the Hare, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1024/1615-16 and Part of 1025/1616-17, the Twenty-ninth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

At eleven at night, on Friday,[1] 21 Ṣafar 1024/22 March 1615, the sun entered the sign Aries, and Saturday, 22 Ṣafar/23 March, was officially counted as New Year's Day. The Shah left Faraḥābād which, like the rest of Māzandarān, was fresh and green after the spring rains, and traveled to Isfahan via Fīrūzkūh.

This year, the crops in the Isfahan area were struck by blight, and the people were in distress. The Shah waived the *dīvān* dues for one year, and in addition paid cultivators of state lands a tithe of the income accruing from crops on crown lands. This bounty alleviated the lot of the peasants and of his subjects generally, and converted their expectation of scarcity into one of abundance.

After the Shah had spent a few days at Isfahan at the Naqš-e Jahān palace, his tranquillity was once again disturbed by trouble on the frontier, and his hopes of peace collapsed like a playhouse which children build in a watercourse and which is swept away by a flash flood. However, the Shah was able to deal with every crisis as it occurred.

A major crisis had arisen after the execution of the Grand Vizier Naṣūḥ Pasha, an experienced and wise administrator who was working for a peace settlement. Sultan Aḥmad I, despite the fact that several ambassadors bearing friendly letters had been sent to Anatolia and were still at Istanbul, and despite the fact that the Safavids had done nothing to violate the truce, chose to listen to the lying words of the two Georgian princes and to take offense at the minor disturbance in Georgia. The Sultan was also incited to take a tough line by some of those close to him who had been brought up in the harem or the royal palace, and who were as yet untouched by the slings and arrows of fortune, whose feet had not yet been blistered by toiling up and down the rough paths of insurrections and rebellions. It was reported that the Sultan had lost patience, had thrown covenants and sworn agreements out of the window, and had sent the new grand vizier, Moḥammad Pasha, known as Öküz[2] Moḥammad, against Iran.

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[1] 21 Ṣafar was a Monday.

As a precaution, until he knew whether this report was true or not, the Shah sent 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *dīvānbegī*,[3] to Tabriz to take up residence there with the emirs of Azerbaijan and to report the situation. Troops were sent to raze the fort at Ganja, because it could not be relied on as a defensive position. Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū Qājār, the *beglerbeg*, was ordered to transfer his seat of government from Ganja to Tiflis. 'Alīqolī Khan learned that Moḥammad Pasha had reached the frontier, intending to winter in Dīār Bakr and take the field against the *qezelbāš* in the spring. His arrival had caused a fresh outbreak of disorders in Georgia, Šīrvān, and elsewhere.

The New Disorders in Georgia and Šīrvān, and the Return of Ṭahmūraṣ Khan to Georgia

The advance of the Ottoman army caused new uprisings in the frontier areas: Dā'ūd Gorjī, who was acting as 'Īsā Khan's lieutenant, showed signs of rebellion. The Georgians of Kakhetia went in large numbers to the church of Alaverdi to celebrate a Christian festival, and the musketeers who were on guard at the church carelessly allowed too many of them to enter. After the conclusion of the service, they began rioting. Incited by Dā'ūd Beg and Tahmasp Qeseqī, a noble of Qeseq and a supporter of Ṭahmūraṣ, they attacked and killed most of the musketeers. Dā'ūd Beg at once sent a courier to Ṭahmūraṣ Khan urging him to return to Kakhetia. In Šīrvān, a number of persons who had been accused of collaborating with the Ottomans and had been sentenced to be sent into exile—in particular Malek Pīrī, known as Delī Malek 'Eṣābā'ī, who was the chief of the Turkman tribes of Qabala and Qābestān—came out in revolt. Malek Pīrī made Dāğestān his base. A group of seditious persons from Šīrvān gathered around him, and he began to ravage the frontier. He too sent a messenger to Ṭahmūraṣ declaring his allegiance to him.

Thus urged on from all sides, Ṭahmūraṣ Khan returned to Kakhetia and gathered a large army. He sent Dā'ūd Khan, the *vakīl,* against Bektāš Beg the centurion and his *qūrčīs*. The latter, not having the strength to withstand him, allowed themselves to be taken prisoner in the hope of eventually being repatriated, but the Georgians put them all to death. Delī Malek followed with a success against Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Sultan, the grandson of 'Emād al-Dīn Beg Šīrvānī and the nephew of Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa Ẕu'l-Qadar the keeper of the seal, who was governor of Areš. Delī Malek and his Šīrvānīs caught Moḥammad Sultan off his guard when he left the fort on the occasion of the arrival of his baggage train. Though Moḥammad Sultan and the small band of men he had with him fought bravely, they were all slain, and the rebels took possession of the baggage. The Sultan's retainers in the fort hoped they might be able to negotiate a withdrawal on condition their lives were spared. Delī Malek camped before the walls of the fort at Areš, and the Qorūġlū Ẕu'l-Qadar *ġāzīs* inside the fort, not being numerous enough to endure a siege, were filled with consternation and sought a way out of their dilemma. They were saved by the news of the approach of a *qezelbāš* relief force, which promptly caused the Šīrvānīs to decamp.

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[2] Not a very complimentary sobriquet! *Öküz* means ox, and hence dull, stupid.

[3] See *TM*, pp. 119-20. The *dīvānbegī* was the highest civil magistrate in the land and, since in practice *'orf* (customary law) had greater influence than the *šarī'a* (canon law), it followed that the *dīvānbegī's* judicial authority was greater than that of the *ṣadr*. From the time of Shah 'Abbas onward, he became one of the seven members of the supreme council of emirs (*TM*, p. 44).

As soon as the Shah was sure the Ottomans did not intend to invade Iran until the spring, he sent the *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* Esfandīār Beg 'Arabgīrlū, the *evčībāšī,* with a detachment of musketeers of the royal stirrup, to deal with the revolt in Šīrvān. 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *dīvānbegībāšī*[4] was ordered to march from Tabriz to Qarābāġ, together with the whole of the army of Azerbaijan, and Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oġlū and the emirs of Qarābāġ. 'Alīqolī Khan marched rapidly to Šīrvān, joining forces en route with Esfandīār Beg.

The revolts in the Šīrvān and the threat of Ottoman invasion did not prevent the Shah from enjoying himself in Māzandarān as usual during the winter. While he was there, he heard that Rostam Moḥammad Khan, who had returned to Herat after the disastrous failure of his expedition to Balḵ, wished to see him. So the Shah dispatched Zamān Beg (who at that time was still a *moqarrab* but later became *nāẓer*), to fetch him as quickly as possible, because spring was at hand and the hunting in the Mīān-kāl district of Māzandarān, and the boar hunting in Gīlān, were calling the Shah. They say that Zamān Beg covered the more than twenty stages to Herat in seven days and nights and returned with the Uzbeg prince, who was received with honor and given gifts.

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[4] There were, of course, no subordinate *dīvānbegīs*, and so the term *dīvānbegībāšī* (head *dīvānbegī*) is a solecism.

The Seizure of the Fortress of Domdom by the Barādūst Kurds and Its Recovery by Safavid Forces

Readers will recall that, after the suppression of the earlier Barādūst revolt, Qabān Khan Begdīlū, the brother of Moḥammad Beg, had been made commandant of the fort of Domdom and governor of the province of Orūmīya. One of Emir Khan Čūlāq Barādūst's wives, who came from a low-class family, and a group of Kurds were in the fortress acting as servants to the *qezelbāš* garrison; Qabān Khan thus made the fatal mistake of admitting Kurds into the fort, however base-born and apparently servile they might be. From time to time too, Qabān Khan went out hunting. Olog̈ Beg Barādūst, a kinsman of Emir Khan, who lived like an owl among the ruined forts along that part of the frontier, was in constant correspondence with Emir Khan's wife and the Kurdish servants, and had instructed them to let him know the next time Qabān Khan was absent from the fort at night. This they duly did. Olog̈ Beg arrived with about fifty of his Kurds, and his accomplices within the fort made a hole in one of the towers of the *sūloq*, which readers will remember was adjacent to the northern wall of the fort. The raiding party crept into the tower one by one. They slew the guards in their beds and killed anyone they found sleeping in any of the other towers. They then went to the bandstand and beat the drums in triumph in the name of Olog̈ Beg. All the Kurds in the fort rushed to join Olog̈ Beg; the garrison, officers, men, and servants, not knowing how large a body of assailants had fallen upon them or who they were, fled from the fort, so that by morning there was no sign of a *qezelbāš* anywhere. Thus the Kurds seized possession of the fort and everything belonging to the *qezelbāš*, and they sent orders to the Kurds in the surrounding area calling on them to help.

Qabān Khan hastened back to the fort to retrieve the situation, and by good fortune met Aqa Sultan Moqaddam, who had marched at top speed from Marāg̈a when he heard the news. Together, the two *qezelbāš* emirs attacked and routed a group of one hundred and fifty Kurds who were making their way to the fort in answer to Olog̈ Beg's summons. Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, and Šahīr Sultan Mokrī, also on their way by forced marches to Domdom, were met by a shamefaced Qabān Khan. The emirs learned that the fort was held by only a small body of Kurds, and they were planning an assault when they had an unexpected piece of good fortune. One day, Oloğ Beg was handing out gunpowder to his musketeers. A spark fell on the pile of gunpowder, which exploded and severely burned his face; he collapsed unconscious, and several of his men were also injured. The Kurds, seeing the fort surrounded by *qezelbāš* troops and learning of the rout of their reinforcements, decided there was nothing to do but try and escape. One night, they loaded what possessions they could onto their well-rested horses, lashed Oloğ Beg to a horse, opened the gates of the fort, and rode off at top speed. The emirs sent some men in pursuit, but they failed to catch them.

Thus the fortress of Domdom, after being in the hands of the Kurds for no more than eight or nine days, was recovered by the *qezelbāš*. Qabān Khan's brothers were somewhat ashamed of his negligence, but the Shah, because of their excellent record of service, did not vent his wrath on the family as a whole. Qabān Khan was dismissed from the governorship of the province of Orūmīya, which was placed initially under the jurisdiction of Pīr Būdāq Khan and subsequently given to Aqa Khan Moqaddam; a garrison of Ḵorāsānī artillerymen and musketeers from the royal household regiments, under the command of Majnūn Beg, a centurion of musketeers, was placed in charge of the fort.

The Battle between Ṭahmūraṣ Khan the Georgian and ʿĀlīqolī Khan at Boḥrān, and the Destruction of the Qezelbāš Army

When God wills a certain action, there is nothing man can do to change it, and man can only accept God's will. As I previously related, ʿĀlīqolī Khan and Esfandīār Beg, marching north with the army of Azerbaijan, reached the Aragvi River, which marks the boundary between Kakhetia and Kartlia, and camped there. Their army consisted of about fifteen thousand men, but they had marched without waiting for the arrival of the musketeers and some other regular units. The camp lay astride the road to Bāšī-Āčūq, and they thus thought to bar Ṭahmūraṣ's path should he try to reach that province. Those Georgians who had declared their "love of the Shah" and had come forward to help were sent out on patrol with the *qezelbāš*, and every effort was made to block any route by which Ṭahmūraṣ might approach and to obtain intelligence regarding his movements.

Ṭahmūraṣ was on his way to give battle to the Safavid army, but the *qezelbāš* emirs, since there was no apparent sign of him, were inclined to believe false reports put out by the Georgians that he had retreated. However, one night the Georgian patrols reported that Ṭahmūraṣ was in the vicinity, intent on battle. The *qezelbāš* emirs, although placing no reliance on these reports, prepared for battle the following morning as a precaution, and marched out to find suitable ground on which to fight. After a long wait, since their patrols still brought in no report of the enemy, they returned to camp, each unit returning to its own tents. Suddenly drums were heard, and word came that the enemy was upon them. The Georgians who had protested their "love of the Shah" had betrayed them, and had kept from the *qezelbāš* information regarding the route by which Ṭahmūraṣ was advancing—a route unknown to the *qezelbāš*.

The *qezelbāš* at once mounted again and prepared for battle, with Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, leading the vanguard; he was accompanied by other emirs from Qarābāğ —Peykar Sultan Īgīrmī-dört[5] and Delī Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū. However, because the emirs had been caught unprepared, not all units had mounted or taken up their battle stations before Ṭahmūraṣ Khan appeared on the scene with five or six thousand cavalry and launched a vigorous charge against the Safavid van, which was routed. The support troops for the vanguard, Peykar Sultan and Delī Moḥammad Sultan, were also swept aside. Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū and a number of his Qājārs were killed. The Georgians swept on, without checking rein, and hurled themselves against the Safavid center, where 'Alīqolī Khan and his Šāmlūs had their station. The Azerbaijan auxiliary troops fled without even using their weapons, and the center was also thrown into confusion, with men being cut down by the Georgians in all directions. 'Alīqolī Khan and Esfandīār Beg, both outstandingly brave men, tried to fight on to preserve their honor, but soon saw that further resistance was futile; they left the field and marched toward Tiflis. Ṭahmūraṣ entered the abandoned *qezelbāš* camp in triumph and occupied 'Alīqolī Khan's quarters, while his men took over all the *qezelbāš* possession.

Apart from Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū, the Safavid officers of note lost in this disastrous defeat were these: Ḥoseyn Khan Gīlānī, the governor of Kūhdom in Gīlān; and the centurion Ḥoseynqolī

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[5] A clan of the Qājār tribe.

Beg Ṭāleš, the son of Yādegār 'Alī Sultan. Esḥāq Sultan Mīr Ṣūfī was wounded.

Morteżāqolī Khan Gaskarī, the governor of Gaskar, who was stationed on the edge of the battlefield, attacked the Georgians in the rear after they had swept past him, killed some fifty of their infantry, and then joined the other emirs at Tiflis. 'Alīqolī Khan left a garrison at Tiflis consisting of Moršedqolī Beg, the son of Moḥammad Khan, with a detachment of Qājārs and a group of musketeers, and retired to Ganja, intending to spend the winter in the ruins of the fort there. He reported the disaster to the Shah, who although furious at the turn of events, sent comforting letters to 'Alīqolī Khan and the other emirs. In military history, he said, victory and defeat have been indissolubly connected; they should not grieve too much, therefore, at this defeat to the armies of Islam, but await his arrival; with God's help, he said, he would exact retribution on this impious enemy.

Events in Khorasan This Year

This year, one of the Uzbeg chiefs named Qarā Toğma, who had risen to prominence in the Balḵ region, gathered an army of irregulars, ultimately some five thousand men, and began making raids in all directions. He had already entered Khorasan once and had descended on the Jām, Ḵ̌āf and Bāḵarz area and ravaged the region unchallenged. Now he returned to Khorasan and clashed with the Jamšīdī tribesmen who held the fort at Karoḵ,[6] both sides suffering casualties. Failing to take the fort, he moved on to the Herat region, and finally retired toward Kohdastān with his booty. Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Herat, sent a scratch force of six or seven hundred men against them under the command of Beyrām Beg Kašta (squint-eyed) Šāmlū, but after this force had left, he reflected that it would not redound to his credit if it was defeated, and so he sent after it a second force of two hundred regulars under the command of Ḵosrow Beg (later, Ḵosrow Sultan, governor of Mārūčāq).

Beyrām Beg, passing the Uzbeg camp in the Kohdastān plain during the night, near dawn fell in with some Jamšīdī tribesmen who knew its location. He sent out a reconnaissance party that reached the Uzbeg camp while some of the enemy were still asleep. But those who were awake heard the neighing of the horses, the clink of weapons, and the braying of camels. Beyrām Beg feared that, in view of the great numerical superiority of the Uzbegs, if he waited to attack until full light and the Uzbegs became aware how few men he had with him, his men would be annihilated. Trusting in God, he attacked at the first hint of daybreak. Seven or eight hundred Uzbegs ran in panic for their horses, mounted, and a fierce struggle ensued in which the Uzbegs suffered heavy casualties. While the battle was still at its height, Ḳosrow Beg and his two hundred men descended on them like a thunderbolt. The Uzbegs heard Ḳosrow Beg's trumpets sounding, and thinking Ḥoseyn Khan was upon them, turned and fled. The *ḡāzīs'* swords flashed from their sheaths, and they returned with much booty. It was thought at first that Qarā Toḡma had perished in the battle, because no trace of him could be found, but it was later discovered that he had survived. This single victory by the Šāmlūs discouraged the Uzbegs from crossing the border into Khorasan for quite a while.

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[6] See *TM*, p. 168.

Another event which occurred in Khorasan this year was the murder of Qazāq Khan, the son of Ḥoseyn Khan the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, who was the governor of Mārūčāq. A number of men from the Arolāt Čaḡatāy tribe, under their chief Čalma Sultan, had come over to the Safavids and been allotted fiefs in the Zāva and Moḥavvalāt region. Čalma Sultan had put to death several leading men of his tribe on the suspicion of disloyalty to himself, and those who had been supporters of those men were on the point of fleeing in fear of their own lives. Another group of Arolāt tribesmen had come to Mārūčāq at an earlier date and were still there. Ḥoseyn Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, censured Čalma Sultan for his action in the presence of the elders of the Arolāt tribe, and tried to reassure the Arolāt tribesmen and dissuade them from leaving. The Arolāts, however, declared that Čalma Sultan still bore a grudge against them, and so they agreed with Ḥoseyn Khan to join their fellows at Mārūčāq. The whole group would continue in the service of Qazāq Khan. However, they did not keep their word; instead of staying at Mārūčāq, they left and joined the Uzbegs.

Their flight caused nervousness and anxiety among the original Arolāts at Mārūčāq too, and one of the young men of the tribe, a servant of Qazāq Khan and trusted by him, stabbed his master to death when the latter was in a drunken coma; no one knew whether he had acted on his own initiative, or at the instance of one of his kinsmen. As a result of the murder of Qazāq Khan, the whole group of Arolāts, either because they genuinely feared for their lives or because they were secretly disaffected, left Mārūčāq the same night and fled in the direction of Meymana.

The garrison at Mārūčāq did not dare to send anyone in pursuit of the fugitives, but immediately reported what had happened to Herat. Ḥoseyn Khan was deeply grieved by the death of his son, but it was no use fretting, and he bore his grief patiently. He sent a detachment of veterans to Mārūčāq under the command of Ḵosrow Beg in case any further disturbances should break out. When a report on these events reached the Shah, he appointed Ḵosrow Beg governor of Mārūčāq.

Finally, while the Shah was at Isfahan, Mīr 'Emād Qazvīnī the calligrapher was murdered. He was a Ḥasanī *seyyed* from Qazvin, from the well-known Seyfī family of *seyyeds*. He was a master of the art of writing the *nasta'līq* script, and his letters were well-proportioned and attractive. Mīr 'Emād was known to be a Sunni; he was murdered by a fellow Qazvīnī, Ostād Maqṣūd, the coppersmith, either in an excess of Shi'ite zeal, or to clear himself of the suspicion of being a Sunni—a suspicion that falls on most of the people of Qazvin.

The Shah's Almsgiving during the Month of Ramażān

Commencing this year, the Shah decided to give away each year, in the form of alms to his Shi'ite subjects throughout Iran, the whole income for the month of Ramażān, the month "in which the Koran was sent down"[7] and in which acts of devotion and worship are particularly incumbent upon mankind; this income was that which accrued from *dīvān* dues, taxes, leases, and rents from property. In other words, during the month of Ramażān, all men were exempt from tax demands on the part of the *dīvān*, and no creditor was allowed to hound a debtor. No one was permitted to lay covetous eyes on the peasant's bursting ears of wheat, and the threshing floors of cultivators everywhere were safe from invasion by tax collectors, who could only look longingly at them. The Shah's purpose was that every man should be able to spend the month of Ramażān in fasting and prayer, with his mind free from financial anxieties. Letters to this effect were distributed throughout the Safavid empire, and this bounty was added to those already granted by the Shah.

The Shah also turned his attention to the fines collected by the

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[7] Koran, 2:186.

aḥdāş (night watch).[8] Previous monarchs had neglected to levy the amount of taxes under this head which was entered in the official tax registers, because the collection of these fines involved judicial proceedings and the fining of the guilty parties; it is the function of the *dārūğa* to lay charges and to collect the *aḥdāş* fines, and the practice of levying as a separate tax on the public the sum entered in the tax registers as *aḥdāş* fines has naturally given rise to the suspicion in the minds of the taxpayers that they are being taxed twice over. When Shah 'Abbas was reviewing his financial administration, his sharp eye spotted this anomaly, which he brought to the attention of the accountants of the *dīvān*. The accountants all confirmed that the Shah was right, and praised him for his perspicacity. This tax was reduced throughout the Shah's dominions, and a royal order was issued that the chief accountants should enter both taxes, currently collected throughout the Safavid empire by financial officials and fiefholders, and amounting to the sum of approximately thirty thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*, in fresh ledgers at a reduced amount, and that no alterations should be made in the amounts. I hope that the Shah receives his reward for this action both in this world and the next.

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[8] The *aḥdāş* were officers under the jurisdiction of the *dārūğa* (see *TM*, pp. 82, 149). Their duty was to patrol the city at night, to arrest prostitutes, stop brawls in the taverns, break up gambling parties, and so on.

Events of the Year of the Dragon, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1025/1616–17, the Thirtieth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas, and in Particular the Punitive Expedition to Georgia Led by the Shah

It had been the Shah's policy to devastate the Kakhetia region of Georgia, to subjugate the infidels there, and to convert them to Islam, and more than one hundred thousand women and children had already been taken captive in the course of his previous campaigns. When Shah 'Abbas, who was in Māzandarān, heard that Ṭahmūraṣ had returned to Georgia and had defeated a *qezelbāš* army, his rage knew no bounds, and he resolved to lead an army to Georgia to chastise those impious people who had dared to slay Muslims. He therefore issued a general mobilization call; several thousand musketeers from Isfahan and other places in Iraq who were on the reserve were called to the colors. The Shah did not consider it expedient to meet the Georgian princes, and so he sent Lūārsāb to Astarābād and 'Īsā Khan to Damāvand, with instructions to the local governors to keep them in custody until he returned from the Georgian campaign.

At a propitious time, the Shah left Faraḥābād and marched west along the shore of the Caspian Sea, being joined at intervals by contingents of the royal army. New Year's Day fell on Tuesday, 2 Rabī' I, 1025/20 March 1616.[1] The customary New Year's celebrations were not held because of the exigencies of the campaign. At the rendezvous at Ganja, the Shah was met by 'Alīqolī Khan and the other emirs. Pīr Būdāq Khan Pornāk and the emirs who had come with him from Azerbaijan were ordered to return and keep watch on the frontier, and Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, was ordered to accompany him.

When the Shah reached Tiflis, he conferred the governorship of the province of Kartlia on Mīrzā Khan b. Dā'ūd Khan b. Lūārsāb, who had embraced Islam during the reign of Shah Tahmasp and had been honored by being given the title of khan and the style of "my uncle." From Tiflis, the Shah marched to Kakhetia; Ṭahmūraṣ, who had thought that the *qezelbāš,* because of the threat of Ottoman invasion, would not be able to send an army to Georgia this year, promptly fled to Bāšī-Āčūq.

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[1] 10th *(dahom)* in the text is a mistake for 2nd *(doyyom)*, which gives 20th March.

The Shah divided his army into several army corps, each under the command of a senior emir. Yūsof Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, was ordered to invade Georgia from the east, while the Shah himself advanced from the west; Kakhetia was thus completely surrounded by Safavid forces. In accordance with the Koranic injunction, "Slay all those who attribute partners to God,"[2] the Shah ordered his men to spare no male Georgian, to take prisoner the women and children, and to plunder their possessions. The Georgians, finding themselves trapped, fled into the forests to strongholds approached by only one path; wherever possible, they protected these defensive positions with ditches and moats. Into these strongholds, which the Turks call *saqnāq* (hideouts), they moved their troops, civilians, and belongings.

Most of these defensive positions lay the other side of the Qānoq River, which could be crossed at this time of year only by boat because it was in flood as a result of the spring rains. The Georgians had concealed all available boats. The Shah therefore left all his heavy baggage on this side of the river, in the custody of Nadr Khan Ẕu'l-Qadar the keeper of the seal, who was appointed camp commander, and Kalb 'Alī Beg Šāmlū, an aide-de-camp. He then led his men, who carried only their personal weapons, across the river, obeying the Koranic injunction: "Strive in the way of God."[3] Because of the lack of boats, however, the Safavid army lost many horses, camels, and mules.

Once across the river, the *qezelbāš* began the methodical storming of the Georgians' hideouts, and every day the heads of the slain and prisoners were paraded before the Shah. The centurion Ḥoseyn Beg Šams al-Dīnlū, who had been sent into the forests by the *qūrčībāšī* with a detachment of *qūrčīs* and other troops, came across a major Georgian hideout that housed nearly ten thousand families and the greater part of the Georgian army. A ditch, filled with water, had been dug around this hideout. The only approach was across a narrow wooden bridge. Without bothering to ascertain the size or composition of the enemy force or to make a prudent appraisal of the situation, three or four hundred of the *qūrčīs* leapt off their horses, swarmed across the narrow bridge into the hideout, and scattered in all directions in search of plunder and prisoners.

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[2] This "verse" appears to be a synthesis of Koran, 9:5 and 9:36.

[3] A recurrent phrase in the Koran—see 9:41, 22:79, and so on.

The Georgian troops rushed out to attack the *qezelbāš*. Ḥoseyn Beg was slow in sending reinforcements, and the Georgians had time to cut off the retreat of the men inside the hideout by destroying the wooden bridge. The *qezelbāš*, surrounded by the enemy and broken up into isolated groups, fought on as long as they had bullets and arrows left. They then tried to escape, but most were slain; a few men, though wounded, managed to swim across the ditch. The Shah summoned Ḥoseyn Beg and gave him a severe dressing down: "You had no orders," he said, "to attack the hideout; on discovering it, you should have made an appraisal of the strength of the enemy force and of possible approaches. Having got this information, you should then have made a report to your superior officer, who sent you on this mission. Instead, you sent a group of men, without an officer, into the middle of the enemy's hideout, with no information about it and not knowing how the men were going to get out again. If it is true that the men charged into the hideout without your orders, your concern should immediately have been to protect them by finding alternative ways of crossing the ditch and by stationing troops to guard the crossing points. You should then have brought up the rest of your troops and sent them into action against the hideout in proper battle order and with the inspiration of your leadership. If you judged it inappropriate to continue the action, you could then have brought your men out safely by the routes you had already prepared."

Ḥoseyn Beg opened his mouth to make excuses for his behavior, but since there is no acceptable excuse for incompetence in action of this sort, the executioner did not give him a chance to speak. He was put to death and his corpse paraded around the camp. After his execution, the *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* Qarčaqāy Beg was dispatched to the hideout with a strong force. In accordance with the Shah's advice, he ordered his men to cut down trees and construct bridges across the ditch at suitable crossing points; he then sent his men in to the attack in proper battle order. At various points, the Georgians had constructed stockades which they prepared to defend like forts. Qarčaqāy Beg, ordering his men not to attack the stockades, brought up artillery and smashed them one by one.

The *ḡāzīs* then went in to the attack, and fighting continued all day. Both sides broke off the action after nightfall, and the *ḡāzīs* reassembled and mounted guard for the night. In the middle of the night, a group of Georgians from the hideout, estimated at between four and five hundred men, equipped with riding horses and packhorses, some on their own, some with their women and children lashed across the cruppers of their horses, opened up an escape route at the rear of the hideout and fled to the foothills of Daḡestān. Next day, the Georgians who had stayed behind considered further resistance impossible, and fled in every direction. They ran into a group of *qezelbāš* who were combing the plains, mountains, and forests for the enemy, and the men were slain to a man, while the women and children were taken captive. The *ḡāzīs* found much booty in this hideout, and the other hideouts they discovered were systematically reduced.

The Shah remained encamped across the other side of the Qānoq River for twenty days while the *ḡāzīs* continued their mopping-up operations. Yūsof Khan and the emirs of Šīrvān, who had been advancing from the east from the direction of Zagam, followed the same routine. One day, as Yūsof Khan and his men were encamped near a river, they were attacked by a large force of Christians from Zagam. The Christians were almost annihilated, and their homes and territory devastated. In short, the whole of Kakhetia was ravaged because of the rebellious activities of Ṭahmūraṣ, and it is doubtful whether this area had ever suffered so much destruction since the advent of Islam. The number of slain exceeded sixty thousand, and the number of prisoners, including many beautiful girls, exceeded one hundred thousand. This was the number of prisoners who were paraded before the Shah, but in my estimation, more than thirty thousand more persons were taken prisoner but not recorded on the lists of prisoners of war.

Three months had now elapsed since Nowrūz. The Ottoman commander in chief was encamped in the plain of Mūš, and the Shah decided it was not wise to stay longer in Georgia. He returned to Kartlia via Mardānqūb, spent a few days at Tiflis seeing that Bagrāt Khan had everything he needed for the defense of the castle there, and then marched to Gökča Deñīz via Aḵtābād and the summer station of Meydānjūq. There he remained for three months, the period during which the Ottomans might be expected to make a move.

The Battle of Salmās, between the Qezelbāš Army and Takkalū Pasha, the Beglerbeg of Vān, and the Emirs of the Kurdish Subprovinces; and the Death of Pīr Budāq Khan

Pīr Būdāq Khan, as previously stated, had been instructed to keep watch on the frontiers of Azerbaijan, with Ganj 'Alī Khan to assist him. He had marched in the direction of Salmās to deal with some rebellious Kurds, in particular the sons of Ġāzī Beg b. Šāhqolī Balīlān, who had seized the fort of Qarnī-yarūq by guile and were raiding the Salmās area. Pīr Būdāq Khan had been joined by Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū Ostājlū; Salmān Sultan *sūbāšī* Donbolī; Ebrahim Beg, the brother of "my devoted servant" the vizier of Azerbaijan, with auxiliary troops from that province; and Moḥammad Taqī Beg, a chiliarch of the regiment of Azerbaijan musketeers. This combined force had marched to Qarnī-yarūq, and the Kurds had hastily sent a courier to Vān to seek assistance from the *beglerbeg* of Vān, Moḥammad Pasha, known as Takkalū Pasha, and from the Kurdish emirs. In response to this request, Takkalū Pasha came with his Ottoman troops, and Zeynal Khan Maḥmūdī, the governor of Ḱošāb, and other Kurdish *sanjaq-begs*, brought contingents—in all some six or seven or seven thousand men.

Pīr Būdāq Khan, who had about five thousand men with him, calculated the time of arrival of the Ottoman force at Salmās, and his calculation was confirmed by intelligence reports that came in from his scouts. He then sent a courier posthaste to Ganj 'Alī Khan, requesting him to meet him at Salmās on the appointed day so that they might jointly give battle to the Ottomans, but the plan went awry. Pīr Būdāq Khan's men arrived at the rendezvous a day early; the various units having become strung out on the march, they camped in not very good order. Ganj 'Alī Khan, on the other hand, was a day behind schedule, and had only reached Ṭasūj. Suddenly the *qezelbāš* scouts reported that they had sighted the enemy. The *qezelbāš* emirs, in a state of great confusion, sent Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū with some of his men to hold off the enemy. But before the main body had time to form up for battle, the Ottomans had swept aside Maqṣūd Sultan's outriders and were advancing in a compact mass. Maqṣūd Sultan was cut off and unable to regain contact with the main *qezelbāš* force.

The Safavid auxiliaries stationed in the rear at once took to their heels, and the main body of *qezelbāš* was overwhelmed. Pīr Būdāq Khan, conscious of the disgrace of flight, fought on stubbornly until two or three of his retainers seized his horse's reins and started to drag him away from the battlefield. Zeynal Khan Maḥmūdī came around behind him with a group of his Kurds, and wounded him without knowing his identity. One of the *ğāzīs* gallantly threw himself on Zeynal Khan, but was cut down by the other Kurds. At that moment, Pīr Būdāq Khan died of his wound.

Salmān Sultan *sūbāšī* and Moḥammad Taqī Beg managed to gain the shelter of a walled garden with some of their men, and they kept up a steady fire on the enemy through cracks in the wall. The enemy, content with their victory, camped on the spot, and collected all the *qezelbāš* possessions outside the walled garden. The next day, they launched repeated attacks against the garden, but were driven back by musket fire. The news that the Shah was marching back from Georgia caused the enemy to retire, and the gallant band in the garden were able to withdraw toward Tabriz.

Meanwhile, Ebrahim Beg and other fugitives from the Safavid army had reached Ganj 'Alī Khan at Ṭasūj. The latter did not consider it within his power to go to the assistance of the men holding out in the garden, and he fell back on Tabriz, intending to mobilize more troops before engaging the enemy. He found panic reigning in the city, where the populace hourly expected the arrival of the Ottomans. His own arrival, followed by the news that the Ottomans had retired, calmed the Tabrīzīs.

Ganj 'Alī Khan's report on the situation reached the Shah on the march between Aḳtābad and Gökča Deñīz and cast gloom on those with the Shah, especially the Turkman[4] tribe. The Shah, however, received the news with his customary *sang-froid,* and appointed Pīr Būdāq Khan's son *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan and governor of Tabriz, with the rank of khan, in recognition of his father's bravery. Salmān Sultan *sūbāšī* who had also fought gallantly, was also promoted to the rank of khan, and Moḥammad Taqī Beg received marks of royal favor. Hearing that the Ottoman commander in chief was on the move, the Shah sent Ḥasan Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Hamadan, in the direction of Tabriz, and ordered Kalb 'Alī Beg Šāmlū, an aide-de-camp, to collect the frontier emirs and keep watch on the border.

[4] Pīr Būdāq Khan was a Turkman.

The March of the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Moḥammad Pasha, toward Azerbaijan, His Siege of Erīvān, and His Return without Achieving His Objective

After Sultan Aḥmad I had wilfully destroyed the chances for peace, after preliminary covenants had been sworn and exchanged, Moḥammad Pasha (known as Öküz Pasha) had collected a huge army from Rumelia, Anatolia, Menteše-īlī, Egypt, Syria, Aleppo, Trablos, Trebizond, Upper Mesopotamia, and Erzerum, and from contingents sent by the Kurdish *sanjaq-begs*. It was the largest and most capable army ever sent against Iran by the Ottomans. In its ranks were all the Ottoman viziers, pashas, and principal officers of state—even the *yeñīčerī-āğāsī* (Aga of the Janissaries), who normally never left the Sultan's side. The army was equipped with an abundance of guns of all kinds.

The Shah's first move was to see to the defenses of the fortress at Erīvān. He sent a force of Qājār *qūrčīs* and a strong contingent of musketeers from the Isfahan, Khorasan, and other regiments, under the command of their respective officers: Mīr Fattāḥ, chiliarch of the Isfahan musketeers, an experienced officer especially skilled in the art of defending fortresses; Aḥmad Sultan Močakī[5] Ḵorāsānī; Mollā-zāda-ye Bāfqī; and others. This force was sent to reinforce Emir Gūna Khan at Erīvān. From the Kūbīklū tribe, too, a group of doughty *qezelbāš*, that is to say, men who have a natural desire to perform valiant deeds, was dispatched to Erīvān with fine promises of royal favor if they distinguished themselves.

The Ottoman commander in chief arrived before the walls of Erīvān on 13 Šaʻbān 1025/26 August 1616. Thanks to the presence of the Aga of the Janissaries and men who were skilled in siege warfare, and of Türkča Bīlmez, the governor of Āḵesqa, who was always uttering empty boasts along this frontier, the capture of Erīvān was thought to be an easy matter. More than one hundred thousand Ottoman troops, experts in siege warfare, surrounded the fortress. Shah ʻAbbas decided against committing his troops to a pitched battle; instead, he divided his army into various corps and dispatched them to Erīvān with orders to shadow the Ottomans and take advantage of any opportunity which presented itself to make limited attacks on a section of the Ottoman camp. The *moqarrab al-ḥażrat*

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[5] The vocalization of the name of this tribe, which was of eastern origin, is uncertain—*TM*, p. 17, gives merely "M. ch. Ki."

Qarčaqāy Beg, who had recently been promoted to khan with the title commander in chief of Iran *(sepahsālār-e īrān)*,[6] led one of these army corps, which consisted of *qūrčīs, ḡolāms,* and the pick of the retainers of the royal stirrup. Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, was ordered to approach the Ottoman camp from the east; Ḥasan Khan, Ganj 'Alī Khan, and the other emirs who were at Tabriz with Kalb 'Alī Beg Šāmlū, the aide-de-camp, were ordered to join forces with Emāmqolī Khan. Delī Moḥammad Šams al-Dīnlū was ordered to approach the Ottoman camp from the west, i.e., from the direction of Erzerum, with specific orders to cut the Ottoman lines of communication.

Qarčaqāy Beg detached from his corps a troop of veterans, under the command of Ḵalaf Beg *sofračī* (the sewer),[7] and sent them to a place called Kona-gīr, situated on the slopes of a mountain one *farsaḵ* north of the fortress, and thus located between the fort and the royal camp. The duty of this group was to keep open communications between the fort and the royal camp, and to ensure safe passage for any couriers going between the two. Qarčaqāy Beg held his main force in readiness to go into action whenever an opportune moment presented itself. He sent out experienced patrols in every direction to obtain intelligence regarding the enemy. Emāmqolī Khan and the other emirs kept constantly on the move, probing the enemies' defenses all the time, and maintaining close contact with one another. The Ottomans were not allowed to relax for a moment, and were forced to maintain a force of up to fifty thousand men ready for instant action. In other words, about half the Ottoman army was prevented from taking part in the siege operations.

When the weather in the Shah's summer quarters at Gökča Deñīz turned cold, the Shah moved his camp to Alākīs, near Gökča, which has a very pleasant climate. Meanwhile the Ottoman officers were prosecuting the siege with great vigor. In several places, breastworks and trenches had been pushed forward, and cannon placed in these forward positions bombarded the fort night and day; the artillery was directed by both Ottoman and European gunners. On the other side of the fort, a mound of earth designed to rise higher than the walls was gradually being pushed forward. Emir Gūna Khan and his men expended every effort to defend the fort, and the Shah sent daredevils every day to get an up-to-the-minute report on conditions. This evidence of the Shah's concern and support kept the morale of the defenders high, even though they were faced by an enemy renowned for their skill in siege works.

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[6] It is probable that this ancient title was revived by Shah 'Abbas when the *qezelbāš* were no longer the principal, or even the majority, element in the Safavid army, the point being that the terms used for commander in chief under the early Safavid empire, first *amīr al-omarā* and later *qūrčībāšī*, were irrevocably associated with the *qezelbāš*.

[7] The OED defines "sewer" as "An attendant at a meal who superintended the arrangement of the table, the seating of the guests, and the tasting and serving of dishes." I.e., an officer of the royal household.

One day, the Ottomans made an assault on one of the gateways of the fort which had had two or three of its towers destroyed by artillery fire. But they were repulsed with heavy casualties by heavy cannon and musket fire from gunners who, without the slightest exaggeration, were capable of hitting the eye of an ant if it presented itself as a target. The Shah thought it prudent to reinforce the garrison with a thousand musketeers from the musketeers of the royal stirrup regiment. The reinforcements moved by night and took up their station at Kona-gīr with Ḳalaf Beg, and informed Emir Gūna Khan of their intention. In the darkness before dawn, Emir Gūna Khan opened the north gate facing Kona-gīr, and the musketeers ran like the wind and hurled themselves into the fort. The impartial reader must admit that to pass a thousand armed men through the lines of such a huge enemy army and to get them safely into the fort was a victory in itself. The drums were beaten in the fort to celebrate this feat.

The Ottomans, informed of this piece of audacity, stepped up their bombardment and pushed forward their breastworks with redoubled energy. One day, the Aga of the Janissaries and Türkča Bīlmez, with several pashas who had had more experience of handling artillery than the other officers, came up to the gun positions and directed the artillery fire. As chance would have it, a lucky shot from one of the cannons in the fort struck the Aga of the Janissaries, Türkča Bīlmez, and a third man, who happened to be standing one behind the other.

The Ottomans who were pushing forward the mound of earth had now reached the ditch and had started to fill it in when the Qājār *gāzīs* and other troops from the fort made a sudden sortie against them, slew some behind their breastworks and earthworks, and took prisoners and captured a lot of weapons. Every day, there were clashes between defenders and besiegers. Some of the enemy were brought before the Shah for interrogation, and with one voice they declared that a general assault on the fort was planned for a certain day, the point of the assault being an area of the wall where Ottoman fire had caused cracks to appear in several of the towers. The Shah at once sent a man into the fort to warn the garrison to be on their guard that day and to fight like men; at the same time, he ordered his emirs to be ready to sound the general advance if the Ottomans carried out their plan of attack.

On the appointed day the Ottoman assault began, and the attackers were met by determined fire from muskets and bows. The assault went on from morning till noon, and the Ottoman dead began to pile up against the walls. The Ottoman commander in chief called off his men, but only as a ruse, and immediately launched a second attack, thinking to catch the defenders off their guard and exhausted. The *ğāzīs,* worn out by their exertions and weak from not having eaten all day, had not yet reached their quarters when a sudden din heralded a second assault. They rushed back to their positions on the battlements and repulsed this second assault too, again with heavy loss to the Ottomans.

The morale of the defenders was now higher than ever, while that of the attackers had sunk proportionately. All the defenders had performed prodigies of valor, but especially the Qājār *ğāzīs.* As the siege dragged on, a shortage of food began to make itself apparent in the Ottoman camp. With the onset of wintry weather, sickness began to affect the Ottomans too, and men died every day. The Ottoman commander in chief began to despair of taking the fort, and on several occasions sent Ḵalīl Aqa to discuss peace with the Shah, and in return the Shah sent first, Sārū Beg Begdīlū, and second, Čerāğ Sultan Gerāmpā Ostājlū. Details of these negotiations will be given below, but first, I must describe various encounters between Safavid and Ottoman troops outside the walls of the fortress of Erīvān.

Encounters Which Took Place between Safavid and Ottoman Troops outside the Wall of the Fortress of Erīvān during the Course of the Siege

I have already described how the Shah divided his army into various corps with the object of surrounding the Ottoman camp and harrying the attackers whenever the occasion arose. Every day, there were clashes between Safavid and Ottoman troops, and the heads of the Ottoman dead and the captured weapons were displayed to the

Shah. It would take too long to describe all these encounters, so I will content myself with describing the principal ones.

The first of these occurred when the Ottomans, their food supplies almos exhausted, sent out a forage party in the direction of Korpī on the road to Nakčevān; this party consisted of grooms under the command of a number of *mīr-sanjaqs* and *ala-begs,* and having with them two thousand horses, mules, and donkeys. Emāmqolī Khan led the army of Fārs against this forage party; he descended on it like a thunderbolt when the Ottomans had reached a village and the men had dispersed inside the houses in search of provisions. About one thousand five hundred Ottomans were slain or taken prisoner, and several thousand horses, mules, and donkeys fell into Safavid hands, together with captured weapons. The survivors made their way with difficulty back to the Ottoman camp.

The second encounter occurred soon after Emāmqolī Khan had been joined by Ḥasan Khan, Ganj 'Alī Khan, and the emirs who had come from Tabriz with Kalb 'Alī Beg. The whole force was encamped near the river Karrī-čay when it was attacked by an Ottoman force of four thousand men and sixty or seventy standards. Qarčāqay Beg's spies and scouts had reported the approach of this Ottoman force, and he had immediately warned the emirs, who had time to send their baggage and other impedimenta to higher ground and prepare themselves for action. Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, and Begverdī Beg, Emāmqolī Khan's lieutenant *(vakīl),* led their men in a charge in which some twenty of the Ottoman advance guard were killed and a number of others captured. Ganj 'Alī Khan, who was an old hand at warfare, prudently called his men back when the Ottoman main body came in sight and rejoined his own center, which formed up in a good position on rising ground. Begverdī Beg, being a more impetuous officer, did not immediately withdraw his men, but was eventually forced to do so and to rejoin his center after losing about fifty musketeers, though not frontline troops. After this skirmish, the Ottomans declined battle and withdrew.

The third encounter occurred between Kalaf Beg and Delāvar Pasha, who repeatedly tried to dislodge the *qezelbāš* from the vital station at Kona-gīr, which kept open the lines of communication to the fort. He made one particularly determined effort to assault the *qezelbāš* position, but the *qezelbāš* made an equally determined charge against the Ottomans, and after heavy fighting defeated the attack and returned to their positions. In the course of the fighting, Jahāngīr Khan Baḵtīārī, a Lor chieftain who was under Ḵalaf Beg's command, launched his two hundred Lors against a much more numerous group of the enemy and was almost taken prisoner. But aided by fortune (as the name of his tribe suggests),[8] he and his men succeeded in hewing their way to safety. After they had been repulsed, the Ottomans brought up more troops, but did not dare to make another attack, and finally retired.

The fourth encounter occurred between Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū, the governor of Naḵčevān, and a group of Ottoman and Kurdish reinforcements who were on their way to Erīvān from Vān and Kurdestan. Maqṣūd Sultan intercepted them, slew many of them, and pillaged their baggage; he also intercepted a camel train belonging to Ḥāfeẓ Pasha which was on its way to Erīvān.

The fifth encounter involved the capture of an Ottoman baggage train belonging to Delāvar Pasha and other pashas from Dīār Bakr. This incident occurred during the Ottoman withdrawal from Erīvān, and Tīmūr Beg *ev-oğlū*, an aide-de-camp, intercepted this baggage train as it was on its way to Vān with an escort of Kurds.

Finally, Delī Moḥammad Šams al-Dīnlū, who had been sent in the direction of Qārṣ and Erzerum to keep watch on enemy movements, on several occasions intercepted groups of Ottomans and overpowered them. He captured the *čavošes* who were on their way from Istanbul to Erīvān with orders for the Ottoman commander in chief, and also couriers dispatched by the latter with reports for the Sultan, and all these documents were forwarded to the Shah.

The Withdrawal of the Ottoman Army and Renewed Peace Negotiations

When the Ottoman commander in chief, despairing of being able to capture the fortress of Erīvān, reopened peace talks, he accused the *qezelbāš*, through their negotiator Čerāḡ Sultan, of having violated some of the conditions of the preliminary peace treaty negotiated between Naṣūḥ Pasha and the *ṣadr* Qāżī Khan. But the Shah denied the charge and asserted that all the conditions laid down in the preliminary treaty had been observed. It was the Ottomans, he declared, who had broken the preliminary agreement without reason,

[8] A pun on the two words *baḵt* (fortune) and *yārī* (assistance).

and had recommenced the fighting. What had they achieved, he asked, during the holy month of Ramażān, the month of fasting, except the shedding of blood and the incurring of loss in this world and the next. Now the Ottomans wanted to talk peace again; well, his terms had not changed, said the Shah. If Moḥammad Pasha wanted to discuss the actual terms of the preliminary treaty, Qāżī Khan was still alive even if Naṣūḥ Pasha was not, and he could ask him, or any of the Ottoman officers who were with him and had been privy to the discussions, such as Delāvar Pasha, Bāqī Pasha, and Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha. If there was any query about the report of the boundary commission, a copy of the text was available, authenticated by the seals of these officers. If Moḥammad Pasha wished, said the Shah, he would send Qāżī Khan to discuss matters with these pashas face to face.

It was so agreed, and Qāżī Khan went to the Ottoman camp to reaffirm the bases of the peace treaty. On 25 Šavvāl 1025/5 November 1616, however, before Qāżī Khan had arrived in the Ottoman camp, Moḥammad Pasha had sent an envoy to Emir Gūna Khan to inform him that peace had been concluded between himself and the Shah, and that consequently he was withdrawing his forces to Erzerum. Qāżī Khan met the Ottomans on the march. He was received with honor by the pashas, who begged him to accompany them to Erzerum, because they were nervous about possible pursuit by the *qezelbāš*. At Erzerum, the preliminary peace treaty was reaffirmed on the same basis as before; Qāżī Khan was then given leave to depart, and Moḥammad Pasha and the other Ottoman nobles continued on to Istanbul.

During this campaign, the Ottomans lost close to forty thousand men, either killed during the siege of the fort or in the various encounters outside the fort, or dying from cold or sickness. Countless mules and camels died from lack of fodder. Qāżī Khan and his companions used to relate how, in the course of their retreat, the Ottomans never stayed more than a night anywhere, and went on without resting. At every stage of their journey, an Ottoman cemetery would be created as they buried the day's dead. At every stage, too, they left behind so many tents through lack of pack animals to carry them that it seemed as though the army had not in fact marched. At least half the army was forced to march on foot.

At an early stage of the siege, Ḳāja 'Alī Akbar Eṣfahānī, who was descended from the Ẕu'l-Nūnī shaikhs and was a member of the royal secretariat, had a dream in which he asked some person he met what the outcome of the struggle for Erīvān would be, and this person had replied that "victory would go to the son of 'Alī." I started thinking whether this phrase could be fitted into a chronogram, and I finally managed it by dint of adding the words "the exalted, the saint" after 'Alī.[9] All the inmates of the fort, good Shi'ites all and devoted supporters of the Safavid dynasty, kept the day of their deliverance from the enemy as a festival, and Ḵāja Moḥammad Yūsof Qazvīnī, another member of the secretarial profession, devised this chronogram: "Today is a festival for Shi'ites."[10]

After the withdrawal of the Ottoman army, the Shah sent his heavy baggage to Bargošāṭ and went to inspect the new fortress of Erīvān, which had been constructed in the Year of the Horse but had not been seen by him. He loaded Emir Gūna Khan and the other officers at the fort with honors, and conferred on Emir Gūna Khan, in recognition of his valor, the title of blond lion *(sārū aṣlānī).*

It is well known that the Ottomans learned the art of siege warfare from the Europeans and then became superior to them in the subjugation of fortresses, because they have captured from the Europeans several fortresses of great strength, such as that at Constantinople. During the reign of Shah 'Abbas, the *qezelbāš* surpassed the Ottomans in capturing castles, taking from them several notable fortresses such as the old and new forts at Erīvān, and the forts at Ganja, Šamāḵī, Darband, Tiflis, and elsewhere, all of which were well-garrisoned and provisioned. The garrison at Erīvān held the fort for two and a half months against more than one hundred thousand Ottomans, and Bābā Sultan Qalandar Qomī, who belonged to one of the dervish fraternities which had special initiation ceremonies of girding and so on, composed a quatrain on the subject.

After inspecting the fortress, the Shah moved to winter quarters in Qarābāg. After reviewing his troops at Naḵčevān, he sent them on leave. He caught up with his heavy baggage at Bargošāṭ, and then went on a hunting expedition along the river Kor. Since the subjugation of Georgia had still not been completed to his satisfaction, the Shah chose the plain of Dāneqī, on the other side of the Kor, as a

[9] The chronogram *fatḥ az pesar-e 'alī-ye 'ālī-ye valī* produces the correct date, 1025/1616.

[10] The words *āmad emrūz shī'īānrā 'eyd* yield the correct date, 1025/1616.

suitable spot for his winter quarters. Qāżī Khan, the *ṣadr,* arrived from Erzerum and was received in audience by the Shah; he reported on his discussion with the pashas regarding the peace terms. But once again the hopes of peace did not materialize: A group of high Ottoman officials, who held the real power in the state, in their eagerness to rise even higher, and in particular to wrest the office of grand vizier from Moḥammad Pasha, charged the latter with dereliction of duty in his conduct of the siege of Erīvān. As a result, Sultan Aḥmad dismissed him from the office of grand vizier and from his post as commander in chief, and replaced him by Ḵalīl Pasha.

The following year, the Year of the Serpent (1026/1617), the Sultan sent Ḵalīl Pasha to Dīār Bakr to winter there and mobilize yet another Ottoman army for the invasion of Iran in the spring of the Year of the Horse (1027/1617-18). He was to be joined by Jānī Beg Gerāy Khan, the chief of the Crimean Tartars, with twenty thousand men. However, "man proposes, but God disposes," and Sultan Aḥmad was suddenly taken ill and died. As the deceased Sultan had only infant sons, the principal officers of the Ottoman state chose as his successor his brother Sultan Moṣṭafā, who was known to be mentally deranged and for that reason had not been put to death in the customary manner on the accession of Sultan Aḥmad. After Sultan Moṣṭafā had been on the throne for six months, a group of nobles, tired of his reign, transferred their allegiance to Sultan Aḥmad's eldest son, 'Oṣmān, now a boy of twelve, and deposed Sultan Moṣṭafā.

Sultan 'Oṣmān proceeded with the plans to invade Iran in the Year of the Horse (1027); Ḵalīl Pasha was defeated at the battle of Sarāb and, like his predecessor, decided after being defeated to resume peace negotiations. Once again, not only did the Ottomans gain no advantage from this campaign, but their Tartar allies caused a great deal of devastation in Ottoman territory. But I will give full details of all these events in book III, as I promised, if I am spared to record them as Shah 'Abbas's reign goes into its second thirty-year period.

Events Which Occurred While the Shah Was in His Winter Camp at Dāneqī

Despite the severity of the Shah's punitive expedition to Georgia in 1025/1616, which had devastated and depopulated the country, his wrath was still unassuaged, particularly since he had received reports that Delī Malek Šīrvānī, Dā'ūd Gorjī, and Tahmasp Qeseqī had entered Kakhetia and were busy raising a fresh army from the scattered survivors of the previous campaign and from among the Georgian peasantry, who were living a miserable existence, a group here and a group there, in the plundered ruins of their homes. The Shah delegated the *qūrčībāšī*, 'Īsā Khan, to take a force of *qūrčīs*, *ḡolāms*, and musketeers to Georgia. The Qeseq district was the first to be swept clean; the men were to be put to the sword, and the women and children taken captive.

The Safavid troops discovered where Dā'ūd's hideout was, and pushed their way to it through dense forests over paths covered with snow. Dā'ūd learned of their approach just before they arrived; he abandoned his possessions and fled with some of his womenfolk, making for Dāḡestān by narrow, snow-filled tracks. His party was still in sight when the Safavid troops reached the scene. They pressed the pursuit with great determination along tracks so narrow that it was quite impossible for two horsemen to ride abreast along them. Most of the Georgians sent their women ahead on horseback, and they themselves made their way in ones and twos through the forests, prepared to fight their way to safety. Ḥasan 'Alī Beg, the brother of Peykar Sultan Īgīrmī-dört, who had outstripped his colleagues in the pursuit, was killed by a musketball. The centurion Bagtar Beg Evoḡlū, the son of Abu'l-Qāsem Beg the *ābdārbāšī* (chief of the department which supplied cooling drinks to the Shah), came up and was stringing an arrow to his bow when he was struck in the chest by a musketball and rolled from his horse. Mīr Fattāḥ Eṣfahānī, the chiliarch, came from behind and leaped on Bagtar Beg's horse, but he too was hit and died later of his wounds. The cost of pursuing this small group of Georgians was becoming too great, and as the sun was also setting, the pursuit was called off. Once again Dā'ūd and his fellow rebels escaped their appointment with death.

However, some ten thousand prisoners were taken—the cream of the Georgians, who had escaped the first punitive expedition but were captured this time because their escape routes were blocked by heavy snow. The weather was also intensely cold. A great quantity of booty fell into the hands of the *ḡāzīs*. The northern part of Kakhetia, being adjacent to the Dāḡestān border, had always been exposed by raids by Dāḡestānīs who were on the lookout for captives. This year, because the province of Kakhetia was in such a chaotic state and there were no Georgian forces guarding the frontier, the Dāḡestānīs penetrated deeper than usual in their search for prisoners. Only small groups of inhabitants had remained in this part of the province, hiding in holes and corners in the forests—but even these few, in fear of the Lezgīs from Dāḡestān, now fled over the border into Kartlia, Bāšī-Āčūq, or Didoeti. This northern part of the province became completely depopulated. Thus, through the folly of Ṭahmūraṣ, this rich province, which had substantial annual revenue, was ruined. Several thousand families of the Anīsel tribe and Georgians from Zagam and neighboring regions, preferring exile to the prospect of being plundered and taken captive by the Lezgīs, asked to be transferred to Māzandarān. The Shah granted their request and moved them to Faraḥābād.

The Shah had heard that the people of Dāneqī, subjects of the governor of Ganja, had shown signs of disaffection during Ṭahmūraṣ's rebellion and that some of them had supported him. They had put to death a number of Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū Qājār's retainers who were stationed there. After his arrival in Dāneqī, the Shah held a judicial inquiry; when the guilt of the suspects had been proved, he executed the local chief and some thirty or forty of his nobles. Others, whose loyalty was somewhat doubtful, were transferred to Faraḥābād.

While the Shah was in winter camp at Dāneqī, he received envoys from the local governors of Dāḡestān and Ṭabarsarān, who brought him gifts. The envoys were given robes of honor and other marks of royal favor, and the affairs of those regions were settled to the Shah's satisfaction. Since this year had been one of signal success for the Shah—the Ottomans repulsed from Erīvān, and thousands of infidels slain—he needed the slight reverse his forces suffered in Khorasan to prevent things from being too perfect. Toward the end of the year, a raiding party of one thousand two hundred Uzbegs under Moḥammad-qolī Dūrman ravaged the Saraḵs and Herat region. Ḵosrow Sultan, the governor of Mārūčāq, led a body of men against them. He was joined by Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Saraḵs. Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan was the son of the celebrated Mīr Ḥoseyn Sultan Fīrūz-jang, and he brought with him a contingent of Čaḡatāy troops who regularly displayed their military prowess in clashes with the Uzbegs along the frontier.

Ḵosrow Sultan, confident of his own valor, carelessly selected an unsuitable site for the battle; strive as he might, he was eventually defeated and left the field. Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, an experienced veteran, could not bear the disgrace of flight, and so led his Čaḡatāys in a charge against the enemy. His son, Mīr Sultan Ḥoseyn, was killed in this charge. Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, grieving for his son, was even more determined not to live now that his son was dead; he fought so stubbornly that, in the end, he and the band of Čaġatāys with him were all killed. The rest of his men then withdrew to the banks of a nearby stream and took up defensive positions behind it. They fought on doggedly until nightfall, when they were able to withdraw safely. The Shah, who always recognized what he owed to those who served him loyally, appointed Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn, another son of Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, governor of Saraḵs with the rank of khan, and transferred to him his father's fiefs.

Deaths This Year

1. The *'Allāmat al-'Olamā* (most distinguished *mojtahed)* of his time, Mīrzā Ebrahim al-Ḥasanī al-Hamadānī, about whom I had something to say in my biographical sketches of *seyyeds* and theologians of the time of Shah Tahmasp, in book I. Mīr Fānī Kermānī devised the following chronogram to mark his death: "With a heavy heart I told him the year of his death, 'may the tree of paradise be his station.' "

2. Seyyed Mobārak Khan, the ruler of the Ḥavīza region of 'Arabestān. He was a Shi'ite *seyyed* of pure faith who, after the death of Shah Tahmasp, brought that province under his control by the strength of his good right arm, and became governor of it. Before his accession, he had from time to time been at loggerheads with the *qezelbāš* emirs in the area, but, after the accession of Shah 'Abbas, he pledged his allegiance to him and sent his infant son, Seyyed Nāṣer, as an earnest of his good behavior. Seyyed Nāṣer was brought up at the Safavid court. This year, shortly before his father's death, Seyyed Nāṣer was given permission to go to 'Arabestān. After his father died, he inherited his kingdom, but he too died before the year was out. In accordance with the wishes of the elders of the tribes in the area, the governorship of 'Arabestān was conferred on Seyyed Mobārak's nephew, Seyyed Rāšed.

3. Mīr Fattāḥ Eṣfahānī, the chiliarch, who was killed in action in Georgia, as already related. His eldest son was given his position, with the title of Mīr Fattāḥ the second.

Epilogue to Books I and II

Exponents of the secretarial art and annalists and historians have produced prodigious quantities of the most exquisite prose as their memorial; although any attempt of mine to emulate them must necessarily fall short of the mark, and although people say that there is nothing new left to say in the world, I offer this epilogue to my readers, judging it, thanks to the grace of God, to be not entirely devoid of literary merit.

In the preface to this work, I dared to state that my purpose was to write a history of Shah 'Abbas, who considers himself, such is the purity and sincerity of his faith, to be the personal servant of the Commander of the Faithful, the Imam of Muslims, 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb (the blessings of God be upon him and his immaculate descendants!), and takes pride in this relationship (which is a mystery). I undertook to write my history without undue literary elaboration, and without worrying too much about elegance of phrase or the use of metaphor. In this way, I hoped my history would be a useful tool for other scholars and historians. Now God be praised that I have completed my task, and have recorded in book I the events of the reign of Shah 'Abbas from his birth, when Khorasan was filled with the luster of his future greatness, up to the time of his accession to the throne of Iran. In book II, I have brought the story down to the time of writing, which is the year 1025/1616-17 and completes the first thirty years of the reign of Shah 'Abbas. My hope is that, when the rulers and monarchs of the world study his achievements, they will take them as their model and exemplar. My hope is, further, that my history will meet with the approval of Shah 'Abbas, and that it will be spared the criticism of the envious and the ignorant. Finally, I hope that it will pass muster with students of history, and that they will derive enjoyment from it. God willing, if I am spared, I will continue the history of Shah Abbas in a third volume, and so I will leave the real epilogue until the completion of that. Verily, God does what he wishes, and ordains whatsoever he desires![1]

O Lord, of Thy boundless grace,
Grant me a place within the precincts of Thy
throne;
Turn the night of my misfortune into day,
Strengthen my heart with the hope of reaching
this goal.

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[1] A combination of Koran, 22:19 and 5:2.

Book III

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

Praise and thanksgiving to the Creator of heaven and earth, who has given order to this world through the medium of kings who are defenders of the faith and dispensers of justice; and salutations to that title page of the book of prophethood, Moḥammad (the blessings of God be upon him and his family and his pure descendants!), and especially to that progenitor of the immaculate Imams ʿAlī, who proves the truth of the Tradition of the Prophet: "I am the city of knowledge, and ʿAlī is its gate" (the blessings of God be upon ʿAlī and all the Imams, who are the repositories of knowledge, the most excellent men of the faith, and guides on the paths of designation.

Readers will recall that this least of God's creatures, Eskandar Monšī, expressed the intention right at the beginning of this work of devoting the second book of this history to the reign of Shah ʿAbbas, and that book II would comprise two parts: Part 1, from the accession of Shah ʿAbbas to the end of the thirtieth year of his reign; part 2, from the thirty-first year of his reign onward, concluding with some rare anecdotes and strange tales of the times. Part 1 has been completed (book II). I will now commence part 2 (book III), in the hope that God will grant me the years to complete it, and that, watered by the springs of his abundant grace, this tender literary plant may become green and flourish. "I have no power save through God!"[1]

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[1] Koran, 11:89.

The Beginning of the Year of the Serpent, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1026/1617, the Thirty-first Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

As previously recorded, the Shah spent the winter of 1025–26/1617 at Dāneqī. For the period of the Shah's sojourn there, pleasant residences and bathhouses were prepared, and all the principal officers of state built themselves pavilions and summerhouses of wood and reeds. Thus the winter passed agreeably, and spring arrived at 9:42 A.M. Monday, 12 Rabī' I, 1026/20 March 1617, when the sun left the sign Pisces and entered that of Aries. After the Nowrūz festival, when the weather began to get hot, the Shah left Dāneqī and moved toward the winter quarters of Georgia.

One of the successes which attended the Shah's arms about this time was the capture of the fortress of Qırlānqūč, which was held by some Georgian rebels. This fort was situated in a position of great natural strength atop a hill, and was not commanded by higher ground on any side. The height of the fort was such that, in order to reach the garrison's quarters from the main gate, one had to climb fifty or sixty stairs. If this fort, in addition to its rainwater cistern, had possessed a spring, it would have been quite impregnable. The proximity of the Shah caused the Georgian garrison to negotiate for terms, using the ruler of Kartlia, Bograt Khan, as their intermediary, and they surrendered the fort. The garrison was granted quarter; those who wished to go to Kartlia and enter the service of Bogrāt Khan were allowed to do so; others were sent to Faraḥābād. The Shah placed a garrison of musketeers of the royal household in the fort.

At this juncture, the Shah learned that a number of other Georgian rebels, who had escaped the swords of the *ğāzīs*, had gathered at Qeseq. Since the Shah's wrath against the Georgians was still unassuaged, he at once sent a detachment of troops against them, and followed this up by sending Zamān Beg, a centurion of the *ğolāms*, with another force to ravage the area and take prisoners. A large number of infidels fell into Safavid hands. The nobles and many of the rank and file were put to death; others were taken captive with their wives and children, but were put to death on arrival at the Shah's camp.

When he had dealt with the affairs of Kakhetia to his satisfaction, the Shah marched toward Tiflis, where he was entertained by the ruler, Bograt Khan, who was rewarded with marks of royal favor beyond his expectation. From Tiflis, the Shah marched to Somketi, where he lodged for a few days in the house of Malek Atabeg, the grandson of Malek Mirman Somketi, a loyal supporter of the Safavid house. From there he marched to the summer quarters of Gökča Deñiz, where he spent a few pleasant days on the shores of the lake, and in the surrounding countryside.

The Expedition Sent to Erzerum and Then to Vān under the Command of Qarčaqāy Khan, the Commander in Chief of Iran

While the Shah was in summer quarters at Gökča Deñiz, repeated reports came in from his spies that Sultan Aḥmad, the Ottoman Emperor, had renounced the preliminary peace treaty concluded the preceding year by the Ottoman commander in chief, Moḥammad Pasha, and at the instigation of the enemies of Moḥammad Pasha, had accused the latter of dereliction of duty and dismissed him from the post of grand vizier, replacing him with Kalīl Pasha. Kalīl Pasha was also appointed the new Ottoman commander in chief, with orders to winter in Anatolia and prepare for an invasion of Iran the following spring, in conjunction with the Tartar army under Jānī Beg Gerāy Khan. Kalīl Pasha had marched from Moḥammadīya at Istanbul, the Shah's spies reported, with an army of *qapı-qolları*, or troops of the royal household, and was now on his way to winter quarters.

After verifying these reports, the Shah decided to lay waste the Erzerum-Vān area, which any invading Ottoman army would have to cross, so that the Ottomans, bereft of provisions, would have a hard time crossing this region. Qarčaqāy Khan, who was the Shah's protégé and had demonstrated his wisdom and ability and deserved to be placed in command of this expedition, was given the title of commander in chief and dispatched by the Shah after he had spent several days reviewing his troops at Qerek-bolāg in the Gökča district. The Shah himself marched toward the river Aras, hunting as he went. Crossing the river, he marched to Ahar via Gargar. He visited the shrine of Shaikh Šehāb al-Dīn Aharī and then, leaving his heavy baggage at Ahar, rode to Ardabīl to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of the Safavid shaikhs.

Qarčaqāy Khan meanwhile, following orders, had marched toward

Erzerum. Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum and a distinguished Ottoman officer, had retreated within the walls of the fort. A group of bold spirits among the Ottomans who tried to oppose Qarčaqāy Khan were swept aside by the Safavid skirmishers and driven back into the city; the *ğāzīs* pursued them up to the walls of the fort, killing some and taking others prisoner. Qarčaqāy Khan remained in the area for several days and sent detachments of troops to ravage the surrounding countryside. The *qezelbāš* troops did their job so thoroughly that no benefit could be derived from the area as far as agriculture was concerned, and the devastation of the region was total.

From Erzerum, Qarčaqāy Khan proceeded to Vān. The *beglerbeg* of Vān was Moḥammad Pasha Takkalū, known as Takkalū Pasha, a pasha renowned for his power, daring, and courage. His victory the preceding year at Salmās over Pīr Būdāq Khan and other Safavid emirs had increased his self-confidence immensely. Some of Qarčaqāy Khan's advisers had considered it inexpedient to proceed to Vān, because the *qezelbāš* had covered a lot of ground in the Erzerum area and their horses were tired and unfit for action. On the other hand, they said, Takkalū Pasha and the *sanjaq-begs* of Vān had large forces at their disposal and their horses were fresh; they were eager for battle, and the *qezelbāš* might easily be worsted. A council of war had been held, and all the emirs and senior officers had said their piece. It had finally been decided, after it had been ascertained from travelers that the forces under the command of Takkalū Pasha and the Kurdish emirs at Vān did not exceed fifteen thousand, that it would be unworthy of the honor and prestige of the Safavid state to decline to give battle. All those *qezelbāš* whose horses were unfit for action should be sent back to Tabriz. The remaining forces, a mixture of cavalry and infantry, should put their trust in God and march on Vān.

This plan had won the support of a majority of the emirs, and the Safavid army marched. It had not gone more than a few stages before Qarčaqāy Khan received the astonishing news that Takkalū Pasha had been slain by Ḥakkarī Kurds.

The Death of Moḥammad Pasha, known as Takkalū Pasha, and of Yaḥya Beg the Son of Zakarīā Khan, at One Another's Hands

According to reports from reliable informants, the story goes as follows: Takkalū Pasha, learning of Qarčaqāy Khan's march to Erzerum, had set out from Vān with a force of some ten or twelve thousand Ottoman and Kurdish troops, intending to ravage the region in the direction of Tabriz. When he reached Qarā Darra in the district of Ḵoy, near Čālderān, he heard that Qarčaqāy Khan had left Erzerum and was on his way to Vān. Takkalū Pasha wanted to mobilize the remainder of the *mīr-sanjaqs* and tribal chiefs in the area and give battle to the *qezelbāš*. But the Kurdish emirs he had with him did not like this idea and agreed among themselves to leave him and return each to his own tribal base to see to the defense of his own territory and castles, because they knew that the *qezelbāš* would wreak havoc on their tribes if they left them defenseless. They strongly advised the Pasha to return to Vān and look to the defense of the city; with most of his troops gone to protect their homes and families, he would not be able to give battle to the *qezelbāš*.

Żīā al-Dīn Khan, the son of Šaraf Khan, the ruler of Tiflis, left with his men without permission from the Pasha and returned to Tiflis. Yaḥyā Beg, the son of Zakarīyā Khan and the chief of the Ḥakkārī tribe, planned to follow his example, but the Pasha got wind of his plans and determined to prevent him from leaving. He sent a *čavoš* to summon him, but Yaḥyā Beg made excuses and did not answer the summons. The *čavoš* exceeded his authority and began cursing Yaḥyā Beg and threatening him with his sword, whereupon one of the latter's men, unable to tolerate this affront to his chief, lunged at the *čavoš* with his sword and killed him. Takkalū Pasha, enraged by the news, sent a posse of men to seize Yaḥyā Beg by force. By the time this posse arrived, the Ḥakkārī tribe was already on the march, and Yaḥyā Beg himself was on the point of leaving with his officers and personal attendants. Afraid of the outcome of a general free-for-all, Yaḥyā Beg made no open show of resistance, but accompanied the Pasha's men back to his camp. The moment the Pasha saw him, he rounded on him and, laying his hand on his sword, rushed toward him.

Several of Yaḥyā Beg's retainers, close friends of his, thinking that the Pasha intended to kill Yaḥyā Beg, cast prudence to the winds, ran forward, and struck the Pasha with their weapons, whereupon the Pasha's men drew their swords and attacked Yaḥyā Beg. Both men were killed, as were several others on each side. With the two commanders dead, and reports coming in regarding the momentary approach of the *qezelbāš* army, confusion broke out in the Ottoman camp as every man looked to his own safety. The Ottomans retreated to Vān, and the Kurds dispersed to their own bases.

Fortune indeed smiled on the *qezelbāš* by dispersing the Ottoman army and disposing with such ease of two powerful adversaries. Yaḥyā Beg's ancestors had for many generations been chiefs of the Ḥakkārī tribe; his family claimed descent from 'Abbās b. 'Alī (upon him be peace!), and with the concurrence of Shi'ite circles, counted themselves *seyyeds*. However, since Sunnis count as *seyyeds* only the children of Fāṭema, the Ottomans refused to recognize their claim to *seyyed*ship, and did not use the style *seyyed* in any of the enactments issued in respect of Yaḥyā Beg or his forefathers. Yaḥyā Beg's father, Zakarīā Beg, had declared his allegiance to Shah 'Abbas, and was constantly sending letters to the Shah in which he expressed his loyalty and counted himself a faithful supporter of the Safavid crown. Shah 'Abbas showed him special favor because of his *seyyed*ship and descent from 'Abbas, and bestowed on him the title of khan. However, his son Yaḥyā Beg reversed his father's policy and, with Ottoman assistance, deprived his father of all authority and seized power over the Ḥakkārī tribe. He was hostile to the *qezelbāš*, and committed many enormities against his father. Thus he finally obtained his deserts, as the heavens demonstrated such astonishing sleight of hand. "How sweet it is to kill two birds with one stone!"

When Qarčaqāy Khan and the other Safavid emirs heard the news, they pressed ahead with even greater speed; they devastated the Vān area in the same manner as the Erzerum region before returning to Tabriz, where they were received in audience by the Shah.

Ḵalīl Pasha's Expedition to Dīār Bakr and His Dispatch of a Force to Hamadan; and the Lull in Hostilities Caused by the Death of the Ottoman Emperor Sultan Aḥmad and the Accession of his Brother, Sultan Moṣṭafā I

The newly appointed Ottoman grand vizier and commander in chief, Ḵalīl Pasha, had assembled an army for the invasion of Iran and had wintered on the frontier; because of the devastation wreaked by the *qezelbāš* in the Erzerum area, he had been forced to spend the winter in Dīār Bakr. He allotted his ally, Jānī Beg Gerāy b. Mobārak Gerāy, ruler of the Tartars, suitable winter quarters, and dispersed his Ottoman and Tartar troops to quarters wherever supplies were still available. The Tartars caused a lot of damage on Ottoman soil this year. The Shah decided to station Qarčaqāy Khan on the frontier of Azerbaijan to confront Ḵalīl Pasha; he therefore left him at Tabriz, together with a detachment of Safavid troops accused of dereliction of duty in Georgia.

The Allocation of Pay and Allowance to the Household Troops in the Form of Permanent Annuities (Hama-sāla)[1]

It had been the Shah's constant aim to ensure that all the troops of the royal stirrup, down to the apprentices in the royal workshops, should have their pay allotted in the form of permanent drafts on some stipulated location, so that they might be able to draw their pay regularly each year from that place, and not have to bother with repeated visits to the paymaster's office and the *dīvān* to seek orders for pay and allowances; in this way they would be encouraged to perform their duties zealously. This year Shah 'Abbas put his plan into effect, and gave orders that the whole of the army estimates was to be met from local cash revenues. The *e'temād al-dowla* Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, the vizier of the supreme *dīvān,* was put in charge of this operation; he was instructed to get together with the scribes of the royal secretariat this winter in Tabriz, and to assign the pay of every individual in every group at some location suitable to that person, bearing in mind the distance to the place in question from the person's home, and seeking to arrange this to the satisfaction of the payee. Each man was to be given a draft in the form of a permanent annuity. The vizier and the chief accountants spent four months at Tabriz working on this task. The author of this history was one of the secretaries delegated to help in this work, and I spent four months working night and day writing out payment orders under the supervision of these senior officials.

The Shah meanwhile had moved to winter quarters in Māzandarān to prepare himself for whatever trials might face him in the spring. Before the end of the year, Ḵalīl Pasha sent a detachment of Ottoman troops under Qāyeš Pasha, together with 'Omar Beg the *mīr-sanjaq* of the Sohrān tribe and a body of Tartars, from Dīār Bakr in the direction of Karkūya and Šahrezūr, with the object of ravaging the province of Hamadan. Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, and Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū Afšār, the Safavid officers in charge of this section of the frontier, marched against the invaders and came to grips with them at Māhīdašt. After a severe struggle, the Ottoman force was put to flight, and Qāyeš Pasha was killed in the battle; 'Omar Beg was taken prisoner. The Ottoman army suffered heavy casualties, while the Safavid army did not lose any officer of note and did not suffer a significant number of casualties. The Shah congratulated the emirs on their victory and entrusted 'Omar Beg to the custody of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū at Rayy. He was not heard of again.

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[1] The *hama-sāla* was the best type of *barāt* (draft), since it was assigned on the same source or person and did not have to be renewed annually like the *yak-sāla (TM,* p. 153).

The Ottoman emperor, Sultan Aḥmad I, died this year. According to reliable sources, the Sultan fell ill in the autumn after the dispatch of Ḵalīl Pasha to Iran and died a few days later at Istanbul, though still a young man. His life was cut short because he broke his sworn oath, an act expressly forbidden by God and considered reprehensible by men. He was buried in a building which he himself had built at Istanbul. He had two sons: Sultan 'Oṣmān, who was twelve years old; and Sultan Morād, who was five. The senior officials of the Ottoman empire, and in particular the *qızlar-āqāsī,*[2] an official of great influence in the royal harem, decided to pass over the two princes in view of their youth and to confer the sultanate on the deceased Sultan's brother, Sultan Moṣṭafā. The latter was mentally unbalanced, and had for this reason not been put to death by Sultan Aḥmad at the time of his accession, but had remained in the harem in the care of the women. My informants from Asia Minor tell me that Sultan Moṣṭafā had been averse to his brother's policy of sending armies to Iran to fight against fellow Muslims and had on occasion given expression to his opinions, though whether his remarks stemmed from shrewdness or insanity it is hard to say.

After his accession, he decided on a peace policy toward the *qezelbāš,* adopting this policy either on the basis of his own convictions or on the advice of the *qızlar-āqāsī* and other principal officers of the Ottoman empire. It will be recalled that a Safavid ambassador, Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān, had been sent two years previously to Istanbul in the company of the Ottoman ambassador, Enjīllū *čavoš,* and the Ottoman prisoners of war who were being repatriated from Georgia. Qāsem Beg carried with him a letter of friendship from Shah 'Abbas and gifts for the Sultan. Sultan Aḥmad, who in his arrogance and enmity toward the *qezelbāš* had decided not to proceed with the peace negotiations, had refused to give audience to Qāsem Beg, and had placed him in custody in the Haft

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[2] He ranked third in the Ottoman empire, after the grand vizier and the Shaikh al-Eslām (see Gibb and Bowen, p. 76 etc.).

Qal'a at Istanbul. Qāsem Beg was now summoned into audience by Sultan Moṣṭafā, received with proper ceremony, and allowed to depart after delivering his gifts.

This year, Khan Aḥmad Khan, the son of Holow Khan Ardalān, was firmly established in the government of his hereditary territories. Readers will recall that last year Shah 'Abbas sent Khan Aḥmad Khan, who had been brought up since infancy in the care of the royal household, back to Kurdestan to his father. His father had become very old, and the Shah's plan was that, if he died, Khan Aḥmad Khan would succeed him. But Holow Khan, like all human beings, wanted to hang on his worldly possessions as long as there was breath left in his body, particularly since these possessions included the leadership of his tribe and rank and power. He was afraid that his son might deprive him of power, and he became suspicious of him and refused to admit him into his presence. Finally, on the advice of some of his soldiers, he allotted him land in Šahrezūr and the castle of Zalam. Some of the Ardalān tribe gathered around him there, and troublemakers caused relations between father and son to deteriorate. In the end, fighting broke out between the two sides, and Khan Aḥmad Khan, who was afraid of his father, withdrew for a while.

This year, Holow Khan left his seat of government, Ḥasanābād, in order to see to the strengthening of one of his other forts. Khan Aḥmad Khan took advantage of his absence to slip into Ḥasanābād with a few men, gain entrance to the fort by trickery, and seize possession of the fort and all his father's treasuries, filled with the accumulated wealth of years. He proclaimed to the Ardalān tribesmen that he would pay grants and bonuses to them, and as a result large numbers of them rallied around him and acknowledged him as their governor. Holow Khan, because of his great age and physical infirmity, had no choice but to accept the *fait accompli;* with his son's approval, he set off for the Shah's court. He asked the Shah's pardon for his past sins of disobedience, and the Shah overlooked them in view of the fact that he had sent his son to enter the Shah's service at court (though he had been obliged to do this), and sent him to Isfahan to spend the rest of his days there. Although Holow Khan had passed his eightieth birthday, he did not look more than seventy.

The Invasion of Khorasan by the Uzbegs from Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān and the Victory of Meḥrāb Khan, the Governor of Marv, over them

At the end of autumn and beginning of winter this year, Emāmqolī Khan Özbeg, the ruler of Transoxania, sent a force of some thirty thousand men from the army of Bokhara to ravage Khorasan; this army was under the command of Nadr Toḡāy, the *dīvānbegībāšī*. Crossing the Oxus, the Uzbegs made for Marv; they then rode west to Abīvard, and from there swung southwest via Darra Jaz and pillaged the Nishapur area. The Bayāt, Čamešgezek, and other tribes living in the area suffered greatly from their depredations. The Uzbegs were proposing to ravage the Mašhad area when they heard the news of Meḥrāb Khan's victory over the Uzbeg army from Ḥeṣār, and they withdrew in a panic.

A force of fifteen hundred crack Uzbeg troops from Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān had been instructed to join Nadr Toḡāy, and this force had marched from Ḥeṣār under the command of Tūlak Bahādor and Dūstom Mīrzā. The force had bypassed Marv and was several *farsaḵs* west of that city when Meḥrāb Khan heard the news and set out in pursuit of them with one thousand veteran *qezelbāš* and expert musketeers. When the Uzbegs saw the vanguard of the *qezelbāš* army, they dismounted and made a breastwork of their folded tents; they then took cover behind their horses and prepared to fight on foot. When Meḥrāb Khan realized what the Uzbeg tactics were, he ordered his musketeers forward with instructions to aim at the Uzbeg horses. The musketeers carried out their orders, and in the process also inflicted heavy casualties on the Uzbegs themselves. Seeing the Uzbeg morale flagging, Meḥrāb Khan gave the order to charge, and the Uzbegs broke and tried to reach their horses to escape on horseback. Some were successful, others fought briefly on foot before they were cut down. Altogether, five hundred of the Uzbeg force were killed, and two hundred and fifty taken prisoner, including both the commanders, Tūlak Bahādor and Dūstom Mīrzā.

Meḥrāb Khan detailed a troop of *ḡāzīs* to go in pursuit of the Uzbegs who were fleeing across the plain on horseback or on foot, but the Uzbeg commanders begged him in the name of the Shah to call off the pursuit and be satisfied with the victory God had granted him. Meḥrāb Khan agreed. Deeming it unwise to remain any longer away from the protection of his fort, he returned to Marv and sent a report to the Shah. He also sent ten prisoners of note, with their officers, to the Shah, who put them all to death. Rostam Moḥammad Khan b. Valī Moḥammad Khan, who was in Herat, begged the Shah to release the two emirs. The Shah agreed to this and sent them both to Herat; some four or five days after their arrival at Herat, however, the Uzbeg emirs left the city and fled to Ḥeṣār.

This year, Qāżī Khan Seyfī al-Ḥoseynī was dismissed from the *ṣadārat*, and was replaced by Qāżī Sultan Torbatī, a Mūsavī *seyyed* from Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya and warden of the shrine at Mašhad. The latter post was given to Mīrzā Moḥsen Reżavī, the son of Mīrzā Oloğ, who was connected by marriage to the Shah. On the very day of his appointment as *ṣadr*, Qāżī Sultan fell ill. After being bedridden for seven days, he died at Ardabīl on the eighth day of his illness. Mīrzā Rafī' al-Dīn, the son of Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Ḵalīfa Seyyed 'Alī, known as Ḵalīfa Sultan Eṣfahānī, was now made *ṣadr*. He came from a Māzandarānī family descended from Mīr Bozorg, the former ruler of Māzandarān. One of their ancestors, Emir Neẓām al-Dīn, had been forced by circumstances to migrate to Isfahan, where he had settled. The family had become known as the Ḵalīfa *seyyeds*. Mīrzā Rafī' al-Dīn came to court from Isfahan and assumed the post of *ṣadr* with full independence in office. He was an extremely learned man, and a person of integrity and charity. His father, Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd, had been one of the most learned theologians of his time, and I said a few words about him in Book I under the head of *seyyeds* and *'olamā* of the time of Shah Tahmasp.

Deaths of Notable Persons This Year

1. Qāżī Sultan, mentioned above. He had come to Iraq during the troubles in Khorasan, had come to the notice of the Shah by virtue of his ability, and had been appointed to high office. After the reconquest of Khorasan, he had been appointed governor of Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya and warden of the shrine at Mašhad. He discharged these offices for twenty-one years to the complete satisfaction of the Shah.

2. Seyyed Nāṣer, the son of Seyyed Mobārak, the ruler of 'Arabestān-e Ḥavīza; he was related by marriage to the Shah. At the Shah's orders, he had gone to Ḥavīza the previous year and assumed the position of ruler after his father's death. This year, he became seriously ill and died. Some people think he was poisoned by one of the women in the harem who had had a son by Seyyed Mobārak and had

been incited by Arab troublemakers to murder Seyyed Nāṣer. God alone knows the truth! Since this other son of Seyyed Mobārak was still a child, the governorship of the province was conferred on Seyyed Rāšed, his nephew. Seyyed Nāṣer was a humble man, who always treated people with great magnanimity. He was so good-natured and self-controlled, in fact, that the fiery part of one's nature which is most necessary to kings and governors was almost completely lacking in him.

3. Mīrzā Rażī b. Mīrzā Taqī, an Eṣfahānī *seyyed* of the highest rank, of the family of Šahrestān *seyyeds;* he was connected by marriage to Shah 'Abbas. While the court was in its summer quarters at Gökča and Meydānjūq, he was afflicted by some stomach disorder, but rarely bothered to have treatment for it. He accompanied the Shah from Ahar to Ardabīl, and there his illness became more severe; he was afflicted by diarrhea, and daily grew weaker. When the court left Tabriz to return to Iraq, he was too weak to mount his horse and had to be carried in a litter; he died at Zenjān. His body was taken to Qom and buried near the tomb of Fāṭema. The Shah, much affected by his death, gave his office of *ṣadr* in the first instance to his son Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn Moḥammad, his own grandson through his daughter. In view of his extreme youth, his cousin Mīrzā Rafī' was initially appointed his deputy, but eventually Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn became *ṣadr* in his own right, was honored by a marriage alliance with the Shah, and was made keeper of the seal of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones, an office which had belonged to Mīrzā Rażī.

4. Ḥeydar Sultan Begdīlū Šāmlū, the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī-ye ḥaram,*[3] died in office this year at Isfahan. His post was given to Abū Qāsem Beg the *ābdārbāšī* (keeper of the royal pantry), and the latter's post was given to his brother, Čelebī Beg. The deceased was a member of the Begdīlū clan of the Šāmlū tribe, and he and his brothers had attracted the Shah's attention by their devoted service. They enjoyed the Shah's confidence, and had become powerful and wealthy. Ḥeydar Sultan's assets, which amounted to nearly two thousand Iraqi *tomān,* were inherited by his son Nūr al-Dahr Beg, a level-headed young man of excellent behavior.

5. Moḥammad Reżā Beg, the head of the torchbearers,[4] who had been sent to India as ambassador to Jahāngīr the Mogul Emperor.

[3] See Savory, *EI²*, Vol. IV, p. 118.
[4] On his duties, see *TM*, p. 138.

He had just obtained leave to depart and had set out on his return journey to Iran, when he died at Lahore. He was born at Herat; as a youth, he had been in attendance on the young prince 'Abbas in that city, and had been placed in charge of the torchbearers' department. His luster remained undimmed to the end of his days. He was a personable young man, a good conversationalist, and a connoisseur of poetry. He had an expansive manner, and his talk was larded with colorful and witty remarks. His son succeeded him in office.

Events of the Year of the Horse, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1027/1617-18, the Thirty-second Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Nowrūz this year fell on Wednesday,[1] 23 Rabī' I, 1027/20 March 1618. The sun left the sign Pisces and moved into the sign Aries on Tuesday, after completing seven hours and nine minutes of its journey. The Shah left Faraḥābād and traveled to Qazvin via Māzandarān and Fīrūzkūh, indulging in some hunting on the way. He spent two months at Qazvin in residence at the Bāḡ-e Sa'ādatābād, and issued general mobilization orders naming Solṭānīya as the rendezvous. The Shah was still at Qazvin when he heard that Sultan Moṣṭafā had been deposed, and that Sultan Aḥmad's son, Sultan 'Oṣmān, had been put on the throne.

The reason given for the deposition of Sultan Moṣṭafā, and one which makes sense, was that Ḵalīl Pasha, who was away in Dīār Bakr on an important campaign, had not been consulted, and it was contrary to Ottoman practice to make a decision of this kind without the advice of the grand vizier. The decision to put Sultan Moṣṭafā on the throne had been taken primarily by the *qızlar-āqāsī* and other nobles in Istanbul. Ḵalīl Pasha refused to accept their decision, citing in justification of his attitude Sultan Moṣṭafā's deranged mind, which was a fact known both to friend and foe and was responsible for a lack of confidence in the Sultan. He asserted that Sultan Moṣṭafā was not capable of holding such an important position as that of Sultan, and that Sultan Aḥmad's son 'Oṣmān, even though he was young, was a better man for the position; he would soon reach maturity, he said. As a result of all this, six months after the accession of Sultan Moṣṭafā the Ottoman nobles urged him to abdicate voluntarily in favor of Sultan 'Oṣmān, which he did, retiring once again to his habitual way of life as a recluse.

The Ottomans sent a long letter to Shah 'Abbas, embellished with a preamble, an enumeration of all his customary titles and the usual polite phrases. This letter was brought to the Shah at Qazvin by the *čavoš*, Ḥasan Aqa, and a retainer of Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān (Qāsem Beg himself had returned from his embassy to Istanbul after the accession of Sultan Moṣṭafā). The gist of the letter was as follows:

[1] 23 Rabī' I was a Tuesday.

> It has pleased God to take the life of my father, Sultan Aḥmad, while he was in the prime of life and at the beginning of his reign. My esteemed uncle, Sultan Moṣṭafā, agreed to leave his solitary way of life and take charge of the state for a while, but he longed to return to this way of life, and has now agreed to do so and to hand over the throne to me. I have received ambassadors from near and far congratulating me on my accession. Ḵalīl Pasha, who was entrusted by my father with the task of settling the problems of the frontier with the *qezelbāš*, has now been given full authority by me to determine this question of peace or war.

When the Shah had perused this letter from Sultan 'Oṣmān, and another communication from Ḵalīl Pasha, he perceived in them a desire to make peace. To alleviate the lot of God's people, and prevent further strife, he accordingly reciprocated by sending as his ambassador to Ḵalīl Pasha Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Abharī, a vizier and member of the secretariat. His message was as follows:

> In the time of Sultan Aḥmad, peace terms were negotiated through the good offices of Naṣūḥ Pasha and other well-wishers, and I sent as my ambassador to the Porte Qāżī Khan the *ṣadr*, a distinguished *seyyed* and theologian. In the presence of the *moftī*, the chief *qāżī*, and other Ottoman dignitaries, these peace terms were approved and further exchanges of envoys took place. Suddenly, without any infringement of the peace terms from this side, Sultan Aḥmad broke his oath and dispatched Öküz Moḥammad Pasha with a large army against Erīvān. Your Majesty well knows that this expedition led to nothing but loss of life among both the military and civilians. Sultan 'Oṣmān has now made you his plenipotentiary in the matter of peace and war; I still desire peace, and my terms are the same as before. If you are minded to conclude peace on these same terms, which were repeatedly agreed upon with Öküz Moḥammad Pasha, what could be better? God's servants will once more be able to live in peace and security, without being trampled underfoot by mar-

> ching troops, and pilgrims to Mecca will once more be able to perform the pilgrimage unmolested, and will offer prayers for the continuance of both realms, and both parties will obtain rewards from such a policy. If, however, you desire war, I am ready for that too, and let fate decide between us.

After sending this message to Ḵalīl Pasha, the Shah marched toward Azerbaijan and spent several days in the summer quarters of Ḵalḵāl. Of the great emirs, he retained at his side ʿĪsā Khan the *qūrčībāšī*, ʿAlīqolī Khan Šāmlū, and a number of other principal officers of state and *moqarrabs*. The rest of the emirs he sent on to Tabriz to join Qarčaqāy Khan, the commander in chief, with orders to be ready for action.

Ḵalīl Pasha's March to Azerbaijan and Related Events

Shortly after the arrival of spring, Ḵalīl Pasha, having been joined by the frontier *sanjaq-begs* of Anatolia and Syria with their troops, left his winter quarters and marched toward Azerbaijan. En route, he was met by the Iranian ambassador Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn. Ḵalīl Pasha gave the previous ambassador, Qāsem Beg, leave to depart, and sent him back to the Shah with an envoy of his own and a message in which he declared his sincerity and his concern for the welfare of all Muslims. "The Shah knows well," he said, "that everyone has his enemies who find fault with him, and that troublemakers lurk on all sides who represent his virtues as defects and parade them before the eyes of all. By divine decree and the orders of the emperor, the Ottoman army is now on the march under my command. This action is made necessary by the interests of the state and the exigencies of the moment; I hope you will agree that 'the man who is only obeying orders is guiltless.' I cannot turn back and endure the taunts of my enemies. However, when our two armies near each other, I pray that God the Compassionate will find some solution which is in accordance with His will, with the well-being of his people, and with the interests of both parties."

Qarčaqāy Khan, stationed at Tabriz, learned that Ḵalīl Pasha had not given a clear answer on the question of peace and war, but had left the outcome in the hands of fate. Without express orders from the Shah, Qarčaqāy Khan could not give battle to the Ottomans; but in order to protect lives and property, he removed all civilians from regions through which the Ottomans were likely to march, and he also evacuated all civilians from the city itself. He then awaited orders from the Shah. When the Ottomans reached Tabriz, they found the city stripped of military stores, and were unable to stay more than five days; on the sixth day, they moved to the village of Fahvasfanj, three *farsaḵs* southeast of the city.

The Shah meanwhile had moved from Ḵalḵāl to Ardabīl, and had visited the tombs of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn and his other illustrious ancestors to invoke their aid in the coming struggle. At Ardabīl, the Shah received in audience Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān and 'Oṣmān Aqa, Ḵalīl Pasha's ambassador, who uttered all manner of smooth and deceitful words. The Shah replied: "Since Ḵalīl Pasha talked of his desire for peace, I have thus far restrained the *qezelbāš* and have forbidden them to give battle. But your actions do not match your words, and to advance thus with so little circumspection can lead to only one result—battle." The Ottoman envoy made excuses; Ḵalīl Pasha's advance beyond Tabriz, he said, had been forced on him by lack of provisions; the Ottoman army had advanced to its present position so that it might not suffer hardship from lack of food during the peace negotiations; "in other words," he said, "we shall be your guests for a few days."

The Shah dismissed 'Oṣmān Aqa and sent Qāsem Beg back to Ḵalīl Pasha with appropriate messages. Although the Shah was fully confident that he would be the recipient of God's favor and of the support of all pure souls in the holy places, and although he had great faith in the ability of the holy spirits of the Safavid shaikhs to protect the region, nevertheless, just to be on the safe side, he ordered all civilians to be evacuated from Ardabīl and dispersed in the surrounding countryside, where they might be safe from harm. In addition, since the ambassadors had returned by way of Qarčaqāy Khan's camp at Saqīnsarā near Sarāb, prudence dictated that the location of the camp should be changed. A new campsite was selected, and the heavy baggage was sent on ahead.

The very morning that Qarčaqāy Khan proposed to strike camp and move to the new site, his scouts came in with the news that the Ottomans were close at hand and about to give battle. His emirs gathered around him in a great state of perturbation, because there was no time to inform the Shah and get instructions from him. While their council of war was still going on, the advance guard of the Ottoman army came in view and was almost upon them. The emirs had no alternative but to agree to fight, and Qarčaqāy Khan set about making his battle dispositions.

Qarčaqāy Khan's Victory over Ḵalīl Pasha and the Tartars, and the Conclusion of Peace

The following account of the battle is based on reports from reliable sources. Jānī Beg Gerāy, the ruler of the Crimean Tartars, had gone to the Ottoman commander in chief, Ḵalīl Pasha, together with a number of emirs, pashas, and prominent warriors from the area, and had discussed with him the problem of how to deal with the *qezelbāš*. "The Tartar army has been on Ottoman soil now for several years, waiting to invade Iran," they said, "and people's land and property have suffered heavily in consequence. No positive result can be expected from this policy. The Tartar army cannot remain longer in these regions, and insists on giving battle. We advise you," they said, "to give battle to Qarčaqāy Khan; if we are victorious, we have achieved our object. If we are defeated, at least we will not be taunted with cowardice and accused of failing in our duty." Although this plan ran counter to the negotiations in which Ḵalīl Pasha had been engaged, this group argued its case strongly and succeeded in convincing the Pasha that he ought to give battle. According to the most reliable account, the Tartar army at that time did not number more than fifteen thousand men, and Ḵalīl Pasha detailed an additional thirty-five thousand men, Ottomans and Kurds, under the command of Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, who held the rank of vizier. Others put the Ottoman forces at forty thousand men, and the total number of men committed to battle at sixty thousand; but the former account is the more reliable.

This combined Ottoman-Tartar army had left at night and marched from their camp at Areštanāb, situated four *farsaḵs* from the *qezelbāš* camp at Saqīnsarā. Qarčaqāy Khan stationed his household troops, some twenty thousand men, in the center; the Šāmlū *ḡāzīs* and others were stationed on the right, under the command of Zeynal Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū and Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, on the left; he then set his whole army in motion, and marched in battle array, with center, right and left wings, skirmishers and advance guard all in their proper stations, toward the enemy. The outriders of the two armies made contact at a place called Pol-e Šekasta (Broken Bridge), and heavy fighting ensued.

The Ottomans launched such determined attacks that they appeared to be getting the upper hand. Zeynal Beg Begdīlū, fearing a Safavid defeat, led his Šāmlū centurions and *qūrčīs,* and his Afšārs of the Īmānlū clan, in a furious charge against the Ottoman center, despite his inferiority in numbers. The impetus of his charge carried him to the heart of the Ottoman center, where he and his men inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Simultaneously, Emāmqolī Khan, who had fought off repeated Ottoman attacks on his sector, also led his men in a charge against the Ottoman center, which was thrown into disorder by this combined attack and turned to flee. Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, was taken prisoner by the *qūrčī* Šāh-geldī *ev-oğlū;* since Ḥasan Pasha was severely injured and was unlikely to live, he was put to death by the *qūrčī* and his head taken to Zeynal Beg. The latter sent it on the commander in chief. Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Vān, was taken prisoner by a Šāmlū *qūrčī* of the Imānlū clan, and many other pashas and officers of note were either killed or captured.

Jānī Beg Gerāy's cousin, Šāhīn Gerāy Khan, who had declared his allegiance to the Shah when the latter was in Georgia, was stationed in the Safavid vanguard, and the two cousins therefore confronted each other. Some of Jānī Gerāy's experienced men, apprehensive of some harm coming to the Khan, had persuaded him to move some distance away from his standard. When the Ottoman ranks broke, Jānī Gerāy at once turned and fled. Most of his men, however, fell beneath his standard, and his *vakīl,* Mīrzā Beg Aqa, who was his chief administrator *(jomlat al-molk)* and wielded immense power among the Tartars, was taken prisoner with some eighty Tartar princes and sons of emirs. Mīrzā Beg Aqa and a few others were spared; the rest were put to death. The Safavids captured some seventy or eighty Ottoman standards, termed *alay,* each belonging to a field officer.[2]

After his victory, Qarčaqāy Khan restrained his center, composed entirely of household troops, from pursuing the enemy, and sent couriers to recall the troops of his right and left wings currently engaged in pursuit of the Ottomans. He took these steps for several reasons: In the first place, he suspected that the enemy might have troops in reserve (called by the Turks *bosū*) ready to ambush the pursuers, and so military prudence dictated that he not commit his center to action. Second, he had fought this battle without permission from the Shah, and so he did not dare to go further than he already had. Third, the day was drawing to its close. However, the Khan's orders were not obeyed to the letter, because his men's blood was up, and some of them slipped away and pursued the enemy as far as the Šeblī pass, three *farsaḵs* from the battlefield, and returned in triumph. They kept quiet about the matter, in the manner of subordinates, and it only came to light later.

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[2] *Alay* in Turkish means an array or formation of troops (Gibb and Bowen, p. 51); see Gibb and Bowen, index, for the status and duties of the *alay-begs.*

Qarčaqāy Khan sent an immediate report to the Shah and then marched to rejoin his heavy baggage, which had reached Kord-kandī. The next day, he took stock of the heads of the enemy dead, the captured weapons and standards, and congratulated those who had distinguished themselves in the battle. The names of about fifteen thousand enemy dead were recorded; the Safavid army, protected by God, did not lose a single officer of note. The *ḡolām* Yūsof Beg took the news of the victory to Ardabīl, and was followed by Moḥammad Taqī Beg Tabrīzī, a chiliarch of the Azerbaijan regiment of musketeers, who gave the Shah fuller details and a complete list of the names of the prisoners. Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Vān; Mīrzā Beg Aqa-ye Tatār; and several other prisoners were presented to the Shah, who received them with kindness.

When the Ottoman survivors streamed back to Ḵalīl Pasha's camp, the latter's first reaction was panic, thinking that the whole *qezelbāš* army would soon be about his ears. The sons of Ḵandān Aqa, who had been in attendance on the Shah for some time and had made their escape during the expedition to Georgia and were currently in the Pasha's retinue, were familiar with *qezelbāš* practice. They assured the Pasha that no *qezelbāš* emir would dare to take independent action of this sort without instructions from the Shah. The battle which had just been fought had been forced on the *qezelbāš* emirs before they had had time to obtain orders from the Shah.

Their words reassured the Pasha, who started thinking rationally again. He advanced several stages and sent another envoy to the Shah to reopen peace talks. He talked more enthusiastically about peace than he had on the previous occasion, and he absolved himself from blame for the battle, blaming this on the Tartar ruler and a number of his less experienced officers. He asked the Shah to appoint as his ambassador a high-ranking *qezelbāš* officer, whom he could send to the Ottoman court furnished with a covenant regarding peace sealed with the Shah's seal. Such a covenant, he said, would give assurance to well-disposed persons in both camps, and would be a guarantee to both parties that there would be no retreat from this position. Once the ambassador had made his formal greetings to the Ottoman Sultan, the peace negotiations could be carried on through the good offices of himself, and would be concluded to the Shah's satisfaction in a manner that protected the peace from future violations. Ḵalīl Pasha said in conclusion that he would stay a few days on Iranian territory as the guest of the Shah, to await the arrival of the ambassador bearing the Shah's covenant. During this time, no action would be taken by him which might prejudice the peace negotiations. After the Shah's plenipotentiary had arrived, said Ḵalīl Pasha, he would send back Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn and the other servants of the Shah who were at his camp.

Shah 'Abbas had initially been willing to conclude peace on the basis of the treaty signed between Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Süleymān, and he had sent to the Porte Qāżī Khan the *ṣadr,* one of the most eminent *seyyeds* in the whole of Iran, with full powers to negotiate on these terms. Since then, Ottoman armies, for no apparent reason, had broken the truce by invading Iran. Although on every occasion Safavid arms had been victorious, the Shah had agreed, whenever the Ottomans once more wished to discuss peace, to make peace on the same terms as before, in case people should accuse *him* of having broken the truce for the sake of obtaining more advantageous terms. So on this occasion too, the Shah accepted Ḵalīl Pasha's excuses and released Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Vān, who was a well-disposed person and an officer of great integrity, and several of the other prisoners. He also acceded to the Ottoman commander in chief's request to appoint a *qezelbāš* officer as plenipotentiary, and nominated as his ambassador Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ṭāleš, who was an experienced officer of proven worth, just back from a mission to India. He had been promoted to the high office of *ḵolafā.* This officer was dispatched to Ḵalīl Pasha with the stipulated covenant, suitable gifts, and a friendly letter from the Shah.

Since Ḵalīl Pasha had substituted amity for enmity and had said that he and his men were the Shah's guests, the Shah's native generosity and his natural inclination to extend hospitality to his guests, be they friend or foe, led him to set aside the ordinary protocol regulating the behavior of the rulers of this world, and to send Ḵalīl Pasha and his officers the ingredients of a banquet. He accordingly designated for the Pasha's use five hundred camel loads of flour, rice, cooking fat, sugar, candy, preserves, sheep, all kinds of fruit, and other foodstuffs, together with fodder for their animals. These supplies were sent to Qarčaqāy Khan, with orders to the commander in chief to deliver them to the Pasha whenever the time was right. When this news reached Ḵalīl Pasha, he at once struck camp and retired.

The Shah knew that the Ottomans always looked to the long-term advantage and were capable of great guile, and he had on numerous occasions learned by experience that their actions did not necessarily match their words. It occurred to him to wonder, therefore, whether Ḵalīl Pasha had been deceiving him on this occasion too, and his talk of peace was merely a ruse to keep the *qezelbāš* quiet and enable him to withdraw his troops in safety from Iran. He therefore instructed Qarčaqāy Khan and his emirs to shadow the Ottoman army as it withdrew. "I have given my covenant," he said. "If the Ottomans are sincere in their desire for peace, the Pasha must soon send a reciprocal covenant bearing his seal, for the Sultan has made him his plenipotentiary; this covenant must also be sealed by the other officers of the Ottoman state who are with him, such as the *qāżī* and the *moftī*, and must be sent to me by the hand of my earlier envoys who are still with him."

Following orders, Qarčaqāy Khan and the Safavid emirs shadowed Ḵalīl Pasha's army as far as Čaman-e Aḵtāḵāna near Marand. At each stage, they camped so close to the enemy that each side sould clearly see the other's tents. Ḵalīl Pasha was proposing to take no action until the new Iranian ambassador arrived, but the sons of Ḵandān Aqa spoke frankly to him and to the Aqa of the Janissaries and the *qızlar-āqāsī*, both officers of the highest rank in the Ottoman empire. "The fact that the *qezelbāš* are shadowing us so closely," they said, "is a sure sign that they have received permission from the Shah to attack us if necessary. If you are serious about the peace negotiations you have initiated, you must send back the Shah's earlier ambassador with the covenant which they have requested, in terms acceptable to the Shah; do not quibble over matters of detail. If you do not do this, you had better be ready to fight the major battle which is undoubtedly imminent."

Since the Ottoman army had been seriously weakened by the loss of the Tartars and was beginning to look more and more ragged the nearer it got to Ottoman territory, the Pasha was of the opinion that it was in no fit state to fight. He therefore decided to strengthen the bases of peace, and he dispatched to the Shah by the hand of Mīrzā Ḥoseyn a covenant sealed by himself, the *qāżī-ye 'askar*, the *moftī*, and his senior army officers. When the latter reached Qarčaqāy Khan's camp, the Safavid commander in chief released to the Ottomans the Shah's gift of food, and forwarded Mīrzā Ḥoseyn to Ardabīl, where he was received by the Shah, who at once dispatched Yādegār 'Alī Sultan to Istanbul. The final stages of the conclusion of peace will be described in my account of events next year, God willing.

Qarčaqāy Khan returned with his troops to Torkomān-kandī near Garmrūd, where he received orders to review his men and send them on leave. The Shah himself, with his personal attendants, returned to Tabriz, where he devoted his energies to restoring life to normal for the ordinary citizens of the area. Qarčaqāy Khan was appointed governor of the city and *amīr al-omarā* of the whole province of Azerbaijan. Safavid losses in this whole campaign had been extraordinarily light: apart from a few musketeers who lost their lives early on at Ḵosrow Shah near Tabriz, when they unexpectedly ran into a Tartar patrol, and four or five junior *qezelbāš* officers killed by musketballs in the battle at Pol-e Šekasta, no one else of note had been killed. God is the repository of all knowledge! The Shah, having ascertained the losses suffered by the peasants as a result of the passage of the Ottoman army through Azerbaijan, generously compensated them from the funds of the supreme *dīvān* for the full amount of their loss and something in addition. The peasants, overjoyed at the Shah's munificence, offered prayers for his well-being. The Shah then returned to Iraq.

The Arrival at the Shah's Court of Various Foreign Embassies

I have previously mentioned the dispatch by Jahāngīr, the Emperor of India, on a mission to Iran, of Mīrzā Barḵordār, styled Khan-e 'Ālam. The latter was a leading Mogul emir, and belonged to the Barlās Čağatāy tribe, which traced its ancestry to Īkū-Tīmūr; the Emperor used to address him as Bā'ī, meaning "My brother." He had traveled to Iran with the returning ambassador Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ṭāleš, and had remained for a while at Herat. This year, he continued his journey to the Shah's court. As the Shah was absent on campaign in Azerbaijan, he ordered a *moqarrab*, Kalb 'Alī Beg

Šāmlū, one of the aides-de-camp, to receive him and conduct him to Qom. The Indian ambassador proceeded to Qazvin with Yādegār ʻAlī Sultan, and then turned south to Qom while the latter went on to the Shah's camp.

I happened to be in Qazvin on the day when Khan-e ʻĀlam entered the city, and I saw the pomp and ceremony with which he arrived. Oldtimers said that never since the establishment of the Safavid dynasty had an ambassador from either Turkey or India come to Iran with such a magnificent retinue, and it is hard to imagine that, even in the days of the Ḵosrows or the Keyānīds, any embassy to the Shah's court that equaled the splendor of this embassy from India, come to do honor to Shah ʻAbbas. Mighty kings of other countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim, have gladly established friendly relations with Shah ʻAbbas, and a connection which is both material and spiritual, and love of the Shah is so firmly rooted in their hearts that they regard the mutual exchange of ambassadors between themselves and his court as conferring honor and prestige on themselves. God be praised for that!

When Khan-e ʻĀlam set foot on the soil of Iran, he had with him about a thousand royal retainers and personal attendants, not to mention servants. Included among his retinue were two hundred falconers and huntsmen. Some of these people were sent back from Herat to India, but, on the day when Khan-e ʻĀlam entered the city of Qazvin, he still had with him some seven or eight hundred retainers of the royal household, personal attendants, servants and zookeepers, together with ten huge elephants, equipped with gold howdahs and embellished with all kinds of trappings, and a variety of animals, including tigers, leopards, antelope, Indian lambs, cheetahs, rhinoceroses, talking birds, and water-buffalo which pulled various types of litters.

When the Shah returned from Azerbaijan to Qazvin, he summoned Khan-e ʻĀlam. When the Indian ambassador neared the city, he was met by a group of the great emirs, who escorted him with honor into the city and saw him to his quarters in the Bāḡ-e Saʻādatābād. The following day, while the Shah was enjoying polo and archery practice in the Meydān-e Saʻādat, Khan-e ʻĀlam was received and accorded an unwonted degree of royal favor. The Shah said, "The Emperor of India and I treat each other as brothers; he has called you his brother, and the brother of a brother is also a brother." Accordingly, during the formal salutation, the Shah embraced Khan-e 'Ālam like a brother, and showered on him royal honors and many informal acts of kindness.

During the few days that Shah stayed at Qazvin, he held social gatherings in the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād every day, and Khan-e 'Ālam was honored by being invited to these. Khan-e 'Ālam wanted to display all the gifts he had brought from India; his idea was to display a few items each day to the Shah and in this way to prolong the proceedings. However, the Shah had other ideas; he wanted to travel via Gīlān to Māzandarān to take part in the bell-hunt which, as I have mentioned before, is peculiar to that province and takes place at a fixed time. Time was getting short if he was to get there in time, and so he could not fall in with Khan-e 'Ālam's plan. The baubles of this world were not so important to the Shah as to justify his spending several days of his valuable time inspecting them and as a result missing the hunting in Māzandarān. He therefore allotted the Indian ambassador one day in which to display his gifts, and instructed him to show a few choice articles in each category, and to make a detailed list of the remainder and hand them over to the royal workshops, so that he might inspect them at his leisure. The Indian ambassador was extremely put out, but was forced to comply. He selected some three hundred items, including items of jewelery, bizarre objects, precious stuffs, and so on, and paraded them before the Shah in the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād. The Shah then left the royal workshops behind at Qazvin and rushed off to see this special type of wild boar hunt called the bell-hunt.

The Arrival of the Russian Ambassador

The Russian ambassador, who was a distinguished emir and ecclesiastic, arrived this year at Darband in Šīrvān after traversing the Ḳazar steppe and crossing the Caspian Sea, and he followed the royal progress from Ardabīl to Qazvin, where he was received in the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād by Shah 'Abbas. Through the medium of an interpreter, he expressed the desire of his master, the Tsar, for a friendly alliance between their two countries, and delivered to the Shah a massive letter written in Turkish. He was received graciously and allowed to present the Tsar's gifts on the same day that the Indian ambassador presented his. The Tsar's gifts included a number of hunting falcons, of a type not found anywhere in the world except in Russia. The Shah gave one of these falcons to Khan-e 'Ālam. The Russian ambassador had indeed brought with him rare and unusual gifts, and he was given permission to return to his own land by way of Gīlān, after he had been the recipient of much royal favor.

The Arrival of the Ambassador from the Qoṭbšāh, the Ruler of Golconda in the Deccan

A third foreign ambassador to arrive this year at the Shah's court was Shaikh Moḥammad Ḵātūn, a distinguished theologian and scholar. His father, Shaikh 'Alī Ḵātūn, who had acquired the sobriquet of Ḵātūn among that Arab family, had been one of the holy men in the employ of the Mašhad shrine during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and had drawn a stipend from the shrine administration. During the Uzbeg troubles in Khorasan, Shaikh Moḥammad Ḵātūn had migrated to the Deccan, and had entered the service of the Qoṭbšāh. Shaikh Moḥammad reached Qazvin in the company of Ḥoseyn Beg *qeyčāčī* (the tailor) Tabrīzī, who had been sent to the Deccan three years previously to offer the Shah's condolences on the death of Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh and his congratulations to his successor, Sultan Moḥammad, who was the nephew and son-in-law of the deceased ruler. Shaikh Moḥammad was received by the Shah. He presented a letter of friendship from the Qoṭbšāh and delivered the latter's gifts plus his own offerings.

After he had dealt with all these state matters, Shah 'Abbas left for Māzandarān for the hunting, and spent the winter at Faraḥābād in the congenial company of his guests and personal friends.

This year, the Uzbegs had been encouraged by the death of Ḥoseyn Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, to raid that province in search of plunder, and about a thousand marauders under Yānaltegīš Bahādor and a number of other emirs from Balḵ and Bokhara camped near Ḡūrīān. Ḥasan Khan had taken charge at Herat after the death of his father, Ḥoseyn Khan, and it was the consensus of the Šāmlū officers and the officers from other *qezelbāš* tribes stationed at Herat that they should not meet the Uzbegs in the field but should defend the fortress at Herat. Yānaltegīš, realizing he could not take Herat, attacked Ḡūrīān, which was stoutly defended by the vizier of Khorasan, Ḵāja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar Ḡūrīānī, who erected barricades in the streets. After heavy fighting, the Uzbegs failed to pierce the defenses. Meanwhile, Ḥasan Khan and Rostam Moḥammad Khan b. Valī Moḥammad Khan Özbeg who, as previously related, had been driven to take refuge at Herat by the hostility of their cousins and were presently encamped outside the city, had conceived the excellent plan of raiding the Uzbegs' baggage train, which had been left at Čīčaktū and Meymana. With some of their own men and a detachment of Šāmlūs, they plundered the baggage train and brought back large quantities of booty and animals. This action caused the immediate withdrawal of Yānaltegīš Bahādor.

Another event this year was the appearance of a number of celestial signs. The first of these was a slanting shaft of light, shaped like a sword, which was visible in the east nearly every morning; its tail pointed southward. The astrologers called it the "morning light." A few days after this, a fiery comet made its appearance in a northeasterly direction, sending off rays of light. It continued with extreme brilliancy for a month or six weeks, and remained visible, although with reduced brilliancy, for two or three months. The astrologers interpreted this to mean the onset of pestilence with heavy loss of life, and the imminence of wars and bloodshed. It would have its maximum effect, they said, in the east, north, and south, and would have less impact on Iran, which was the center of the civilized world. Despite this prediction, serious effects were felt in Iran as well as elsewhere: there were uprisings and wars in many countries, for instance between the Ottoman empire and the rulers of Europe,[3] and there was fighting in Transoxania and Turkestan and elsewhere; in addition, various types of pestilence made their appearance in Gīlān and Māzandarān and other northerly regions, and many people died; and seditious mutterings among the common people affected even the upper classes.

Another occurrence this year was the quarrel between the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, and the comptroller in chief, Qavāmā Moḥammad Eṣfahānī. Each accused the other of malfeasance and misappropriation of *dīvān* funds, and each told his side of the story to the Shah. The Shah set up a board of inquiry consisting of the *ṣadrs* under the chairmanship of Kalb 'Alī Beg Šāmlū, an aide-de-camp, to hear both parties and adjudicate between them. The board met in Faraḥābād; the comptroller in chief set forth a detailed list of charges, and the vizier made a rebuttal of each. The Shah divined that there was no substance in any of these accusations, which arose simply out of the mutual jealousy of the two parties, and so he closed the inquiry and the two parties concerned withdrew shamefacedly and said nothing further on the matter.

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[3] The astrologers had not mentioned effects in the *west!*

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg,* an old retainer of the Shah's. His length of service and excellent performance of his duties had earned him royal patronage and promotion. He had been governor of Herat and governor-general of Khorasan with full powers for twenty years,[4] and the Shah, in his orders and letters of appointment, used to style him "my faithful old servant." He fell sick and died this year, and the Shah, in recognition of his services, ordered his body to be buried within the precincts of the shrine at Mašhad. His son, Ḥasan Khan, succeeded him in office and took over command of his troops.

2. Mahdīqolī Beg Čağatāy, the master of the royal stables, a trusted retainer and *moqarrab;* he was a man of sound judgment. Early this year, when the Shah had reached Qazvin on his way from his winter quarters in Māzandarān to Azerbaijan, Mahdīqolī Beg fell ill, grew steadily weaker, and died at the beginning of Šaʿbān 1027/end of July 1618. He was also buried at Mašhad. His sons were all too young to take on his office, which was therefore bestowed on another of the Shah's old retainers, ʿAlī Beg Zangana, known as ʿAlī Bālī.

3. Shah Naẓar Khan Tükelī Čağatāy, governor of Mašhad, fell ill and died this year. He was a valiant officer, whose excellent services had won him a governorship and the rank of khan. His first governorship was that of the province of Jām, and he was subsequently promoted governor of Mašhad. After his death, his nephew succeeded him as chief of the Tükelī tribe, and held the post of governor of Jām.

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[4] He was appointed in 1007/1598, after Shah ʿAbbas's reconquest of Khorasan from the Uzbegs.

Events of the Year of the Sheep, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1028/1618-19, the Thirty-third Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Nowrūz this year occurred on Thursday, 4 Rabī' II, 1028/20 March 1619.[1] The sun moved from the sign Pisces to that of Aries a few minutes after nine o'clock on the eve of the Thursday abovementioned. The Shah celebrated Nowrūz at Ašraf, a small town in Māzandarān which had been developed by His Majesty. The *moqarrabs* and other members of the court presented the usual New Year's greetings to the Shah. At the conclusion of the Nowrūz celebrations, after the Shah had dealt with essential affairs of state, he decided to go hunting at Mīānkāl. He gave orders for beaters to gather from all over Māzandarān and drive the game to Mīānkāl.

Mīānkāl is a promontory surrounded on three sides by water, measuring approximately three *farsaḵs* in length and two-thirds of a *farsaḵ* at the widest point, where it joins the mainland; from this point, the spit of land gradually becomes narrower, until it disappears into the ocean. Once the beaters had driven the game onto this promontory, they would block their way of escape by erecting a line of tents across the neck of the promontory; the hunters would then start the slaughter with their arrows and bullets. Wild animals from both mountain and plain were caught in the beaters' net, and included antelope, cheetah, leopard, and gazelle. The gnus, startled by the firing and the din made by the hunters, threw themselves into the water and swam as much as half a *farsaḵ* offshore. When their strength was exhausted, they were forced to return to the shore, though some, seeing themselves trapped, tried without success to postpone the evil moment. Truly, it is a rare sight and a novel method of hunting. At several points, the Shah had had chalets constructed. He retired to these when he had had enough hunting, and made merry with his close companions and special friends. He bade the emirs, principal officers of state, nobles of the court, guests, and visitors known and unknown to join in the hunt, which went on for a week, the Shah moving to a different chalet every few days. At the end of a week, he dismissed the beaters and returned with his court to Faraḥābād, where he remained for another two months. In the third month after Nowrūz, when the weather began to grow hot, the Shah moved to Isfahan.

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[1] Text has Rabī' I, but this must be an error, since Nowrūz fell on 4 Rabī' II this year.

The Shah received news that Ḳalīl Pasha had returned to Istanbul, taking with him the Iranian ambassador and plenipotentiary, Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ḳolafā. The Shah decided to recall Qarčaqāy Khan, lest the continued presence near the frontier of the officer who was the commander in chief of the *qezelbāš* army might cause unease to the Ottoman nobles. He therefore appointed Qarčaqāy Khan governor of Mašhad, and the governorship of Tabriz reverted to Šāhbanda Khan Pornāk.

One of the curious events which occurred early this year can only be attributed to the calamitous effects of the comet, which had been predicted by the astrologers. While the Shah was still at Ašraf, a young Georgian named Ramāz, one of those who had declared their "love of the Shah," was murdered by a Georgian noble named Ḥajna Beg, who, with several of his brothers, was enrolled among the *ḡolāms* of the royal household and who had a grudge against the murdered man. The Shah ordered the vizier of the supreme *dīvān;* Kalb 'Alī Beg Šāmlū the aide-de-camp, who at that time held the post of *dīvānbegī;* and Ommat Beg Sīāh-manṣūr, the *dārūḡa* of Faraḥābād, to summon Ḥajna Beg and question him as to his motive for this crime. This tribunal was convened in the audience hall at Faraḥābād. Ḥajna Beg and two of his brothers presented themselves before the tribunal, and Ḥajna Beg, in response to questioning, admitted quite openly that he and his brothers had killed Ramāz.

Since they had admitted their guilt before the tribunal, the *dīvānbegī* wanted to arrest them and report to the Shah for instructions. Without waiting for permission from the vizier of the *dīvān,* he grabbed Ḥajna Beg by the belt, but the latter and his brothers promptly drew their swords and seriously wounded Kalb 'Alī Beg; and one of them made a thrust at the vizier. People ran in from all sides, but retreated again when they saw the gleam of cold steel. The assassins then forced their way into the private quarters of the palace; Ommat Beg the *dārūḡa* and some others who tried to bar their way were wounded, and two men were killed. Since they had violated the sanctity of the royal palace, which is a place of refuge for criminals, and had had the temerity to commit these dastardly acts, they merited the death penalty. Ommat Beg collected some more men and shot the murderers down in the private garden behind the palace.

Another event this year which could be attributed to the effects of the celestial signs involved Amīrqolī of the Kurdish tribe of Garrūs, one of the royal grooms. As a reward for excellent service, he had been made chief of the Garrūs tribe with the rank of sultan. While the Shah was in his summer quarters, Amīrqolī was visited at Isfahan by Tīmūr Khan, another groom and also of the Garrūs tribe, and a number of his colleagues. As they were leaving Amīrqolī's house after dining with him, Tīmūr Khan, apparently consumed with envy of his host, suddenly drew his sword and mortally wounded Amīrqolī, who was escorting them from the house; in the process of killing him, Tīmūr Khan broke his sword. One of Amīrqolī's servants seized the piece of broken sword and inflicted such a deep wound on Tīmūr Khan that the latter stirred no more. Tīmūr Khan's companions, a man named Alvand, also a royal groom, and his son, terrified of being implicated in Amīrqolī's murder, fled but were arrested shortly afterward and executed after having had both feet amputated. The Shah's wrath was also visited upon certain other members of the Garrūs tribe who had shown hostility toward Amīrqolī. The position of emir of the tribe was the conferred on Amīrqolī's son, Nafsqolī Sultan.

A third calamity which occurred this year was the collapse of a wall at Isfahan which buried some forty or fifty people; the bodies were still being dug out of the rubble two or three days later. This occurred in the middle of the month of Jomādā I 1084/beginning of May 1619, some forty days after Nowrūz.

The fourth calamity resulting from the malignant effect of the comet was an earthquake in parts of the Zāva and Moḥavvalāt districts of Khorasan. In the prosperous village of Dūḡābād, the shock was the greatest ever experienced. A reliable informant told me that the houses were so completely destroyed that the village resembled one huge mound of earth, with no trace of houses or walls remaining. Fortunately, most of the inhabitants were out in the fields at the time of the earthquake, but even so, some seven or eight hundred people lost their lives. About eighty of the victims were women who were taking part in a wedding reception at the bride's house. Through God's excellent wisdom, their rejoicing was turned to mourning. By a miracle, the bride herself was unharmed; when the earthquake started, in her panic she cowered between the door and the window, and the wooden beams protected her, thus providing an excellent illustration of the Koranic statement: "You will something only if God has willed it."[2]

[2] Koran, 76:31 and 81:30.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Bagrāt Khan, the son of Dā'ūd Khan b. Lūārsāb Khan Gorjī. Lūārsāb Khan, the ruler of the Kartlia province of Georgia, rebelled during the reign of Shah Tahmasp and met his death at the hands of the army of Qarābāḡ, as I related in book I. His son, Dā'ūd Khan, went to Shah Tahmasp's court, and was converted to Islam and appointed governor of Tiflis, the capital of Kartlia, which had come under the administration of the Safavid *dīvān*. Dā'ūd had sent his infant son, Bagrāt Khan, to Shan Tahmasp's court, and the lad had been brought up among the *qezelbāš* and had acquired a knowledge of philosophy. He had been appointed governor of Kartlia by Shah 'Abbas, but this year he fell ill at Tiflis and died. Shah 'Abbas, demonstrating his habitual magnanimity toward those who had served him well, appointed his son Simon, who was still a child, governor of Kartlia, with a Georgian noble who was a convert to Islam, Mūrāv Beg, as his *vakīl* and guardian.

2. 'Alī Pasha Rūmī, an eminent Ottoman emir and *beglerbeg* of Tabriz. As previously related, he had been the recipient of royal favor and had become a member of Shah 'Abbas's retinue. Last year, when Ḵalīl Pasha invaded Iran, 'Alī Pasha had discreetly retired to Mašhad, where he received an annual pension of three hundred Iraqi *tomān* in cash, and an allowance of about five hundred camel loads of wheat. He died this year, and received the signal honor of being buried within the precincts of the shrine. He had no legal heir in Iran, and so the Shah ordered his effects to be collected and sent to Anatolia in the care of the Ottoman ambassador, to be distributed there to any of his relatives who had a legal claim to the property, at the discretion of the *qāżīs* and religious authorities there.

Events of the Year of the Monkey, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1029/1619-20, the Thirty-Fourth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year occurred on Friday, 15 Rabī' II, 1029/20 March 1620; the sun left the sign Pisces and entered the sign Aries at 5 A.M. that day. The Shah was at Isfahan for the Nowrūz celebrations.

The season was marked by the arrival of the Ottoman ambassador, Ebrahim Aqa, an experienced negotiator. He arrived with the returning Iranian ambassador, Yādegār 'Alī Ṣultan Ḵolafā, and brought an affectionate letter from the Ottoman Sultan, 'Oṣmān. The Sultan assured the Shah in this letter of his sincere desire for peace. Through the good offices of the *moqarrabs*, Ebrahim Aqa received an audience with the Shah, who lavished marks of royal favor upon him. The Ottoman ambassador displayed to the Shah the gifts he had brought from the Sultan. The Shah had an equally friendly letter penned in reply to the Sultan, and sent it by the hand of the centurion Taḵta Beg Ostājlū, who last year held the office of *dārūġa* of Isfahan. The new ambassador, bearing suitable gifts for the Sultan, set off in the company of Ebrahim Aqa.

Peace was thus concluded on the basis of the treaty signed by Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Sülaymān, with the following changes: (1) the district of Āḵesqa in the Georgian province of Meskhia, formerly Persian territory and now in Ottoman hands, should remain Ottoman territory; (2) the district of Dar-e Tang and Zanjīr, on the borders of Iranian territory and Arab Iraq, formerly Ottoman territory and now in Iranian hands, should remain Safavid territory. Both parties contracted to observe the status quo in these two regions and not make them the cause of further dispute. In all other respects, the terms of the earlier peace treaty were to apply. The Shah was reluctant to surrender Āḵesqa, but he agreed to these terms at the request of Ḵalīl Pasha and the other negotiators. At the request of Ebrahim Aqa, the Shah issued orders to his frontier emirs stating the terms of the agreement, and Ebrahim Aqa departed well satisfied. Thus peace descended on the frontier between the two empires; fate does not allow man to live in peace for long, but one may hope that an agreement which is in the best interest of all Muslims will have some durability.

The Shah's Scheme to Bring the Waters of the Kūrang River to Isfahan

The Kūrang River had its origin in two springs, one of the same name, the other named the Maḥmūdī spring. These waters issue from the mountains in the district of Rārūmzūj on the borders of Isfahan province, and flow south via Nahr-e Moqa''ar toward Kūh Gīlūya and Ḵūzestān, finally debouching in the Šaṭṭ al-'Arab. There is no mention of the Kūrang in the *Nozhat al-Qolūb,* the *Ṣovar-e Aqālīm,* the *Masālek al-Mamālek,*[1] or other standard geographical works. According to current information, the waters from these two springs become one as they flow down from the mountains; their source lies across the watershed from the Zāyanda-rūd which flows through Isfahan. The Kūrang River, throughout its course from its source to the Šaṭṭ al-'Arab, flows through a steep gorge, and no land along its course is irrigated by it.

Shah 'Abbas had long had a scheme to divert the waters of the Kūrang, link them with the Zāyanda-rūd, and increase Isfahan's water supply, so the inhabitants of the city might not suffer from a shortage of water in a dry year. The extra water would also permit additional acreage to be brought under cultivation or planted with orchards. The vizier of Isfahan, Mīr Fażlollāh Šahrestānī, was first put in charge of the plan. The chief difficulty was that a lofty mountain massif lay between the headwaters of the Kūrang and those of the Zāyanda-rūd. Mīr Fażlollāh had hired miners and well diggers, who tunneled away at the rock and made as much progress as they could, but finally gave up in despair. The work had been abandoned. The Shah, however, had refused to let go of the idea, and for several years he kept sending teams of masons and engineers. But certain short-sighted, faint-hearted people kept declaring that the project was impossible, and the scheme, splendid though it was, was allowed to lapse.

A few years ago, the Shah sent Moḥebb 'Alī Beg, the *lala* (guardian) of the *ḡolāms,*[2] who was in charge of the administration of the royal palaces in Isfahan, with a team of experienced engineers and others, to have another look at the feasibility of the project. This team reported that the scheme was feasible on the following conditions: the waters of the Kūrang must be dammed to raise the water level eighty meters; and a tunnel must be bored through the mountain, three thousand meters long, at a depth of one hundred and fifty meters. If this were done, water would flow from the dam in the direction of Isfahan. The Shah gave orders for work to start.

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[1] The Road Books: Ninth-century works which give details of the principal routes of the Islamic empire, together with information on the revenues, products, and so on of the different regions (see Le Strange, pp. 11ff.).

[2] See *TM*, pp. 57, 127-28.

Lala Beg assured the Shah that he could complete the work in four or five years, and the Shah told him to start. But it was an enormous project, and the Shah was looking for some way of completing the work in his lifetime, so that he could thereby acquire fame in this world as well as gaining reward in heaven, and he had no confidence in Lala Beg's ability to complete the work in the contracted time. So this year, the Shah put Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, in charge of the mining operations, and made Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, and the chief of the Baḵtīārī tribe, at this moment Jahāngīr Khan, responsible for construction of the dam; he allocated funds to meet their expenses and to enable them to collect the necessary materials. It was agreed that they should have this year for the collection of materials, and be ready to start construction next year. Builders and stone masons were gathered from all over the country, and the Shah ordered the populace of Fārs, Isfahan, and Lorestān to help in the work of excavation against receipt of wages. The emirs set to work with a will. God grant that the Shah may see this project brought to a successful conclusion!

Some mean-spirited people consider the project to be impossible because, they say, the core of the mountain massif will probably turn out to be a slab of solid rock which no drillers can penetrate. Furthermore, they say, the scene of operations is in an extremely cold region, which has cold weather and frost for four or five months of the year, during which time no work can be carried on. At that rate, they say, the five years needed to complete the job will extend to twenty years; and one must not forget that, during the whole of this time, there will be other little problems to contend with, such as directing armies in the field, defending the realm against its enemies, and so on. It is true that the project is one of extreme difficulty, but the Shah, in defiance of majority opinion, has devoted all his energies to the task. It should not be forgotten that, with God's assistance, he has already accomplished many tasks during his lifetime which were said to be impossible. God grant that he may add this to his list of achievements!

The Dispatch of Ambassadors to the Mogul Court, to the Porte, and to the Deccan

Early this year, the Indian ambassador Khan-e 'Ālam obtained permission to depart, and one of the Shah's personal attendants at court, Zeynal Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū the *tūšmālbāšī* (superintendent of the royal kitchens), was nominated ambassador to India. Khan-e 'Ālam was furnished with a magnificent robe of honor, munificent gifts of cash, quantities of precious stuffs, and Arabian horses. The value of what he was given when he left Iran, plus the value of everything he had been given during his stay in the country, amounted to more than fifteen thousand Iraqi *tomān,* not counting the cost of the requisitions on the *dīvān* made by the *moqarrabs* and nobles of the court and by the governors of Khorasan, nor the cost of the gifts the Shah sent to the Mogul Emperor, which included jewelry; precious stuffs from Turkey, Europe, Russia, and Iran; rare items from many places; and countless numbers of Arabian horses.

One of the rare items was a turban decoration composed of egret's feathers, the choicest that could be found, selected from thousands of feather's and studded with rubies and pearls. One of the rubies was of a size and luster not to be found in the treasury of any mighty king. Jewelers had appraised its value at seven thousand *tomān,* if not more. On it was inscribed the name of Mīrzā Olog̃ Beg b. Šāhrok̮ b. Emir Tīmūr Gūrakān; it had passed into the possession of Shah Esma'il I, and since then had been handed down to each of his successors and had been deposited in the royal treasury. The Shah also sent to the Mogul Emperor a fraternal portion of the gifts which the Ottoman ambassador had brought to Iran this year, together with a letter of friendship.

The ambassadors from the Deccan were also given leave to depart, laden with gifts and favors. Ṭāleb Beg *ev-og̃lū* was nominated ambassador to Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh, the ruler of Bījāpūr, and traveled with the returning ambassador from the Deccan, Mīr K̮alīl the calligrapher. Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān was nominated ambassador to Sultan Moḥammad Qoṭbšāh, the ruler of Golconda, and accompanied the latter's returning envoy Shaikh Moḥammad K̮ātūn. Darvīš Beg was dispatched as ambassador to the Neẓāmšāh, the ruler of Aḥmadnagar in the Deccan; Darvīš Beg came of a family of *seyyeds* from Marāg̃a, and was enrolled among the Šāmlūs who were retainers of the royal stirrup. Darvīš Beg died in Shiraz, and his son, Moḥammadī Beg, was appointed in his place.

The Conquest of the Province of Dūraq and the Capture of the Fort There

In the time of Shah Tahmasp, the province of Dūraq had been under the jurisdiction of the *qezelbāš* emirs who governed Kūh Gīlūya. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, confusion reigned, as upstarts arose in every corner of the empire. Seyyed Mobārak seized possession of the Jazīra region of 'Arabestān from the Afšārs and incorporated it in the Ḥavīza district, which his father, Seyyed Moṭṭaleb, had ruled for years. Since Seyyed Moṭṭaleb and Seyyed Mobārak declared their allegiance to the Safavid crown, they were left in possession of the territory they had acquired, and this territory has remained in their possession until the present time. After the slaying of Seyyed Rāšed, the ruler of Ḥavīza, which I shall describe below, Seyyed Salāmat seized power and strengthened the fort. This year, Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, acting on orders from the Shah, took a body of troops to Dūraq and laid siege to the fort there. Seyyed Salāmat saw no alternative but to surrender the fort and retire to Ḥavīza, and the province of Dūraq came once again under Safavid jurisdiction.

The death of Seyyed Rāšed had come about as follows: Afrāsīāb Pasha, the governor of Baṣra, had sent a detachment of troops against one of his enemies, Ḥasan b. Yāzījī, who ruled the territory adjacent to that of Seyyed Rāšed. Ḥasan had sought assistance from Seyyed Rāšed, who had responded by leading a force of Arab tribesmen to his aid, and this action had caused the Ottoman troops to withdraw to Baṣra.

After the death of Seyyed Mobārak, some Ḥavīza Arabs of the Āl-e Fożeyl tribe had gone to Baṣra and entered the service of Afrāsīāb Pasha. Seyyed Rāšed now demanded the repatriation of these Arabs, and the latter agreed to leave Baṣra and return to their homes; but Seyyed Rāšed did not believe them, and became more and more importunate in his demands that they return. Eventually, he was foolish enough to march several stages toward Baṣra to fetch them, and he pressed on with a small body of men even after most of his men refused to accompany him. The Āl-e Fożeyl, now thoroughly frightened of him, came out to fight, and in the battle Seyyed Rāšed was killed. It is not clear whether he was slain by one of the Baṣra group of Āl-e Fożeyl, or by one of the same tribe among his own troops. The probabilities are that his killer was one of his own men who had been incited to slay him by kinsmen in the Baṣra group.

After the death of Seyyed Rāšed, the Ḥavīza Arabs split into three groups. One group remained loyal to the Shah, rallied around 'Abdollāh Loqmān, and held the forts of Maškūk and Ḥavīza-ye Kūček; they sent a report on the situation to the Shah.

Another occurrence this year was the messianic uprising stirred up by the deceitful *seyyeds* of Gīlān. Although all men are inclined to listen to the evil promptings of Satan and to fill their heads with perverse ideas, the people of Gīlān are more prone to this sort of thing than most men; they are always ready to lend their support to unlawful and dangerous enterprises without giving a thought to the outcome of their actions. This year, a number of deceitful *seyyeds* conceived the sort of crazy idea which arises from the consumption of too much Indian hemp. One of them, Seyyed Moḥammad by name, proclaimed himself to be the messenger and deputy of the Hidden Imam, and nominated several other people his *ḵalīfas* and missionaries *(dā'īān)*. To begin with, he sent two men to the Shah to give him the good news of the manifestation of the Hidden Imam. Next, he published letters of appointment in the name of the Shah, sealed with his own seal after the manner of princes, and circulated them throughout Māzandarān; in these documents, he announced that he was the messenger of the Hidden Imam, and that so-and-so were his *ḵalīfas* and missionaries. His representatives duly reached the Shah and were regarded with disbelief and astonishment at court; the wits at court had great fun with the incident. Men were sent to bring Seyyed Moḥammad to court with honor. On arrival he stuck to his story, and was judged to merit the death penalty because of his foolish and insane behavior. When brought to execution, he confessed the falsehood of his claim, but it was considered best to proceed with the execution as a warning to other foolish people who might be tempted to make similar claims.

This year, an argument broke out between the viziers and the secretarial staff; this may be attributed to the influence of the stars, and in particular to the effect of the immersion of the planet Mercury and the departure of Jupiter from its normal path, because members of the bureaucracy are subject to the influence of these two planets. Qavāmā Moḥammadā Kafrānī Eṣfahānī, the comptroller in chief, had a dispute with Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā Fadavī, who had been vizier and superintendent of financial affairs in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān for ten years, when he came to audit the latter's accounts. He claimed that Ḵāja Moḥammad was in arrear with his payments to the *dīvān,* and the Ḵāja denied it. The case was heard on several occasions in the *dīvān;* both sides put their case before the Shah, and the verdict was that a large sum of money was owed to the *dīvān.* The Ḵāja's case was that he was not guilty of embezzling *dīvān* funds; any arrears of tax due were shown in the detailed accounts verified by his local agents on the spot. The Shah decreed that the arrears of tax due to the *dīvān* should be shown as arrears in the Ḵāja's account, and that demands for payment should be sent to the taxpayers in respect of the amount for which each individual was responsible. If anyone claimed he had already paid, or if it was discovered that the Ḵāja's agents had embezzled the money, the matter was to be settled between the parties concerned. If the taxpayers raised no protest, they were to pay the arrears of tax. The Shah then bound both parties over to keep the peace.

However, in the course of the hearings before the *dīvān,* the comptroller in chief and the vizier had said some pretty hard things about each other, and the vizier had accused the comptroller in chief and the other secretaries of the royal secretariat of false practice and dereliction of duty. These charges had caused the Shah to become a little suspicious of some of the members of the secretariat, and he had several people arrested and threatened with prosecution. One of these was Aqa 'Azīz Eṣfahānī, who was the *avāraja-nevīs*[3] of Khorasan, and an opium addict; he was arrested and placed in the custody of the aide-de-camp Tīmūr Beg *ev-oğlū.* The Shah decreed that his punishment should be that he should be deprived of opium.

The following day Tīmūr Beg, feeling sorry for 'Azīz Eṣfahānī, brought him some opium, but the latter refused it; "The Shah himself," he said, "who is my spiritual director and patron, decreed with his own lips that my punishment was to be deprived of opium. You are disobeying the Shah's wishes. Perhaps the Shah wants to make my punishment more severe by torturing me in this way. I will not act contrary to the Shah's will. If the Shah has forgiven me, well and good; if not, I pray for his well-being." Tīmūr Beg related what had happened to the Shah, and swore by the dust beneath the Shah's feet that he had assured 'Azīz Eṣfahānī that the Shah's words were to be taken as a joke, or as a measure of his displeasure of the moment with the officials under suspicion, and that the Shah had not really intended to cause him physical discomfort by depriving him of opium. 'Azīz Eṣfahānī, he said, as a result of not having consumed his regular dose of opium, was shaking all over, and his body was twisted by spasms of pain, but he kept on refusing the opium. The Shah relented and gave him permission to take the opium.

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[3] The *avāraja-nevīs* was the keeper of the *avāraja* books. What exactly these were is open to some argument (see *TM,* pp. 144ff.), but it is probable that they were cash-books in which payments made by individual taxpayers were recorded.

All the members of the secretariat who were under suspicion were fined according to their status, and Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā's agents were given leave to enter in the royal register the number of cases of malfeasance or dereliction of duty, and to report to the Shah. In compliance with this order, Ḵāja Moḥammad Ma'ṣūm, who was chief accountant of Azerbaijan on behalf of Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā, and Ḵāja Malek Aḥmad Eṣfahānī, a tax collector *(moqarrer)* and an enemy of the comptroller in chief, moved into the royal secretariat. They installed a scribe in each department and began a systematic examination of the annual account books and the registers of arrears. They were given six months to complete the job, but during this period Qavāmā Moḥammadā died, and the whole matter was allowed to lapse.

The Shah's Illness and Subsequent Recovery, by the Grace of God

One of the evil effects the astrologers had stated would result from the appearance of the comet last year was the onset of pestilence, which would be universal but would have its maximum effect in northern regions. The Shah, at the conclusion of the hearings in the *dīvān* concerning the civil service, went to Māzandarān, and became seriously ill there partly as a result of the unhealthiness and excessive heat of the climate, and partly as a result of the influence of the stars. He had a high fever, but despite his weakness and the persistence of the fever, moved to the summer quarters of Fīrūzkūh and Damāvand.

The same pestilence struck down large numbers of the court, and men of every station in life took to their beds. Many of the common people and some of the nobility died, and the names of these notables are recorded below. Prayers and alms were offered for the Shah, who gradually recovered his strength. After his restoration to health, he planned a pilgrimage to the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad, but when he got as far as the Semnān and Dāmḡān region, the need to attend to various matters of state caused him to abandon his plan and go instead to Faraḥābād, where he spent the winter.

This year, Shah 'Abbas took steps to rehabilitate the Kakhetia province of Georgia, which had suffered heavily as a result of his various punitive expeditions to the area. He planned to move some tribes into the area to settle there, bring the land once more under cultivation, and restore the buildings. He hoped that any Georgians who had escaped by fleeing into the mountains or by taking refuge in other parts of Georgia would return to their former homes and resume their normal lives once they realized that the Shah's anger was assuaged. Ṭahmūraṣ, who by his intransigence had brought such terrible retribution on his country, was now a stateless refugee. Accordingly, the Shah appointed Peykar Sultan Īgīrmī-dört[4] governor of Kakhetia, with the rank of khan, and ordered him to proceed there from Qarābāğ with his whole tribe, and to make his base in the vicinity of the fortress of Qırlānqūč. He was also to take with him members of any other tribes who were suitable for settlement in Kakhetia. Peykar Khan accordingly moved to Kakhetia and encouraged the scattered Georgians to return by promises of amnesty. The province was gradually restored to prosperity.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, Shah 'Abbas's brother, who was incarcerated at Alamūt.

2. Delī Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū, an emir from Qarābāğ and *moqarrab* at court. He fell ill at Isfahan and refused either to have proper treatment or to abstain from eating and drinking unsuitable things. He died at Faraḥābād. His brother Salīm Beg was made emir of the Šams al-Dīnlū tribe.

3. Morteżāqolī Khan Gaskarī, the son of Amīra Sīāvoš, ruler of Gaskar. He had been brought up since infancy at the Safavid court, and was enrolled among the *moqarrabs*. He fell ill at Faraḥābād and Fīrūzkūh, and the treatment prescribed by the physicians had no effect. He was moved from Damavand to Tehran for a change of air and water, and died there. Since his sons were still infants, the position of ruler of Gaskar was conferred in the first instance on Behbūd Khan Čerkes, and subsequently on Yūsof Sultan, a *ğolām* of the royal household.

4. Ḥakīm 'Enāyatollāh Yazdī, one of the royal physicians, and a

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[4] A Qājār clan.

good one. His wife was the daughter of Mowlānā al-Dīn Ḥakīm Yazdī, a physician renowned for his shrewdness and intellectual powers. She was an attendant in the royal harem, and Ḥakīm 'Enāyatollāh himself was closer to the Shah than any of the other royal physicians. The Shah often used to have private conversations with him, and had great trust in him. He died at Fīrūzkūh after a short illness.

5. Qavāmā Moḥammadā, the comptroller in chief of finance. He was born at Kafrān in the district of Isfahan, and was of noble birth. On Monday[5] 10 Ramażān 1029/9 August 1620, without any previous warning and while he was busy in his office, he suffered a stroke and became unconscious. He remained in a coma for the rest of that day and throughout the night, and the physicians of Isfahan could not agree on a diagnosis. Some diagnosed his condition as a severe faint; others said that some bad humors had poisoned his stomach; still others said that an excess of bad blood had rendered him unconscious. The following morning the physicians decided to bleed the patient, and they drew off about eighty *meṣqāls* of blood; after being bled, the patient grew rapidly weaker and died. After his death, some declared that they saw indications that he had been poisoned. True knowledge is with God!

His body lay for a while on the dais of the theological seminary near his home, and was subsequently transported to Arab Iraq for burial at Karbala. He was a man of noble character, concerned for the well-being of others. The chronogram giving the date of his death is: "When Qavāmā died, his good reputation survived."[6] The office of comptroller in chief was conferred on Mīrzā Sa'īd, the grandson of Ḵāja Qāsem who was comptroller in the time of Shah Tahmasp. He was a pious man, not in the least avaricious.

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[5] 10 Ramażān was a Sunday.

[6] *Qavāmā čū šod, nām-e nīkaš bemānd*-1029 A.H.

Events of the Year of the Fowl, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1030/1620-21, the Thirty-fifth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

This year, New Year's Day fell on Saturday,[1] 25 Rabī' II, 1030/ 19 March 1621. On that day, at 9:11 A.M., the sun moved from the sign Pisces to that of Aries. The Shah celebrated Nowrūz in Māzandarān, and enjoyed himself by taking a holiday and hunting. Slightly more than two months later, when the weather began to turn hot, the Shah moved to Isfahan.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred at the Beginning of This Year

Taḵta Beg Ostājlū, the centurion, returned from his mission to the Porte, bringing with him a distinguished Ottoman ambassador, Moḥammad Aqa, who bore a most friendly letter from the Ottoman Sultan and other similar letters from the Ottoman viziers and principal officers of state, all relating to the cementing of peace between the two empires.

The ruler of Kīj and Makrān, Malek Mīrzā, visited the Shah's court at this time. These provinces, which are adjacent to the provinces of Thatta and Sind, are dependencies of the Mogul empire and give nominal allegiance to the Emperor. Because of the great distance from them to Agra and Delhi, the Emperor is satisfied with nominal tribute, and in return for this concession the rulers of these provinces do not cause trouble on the frontier. These provinces are adjacent to the provinces of Kerman, Sīstān, and Hormūz, which are part of the Safavid empire. Some years ago, as I have already mentioned, the Shah decided to subjugate the Makrān area, and sent a force under Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, against Bon Fahl, a dependency of Makrān and the seat of government of Malek Šams al-Dīn, one of the princes of the region. This force had stormed the fort there and had brought Malek Šams al-Dīn back with it to court.

The Shah had then issued admonitory letters to the ruler of Makrān, Malek Mīrzā, and had sent these by the hand of Malek Ḥoseyn, one of the princes of Sīstān. Malek Mīrzā, who was the most important prince in those parts, had heard reports of the power of Shah 'Abbas, and he was torn between hope and fear as to whether he should visit the Shah to pay his respects. Finally, this year he came to Isfahan, where the Shah rewarded him for this demonstration of loyalty by giving him a hat, a sword belt, a horse and bridle, and other presents. The Shah confirmed him in control of his hereditary lands, and he returned to Makrān rejoicing.

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[1] 25 Rabī' II was a Friday.

This year, 'Abd al-Raḥīm Ḳ̌āja, the son of Ḳ̌āja Kalān, arrived at the Iranian frontier at Marv with the intention of making the pilgrimage to Mecca. 'Abd al-Raḥīm came from a family of *seyyeds* of Bokhara known as the Jūybārī *seyyeds,* who had great influence in the area and were greatly esteemed by the Uzbeg rulers, under whose patronage their power increased above that of the other *seyyeds* of Transoxania. From Marv, 'Abd al-Raḥīm Ḳ̌āja traveled to Isfahan to present himself to the Shah before proceeding on his way to Mecca. All the *ṣadrs, seyyeds,* and *'olamā* turned out to meet him, at the Shah's order, and escorted him into the city on Wednesday,[2] 23 Ša'bān 1030/ 13 July 1621, and allotted him suitable quarters. As a mark of great respect, the Shah visited him at his lodgings and furnished him with provisions and a lodging allowance while he was in the capital. While at Isfahan, 'Abd al-Raḥīm fell ill, and the Shah sent messengers daily to inquire after his health. The Ḳ̌āja was eventually restored to full health, but by that time the season for the pilgrimage had passed, and he was forced to abandon his plan to perform the pilgrimage this year.

The Shah Again Turns His Attention to the Kūrang Scheme

The Shah, who has been extremely keen on the Kūrang scheme, decided this year to go in person to the site to see how work was progressing. He spent several days in the area, informing himself thoroughly on the merits and defects of the scheme, and giving his emirs working on the project lengthy instructions. Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs; Ḥoseyn Khan, governor of Lorestān; Jahāngīr Khan Baḳtīārī; Ṣafīqolī Khan, governor of Hamadan, and the nobles from Fārs and Isfahan who were working on this project had been exerting themselves to the utmost in constructing the dam and tunneling through the mountain. Let us hope that the scheme is completed to the Shah's satisfaction.

The Province of Ḥavīza Is Conferred on Seyyed Manṣūr

After the death of Seyyed Rāšed, previously reported, affairs in

[2] 23 Ša'bān was a Tuesday.

'Arabestān fell into disorder, each of the Arab chiefs aspiring to make himself supreme. The Shah summoned to Isfahan Seyyed Manṣūr, the brother of Seyyed Mobārak, who had been sent into exile at Astarābād in order to prevent the accession of Seyyed Rāšed from being disputed. The Shah now appointed Seyyed Manṣūr governor of 'Arabestān and conferred on him the rank of khan. Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, and 'Alī Sultan Čağatāy, the governor of Šūštar, were ordered by the Shah to supervise his installation. 'Abdollāh Loqmān, who held Ḥavīza-ye Kūček, surrendered to him the forts of Maškūk and its dependencies, and swore allegiance to him. Seyyed Tahmasp, who had been thinking of opposing him, saw no alternative but to give his allegiance to him and surrender the territory he had seized. Their mission accomplished, the two emirs returned to their respective posts.

The Attack on the Portuguese at Hormūz

The Portuguese who had established themselves on the island of Jarūn (Hormūz) had repeatedly resorted to trickery and guile, had acted in an unbecoming fashion, and had broken the sworn oaths and covenants they had made with the Muslim governor of Jarūn when they first set foot on the island. They had built a fort on the island of Qešm, from which Jarūn derived its water supply, stationed a garrison, and developed quite a colony there. Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, notified the Shah of the Portuguese action, and sent a force to destroy the fort. The story of this expedition will be given in the course of my account of events of the year 1031/1621-22.

The Conversion of a Number of Christians to Islam

This year the Shah decreed that those Armenians and other Christians who had been settled in Farīdūn, on the borders of Baḵtīārī territory, and had been given agricultural land there, should be invited to become Muslims. Life in this world is fraught with vicissitudes, and the Shah was concerned lest, in a period when the authority of the central government was weak, these Christians, if they preserved their present status as *ẕemmīs*,[3] might be subjected to attack by the neighboring Lor tribes (who are naturally given to causing injury and mischief), and their women and children carried off into captivity. In the areas in which these Christian groups resided, it was the Shah's purpose that the places of worship which they had built should become mosques, and the muezzin's call should be heard in them, so that these Christians might assume the guise of Muslims, and their future status accordingly be assured.

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[3] Non-Muslims (principally members of other revealed religions, including Jews and Christians) to whom the early Muslim community had extended hospitality and protection under a contract termed *ẕemma* (see *EI*², Vol. II, pp. 227ff.).

The *seyyed* Emir Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṭanzī, the royal *majles-nevīs,* was entrusted with the task of ensuring their conversion; his family had been servants of the Safavid house for generations, and he himself had grown up from infancy under the Shah's tutelage, and was distinguished among his peers by his closeness to the Shah and the degree of trust the Shah placed in him. Some of the Christians, guided by God's grace, embraced Islam voluntarily; others found it difficult to abandon their Christian faith and felt revulsion at the idea. They were encouraged by their monks and priests to remain steadfast in their faith. After a little pressure had been applied to the monks and priests, however, they desisted, and these Christians saw no alternative but to embrace Islam, though they did so with reluctance. The women and children embraced Islam with great enthusiasm, vying with one another in their eagerness to abandon their Christian faith and declare their belief in the unity of God. Some five thousand people embraced Islam. As each group made the Muslim declaration of faith, it received instruction in the Koran and the principles of the religious law of Islam, and all bibles and other Christian devotional material were collected and taken away from the priests.

In the same way, all the Armenian Christians who had been moved to Māzandarān were also forcibly converted to Islam; this task was entrusted to Mowlānā Moḥammad 'Alī Tabrīzī. Most people embraced Islam with sincerity, but some felt an aversion to making the Muslim profession of faith. True knowledge lies with God! May God reward the Shah for his action with long life and prosperity!

The Shah's Expedition to Khorasan, Which Was Dictated by the Needs of the State, and Associated Events

The Shah had long had the ambition to recapture Kandahar, which was the hereditary territory of the Safavid dynasty. As I related in book I, Kandahar had fallen into Mogul hands, but Shah 'Abbas, since he was on friendly terms with the Mogul Emperor, had not wished to jeopardize these good relations by taking steps to recover it. He had therefore generously left it under Mogul control, even though he had had to suffer the jeers of his enemies and the taunts of idle people. Last year, he had discussed the situation frankly with Khan-e 'Ālam, the Indian ambassador.

Recently, the Shah had learned from the reports of travelers and the statements of well-wishers of the Safavid dynasty that certain troublemakers and flatterers at the Mogul court were encouraging Emperor Jahāngīr not to return Kandahar. The Shah accordingly decided to march to Khorasan in order to resolve the problem of Kandahar in a manner satisfactory to both parties, if possible without rupturing the friendly relations between the two countries. At the same time, the Shah intended to visit condign punishment on the Uzbegs for the various incursions they had made into Khorasan during the years he had been fully occupied with the Ottoman threat in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Only this year, a band of Uzbeg marauders from Balḵ had surprised the *qezelbāš* garrison at Bālā Morḡāb and slaughtered them, taking the commandant of the fort, a Šāmlū officer, prisoner to Balḵ. The Uzbegs had occupied the fort and had raided Bādḡīs, killing and capturing a number of Šāmlūs. The previous year, Rostam Moḥammad Khan b. Valī Moḥammad Khan, who was camped in the vicinity of Balḵ hoping to get an opportunity to seize the city with *qezelbāš* assistance, had raided the Andeḵūd and Šoborḡān regions with a force of some two or three thousand Uzbegs who had rallied to his colors, and had caused considerable damage there.

In revenge, the Uzbegs this year had sent a large army against Rostam Moḥammad Khan to the Owba and Šāqolān region. Rostam Moḥammad Khan got wind of the approach of the Uzbeg army and retired to Herat. The inhabitants of the Owba and Šāqolān regions had taken refuge in their forts, and the Uzbegs had severely ravaged both districts before returning. In addition, a certain Qarā Toḡma, an Uzbeg officer in command of skirmishers who had invaded Khorasan some years before, been soundly defeated, and had an undistinguished career since that time, this year moved into the Čaqčarān district of Ḡarjestān and built a fort there, hoping to ambush Rostam Moḥammad Khan and take him prisoner. For all these reasons, the Shah decided on an expedition to Khorasan and issued general mobilization orders.

The Shah delayed his departure to Khorasan because of another bout of sickness, and ordered his troops to assemble at Nishapur for the winter and to await his arrival. The officers involved were 'Īsā Khan, the commander of the *qūrčīs;* 'Alīqolī Khan, the *dīvānbegī-bāšī,* in command of the junior officers of the court and their retainers; Manūčehr Beg, the son of Qarčaqāy Khan the Safavid commander in chief and himself a centurion of the *ḡolāms,* in command of the *ḡolāms* and musketeers. A further account of this expedition will be given under the events of next year.

The Dispatch of an Ambassador to the Safavid Court by the Uzbeg Princes, to Negotiate Peace

As soon as they heard of the Shah's proposed expedition to Khorasan, the Uzbeg and Čaḡatāy chiefs of Transoxania were filled with consternation. The Uzbeg princes regretted their indiscretions and asked the Shah for forgiveness. Nadr Moḥammad Khan, the brother of the ruler of Transoxania Emāmqolī Khan, either on his own initiative or at the suggestion of his brother, sent an ambassador to the Shah in the shape of his *čūra-āqāsī* (officer in charge of the court pages), Pāyanda Mīrzā. This person, according to Uzbeg custom, held the office equivalent to that of *qūrčībāšī.* He bore a letter from the Uzbeg Khan, and also from the Khan's mother. The latter was the daughter of a family of Reżavī *seyyeds* at Mašhad, and the stepsister of Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, the son of Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāsem. During the reign of 'Abdollāh Khan, when 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan occupied Mašhad, Talīm Khan had married her. She now sought pardon for her son who, she said, had been provoked by the hostile actions of his cousin, Rostam Moḥammad Khan; he promised, she said, never to depart again from the path of obedience as long as he lived.

The background to these events, according to travelers from Transoxania, was that Emāmqolī Khan, the ruler of Transoxania, had led an army against the Qazāq princes who had overrun the Tashkent area and who were interfering with trade in the Samarkand region. Emāmqolī Khan had rashly crossed the Šāhroḵīya River and had been defeated in a great battle there, with the loss of some twenty thousand men (the responsibility for the accuracy of this story rests with the transmitter), either killed in battle or drowned as they tried to recross the river.

Emāmqolī Khan himself made his way back to Bokhara and immediately sent a courier to his brother at Balḵ, Nadr Moḥammad Khan, requesting him to bring his troops to Bokhara so that they could march together against the Qazāqs. However, Nadr Khan had not complied with this request, making the proximity of Rostam Moḥammad Khan his excuse; in reality, he was more than a little apprehensive of his brother. Emāmqolī Khan had refused to take no for an answer, and had marched to Balḵ with some of his men and held a council of war with his brother. Nadr Moḥammad Khan had finally agreed to send his brother, Yānaltegīš, with a detachment of troops from Balḵ and Ḥeṣār. Emāmqolī Khan, thirsting for revenge against the Qazāqs, had sent Yānaltegīš to Samarkand at the head of their combined armies. He had followed Yānaltegīš to Samarkand, and another battle had been fought in which the Qazāqs had again been victorious. The army of Balḵ and Bokhara had suffered heavy casualties. A sort of truce had been patched up with the Qazāq princes through the good offices of Ḥāšem Ḵ̌āja, and each side had retired to its own base.

At all events, Pāyanda Mīrzā reached Isfahan and was admitted to audience with Shah 'Abbas at the Naqš-e Jahān palace. Among the gifts he brought with him were forty-five Alešа horses from Ḥeṣār, and Qaraqorūmī and Badaḵšī horses, a personal gift from Nadr Moḥammad. Since Pāyanda Mīrzā was an intelligent and eloquent man, he carried out his mission in an exemplary manner and won the Shah's favor. In addition, 'Abd al-Raḥīm Ḵ̌āja made friendly overtures on behalf of Emāmqolī Khan. After recalling that he had been prevented by illness from carrying out his plan of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and expressing the hope that he would have a further opportunity of going to Mecca and thus a reason for visiting the Shah's court, he said he hoped the Shah would overlook the past misdemeanors of the Uzbegs in view of Nadr Moḥammad Khan's sincere desire for friendly relations with him, and would extend his forgiveness to Emāmqolī Khan, in view of the contrition the latter had expressed for his actions. 'Abd al-Raḥīm then volunteered his good offices in the service of peace after his return to Transoxania. He hoped it might be possible to effect a lasting peace, so that Transoxania might be spared from the onslaught of *qezelbāš* armies. War, he said, brought nothing except bloodshed; Muslims were pillaged and taken into captivity, and the weak and defenseless trampled underfoot. Since he had been denied the felicity of making the pilgrimage to Mecca, he said, he hoped that through the Shah's magnanimity, he might succeed in this other meritorious project instead.

In reply, the Shah complained that the Uzbegs had taken advantage of his absence in Azerbaijan and Georgia to make repeated incursions onto his territory, and it was not compatible with his royal dignity to ignore such affronts. "I have," the Shah went on, "for a variety of reasons, decided to lead an expedition to Khorasan. Since Nadr Moḥammad Khan has sent an ambassador, has professed his sincere friendship toward me, and has asked my forgiveness, I have decided, partly out of respect for his mother, who has distinguished connections in Iran, to send a return embassy to him and reciprocate his offer of friendship. If Emāmqolī Khan decides to follow suit, so much the better, so that Muslims may live in peace during my reign. God willing, the affairs of Khorasan will be settled in a way which is in the interests of the welfare of the people, and is consonant with my royal honor."

Pāyanda Mīrzā was then dismissed with honor, and Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Beg, formerly vizier of Šīrvān, was nominated ambassador to Balḵ, and carried with him letters of friendship to Nadr Moḥammad Khan and his mother. 'Abd al-Raḥām Ḵ̌āja was also given leave to depart, and was loaded with marks of royal esteem.

After they had left, the Shah marched from Isfahan for Khorasan on 3 Rabī' II, 1031/15 February 1622, and followed the Bīābānak and Ṭabas-e Gīlakī route.

Another event which occurred this year was the arrival of Ḥabaš Khan, who had been sent as an ambassador to the Shah's court by the Neẓāmšāh, the ruler of Aḥmadnagar in the Deccan, and by Malek 'Anbar, the commander in chief, who was the real power behind the throne in the Neẓāmšāhī state. Ḥabaš Khan was descended from an Ethiopian, and was a tried and experienced officer and a friend of the Safavid house. He was a scholar, and was well versed in the Persian poets. He was received by the Shah at his court in Māzandarān, where he confirmed the friendship of his master's house for the Safavid house and delivered his gifts. When the Shah moved to Isfahan, Ḥabaš Khan obtained permission to make the pilgrimage to the shrine of the Eighth Imam at Mašhad; he returned to Isfahan in time to accompany the Shah on his expedition to Khorasan and Kandahar.

Miscellaneous and Strange Events Which Occurred This Year

The first of these is the blinding of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā. Men of discernment will be well aware that it behooves all princes to act with great circumspection and to consider well the end result of their words and deeds. The case of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā is a good illustration of this maxim. The prince, during his father's illness at Fīrūzkūh, forgot all his father's kindness toward him and, urged on by certain ignorant people, committed various acts which displayed the contrary of sincere affection for his father. Specifically, while his father was seriously ill, the prince spent his time in merrymaking, celebrating the fact that he would soon be king, forgetting that kingship is at the disposition of God alone. When the prince's behavior was reported to the Shah, the prince was terrified, realizing that he had destroyed the Shah's confidence in him. The Shah had him blinded, but even after this, a group of people more stupid than himself plotted to spirit him away somewhere. One of the conspirators, 'Abbasqolī, the son of Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Beg *tūšmāl* (assistant in the royal kitchens), was unable to go through with the scheme, and informed the Shah. When the prince was arrested, he made various unacceptable excuses. The Shah considered that he had already been sufficiently punished, but those who had planned to engineer his escape were put to death. The Shah saw to it that the prince was provided for.

The second unlooked-for event this year was the fall from favor of the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb b. Ḥātem Beg. The only apparent reason for his downfall was that he gave too much rein to his carnal desires, which are inseparable from youth. At all events, he was dismissed from office, and the office of vizier was conferred on Salmān Khan, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā and the grandson of 'Abdollāh Khan, who was connected by marriage with the Safavid house.[4] Salmān Khan was conversant with all the customary branches of knowledge, was skilled in accountancy, and wrote polished prose.

The third of these examples of royal justice which occurred this year was the execution of a group of ill-starred rascals from Qom who had been causing riot and mischief in the area and molesting the inhabitants. The suppression of this type of mischief-maker is essential in order to preserve the stability of the realm and to keep the peace. A Šāmlū officer of note, Šāhqolī Beg, interceded for them with the Shah and offered to act as guarantor of their good behavior in the future. Since he was acquainted with these micreants, he too incurred the Shah's wrath and shared their fate.

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[4] He had married Šohra Banū Ḵānom, the seventh daughter of Shah Tahmasp; his bride died in 991/1583, shortly after their marriage.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Qāżī Khan, the former *ṣadr*. He fell ill last year in the small town of Ṭerešt near Rayy, and died early this year. His body was transported to Mašhad for burial. He came from the Seyfī Ḥasanī family of *seyyeds* who for generations had held the office of *qāżī al-qożāt* (chief *qāżī)* in Qazvin and the surrounding area. He himself was a learned man of fine character. He had been appointed *qāżī-ye 'askar*[5] by Shah 'Abbas, and held this office for some time. After relinquishing it, he went on pilgrimage to Mecca and then, in 1015/1606–07, was appointed *ṣadr*, which office he held for twelve years with full independence,[6] and many students were the recipients of his favors. He left one son, seventeen years of age, who died of smallpox this same year.

2. Farīdūn Khan, the governor of Astarābād. He fell ill in his summer quarters at Sāvar and was brought back to the city, where his condition worsened daily and he eventually died. His body was transported to Mašhad for burial; he was of the Čerkes tribe, and was one of the Shah's servants;[7] the Shah had noticed his ability and competence and had watched over his career. After his appointment as governor of Astarābād, he held that office for eighteen years and acquired a reputation for honest and just administration. He was engaged in constant warfare against the Ṣā'en-ḵānī Turkman tribes, who were forever raiding along the borders of Astarābād, and he was uniformly victorious in these engagements. As a result of this warfare, the most troublesome tribes in this group, the Göklen and the Ūḵlū, were left without any leader of consequence, and Farīdūn

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[5] See *TM*, pp. 43, 112. The influence of this official declined partly as a result of the growing power of the *ṣadr* in judicial matters, and partly as a result of the increasing control of the officer in charge of the secular branch of the judiciary, the ***dīvānbegī***, over the *šarī'at* administration as a whole.

[6] This is an error; for at least part of his term of office, Qāżī Khan had a companion in office.

[7] *'Abīd;* this almost certainly means he was a ***ḡolām***, and the fact that he was a Circassian confirms this idea.

Khan made Behbūd Khan Čerkes governor of their territory. However, Behbūd Khan proved an unsatisfactory governor, and he was dismissed and replaced by Ḵosrow Khan, one of the *ḡolāms* of the royal court.

3. Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn Moḥammad 'Āmelī. I have said something about the remarkable qualities of this man in Book I. He reached the highest stages of *ejtehād* (independent inquiry into problems of religious law). He was a man of ascetic habit and exemplary conduct who treated other men as his equals. In the course of this year, he was performing his prayers one day at the tomb of the mystic Bābā Rokn al-Dīn Eṣfahānī, when he heard a voice from the grave addressing him as follows: "What is the meaning of all this negligence? Now is the time for vigilance." The speaker gave his name and genealogy and revealed some mysteries, but the Shaikh did not repeat them publicly and said nothing about the remarks made by the voice from the tomb except those concerning negligence and the need for vigilance. After the Shaikh's death, however, one of his devotees who had been a confidant of the Shaikh divulged something of these mysteries.

After this extraordinary event, the Shaikh remained immersed in deep thought, and for a few days he did not meet his devotees, intimate friends, and students, but prepared himself for death, which he expected would come in the month of Šavvāl. He did not enjoy peace of mind for a single moment. Finally, one of his students who received instruction from him every day persuaded the Shaikh by various rational arguments that, although his inner self was with God, his outward self should not neglect his students by depriving them of the benefit of his teaching; the spiritual rewards he would obtain in this way would be added to the total of his acts of obedience and devotion. Through the repetition of such arguments, the Shaikh became more serene and gradually began to mix with people again. For three months, his outward self was devoted to the teaching of his students and theological argument, and he strove to complete the manuscript of the *Jāme'e 'Abbāsī*,[8] while his inner self was in communion with the spiritual world, and with holy men inhabiting the world of shades.

On 4 Šavvāl 1030/22 August 1621, the Shaikh fell ill, took to his bed, and died eight days later on 12 Šavvāl/30 August. The Shah was in his summer quarters, but those nobles who had remained in the capital took up their station around the bier, and men of all classes vied with one another for the honor of acting as pallbearers. The throng in the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān was so great that, despite the size of the square, men were pressed tightly against one another, and the pallbearers could only with difficulty make progress through the crowd. In the old Masjed-e Jāme‘,[9] the body was washed for burial, and the theologians and scholars performed the burial service. The body was housed temporarily in the shrine attributed to the Imam Zeyn al-‘Ābedīn,[10] which is the burial place of two eminent descendants of the Imams, and was later transported to Mašhad and buried, in accordance with his own testamentory disposition, in a tomb at the foot of the tomb of the Imam, a spot where the Shaikh used to hold his classes when he was a teacher on the staff of the shrine at Mašhad. Many chronograms were devised to commemorate the year of his death. The following one was the work of the vizier Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb: "Alas for Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn!"[11] My nephew, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, devised the following: "Alas for the exemplar of the age!"[12] Many other chronograms were devised, but these two are sufficient.

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[8] A work on Shi'ite jurisprudence.

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[9] Begun in the eleventh century A.D., and added to and restored many times in succeeding centuries.

[10] The Fourth Es̱nā 'Ašarī Imam; died ca. 94/712-13, and buried at Medina.

[11] *Šeyḵ bahā al-dīn vāy*-1030/1621.

[12] *Afsūs ze moqtadā-ye dowrān*-1030/1621.

Events of the Year of the Dog, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1031/1621-22, the Thirty-sixth Year of the Reign of Shah ʿAbbas

Nowrūz this year occurred on Monday, 8 Jomādā I, 1031/21 March 1622. The Shah, as previously related, had marched from Isfahan in February en route to Khorasan, and he celebrated Nowrūz at Ṭabas-e Gīlakī and dealt with petitions from the people there. Then, ordering the troops that had wintered at Nishapur to join him at Farāh, he proceeded by the road to Tūrān and the Dašt-e Beyāż, intending to enjoy some hunting along the banks of the Hīrmand River and at the same time take all necessary steps to settle the affairs of Khorasan. On arrival at Farāh, his troops marched in review before him and cheered their king.

In Books I and II of my history, I related how Kandahar passed out of the hands of officers of the Safavid house into those of officers of the Mogul dynasty, and gave my readers the history of Kandahar in instalments, so to speak. At this point I decided not to flinch from repetition, but recapitulate the main events in the city's history, so that historians avid for facts may be sated, and brave and chivalrous men of action may not regard the Shah's expedition to Kandahar as a breach of friendship with the Mogul Emperor.

In Book I, in my account of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, I recorded that on numerous occasions Kandahar was brought under Safavid jurisdiction through the efforts of *qezelbāš* emirs. Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, was made governor of the province, and held that post until his death in 984/1576. The governorship was then divided by Sultan Moḥammad Shah between his sons: his elder son, Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, received Kandahar, and his younger son. Rostam Mīrzā, received Zamīn Dāvar. In Book II, I described how, when the Uzbegs overran Khorasan, the princes looked calmly on and, because of their divisions among themselves, took refuge with the Mogul Emperor Akbar and handed over Kandahar to his officers. In 1007/1598, when Shah ʿAbbas had reconquered Khorasan from the Uzbegs, in consideration of the friendship which had long existed between the Safavids and the Moguls, he had sent a *qūrčī*, Mīrzā ʿAlī Beg Ḳodābandalū, to inform Akbar of his victory. In the course of his letter to the Emperor Akbar, Shah ʿAbbas had stated that he had reconquered all the territory in Khorasan that had been in enemy hands, plus a bit more; only Kandahar remained, he said. That was in Mogul hands and, since the Safavids and Moguls were allies, one might say that Kandahar was not in foreign hands. In view of the long-standing friendship between the two dynasties, and the more recent personal friendship between himself and Akbar, which was like the relationship between father and son, the Shah had suggested that Akbar should hand back to him Kandahar, and make their mutual friendship even stronger by this act of generosity.

Unfortunately, the Emperor Akbar had ignored Shah 'Abbas's broad hints, and had missed the opportunity to make a magnanimous gesture. Shah 'Abbas, who was a man of infinite patience, and who did not wish to damage his relationship with Akbar, said nothing further on the subject until after Akbar died and was succeeded by his son Nūr al-Dīn Moḥammad Salīm (the Emperor Jahāngīr). In the early part of his reign, Jahāngīr was preoccupied with the attempt of his own son, Sultan Ḵosrow Mahīn, to seize the throne. A group of emirs in the neighborhood, in particular the governors of Farāh and Sīstān, had marched on Kandahar with the assistance of a detachment of *qezelbāš* troops from Herat and had occupied the province and laid siege to the fort.

This action was reported to Shah 'Abbas while he was on campaign in Azerbaijan. It would have been an easy matter for him to capture Kandahar, but the Shah at the time was so busy directing the ship of state that many other worthy projects were inevitably left in abeyance. In addition, the Shah had not as yet sent the embassy, customary between friendly powers, to offer condolences on the death of the ruler and congratulations to his successor on his accession. Considering the action of the emirs unfortunate in the circumstances, he repudiated it and forbade them to attack the fort. He also sent letters to the Mogul commandant at Kandahar, Šāhī Beg Khan Čaḡatāy, by the hand of Ḥoseyn Beg Ḵodābandalū Šāmlū: "Since the Mogul Emperor and I have love and affection for each other," wrote the Shah, "and are as brothers to each other, and neither begrudges the other his territory, you may continue to administer the province of Kandahar with an easy mind." However, the Shah fully expected that, after his ambassador had arrived in India, and after the formalities had been completed, the Emperor, touched by his generosity in handing back territory he had subjugated, would consider it not worthwhile to keep Kandahar, his own claim to which was regarded by friend and foe alike as either dubious or invalid, and would return it to Safavid possession, in accordance with past custom, as a token of his sincere love for the Shah and in return for past acts of generosity on the part of the Safavid shahs and those to be vouchsafed to him in the future.

As I have already related, Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ṭāleš, a senior and experienced *qezelbāš* officer, was sent by the Shah as his ambassador to India. Both he and subsequent ambassadors sent by the Shah to the Mogul court had alluded or referred openly to the question of Kandahar, but had not received any satisfaction or evoked any response from the Emperor or his officials. For his part, the Shah considered it a breach of friendship to seize the city by force. Thus the matter rested, with Kandahar remaining in Mogul hands, until the arrival at the Safavid court of the Indian ambassador Khan-e 'Ālam, whom the Emperor dubbed Bā'ī, and who was the Emperor's confidant.

In the course of his conversations with Khan-e 'Ālam, the Shah had spoken openly to him about the Kandahar question, stressing that his own inaction in the matter had stemmed from his reluctance to break the bond of friendship between the two countries, and calling the ambassador's attention to the fact that the Emperor was apparently ignoring the whole matter. "My friendship for the Emperor," he said, "is too great to be injured by disputes over territory; but Kandahar is part of Khorasan, which is my hereditary territory, and men both near and far, seeing only the external appearances of this world and ignorant of the world of the spirit, utter senseless remarks in their assemblies and put an altogether different interpretation on my behavior. The Emperor's love for me, therefore, and the interests of both parties, require that he give back to me, his loving brother, territory which is far from the heartlands of India and is a stumbling block to our friendship. If he does this, the jeering tongues of my enemies will be stilled, and the news that the bonds of friendship between our two countries are stronger than ever will have considerable effect on neighboring princes, and especially on the Uzbegs, who are our mutual foes. If the Emperor finds it difficult to hand Kandahar back, I place pleasing him above all worldly ambitions. I will visit the Kandahar area and spend a few days hunting in the company of the Emperor's officers; after enjoying their hospitality for a few days, I will retire. It will thus be clear to all that the handing back of Kandahar is a pure act of friendship, and is not taking place as the result of an estrangement between us."

As already related, Zeynal Beg Begdīlū *tūšmālbāšī* (superintendent of the royal kitchens), who was one of the Shah's personal attendants and his confidant, went to India with Khan-e 'Ālam and reiterated the Shah's remarks. But the Shah's plan came to naught because certain flatterers at the Mogul court, seeking to ingratiate themselves with the Emperor, listened to the evil promptings of Satan and stirred up mischief by frustrating it, giving their action the name of loyal service to the Emperor. Those who sincerely desire to serve the best interest of their master and patron, however, seek to convert enemies into friends, and to make existing friends even stronger friends; they consider this the best way to make the state prosper. How much the more should the Mogul Emperor's advisers have sought to strengthen the ties of friendship with a friend like the Shah, since the advantages of a friendly alliance with the Shah consist in an outward increase in one's prestige among other princes, and in an intrinsic strengthening of the foundations of one's own realm. If I were to say but a little of what could be said on this subject, my tale would become a long one.

Anyway, at the beginning of this year, the Shah fulfilled the promise he had made to Khan-e 'Ālam by going hunting along the banks of the rivers Hīrmand and Arğandāb.[1] From Farāh, he had sent letters to the governor of Kandahar, 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan, and to the other Čağatāy emirs there, by the hand of Veṣāl Beg *ev-oğlū*, a trusted official of the court. In this letter, the Shah explained that interests of state required his presence in Khorasan, and that he had decided to fit in some hunting on the way. The Shah urged the governor of Kandahar to convince himself that his presence in the area had no underlying motive except hunting, and exhorted him to come out to welcome him and kiss his stirrup, and to extend hospitality, on behalf of the Mogul Emperor, to him and his party during the few days that they were in the area. He might rest assured, wrote the Shah, that the servants of his brother, the Mogul Emperor, would receive only the greatest honor and respect. "The basic purpose of this expedition," went on the Shah, "as I told Khan-e 'Ālam, is to 'show the flag' along the frontier and make it clear to recalcitrant elements, particularly the Uzbegs, that your country and mine are one and undivided."

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[1] See Le Strange, pp. 346-47.

The Shah reached the Hīrmand River, where Mīrzāqolī Sultan Sīāh-manṣūr, the governor of Kerešk, brought in as prisoners a number of Čağatāy retainers belonging to 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan, who had been dispatched to strengthen the defenses of the fort of Band-e Tīmūr. The Shah was furious, and severly reprimanded his officer: "The retainers of the Emperor are my retainers too," he said. "Why did you take this action without orders and without cause?" He released the prisoners, bestowed on them robes of honor, and sent them on their way to carry out their duties.

After receiving the Shah's letter, 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan and the Čağatāy nobles sent Mīrzā Bāqī Kābolī to him with a wily letter, asking the Shah to give up his plans and retire; if he advanced further, they said, their duty as servants of the Emperor would compel them to oppose him. The Shah was infuriated to have his plans frustrated by the impertinent interference of short-sighted meddlers, who apparently preferred hostility and estrangement to a peaceful alliance, and he determined to press on. He sent a detachment of troops under Ḵosrow Sultan, the chief of the Pāzūkī, against the fortress of Zamīn Dāvar, held by Shah Kalān, and he himself appeared before Kandahar on Wednesday,[2] 8 Rajab 1031/20 May 1622.

'Abd al-'Azīz carried out the threat contained in his letter to the Shah and opened fire on the Safavid camp with artillery. Despite this, the Shah held his forces back for several days and forbade them to commence the siege, while he made further attempts to persuade the garrison to abandon its resistance. But in vain. The Shah realized that he had no alternative but to take the city by storm, and that further delay would not be consonant with his dignity. He therefore gave orders to his men to commence the siege, despite the fact that he had none of the necessary resources for the task—heavy siege guns, artillerymen, sappers, and so on. His men encircled the fort and pushed foward breastworks. Daring spirits, clinging to the walls and towers by their fingernails, within seventeen days made breaches in the walls, and by means of tunneling riddled the defenses like a honeycomb. Every few days, a tower would crash down in ruins. Still the Shah refused to give the order for the assault, in his compassionate concern for those civilians who might inadvertently be cut down by the assault troops, and eventually the garrison sued for quarter.

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[2] 8 Rajab was a Thursday.

Although the garrison had behaved with great impertinence, the Shah continued to treat them with that innate magnanimity and chivalry which is a special attribute of members of the house of prophethood and sainthood, and granted them quarter, and the city surrendered on Tuesday, 11 Ša'bān 1031/21 June 1622. 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan came out of the fort with his other officers and nobles, including Šamšīr Khan, 'Alīqolī Dūrman, Mīrzā Fażl known as Makdūmzāda, Kāja Āftab, Shah Moḥammad Khan known as Khan-e Dowrān, the son of Šāhī Beg Khan the former governor of Kandahar, and Tūla Khan. They wanted to appear before the Shah like criminals, with their quivers slung round their necks, but the Shah refused to allow this, airily dismissing the few days' exertion he had expended in capturing the fort and calling the defense the action of loyal servants of the Emperor. The Shah received them, accepted their surrender, gave them robes of honor, and allowed them to return to their quarters in the fort.

Three days later, 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan again came out of the fort, this time with the whole garrison, numbering some four or five thousand men, and pitched camp over against the royal camp. Despite all the Shah's magnanimity toward them, the Čağatāy army was still nervous and apprehensive. On Friday, 14 Ša'ban/24 June, the Shah entered the city, and the names of the Twelve Imams were once again recited in the Masjed-e Jāme', where they had not been heard for more than twenty-five years,[3] and the name of Shah 'Abbas was mentioned in the *kotba.* The garrison asked permission to return to India, and to present the Shah with suitable gifts as a token of their gratitude for their lives. But the Shah would not accept their gifts, being more interested in winning their hearts than in amassing worldly goods; not only did he return their gifts, but he gave them provisions for their journey and camels to carry them, and Arabian horses of Iraqi stock, as many as they needed, and sent them on their way safely with all their possessions and their wives and families.

Accompanying this caravan, the Shah sent Ḥeydar Beg Qarādāğlū, a centurion, bearing a letter for the Mogul Emperor in which he explained the capture of Kandahar. With the letter, he sent two keys of pure, unadulterated gold, intended to be the keys of friendship and alliance between the two countries; on the one was inscribed the word Kandahar, and on the other, the names of the provinces of Iran. The Shah blamed the unfortunate incident of Kandahar on the recalcitrant attitude of the garrison there, who had rejected his friendly overtures. "God in His bounty," said the Shah, "has conferred on me, your brother, all the provinces of the land of Iran. I would like you to think of these provinces as one fort, the key of which you hold in your hand; it is the key of friendship, and I beg you not to regard these words as mere empty platitudes. God be praised that His creatures attach such importance to the principles of friendship and conciliation that two great rulers, each possessing the power to cause havoc in the world, are able to ignore this incident and, allowing their actions to be governed by reason (of which faculty kings possess more than ordinary mortals), not lose sight of these principles.

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[3] In fact, Kandahar had been in Mogul hands for thirty years, since 1000/1592.

As the garrison of Kandahar was about to leave for India, the Shah sent a messenger to Shah Kalān, the governor of Zamīn Dāvar, notifying him of the fall of Kandahar and bidding him and any of his men who wished to do so to join up with the caravan from Kandahar. But in their folly, the garrison in Zamīn Dāvar behaved in an extraordinary manner, and so brought about their own destruction. They had endured some three weeks of siege at the hands of K̲osrow Sultan when the news of the fall of Kandahar reached them. Abandoning the defense of the fort, they marched out, but because of the fighting which had taken place between them and their besiegers, they imagined the *qezelbāš* might be out for revenge, and so they agreed among themselves that, at the first opportunity, they would cut their way through the enemy and make off in the direction of Kabul. K̲osrow Sultan, in order to reassure them that the *qezelbāš* had no hostile intentions against them, invited Shah Kalān and his senior officers to a feast. The Mogul officers arrived early, before the *qezelbāš* emirs had arrived, and took their places; they were all wearing *būkadas* and Indian *jamdars* and other weapons.

K̲osrow Sultan greeted them cordially but did not immediately insist on their removing their weapons, as has been the custom since time immemorial when one goes to a feast. Next to arrive were a group of Shah Kalān's men, similarly fully armed. K̲osrow Sultan said mildly to Shah Kalān that he thought it was unnecessary to wear arms when the weather was so hot. If he would give the order to his men to remove their arms, they could all be more comfortable, he said. Some of K̲osrow Sultan's servants moved forward to assist the guests in removing their arms, but the latter tried to stop them. One or two of the servants, in the course of trying to do their duty, foolishly laid hands on some of the *būkadas* and *jamdars*, and the Moguls at once presented their weapons at them. Ḵosrow Sultan, seeing this, rose and tried to leave the room, but was prevented from doing so by the drawn swords of the Čaḡatāys, who wounded several of his servants. The *qezelbāš* poured in with drawn swords and a general melee ensued, in the course of which Ḵ̌āja Moḡol Zamīn-dāvarī took the opportunity to settle an old score with Shah Kalān by stabbing him to death. The banqueting hall was converted into a battlefield, and most of the Čaḡatāys were eventually disposed of. The workings of fate are indeed mysterious. Here we had people getting ready for a banquet and merrymaking, while all the time the fates were planning something more sinister. We ordinary mortals can only shrug our shoulders and acquiesce in God's will!

When the Shah heard the news he was astonished, and started blaming Ḵosrow Sultan *in absentia* in order to calm the fears of 'Abd al-'Azīz and his men. Subsequently, however, some of the latter declared that Ḵosrow Sultan had not done anything amiss, and that the Čaḡatāys had started it. The Shah continued to treat 'Abd al-'Azīz with the greatest possible favor, and he and his men realized that the incident in Zamīn Dāvar occurred because of the unjustified suspicions and stupid ideas of a few troublemakers. The Shah entrusted the families of the Čaḡatāys who had been killed to 'Abd al-'Azīz.

At this juncture, the Shah received an ambassador from the Emperor Jahāngīr's son, Mīrzā Ḵorram, in the person of Zāhed Beg; Zāhed Beg, on arrival at Mašhad, had heard of the Shah's impending expedition to Khorasan, and had awaited his arrival at Mašhad; he had now traveled to Kandahar at the Shah's order. During his stay at Kandahar, Zāhed Beg was invited to all the Shah's private assemblies. The ambassador submitted a request from the Mogul prince that the Shah recognize the title of Shah Jahān which had been conferred on him by his father.[4]

Another visitor to the Shah's camp at this time was Esfandīār Khan b. 'Arab Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ḵ̌ārazm. The ruler of Ḵ̌ārazm, especially 'Arab Moḥammad Khan's father, Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, had always turned to the Safavid court for assistance; diplomatic relations were maintained both in good times and bad, and the khans of Ḵ̌ārazm, if driven out of their territories, took refuge at the

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[4] Shah Jahān became emperor in 1037/1628. Shah 'Abbas, with his usual acumen, had spotted him as "emperor material" early in Jahāngīr's reign; hence the special treatment of Shah Jahān's ambassador.

Safavid court. Thus Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan and his sons had taken refuge with Shah 'Abbas when they were driven out of Ḵārazm by 'Abdollāh Khan and his son, and had been restored to their throne with the Shah's assistance. In the case of Esfandīār Khan, his brothers had rebelled against their father, had seized him, and had deprived him of power. Esfandīār Khan, who disapproved of his brothers' action, had marched to his father's assistance, but his brothers had promptly blinded their father and turned on him. Since he was one against three, he had been unable to withstand them, and had come via Astarābād to Kandahar, where he was welcomed by the Shah.

Esfandīār Khan took back with him orders from the Shah commanding help for him from the chiefs of the Ṣā'en-ḵānī tribes, from the governor of Astarābād, and from other emirs in the area. He went among the Ṣā'en-ḵānī tribes, raised an army, and with help from the army of Astarābād, defeated his brothers. One of his brothers, Abu'l-Ǧāzī Sultan, expressed his wish to join him, and Esfandīār Khan considered it expedient to allow him to do so. After the defeat of the other brothers, Esfandīār Khan divided the kingdom with his brother, making it clear that he was the ruler and his brother his vassal. They are still ruling the country in apparent harmony, and Esfandīār Khan regularly sends envoys to the Shah's court.

The Shah's Return from Kandahar

After the annexation of Kandahar to the Safavid empire, the Shah appointed Ganj 'Alī Khan Zīg governor of the province; he was one of the great emirs and an old supporter of the Safavid dynasty; he was also a brave and intelligent man, and had been governor of Kerman for many years. All the Kurdish contingents that had accompanied the Shah on this expedition were placed under his command. Aḥmad Sultan Močakī, the governor of Toršīz, was instructed to repair the fort. On Wednesday,[5] 24 Ša'bān 1031/4 July 1622, the Shah marched from Kandahar and camped at Bābā Ḥasan Abdāl. There, he received letters from Yānaltegīs Bahādor Özbeg, who was based in the Balḵ region, asking the Shah's pardon for his past actions and expressing his gratitude for the magnanimity which the Shah, at the supplication of 'Abd al-Raḥīm Ḵāja, had shown toward the Uzbeg nobility, and which had overjoyed Pāyanda Mīrzā, the *čūra-āqāsī*

[5] 24 Ša'bān was a Monday.

of Nadr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Balḵ. These letters had been flowing in to the Shah's officers in the area, and especially to Esfandīār Beg 'Arabgīrlū, the *evčībāšī*, and the Shah sent reassuring letters in return.

The sun had by now passed from the sign Cancer to that of Leo, and the heat was appalling. The Shah realized that the army could not march back across the desert in such heat, and so he decided to spend the summer in the Ḡūr region. He set off for summer quarters there on 12 Ramażān 1031/21 July 1622. Ḡūr was the mountainous area in which the Ḡūrīd princes had maintained their independence for some many years.[6] Apart from the Ḡūrīds, who were native to the district, I have not found any indication in the old histories that any other dynasty succeeded in crossing this mountainous region with its armies. Shah 'Abbas's army made its way laboriously across the mountains with its trains of Bactrian camels carrying the heavy baggage, and reached Herat in twenty-six stages, entering the city on the twenty-seventh day after leaving Bābā Ḥasan Abdāl.

On the way across the region of Ḡūr, a detachment of the royal army under the command of Ḵalaf Beg *sofračībāšī* (chief sewer), which was proceeding by the Ḡūr-e Bālā route, fell in with a troop of rebel cavalry from Fīrūzkūh, which from time to time made common cause with the enemies of the Safavid state and caused trouble in that area. On this occasion, too, the rebels had remained aloof and had not presented themselves to the Shah. Ḵalaf Beg's troops wiped out most of the rebels and killed their leader, Tarenī Moḥammad.

The Conquest of Hormūz by Emāmqolī Khan, the Beglerbeg of Fārs, and his ḡāzīs.

The island of Hormūz, according to the *Tārīḵ-e Jahān-ārā,* was originally bought from the local princes of Qešm by a certain Šehāb al-Dīn Ayāz, who came from a branch of the Salḡorīd *atābegs* of Lorestān and Šūlestān.[7] Šehāb al-Dīn developed the island and built a flourishing city which he ruled with complete independence. After his death, the government of Hormūz and its dependencies was taken over by Malek Kerdānšāh, who traced his descent on his father's side from the prophet Heber, and on his mother's side from Gostaham b. Ašk, whose line were kings of Iran. He established a dynasty at Hormūz that ruled the island generation after generation. One of his descendants, Salḡor Shah b. Šehāb al-Dīn b. Tūrānšāh, became the possessor of parasol and banners, and was a powerful and liberal ruler.

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[6] The Ḡūrīd dynasty ruled an empire in Afghanistan and northern India from ca. 1000 to 1215 A.D. The dynasty was overthrown by the Ḵārazmšāh shortly before both states were overrun by the Mongols.

[7] See Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties,* Edinburgh 1967, 125–26.

In the reign of Shah Esma'il I, when Salḡor Shah II b. Tūrānšāh was ruling at Hormūz, the Portuguese seized control by a combination of guile and *force majeure*. They built a fort near the seashore and exacted tithes from merchants and other persons traveling from port to port, remitting to the governor of Hormūz only a small portion of these tithes. The size of the Portuguese colony steadily increased, and the King of Portugal replaced the commanding officer of the garrison, called Capitan, every three years. In the course of time, the Portuguese acquired an interest in all the island's revenues and expenditures. Farroḵ Shah b. Tūrānšāh succeeded as ruler of Hormūz, and after him his son Fīrūzšāh; by that time, the Portuguese had gained complete control of the island, and nothing was done without the Capitan's approval. The authority of the Muslim rulers had become a mere shadow.

After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, foreign princes became anxious to establish and strengthen diplomatic ties with the Safavid court. Shah 'Abbas did not molest the Portuguese garrison at Hormūz, but at his orders, Allāhverdī Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, reestablished Safavid control over Bahrain and the outlying dependencies of Hormūz. The Muslim ruler of the island of Hormūz, Maḥmūd Shah b. Farroḵ Shah, was by this time a virtual pensioner of the Portuguese, who gave him an allowance from the revenues. There were incidents in which Muslim travelers were molested, and on several occasions the Portuguese sent ships and artillery in an effort to recover Bahrain, but without success.

Early in Shah 'Abbas's reign, the Portuguese had taken advantage of the Shah's preoccupation with other matters to build a fort on the mainland opposite Hormūz, at Gombroon,[8] thereby violating agreements made with Shah Tahmasp. But Allāhverdī Khan and his son Emāmqolī Khan had subsequently driven them out of Gombroon, later renamed Bandar 'Abbās. For some years after this, relations with the Portuguese on Hormūz went more smoothly, and since there was no interruption with trade from the southern Indian ports in the Deccan, and the existence of law and order on the high seas increased the profits made by our merchants, no action was taken against them.[9]

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[8] Renamed Bandar 'Abbās by Shah 'Abbas after its recapture from the Portuguese in 1622. On the origin of the name Gombroon, see L. Lockhart, *Persian Cities*, Brentford 1939, pp. 103ff. The city lay 13 miles west-northwest of the port of Hormūz.

This state of affairs did not last for long, because the Portuguese secretly transported materials to the island of Qešm to build a fort there; the strategic value of Qešm lay in the fact that it was the source of much of Hormūz's water supply, which was transported by sea to that city. This act was deemed by the Shah to be an act of rebellion on the part of the infidels, and he instructed Emāmqolī Khan, who had succeeded his father as *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, to send a punitive expedition against the Portuguese and destroy the fort on Qešm. Emāmqolī Khan sent a force there under his *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*, Begverdī Beg, who had orders to prevent the completion of the fort and destroy what was already built. The Portuguese, however, by making strenuous efforts, succeeded in completing the fort, and defied Begverdī Beg. Emāmqolī Khan sent reinforcements and eventually took the field himself, and the fort was captured, though not before the *qezelbāš* had suffered heavy casualties. The Portuguese garrison was put to death. Since the fort guarded the fresh-water supply, it was judged better to leave it *in situ* and to install a garrison there.

After this victory, Emāmqolī Khan determined to attack Hormūz itself and destroy the Portuguese colony there, and he obtained permission from the Shah for this operation. Hitherto the problem had been that, if the Portuguese were expelled from Hormūz, the sea trade with points farther east would be interrupted and the prosperity of the city would decline. For this reason, and because the Portuguese paid certain dues and tribute money to the Safavid authorities, no attempt to reconquer Hormūz had so far been made. The situation had now changed, because a group of Englishmen had recently presented themselves at the Safavid court and had said that, whenever the Shah wished to recapture Hormūz, they were ready to help him with troops. They explained to the Shah that they were enemies of the Portuguese, and that their mutual hostility derived in part from sectarian differences. After Hormūz had been recaptured, they said, ships from other ports under English control would ensure that the Portuguese did not regain a foothold there. Shah 'Abbas decided to accept the offer of help made by the English. As the saying goes:

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[9] The author is rationalizing; no action could be taken by Shah 'Abbas against the Portuguese on Hormūz because he did not have a fleet.

> Although the water from the Christian well is impure,
> It only washes a dead Jew, so what is there to fear?

He notified the English that he was ready to move against the Portuguese, and the English made their preparations.

Emāmqolī Khan made Gombroon, now Bandar 'Abbās, his base, and his troops were transported to Hormūz in English ships. The Portuguese Capitan and the Muslim ruler, Maḥmūd Shah, both retreated into the fort, and forced all merchants and the civilian population in general to move in as well. The fort was thus defended by both Muslims and Christians. In the besiegers' camp, the work of digging trenches was allocated, and the English fleet anchored on the side of the fort where the walls ran down into the water. After the siege had been in progress for some time, Emāmqolī Khan crossed over from Gombroon and took charge of operations. The *ğāzīs* redoubled their efforts; the breastworks were pushed right up to the walls of the fort, and mining operations began.

According to reliable informants, the thickness of the walls of the fort was more than thirty cubits, and the walls were strongly constructed of stone cemented together with lime mortar. The *ğāzīs* excavated the soil from beneath two of the towers and detonated charges of gunpowder that blew parts of the tower in the air but left two-thirds of it standing. As soon as the first cracks appeared in the tower, the *ğāzīs* stood by for the assault. When the attackers began to get the upper hand, the Portuguese appealed for terms to the English, since they were fellow Christians. The Portuguese laid down their arms, and were taken on board the English ships with their baggage. Before the siege began, it had been agreed between the English officers and Emāmqolī Khan that, after the capture of the fort, the English would take charge of the Christians and their possessions, and leave the Muslims to the *qezelbāš*. Since the primary object, the capture of the fort and the city, had been achieved, the Khan adhered to this agreement and did not molest the Portuguese, but left them to the English to do what they wanted with them.

Thus the fort at Hormūz, an outstanding example of Frankish skill in the art of building forts, fell after two months' siege. Maḥmūd Shah, the ruler of Hormūz, was taken prisoner with his followers. Of the Muslims who were found within the fort, those who had collaborated with or fought at the side of the Portuguese were executed; those who had been forced against their will by the Portuguese to enter the fort were released to return to their homes. Emāmqolī Khan appointed a governor of the city and took steps to conciliate the townspeople. Among the weapons that fell into *qezelbāš* were several large cannon and siege guns of various sizes, cunningly wrought by skilled Portuguese craftsmen. Each one was a masterpiece of the art of the Frankish cannon founders. These, and other choice items suitable for the king's eyes, were set aside for the royal workshops; the rest of the booty was distributed among the troops. Emāmqolī Khan returned to Shiraz and sent a full report to the Shah, which reached him at Kandahar during his siege of that city. The Shah sent congratulations to Emāmqolī Khan on his victory, the news of which spurred the besiegers to still greater efforts, and Kandahar fell a few days later.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred during the Shah's Stay at Herat

The Shah spent two and a half months at Herat, seeing to the affairs of Khorasan. While he was there, an ambassador arrived from Nadr Moḥammad Khan Özbeg at Balḵ in the person of Ebrahim Ḵ̆āja, a distinguished *seyyed* of that city. He was accompanied by Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Beg, formerly the vizier of Šīrvān, who had been sent on a mission to the Uzbeg princes at Balḵ and Bokhara in the company of the Uzbeg ambassador, Pāyanda Mīrzā, and 'Abd al-Raḥīm Ḵ̆āja Boḵārī. Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Beg had delivered the Shah's letter to Nadr Moḥammad Khan Özbeg at Balḵ; the latter had been overjoyed at its contents, and had treated Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Beg with great honor and sent him on to Bokhara after he had recovered from the fatigue of the journey. At Bokhara, he had met Emāmqolī Khan, the ruler of Transoxania. The fall of Kandahar had made the Uzbeg princes additionally apprehensive about their own position, and so the Shah's reassurances were all the more welcome. Nadr Moḥammad Khan had hastened to send Ebrahim Ḵ̆āja to reiterate their sincere desire for peace. "I realize," he said, "that Iranians and Tūranians are traditional enemies; but, since my brother and I are sincere in our desire for friendship and alliance with you, and you have so extinguished strife that the lion may lie down with the lamb, let us renounce the traditions of former days and follow the path of peace." This plea was reinforced by envoys who arrived shortly afterward from the Jūybārī Ḵājas of Bokhara.

Nadr Moḥammad Khan appealed to the Shah to remove Rostam Moḥammad Khan from the Balḵ frontier region and to take him back with him to Iraq, because, he said, the continued presence of Rostam Moḥammad Khan and his Kurds in the Balḵ area caused nothing but trouble. "He is at loggerheads with his cousins," said Nadr Moḥammad Khan, "and he has gathered around him a group of seditious Uzbegs who are looking for trouble and are constantly raiding along the frontier in search of plunder. If we ignore his activities, the population of the area suffers; if we march against him, we have to encroach on your territory, and your subjects are harmed by the passage of our troops; furthermore, such action on our part violates our sworn covenants, and provokes your wrath." The Shah responded favorably to this appeal, and decided to take Rostam Moḥammad Khan and his reliable retainers back with him to Iraq and let them live there on pension; the unruly mob of Uzbegs he had gathered would be dispersed, since one cannot trust people like that whether they are one's friends or one's enemies. The Shah decided on this course of action in order to bring peace to the northeast frontier.

The Shah had heard that Sultan 'Os̱mān, the Ottoman Sultan, had launched a major campaign in Europe against the Franks who were harassing the frontiers of Islam, and so he dispatched an ambassador from Herat, the *qūrčī* Čelebī Beg Qājār, to seek verification of these reports and to notify the Ottoman Sultan of his own victories at Kandahar and Hormūz. After the dispatch of this ambassador, and before the Shah's departure from Herat, news arrived of rebellion in the Ottoman empire and the murder of Sultan 'Os̱mān.

The Revolt in the Ottoman Empire and the Murder of Sultan 'Os̱mān

According to the reports of travelers coming from Anatolia—reports later confirmed by Ottoman envoys sent by the new Sultan—Sultan 'Os̱mān had returned victorious from his campaign in Europe, and had announced his intention of going into winter quarters at Aleppo prior to performing the pilgrimage to Mecca. Some say that he intended to break his sworn oaths and violate the peace he had concluded with the Shah. God alone knows the truth! At all events, the Janissaries, the most important unit in the Ottoman army, warned him that his plan to go to Aleppo might cause all sorts of trouble along the frontiers with the Arabs and the *qezelbāš;* it was not in the interest of the state, they said. "Moreover," they said, "it is not the Ottoman tradition to take the field twice in the same year; the army is but recently returned from the campaign in Europe, and the men have only recently gone on leave. Postpone your departure until next year, when if your plan seems to be in the best interests of the state, it will be carried out."

Sultan 'Oṣmān, however, with the arrogance of youth, and in his ignorance of time-honored Ottoman customs, remained adamant, and censured the Janissaries for opposing his wishes. He was encouraged in his attitude by Delāvar Pasha, who had recently become grand vizier and was sworn enemy of the Aqa of the Janissaries, and by several other sycophantic and ambitious advisers. The Aqa of the Janissaries and the other senior Janissary officers at once rebelled, and plotted to murder Delāvar Pasha and a number of the Sultan's other powerful advisers. The conspirators sent a message to the Sultan to the effect that Delāvar Pasha and the others were not loyal to the Ottoman state, and their dominance in the counsels of state was undermining its foundations. They were dissatisfied with their conduct, said the conspirators, and demanded that the Sultan hand them over to the Janissaries for execution. They reminded the Sultan that on occasions in the past when the Janissaries had requested something of the Sultan in the interests of the state, the Sultan had acceded to their demands. They therefore requested the Sultan to comply with their demand on this occasion.

Sultan 'Oṣmān refused their demands absolutely and uttered threats against the Janissary officers. The Janissaries promptly rioted and resolved to assassinate Delāvar Pasha and his associates. They, in fear of their lives, took refuge in the Sultan's palace. There, a large group of palace servants and workmen and *sepāhīs*[10] rallied around them and tried to suppress the rioters. Fighting broke out and many were killed on each side. Finally, the Janissaries drove their opponents back and forced their way into the inner apartments of the palace, shouting, "Our king is Sultan Moṣṭafā, the brother of Sultan Aḥmad. After the death of Sultan Aḥmad, we gave our allegiance to him, and we were not in favor of his deposition; we have the right to give our allegiance to him."

[10] Feudal cavalry; see Gibb and Bowen, pp. 69ff. and 70.

Sultan 'Oṣmān, terrified by the turn of events, was obliged to send the following message to the Aqa of the Janissaries: "Because of my youth, I disregarded the tradition of my fathers; I regret my action, and will do whatever you decide." Some of the Sultan's advisers thought that it was too late for messages, since the Janissaries were out of control. The only chance, as far as they could see, lay in his going to the quarters of the Aqa of the Janissaries and throwing himself on the mercy of the Janissaries, in the hope that their sense of honor would prevail and they would abandon their demand that Sultan Moṣṭafā come to the throne. Accordingly, Sultan 'Oṣmān slipped out of the palace at the height of the riot and made his way to the house of the Aqa of the Janissaries. However, the Janissaries already within the palace murdered Delāvar Pasha, the grand vizier, and his associates such as Ḥoseyn Pasha, the second vizier; the *qızlar-āqāsī;* Ḥājjī *sūbāšī,* a *sepāhī* officer; the *čavošbāšī;* the *bostānjībāšī,* whose authority was paramount in the palace; and others. They then went to Sultan Moṣṭafā's lodgings, brought him out, and saluted him as Sultan.

Meanwhile the Aqa of the Janissaries had learned that Sultan 'Oṣmān had taken refuge in his house; he greeted him and rallied to his support, addressing the senior officers of the Janissaries as follows: "Since the Sultan has come to your quarters and has shown contrition for his actions, magnanimity and the desire to avoid ill-repute demand that we reassure him. The Sultan has conceded the point at issue, and our enemies have been removed from the scene; let us seek the Sultan's forgiveness and seek to gratify his wishes." The Aqa of the Janissaries pressed his point of view vehemently, but the Janissaries, fearing that he would win the day, and that Sultan 'Oṣmān, a young, ignorant ruler with hatred of them in his heart, would exact his revenge on them, rushed at their commanding officer and killed him. They then seized 'Oṣmān Sultan and carried him away to Yedīqola near Istanbul, where they subsequently put him to death, being afraid that in some way or other he might succeed in recovering the throne. The next day, all units of the Ottoman army donned mourning and bore Sultan 'Oṣmān's body into the city for burial in the mausoleum of Sultan Aḥmad.

Thus Sultan Moṣṭafā returned to the throne, and there was now no check on the power of the Janissaries. The grand vizier and other high officials acted in accordance with their wishes. Since Sultan Moṣṭafā's mind was unbalanced, his mother ruled with the advice of the viziers. A letter was sent to Shah 'Abbas at Herat informing him of these events and assuring him that they did not constitute a threat to the peace. Since Sultan Moṣṭafā's mental derangement was well known, and it was probable that his reign would weaken the state, there was one party in Istanbul that supported the candidacy of Sultan 'Oṣmān's brother, Sultan Morād, who was still an infant. These people intended to put him on the throne as soon as they could and to seek revenge for the murder of Sultan 'Oṣmān. For this reason, the letter said, the Janissaries were opposed to the idea of putting Sultan Morād on the throne, and the argument was still going on. When this news reached the provinces of the Ottoman empire, revolts broke out in many places.

Events at Baghdad and the Disturbances in Arab Iraq

The Ottoman military authorities at Baghdad had long been used to enjoying a considerable degree of independence, and to using the revenues of that province for their own purposes. The governors and pashas sent out from Istanbul had found themselves stripped of power at Baghdad. Some of the local officers would give nominal allegiance to the pasha for a time, would install him in the governor's palace, and would give him a subsistence allowance; those governors who were not satisfied with this sort of existence returned to Istanbul; the rest stayed and put up with it.

At this juncture, the governor's power at Baghdad had been usurped by two officers: Moḥammad Qanbar, the Aqa of the Janissaries at Baghdad, and Bakr the *sūbāšī*.[11] Each of these officers had gathered around him a number of personal retainers, known as *sagbān*,[12] and vied with the other for control of Baghdad. When Bakr the *sūbāšī* showed signs of getting the upper hand, Moḥammad Qanbar decided to take action. When Bakr went to Ḥella to collect taxes from some recalcitrant elements there, Moḥammad Qanbar sent a messenger to Ḥella exorting these elements not to recognize Bakr's authority. During the latter's absence from Baghdad, Moḥammad Qanbar marched to his quarters intending to loot his possessions. A group of Bakr's men resisted him, and fighting broke out. Bakr, who heard the news when he was on his way back to Baghdad, ensured the loyalty of the men he had with him by making them cash grants and fine promises, and reentered Baghdad.

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[11] A *sepāhī* officer below the rank of *alay-beg* (see Gibb and Bowen, p. 51 and index).

[12] Ottoman: *seğmen*. The *Seğmens*, originally an independent corps, were later absorbed into the Janissaries.

The city was now divided in two camps: Moḥammad Qanbar's supporters in the citadel, and Bakr's men in the city. Skirmishes took place between the two groups, but eventually Bakr succeeded in suborning most of Moḥammad Qanbar's men, who joined him in the city. In the end he got control of the citadel too, and put to death Moḥammad Qanbar and a number of his supporters of whose loyalty he was uncertain. He thus acquired all his opponents' belongings, which he distributed among his own *sagbāns* and *sepāhīs*. He seized a number of the shaikhs from the mausoleum of Abū Ḥanīfa because they had supported Moḥammad Qanbar, placed them in a ship and set fire to it, and then looted their homes, in the process making off with some items which belonged to the shrine. Bakr thus made himself the undisputed governor of Arab Iraq.

When the news of Bakr's coup reached Istanbul, the officers of the Porte appointed Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha governor of Baghdad, with full powers to settle the situation in the best interests of the state and to execute the rebels. This news frightened Bakr, who contacted the *qezelbāš* frontier emirs and told Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, that he had engineered the coup at Baghdad out of devotion to the Shah; henceforth he wished to be the Shah's servant. He hoped he would receive help from the Shah, and he was holding Baghdad, which was the Shah's hereditary territory, until such time as the Shah could take it over. Ḥoseyn Khan sent his envoy on to the Shah, accompanied by one of his own men. Aḥmad Pasha reached Baghdad, but Bakr, backed by all the Ottoman troops at Baghdad, refused to recognize his authority, and Aḥmad Pasha was obliged to retire to Dīār Bakr and send a report to the Sultan.

Another governor was then sent out from Istanbul, 'Alī Pasha known as Kamānkaš (the archer). This time, Bakr pretended to give his allegiance to him and allowed him to enter the citadel. 'Alī Pasha decided to accept the partial authority offered to him, but Sultan Moṣṭafā and the officials of the Porte were annoyed by this capitulation, dismissed him, and appointed a third governor, Yūsof Pasha. Yūsof Pasha's aim was to gain control at Baghdad and wipe out the rebels, but Bakr fathomed his intentions at their first meeting and refused to see him again. Bakr then seized the Pasha, plundered his possessions, and put him to death. A fourth pasha, Kūr Ḥasan, the governor of Mosul, made an effort to deal with the revolt, but Bakr refused him admittance to the city, and he too retired. The story of the Shah's annexation of the province of Arab Iraq will be told under the events of next year.

The Shah's Return from Khorasan and His Visit to Māzandarān

After a stay of two and a half months at Herat, the Shah began his return march to Mašhad, taking with him Rostam Moḥammad Khan as requested by the Uzbeg princes of Transoxania. Near Ḡūrīān, Ḵ̆āja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar Ḡūrīānī met him with provisions for the next stage of his journey, and the Shah proceeded to Mašhad, where he conferred the office of warden of the shrine on Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī. The Shah decided not to move farther west until he saw whether there would be any repercussions from his capture of Kandahar, and whether Esfandīār Khan had succeeded in establishing himself in Ḵ̆ārazm. Since it would place too great a burden on local food supplies if the whole royal army spent the winter at Mašhad, the Shah divided up his forces and sent each to a different winter quarters. He himself traveled to Māzandarān with a small body of retainers. He allotted the small town of Dargozīn to Rostam Moḥammad Khan, and sent him there. The ambassadors from the Ḵ̆ājas of Bokhara, and Ebrahim Ḵ̆āja, Nadr Moḥammad Khan's ambassador, accompanied the Shah to Māzandarān. The former were given leave to depart there, but Ebrahim Ḵ̆āja stayed with the Shah and did not return until the following year, after the Shah's return to Isfahan.

The Shah Takes Mīrzā Faṣīḥī with Him from Herat

The Shah had always liked the company of scholars and poets. Although his other preoccupations had left him relatively little time to indulge this inclination, he always liked to have someone to grace his festive gatherings with scholarly wit. During his stay at Herat, he had enjoyed the company of that eloquent wit and scholar, Mīrzā Faṣīḥī Haravī, an eminent *seyyed* and member of the Anṣārīya family. The Shah demanded that Mīrzā Faṣīḥī be present at all his gatherings. When he left Herāt, the Shah had demanded that Mīrzā Faṣīḥī accompany him to Iraq. Herat's loss was the court's gain, since Mīrzā Faṣīḥī was enrolled among the *moqarrabs*.

In Māzandarān, the Shah divided his time between Ašraf and Faraḥābād. While he was in the province, the Shah was visited by Yūsof Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, and his emirs. Yūsof Khan presented the Shah with fabulous gifts: *ḡolāms*, both male and female; swift Alеša horses; camels; large sums in cash; rich and precious stuffs from many parts; Russian sable coats of great value; rare Circassian coats of mail; muskets of great price, and other items too many to enumerate. In short, avoiding the usual poetic hyperboles of the age, Yūsof Khan presented gifts which won the admiration of all, and he constantly received some new mark of the Shah's favor. While he remained at court, he accompanied the Shah on his hunting expeditions, and was constantly present at his private banquets. When he left, he was given magnificent robes of honor. The Shah also summoned to court Qarčaqāy Khan, the commander in chief of Iran and governor of Mašhad, so that he might renew his acquaintance with Yūsof Khan, whom he had not seen for a long time but who was a close friend of his, since they had been brought up together as children. When Yūsof Khan returned to Šīrvān, Qarčaqāy Khan remained at court.

The Shah's Widening of the Roads in Māzandarān

Readers will be well aware that the narrowness of the roads through the forests and over the mountain passes of Māzandarān makes it difficult for even a single rider to traverse them. At every step, the rider is forced to dismount because of some hazard, and it is impossible for slow-moving camels to make their way along them. In fact, the natives of the region had never even seen a camel, even in their dreams, and when they *did* see one, they were astonished.

The Shah had done a lot toward the opening up of the area by building the city of Faraḥābād and the town of Ašraf, by his practice of spending most winters there, and by his frequent hunting expedition in the province, but the basic problem of the roads remained. It was extremely difficult for retainers of the royal stirrup to go about their business, or for anyone else traveling to or from the court in Māzandarān to make his way along roads which were not only dangerously steep or narrow but, in their more level stretches, often a morass of mud because of the heavy rainfall in the region. As a result, both military forces and travelers in general suffered inconvenience and loss.

This year, therefore, the Shah resolved to embark on a program of road widening, so that camel trains could move easily to and fro, and travelers not sustain any loss. Mīrzā Taqī, the vizier of Māzandarān, was placed in charge of this task, which all thought difficult and many thought impossible. The inhabitants of the province were ordered to assist him. Laborers were to draw their wages in cash from funds made available from the royal treasury, and a start was made on the work. The principal road through Māzandarān was the Savād-kūh highway, which passed through Ḵār, Halīrūd, and Fīrūzkūh. This was the route chiefly used by those traveling to the royal court in Māzandarān. The total distance to Faraḥābād is eight stages, each of five *farsaḵs* or more. Stonemasons, woodcutters, builders, and laborers were assembled from all over the place, and the necessary materials were collected.

Solid bridges of stone, brick, and lime mortar were built over all the rivers that crossed the road. In the case of watercourses which carried flash floods down from the mountains, wherever the workmen thought the banks might collapse, they constructed diversionary channels lined with brick and cemented with lime mortar to take off the surplus water and lead it down to a river. Efforts were made to level the road, and wooded sections were cleared by woodcutters. Sand and gravel were brought from immense distances so that the ground each side of the road could be sloped off in order to carry rainwater into channels and thence into the rivers; in this way, the center of the road remained dry and free from mud. Narrow stretches of the road through the forest were cleverly widened. In some places, massive timbers were laid down, and in others, the engineers had to cut away rock, using a variety of novel techniques. The work was completed to the Shah's satisfaction in a remarkably short time, and work was then begun on the other roads in Māzandarān to bring them up to the standard of the roads in other provinces. By a coincidence, the words "a public work" *(kār-e ḵeyr)* give the date[13] of this great achievement.

Notable Deaths

1. Ḵāja Moḥammad Reżā Fedavī, known as Sārū Ḵāja, the vizier of Azerbaijan. He had acquired the title of *fedavī* (devoted servant) in the course of an expedition to Georgia. He had been at court for several years, and had become a *moqarrab* and one of those admitted to the Shah's private banquets. I have already said something about him, so I will merely add a few remarks here. He was born at Joveyn in the Qazvin district. From being the vizier of Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū, he entered royal service and became vizier of Azerbaijan with full independence. By virtue of his ability and his success in augmenting the *dīvān* revenues, he gained steady promotion. He

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[13] 1031/1622.

was a man of excellent judgment. He had close connections with poetic circles, and his ready wit made him always welcome at the Shah's assemblies.

This year, he fell ill with some affliction of the stomach which refused to yield to treatment. His condition grew worse in the course of the expedition to Kandahar, and he had to stay behind at Tūn; he came on at his own pace, but died at a small place which is the burial place of Imamzada Moḥammad, and was buried at Mašhad. He was a generous man, and did not spare himself in his concern for his friends and for all needy persons.

2. Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Beg, the former vizier of Šīrvān. After his return from his mission to Transoxania, he remained with the Shah in Māzandarān for a time before being appointed vizier and *kalāntar* of Qom. Although he was ill, he set off for Qom, but died two days' journey from his destination. The people of Qom who had come out to welcome him received his corpse instead, and he was buried in the shrine at Qom. He was a Tabrīzī by birth, and was a protégé of Farhād Khan. After the Khan's execution, he entered royal service and held a variety of posts in the *dīvān*. He was a man of great integrity whose conduct in office was unexceptionable.

Events of the Year of the Pig, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1032/1622-23, the Thirty-seventh Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Spring began officially a few minutes after eight o'clock on Sunday,[1] 19 Jomādā I, 1032/21 March 1623. The Shah celebrated Nowrūz in Māzandarān. The *moqarrabs* and the principal officers of state paid the traditional greetings to the Shah, who after the conclusion of the festivities went hunting.

The *moqarrab al-ḵāqān* Zeynal Beg, the *tūšmālbāšī* (superintendent of the royal kitchens), returned from his mission to India, along with the centurion Ḥeydar Beg Qarādāğlū and Mīr Valī Beg, who had been sent on missions to India after the capture of Kandahar.

Readers will recall my description of the embassy of Khan-e 'Ālam, and of the fabulous gifts he brought from India. When the time came for him to return, the Shah did a mental review of all the emirs and *moqarrabs* and finally selected Zeynal Beg as possessing the necessary qualities for an ambassador: intrinsic suitability, shrewdness, magnanimity, natural good manners, and excellence of conduct. In addition, he was a man in whom the Shah had complete trust. For his part, Zeynal Beg resolved, on the basis of the faithful and devoted conduct expected of a Sufi, not to spare either life or property in the service of his supreme spiritual director *(moršed-e kāmel)* and benefactor; he resolved to perform his duties in a manner which would be deemed worthy by both friend and foe.

Zeynal Beg therefore set about preparing an embassy that would do credit to the Shah; he gathered together Arabian horses, jeweled saddles, and saddles of gold and silver, which are the best ornament of armies; jewelery of all kinds, and countless other luxury items. All this was in the charge of large numbers of servants and workmen from the royal workshops.

When he reached Mogul territory, Zeynal Beg was welcomed at every stage of his journey. On his arrival at Lahore, he discovered that the Emperor was absent, but expected momentarily. As ordered, Zeynal Beg waited at Lahore, and Khan-e 'Ālam went ahead to greet the Emperor. After the Emperor reached Lahore, Zeynal Beg was received in audience and presented his most humble greetings and respects. The Emperor greeted him in a friendly manner, whereupon Zeynal Beg presented his gifts and delivered the Shah's letter, and omitted nothing that might contribute to the mutual friendship between the two states.

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[1] 19 Jomādā I was a Tuesday.

It is the custom of the Mogul emperors to hold annual festivities on their birthday at their place of birth, and to perform the vows made at the time of their birth. The Emperor Jahāngīr was born at Delhi and his birthday was close at hand; he therefore did not linger in Lahore, but proceeded rapidly to Delhi. On the advice of Khan-e 'Ālam, Zeynal Beg broached the matter of Kandahar with the principal officers of the Mogul state, but he got no satisfactory reply. He decided to return to Iran and not bother to go on to Delhi, rejecting the advice of those who urged him to do so. Readers will recall that the Shah had intended to give as a gift to the Mogul Emperor the turban jewel inscribed with the name of Mīrzā Oloḡ Beg b. Mīrzā Šāhroḵ b. Emir Tīmūr Gūrakān, judging it to be an appropriate present in view of the descent of the Mogul Emperor from the house of Tīmūr. This ornament, which had not been ready in time to accompany Zeynal Beg and had been sent on later, arrived at this juncture, together with some of the gifts sent to the Shah by the Ottoman Sultan, which the Shah had sent on to the Emperor as "a brother's portion." There was also a letter from the Shah to Zeynal Beg instructing him how to present these gifts. Zeynal Beg had therefore no alternative but to proceed to Delhi. After the conclusion of the birthday festivities he delivered the gifts, and then accompanied the Emperor to Agra. However, he got nowhere with Mogul officials in his discussions about Kandahar, and he reported the situation honestly to the Shah.

When the news of the Shah's capture of Kandahar reached Delhi, the Mogul court suspected Zeynal Beg of being responsible for having suggested this action, and for several days he was in extremely bad odor. Then the centurion Ḥeydar Beg Qarādāḡlū and Mīr Valī Beg the *dārūḡa-ye šotor-ḵān* (officer in charge of the camel stables) arrived in quick succession, bearing the Shah's letters of explanation about Kandahar, and Zeynal Beg found himself back in favor again. When Jahāngīr left for Kashmir, he gave Zeynal Beg and the other Safavid ambassadors permission to depart. He also gave them a letter for the Shah in which the following sentence occurred: "I value your friendship more than the whole world, and more than any gift."

It is the custom at the Mogul court for the Emperor to hold a special reception for departing ambassadors at which the Emperor expresses his appreciation for the ambassador's services. This type of reception required the ambassador to humble and abase himself before the Emperor, but Zeynal Beg's personal pride, and his awareness of his status as the Shah's ambassador, would not allow him to make the necessary obeisance. He persisted in his refusal despite the fact that both members of his own party and officers of the Mogul court urged him to comply. "It is not the custom of the Safavid court," he said; "if the king confers some special favor or honor on a person, which is not tainted by worldly financial considerations, then it is in order for the king's servant to do him homage without stint." Certain officials at the Mogul court, partly in their desire to perpetuate their traditional ceremonial and partly in their dislike of Zeynal Beg, refused to allow the Emperor to make any relaxation in the ceremonial, and so Zeynal Beg eventually left without having been accorded one of these special receptions. When he reached the Safavid court in Māzandarān, he was congratulated by the Shah on the excellent manner in which he had discharged his mission, and his status was thereby enhanced.

The Shah, now reassured that there would be no repercussions from his capture of Kandahar and satisfied that the Uzbeg princes were sincere in their protestations of peace (they had returned the commandant of the fort at Bālā Morḡāb whom they had captured the previous year, and had handed back the fort itself to Safavid officers), decided that the presence of the royal army in Khorasan was no longer required. He therefore ordered 'Isā Khan the *qūrčībāšī* and 'Alīqolī Khan the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* to review the troops and send them on leave. The Shah then returned from Māzandarān to Isfahan, where he spent the next six months in residence in the Naqš-e Jahān palace. Ebrahim Ḵ̌āja, the Uzbeg ambassador from Balḵ, was given permission to depart, laden with gifts and other marks of royal favor and bearing a friendly letter from the Shah to his master. Events in Arab Iraq then made it imperative for the Shah to go there in person.

Events at Baghdad and Ḥafeẓ Aḥmad Pasha's First Expedition against the City

My readers will be well aware that the great and prosperous city of Baghdad, which for over five hundred years was the seat of the caliphate, passed into Safavid hands soon after the accession of Shah Esma'il I and was governed by Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oḡlū

Takkalū. In the year 940/1533-34, Ūlāma Sultan and Ġāzī Khan the keeper of the seal, both high-ranking Takkalū emirs, defected to the Ottomans, and at their instigation the Ottoman Sultan Sülaymān invaded Iran. The Takkalū tribe, guilty of treachery, expelled that loyal Sufi Moḥammad Khan from Baghdad, and Sultan Sülaymān occupied the city.

Since that time, Baghdad has been in Ottoman hands, but for more than twenty-five years now, it has been in a state of great disorder. Every little while an army officer, in his ambition to govern the city, has raised the standard of revolt, and the governors and pashas sent out by the Porte, such as Moḥammad Pasha and Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, have been powerless against the rebels. Not infrequently, fighting has ensued, and numbers of Ottoman regulars have been killed. As a result of the impotence of the officially appointed governors and the control of the city by rebel elements, the ordinary people have been severely oppressed, and the residents of the Shi'ite holy places in Iraq have not been able to sleep at night.

In the last few years, as I have already mentioned, the city had seen the rivalry between Moḥammad Qanbar and Bakr the *sūbāšī*, which ended in the death of the former. Bakr's rule was oppressive and rapacious; he arrested the wealthy for the purpose of extorting money from them, and in order to keep the soldiery happy, made no effort to check their license and lawlessness. As the poet Sa'dī has well said: "If a sultan allows the theft of half an egg to go unpunished, his troops will barbecue a thousand chickens." Because of Bakr's oppressive rule, the peasants and cultivators left their fields untilled, and the resulting shortage of cereals caused great hardship. To add to the troubles of the people, there was a drought in the Baghdad region which was followed by famine.

Those who had money used their capital to buy food and save their lives, though they still lived on meager rations. Of the middle classes, those who could left the city and scattered in all directions—to Iran, Baṣra, and the Ḥavīza region of 'Arabestān; altogether some one hundred thousand people deserted the city. In short, people fled wherever they heard there was a bite of bread to eat, and many people, in their desperation, slew their children with the sword. The writer of this history traveled to Baghdad in the footsteps of the royal army. There was not a single stage on my journey, and not a single village through which I passed, where I failed to see a number of destitute refugees from Baghdad, with no fixed abode, ekeing out a living on the charity and alms provided by the peasants. As for the poor, who did not possess the wherewithal either to stay in Baghdad or to leave, they collapsed in the streets and died of hunger.

At this juncture, Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, who had initially been rebuffed by Bakr and the rebels at Baghdad, returned with an army of thirty thousand men from the army of Dīār Bakr, the troops of the frontier emirs and the Kurdish *sanjaq-begs*. He had been furnished with full power to restore the situation at Baghdad to normal and to punish the rebels, and he brought with him a certain Soleymān Pasha, who had been nominated governor of Baghdad and would take office after the rebellion had been crushed. When Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha neared the city, some of the riffraff who had gathered around Bakr left and melted away, but the regular Ottoman soldiery, fearing that their repeated acts of disobedience had destroyed any chance they might have had of pardon, decided to stand firm in support of Bakr and fight it out.

When Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha camped near the citadel with the intention of investing it, some five thousand of Bakr's Ottoman regulars marched out and, with the greatest effrontery, formed up in battle array. Since they were outnumbered two to one by Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha's men, they were defeated with the loss of fifteen hundred men killed, and the survivors streamed back to the citadel in sorry shape. Bakr the *sūbāšī*, now thoroughly alarmed, bombarded the *qezelbāš* emirs in Hamadan and Lorestān with letters asking for assistance. He had turned to the Shah in all sincerity, he said, because he had no other refuge. The province of Baghdad belonged to the Shah by right of inheritance, and whenever the Shah appeared on the scene, he would give him implicit obedience.

Ṣafīqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Hamadan, and the other frontier emirs reported the matter to the Shah. The Shah ordered them to move their troops to the fort of Zanjīr in the district of Dar-e Tang, nearer the frontier, in case Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha's troops made any incursions across the border; he thought it possible that the refugees from Baghdad, once they heard of the movement of the *qezelbāš* troops, might find some means of escape from their plight. In response to the urgent and repeated requests for help from Bakr, and in their compassionate desire to alleviate the plight of the destitute of that province, who, already starving, were now additionally trampled underfoot by the armies of Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha and the Baghdad rebels, the emirs moved their men two or three days' march nearer the frontier. They sent a letter to Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha by the hand of a Šāmlū *ḡāzī* of the Ḵodābandalū clan:

> We have heard reports of the hardship suffered by the people of Baghdad as a result of the scarcity and famine which has prevailed during the past two years. We have heard that most of the inhabitants of Baghdad have abandoned their homes, and that the province is in a state of total ruin. A number of the inhabitants of the province, both military and civilians, have in their desperation appealed to the Shah for assistance. In response to this appeal, we have moved our troops nearer the frontier. If both combatants can resolve their differences and stop the fighting, it will afford relief to God's servants, which is the duty of all princes, and will be the best solution for all concerned.

When Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad received the letter from the emirs, despite the fact that he had thirty thousand men and the emirs only seven thousand, he was reluctant to give battle to the *qezelbāš* and retired the following day. Before he did so, however, he sent a message to Bakr informing him that the Sultan had given him full powers to settle affairs at Baghdad; he had therefore decided, he said, to confirm Bakr as governor of the province, and to forgo the gifts which Bakr was sending him; in return he said, Bakr must take control of the province himself and, if the *qezelbāš* entered it, he must not allow them to enter the city of Baghdad or its citadel.

As a result of the maneuverings of Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha's troops, the environs of Baghdad as far as Šahrabān had been ravaged; this had added to the general despoliation of the area, and the peasants and other defenseless inhabitants of the region had been overwhelmed by misfortunes and had dispersed. After Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha had departed, the knowledge that Ṣafīqolī Khan and the other *qezelbāš* emirs were near at hand reassured these people, who began to return to their homes. On receipt of this news, and of further declarations of fealty from Bakr the *sūbāšī*, the Shah decided to march.

The Shah's Conquest of the Province of Arab Iraq and His Pilgrimage to the Shrines of the Immaculate Imams

Shah 'Abbas's whole being was by nature devoted to love and service of 'Alī and the other Imams. In order to indicate this devotion, he used to call himself "the dog of the threshold of felicity," that is, of the sultan of Najaf, that is, of 'Alī. He had long had the desire to make the pilgrimage to the tombs of 'Alī and of the other Imams, but this desire had remained unfulfilled because of his many preoccupations and because of the obstacles in the way, not least of which was the state of peace existing between the Safavid state and the Ottoman empire, which meant that any visit by the Shah to the tombs of the Imams would be construed as a violation of the peace.

But "events must wait upon their seasons," as the saying goes, and the situation now was completely different. A palace revolution at Istanbul had resulted in the murder of Sultan 'Os̱mān, and disturbances had broken out in many parts of the Ottoman empire. The Ottoman governors and pashas on the frontiers had committed acts which constituted violations of the peace, and none was subject to the authority of another. In particular, the people of Baghdad acknowledged the authority neither of the Ottomans nor of the *qezelbāš*, and the plight of the inhabitants of that province, and of those residing at the Shi'ite shrines, had been brought to the attention of the Shah. In the light of all this, the Shah, while actually en route to his winter quarters in Māzandarān, suddenly changed his plans and made a snap decision to go to Najaf and Baghdad. He hoped by this action to restore stability to the province, and security to the lives of the inhabitants and the keepers of the holy shrines.

Before taking this momentous decision, the Shah as usual sought an omen from the Koran. At the top of the right-hand page were the words, "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!" which are always taken to signify the attainment of one's goal and a successful expedition. Cheered by this happy omen, the Shah marched from Isfahan with the small body of troops he had with him. Moḥammad Yūsofā Qazvīnī devised the chronogram "I have put my trust in God"[2] to commemorate the event.

The Shah publicized his intention of visiting the shrines of the

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[2] Koran, 11:57. The chronogram, *tavakkolto 'ala'llāhe*, gives the correct date, 1032/1622-23.

Imams, so that any who wished to do so could join the royal cavalcade, and he issued letters of appointment in the name of Bakr the *sūbāšī*, conferring on him the title of khan and informing him of his approach. Ṣafīqolī Khan and his fellow emirs advanced still farther and camped within sight of Baghdad, waiting for Bakr to fulfil his fine promises, hand over the city, and offer them hospitality. The advance of the *qezelbāš* army had saved Bakr from being besieged by the Ottoman army, but on the other hand he had been promised the governorship of Baghdad by the Ottomans, and so he resorted to the most unacceptable double-dealing in regard to the *qezelbāš*, and failed completely to behave in the manner expected. At times he said he wished to postpone his meeting with the emirs until the Shah himself arrived; at others, he resorted to other equally unacceptable excuses. After a few days of this procrastination, Bakr abandoned all pretense, threw up earthworks to defend the gates of the city and the citadel, and opened fire on the *qezelbāš* camp with heavy siege guns. The emirs moved their camp out of range and reported Bakr's treachery to the Shah, who received their dispatches in his camp at Kangāvar.

Since the main purpose underlying the Shah's expedition was his pilgrimage to the Shi'ite shrines, he again issued letters of appointment in the name of Bakr the *sūbāšī*, and made another attempt to conciliate him; if he carried out the promises he had made repeatedly to the Shah, the governorship of Baghdad would be left in his hands. The Shah insisted that he had nothing else in mind except his pilgrimage to the Shi'ite shrines. Mīr Valī Beg, the *dārūġa-ye šotorḵān* (officer in charge of the camel stables), was delegated by the Shah to take this second missive to Bakr, and the Shah waited for a reply before advancing farther. When the envoy reached Baghdad, however, Bakr, at the urging of a number of religious bigots, refused to meet him or take delivery of the letter. Some of Bakr's ill-starred, ignorant supporters slew one of Mīr Valī Beg's men and wanted to murder the envoy himself, but were fortunately restrained from doing so by a man whose name is reported as 'Abd al-Raḥmān.

Mīr Valī Beg managed to escape from this perilous situation and report to the Shah that Bakr intended to defend the city and citadel against him. The Shah's wrath was kindled, and he resolved to capture Baghdad and exterminate those seditious elements which for years had kept the region in a state of unrest, and had managed to exist by playing off Ottomans and *qezelbāš* against one another. He gave orders to 'Isā Khan Ṣafavī, the *qūrčībāšī*, and the *moqarrab al-ḥażrat* Zeynal Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū, the *tūšmālbāšī*, who had recently returned from an embassy to India and had been loaded with honors by the Shah, to advance from Dar-e Tang and join forces outside Baghdad with Ṣafīqolī Khan and his men. If Bakr the *sūbāšī* was still maintaining his attitude of hostility and defiance toward the latter, the combined force of emirs was to make a careful reconnaissance of the defenses, seal all routes into and out of the city, and then commence the siege.

The Victories Won by the Qezelbāš Forces before the Arrival of the Shah

The first success won by Safavid forces in this campaign was the capture of the fort of Moḥammad Lak,[3] who was a *sanjaq-beg* subject to the jurisdiction of Baghdad. The Lak tribe were the riffraff of the tribes in the Shah's dominions; the said Moḥammad, during the recent troubled times, had gathered around him a band of ill-starred men and had indulged in highway robbery and general looting. In his fear of the *qezelbāš*, he had built himself a fort near Żohāb, in the district of Dar-e Tang, and had also extended his sway over various dependencies of Baghdad; he had declared his allegiance to the Ottomans, had been raised to rank of *sanjaq-beg* by the governor of Baghdad, and had continued to harass people in the area. This Moḥammad died this year, and his son and brother were resident in the fort.

Hearing of the Shah's approach, the latter sent an envoy to the *qezelbāš* emirs to declare their "love of the Shah," and the emirs detached five hundred *ġāzīs* under the command of Jahāngīr Beg, a kinsman of Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū, to go to the fort and see whether this brother and son were sincere in their declaration; if they were, they were to take possession of the fort and bring them before the Shah. Moḥammad's brother and son played for time by pretending they were sincere; then they slipped out of the fort with a group of their followers who were apprehensive of the *qezelbāš*, and rode off toward Karkūya and Šahrezūr on the pretext that they were going to visit the Shah. Jahāngīr Beg sent a posse of his men in pursuit, and they slew some sixty or seventy Kurds; the rest escaped after abandoning their baggage. The fort thus passed into Safavid hands, and the Shah, when he reached the area, made Jahāngīr Beg its commandant.

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[3] The Lak were a southern Kurdish tribe living in the Salmās area *(TM*, p. 165).

The Victory of the Emirs over a Group of the Reprobates from Baghdad

When Ṣafīqolī Khan and his fellow emirs were forced to change the location of their camp because of Bakr's bombardment, they crossed the Tigris to Old Baghdad and camped there, thus cutting off the Ottoman line of retreat to the west by way of the bridge. They seized a few boats, and planned a crossing opposite the shrine of Kāẓemeyn.[4] Not more than a hundred men and sixty or seventy horses had gotten across when an enemy force of one thousand men appeared on the scene; this force, under the command of Bakr's brother, Ḥamza Beg, 'Omar Kadḵodā the *vakīl,* and Ḥarīr Aqa, had been sent by Bakr when he heard of the attempted *qezelbāš* crossing. The *qezelbāš* charged without waiting to find out how many they were, and broke the enemy with their first charge and took prisoner all three enemy commanders; 'Omar Kadḵodā was captured by Soheyl Beg the sewer of Ḥoseyn Khan the governor of Lorestān; the captors of the other two commanders are unknown to me. The *qezelbāš* pursued the enemy as far as the end of the bridge, and slew some three hundred of them. In the course of this decisive victory, Ṣafīqolī Khan, Ḥoseyn Khan, and the other emirs performed prodigies of valor, each unhorsing with his lance as many as seven or eight of the enemy. This remarkable victory against an enemy force ten times as great, which signaled the beginning of the Shah's victorious campaign in Arab Iraq, was possible only through the intervention of divine providence. The Shah bestowed his warmest congratulations on the commanders responsible. The reputation of the *qezelbāš* for valor and daring was enhanced by this victory, but the enemy still resolved to defend the citadel.

The Destruction of an Enemy Force Which Had Gone Out to Meet a Trading Caravan

Bakr the *sūbāšī,* hearing of the approach of a trading caravan from Aleppo, sent out a body of troops to meet it and expedite its entry into the citadel, in case it should fall into *qezelbāš* hands. Bakr's troops seized possession of the caravan, and the merchants, resigned to the loss of their goods, hoped only to save their lives. They secretly sent a messenger to the *qezelbāš* to say that, if they sent a force to rescue them, they would tell the full story of the seizure of the caravan. When this messenger reached the great emirs who had effected the crossing of the Tigris, they sent a detachment of troops that surrounded the caravan as though with a hunting circle, slew all the enemy (the *ḡāzīs* divided their possessions among themselves), and rescued the merchants, who later appeared before the Shah at Baghdad.

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[4] Contains the tombs of the "two Kāẓems," i.e., Mūsā and Moḥammad Taqī, the Seventh and Ninth Shi'ite Imams.

The Siege of the Citadel and the Capture of the City of Baghdad

It was God's will that the province of Baghdad should be taken from the hands of a group of rebels who oppressed the people, and that justice should be restored under the Shah's rule. A clear indication of this is the fact that, if Bakr had lived up to his promises, the Shah would have had to confirm him as governor of Baghdad; but Bakr's tyrannical rule had merited divine retribution, and God willed that Bakr should oppose the Shah and thus enable the latter to be the instrument of this divine retribution.

The Shah reached Baghdad on 1 Rabī' I, 1033/23 December 1623, and pitched the royal pavilion near the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa. He sent an ultimatum to Bakr, calling on him to submit and declare his allegiance. Bakr had three days to make up his mind; if at the end of that time he had not complied with the Shah's demand, it would mean war, and if the Safavid forces captured the citadel, he could expect no quarter. Bakr's answer was to open fire with his cannon; he refused to see the Shah's messenger, and threatened him with death. Upon the expiry of the ultimatum, the Shah commenced the siege of the city and the citadel.

Meanwhile, Ḥasan Pasha, the governor of Mosul, was marching to the assistance of Bakr, and Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, with a scratch force of five hundred men, was bringing a large supply train for the benefit of the defenders of the citadel. The Shah promptly dispatched against them a detachment of troops including musketeers of the royal stirrup, under the command of Zamān Beg the *nāẓer-e boyūtāt* (superintendent of the royal workshops),[5] while the besiegers began the work of constructing breastworks and digging trenches. Particularly good progress was made in the western part of the city, in the direction of Nārīn Qal'a, which was defended by Darvīš Moḥammad Pasha b. Bakr the *sūbāšī*. In this sector, which had been entrusted to the *qūrčībāšī*, the breastworks were pushed up to the towers within a few days, and mining operations began. In less than three weeks, the situation of the defenders had become so desperate that Darvīš Moḥammad sued for quarter. But on the eve of 21 Rabī'

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[5] For his duties, see *TM*, pp. 48, 118ff.

I, 1033/12 January 1624, an assault force of *qūrčīs* stormed Nārīn Qal'a and gained an entry through a small aperture which faced the *qūrčībāšī's* breastwork; in the course of the night, two or three hundred *qūrčīs* forced their way into Nārīn Qal'a. Finally the *qūrčībāšī* himself entered, and the war trumpets were sounded to signal their success. Darvīš Moḥammad and his officers and men, seeing that further resistance was useless, surrendered to the *qūrčībāšī* and took refuge in the royal mercy. The sound of the trumpets and the din of battle jolted Bakr and his senior officers, who had their quarters in the city, out of their complacency.

On Sunday, 23 Rabī' I, 1033/14 January 1624, Baghdad fell and was returned to Safavid hands after such a long period of time. Thus Shah 'Abbas achieved a feat none of his predecessors had been able to accomplish. May Baghdad remain in Safavid hands until the end of time,[6] and may Shah 'Abbas be spared to care for its holy shrines until the second coming of the Hidden Imam!

After the fall of the citadel, Darvīš Moḥammad b. Bakr, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Čelebī, and several others who had surrendered and declared their allegiance to the Shah were spared, Their men were then interrogated; all those who were found to be Shi'ites, although they richly deserved death for a multitude of crimes, were also spared; the rest were executed.

The principal problem facing the Safavids after their capture of Baghdad was how to deal with the starving populace. Several thousand women, children, dervishes, and the poor and needy came to the Shah's camp crying that they were starving, and their needs were seen to. Gradually, the situation improved. In the opinion of this writer, the clearest indication of the divine wisdom in bringing this campaign to a successful conclusion is the fact that the Shah's victory meant the salvation of the ordinary people from famine.

On 28 Rabī' I, 1033/19 January 1624, in the Masjed-e Jāme' which was restored by the Abbasid caliph al-Mostanṣer-bellāh (his name is inscribed on the portal),[7] the *ḵoṭba* of the Twelve Imams was embellished with the name of Shah 'Abbas, and this was repeated from pulpits across the city. Ṣafīqolī Khan, governor of Hamadan and *amīr al-omarā* of that frontier, was appointed governor of Baghdad and continued to hold his existing posts as well. During the month that the Shah stayed in Baghdad to see to affairs there, he constantly visited the shrine at Kāẓemeyn, and bestowed gifts and alms on the employees of the shrine, and on all meritorious persons and the residents of the district in general. He enriched the shrine with gifts of carpets, embroidered decorative spreads for covering chests, and so on.

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[6] This prayer was not answered, since the Ottomans retook the city in 1048/1638.
[7] Caliph 623-640/1226-1242.

From Baghdad, he went to Najaf. One day's journey from the shrine, the Shah dismounted and proceeded on foot. He spent ten days at the shrine, engaged in prayer and devotions, and took his turn sweeping those sacred precincts. The Shah reopened a canal which had been dug by Shah Esma'il I to bring water from the delta of the Euphrates to Najaf, and which had become silted up over the years. The troops were ordered to perform this task. The water flowed in a surface channel as far as the mosque at Kūfa, but from there to Najaf the ground rises, and the Shah planned to bring the water through a *qanāt* (underground water channel) past Najaf to Najaf lake. At Najaf, the Shah planned to construct cisterns with access staircases which people could descend in order to draw water. When these were completed, the residents and people living nearby would no longer have to make do with the bitter and brackish water of the existing wells. God grant that the Shah may live to see the completion of this great work, and that in the next world he may receive his reward in the form of refreshing draughts from the river of paradise: "And their Lord will give them to drink a pure beverage."[8]

During the ten days the Shah spent at Najaf, he was in attendance at the shrine night and day, and conducted himself with the greatest humility. All the employees of the shrine, those living in the area, and all worthy persons, women and the needy of the district of Najaf, were granted pensions, votive offerings, and alms. From Najaf, the Shah went to Karbala, the burial place of the Third Imam Ḥoseyn. The year was now at an end, and so I will digress to describe other events which occurred this year before returning to my narrative of events in Arab Iraq.

The Dispatch of an Ottoman Relief Force from Mosul and Its Engagement with Qezelbāš Troops

As already related, Kūr Ḥasan Pasha, the governor of Mosul, was

[8] Koran, 76:22.

on his way to the relief of Baghdad with five thousand men. Hearing that a *qezelbāš* force under Zamān Beg was marching against him, he halted at an old caravanserai along the route and sent to Mosul for reinforcements from the Kurdish and other tribes in the area. Meanwhile, Zamān Beg's troops reached the caravanserai and surrounded it, and Zamān Beg sent an envoy to Ḥasan Pasha calling on him to surrender and enter the Shah's service. The Ottomans decided on resistance. After a few days' desultory fighting, the news arrived of the fall of Baghdad, and the defenders, despairing of receiving reinforcements from Mosul, succumbed to a *qezelbāš* assault. Ḥasan Pasha and most of his men who were captured were put to death, and their possessions and all the supplies they were taking to Baghdad fell into the hands of the *qezelbāš*. Zamān Beg marched back to Baghdad in triumph, and was congratulated by the Shah on his exploit.

The Dispatch of Qarčaqāy Khan, the Commander in Chief of Iran, against Mosul and Karkūk

The capture of Baghdad and the death of Ḥasan Pasha destroyed the morale of the Ottoman garrisons at Mosul, Karkūk, and Šahrezūr. The troops began to desert in order to save their lives, leaving the civilian populations in a state of panic. Purely in order to give security to the latter, Shah 'Abbas dispatched two columns: one consisting of *qūrčīs, ḡolāms,* and musketeers, under the command of Qarčaqāy Khan the commander in chief of Iran, to the Mosul area; the other, under command of Khan Aḥmad Ardalān, to Karkūya and Šahrezūr, which were close to the Ardalān tribal territory. The Ottoman garrison at Karkūya promptly evacuated the fort and fled to Dīār Bakr. Khan Aḥmad and his men took possession of the fort, assumed control of the area, and took steps to protect the property of the inhabitants.

At Mosul, however, the *qezelbāš* met resistance from some of the Ottoman troops who, well supplied with provisions and munitions, were confident of their ability to defend the fort. Qarčaqāy Khan detailed some of his men under the command of Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū Afšār to lay siege to the fort, while he himself made a sweep through Dīār Bakr in the course of which he acquired a great deal of plunder. By the time he returned to Mosul, the fort was on the point of falling. The presence of the commander in chief caused the *ḡāzīs* to redouble their efforts, and a general assault was successful. The defenders cried for quarter and declared their submission, but too late: The *gāzīs* cut down any who offered resistance, and shared the booty.

Qarčaqāy Khan rejoined the Shah during the month of Rajab 1033/March-April 1624, when the Shah was still doing the rounds of the shrines at Najaf and Karbala, and the Shah took him and his men, who had not so far had the opportunity of visiting the shrines because of their mission to the Mosul area, on the pilgrimage. Qāsem Beg Īmānlū was promoted to rank of khan and appointed governor of Mosul, and a force of Afšār centurions and *qūrčīs* was placed under his command. Qāsem Khan strengthened the defenses of the fort at Mosul and took over the administration of the area. Abu'l-Qāsem Sultan, the son of Pīr Ǧeyb Sultan Ostājlū, was made an emir with the rank of soltan and given the district of Javāzer and its dependencies.

Emir Gūna Khan's Subjugation of the Fort of Āḵesqa and the Appointment of Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū as Governor of That Province

Emir Gūna Khan Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, was ordered this year to subjugate the fort at Āḵesqa. As I have previously stated, the Āḵesqa region of the Meskhia province of Georgia had been part of the Safavid empire in the time of Shah Tahmasp, and its governor had owed allegiance to the Shah and had paid tribute to him. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, the Ottomans had gained control of the area, and ever since that time Āḵesqa had been a bone of contention between the two empires. After fighting a number of battles against Ottoman and Georgian troops, Emir Gūna Khan succeeded in subjugating the strong fort of Āḵesqa, the seat of the Ottoman governor. Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū, the governor of Lori, was appointed governor of Āḵesqa, and given a thousand musketeers of the royal stirrup as part of the garrison of the fort. The Šams al-Dīnlū[9] *gāzīs* occupied the fort at Āḵesqa and the other dependent forts in the area, and took charge of the administration of the region.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Shaikh Loṭfollāh Meysī, an Arab from Jabal 'Āmel, an outstanding scholar and jurist of his time. I said something about him in book I, in my biographical notes on theologians and shaikhs of Shah

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[9] The Šams al-Dīnlūs were a clan of the Ẕu'l-Qadars (*TM*, p. 16).

Tahmasp's reign. He fell ill this year and died at Isfahan, while the Shah was still in his summer quarters at Fīrūzkūh and had not yet left for his campaign in Arab Iraq. He had held the office of prayer leader at the mosque which Shah 'Abbas had built facing the Naqš-e Jahān palace.[10] He resided within the precincts of the mosque, and up to the time of his death, continued to give instruction in the religious sciences, to examine theological problems, and to carry out his duties as prayer leader. His opinion on theological problems carried great weight. His name, Shaikh Loṭfollāh, produces a chronogram of the date of his death, if one excludes two *l*s.[11] His elder son, Shaikh Ja'far, is an extremely pious man, and excels even his father in scholarship. Shaikh Loṭfollāh's family were allotted pensions and stipends by the Shah.

2. Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, governor of Marv-e Šāhījān. He fell ill this year at Marv and, the physicians' treatment proving of no avail, died. His body was taken to Mašhad for burial within the precincts of the shrine.

Meḥrab Khan came from Qarābāġ to Iraq early in Shah 'Abbas's reign and enrolled among the court retainers. His first post was that of *davātdār* (inkhorn holder), and his excellent service and natural good manners won him a place among the *moqarrabs* at court. When the Uzbegs subjugated Khorasan, the office of *davātdār* was transferred to his brother, Laṭīf Khan Beg, and he himself was raised to the emirate and appointed governor of Ṭabas-e Gīlakī. While holding this post, he stoutly defended the eastern frontier against Uzbeg attacks, and he subsequently held a variety of posts in Khorasan. He was governor of Mašhad when Bektāš Khan Ostājlū, the governor of Marv, died, and he was transferred to Marv. During his term as governor of Marv, he fought a number of major battles against the Uzbegs, and he became celebrated along that frontier for his exploits. He retained the Shah's favor to the end of his days. After his death, his governorship was given to 'Āšūr Khan Čeganī.

3. Ḵāja 'Alī Akbar, the comptroller of Isfahan. He fell ill in Māzandarān, and died at the summer station of Kalāra-dašt, where sickness was rampant at court. He hailed from Andān in the Mārbīn district of Isfahan, and claimed descent from Shaikh Ẕu'l-Nūn Meṣrī. He was a man of great honesty, integrity, and piety—qualities which

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[10] The magnificent Masjed-e Shaikh Loṭfollāh, begun in 1603 and finished in 1618.

[11] The letters *sh. y. kh. l. ṭ. f. ā. h.* appear to yield the date 1035, not 1033.

won him his first post as *żābeṭ-nevīs* (revenue-collector)[12] of the royal secretariat. After the death of Aqa Abū Fatḥ Eṣfahānī, the *mostowfī-ye ḵāṣṣa* (comptroller of the *ḵāṣṣa* branch of the administration),[13] Ḵāja 'Alī Akbar replaced him. When Ḵāja 'Alī died after a number of years in that office, he was succeeded as *mostowfī-ye ḵāṣṣa* by a certain Aqa Ḥoseyn, an Eṣfahānī, who was a scribe in that department. He too died, only a few days later, and was succeeded by Mīrzā Bāqer, the *ṣāḥeb-towjīh* (the master of assignments).[14]

4. Jān Aqa Ḵānom, the daughter of Morād Beg Bāyandor Torkmān, and the wife of the late 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan. When 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū was governor-general at Herat and guardian of the infant prince 'Abbas, Jān Aqa Ḵānom looked after the latter, and cared for the prince for more years than any of the other women of the harem. As a result, she was given the distinguished title of *nana,* or mother, and became the doyenne of the royal harem and the object of the Shah's special favor. She died this year as the court was leaving its winter quarters in Māzandarān, and the Shah had her body taken to Karbala for burial.

5. Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṭanzī, the vizier of the *ḡolāms* and the royal *majles-nevīs* (secretary of state).[15] He accompanied the Shah to Najaf. When the cavalcade reached Ḥella, Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī went to the bathhouse shortly before it was time to depart. On his return from the baths, he went to his own tent for a short nap. His servants, having gotten everything ready for the journey, came to wake him, and found him dead. Thinking he had had an apoplectic fit, they bled him, but to no avail; they could extract no more than a few drops of blood. His body was taken to Karbala, and buried there in a tomb he had had prepared only a short time before. The Shah was much grieved by the death of such an honest old servant. In view of his length of service, the Shah gave his offices to his eldest son, Mīrzā Moḥammad Reżā, who was even more capable than his father.

Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī was a Barzrūd *seyyed* from Naṭanz, who claimed descent from Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Eṣfahānī, a disciple and devoted follower of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn Esḥāq, who thought highly of him, as is shown by the fact that when Shaikh Ṣafī died, his last will and testament contained the request that Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Eṣfahānī wash his body and prepare it for burial. Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī was a humble man, and a person of integrity and excellence of character. He entered the Shah's service at an early age and performed his duties so well that he rose to higher office than his ancestors and became one of the *moqarrabs* at the court.

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[12] See *TM*, pp. 76, 142; this official was in the department of the comptroller of finance.

[13] See *TM*, pp. 25, 123.

[14] See *TM*, pp. 76, 143.

[15] See *TM*, p. 121.

Others of the Shah's entourage who died during the expedition to Iraq included the following.

6. Mīr Jamāl al-Dīn Kāšī, a noted scholar of his time. Last year, he held the office of prayer leader at the Masjed-e Šāh in Isfahan. He accompanied the Shah to Arab Iraq and, after the conquest of Baghdad, recited the *koṭba* of the Twelve Imams, in the name of Shah 'Abbas, in the mosque at Kāẓemeyn and in the congregational mosques at Baghdad and Najaf. He fell ill at Karbala, and died and was buried there.

7. Ḥakīm Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī Ṭehranī, known as Ḥakīm Ḵeyrātī. Wishing to visit the Shi'ite shrines in Arab Iraq, he accompanied the Shah's expedition. He too died at Karbala and was buried there, thus achieving the supreme goal of all lovers of the house of the Prophet.

8. Mīrzā 'Enāyatollāh Eṣfahānī, the grandson of Ḵāja Ne'matollāh Mālamīrī, who for a number of years was the *vazīr-e mohr* (the vizier of the seal). This year he was appointed vizier of Yazd. He accompanied the Shah's expedition to Arab Iraq and died at Baghdad after completing his visit to Karbala and Najaf. He was buried at Karbala.

Events of the Year of the Rat, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1033/1623-24, the Thirty-eighth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on Wednesday, 29 Jomādā I,[1] 1033/20 March 1624, and the year began at 2:48 a.m. The Shah, who was at Karbala, visited the shrine of the martyred Ḥoseyn, and donated to the shrine brocade spreads for covering chests, carpets (including some woven with gold thread), and other items; in addition, he gave grants and alms to all the shrine attendants and holy men, and to residents of the shrine and other deserving persons, both men and women. The Shah then paid yet another visit to the tomb of 'Alī at Najaf, and returned to Karbala. He appointed that loyal officer of Sufi stock, Sārū Sultan Begdīlū, the brother of the *moqarrab al-ḵāqān* Zeynal Beg the *tūšmālbāšī*, warden of the holy shrines of the Imams and governor of Ḥella. Sārū Sultan was also given five hundred *qezelbāš* to form a guard at Najaf. The administration of all cultivated lands belonging to the shrines was placed in his hands as well.

After completing these administrative arrangements, the Shah began his march back to Baghdad, stopping once more at the shrine at Kāẓemeyn, where he distributed more brocade spreads and beautiful rugs. The month of Jomādā II was now well advanced, and the month of Rajab, and the holy days *(vaqfa)* during which, according to sound tradition, a pilgrimage to the shrine of Ḥoseyn is particularly efficacious, were close at hand. The Shah, being informed of the special holiness of this period, left his troops at Baghdad and journeyed once more to Karbala with a few companions.

On his return to Baghdad, he devoted a few days to settling urgent matters there, and then traveled to Sorra-man-ra'a, commonly known as Samarra.[2] There, he visited the shrines of the two 'Askarīs[3] and the Twelfth Imam, the Lord of the Age. The Shah ordered a census to be made of all residents of that holy place, including men, women, and children, even unweaned infants, and each received an allotment. There was even the case of the pregnant woman who gave birth during the night, and whose husband turned up in the morning and claimed an allotment for the newborn child; this was granted him on the same basis as for other suckling children.

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[1] Both printed text and MS. have, wrongly, Jomādā II.

[2] Sixty miles from Baghdad. See Le Strange, pp. 53ff., and Donaldson, pp. 242ff.

[3] The Tenth "Twelver" Imam, 'Alī Naqī, and the Eleventh, Ḥasan al-'Askarī.

At the conclusion of all these activities, the Shah began his return to Isfahan. En route, he stayed a few days at Ṭāq-e Bostān,[4] where he reviewed his troops and sent them on leave. He reached Isfahan on 17 Ramażān 1033/3 July 1624. From Isfahan, he sent Aqa Moḥammad, the *mostowfī* (comptroller) of the *ḡolāms*, on a mission to the Emperor Jahāngīr, to maintain the good relations between the two states which were of such long standing, and had recently been reconfirmed. In particular, the Shah wished to inform his royal brother of the capture of Baghdad, and he sent with his ambassador a portion of the choicest spoils from that campaign.

This year, Seyyed Moḥammad Khan, the son of Seyyed Mobārak, was appointed governor of the Ḥavīza region of the province of 'Arabestān. I have previously mentioned that Seyyed Manṣūr, the brother of Seyyed Mobārak, had been appointed governor of this province. The Shah had ordered Seyyed Manṣūr to join him on the Baghdad expedition with his troops, and Seyyed Manṣūr had discharged his duties satisfactorily. But Seyyed Manṣūr had made unacceptable excuses for not complying with the Shah's order; he even went so far as to utter a number of seditious remarks, and he showed hostility to those who counseled him to obey the Shah's order—men like Shaikh 'Abdollāh No'man. Seyyed Manṣūr's conduct so angered the Shah that, on his return from Baghdad, he replaced him as governor with Seyyed Moḥammad the son of Seyyed Mobārak; he conferred on Seyyed Moḥammad the title of khan, and dispatched him to Ḥavīza in the company of Shaikh 'Abdollāh No'man. Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, was instructed to give them all necessary assistance. When Seyyed Moḥammad reached Ḥavīza, Seyyed Manṣūr defiantly closed the gates of the citadel against him. Emāmqolī Khan laid siege to the fort. When the situation grew desperate for Seyyed Manṣūr, the latter fled and took refuge among the Āl-e Fożūl and built another fort there. At the time of writing, 1033/1624, he is still there, but he will shortly pay for his crimes.

This year, the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, Salmān Khan the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā, died. The Shah, after reviewing possible candidates, chose as his successor Sultan al-'Olamā'ī Ḵalīfa Sultan, the son of the *ṣadr* Mīrzā Rafī' al-Dīn Moḥammad, the son of the late

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[4] See Le Strange, pp. 187-88.

Mīr Šojāʿ al-Dīn Maḥmūd, who possessed all the necessary qualities. Šojāʿ al-Dīn Maḥmūd was an eminent *seyyed* of Isfahan, of the celebrated family of the Ḵolafā *seyyeds*, who were descended from Mīr Bozorg, the ruler of Māzandarān. I said something about Mīr Šojāʿ al-Dīn in book I in my biographical notes on the *seyyeds* and *ʿolamā* of the time of Shah Tahmasp. Ḵalīfa Sultan's father is the present incumbent in the office of *ṣadr;* he is an extremely learned man, and is connected by marriage to the Safavid royal house. One chronogram for the date of Ḵalīfa Sultan's appointment is: "The ornament in the crown of the office of vizier."[5] Another chronogram, composed by my nephew, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, ran as follows: "Sultan, the Shah's son-in-law, became vizier."[6]

This year, the Shah decreed that Ḵ̌āja Moḥammad Maʿṣūm, the *nāẓer-e daftarḵāna-ye homāyūn* (superintendent of the royal secretariat)[7] and *mostowfī-ye baqāyā* (comptroller of the arrears),[8] should affix his seal to all documents pertaining to transactions coming within the purview of the Department of Arrears, in lieu of the accountants in the Department of the Comptroller of Finance, and the latter were instructed to hand over to him at the end of the year a summarized version of the accounts.

Events in the Ottoman Empire

Since an account of these events is relevant to my purpose, I have no choice but to give it. Readers will recall that the Janissaries had assassinated Sultan ʿOṣmān and had reinstated as sultan his paternal uncle, Sultan Moṣṭafā. One consequence of this action had been that the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, Moḥammad Pasha, known as Abāza Pasha, in his fury against the Janissaries, summarily executed any he could lay hands on, and appropriated their property. Then, behaving like a Jalālī, he gathered a band of ruffians and brought under his control the provinces adjacent to Arzan al-Rūm, or Erzerum as it is now known. He then marched on Istanbul with a large army, with the intention of setting on the throne Sultan Morād, the brother of Sultan ʿOṣmān, and of exacting revenge on the Janissaries. He reached Üsküdar, a suburb of Istanbul, plundered it, and slew any Janissaries he came across.

[5] *Zībanda-ye afsar-e vezārat*, which yields the correct date, 1033/1624.

[6] *Vazīr-e šāh šod solṭān-e dāmād*, which also yields the correct date.

[7] See *TM*, pp. 71, 140. This officer was the head of the royal secretariat under the overall jurisdiction of the vizier.

[8] See *TM*, p. 123 and n. 1.

According to some reports (God alone knows the whole truth!), two thousand Janissaries met their end in this way, and Abāza Pasha distributed among his followers the large quantities of booty he acquired. Contrary to his expectations, the chief officers of the Ottoman state repudiated his actions and ordered him to stop taking the law into his own hands; moreover, they declared his actions harmful to the state, and prepared to take countermeasures against him. Abāza Pasha, disappointed in his hopes of gaining support among the chief officers of the Ottoman state, returned to Erzerum.

Meanwhile, Sultan Moṣṭafā, who had been deposed before because he was of unsound mind, now, after his reinstatement as Sultan, began to act in an even more insane way. The chief officers and leaders of the Ottoman state, fearing that disorders would break out throughout the empire, decided to depose him again, this time in favor of Sultan Morād, who was still a child. This move was opposed by the Janissaries, still fearful of retaliation for their murder of Sultan 'Os̱mān. Sultan Morād's mother made strenuous efforts to win over the Janissaries, and urged the army leaders to conclude a sworn covenant with the Janissaries promising that the matter of Sultan 'Os̱mān's murder was closed and that there would be no inquiry into its circumstances; further, the Janissaries would retain the traditional powers they had always had. This covenant satisfied the Janissaries. After the *moftīs* had been consulted, Sultan Moṣṭafā was again deposed and Sultan Morād IV placed on the throne.

At this juncture, the news arrived of the capture of Baghdad by the *qezelbāš*, and the Ottoman authorities took immediate steps to recover that city. Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr, who was a shrewd and experienced officer and familiar with the situation at Baghdad, was appointed grand vizier and commander in chief, and given full powers to settle affairs on the *qezelbāš* frontier. A new Aqa of the Janissaries was appointed (the former one had been murdered by his own men at the time of the revolt against Sultan 'Os̱mān), and the Janissaries agreed to deal with Abāza Pasha, who had had the temerity to put to death so many of their number, and then to march on Baghdad. The troops stationed at Istanbul, known as *qapı-qolları*, were made ready and dispatched to Dīār Bakr with provisions, artillery, and other siege equipment. When Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha received his commission as grand vizier, he issued mobilization orders to all the pashas throughout Dīār Bakr, Egypt, Syria, Aleppo, Rumelia, and Anatolia, and handed over the government of Dīār Bakr to a certain Morād Pasha. The story of his expedition to Baghdad will be told under the events of next year, God willing.

The Arrival of Various Foreign Embassies at the Safavid Court

After the Shah had been at Isfahan for some considerable while, dispensing justice and dealing with petitions, he suffered a short illness. On his recovery, he set out for his winter quarters in Māzandarān, and eventually reached Faraḥābād and Ašraf after spending some time on the way hunting. A number of foreign ambassadors visited his court there. They included Nadr Mīrzā-bāšī Özbeg, an ambassador from Balḵ on behalf of Nadr Moḥammad Khan. This envoy reached Isfahan after the Shah had left for Māzandarān, and was welcomed by the governor, vizier, and people of the city of Isfahan. He was given quarters in the Sarvestān building in the Naqš-e Jahān park, and was royally entertained during his stay at Isfahan. After he was sufficiently rested from the fatigue of his journey, he proceeded to Māzandarān and was received by the Shah at Ašraf. He presented a letter of friendship from his master and gifts sent by the latter, and spent two months at the Shah's court before being given leave to depart and sent on his way with honor.

A second envoy was Ḵ̆āja Ḥājjī, an ambassador from Shah Jahān, the son of the Mogul Emperor Jahāngīr; he too was received by the Shah at Ašraf, and presented to the Shah a letter from Shah Jahān which described the latter's struggles against his father's officers. The letter was full of complaints about his father's treatment of him, particularly his sending armies against him. The Shah kept his ambassador at Ašraf until after Nowrūz, and then sent him back with a letter full of fatherly advice. God, he said, had enjoined sons to obey their parents; the prince should seek to do his father's will, thus removing his father's ground for complaint against him and removing the need for him to take military action against him. If the prince would take this advice, he said, he would be applauded and esteemed. He should practice the art of dissimulation toward his father's enemies and people with an axe to grind, and should devote himself to pleasing his father.

The third envoy this year was from Šāhīn Gerāy Khan, the Tartar prince who, as I mentioned earlier, had taken refuge at the Safavid court as a result of opposition from his nephew, Jānī Beg Gerāy, who had become ruler of the Tartars with Ottoman support. Šāhīn Gerāy Khan, after a spell at court, had taken up residence at Darband in Šīrvān and was living in hope of regaining his hereditary territory. The Shah had given him moral encouragement and material assistance to that end. This year, his elder brother Moḥammad Gerāy Khan had succeeded as ruler of the Tartars, and the senior Tartar chiefs had chosen Gerāy Khan as his heir-apparent. They called him *qalḡā* or lieutenant after the Tartar custom, and had sent for him. Šāhīn Gerāy had asked the Shah for his moral support and set off for the Crimea. From what the envoy told me, and from reports of travelers from the Crimea, I learned that the Ottoman Sultan had sent him large quantities of cash and presents in an effort to secure his allegiance to the Ottomans and a guarantee of his hostility toward the *qezelbāš*, but he had refused, and continued to count himself a devoted supporter of the Shah. Indeed, the signet ring with which he had sealed his letter to the Shah bore the inscription: "Šāhīn Gerāy, the slave of Shah 'Abbas." He had fought battles at Kaffa against the Ottoman pashas who had been sent against him in support of Jānī Beg Gerāy, and had been victorious. He now reported all this to the Shah, and gave thanks to him for his support. The Shah treated his envoy with the greatest esteem, and dispatched him with words of wisdom such as a spiritual director gives his disciple. He also sent the Tartar chief a robe of honor and numerous other gifts.

The fourth envoy to reach the Shah's court this year came from Abāza Pasha; he was a certain Seyyed 'Azīzī, known as Emir Efendī, (the Ottomans habitually called *seyyeds* Efendī as a mark of respect).

Abāza Pasha was the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, and thought it expedient to keep on good terms with the Safavids in view of the fact that his province bordered on that of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, which was governed by the powerful *qezelbāš* emir Gūna Khan. After his intervention against the Janissaries following their murder of Sultan 'Oṣmān and his subsequent withdrawal from Istanbul, he thought it prudent to make overtures to the Safavid court through Emir Gūna Khan, and he accordingly sent Emir Efendī as his ambassador to declare his allegiance to the Shah. Although the Shah did not believe there was a word of truth in what he said, and was well aware that Abāza Pasha only wanted a place to retreat to in case the Ottoman authorities decided to punish him for his recent activities, he preferred to take his protestations at face value. He received Emir Efendī with honor and issued letters of appointment conferring the status of khan on Abāza Pasha.

He sent Emir Efendī back with gifts for his master, accompanied by a Safavid envoy in the person of Nowrūz Beg, an Ostājlū *qūrčī*. At first, Abāza Pasha professed to be honored by having the status of khan conferred on him, and treated Nowrūz Beg with honor; later, however, his duplicity began to show itself, and he resorted to trickery and double-dealing in his relations with officers of the Safavid state.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year

When the Shah's spies and informers reported the buildup of Ottoman troops in Dīār Bakr under the command of Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, the Shah thought the latter might be intending to invade Azerbaijan, and so he decided to deny the Ottomans provisions along their line of march. They could take one of two routes from Dīār Bakr: via Erzerum, or via Vān. Since Erzerum was insecure because of the seditious activities of Abāza Pasha, the Shah thought the Vān route would probably be chosen. He therefore sent the aide-de-camp Rostam Beg to Tabriz with orders to mobilize, in conjunction with Šāhbanda Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, the *qezelbāš* forces in that province, and to proceed in the direction of Vān and ravage all regions through which the Ottomans might pass. The necessary orders were sent out, and every commander reported for duty and paraded his men with full equipment before Rostam Beg and the *beglerbeg*. The size of each contingent depended on the size of the fief, the emoluments accruing from it, and the zeal of the individual commander in the cause of religion and the state. This force then proceeded toward Vān and stripped the area of all provisions and livestock, none of the Ottoman or Kurdish forces in the area daring to interfere. Rostam Beg then returned to court and reported to the Shah that his mission had been accomplished.

The Engagement between The Enemy in the Mosul Area and Qāsem Khan and his Afšār Qūrčīs

As previously reported, Qāsem Khan Īmānlū had been stationed on the Mosul frontier with his Afšār centurions and *qūrčīs*, and held the fort there. He had no more than three hundred men with him, and the total force at his disposal numbered only seven or eight hundred. He was attacked by a combined army of Ottomans, Arabs, and Kurds, who had been emboldened by the appointment of Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha as commander in chief and by the Ottoman mobilization in Dīār Bakr. This combined force numbered three thousand men, seven hundred of whom were musketeers, and was commanded by Ḥasan Pasha and by the brother of Kūr Ḥasan Pasha, who had been captured and executed near Baghdad. Despite their tremendous inferiority in numbers, the *qezelbāš* decided to give battle. Afšārs of the Arešlū clan led the first determined charge, followed by the other Afšār clans and by Qāsem Khan and his men, who charged the enemy at full gallop. The ferocity of their attack broke the enemy ranks, and the *qezelbāš* routed their opponents, who suffered more than a thousand men killed. When they were certain that the frontier was once again secure, the centurions and *qūrčīs* said farewell to Qāsem Khan, and marched to the Safavid court at Faraḥābād to display the heads of the enemy slain and the captured weapons to the Shah. I obtained the details of this battle from several *qūrčīs* who took part in it.

The Dispatch of Zeynal Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū to Take Charge of Affairs in Arab Iraq, and His Victory over the Enemy Near Mosul

The news of this engagement made the Shah realize that enemy forces in the Mosul area had been encouraged by the presence of strong Ottoman support in Dīār Bakr to act in an insolent manner. He received a report that a group of Arabs, in particular Abū Ṭāleb b. Nāṣer Mohannā, were ravaging the countryside in the region of Ḥella and Najaf and causing injury and loss to the inhabitants. The Afšār tribe, the report went on, had not been able to mobilize as it had wished because of the incidence of plague at Mosul, where Qāsem Khan was still holding the castle with a small band of men. As a result, the situation was deteriorating fast. The Shah decided to send one of his most experienced officers, one of the select group of his personal attendants at court, who had distinguished himself by his honorable conduct, his valor, and his total dedication to the cause of religion and the state, Zeynal Beg Šāmlū the *tūšmālbāšī*. His orders were to mobilize the available forces in Hamadan province, take the field against these rebel bands, and give all necessary assistance to the Safavid frontier commanders in the area. Zeynal Beg was given the services of Mīr Fattāḥ, the chiliarch of the Isfahan musketeers, and of another contingent of musketeers of the royal stirrup.

When he neared the frontier, he learned that a large force of Ottomans and local troops from the Mosul region was advancing on Mosul, and that Qāsem Khan and the two or three hundred Afšār *gāzīs* he had with him, faced by overwhelming numbers of the enemy and suffering from a shortage of provisions and the incidence of plague, had evacuated the fort at Mosul, which had been occupied by the enemy. There was also a fear, the report to Zeynal Beg said, that Khan Aḥmad Khan Ardalān would for the same reasons hand over the fort at Karkūk to the enemy. The report concluded by stating that there had been several clashes between Mohannā's Arabs and Sārū Sultan Begdīlū, Zeynal Beg's brother, who was warden of the Shi'ite shrines and commander of the *qūrčīs* at Najaf.

On receiving this intelligence, Zeynal Beg quickened his pace. On arrival at Dar-e Tang, he was joined by Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, and a small body of troops. He received the additional information that the Ottoman army operating in the Mosul and Karkūk area was under the command of Ḥasan Pasha Čerkes, and was a combined force of Ottomans, Kurds, and Arabs, six thousand strong. He further learned that the enemy intended to transfer some two thousand families from Qal'a-ye Ẕohāb, known as Qal'a-ye Lak, and move them west of the Tigris. Zeynal Beg reviewed his troops and found that he had about three thousand regulars and musketeers. He moved against the enemy by forced marches, and reached them on the third day. The speed of his advance had been such that only about two thousand men had kept up with him. However, the mere news of his approach was sufficient to cause some of the Ottomans' Kurdish and Arab allies to desert, and the enemy army was reduced to three or four thousand men. The enemy force was speedily defeated, with the loss of some six or seven hundred men killed; the Safavid losses were nowhere near as heavy.

Ḥasan Pasha and the remnants of his routed army retreated within the fort at Mosul, and their camp was plundered by the *qezelbāš* and the Safavid musketeers. The plague still raged within the city, and some Ottomans succumbed to it every day. In view of this, Ḥasan Pasha opened negotiations with Zeynal Beg, and proposed that he should evacuate the city and that the city should be left unoccupied until the plague abated, at which time some agreement would be reached. Zeynal Beg, in his compassion for the enemy in their plight, agreed to this suggestion. He returned to their former locations the tribesmen who had been uprooted by the Ottomans, and marched back to court. On orders from the Shah, he sent Mīr Fattāḥ and the musketeers to reinforce the garrison at Baghdad. Zeynal Beg reported to the Shah at Solṭānīya, when the latter was on his way to Georgia. I obtained the details of the above battle, and of Zeynal Beg's march to and from Iraq, from statements made by several soldiers who fought in this battle.

The Dispatch of Qarčaqāy Khan, the Commander in Chief of Iran, to Georgia and the Revolt of Morāv

When God has decided on a course of action, no act of man can deflect the divine will. This is aptly illustrated by the campaign of Qarčaqāy Khan in Georgia, a campaign which occasioned so much bloodshed and had such important repercussions.

After the conclusion of the Shah's punitive campaigns in Georgia designed to suppress the revolts instigated by Ṭahmūraṣ, the government of Kakhetia was placed in the hands of Peykar Khan Īgīrmīdört Qājār. The latter made the fortress of Qırlānqūč his base, and built a whole city around it—residential accommodations of all kinds, caravanserais, public baths, and other buildings. He encouraged the Georgians who had scattered in all directions during the Shah's campaigns to return and begin the task of restoring prosperity. Gradually a number of Georgian nobles and soldiers also began to drift back, and the influx of these elements increased the risk of rebellion. Peykar Khan began sending in reports (and these were confirmed by Georgians in the royal service who had the Shah's ear) to the effect that the Georgian nobles and troops who had returned to Kakhetia were in contact with Ṭahmūraṣ; secret correspondence was going to and fro between the two parties, and there was a danger that they would succeed in suborning the common people too, with the result that there would be a new revolt in the near future.

The Shah decided to send an experienced officer to see what the situation was, and to take whatever steps he thought necessary in the interests of the state. He chose for this task Qarčāqāy Khan, the commander in chief of Iran, who was at the Shah's court in Māzandarān. With him he sent Morāv Beg Gorjī, who had formerly held the office of *vakīl* to Simon Khan, the ruler of the Kartlia province of Georgia. It is now more than ten years since Morāv Beg embraced Islam and with his wife and family entered the Shah's service. He was honored with the grant of fiefs and became a *moqarrab* and one of the Shah's banquet-companions. The Shah chose him for this assignment because he was a shrewd man, conversant with Georgian affairs, and trusted as a result of his loyal and excellent service.

Another member of this cavalcade was the daughter of 'Īsā Khan the *qūrčībāšī*, who was the Shah's own granddaughter[9] and had been betrothed to Simon Khan.

The Shah issued orders that the emirs of Šīrvān and Qarābāğ should all rally to the support of Qarčaqāy Khan and place themselves under his orders. When Qarčaqāy Khan and Morāv Beg arrived in Georgia, Yūsof Khan the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, Moḥammad-qolī Khan Zīād-oğlū the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, and the other emirs, who had been forewarned, joined them bearing wedding gifts. Qarčaqāy Khan therefore decided to celebrate the wedding of 'Īsā Khan's daughter as his first move. This done, in order to clarify the situation and enable him to distinguish between soldiers and civilians, Qarčaqāy Khan issued a general call to the people of Kakhetia on the pretext of raising troops to accompany him on a raid on the Bāšī-Āčūq district, which had been announced. Nearly ten thousand fully armed Georgians assembled in response to his call. Qarčaqāy Khan observed signs of rebellion among them, and urged on by Morāv Beg, decided to make an end of them. He announced that he had decided to excuse them from the expedition to Bāšī-Āčūq on the ground that it would be hard for them to fight against their own coreligionists, and they should therefore stack their arms and hand them over to the *ğāzīs*. When all their arms had been collected, the Kakhetians were surrounded like game and dispatched in the twinkling of an eye. After this massacre, Morāv Beg revealed his own intrinsically evil nature and apostatized—either because he had never really abandoned his Christian faith, or because he aspired to be the ruler of Kartlia. He plotted with the Georgian nobles to murder Qarčaqāy Khan and some of the other emirs, but I will keep this story for my account of next year's events.

This year, plague and pestilence struck parts of Azerbaijan. Ardabīl was particularly hard-hit, and in that city alone more than twenty thousand people died. In neighboring districts, such as Meškīn, Sarāb, Zarnaq, Garmrūd, and Ḵalḵāl, another eighty thousand died, making a total, without the slightest exaggeration, of more than one hundred thousand dead. The oldest inhabitants of the region tell me that they cannot remember a plague of such severity. The contagion also spread to some adjacent districts in Ṭārom and Qazvin, and some people died there too.

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[9] 'Īsā Khan had married a daughter of Shah 'Abbas.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Esfandīār Beg 'Arabgīrlū,[10] one of the *moqarrabs* of the court. He fell ill on his return from the expedition to Baghdad as he was riding along with some of his companions, and was forced to stay behind. The Shah kindly sent a traveling litter for him, but after the bearers had taken a few paces, he collapsed. He indicated that he wanted to try and ride again, but this was beyond his powers; he was forced to rest by the roadside, and died shortly afterward. He was the son of Kamāl Beg, and his family had for generations been faithful Sufis loyal to the Safavid house. He had risen to the post of *evčībāšī* and, just before his death, had been appointed *ešīk-āqāsī-ye ḥaram*. He had received the office of *evčībāšī*, an office hereditary in his family, after his father's death, and his excellent performance in this office had taken him to great heights. He became a *moqarrab* at court and one of the Shah's companions at private banquets. He was a man of sound judgment and counsel. Since his son was still very young, the office was not conferred on him but remained in abeyance until the boy should reach maturity.

2. Salmān Khan, son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā, the vizier of the supreme *dīvān* and *e'temād al-dowla*. He was taken ill at Isfahan after his return from the Baghdad expedition. The indications pointed to his having cancer. Successive cuppings and the use of ice packs had no effect. The disease gained the ascendancy, and the vizier died.

His father, Shah 'Alī Mīrzā, was the son of Shah Tahmasp's sister. Traditionally, his family had been honored by marriage ties with the royal house. Salmān Khan himself was twice so honored, but both marriages were without issue, and he had no heir. While he was still in good health, he had made a gift of his personal possessions to Shah 'Abbas, as I heard him repeatedly declare with his own lips. He also held the post of auditor of the revenues of the supreme *dīvān*. His possessions were accordingly taken over and the office of vizier, as I have already mentioned, was conferred on Sultan al-'Olamā'ī Ḵalīfa Sultan b. Mīr Rafī' al-Dīn the *ṣadr*.

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[10] A Šāmlū clan.

Events of the Year of the Ox, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1034/1624–25, the Thirty-ninth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Wednesday[1] 12 Jomādā II, 1034/22 March 1625, and the New Year officially began at 10:17 a.m. The Shah was at Ašraf in Māzandarān, and the Nowrūz celebrations were held in his beautifully decorated private apartments there. The principal officers of state, foreign ambassadors, and senior representatives of every class of society presented themselves to the Shah and offered their salutations and felicitations. But men are not left in peace for long in this world: this year many slumbering revolts awoke, armies were on the move in many places, and mighty events were in the offing. Although there were rebellions and disturbances everywhere, eventually they subsided, through God's mercy and through the good fortune, strenuous efforts, and sound planning of the Shah, but not before many innocent lives had been lost. The first of these rebellions I shall mention is that of the Georgian Morāv, a rebellion which had widespread repercussions, and which brought (and still brings) ruin and affliction upon the heads of God's servants.

Morāv's Apostasy and Rebellion, and His Infamous Acts

After the massacre of the Kakhetians I described earlier, Morāv, whose conversion to Islam had been only a matter of expediency and who had in reality never abandoned his Christian faith, succeeded, by lies and falsehoods, in seducing the people of Kartlia from the path of loyalty to the Safavid house which they had always followed. He quoted to them certain remarks made by the Shah which seemed to indicate a withdrawal of the Shah's favor from them and gave rise to fear and apprehension on their part. Since Morāv held a position of trust at the Safavid court, and was privy to the Shah's secrets, the Kartlians considered his lies to be the truth. Their fear increased daily, and while Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, Peykar Khan Īgīrmī-dört, and most of the other emirs had gone off, at Morāv's suggestion, to attack various infidel strongholds, the Kartlians decided to come out in revolt and to kill Qarčaqāy Khan.

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[1] 12 Jomādā II was a Saturday.

One morning, Morāv, fully armed, left his tent, went to Qarčaqāy Khan's headquarters, and informed him (as a demonstration of his own loyalty) that the Kartlians were in general revolt. He should leap on his horse immediately, he said, and go to the scene, lest the *qezelbāš* forces suffer some reverse at the hands of the rebels. Qarčaqāy Khan and his fellow emirs knew in what high regard Morāv was held by the Shah, and had seen with their own eyes the almost daily favors the Shah lavished upon him. Moreover, one of his sons and the rest of his family were in Iran, under the Shah's care, and it never occurred to them that Morāv might be plotting treachery. Qarčaqāy Khan accordingly agreed to Morāv's suggestion and got his equipment ready; as he was mounting his horse, Morāv thrust at him with his lance so viciously that the point of the lance emerged on the other side of his body. Morāv then went to the tent of Yūsof Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Šīrvān, tricked him similarly, and killed him as well.

After the murder of these two high-ranking emirs, the Georgians fell upon the *qezelbāš* camp; they slew a son of Qarčaqāy Khan named Emāmverdī Beg and anyone else they came across. The rest of the *qezelbāš* fled in all directions, and the Georgians plundered the camp. The news caused consternation among the other *qezelbāš* emirs; since each had been sent on a mission in a different direction, there was no possibility of their reuniting their forces, and the one thought of each commander was to get his own men out safely. Simon Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, did not think it was the moment to go to Tiflis, his seat of government; he went with Moḥammadqolī Khan Zīād-ōğlū, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, to Āğča Qal'a, and took refuge there.

Morāv then marched on the fortress at Qırlānqūč, intending to seize Peykar Khan and to kill and plunder the Īgīrmī-dört tribe. Peykar tried to evacuate the tribesmen, all of whom had their women and children with them, from the area. But they were still in the process of crossing the Kor River when the Georgians caught up with them, seized large numbers of animals and other plunder, and carried off into captivity many Muslim women and children. Peykar Khan succeeded in getting away safely with his men, but the fort of Qırlānqūč, with all its provisions (which included fifty *ḵarvārs* of silk), fell into Georgian hands. The Georgians then made for Tiflis, the seat of government of the rulers of Kartlia, hoping to get possession of the fort there by guile. That fort was garrisoned by a detachment of Nūrī musketeers under the command of Šāṭer Šāhī; the latter, having no confidence in the loyalty of the Christians of Tiflis, moved Simon's family from the city into the fort and prepared to put up a stout defense, despite the lack of munitions and his own lack of experience in siege warfare. He expelled from the fort any Christians of whose loyalty he was suspicious; some of the Christians took up arms against him, and there were clashes between them and his men and casualties on both sides.

From the slain and from other Christians, the musketeers managed to collect enough munitions to last them for two months, and they prepared to hold out for that length of time. Morāv left a detachment of Georgians to continue the siege, while he himself took his main army to Ganja in Qarābāġ and plundered that city, which is the seat of the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāġ and of the chiefs of the Qājār tribe; from Ganja too, they carried off into captivity some Muslim families. There was a general exodus of the tribes of Qarābāġ, who fled south and did not draw rein until they reached the Ḵodā-āfarīn bridge across the Aras River. After pillaging the Ganja area, Morāv returned to continue the siege of Tiflis, and tried by fair words and other blandishments to trick Šāṭer Šāhī, but without success; the musketeers stuck to their task and gave no answer to Morāv's letters save the whistle of arrows and bullets.

Meanwhile express couriers from the emirs and from the musketeers at Tiflis had informed the Shah of these events; they had further informed him that Morāv had declared his allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan, and had sent the heads of his slain opponents to the Ottoman commander in chief of Dīār Bakr, with gifts including some of the precious stuffs which had fallen into his hands. He had urged the Ottoman commander in chief to march to Georgia and Šīrvān. The latter, thinking that Morāv's revolt was the first step in the Ottoman reconquest of this area, had issued letters of appointment conferring on Morāv the governorship of the province of Kartlia, and on Ṭahmūraṣ the province of Kakhetia. Ṭahmūraṣ meanwhile had returned to Georgia and joined up with Morāv.

The Shah appointed 'Īsā Khan the *qūrčībāšī* field commander of the Safavid forces in Georgia and Qazāq Khan Čerkes, the *dārūġa* of Lāhījān in Gīlān, *amīr al-omarā* of Šīrvān in place of the murdered Yūsof Khan; Qazāq Khan's orders were to proceed at full speed to Šīrvān, mobilize the Safavid forces in the area, and then march to the assistance of the *qūrčībāšī*. Emir Gūna Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Čoḵūr-e Saʿd, and Šāhbanda Khan the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, with the emirs under their command, were also ordered to accompany ʿĪsā Khan. The Shah meanwhile marched from Māzandarān and camped at Qazvin; after a few days there, he moved to summer quarters at Solṭānīya. Reports of Ottoman troop movements kept coming in, and the Shah remained at Solṭānīya until he could ascertain the Ottoman point of attack; he was joined there by Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, with his troops. All troops who had not actually left for Georgia were now held by the Shah at Solṭānīya.

The Safavid Victory over the Georgians

The *qūrčībāšī* marched toward Georgia, joined at every stage along the way by contingents of the troops that had been ordered to report for duty; he thus assembled a large army of *qūrčīs*, *ḡolāms*, and musketeers of the royal household, and *qezelbāš* units from Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Šīrvān. On the Georgian side were not only Morāv but also Ṭahmūraṣ and Aṭābeg Khan, the son of Manūčehr Khan, the ruler of Meskhia, both of whom had fled to those areas of Georgia that were subject to Ottoman jurisdiction. They had now emerged from their hiding places at the instigation of Morāv and the Ottoman commander in chief. Under their command were all the Georgian forces available in Kartlia and those from Kakhetia who had survived the massacre there, some twenty thousand infantry and cavalry in all.

The two armies met at Gūmešlū, in the Alget-čay district, on 24 Ramażān 1034/30 June 1625. Since Šāhbanda Khan and the army of Azerbaijan was still a day's march away, the *qezelbāš* army waited for him to come up before giving battle. The Georgians did not launch an attack that day either, and both camps spent the night on guard. The following day, 25 Ramażān/1 July, the *qūrčībāšī* made his battle dispositions as follows: himself in the center; Emir Gūna Khan as advance guard; and his remaining troops on the wings. The Georgians attacked in a dense mass and swept aside the Safavid advance guard, Emir Gūna Khan being severely wounded as he tried to stand his ground. No help reached them from either of the Safavid wings, the lie of the land being unfavorable to them, but the Qājārs succeeded in carrying the wounded Emir Gūna Khan away from the battlefield. The Georgians, still carried by the impetus of their charge, smashed through the ranks of the musketeers too, and the latter suffered heavy losses. The Georgians still came on with such élan that a group of them, finding no opposition in front, swung around behind the Safavid army and fell on the commissariat. The commissariat servants, apprentices, and the like were scattered, and uproar broke out in the camp. The ruffians who accompany an army on the march fell to plundering one another's goods and fleeing with their loot. The Safavid camp, in total confusion, suffered heavy losses as a result. As I mentioned before, the site was not favorable for a battle.

The Safavid right and left wings, because of the lie of the land, could not see their center; therefore, when they heard the uproar coming from the camp, they thought the center had been overwhelmed, and they began to leave the field, some out of cowardice, some in their anxiety to save their worldly possessions. The general confusion even began to affect the Safavid center, but there the *qūrčībāšī* stood firm with his men, who put their honor before their lives. By keeping calm amid the confusion, the *qūrčībāšī* instilled new courage into other units, which re-formed and charged the enemy. At this juncture, Šāhbanda Khan reached the battlefield with his advance guard, checked the flight of those who were leaving, and joined in the fray. The Georgians were routed, with some ten thousand men killed. Their leaders, Morāv, Ṭahmūraṣ, and Aṭābeg, fled. The Georgian fugitives fled to Tiflis, crossed the Kor River, burning the wooden bridge behind them, and fled into the dense forests and places difficult of access. The following Georgian officers and notables were killed in this battle: Ṭahmūraṣ, chief of the Mokrān; Aqa Tengīz; Īvāl Beg; Bījan Beg; Sohrāb Beg. On the Safavid side, a number of centurions of the *qūrčīs*, *ḡolāms*, and musketeers were killed in the first Georgian onslaught. Of the lower ranks, some one thousand men were killed, mostly from the musketeer regiments.

After their victory, the *qūrčībāšī* and his emirs went to survey the Safavid camp. They found the tents stripped of all their contents, and no sign of a horse, mule, or camel. Gradually, as the news of the Safavid victory spread, the commissariat personnel began drifting back, bringing with them pack animals, mules, and other items, which were eagerly claimed by their owners, and the camp slowly regained some sort of order. The emirs then marched to Tiflis and relieved the gallant garrison there. Some of the rebels had fled to Bāšī-Āčūq and established a stronghold there. Šāhbanda Khan and Qazāq Khan marched against them and returned victorious, bringing much booty, including many mules. Swift couriers were dispatched to take the news of the victory to the Shaḥ, whom they found camped just outside Qazvin.

The Dispatch of a Safavid Force in the Direction of Qarāqol-Ḵān, and the Death of Šāhbanda Khan

One of the serious setbacks suffered by Safavid arms on this campaign was the death of Šāhbanda Khan and the capture of Qazāq Khan on the road to Qarāqol-Ḵān. Qarāqol-Ḵān (Ananuri) is a small fort in an extremely inaccessible part of Georgia, and for this reason is often used by the Georgians in time of need. At this moment, the dependents of 'Abd al-Ğaffār Beg were discovered to be there. 'Abd al-Ğaffār Beg, the son of Farāmorz Beg, was a distinguished Georgian who had embraced Islam and was highly thought of by the Shah. His sister was a servant in the royal harem, and he himself was the son-in-law of Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs. He was presently in Georgia, and after the Georgian rebellion, his life was in danger. The Shah swore he would spare no effort to try and rescue him and his dependents. Accordingly, the *qūrčībāšī* sent a detachment of troops under Šāhbanda Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan; Qazāq Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān; and Ḵosrow Mīrzā, the brother of Bagrāt Khan Gorjī, to the fort of Qarāqol-Ḵān, which they surrounded. The small garrison of the fort willingly handed over the dependents of 'Abd al-Ğaffār on condition that the Safavid troops leave without molesting them, and the emirs, seeing no point in wasting time there, agreed.

The Georgians stationed a number of musketeers and archers in ambush along the route by which they thought the Safavid troops would return. Providentially, the emirs chose a different route and advanced with extreme caution, with guards both ahead and in the rear of the main body. After a long wait at their ambush, the Georgians realized the emirs must be traveling by a different route, and they sent troops in pursuit of them. One day, Šāhbanda Khan and Qazāq Khan, who were bringing up the rear and keeping a close watch on all sides (most of the column had already passed this spot and was nearing its camping place for that night), heard musket shots and suddenly found themselves attacked on three sides by the Georgians. A number of Šāhbanda Khan's Turkmans were killed, but the rest fought back strongly; Qazāq Khan's men, however, turned and fled, abandoning their commander.

Qazāq Khan wanted to stand and fight, but Šāhbanda Khan said it was folly to stand there to be shot at; they should try to cut their way through the enemy. Qazāq Khan refused to listen; crossing a stream, he went off on his own to try and ascertain the size of the enemy force. The Georgians, seeing him alone, closed in on him from all sides, and Šāhbanda Khan, unwilling to save his own life by abandoning his comrade to certain death, went to help him. Qazāq Khan was taken captive, and Šāhbanda Khan and several of his Turkman *ğāzīs* fought to the end.

Because of the extreme difficulty of the road, it was impossible for the main Safavid column to return to the assistance of the rear guard, and such an action would in fact have been pointless. So the column reached its appointed camp for the night in safety. Because Ṭāhmūraṣ, Morāv, and Sohrāb Beg had eaten bread and salt with Qazāq Khan at the Safavid court, they did not put him to death, and Qazāq Khan subsequently succeeded in bribing two of his guards to let him escape. He rejoined the *qezelbāš* forces, and today holds his old post of *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān.

The Shah was so touched by Šāhbanda Khan's selflessness that he raised his son, although he was only three years old, to the rank of khan, and appointed him *amīr-al-omarā* of Azerbaijan in his father's place, with one of his kinsmen acting as regent. The news of this compassionate act on the part of the Shah turned the mourning of Šāhbanda Khan's womenfolk into rejoicing, and strengthened the hopes of the Shah's servants of receiving similar royal favors. Very few monarchs in the annals of history have rewarded selfless devotion on the part of their servants to the extent that Shah 'Abbas did on this occasion, when he ignored political and military expediency and made a three-year old khan and *amīr al-omarā* of a province. I hope that the Shah will enjoy long life and prosperity, and will obtain suitable rewards in heaven!

Various Events Which Took Place This Year before Shah 'Abbas's March on Baghdad

Following Morāv's rebellion, all sorts of rumors were rife along the frontiers of the Safavid empire. Insurrections broke out on all sides as foolish opportunists interpreted the success of the Georgian revolt as a sign of weakness in the Safavid state, and a number of people who professed to be loyal showed themselves in a contrary light. For instance, Abāza Pasha threw his professions of allegiance out of the window and sent a courier to Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha in Dīār Bakr to assure him of his allegiance to him. He seized the *qūrčī* Nowrūz Beg

Ostājlū, whom the Shah had sent to him as an envoy, and gave out that he had put him to death; in fact, he slew several of his companions and retainers, and sent their heads to Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha. One of his emirs, Morteżā Pasha, who held the Qarāja Ardahān district of Āḵesqa, marched to subdue the fort of Āḵesqa, either on orders from Abāza Pasha or on his own initiative. Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū, the governor of Āḵesqa, who held the fort with a garrison of musketeers, heard the alarming reports coming from Georgia and elsewhere, gave up hope, and abandoned the fort, joining the *qūrčī-bāšī's* camp. Morteżā Pasha occupied the fort without firing a shot, and Abāza Pasha intercepted a band of Iranian merchants returning from Anatolia and seized all their goods.

On another front, the departure of Emir Gūna Khan from Erīvān to join the royal army had been the signal for the Kurds to start ravaging the Šarūr region; Emir Gūna Khan's sons led their Qājār *ḡāzīs* against the marauders and inflicted casualties on them in a battle. In the Salmās area, the Sohrān and Barādūst Kurds gathered with the idea of ravaging the Orūmī region. Ḥamza Beg, the son of Ḡāzī Khan the grandson of Šāhqolī Balīlān, remained aloof from his brothers and declared his allegiance to the Safavid house. He warned Salmān Khan the *sūbāšī*, the governor of Čors and Salmās, of the intention of the rebels. Salmān Khan in his turn warned Aqa Sultan Moqaddam, the governor of Marāḡa, and they marched together against the rebels; in the ensuing engagement, there were casualties on both sides.

On another part of the Kurdish front, Šīr Beg, chief of the Mokrī tribe, rebelled. After the execution of Qobād Khan and the suppression of the previous Mokrī revolt, the Shah had taken Šīr Beg under his wing and had made him the chief of the tribe. Purely out of consideration for him, the Shah had not punished those who had survived the sword in the previous rebellion. For fifteen years now Šīr Beg, his brother Maqṣūd Beg, and several of his sons and other kinsmen had lived peacefully under the protection of the Shah—protection which had increased Šīr Beg's own power and influence. This year, without any reason at all, at the instigation of various troublemakers in the Mokrī tribe, and particularly his own eldest son, he came out in revolt, marched to Marāḡa, and began to kill and plunder. A number of people, both military and civilians, were put to the sword, and many Muslim women and children were carried off into captivity.

The news of Šīr Beg's revolt caused astonishment at court, but the

Shah remained unmoved. He sent Zamān Beg, the *nāẓer-e boyūtāt* (superintendent of the royal workshops), with a force of five thousand men consisting of court retainers, musketeers of the royal stirrup, and men from Fārs belonging to Emāmqolī Khan's contingent, against the rebels. First, however, he sent Šīr Beg one of the royal bakers, with a loaf of the bread prepared for the king's table. It was as though the Shah had said, "You are my protégé and have eaten the bread and salt of this royal house, which is descended from the house of 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb. Without any justification, you have shown yourself to be an ingrate, and I now commit you to the Lord of this bread." The arrival of this bread, with its overtones of both royal clemency and wrath and the threat of future punishment, caused Šīr Beg to regret his actions, which would shortly bring destruction and ruin on his tribe. Hearing of the approach of the Shah's punitive expedition, he fled into the hills; Zamān Beg marched to Gāvdūl, his seat of government, and pillaged the area before returning.

The Shah's Victorious Expedition to Baghdad

After the Shah had been in camp at Solṭānīya for some time, Zeynal Beg the *tūšmālbāšī* (superintendent of the royal kitchens) returned from the Baghdad frontier and reported on the situation there. Meanwhile, the Shah's spies and intelligence agents had been sending in reports indicating that an Ottoman march on Baghdad was now definite. The Shah decided to march to Baghdad. He appointed Zeynal Beg supreme commander in the field and sent him on ahead with orders to take all necessary measures, in conjunction with the Safavid emirs and governors in the province of Arab Iraq, to guard Baghdad and repel the enemy. At the same time, the Shah issued orders that all Safavid forces in neighboring areas should report for duty to the supreme field commander and place themselves under his orders.

A special force of three thousand veteran troops, including artillerymen, officers from the musketeer regiments, and musketeers experienced in siege warfare, was sent to Baghdad to reinforce the existing garrison commanded by Ṣafīqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Arab Iraq, and Mīr Fattāḥ, the chiliarch of the Eṣfahānī musketeers. In support of Zeynal Beg, following some distance behind him, came another force under the command of his nephew, Nūr al-Dahr Beg. The Shah meanwhile paid a private visit to the Safavid shrine at Ardabīl and sought assistance from the spirits of his ancestors. On his return to

Solṭānīya, he sent orders to the *qūrčībāšī* to winter in Qarābāḡ and complete the job of suppressing the revolt of Morāv and the other Georgian rebels; he was instructed, however, to release all the troops he could spare for service in the Baghdad campaign. On 2 Ṣafar 1035/3 November 1625, the Shah marched from Solṭānīya.

The Siege of Baghdad by Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha

Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, the Ottoman grand vizier and commander in chief, had had two years in Dīār Bakr to assemble a huge army for the reconquest of Baghdad, and to collect all necessary artillery, siege equipment, and munitions. The rebellion of Morāv and the death of the Safavid commander in chief, Qarčaqāy Khan, and of Yūsof Khan, and the revolt of the Mokrī Kurds, convinced him that the time was ripe to march on Baghdad. The rumor that the *qezelbāš* had been routed in Georgia, and that the Shah was at Ardabīl on his way to restore the situation there, clinched the matter. Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha thought that the Shah would not be able to return from Georgia and that the *qezelbāš* emirs at Baghdad, despairing of receiving help from the Shah, would not try to hold the city, which would then fall easily into his hands. The Arab chiefs in the region, such as Abū Ṭāleb the son of Nāṣer Mohannā, supported this assessment of the situation. Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha accordingly set his army in motion, sending on ahead Morād Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr, who considered himself the bravest of the Ottoman emirs.

Morād Pasha had no opposition on his march to Baghdad, because Qāsem Khan and the Afšār *ḡāzīs* at Mosul had been forced by the onset of plague to evacuate the city the previous year. Morād Pasha was joined by Abū Ṭāleb Mohannā, and sent Ḥājjī Beg Lak against the fort of Ẕohāb and Moṣṭafā Pasha Jastānī against the fort of Mandalī. Ṣafīqolī Khan recalled all outlying *qezelbāš* garrisons to Baghdad, an action that led to rumors of *qezelbāš* panic. Ṣafīqolī Khan also, as a prudent military precaution, sent quantities of his heavy baggage and his men's possessions out of the fort, so that the latter was stripped for action. These actions emboldened Morād Pasha, who had now occupied Ḥella and Karbala. His men had occupied the forts of Ẕohāb and Mandalī. The Safavid garrison at Najaf, however, consisting of one hundred and fifty musketeers under the command of Pahlavān Moḥsen 'Āšeqābādī, placing their trust in the prince of Najaf ('Alī), determined to defend the place, and Morād Pasha was forced to detach some troops to lay siege to it.

Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, regarding these preliminaries as a portent of victory, reached Baghdad on 9 Ṣafar 1035/10 November 1625, and blockaded the citadel on three sides. On the first day, when the Ottomans were still taking up their positions around the fort, Ṣafīqolī Khan sent a group of his men to make a sudden sortie against the enemy and retire immediately. This group made its sortie from the direction of the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa, fell like a thunderbolt on the Ottomans, and slew three hundred of them before they could form up; the *qezelbāš* returned to the fort with the heads of the slain and a considerable number of horses, mules, and camels. This success taught the Ottomans that they could not afford to underestimate the defenders, whose morale was correspondingly raised so that they did not suffer from that trepidation which usually afflicts garrisons under siege.

The Ottoman lines extended along the east bank of the Tigris from the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa in the north to the Qarā-qapū gate in the south, a distance of at least one *farsaḵ*. They threw a bridge across the Tigris near the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa, and sent a strong force of troops across the river to occupy Old Baghdad, which lies west of the citadel, and has a small fort known as Qūš-Qal'a. An abundant harvest had recently been gathered in, so the Ottoman army had plenty of provisions. When the Shah reached Hamadan, he received the news that the siege of Baghdad had begun, but the force he had sent to reinforce the garrison there had reached its destination before the Ottomans began their blockade.

Events Which Occurred during the Shah's March to Baghdad

The Shah had advanced slowly from Solṭānīya, to give time for various contingents of his army to join him; some of these units he kept with him, others he sent on ahead to reinforce the advance guard under Zeynal Beg. When the Shah reached Hārūnābād, a district of Māhī-dašt not far from Dar-e Tang, on the borders of Baghdad province, he decided to send an additional force of one thousand men who had special experience in siege warfare to reinforce the garrison at Baghdad. Thinking that the siege might be a long one and that the defenders might run short of ammunition, he had each man carry with him lead and gunpowder. The task of getting this force into a citadel already under siege appeared to most people to be an impossibility. As soon as the plan was announced, a number of men volunteered for the operation, men like Kalb 'Alī Beg, the son of Qāsem Khan Īmānlū, who with the rest of the Īmānlū clan was under a cloud for having abandoned Mosul so readily and was anxious to make amends for this. Other volunteers included Farīdūn Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the son of Ḥoseyn Khan Fīrūzjang Čağatāy; Morteżāqolī Beg, the son of Barḵordār Beg Anīs the *tūpčībāšī* (commander in chief of artillery); Mīrzā Khan Beg Qājār; Mīrzā Ma'šūm 'Arab Ğalīẓī Ḵorāsānī; and Barḵordār Beg Żu'l-Qadar, a retainer of Emāmqolī Khan and the son of an emir of the Żu'l-Qadar tribe.

The one thousand volunteers were soon obtained and set off, putting their trust in God and the Shah. When they overtook Zeynal Beg and the vanguard, the latter, as a precaution, gave them an escort of three thousand men under his nephew, Nūr al-Dahr Beg. The escort marched to within two *farsaḵs* of the city and camped in the plain, standing under arms all night to give assistance to the task force if needed. The task force sent word to the garrison of their arrival, and under cover of darkness made for the gate near the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa. In the darkness, Barḵordār Beg Żu'l-Qadar and Mīrzā Ma'ṣūm Ğalīẓī, with some of their men, became separated from the rest and bumped into the Ottoman lines. The two officers were both captured; some of their men were killed, and others vanished.

The rest of the task force, sticking close together, succeeded in entering both the city and the citadel, taking with them three thousand *man* of gunpowder and lead. The Ottomans in that sector failed to intercept them, and the beating of drums and shouts of triumph from the citadel signaled their safe arrival. The following day, the garrison got word to Nūr al-Dahr Beg that the task force had safely accomplished its mission, and he marched back to rejoin the Safavid vanguard. The infiltration of one thousand men through the lines of one hundred thousand besiegers represented a signal victory for the Safavids. With a king capable of such leadership and troops with such morale, it was obvious that the opposition was not going to have much success.

The fort at Żohāb, better known as Qal'a-ye Lak, and the fort at Mandalī both lay close to the Shah's line of march through Hārūnābād and Dar-e Tang. The occupation of these forts by the Ottomans was a threat to the Safavid lines of communication, so the Shah ordered Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, who was on his way to join the royal camp by a route that would take him past Mandalī, to deal with the enemy garrison there. A detachment of musketeers of the royal stirrup, sappers, and other troops were sent to his assistance. At the same time, the Shah detached Yūsof Sultan, the governor of Gaskar, with a group of Čağatāy and Ḵorāsānī musketeers, to attack Qal'a-ye Lak. The Ottoman garrisons realized they could expect no help from Morād Pasha, because the *qezelbāš* army, encamped at Hārūnābād, lay astride the road between them and Baghdad. Moṣṭafā Pasha Jastānī, the commandant at Mandalī, was the first to ask for quarter and to pledge his fealty to the Shah. He persuaded Moḥammad Aqa the *qapūčībāšī* (head doorkeeper) to do the same, and both officers came out of the fort and surrendered it to the *qezelbāš*. At the intercession of Moṣṭafā Pasha, the lives of the garrison were spared. Since Moṣṭafā Pasha Jāstanī's pledge of fealty seemed to be genuine, he was granted the rank of sultan and given the title of Abdāl 'Alī. As a reward for his achievement in capturing the fort, Ḥoseyn Khan was given Mandalī as a fief. Hearing of the Shah's clemency toward the garrison at Mandalī, Ḥājjī Beg Lak and the garrison at Ẕohāb hastened to follow suit. They presented themselves before the Shah, who granted them quarter. Nafas Sultan Garrūs was made governor of Ẕohāb.

With his rear secured by the capture of these two forts, the Shah marched from Hārūnābād. It was now early spring, the time when all the watercourses were in spate, and Šaṭṭ-e Behrīz, the normal crossing point for troops, was becoming more swollen every day. Ḥeydar Sultan Qūyla-Ḥeṣārlū (a Rūmlū clan) was ordered to construct bridges; taking with him workmen and the necessary materials, he set to work. Zeynal Beg and the Safavid vanguard reached the Šaṭṭ and camped while they waited for the bridges to be completed; for the same reason, the Shah whiled away the last days of winter at his camp at Bašīva near Dar-e Tang. Every day, daredevil *qezelbāš* couriers went to and fro between his camp and the citadel at Baghdad, bringing the most recent news of the state of the siege; the defenders, for their part, were encouraged to put up a vigorous defense by the knowledge that the Shah was on his way.

The Battle between Zeynal Beg and the Enemy

While Zeynal Beg was waiting with the Safavid vanguard for the completion of the bridges, he performed some remarkable feats. In the first place, the bridge builders needed a lot of pitch, and none was available locally. An intelligence agent reported that the Ottomans had brought in large quantities of pitch for bridge building at the time of the revolt of Bakr the *sūbāšī*, and that the surplus had been dumped some two *farsaḵs* from Baghdad, not far from the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa. It was still there, buried under soil. Zeynal Beg determined to get hold of it, and picked a special task force of a thousand men, including musketeers. When this force reached the spot, the men could see the light of the Ottoman lines. One group of Zeynal Beg's men started shifting the pitch while the rest stood guard, and they succeeded in carrying off as much as they wanted without suffering any casualties.

In the second place, Zeynal Beg got tired of waiting for the bridge to be finished. Irked by the sight of the Ottomans methodically proceeding with the siege works without interruption, he decided to liven things up a bit. He ferried his twenty-five thousand men across the Behrīz canal on rafts and in boats, and marched six or seven *farsaḵs* upstream, and drew up his men in battle formation in sight of the Ottoman camp. But the Ottomans did not emerge from behind a ditch that they had dug all around their camp. The day was drawing to a close, and it was impossible for Zeynal Beg's men, who had marched there without baggage, to spend the night in the plain, and so they were forced to march back. The reluctance of the Ottomans to give battle increased the confidence of the Safavid troops. But meanwhile the Ottomans were making steady progress with the siege; working night and day, they carried their breastworks forward. In places, they had pushed earthworks forward as far as the ditch around the citadel. Their artillery fire was beginning to have its effect on the walls and towers, and their sappers had tunneled up to the walls.

Ṣafīqolī Khan and his men performed prodigies of valor. On several occasions, they made sorties against the breastworks and scored local successes, returning to the fort with much booty. Work parties also carried away soil from the Ottoman earthworks and took it within the fort while other men stood guard. The Ottoman artillery was located on the side facing the Qarā-qapū gate, and so the garrison expected the main Ottoman assault to come from that quarter. As a precaution, they constructed inner defense works inside the main walls. The Ottoman pashas and other officers, knowing that the Shah was close at hand, decided on an assault. At this juncture, Morād Pasha returned and rejoined Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, having failed to take Najaf, even though his cannon and musketfire had been directed at the holy shrine, and this settled the matter in favor of an assault.

The ground underneath one of the towers on the Qarā-qapū side was excavated, and the hole filled with gunpowder. When the gunpowder was detonated, the shock of the explosion caused breaches in the tower. At the same time, scaling ladders were placed against the walls. One of the guards sounded the alarm that an assault was imminent, and the defenders rushed to their stations and opened fire on the attackers with their muskets and bows. At the tower which had been mined, however, the Ottomans charged through the breach and planted their standard on the tower. Ṣafīqolī Khan and Mīr Fattāḥ the chiliarch led a counterattack against the Ottomans who had occupied the tower, and the Ottoman standard bearer was cut down and most of the assault party wiped out. Those who had penetrated inside the fort, when they saw the inner defense wall facing them, lost heart and tried to flee, but they were cut down as they attempted to make their way out. Reliable informants told me that the Ottomans lost five thousand men in this abortive assault.

The Shah was in daily contact with the garrison at Baghdad. On the eve of the Ottoman assault, he was extremely anxious about the situation. The astrologers at court, like the sons of the "exemplar of the astrologers" Mowlānā Moẓaffar Jonābādī, predicted that the Ottomans would not succeed. Mowlānā Moḥammad Ṭāher Yazdī, one of the astrologers of the royal household and extremely skilled in the art of astrology, had right from the beginning maintained, on the basis of the positions of the stars and other celestial signs, that the Ottomans would not succeed in their attempt to recapture Baghdad. In order to show his confidence in the accuracy of his prediction, he demanded to be allowed to join the garrison! His wish was granted by the Shah, but Zeynal Beg, the Safavid field commander, would not let him enter the city and detained him at his own camp. When the news came that the assault had been repulsed, the Shah sent his warmest congratulations to Ṣafīqolī Khan and all the garrison.

When Zeynal Beg had assembled all the materials for bridging the river at Behrīz, he decided that the width of the river at that point was too great and moved all his materials to a better point farther upstream, only three *farsaḵs* from Baghdad. Morād Pasha was dispatched with fifteen thousand men and a number of cannon and mortars to prevent this operation, but by the time he got there, the bridge was completed and Ḵalaf Beg *sofračībāšī* (the chief sewer) had started to cross with some of his men. As they were crossing, the bridge broke; Zeynal Beg worked feverishly to repair it, but not more than four thousand men had crossed before Morād Pasha came up and attacked them. However, Ḵalaf Beg and his men charged the enemy so vigorously that they routed them and pursued them. The enemy lost fifteen hundred men killed in this action, and a number of Ottoman and Kurdish *sanjaq-begs* were taken prisoner. Morād Pasha was wounded, but he managed to escape and regain the Ottoman camp under cover of darkness.

The Shah received this heartening news on New Year's Day, and advanced to the Belād-rūd[2] River, one of the tributaries of the Dīāla River, which is known as the Šaṭṭ-e Behrīz.

Since throughout this history I have followed the practice of recording the deaths of notable persons at the end of each year's events, I will continue to do this and will resume my account of the siege of Baghdad under the head of next year's events, God willing!

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Qarčaqāy Khan, murdered in Georgia. He was an Armenian Christian from Erīvān who had been taken captive as a child and enrolled among the *ḡolāms* of the royal household. Since he was an intelligent man, he rose rapidly through the ranks. His first job was in the royal tailoring department *(qeyčāčīgarī),* but he was soon placed in charge of a battery of artillery *(mīr-e tūpḵāna)* and made commander of a regiment of musketeers. From this, he progressed to the rank of field commander *(sardār),* and was promoted to the rank of khan. He discharged these duties so admirably that he was finally appointed commander in chief of the armed forces of Iran *(sepah-sālār).* For a time he was *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan, and later governor of Mašhad and most of Khorasan. After his death, his son Manūčehr Khan was appointed governor of Mašhad, and at the time of writing still holds that post.

2. Yūsof Khan, also murdered in Georgia. Like Qarčaqāy Khan, he was an Armenian Christian, and became a *ḡolām* at the same time. The two men were always close friends. Yūsof Khan's first employment was in the royal aviary, and he was also a keeper of the birds and animals used for hunting. He became skilled in this occupation, and rose to the position of huntsman *(mīr-šekār).* For a time, he was

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[2] The town of Belād-rūd, or Belād al-rūz, formerly Barāz al-Rūz, lay northeast of Baghdad to the east of the main highway to Iran through Ḵāneqīn and Qaṣr-e Šīrīn.

governor of Astarābād. At the time of his death, he had been *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān for twelve years, and had been an excellent governor. Since his sons were still small and the province of Šīrvān needed an experienced officer in charge, Qazāq Beg Čerkes, the *dārūġa* of Gīlān, was appointed governor with the rank of khan.

3. ʻAlīqolī Khan, the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* of the *dīvān*.[3] He was of the Garāmīllū clan of the Šāmlū tribe, and an old retainer who had served the Shah since the latter's childhood at Herat. He had risen steadily in the Shah's service, and eventually became *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*[4] and *mīr-dīvān*. This year, he fell ill and died at Rayy, which was his fief. His sons too were still infants; his office remained vacant for a year, but the following year, as I shall report it, was conferred on Zeynal Beg Begdīlū the *tūšmalbāšī* (superintendent of the royal kitchens).

4. Mīr Rafīʻ al-Dīn Moḥammad Ḵalīfa the *ṣadr*. As I have stated previously, he was of the Isfahan family of *seyyeds* known as Ḵalīfa, which is of Māzandarānī origin and descended from Emir Qavām al-Dīn, known as Mīr Bozorg, who was the ruler of Māzandarān. His own father, Mīr Šojāʻ al-Dīn Maḥmūd, was a learned *seyyed* and theologian. The Ḵalīfa family had held estates in the Isfahan area for generations. Mīr Rafīʻ al-Dīn was appointed *ṣadr* after the dismissal of Qāżī Khan Seyfī Qazvīnī, and discharged this office with piety and integrity; in truth, he was an ornament to that office. At the beginning of this year, when the Shah left Māzandarān to mobilize his forces for the Baghdad campaign, the *ṣadr* fell ill and was carried in a litter to the shrine of ʻAbd al-Aẓīm, where he died. His son, the vizier Sultan al-ʻOlamāʼī Ḵalīfa Sultan, took his body to Karbala and had it buried at the shrine there. The office of *ṣadr* was conferred on Mīrzā Rafīʻ Šahrestānī, who was connected by marriage to the Shah.

5. Ganj ʻAlī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Kandahar. He was of the Kurdish tribe of Zīg, and another old retainer who had also been in the Shah's service when the latter was a young prince at Herat. He had served with distinction on the eastern front against the Uzbegs, and had been promoted to the rank of khan and dubbed by the Shah *bābā*, that is "father." For nearly thirty years, he was governor of Kerman, where he had an excellent record. At the time of his death,

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[3] Despite the fact that both printed text and MS. have *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* of the *dīvān-begī*, I think both are wrong. I know of no such office, and the office meant must be that of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī-ye dīvān*.

[4] See R. M. Savory, in *EI*^{2}, *s.v.*, and *TM*, p. 47.

he was governor of Kandahar. One night he was sleeping on a balcony, on a couch which rested against the railing supporting the roof. During the night, the railing collapsed, and Ganj 'Alī Khan, crawling out of bed half asleep, fell off the balcony and was killed; he was only found considerably later by the servants. His son, 'Alī Mardān Beg, took his father's body to Mašhad for burial within the precincts of the shrine there. When the Shah heard the news, he appointed 'Alī Mardān Beg governor of Kandahar with the rank of khan, in consideration of his father's great services to the crown.

6. Emir Gūna Khan Sārū Aṣlān, the *beglerbeg* of Erīvān. He was of the Aqčaqoyūnlū clan of the Qājār tribe. His father, Golābī Beg, was a *qūrčī* during the reign of Shah Tahmasp. He himself began his career as *ešīk-āqāsī-ye ḥaram*, commander of the guard at the royal palace at Qazvin, and *dārūğa* of that city. He was promoted to khan and appointed *amīr al-omarā* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd, where he served with outstanding success against the Ottomans, and acquired as a result the sobriquet of Sārū Aṣlān (yellow panther). This year, he led the Safavid vanguard on the Georgian campaign, and died of wounds received in battle. He was succeeded as *amīr al-omarā* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd by his eldest son, Ṭahmāspqolī Beg, who was promoted to the rank of khan; the latter had already been sent to Čoḵūr-e Sa'd in case his father should not recover from his wounds.

7. Šāhbanda Khan Torkmān, the son of Pīr Būdāq Khan Pornāk Torkmān. He had succeeded his father as governor of Tabriz and *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan. This year, as already reported, he was killed in action against the Georgian infidels. He was an intelligent, just, and compassionate officer, and a man of personal integrity. His three-year-old son succeeded him, in the care of a regent, with the title of Pīr Būdāq the Second.

8. Ḥasan Khan Ostājlū, another of the Shah's old retainers, who served with distinction in Khorasan. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, he was made a *qūrčī* of bow and arrow, and honored by being allowed to marry into the Safavid royal family. He was appointed governor and *amīr al-omarā* of Hamadan, and governed this province for some twenty-five years. He had retired from his governorship and military duties a year or two ago, and was living at Sāva on estates belonging to his wife, who was the daughter of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, when he fell ill and died.

Other Safavid officers who were killed in action in Georgia included Beyrām Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, a centurion; 'Alī Beg Qezellū Ostājlū, a centurion; Aqa Qavām al-Dīn Lārījānī, a centurion of the Lārījān regiment of musketeers, a competent young officer who was also a competent poet. The Shah looked after his bereaved family. I deemed it pointless to extend the list of casualties any further. May God have mercy on all their souls!

Events of the Year of the Tiger, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1035/1625-26, the Fortieth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year occurred on Tuesday,[1] 22 Jomādā II, 1035/21 March 1626. At 2:07 A.M. on that day the sun left the station of Pisces and entered that of Aries. The year began auspiciously with the news of Morād Pasha's defeat at the hands of Ḵalaf Beg. The Shah, who had the cream of the Safavid troops with him, immediately organized two further columns to reinforce Zeynal Beg and the advance guard; the first was of five thousand *qezelbāš* and *ḡolāms*, under the command of Taḵta Beg Ostājlū, a centurion; the second was of three thousand men, and consisted of officers of the royal workshops and *moqarrabs* under the command of Moḥammad Beg Čaḡatāy the *jelowdārbāšī* (first equerry). Large sums of money to pay the troops were also drawn from the royal treasury and forwarded to Zeynal Beg, to be distributed among the troops at his discretion, and the money was duly distributed by the Safavid field commander.

Other Events Which Occurred before the Shah's Arrival at Baghdad

The failure of the Ottoman assault on Baghdad, the defeat of Morād Pasha, and the reports of the Shah's steady advance on the city shook Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha's confidence somewhat, and he began to look to the defense of his own lines. He had towers erected along the ditch which he had dug around his camp, so as to convert it into a regular line of fortifications. His plan was not to give battle to the *qezelbāš* army, but to sit tight behind his defenses and starve the garrison into submission. He was in communication with the Safavid defenders, to whom he offered alternate blandishments and threats, and also with Zeynal Beg, to whom he offered military advice, hoping to accomplish something by these means. Some envoys from Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha reached Zeynal Beg, and asked for an audience with the Shah: one was a Kurdish *sanjaq-beg* who had been captured during earlier fighting in Azerbaijan, held in custody for some time by the Begdīlū clan, and eventually released through the good offices of Zeynal Beg's brothers; the other was an Ottoman *čavoš*.

Zeynal Beg sent the Ottoman envoys on to the Shah. They said that the Ottoman commander in chief had been given express orders by the Sultan to recapture Baghdad, and that vast sums had been expended to mount this expedition. It would be impossible, they said, for him to return without having achieved his object. At the same time, the fact that the Shah had taken the field in person showed that he regarded it as matter of prestige to retain Baghdad. Both armies had already been in the field for six months, and the hot weather was approaching. During this time, it would be impossible to remain at Baghdad. Accordingly, they asked the Shah to instruct Zeynal Beg to nominate a reliable officer to negotiate with the Ottoman commander in chief; if both sides put all their cards on the table, perhaps some compromise solution might be worked out that would be acceptable to both sides.

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[1] 22 Jomādā II was a Saturday.

In reply, the Shah said he had no objection to Zeynal Beg's sending an envoy. However, he must point out that Baghdad was his hereditary territory. He had taken it from the hand of usurpers who were in revolt against the Ottoman government, and had suppressed the rebellion. The best solution, he said, would be for the Ottoman government to admit his claim to Baghdad, so that the peace which had been concluded between the two states might be reaffirmed. A further point, said the Shah, was that the Ottoman Sultan already claimed to be the guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; it was appropriate that the holy shrines of the Imams at Baghdad, Imams who were the Shah's ancestors, should be in his hands. Since the Ottomans had disputed his claim to Baghdad, continued the Shah, he had taken steps to protect it. He hoped that the outcome of the struggle would be in the best interests of the people.

Zeynal Beg chose as his envoy Jānī Beg Šāmlū, and this officer went to the Ottoman camp with the returning Ottoman envoys. Protracted discussions were held with the Ottoman commander in chief and his emirs and pashas; Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad tried every argument he could think of to achieve his object, but the lack of sincerity of the arguments put forward by both sides caused the eventual breakdown of the negotiations.

When Jānī Beg Šāmlū returned, the Safavid emirs decided that battle was the only way the issue could be decided. Zeynal Beg led his men across the bridge with flags flying and they formed up for battle, thirty-thousand strong. Ḵalaf Beg *sofračībāšī* (chief sewer) and his men formed the vanguard. They advanced until there was no more than one *farsak̠* between the two armies, but there was still no sign of movement from the Ottoman lines. Zeynal gave orders for the tents to be pitched right there on the spot, and sent the following letter to Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha: "We have come to do battle, though we be few; it is not fitting for you, with your superiority in numbers and boasted valor, to decline battle with what is only one corps of the total *qezelbāš* army; to decline battle will be to bring the Ottoman name into disrepute." Having sent off this letter, Zeynal Beg advanced again until the Ottoman lines were no more than the length of a few parade grounds away, and some of the bolder *qezelbāš* rode right up to the ditch around the Ottoman camp and took a few prisoners. The Ottoman army formed up behind its defensive positions, but that was all; the Ottoman commander in chief, in response to Zeynal Beg's letter, made various feeble excuses for not giving battle. The day drew to a close without any change in the situation. Zeynal Beg, having no orders to attack, returned to camp and wrote to the Shah for further orders. On receiving Zeynal Beg's report, the Shah advanced and joined forces with his advance guard.

The Shah held a council of war with his commanders as to how best to relieve the defenders of the strain of the siege, now in its seventh month. The Ottoman position was defended not only by the ditch, but by barricades of gun carriages and palisades, behind which were stationed the artillery and musketeers. An assault on this position would bring heavy losses. The Shah therefore decided to try and cut the Ottoman supply lines, both by land and water. As a first move, the Shah moved his camp to a point near the confluence of the Dīāla River and the Tigris, on the Qarā-qapū side of the city. Next, K̠alīl Sultan Sīl-süpür was dispatched to Samarra to intercept the supplies coming down by boat from Dīār Bakr and Mosul; to support him, the Shah sent the aide-de-camp Rostam Beg with a strong force. Next, the bridge constructed by Zeynal Beg was taken up and laid down again across the Dīāla River at a point opposite the Shah's camp. Zeynal Beg and K̠alaf Beg the *sofračī* then recrossed the Dīāla with a strong force and camped on the west bank, about one *farsak̠* from the Ottoman lines; they set about protecting their camp by digging trenches and placing artillery batteries guarded by detachments of musketeers.

Emāmqolī Khan wanted to take the army of Fārs across the Tigris on rafts and boats and establish a camp on the west bank in order to cut off Ottoman communications with Ḥella and Baṣra, but the Shah would not agree to this. An Ottoman army might suddenly attack him from Old Baghdad, he said, and he (the Shah) might be powerless to help him because of the strength of the current. In the end, he agreed to let Emāmqolī Beg, the *ešīk-āqāsī* of Emāmqolī Khan, take the troops from Fārs and a detachment of musketeers across on rafts and boats and camp on the west bank opposite the Shah's own camp. On arrival at the west bank, this force fortified its camp in the same manner as Zeynal Beg and Ḵalaf Beg, and the Ottomans did not dare to make an attack on it from Old Baghdad.

After establishing his camp, Emāmqolī Beg took some of his men to attack Ḥella, which was held by Arslān Pasha Alvand-oğlū. The latter came out to fight Emāmqolī Beg with a mixed force of Arab and Ottoman troops, but was put to flight with the loss of about one thousand men killed. Arslān Pasha himself escaped in the direction of Fallūja. Large quantities of munitions which were being transported to the Ottoman camp from Baṣra and Javāzer fell into Safavid hands. The Shah heard that the Ottomans, because of the lack of pasture east of the Tigris, had sent their animals across the river, and he sent two successive raiding parties in that direction. The first consisted of Lors, retainers of Ḥoseyn Khan the governor of Lorestān, and the second was under the command of Khan Aḥmad Khan Ardalān. These raiding parties traveled six or seven *farsaḵs* in the course of a single night, reached the Ottoman pasture grounds, and drove off several thousand animals.

One piece of luck for the Safavids was the capture of a supply caravan on its way to the Ottoman camp from Aleppo via Fallūja. The Shah's intelligence was that this Aleppo-Fallūja route was the main Ottoman supply route, so he dispatched Zamān Beg, the *nāẓer-e boyūtāt* (superintendent of the royal workshops) to intercept the traffic. The Safavid successes in the region of Ḥella and Karbala effectively discouraged traffic from that direction. Some traffic that was coming by boat along the Euphrates was intercepted by Zamān Beg, who returned to the royal camp laden with cash and other booty. As a result of these operations, Ottoman supply trains west of the Tigris were interrupted, and the Fallūja route was effectively blocked.

The Shah's Move to Reprovision the Citadel at Baghdad and the Resultant Battle

The Safavid garrison at Baghdad was of considerable size and had more than two thousand horses within the fort, so supplies of food for both men and animals had become scarce because of the length of the siege. Every day, some of the more impoverished local people and indigent persons of the lower classes slipped out of the fort and departed. As a result of loose talk, the Ottomans learned that the defenders were short of food, and confidently expected the garrison to surrender at any minute. The month of Ramażān (May-June 1626) came, and the price of food rocketed because the townspeople, although they had certain stocks of food, in their fear of the soldiery kept it hidden, and there was little trading in the city and the markets.

Finally, Ṣafīqolī Khan sent a report on the situation to the Shah. The Shah decided to collect all the stores in the royal camp that could be spared and attempt to get them into the fort by sending them by water to the west gate, opposite Old Baghdad, where a bridge crossed the river. The Shah hoped in this way both to raise the morale of the garrison and to give confidence to the local inhabitants so that they would once more bring their produce to market. At the same time, he hoped Ottoman morale would be lowered, and the Ottomans would cease to hope that the garrison would be starved into surrender, that last resort of a military commander.

The operation was going to be an extremely difficult one, because the Ottoman camp lined the Tigris at this point along both banks for a distance of about half a *farsak̤* from the west gate. The Shah's supply boats would thus have to run the gauntlet of Ottoman troops who, becoming short of food themselves, were keeping a sharp lookout for any supplies of food by river. To carry out this operation successfully would be a major achievement, and I have not read of anything comparable in the histories of former times. The Shah requested from Ṣafīqolī Khan the boats which were secured within the precincts of the fort, and a body of daring musketeers and other troops ferried these down the Tigris to the Shah's camp under cover of darkness. There they were loaded with flour, wheat, barley, rice, cooking fat, chickens, sheep, and other foodstuffs including desserts, preserves, sherbets, sugar, sugar candy, and the like. The boats were then dispatched at intervals, and K̤alaf Beg was placed in charge of the operation.

There were not enough boats to take all the stores the Shah had collected, and so about five hundred *k̤arvārs* were loaded on camels and mules, and this supply train set off along the bank of the Tigris.

The plan was to transfer the stores to boats when this supply train neared the west gate, because the Ottomans who were stationed in Old Baghdad had completely cut off traffic along the west bank by erecting breastworks, digging ditches, and placing groups of musketeers to guard these defenses. When Ḵalaf Beg and his men reached these defenses, after fierce fighting during which they inflicted heavy casualties on the Janissaries, they drove the Ottomans back behind the wall of Old Baghdad and cleared the bank of the enemy. All the stores were then transported into the fort without the Ottomans on the east bank being able to do anything to prevent the success of the operation. Ḵalaf Beg himself entered the fort and had a friendly conversation with Ṣafīqolī Khan before returning to the Shah's camp, where he was warmly congratulated by the Shah.

The Shah was still camped at the confluence of the Dīāla and Tigris rivers. The Safavid field commander, Zeynal Beg, who had led his men across the Tigris to the west bank, eventually got tired of the inaction and determined to engage the enemy again. He received the Shah's permission to do this, the only stipulation being that he should exercise caution and not risk undue casualties. This time, the Ottomans came out to fight; Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, in view of the stout defense put up by the Safavid garrison and the success of the Safavid resupply operation, had decided to try a pitched battle. A gap was made in the artillery lines and gun-carriage defenses to enable his troops to march out and draw up for battle in front of the ditch. The Safavid advance troops engaged the enemy at several points on the flanks and were getting the worst of it when Zeynal Beg and Ḵalaf Beg launched a tremendous charge which drove the Ottomans back to their ditch with the loss of about one thousand men. A strong wind sprang up at this point and stirred up clouds of dust, which so obscured the battlefield that it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe. Zeynal Beg called off his men, and the Ottomans made their way back to their own lines in confusion. Some Janissaries, who were of course on foot, were trampled down by the cavalry, and others missed the way across the ditch because of the poor visibility and wandering aimlessly around. The only Safavid officer of note killed in this engagement was Moḥebb 'Alī Beg Šāhī-sevan Šāmlū.

The Safavid blockade of the Ottoman supply routes was now having its effect. Not only were the Ottomans short of food, but sickness broke out in their camp, and every tent had its quota of sick men. The enemy now began to think of withdrawing from Baghdad, but were in no fit state to do so because of their losses and the incidence of sickness. Moreover, as a result of the depredations of the *qezelbāš* and the scarcity of fodder, there was a shortage of donkeys for transport purposes and horses to ride. In these conditions, the Ottomans sent an envoy to the Shah, Moṣṭafā Aqa, to ask him to appoint a negotiator. In compliance with their request, the Shah appointed the centurion Taḵta Beg Ostājlū, who returned to the Ottoman camp with Moṣṭafā Aqa. The Ottoman commander in chief and his troops were at loggerheads, but after a great deal of argument and after everyone had had his say, they agreed to ask the Shah to overlook their misdeeds and allow them to retreat unmolested.

Taḵta Beg returned with a different Ottoman envoy, Moḥammad Aqa, and reported this to the Shah. The Shah agreed to the Ottoman request, but while Taḵta Beg was still at the Ottoman camp and Moḥammad Beg in the Shah's camp, and the terms of the agreement had not yet been finalized, the Ottoman troops, acting without orders, began to disperse in all directions. The Ottoman commander in chief and his officers were forced to retire on 9 Šavvāl 1035/4 July 1626. They did not even have enough donkeys to pull a few of their heavy guns, which were cast in the time of Sultan Sülaymān, and they abandoned their artillery and other weapons from the arsenal either on the spot, or at their campsite on the first night of their retreat. Various Safavid officers who found themselves in the Ottoman camp (Taḵta Beg, together with Barḵordār Beg Ẕu'l-Qadar, a retainer of Emāmqolī Khan, and Mīrzā Ma'ṣūm 'Arab Čalīẓī Ḵorāsānī, who had been taken prisoner at night near the fort) were returned. A group of Ṣafīqolī's men emerged from the fort and proposed to annihilate the retreating Ottomans, but the Shah, sticking to his word, ordered Zeynal Beg to shadow them for a few days but not to molest them.

Ottoman commanders in chief had frequently invaded Iran and been forced to retreat in disorder without having achieved their object, but none had retreated in such a sorry state as Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha. Several thousand sick and dying men were abandoned around the fort. The Shah ordered that they be given medical care, but the majority of them died. Large quantities of equipment and weapons were also abandoned by the retreating Ottomans, and there were distributed among the garrison as their portion of the spoils. Although the Safavid troops did not molest the Ottomans, the same was not true of the Arabs and the Kurds, who harassed them all the way to

Mosul, cutting off stragglers and releasing them after stripping them of all their clothes and equipment. At every stage along the journey, some of the Ottoman troops who were sick died.

Thus the province of Arab Iraq remained in Safavid hands, swept clean of Ottoman troops. The Shah sent letters announcing his victory to all parts of the frontier. Then, since the physicians advised that he should not remain longer at Baghdad because of the heat, the Shah sent votive offerings and alms to the residents and the poor of Karbala and Najaf, and after paying another visit to the shrine at Kāẓemeyn, began his return march to Iraq, choosing the Mandalī route because it was cooler. A Tabrīzī poet devised the following chronogram to commemorate this campaign: "'Alī b. Ṭāleb annihilated the Ottomans."[2]

Various Extraordinary and Miraculous Events Which Occurred During the Ottoman Siege of Najaf as a Result of the Influence of the Holy Spirit of 'Alī

Although the status of 'Alī is too high and his miraculous powers too well known by both friend and foe to occasion any wonder, nevertheless, to do honor to and to confer prestige on the clients and friends of the house of the Prophet, I will record what I have heard from reliable sources.

First, I heard direct from Mowlānā Maḥmūd, the keeper of the keys of the shrine of 'Alī at Najaf, that when Morād Pasha first laid siege to Najaf and pushed forward breastworks around the city, a certain Ottoman musketeer used to take up his station every day in a tower on one of the most advanced breastworks and, since he was a Sunni, hurl abuse at the defenders. Sometimes, however, he would pretend to feel sorry for the garrison: "My family comes from Iran," he said, "and so I feel sorry for you because this feeble fort will soon be taken by storm, and your men will be put to the sword, and your women and children taken into captivity, and your possessions plundered." He would then go on to urge the garrison to surrender. This constant propaganda began to undermine the morale of the fainthearted and the guards. One day, one of the children in the fort, who had never held a gun in his life and did not know how to fire one, fetched a musket to try and shoot that ill-starred propagandist. Aided by the holy spirit of 'Alī, he made his way into the tower. When

[2] *Rūmī-rā fanā karda 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb*-1034/1625-26.

that babbler opened his mouth to utter his usual nonsense, the child fired his musket and blew the man's brains out.

The second miracle concerned another bigoted Ottoman musketeer, who had a Jazā'erī musket of particularly large caliber which he used to fire daily in the direction of the shrine, at the same time shouting abusive remarks. The range of the muskets carried by the defenders was too short to reach him, and he had considerable nuisance value. One day he took up his usual station on some rising ground and began to utter a round of abuse directed at the holy sepulcher. When he fired his musket, it burst, and a piece of it struck him such a blow on the head that his brains were knocked out and his tongue silenced for all eternity.

The third miraculous event concerned a lion which appeared near the Ottoman camp and prowled around it at night. Lions and other wild animals were not uncommon around the banks of the Euphrates, and the Ottomans, certain that it was after human prey, were afraid to go out at night and work on extending the breastworks—work which is normally carried on at night. I heard this story from Pahlavān Moḥsen 'Āšeqābādī.

The fourth miraculous occurrence concerned the barrel of lamp oil. This story was told to me by men of substance and trust who had it on the authority of Mīr Bahā al-Dīn, the son-in-law of Mīr Feyżollāh, a resident of Najaf; I myself also had the story direct from the above-mentioned *seyyed,* a most pious and God-fearing man. The story goes that, during the siege, the supplies of lamp oil for fueling the torches in the towers became exhausted, so that the defenders had to resort to using small quantities of suet and household cooking fat to keep the torches going, and the supply of these materials was inadequate. As a last resort, they took some old pieces of fat to the cellar where the oil barrels were stored and burned them inside the barrels, until there was no trace of fat left in the barrels. The guards on the towers, deprived of light, were beside themselves with worry, and the torchbearers went back to the oil cellar to see if they could find a few pieces of fat that they had overlooked. They found a large barrel brimful with oil, and when the news of this miracle got around, it raised the morale of the defenders.

The fifth miracle has to do with the appearance of the light, and the curse which Pahlavān Moḥsen laid on the attackers. I heard this story from Pahlavān Moḥsen himself, when I was in Mīr Moḥammad Bāqer Dāmād's classroom[3] and Pahlavān Moḥsen was telling him the story: "One night," he said, "we were unable to light the torches because of the lack of oil; we managed to light only one torch in one of the towers, but this threw such a bright light throughout the whole fort and both inside and out that our attackers thought we had lit the torches in all the towers. Some of our stupid assailants started taunting us, saying 'You must have a lot of oil to spare if you can afford to burn all those torches.' We shouted back, 'We have not lit any lamps; this light comes from the light of sainthood and the miraculous power of the "prince of Najaf" ('Alī)'! The Ottomans only roared with laughter. Then I cursed them and said, 'If we are telling the truth, you will soon see proof of it.'"

Two or three days after this exchange, the big Ottoman siege gun which had been trained on the fort and had demolished a tower burst when it was fired, and the enemy was deprived of artillery until we had repaired the tower. Morād Pasha sent an envoy to Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha to request another cannon, and reinforcements, but Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha refused and ordered him back to Baghdad, on the ground that he had been laying siege to the fort for several months and had accomplished nothing. Najaf was a dependency of Baghdad, said Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha; "when we capture Baghdad, Najaf will automatically fall into our hands. On the other hand, if we fail to take Baghdad, what will be the point of our having taken Najaf?" So Morād Pasha marched away, and the defenders of Najaf were saved by the holy spirit of 'Alī.

Various Exchanges between the Ottomans and Qezelbāš at Baghdad, and Details of the Contents of a Letter Which the Author Inserted in the Text as Evidence of the Accuracy of Some of the Statements He Has Made

My readers will realize that my account of the Baghdad campaign and of the various engagements between the Ottomans and the *qezelbāš*, an account which was based partly on what I saw with my own eyes and partly on information given to me by reliable persons, was given in summarized form; not wishing to lengthen my discourse unduly, I omitted many details. I was afraid that, if I put in some of these details, interfering busybodies and detractors might accuse me of embroidering the facts as secretaries are wont to do, and would say that

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[3] Moḥammad Bāqer Dāmād, the great Shi'ite theologian.

I was trying to impress somebody and would cast doubts on my veracity.

As it happened, an Ottoman courier was intercepted on his way from the camp of the Ottoman commander in chief to Istanbul. He was carrying dispatches from the Ottoman commanders in the field, and these were seized and forwarded to the Shah. Each writer described some part of the current events in his own individual style. The writers described current events in a variety of different ways, but the pashas, emirs, and senior officers did not dwell on the excellent way in which they were performing their duties, or on the hardships they were suffering, for fear that if they did they would be accused of having some worldly motives for doing so. Among these dispatches, however, was a letter written by a senior Ottoman officer, in Turkish, to a friend of his at Istanbul named Moṣlī Čelebī.[4] The author of this letter had no ax to grind and gave the facts as he saw them. The letter was shown to me, and I reproduce it below exactly as it was written, so that my readers may be fully informed of the realities of the situation, and may not accuse me of being one of those sycophantic time servers who, in order to further their careers, calculate the profit and loss of truth and falsehood like tradesmen in the marketplace. If there are any stylistic errors or infelicities in either the Persian or Turkish of the text of this letter, I hope my readers will not attribute them to mistakes on my part, but realize that it is a line-by-line copy of the original.

Text of the Ottoman Letter

[After the customary compliments to Moṣlī Čelebī, the letter reads:] "To proceed: if you inquire about what took place on this regrettable expedition and about cruel Baghdad, the abode of affliction, what can we say? May this expedition not end in favor of our adversary! We have now been laying siege to the stronghold for nine months and not a single breach more has been made in its stones. At the beginning of our siege, while there was still not a sign of those evil *qezelbāš* who were like a fox lying hidden in a valley, breastworks were made, mines constructed, and palisades erected. Many times attacks took place—in each attack several thousand of the (Ottoman) Household troops and *enfants perdus* perished. From day to day those accursed ones in the stronghold were triumphant and every enterprise ended in defeat for the army of Islam (i.e., the Ottomans). Meanwhile a troublemaker named Zeynal Khan who was in command on behalf of the Shah of Iran appeared with probably forty thousand evil *qezelbāš*, full of cunning and good for nothing. He crossed the Dīāla River and advanced upon us. Many times he drew up his regiments in order of battle. Under cover of their movements, the Shah of Iran advanced step by step with the bloodthirsty force which was with him, paying no attention to us. He assigned a part of his force to attack the fortress of Mandalī. By force of arms he drove the army of Islam together with Meḥemmed Aqa, the *qapıjıbāšī* of the grand vizier, Jestānlū Moṣṭafā Pasha[5] and others, out of the above-mentioned fortress; some were captured, some fell prey to the sword, and some he made unbelieving *qezelbāš* like himself. Afterward, when the army of Islam which was in the Lak fort was overcome, a great fear took possession of the army of Islam at this news.

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[4] Perhaps the person of this name who became *Re'īs ül-küttāb* (chief secretary of the *dīvān*) and died in 1039/1629-30.

"While they were in the stage of concerting measures as to whether it was feasible to go out and confront the enemy, the Shah of Iran made a general advance on us with his household troops. That worthless commander who has been mentioned earlier joined him. While he was beginning to set up a bridge across the Dīāla, the grand vizier sent fifteen thousand valiant youths under Morād Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr, with six guns to drive him off. By chance that accursed trickster swiftly eluded us and established his bridge. While three or four thousand *qezelbāš* were alighting at Šahrabān, Morād Pasha arrived and made an assault with cannon and musket fire on the *qezelbāš* who were there. They were forced to fight. One or two attacks took place (but) the Divine Wisdom of the Seventy Saints *(Rejāl al-Ğeyb)* decided in favor of the *qezelbāš*. With dust and wind and the sharp sword they made the army of Islam retreat.

"In short, with our complete defeat in the above-mentioned battle, the flower of our fine and cheerful young men from the *sanjaqs* of Dīār Bakr, Qaramān, Aleppo, and Anatolia tasted of the draught of martyrdom and what remained wet the poisoned blade. Morād Pasha, intervening in the battle in the evening, came and sought sanctuary in the camp with many of his followers severely wounded. After that the Shah of Iran came and set up a bridge at the place where the Šaṭṭ-e Qādīšān [sic!] joins the Dīāla River and dispatched part of his army against us and part against Old Baghdad. Attacking us like a wolf rushing on its prey, he appeared sometimes on this side and sometimes on that. In short, we were besieging Baghdad and the *qezelbāš* were besieging us so we returned to the right wing, which was galled by artillery fire. If we direct our efforts against the fortress, the *qezelbāš* will attack us unexpectedly out of the redoubt once more, so we should simply persevere in the siege of the stronghold. In the hope that the stronghold might be reduced through hunger and that we might bring them to terms, we had the fortress surrounded on four sides. When the Shah of Iran became aware of these measures, he was not unduly perturbed but dispatched ten thousand *qezelbāš* to Old Baghdad two nights ago. Three thousand loads of provisions and more arrived near the Qūš castle with camels and mules. When the army of Islam attacked them, fortune was not favorable to us. Then many of our *sekbāns* were cast into the water of the Šaṭṭ and many died a prey to the sword. In short, it was early in the morning when we were watching with our keen eyes this immense quantity of provisions ranging from sheep to butter and fowls being landed from boats at the fort. For that reason the army of Islam was defeated and at one blow all our hopes of taking the stronghold were dashed.

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[5] See also *Ta'rīḫ-e Na'īma*, ii, Istanbul 1281, pp. 360–7. In an account of these events by Evlīyā Čelebī (*Fezleke*, ii, Istanbul, 1286–7, p. 76) he is called 'Meḥemmed Pasha, the Bey of Jesan'.

"While we were engaged in these melancholy thoughts about our perplexing situation, the Shah of Iran, gaining assurance from these events, told the *qezelbāš* to cut us off on all four sides from the Šaṭṭ and the Euphrates. Truly a bird could not escape by land or sea. Waters such as the Šaṭṭ and the Euphrates—both like the Danube in fury and turbulence—seemed like a brook under the horses' hooves of those cruel *qezelbāš*. They attacked in the direction of Ḥella, Karbala, Fallūja, and Mosayyeb. It all seemed alike in those places—the army of Islam was of no more account than a dog, the Pasha than a horse and his followers than stableboys. The *qezelbāš* overcame Aṣlan Pasha at Ḥella and the household troops and the Arabs in such a manner that the tongue fails in reporting it and the pen snaps in recording it. In all there were periods when not a single *oke* (2.82 lbs) of provisions came from this direction; if we engage the *qezelbāš*, the garrison of the fortress from behind us will dash our hopes. At length there was nothing for it but to dig trenches, and we made a redoubt,[6] but they paid no heed to the redoubt. Many times they approached our redoubt and drew themselves up in battle order.

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[6] *Ṭābūr:* a defensive position with transport wagons and gun carts chained together to form a circle.

"On 27 Šaʻbān 1035/24 May 1626, when they came with the intention of attacking our redoubt, the grand vizier proclaimed among the army of Islam a general levy for all those able to bear arms—men of high and low degree, horse and foot—apart from the Janissaries, who were at their posts in the earthworks before the stronghold. We went forth and confronted them in battle. From early morning until late afternoon fighting went on under cannon and musket fire. Their commander, Zeynal Khan, put up a fierce resistance. No sooner had he set up the awning (for the Shah) on the *terre-plain* of the fort than those accursed ones beat the kettledrums of rejoicing at the sight of this. Those of humble and high degree (in the Ottoman army) were vexed; the *qezelbāš*, undismayed by the cannon and musket fire, launched an attack which, if the Elborz Range had been in front of them, would have pushed it aside! In short, with this attack the army of Islam was thrown into utter confusion. Such of our *sekbāns*[7] as left the redoubt for the most part became trampled under the horses' hooves.

"When the *sepāhī* detachment saw that the battle was going against them, they did not stay any longer in the grand vizier's regiment but changed their resolution to stand to one of flight, and their heads fell upon desert and plain. Losing their way to the redoubt, most of them from that day forth were never seen again. So-and-so of us were overthrown and beaten down like a moth without wings. We sought refuge in the redoubt and decided to take shelter.

"After this engagement, the grand vizier took counsel with the high-ranking officers. They decided that there was no chance of breaking into the Ottoman camp. Whoever had acquired a great deal of provisions earlier on, now had some of it confiscated and some sold. By this means a time of abundant and cheap food has come about in our camp which we shall mention—1 *oke* of flour cost 1 piaster, 1 *oke* of butter 2 piasters, 1 *oke* of dates 1 piaster, 1 *kīle* (bushel) of barley 8 piasters, 3 dirhems (3.21 grams) of bread 1 asper *(aqča)*, and 1 *oke* of horseflesh was sold for 40 piasters. Those of delicate constitution who were dainty in their food now are thankful when they see horseflesh! Those elegant and dandified fellows who were ashamed to wear a shirt of Egyptian cotton now are glad to get shirts of old tent canvas which do not cover their knees! Those conceited heroes who in the coffeehouses have mocked at the *qezelbāš* for their cowardice now when they behold the most insignificant of them three miles away on the road, compare him with Rostam son of Zāl; and those brave lads who have come in the hope of taking booty from the *qezelbāš* now abandon their tents and gear and are thankful to save their lives! Those dignitaries living in luxury who rode horses with silver trappings and used to go with their retinue to the bath now are filled with longing and regret when they see a pack-saddled ass!

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[7] Troops of the provincial army armed with muskets, who liked to think of themselves as descendants of the Janissary *Sekbān (Sagbān)* division.

"Since of the four parts of our army only one part remained mounted (i.e., only one quarter of the Ottoman army had horses) the survivors of the army of Islam are dismounted and disorganized. If we receive false reports and are forced to withdraw, there are neither men to bring away the Janissary regimental transport horses nor to protect any member of our armory or artillery train. We were reflecting that they have brought the *balyemez* and *sengendāz* guns which have been in Bīrejīk and Baṣra since the time of Sultan Süleymān to reduce the stronghold. The grand vizier is tormented by the thought that it would be a dishonor for the House of 'Oṣmān if they were abandoned. On many occasions men were sent expressly for assistance and money. No trace of them was ever seen again. We do not know whether they fell into the hands of the *qezelbāš*—not that the Sultan wished for the muster roll of the army of Islam to be obliterated from the face of the earth, only there is a ballad which is being sung among the Turks (i.e., as opposed to the Ottoman educated class) to the effect that 'Neither from Baghdad nor Baṣra is anything coming. There is no help coming for us from those Ottoman rascals.' Now if money and help came up to this month, there would be a chance for us; but henceforth even if the Sultan came in person, it would not be enough to help us.

"Why has Fate treated us so unkindly? On one side of us the Dīāla, on another side the Šaṭṭ, behind us Shah 'Abbas and in front of us Baghdad. Perhaps help will come to us from God. In a word, nobody since Adam has fallen into such peril. None knows our plight; and well I know that whatever measure the Shah of Iran undertakes, it will turn out in his favor—there is absolutely no doubt that the miracles of 'Alī have some effect. We do not know why the Emām-e A'ẓam (i.e., Abū Ḥanīfa) is so much weaker in exerting his miraculous power on our behalf or else we could turn for help to the saint on account of his sacred resting place and kindly spirit. When my heart is so troubled about this question, I do not say these strange things aloud but only in a way which can be kept secret between ourselves. You will then be safe from the evil insinuations of those who care only for their own interests. *Amen, O Helper.*

"I expect you know that there is a disease associated with the climate of this province prevalent in our camp—it cuts just like the curved sword of the *qezelbāš*. It is only possible to go back again if one is fortunate enough to escape such sufferings and calamities as colic, dropsy, catarrh, sudden death, and the simoom wind. You are asking pardon and conveying our message of farewell to true friends—let them freely give up any claims against us in the Hereafter. *The judgment belongs to God, the One, the Irresistible.* We should only be thankful that we spent the rest of our life on the ground where the Emām-e A'ẓam lies. We have sent letters secretly to our true friends. If they see any mistakes in them it is only because when I was writing a line, three or four times the alarm arose that the enemy was coming. Those ruthless *qezelbāš* have completely overawed the army of Islam; like the wolf rushing after the sheep, they charged on our redoubt killing all they could find right up to our trenches just as well by night as by day—there were some occasions when they forced their way into our camp at night bearing lanterns. It is all up with us. We have neither been able to loosen our belts from our loins nor our two hands from our weapons—each one has to take care of himself. Apart from God none knows our plight. If all I have to tell you were written down it would not go into a hundred such letters! Truly the calamity of the Day of Resurrection will not equal these days of our sufferings here—you can draw your own conclusion from this—so farewell!"

The Shah's Return from Arab Iraq and His Wintering in Māzandarān

On arrival at Hamadan, the Shah spent a few days at the summer station of Meyham. While he was there, he made some administrative decisions regarding Baghdad. The position of warden of the holy shrines was taken away from Sārū Sultan and was given to Ṣafīqolī Khan, and the latter, in consideration of his valiant defense of Baghdad, received the title Šīr 'Alī. Ḵosrow Mīrzā Gorjī, the *dārūğa* of Isfahan, was placed in charge of repairing the fortifications at Baghdad: he was to construct new towers and reexcavate the ditch around the fort; masons, master builders, and sappers were detailed to help him in this work. The garrison troops who had endured the siege were relieved by a fresh garrison.

After seeing to these matters, the Shah moved to Solṭānīya, where he reviewed his troops and gave gifts and other rewards to all those who had distinguished themselves either in the Georgian campaign or in the Baghdad campaign. Those whose services had been outstanding were enrolled among the *qūrčīs* or the court retainers. Zamān Beg, the *nāẓer,* was placed in command of three thousand musketeers and sent to Azerbaijan with orders to join the *qūrčībāšī* there and share in the task of guarding that frontier. Details of this will be given under the head of next year's events.

While the Shah was at Baghdad, Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha had suggested that he write a friendly letter to the Porte offering his condolences on the death of Sultan 'Oṣmān and his felicitations on the accession of Sultan Morād, and making allusion to the fact that Baghdad was the hereditary territory of the Safavid family. This suggestion was supported by the Ottoman ambassadors Moḥammad Āqā, who had come to the Safavid court while Sultan 'Oṣmān was still alive, and Moṣṭafā Āqā, who had been sent to the Shah at Baghdad by Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha. They all said that such a statement by the Shah would help to remove misunderstanding and contribute to the well-being of God's people. The Shah therefore wrote a letter along the above lines and sent it to the Porte by the hand of Ṭahmāspqolī Šīra Donbolī; I will give further details of this too under next year's events.

At Solṭānīya, the royal army was disbanded and the men sent on leave, and the Shah proceeded to Qazvin with the retainers of the royal stirrup. Ambassadors were waiting for him there from the Tsar and from Nadr Moḥammad Khan Özbeg, the ruler of Balḵ. After receiving them with due ceremony, the Shah went on to his winter quarters in Māzandarān; he divided his time between Faraḥābād, Ašraf, and other places, and enjoyed himself riding and hunting.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Ṭahmāspqolī Khan Tarḵān Torkmān, a *moqarrab* at court. Last year, he was promoted to the rank of khan and given a governorship, and this year he was made governor of Kerman. He was taken ill during the Baghdad expedition with some stomach complaint, which he aggravated by eating and drinking unwisely and to excess. He did not bother much about medical treatment either, and gave no credence to the physicians' advice. When the condition worsened daily, the Shah gave him permission to leave the heat of Baghdad and go to a

summer station, taking a physician with him. He went to the summer station at Kerend, but carried on as before, paying no heed to the physician. Each day, he traveled one stage further along the road to death, which he finally met. The governorship of Kerman, in addition to the office of keeper of the seal, was conferred on Emir Khan Morabbī Söklen, a senior Ẕu'l-Qadar emir.

2. Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī, an eminent *seyyed* of Mašhad and warden of the shrine of the Imam Reżā. He accompanied the Shah on his expedition to Baghdad and, after the repulse of the Ottomans, visited the shrines at Kāẓemeyn, Karbala, and Najaf. I went along with him. When the Shah returned to Qazvin, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb got permission to go back to Mašhad. When he reached Tehran, he was seized by an attack of colic after eating an excessive amount of fruit; treatment proving of no avail, he died. His body was taken to Mašhad and buried within the precincts of the shrine.

Events of the Year of the Hare, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1036/1626–27, the Forty-first Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Saturday,[1] 2 Rajab 1036/19 March 1627, and the sun entered the Sign of Aries at 8:17 P.M. In consideration of his services as ambassador to India and his outstanding feats during the Baghdad campaign, Zeynal Beg Begdīlū was promoted to the rank of khan and appointed *ešīk-āqāsībāšī;* he was given the fief of Rayy, formerly held by 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū.

When the weather began to turn hot, the Shah left his winter quarters in Māzandarān and, since there were once again reports of Ottoman troop movements, marched to Qazvin. From there, he marched to Solṭānīya, and kept watch on the frontiers of both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Rostam Beg, an aide-de-camp whose ability had brought him promotion to the high office of *dīvānbegī,* was sent to Tabriz with orders to keep watch on the Vān frontier in cooperation with the governor of Tabriz and other emirs in that region, and to suppress any insurrections on the part of either the Kurds or the Ottomans.

One auspicious event which occurred this year was the escape of Qazāq Khan Čerkes, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, who had been taken prisoner by Morāv and his Georgian rebels as he was on his way back from Qarāqol-ḵān. He was held prisoner for a considerable time, but eventually, since Morāv's fortunes did not prosper to the extent that he had hoped, Qazāq Khan was able to bribe two of his guards to let him escape. He made his way to the *qūrčībāšī's* camp and, after having reported to and obtained permission from the Shah, returned to Šīrvān, made contact with his deputies, agents, and dependents there, and resumed his post as *beglerbeg* of the province.

The Successful Expedition Led by the Qūrčībāšī against the Fort of Āḵesqa

As I related earlier, the fort at Āḵesqa had been evacuated by Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū and its Safavid garrison, who were afraid of being overwhelmed either by Abāza Pasha or by the Ottoman commander in chief, rumored to be on the march. The fort had been occupied by Ottoman troops under Morteżā Pasha, who had marched from Qarāja Ardahān either on his own initiative or on orders from Abāza Pasha. The *qūrčībāšī*, who had wintered in Qarābāğ, marched to Erīvān under orders to recapture the fort. Zamān Beg, the *nāẓer*, and a detachment of musketeers who had been sent to Azerbaijan the previous year, were now ordered to join forces with the *qūrčībāšī*.

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[1] 2 Rajab was a Friday.

The Safavid force laid siege to Āḵesqa, and gradually carried one defensive position after another. Morteżā Pasha, realizing that the fort would shortly be taken by storm, and not having received any help from any quarter, opened truce negotiations. He and his men were allowed to depart without being molested, and to go wherever they wished; anyone who wanted to come to Iran was welcome to do so. After the necessary covenants had been concluded, Morteżā Pasha handed over the fort and came to join the *qūrčībāšī*; some of his men followed him, others went their own ways. Since Salīm Khan had been guilty of dereliction of duty in abandoning the fort without firing a shot, he was dismissed from his post as governor of Āḵesqa and replaced by Šamsī Khan Qazāqlar, and the latter took charge of the fort with a garrison of Qazāqlar tribesmen who were familiar with that section of the frontier.

Another Auspicious Event Which Occurred This Year: The Georgian Rebels Morāv and Ṭahmūras̱ Turn On Each Other,.and Morāv Is Defeated

After the battle between the combined forces of Ṭahmūras̱ and Morāv and the *qezelbāš* army, a battle in which some of the Kartlian nobles were killed, Morāv aspired to make himself ruler of Kartlia. But a group of Kartlian nobles and leaders *(tavādān)*,[2] more aristocratic than he, were opposed to the idea. Ṭahmūras̱ was a king's son and was also the ruler of Kakhetia, but Kakhetia was still in a state of devastation. Simon Khan, the former ruler of Kartlia, had died without male issue, but Ṭahmūras̱'s sons were grandsons on their mother's side of Simon Khan's family. Moreover, the Kartlian nobles were hostile to Simon Khan's nephew, Simon Khan the son of Bagrāt Khan, and so Ṭahmūras̱ hoped to arouse the interest of the Kartlian nobles in the idea of having one of his own sons as their ruler; he

[2] Georgian *tavadni;* for a discussion of the meaning of this term, see W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People,* London, 1971, pp. 246ff.

would thus retain the throne of Kakhetia and at the same time exercise control over Kartlia.

Some of the Kartlian nobles agreed to this scheme and deserted Morāv; this led to an estrangement between Morāv and Ṭahmūraṣ. The latter was on his guard against Morāv, but even so Morāv fell on him suddenly with a band of his supporters, and Ṭahmūraṣ only had sufficient warning to get away. Ṭahmūraṣ then collected his own supporters, marched against Morāv, and defeated him. Morāv was forced to take refuge on Ottoman soil. He fell in with an Ottoman field commander who was marching to Erzerum against Abāza and returned with him to Istanbul; he is still on Ottoman soil today. Ṭahmūraṣ considered it diplomatic after this to make overtures to the Safavids. He made offers of friendship to Dā'ūd Khan the son of Allāhverdī Khan, who had been stationed at Tiflis by the *qūrčībāšī* with a detachment of musketeers. Dā'ūd Khan had a meeting with Ṭahmūraṣ Khan, and the following year he passed on Ṭahmūraṣ's representations to the Shah.

Ṭahmūraṣ Khan's Overtures to the Safavid Court, Made through the Good Offices of Dā'ūd Khan b. Allāhverdī Khan

After Morāv fled to Anatolia, Ṭahmūraṣ Khan repented of his former actions and reopened negotiations with the Shah. He made friendly overtures to Dā'ūd Khan and, as he had done before, declared his submission and obedience to the Safavid house; through the good offices of Dā'ūd Khan, he asked that his sins be forgiven. Dā'ūd Khan sent a report to the Shah, which reached him as he was on his way back from Baghdad, together with a most humble letter from Ṭahmūraṣ. "I admit," he said, "that I have been guilty of many crimes over the years, and I realize that the *qezelbāš* are out for my blood because of all the wars I have been responsible for. For this reason, I do not have the courage to come before you in person. But if you could find it in your heart to forgive my past crimes and to wipe the slate clean, I will return to my allegiance and henceforth will not swerve an inch from the path of servitude. Perhaps, after I have performed some meritorious acts to demonstrate my devotion to you, acts such as will win the praise of all, I may presume to enter your service. At the moment, such is my fear of your anger at my insolent behavior, I beg to be excused from serving you at court; I will go on living in these old ruins."[3] Dā'ūd Khan, in forwarding this letter, had asked for a letter of safe conduct for Ṭahmūraṣ from the Shah.

The Shah accepted Dā'ūd Khan's supplications on behalf of Ṭahmūraṣ, and wrote the latter a conciliatory letter, in the course of which he pardoned him for his past misbehavior. But he gave Dā'ūd Khan strict instructions to remind Ṭahmūraṣ that he had grown up at the Safavid court and therefore knew him (the Shah) well. "I have accepted all these protestations of contrition and declarations of loyalty and obedience," said the Shah, "but tell Ṭahmūraṣ that his pardon will not be absolute until such time as he presents himself at court with a sword slung around his neck like a common criminal. Tell him that his specious words cut no ice with me. Let him wash away the stain of rebellion with the water of honest service and truthful speech, so that he may render himself fit to come into my presence."

When he received the Shah's orders, Dā'ūd Khan decided to meet Ṭahmūraṣ in person on an informal basis, taking with him only a few of his retainers. Dā'ūd Khan undertook to act as surety for Ṭahmūraṣ's good behavior, but delivered the Shah's warnings in a clear manner. First, the Khan demanded that Ṭahmūraṣ remove his Ottoman-style dress, and put on *qezelbāš* garb, and that his followers do the same. Ṭahmūraṣ then authorized Dā'ūd Khan to intercede for him, and swore that, if he were forgiven, he would not be disloyal again for the rest of his life. After concluding covenants to this effect, Dā'ūd Khan returned to Tiflis and reported to the Shah, and Ṭahmūraṣ has not so far strayed from the path of obedience.

Abāza Pasha's Second Approach to the Safavid Court

When Abāza Pasha heard the news of the retreat of the Ottoman army from Baghdad, he hastened once more to declare his devotion to the Safavid cause, and promptly released the *qūrčī* Nowrūz Beg Ostājlū; he had arrested him the previous year and had put out reports that he had been executed. He made all sorts of excuses for his past actions, which included plundering the possessions of Iranian merchants. An Ottoman commander, Ḳalīl Pasha, had been sent with a punitive expedition against him, and Abāza hoped for support from the Shah. In view of his past duplicity, the Shah did not overexert himself to help him, but he did order the *qūrčībāšī* to hold

[3] A rather tactless allusion, one would have thought, to the devastation in Kakhetia caused by Safavid troops.

himself in readiness in the Erīvān area in case the Ottomans should make an incursion onto Iranian territory. When Ḵalīl Pasha neared Erzerum, he detached a force of Janissaries under Dīšler Ḥoseyn Pasha to attempt to recapture the fort at Āḵesqa, and he sent a delegation to Abāza Pasha led by Bostān Pasha and ʻĪsā Beg, two of his trusted officers, to try and conciliate Abāza Pasha and get him to join Dīšler Ḥoseyn Pasha in the attack on Āḵesqa. Abāza Pasha's friends said to him, "These officers have orders to arrest you. Look out!" and so Abāza arrested them both and held them in custody.

Then, with the knowledge that he had the *qezelbāš* army in Čoḵūr-e Saʻd behind him, he marched out from Erzerum and fell without warning on Dīšler Ḥoseyn Pasha and his men and overwhelmed them. Dīšler Ḥoseyn Pasha and several other senior officers were taken prisoner; Dīšler Ḥoseyn Pasha was brought wounded to the fortress at Erzerum, and died there. Large numbers of Ottoman regulars and Janissaries were killed. Ḵalīl Pasha brought up the rest of his forces and laid siege to Erzerum for four months, but with the onset of winter, he was forced to raise the siege. The Shah said frankly to Abāza Pasha's envoys that he did not trust Abāza because his actions had so frequently not matched his words. "If Abāza is really sincere," he said, "let him send to me the Ottomans he has taken prisoner, as proof that his recent struggle against the Ottomans was an act of devoted service to the Safavid dynasty." I will give the rest of Abāza's story under the next year's events.

Miscellaneous Events Which Must Be Recorded

Everyone knows it is a universally accepted rule among princes that the persons of ambassadors are inviolable and their property immune from expropriation, both in peace and in war, for they are merely doing the bidding of their master in carrying messages and communications; if any prince violates this immunity, he is censured by men and held responsible for his action by God. Of recent years, as I have recorded in the appropriate place, two ambassadors have been sent from Iran to the Porte: the *qūrčī* Čelebī Beg Qājār before the Baghdad campaign, and Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan Šīra Donbolī after it. Both were foully murdered by senior officers of the Ottoman state: Čelebī Beg was put to death by the governor of Qarā Ḥamīd as he was returning from Istanbul, and Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan was murdered on his way to Istanbul by Ottoman officials who were at variance with one another and did not consider it in their interests to allow the ambassador to reach Istanbul. They appropriated all his possessions and pretended he had died of natural causes; to salve their consciences a little, they gave some of his possessions to his retainers. In addition, the governor of Aleppo put to death a certain Aqa Jalāl the *gerek-yarāq* (purveyor), who had been sent by the Shah to Aleppo when peace still reigned between the two empires, to perform certain duties there; in this instance, too, all the envoy's possessions were seized.

If these acts were committed on orders from the Sultan, they show an astonishing lack of foresight and baseness of character; if they were committed by local governors and pashas on their own initiative, they demonstrate a dishonorable impotence on the part of the Sultan, for unauthorized acts by subordinate officials are a sign of the weakness of the state. By contrast, Shah 'Abbas, whose conduct is a model for other princes, royally entertained the Ottoman ambassadors, Moḥammad Aqa who had come to Qazvin before the Baghdad expedition, and Moṣṭafā Aqa who came subsequently, and sent them back unharmed; similarly, Ottoman merchants who found themselves on Iranian soil after the outbreak of hostilities were allowed to go their way unmolested.

The Blinding of Emāmqolī Mīrzā

Because of certain unwise actions on the part of Emāmqolī Mīrzā, he was blinded.[4] Throughout history, kings have put the welfare of their people and the interests of the state before their own worldly aspirations or the ties of paternity. Thus Sultan Sülaymān, the wisest of the Ottoman Sultans, put to death his eldest son, Sultan Moṣṭafā, on suspicion of rebellion, and also another of his sons, Sultan Bāyazīd, together with four of his sons. There are plenty of examples of this sort of thing in history, and I do not need to elaborate further. Emāmqolī Mīrzā, in the ignorance, folly, and arrogance of youth, had committed various acts which were displeasing to his father. The Shah perceived that his son was acting unjustly toward him, and that his unwise actions showed a lack of affection for his father. He therefore decided to have him blinded. Although this was a terrible fate, it was the least of the calamities to which princes are exposed in this world.

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[4] By this act, Shah 'Abbas left himself without an heir: of his other four sons, two had died of natural causes, one had been executed, and one blinded.

The Shah's Return from Solṭānīya to Winter Quarters in Māzandarān

After Ḵalīl Pasha had been forced to raise the siege of Erzerum and the Shah was thereby assured that there was no risk of danger to the fort at Āḵesqa, he sent his troops on leave and made his way with his personal attendants to Māzandarān, where he divided his time as usual between Ašraf and Farḥābād, and spent his time hunting and in other pastimes. The *qūrčībāšī*, who had spent two winters in Azerbaijan, was recalled to court and received by the Shah in Māzandarān. Zamān Beg the *nāẓer* also returned from duty in Azerbaijan, and the troops under the command of both these officers were sent on leave.

Moḥammadqolī Khan Zīād-oğlū, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, was dismissed from his post because he had been guilty of a certain degree of negligence and slackness in his conduct of the campaign against Morāv. He had abandoned Ganja and the neighboring region to the ravages of Morāv, which had caused injury and loss to both civilians and military in the area. He was replaced by Dā'ūd Khan, the son of Allāhverdī Khan, who was guarding Tiflis and the Georgian frontier.

Shah 'Abbas and the Mogul Emperors had always maintained friendly relations and had kept each other informed of the other's affairs, and ambassadors had been going to and fro regularly since the embassy of Zeynal Beg Begdīlū (now promoted to the rank of khan). The Shah now learned of the death of the prince Parvīz, who had been named heir-apparent, and he deemed it necessary to send an ambassador to offer his condolences to the Emperor Jahāngīr on this bereavement. He nominated the centurion Taḵta Beg Ostājlū, an experienced and reliable officer, and furnished him with gifts for the Emperor: precious stuffs and other items from many lands, swift Arabian horses, and a letter of friendship. Taḵta Beg departed on his mission via Isfahan, Yazd, Kerman, and Kandahar, but he had got no further than Isfahan when the unexpected news arrived of the sudden death of the Emperor Jahāngīr himself, and of the subsequent struggle for the succession. By coincidence, two of the Shi'ite rulers of the Deccan, Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh, and Sultan Moḥammad Qoṭbšāh, also died this year. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp there was a similar occurrence, when three rulers died in a single year in India: Salīm Shah, the son of Šīr Shah Afğān, the ruler of Delhi, Agra, Lahore, and Bengal; Sultan Maḥmūd, ruler of Gūjarat; and Neẓām-

Šāh, the ruler of Aḥmadnagar in the Deccan. Mowlānā Qāsem Kāhī produced the following chronogram to mark this earlier instance: "The demise of the princes."[5] Although these events have, strictly speaking, nothing to do with Iranian history, I thought them worthy of mention in view of the long-standing friendship between the Safavid and Mogul dynasties.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Nūr al-Dīn Moḥammad Salīm (Jahāngīr), the Mogul Emperor, b. Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar b. Moḥammad Homāyūn b. Moḥammad Bābor b. 'Omar Shaikh b. Abū Sa'īd b. Mīrzā Sultan Moḥammad b. Mīrzā Mīrānšāh b. Emir Tīmūr Gūrakān. The Emperor was taken ill as he was returning from Kashmir and died before he reached Lahore. He had reigned for twenty-two years (1014-1037/1605-1627). After the death of Parvīz, his next eldest son was Ḵorram, but Ḵorram had for some time been estranged from his father and was living in exile in the Deccan. The principal officers of the Mogul state, apparently in accordance with a testamentory disposition made by Jahāngīr at the time of his death, nominated as his successor Dāvar Baḵš the son of the blind Sultan Ḵosrow, who was known as Sultan Bolāḡī, and minted coins and had the *ḵoṭba* recited in his name. The other princes who were present at court made obeisance to Sultan Bolāḡī, but a younger son of Jahāngīr, Šahryār, opposed the decision of the principal officers of state, marched to Lahore, seized the fort there, together with the arsenal, the royal treasuries, and the elephant house, and had his name inserted in the *ḵoṭba* and coins minted in his name.

The senior emirs, *ḵājas*, and other nobles who were at Lahore were forced to accept him as emperor, and bound themselves to serve him; by dispensing money liberally, Šahryār raised a large army. When the army of the deceased emperor Jahāngīr and the senior emirs who were in attendance on Sultan Bolāḡī (also known as Šīr Shah), together with the other princes and the women of the royal family, neared Lahore, Sultan Šahryār sent his army out with orders to fight Sultan Bolāḡī's army if the latter insisted on supporting a man who was only the grandson of the deceased emperor in preference to himself, a natural son of Jahāngīr. When the two armies came face to face, Āṣaf Khan, the chief of Sultan Bolāḡī's supporters, apprised Šahryār's followers of the testamentory disposition of the dying Jahāngīr in favor of Sultan Bolāḡī, and the leaders of both sides entered into discussion that resulted in a peaceful settlement. Some of Šahryār's men dispersed; others began to make their way back to Lahore. Sultan Bolāḡī rode at top speed to Lahore, without giving Šahryār time to regroup his men, and the latter retreated into the citadel. When Āṣaf Khan and Sultan Bolāḡī entered Lahore, no one went to the assistance of Šahryār, and Sultan Bolāḡī's men entered the citadel without difficulty. They seized Šahryār in his bed, and blinded him. So ended his ten-day reign at Lahore.

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[5] *Zavāl-e ḵosrovān*, which yields 961/1553-54.

Sultan Ḵorram had been the favorite son of Jahāngīr, who had bestowed on him the title of Shah Jahān. Jahāngīr had given him various duties in the Deccan, and had sent him to Borhānpūr.[6] The Emperor had agreed to his request that he should take with him his elder brother Sultan Ḵosrow, who had been blinded, but Shah Jahān, without authority from his father, had had the temerity to put Sultan Ḵosrow to death. He had also behaved like a king in the Deccan, arrogating to himself certain privileges reserved to the Mogul Emperor alone. This behavior was the cause of the estrangement between father and son, and some of those who had the Emperor's ear accused Shah Jahān of rebellion. When Shah Jahān returned from Borhānpūr he was refused permission to go to court, but he took no notice of the ban and marched to Lahore in fine style.

Jahāngīr, by now thoroughly distrustful of his son, and urged on by mischief-makers at court, marched out to meet Shah Jahān and confronted him between Agra and Lahore. Some of Shah Jahān's emirs deserted and went over to the Emperor, and Shah Jahān, terrified, fled back to the Deccan, where he took refuge with the Qoṭbšāh. Later, he reemerged and invaded Bengal, defeated Ebrahim Khan Bangāla'ī, one of Jahāngīr's chief emirs and a relative of Āṣaf Khan, and seized control of the province. From Bengal, he marched to Allāhāpās. Jahāngīr then sent a punitive expedition against him led under the command of the prince Parvīz and Mahābat Khan, the governor of Kabul, another of his senior emirs. Shah Jahān, defeated near Allāhāpās, retreated through Bengal back to the Deccan. This time, he did not stay in the territory of the Qoṭbšāh, but took refuge with the Neẓāmšāh; at all events, the princes of the Deccan placed themselves at his service.

[6] A town in Madhyā Pradēš. In 1025/1616, Shah Jahān made Borhānpūr his headquarters during his Deccan campaigns (see *EI*², Vol. I, pp. 1330-31, article BURHĀNPŪR by A. S. Bazmee Ansari).

Shah Jahān grew weary of the Deccan after a while, and tried to go to Iran and seek assistance from Shah 'Abbas. He reached the province of Thatta, and wanted to capture the fort there and seize control of the province of Sind, which was the Mogul province closest to the Iranian border. The commandant at Thatta defended the fort and Shah Jahān was unable to take it, and his officers prevented him from coming to Iran. So once more he retired to the territory of the Neẓāmšāh in the Deccan. His forces had become dispersed with all this marching to and fro, and he lived quietly in the Deccan with a mere handful of supporters. The Neẓāmšāh, afraid of the Emperor, now wanted to get him off his territory.

This was the situation when news arrived of the death of the prince Parvīz, and of a power struggle at court between Āṣaf Khan and Mahābat Khan. Mahābat Khan had not received the rewards for his services that he had expected because of the power and influence of Āṣaf Khan, the latter's connection with the royal harem, and his position as a confidant of the Emperor. Disappointed in his expectations, Mahābat Khan left the court and joined Shah Jahān. These two unexpected pieces of good fortune caused a sudden improvement in Shah Jahān's prospects, and he was on the point of emerging from the Deccan when he received the further news of the death of the Emperor himself. He at once marched toward Agra with a small body of followers. The princes of the Deccan lent generous support, and from all sides troops flocked to his side—Čaḡatāys, Mongols, Afghans, and Rajputs.

Sultan Bolāḡī's fortunes began correspondingly to decline, and his principal officers of state and the wisest heads among his military leaders saw no future for a grandson now that an ambitious natural son of the late Emperor was in the contest for the throne. Their loyalty to Sultan Bolāḡī wavered, and they began to leave Lahore and go to Agra to join Shah Jahān, striving to outdo one another in the race to pledge their fealty and services. By the time Shah Jahān neared Agra, most of Sultan Bolāḡī's nobles and troops had joined him. Āṣaf Khan and certain other nobles of the court also considered it expedient to send couriers to Shah Jahān indicating their support, and Shah Jahān entered Agra in triumph and assumed the throne.

Āṣaf Khan and his companions then set out for Agra, taking Sultan Bolāḡī with them. Near the city, they put to death five princes on orders from Shah Jahān, and then hurried to prostrate themselves before the new Emperor. The five princes thus done to death were Sultan Šahryār, who had been blinded; Dāvar Bakš b. Sultan Kosrow, known as Sultan Bolāgī and entitled Šīr Shah (as I just related, he came to the throne); one of his brothers, and two sons of prince Dānīāl, the brother of Jahāngīr, who had died during Akbar's lifetime. Thus Sultan Korram became emperor of India, with the title Shah Jahān, which had been conferred on him by his father, and "the second Šāḥeb-qerān" (Tīmūr). He made Āṣaf Khan his chief administrator, and Mahābat Khan his commander in chief, and dubbed him "my dear brother and faithful friend Mobārez al-Dīn Sepahsālār Kān-e Kānān." The old rivals buried the hatchet, treated each other civilly (at least in public) because they were ordered to do so by the Emperor, and busied themselves with the task of ordering the affairs of the realm. I obtained all this information from merchants who trade with India; the responsibility for the accuracy of the report lies with its transmitter!

2. Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh, the ruler of Bījāpūr and Dābol. He surpassed all other rulers of the Deccan in the extent of his territory, the length of his reign, and the abundance of his treasuries and the luxury items in his possession. Because of a blow he had received on the lower part of his body, he was unable to ride and even had difficulty standing. As a result, he always reclined on his throne or a couch. But his intelligence, judgment, and experience were such as to enable him to maintain his position during a long reign. Two of his court poets, Mowlānā Malek Qomī and Mowlānā Ẓahūrī, composed a nine-hundred verse eulogy for their patron (each poet contributing four hundred and fifty verses) to form the preface to the *Ketāb-e Now-ras*, and received as a reward nine thousand rupees, the equivalent of nine hundred Iraqi *tomān*. Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh considered himself to be skilled also in the composition of rounds, in music, and in the playing of various musical instruments. He died this year, and was succeeded by his elder son, who was twenty-two years of age.

3. Sultan Moḥammad Qoṭbšāh, the son of Moḥammad Amīn, who was the nephew of Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh and also his son-in-law. He died after a short reign. The succession of his son, Sultan 'Abdollāh, whose mother was a daughter of Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh, was disputed by various self-interested people on the ground that his descent from Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh was in the female line. These people, urged on by the mother of a younger son of his, summoned Sultan 'Abdollāh to the harem, where they set upon him and blinded

him. The younger son, the seven-year-old 'Alī, was then placed on the throne with the title of Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh. His devotion and loyalty to the Safavid court were more sincere than those of his predecessors, and he sent one of his principal emirs, Ḥeyrāt Khan, as an ambassador to Shah 'Abbas.

The servants of the Safavid court who died this year were as follows:

4. Aqa Beg the *dīvānbegī*. He was a retainer of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū the *dīvānbegī*, and his abilities led him to be enrolled among the retainers of the court. He carried out the duties of the *dīvānbegī* during 'Alīqolī Khan's absence from court. In the Year of the Ox, when the Shah sent an army to Georgia under the command of the *qūrčībāšī* to suppress the rebellion there, he took charge of 'Alīqolī Khan's troops, as the latter had recently died. Aqa Beg died at the beginning of the year on his way back from Georgia.

5. Seyyed Ḥoseyn Kamūna. He came from the Kamūna family of *seyyeds* who were *naqībs*[7] of Najaf. This family had for generations been loyal supporters of the Safavid house, and its members had always been persons of substance and rank. Seyyed Ḥoseyn Kamūna had maintained his position at Najaf under the Ottoman administration. He had the honor of meeting the Shah during the latter's campaign in Arab Iraq, and his obvious merits and open nature recommended him to the Shah, who made him a member of his court. Seyyed Ḥoseyn was a regular banqueting companion of the Shah. Seyyed Ḥoseyn died this year, and his son, Seyyed Nāṣer, was enrolled in his place among the attendants at court.

6. Yūtam Sultan Gorjī, a *ğolām* of the royal household and protégé of Shah 'Abbas. He was appointed governor of Darband, but died this year while still a young man. His governorship was given to Farroḵ Sultan, also a *ğolām* of the royal household, who was commander of the Rostamdārī regiment of musketeers.

7. Holow Khan Ardalān. He was one of Shah Tahmasp's emirs. As I have previously reported, his hereditary territory was conferred on Khan Aḥmad Khan, his son, and he himself at the Shah's order resided at Isfahan, where he lived to be more than ninety. He died this year of a stroke, without any previous illness. His son Khan Aḥmad

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[7] See *TM*, pp. 81, 83, 148.

Khan is still governor of Ardalān, ruler of his hereditary domains, and *beglerbeg* of Šahrezūl.[8]

8. Yādegār ʿAlī Sultan Ḵolafā, of the tribe of Ṭāleš. He was a descendant of Ḵalīfat al-Ḵolafā,[9] who was governor of Baghdad during the reign of Shah Esmaʿil I. Yādegār ʿAlī was one of the great emirs and held the office of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*.[10] He died this year at Ardabīl on his way back from Georgia. He was a benevolent and God-fearing man who performed many good works in the course of his life, including the construction of mosques, theological seminaries, and other buildings. The office of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā* was conferred on Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa.

9. Ḥakīm Seyf al-Dīn Moẓaffar Kāšī, a physician on the staff of the royal household. He was very close to the Shah. In his old age, he was responsible for the medical care of the personnel of the court, and most of the nobles, if they became ill, followed courses of treatment prescribed by him because of his reputation as a skillful and successful physician. Advancing age finally forced him to curtail his practice, and his son, who was a physician at the hospital, began to practice at court. Ḥakīm Seyf al-Dīn died this year at Solṭānīya, and his son, Šamsā Moḥammad, whose medical skill as a young man equaled that of many practitioners with years of experience, was enrolled among the physicians of the royal household and treated patients at court.

10. Šāhroḵ Beg, the vizier of the *qūrčīs*. He was born at Dezmār and was a member of the Qarādāğlū tribe. He wrote a fine hand in the *nastaʿlīq* script. Because of the service rendered by his family to the Safavid house, the Shah regarded him and his brothers with great favor, and one of his brothers, Ḥeydar Beg, is presently a centurion of the Qarādāğlū *qūrčīs*. Šāhroḵ Beg's first post was *mošref-e qūšḵāna* (superintendent of the royal aviary), a post to which he was appointed in succession to his brother Bāyandor Beg, who was killed by a musketball while guarding a breastwork at the siege of Abīvard. Later on, Šāhroḵ Beg was appointed *mostowfī-ye qūrčīān* (comptroller of the *qūrčīs*). After the death of Malek Beg, the vizier of the *qūrčīs*, he was appointed to that office. He died at Solṭānīya this year. He had quite a capable son, but it was thought that he could not manage a post as important as that of vizier of the *qūrčīs*, which was consequently given to Emir Abū ʿAlī, a kinsman of Mīr Abu'l-Maʿālī.

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[8] I.e., Šahrezūr.

[9] Ḵādem Beg Ṭāleš, appointed governor of Baghdad in 914/1508.

[10] See Savory, "The Office of *Khalīfat al-Khulafā* under the Safawids," pp. 497-502.

Events of That Melancholy Year, the Year of the Dragon, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1037/1627-28, the Forty-second Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Monday,[1] 13 Rajab 1037/19 March 1628, and the new year officially began at 2:20 a.m. The beauty and color of spring this year did not seem to bring its usual quota of joy and gladness; it was as though nature was aware of the as yet hidden tragedy which was to befall.

The Shah celebrated the New Year in Māzandarān, at Ašraf, which this year did not fill the heart with joy, in his pleasant residences and gardens and the palace of 'Abbāsābād, which this year were sad and comfortless. The Shah's companions during the Nowrūz festivities were the *moqarrabs* of the court, men like the *qūrčībāšī*, recently recalled from duties in Azerbaijan and Āḵesqa. For three months, the Shah as usual spent his time in hunting and other pastimes, until the weather got uncomfortably hot. Reports kept coming in that Ḵosrow Pasha, the newly appointed Ottoman grand vizier and commander in chief, was marching on Erzerum with a large army, and that the Georgian rebel Morāv was with him.

Fearing another insurrection in Georgia, the Shah left Māzandarān in Šavvāl 1037/June 1628 and marched to Qazvin, where he issued orders for his troops to mobilize and rendezvous at Solṭānīya under the command of 'Īsā Khan, the *qūrčībāšī*. It appeared that the Shah had stayed too long in Māzandarān, and that the unhealthiness of the climate and the heat had affected him, because at Qazvin he developed a high fever. At times the fever would go away, but would return immediately if the Shah ate or drank something unsuitable; it passed through the stages of tertian fever and half-tertian, and finally became a quartan fever. Despite the fever, the Shah continued to attend to affairs of state and important policy and planning matters, and did not allow his illness to divert his attention for a moment from the concerns of religion and the state.

An event which occurred this year was the capture of Šamsī Khan Qazāqlar, the governor of Āḵesqa. A body of marauding Ottomans, between fifteen hundred and two thousand strong, visited the area in search of plunder, but did not dare to attack the fort of Āḵesqa because of the strength of its defenses and its garrison; after ravaging the surrounding area, they retired. Šamsī Khan, a courageous officer, against the advice of his senior officers went in pursuit of them with three hundred Qazāqlar *ḡāzīs,* not realizing the strength of the enemy. He caught up with the Ottomans some four *farsaḵs* away, but he had ridden so rapidly that he had outdistanced most of his men, whose horses had stopped to graze the lush spring grass along the way and were consequently unfit for action. One troop of Ottomans had camped near the road, and two other troops in valleys flanking the road. Šamsī Khan reached the spot with only a hundred men, and some of the veteran Qazāqlar *ḡāzīs* urged him not to attack. But he refused to listen, and charged the Ottoman troop camped near the road, scattering them in all directions. Those who had time to reach their horses leaped into the saddle and fled. The other two Ottoman troops, however, mounted their horses and poured down upon Šamsī Khan and his small band and surrounded them. The *ḡāzīs* fought hard, but most of them were cut down as they tried to make their escape, because their horses foundered. Šamsī Khan was taken alive and carried off to Ḵosrow Pasha's camp.

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[1] 13 Rajab was a Sunday.

Readers will recall that the Shah had told Abāza Pasha that, if he wanted his protestations of loyalty to the Safavid house to be believed, he must send to the court the Ottoman prisoners of war whom he had captured the previous year. Abāza had failed to comply, and so no assistance had been sent to him. This year, however, when Ḵosrow Pasha marched against him, Abāza sent some of his men to Erīvān to be under the protection of Safavid officers, and he forwarded to the Shah Bostān Pasha and ʻĪsā Beg, two of the Ottoman prisoners of war. In his fear of the Janissaries, he had finally decided that he had no option but to turn to the Shah for assistance.

He therefore sent his brother, known as Kücük Abāza, to Qazvin, where he and his one hundred and fifty retainers were received in audience by the Shah. The Shah thought he was now honor-bound to assist Abāza, but the emirs he sent to Erzerum were all men who were under a cloud for some shortcoming—men like Moḥammadqolī Khan Zīād-oḡlū, Peykar Khan Īgīrmī-dört, and Yūsof Sultan the governor of Gaskar. The *qūrčībāšī* also marched from Solṭānīya toward Tabriz, but before he got there, Ḵosrow Pasha had appeared before the walls of Erzerum and was trying to conciliate Abāza Pasha and win him back to his allegiance. He swore he would protect him from the vengeance of the Janissaries, and that no harm would come to him. With these assurances, Abāza Pasha came out of the fort and met Ḵosrow Pasha. The latter had a row with the *yeñīčerī-āqāsī* over Abāza Pasha, and decided to take Abāza Pasha under his personal protection; he returned with him to Istanbul. Ḵosrow Pasha's troops made no incursions onto Safavid territory. Following this, the Shah placed Yūsof Sultan in charge of a regiment of musketeers and sent him to garrison the fort at Āḵesqa. The *qūrčībāšī* returned to Tabriz, and the remainder of the Safavid troops were sent on leave.

Emāmqolī Khan's Expedition to Baṣra

Ever since the recapture of Baghdad, the Shah had aspired to subjugate Baṣra, which lies on the borders of Arab Iraq and Ḵūzestān and is, in point of fact, a dependency of Baghdad. This year, the Shah placed Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, in command of an expedition to Baṣra. The latter marched to Baghdad, intending to follow the Tigris as far as his objective. In addition to the army of Fārs, he had at his disposal a detachment of musketeers of the royal stirrup, and contingents of Lors and Kurds. As Emāmqolī Khan proceeded toward Baṣra, the Arab tribes along the route submitted to him and undertook to perform various useful services. The *beglerbeg* handed out cash grants, robes of honor, and other gifts in profusion as he went along. When he reached Baṣra, most of the tribes in the area submitted to him, and the Ottoman garrison asked for quarter. At this juncture, the news of the sudden death of Shah 'Abbas sent a tremor through the ranks of the *qezelbāš*, and the *beglerbeg* decided to postpone the occupation of Baṣra and to return.

Another event which occurred this year was the arrival at the Shah's court of Šīr Khan Afḡān, the governor of Pūšang and the Kandahār region. He was received by the Shah at Qazvin, and obtained greater favors than he had anticipated. In return, the Shah requested him to see that the trade routes to India were safe for merchants and travelers.

The Shah, who had been weakened by the long duration of the quartan fever, rallied slightly; for several days at a time, there would be a remission of the fever. Then, as the result of indulging in some unsuitable activity, or of eating or drinking the wrong things, the fever would return, and the weakness persisted. The Shah talked of going to Māzandarān for the winter, but his physicians advised against it, because of the dampness of the climate there. The Shah decided to take a prognostication from the Koran. It was not good, but the Shah badly wanted to go to Māzandarān, so he decided to wait a few days and try again. This time, the prognostication was not bad, and so the Shah decided to go.

Because of his weakness, he decided to march by easy stages, and to take twenty-four days over what was normally a twelve-day journey. However, once in the saddle the Shah could not wait to see the beautiful countryside of Māzandarān, and he covered the ground in eight or nine days! On the tenth day, he entered the town of Ašraf. On the days when the fever gripped him a change came over him, and his body was racked by a burning fever, but he still attended to the business of state, and indulged in his favorite sport, hunting. On such days, he would speak of the inconstancy and instability of this world, and he experienced dreams which he himself interpreted as a portent of his approaching death.

The Shah Nominates Abu'l-Naṣr Sām Mīrzā as His Heir-Apparent

The light of sainthood and spiritual guidance told the Shah that he had not long to live, and he decided to nominate Abu'l-Naṣr Sām Mīrzā, the son of Ṣafī Mīrzā, as his heir-apparent; Sām Mīrzā was then eighteen years of age, and had been brought up at Isfahan. The Shah gave orders that he should be escorted to Ašraf by trusted male and female staff of the royal harem, so that henceforth he would be under the Shah's personal supervision as heir-apparent. As it was the Shah's custom to consult the Word of God, even in minor matters, and not to embark on any course of action without ascertaining the divine will, he naturally would not take a step of such importance to religion and the state as the appointment of an heir-apparent without taking advice. He summoned for consultation Mowlānā Moḥammad Taqī, the son of Mowlānā Moẓaffar Jonābādī the astrologer; Mowlānā Moḥammad was one of the royal astrologers and the Shah had confidence in him.

The Shah now sent him to Mowlānā Morād Māzandarānī, one of the most learned and pious men of that region, to obtain his advice. Mowlānā Morād took a prognostication from the Koran, and hit upon the following verse: "Will it not suffice you that your Lord should help you with three thousand angels sent down from on high? Yea, if you be steadfast and righteous, and they come upon you immediately in hot haste, your Lord will help you with five thousand angels, attacking vehemently."[2] It was clear from this verse that the Shah's decision to appoint an heir-apparent was most auspicious, but there was also an indication that he should exercise patience in regard to fetching Sām Mīrzā from Isfahan. And so the Shah delayed sending for him for several days. Subsequent events proved the rightness of this decision.

The Death of Shah 'Abbas

Alas for the instability of the revolving sphere, and the hostility of the perverse heavens! Never a hopeful sapling rises by a stream and bears fruit, but in the end is uprooted by the wind of fate. There is no star, shine it ever so brightly in the firmament of majesty and renown, but must eventually sink in the west. God alone is Unchanging, Undying. Death is the destiny of all men, even kings.

It is with a sorrowful pen that I record that one day Shah 'Abbas went hunting, and ate to excess. On his return, a fever occasioned by an overloaded stomach aggravated the weakness already caused by the original fever. The Shah was bedridden for three or four days, and was afflicted by vomiting and diarrhoea; he was unable to stand up or move about, his face became swollen, and cachexy became apparent. The treatments prescribed by the physicians had no effect, and the Shah grew weaker daily. The women of the royal household kept up an unceasing lamentation, and the principal officers of state and the *moqarrabs* of the court were out of their minds with fear and perturbation. Shah 'Abbas died on Wednesday,[3] 24 Jomādā I, 1038/19 January 1629, just as the sun was rising.

How can I describe the feelings of those who were present, or how the *moqarrabs* of the court were affected? The women of the royal household tore their breasts, lamented bitterly, put on black garments, and heaped ashes on their heads. The world was plunged into mourning, and men's hearts were afflicted with deep sorrow. And why should they not be? A radiant sun, in the shadow of whose justice men had lived in tranquillity, had set; a bright star, which had shed security and well-being on all men, had sunk below the horizon.

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[2] Koran, 3:125-26.

[3] 24 Jomādā I was a Friday.

Wiser heads realized that this calamity had to be borne with patience. Putting their trust in God's assurance that "Those who endure patiently shall have reward without measure,"[4] the principal officers of state, such as 'Īsā Khan the *qūrčībāšī* and the *e'temād al-dowla* Ḵalīfa Sultan, both of whom were connected by marriage with Shah 'Abbas; Zeynal Khan *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* Šāmlū; and the other nobles who were at court, turning their attention to the needs of the state, issued a proclamation informing people that the late Shah had proclaimed Sām Mīrzā his heir-apparent. All the *ḵalīfas,* Sufis and disciples and devotees of the Safavid house who were at court accepted the order of their supreme spiritual director unquestioningly. They drew up a statement to the effect that it had been the dying Shah's wish that kingship should be conferred on Sām Mīrzā, and 'Īsā Khan, Zeynal Beg, and all the nobles and disciples of the Safavid house, in accordance with the convenant between spiritual director and disciple which is the basis of this dynasty, gave their assent and affixed their seals to this document, and dispatched it to Isfahan to Shah Ṣafī (the title assumed by Sām Mīrzā) and his son. God be praised that Shah 'Abbas has such a worthy descendant to succeed him!

The courier bearing this document reached Isfahan in eight days, and informed the young prince of the death of his grandfather. Some of the senior officers of the Safavid household there, such as Abu'l-Qāsem Beg Ev-oğlū, the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī-ye ḥaram,* and Ḵosrow Mīrzā the brother of Bagrāt Khan the ruler of Georgia, who was governor of Isfahan, in order to preserve the stability of the realm and to guard against possible mischief, because the capital was full of sorts and conditions of men, decided that proclamation of the accession of Shah Ṣafī should take precedence over funeral rites for Shah 'Abbas. Without delay, therefore, they placed the prince on the throne, in accordance with the custom and practice of the Sufis of the Safavid house, and they laid out the rug of spiritual direction, an heirloom handed down in the Safavid family, and kissed the Shah's feet. The news of the accession of Shah Ṣafī was then published throughout the Safavid empire.

When the learned men and astrologers looked into the matter, they discovered that the Shah's accession had taken place at a most auspicious moment; in fact, however much they studied their astrological tables and searched their almanacs, they were unable to find a more propitious moment, and people realized that this extraordinary chance was a portent of long life and stable rule for the new Shah. One of the princes who had been blinded and was resident at Isfahan, Emāmqolī Khan, who was a natural son of Shah 'Abbas, asserted that he could see, and claimed the throne. It turned out that a small portion of each pupil had not been affected by the hot iron, and so the Safavid officers, fearful of insurrection among the people, completed the process of blinding that foolish prince. The full implication of that verse from the Koran which had been taken as a prognostication by Shah 'Abbas now became apparent. I mean that portion of the verse which advised patience and steadfastness; for if the future Shah Ṣafī had not been at the capital, Isfahan, when the news of the death of Shah 'Abbas was published, serious riots and insurrections might have resulted which would have caused untold injury to the common people. Large numbers of troops were stationed in Isfahan, some of them reliable and some not.

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[4] Koran, 39:11.

Shah 'Abbas's funeral cortege now set out from Māzandarān. It included Shah 'Abbas's aunt, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, and the other women of the royal household, who transported the royal treasuries and workshops. Devoted Sufis shouldered the bier, and the cortege made its way to Kashan. There, the people came out to meet the funeral procession and demonstrated their great grief. The throng around the bier was so great that the emirs and other nobles could hardly make their way through the crowd. The bier was taken to the Imamzada Ḥabīb b. Mūsā, situated behind the burial ground outside the city. There, the body lay in state pending a decision as to its final resting place. Day and night, teams of persons who knew the Koran by heart recited passages from the sacred text, performing their duties according to a roster, so that the sound of the recitation of the Koran was always present. Incense was burned near the coffin, and the whole night long candles were burning. Every kind of meat and sweetmeat were provided for the Koran reciters, the attendants at the shrine, and the poor and needy. Mahdīqolī Beg, the son of Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū Qājār, who was descended from the emirs of that tribe and from Sufis of the Safavid house, was given the task of seeing to the burial of Shah 'Abbas. Having discharged this duty, he marched to Isfahan, which he entered on 23 Jomādā II 1038/17 February 1629.

On that day, in accordance with *qezelbāš* custom, all the principal officers of state and other nobles, the *moqarrabs* of the court, took their places according to their rank and station in the audience hall of the royal palace of Naqš-e Jahān, to be received by Shah Ṣafī and to kiss his feet. The great khans were the recipients of the Shah's special favor. The sight of the Shah purged their hearts of grief, and they shouted with joy, "Shah Ṣafī!"

Poets vied with one another to produce chronograms to commemorate the death of Shah 'Abbas; through divine inspiration, no less than ten of them produced the same chronogram, "The Shadow of God"[5]—another clear indication that all men lived under the shadow of his felicity. Mowlānā Šarmī Qazvīnī devised an alternative chronogram: "Ṣafī set foot on the throne of kingship."[6]

An Obituary Notice on Shah 'Abbas

The praiseworthy qualities of Shah 'Abbas are too many to enumerate, and his admirable acts are more numerous than can possibly be imagined; both his qualities and his acts are models for the princes of the world. I mentioned some of these great achievements at the beginning of book I of this history, in twelve discourses. In sum, he was a king of unparalleled nobility of nature, and his subtle ideas were merely the reflection of his subtle mind. Through his justice and concern for the welfare of his people, his subjects lived in peace, and all lived in such fear of his wrath and punishment that the lion and the lamb could lie down together. His charitable benefactions, his public works, and his almsgiving were on a large scale. In Iran, they comprised tax relief for his subjects; the creation of orchards and gardens; the repair of pious foundations; and many other charitable works. Enemies and evildoers constantly felt the point of his sword and the thrust of his spear. His grandeur and majesty were incomparable, and the pomp and circumstance of his court surpassed the dreams of former kings. His faith in the family of the Prophet of 'Alī was unshakable, and so Sanjar Mīrzā, a descendant of Shah Ne'matollāh and the nephew of Shah Tahmasp, devised the following chronogram to mark his death: "May he rise again through 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb!"

The rulers of the world, both Muslim and non-Muslim, from the furthest reaches of Europe and Russia and Kāšğar and Tibet and India, established friendly relations with Shah 'Abbas, and were continually sending ambassadors to his court bringing gifts beyond computation from all parts of the world. Despite the vast distance between them and the dangers of intervening oceans like the immense oceans between the Atlantic[7] and the Sea of 'Oman, reports of his just and beneficent rule caused foreign and Christian rulers to send their ambassadors by land and sea. These rulers included the Christian rulers of the Lāz,[8] Germany, France, England, Holland, Portugal, and Spain, as well as the Pope, who is the greatest of the Christian rulers, the caliph of the Christians, and is the exemplar of all Christian sects. The Shah's court was rarely without a foreign embassy.

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[5] *Ẓell-e ḥaqq* equals 1038/1629. This chronogram is particularly apt, of course, since the Safavid kings claimed to the "Shadow of God upon earth" *(ẓellollāh fe'l-arże).*

[6] *Ṣafī pā bar owrang-e šāhī nehād* equals 1038/1629.

Proof of what I am saying is afforded by a letter sent this year to Shah 'Abbas by a certain Pope named Urban VIII.[9] Among the Christians, whoever holds the office of successor of Christ is termed Pope, and his seat is at Rome, in the land of the Greeks, which Christians believe is the place where Christ lived. I have reproduced this letter verbatim, so that envious persons may not accuse me of being a time-serving sycophant, and realize that I am not guilty of artificial elaboration such as secretaries indulge in. The text of the letter is as follows:

"O mighty king! Greetings from us to you, who are the refulgence of the infinite divine grace and the refuge of all mankind! You are a king who is the model and source of guidance for people throughout the world, and particularly for the Vicar of Christ Our Lord at Rome, who is the place of refuge for great and puissant princes. Since you are their superior in grandeur and majesty and dominion, it is incumbent upon all human beings to pray for the perpetuity of your reign, and especially it is incumbent upon my subjects, since I have regarded it as an obligatory duty that in my churches prayers should be offered for your long life and invoking God's assistance on your behalf. I trust that the protection of God's grace may never depart from you. Since your own clemency is boundless, some of your people who are in these parts are being treated by the Christians with the greatest honor and respect. The theologians who are at your court disseminate knowledge just as in times gone by did the Greek philosophers, who taught knowledge and philosophy to the human race. The fame of your greatness and justice has surpassed that of the ancient Iranian kings, because you are the exemplar of the book of the Iranian kings. In Rome, which is a center for men of learning, all make your intellect and thought their pattern, and we have always received with gladness reports of your nobility. We have never had the slightest doubts on the matter; on the contrary, all Europeans have long held this opinion, because a long time has now passed since you gave a home to a group of Catholic fathers, that is to say European theologians, and treated them with the greatest honor and veneration.

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[7] *Daryā-ye moḥīṭ*—lit., the circumambient ocean, thought by medieval Muslim geographers to enclose the world on all sides. In this context, however, it denotes simply the Atlantic (see *EI*², Vol. I, p. 934, *s.v.* AL-BAḤR AL-MUḤĪṬ).

[8] The Lāz are a people of south Caucasian stock living in the region bordering on the southeast corner of the Black Sea, the ancient Colchis. The reference here to the dispatch of ambassadors to the Safavid court is important evidence of the virtual autonomy of the ruler of the Lāz in the 17th century.

[9] This letter was written to Shah 'Abbas by Pope Urban VIII on 9 March 1624, in the first year of his pontificate. The Latin text is contained in *A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia*, II, p. 1294, and an English translation is to be found in the same work, I, pp. 271-72. Eskandar Monšī's version preserves the spirit of the original remarkably well.

"All the Imams of Rome, who are the Popes and the Vicars of Christ, are full of love for you because of your action in sending ambassadors to them, because these envoys are reminders of our solidarity and unity, just as the discalced Carmelite fathers and monks who are in your realm are overflowing with joy and happiness, and they are constantly sending me reports of your greatness and exalted status, because they are grateful for the favors they have received, and are not forgetful of them.

"Your conquests have made your name resound throughout the world; and your conquests have been achieved not only by the sword, for you have given the Carmelite fathers a place in your dominions, and they are able to worship in their own churches according to their own rites without the slightest interference from anyone. Therefore I, in mystical communion with the other Vicars of Christ, have supplicated Almighty God in His mercy to grant you reward for your actions and victory through their good offices, so that the luster of your realm may continue, like the moon, to shed light on all the world, and that you may continue steadfast in your obedience to God's commands, and may exercise dominion like Our Lord Jesus Christ, and may ever attain your object.

"Continue to send ambassadors to us Christians at Rome, so that we may see visible signs of your love and friendship, and so that the followers and servants of Christ may pray for you in all sincerity and peace of mind. The Carmelite fathers are especially honored by the favors you have lavished upon them, and it is for this reason that they are continually singing your praises in Rome, Christ's capital. My own love and affection toward you is of long standing, because of the love which the Popes have borne for you. May the light of God's truth ever shine upon you."

This letter was written in some Frankish tongue, and arrived sealed. Some members of the foreign community in Isfahan translated it into Persian. It was not apparent from the contents of the letter whether its author was, in fact, the Pope. Inquiries were made of the foreign residents, and they replied that it was the custom among them, when persons of rank corresponded with one another, for the author not to make his identity obvious, and this was deemed a mark of courtesy and humility; the identity of the author was alluded to in a subtle manner. The Pope, they said, had therefore observed this polite convention and had concealed his identity; in the custom of the Franks, this is considered the ultimate in elegance. At all events, the greatness of Shah 'Abbas is too well known to require evidence of proof.

At the time of his death, Shah 'Abbas was sixty years of age. He had come to the throne when he was eighteen, and had reigned for forty-two years. He spent the whole of the period from the second year of his reign until his death, a period of forty years, in ceaseless journeyings to and fro in the cause of governing his empire. His Eṣnā 'Ašarī faith was strong and pure. May God have mercy on him and his forefathers!

Deaths This Year among the Moqarrabs of the Court and Other Safavid Officers

1. Yūsof Sultan, a *ḡolām* who was a protégé of Shah 'Abbas. He rose to the status of emir with the rank of sultan, and was appointed governor of Gaskar and chief of the Čapnī *ḡāzīs*.[10] Last year he was charged with dereliction of duty and dismissed from his post, and replaced by Gorgīn Sultan, another *ḡolām*. As a punishment for this dereliction of duty, Yūsof Sultan was ordered to go to Erzerum to support Abāza Pasha, but as I have already reported, that operation miscarried. He was then appointed commander of the musketeers at the fort of Āḵesqa, and was serving in that capacity when he died. He was a most humane and intelligent young man, destined for great things. His sons were enrolled among the *ḡolāms* like their father.

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[10] The appointment of a *ḡolām* to be chief of a tribe in place of the hereditary leader was part of a very significant trend under Shah 'Abbas I designed to curb the power of the *qezelbāš* and the tribes generally.

2. 'Alī Khan Beg the *nāẓer-e davābb* (superintendent of the animals), the son of Elāhī Beg *nāẓer-e davābb*. When Allāhverdī Khan was alive, Elāhī Beg was the superintendent of his household, and his excellent performance in that post gained him the position of superintendent of animals in the royal stables. After his death, his office devolved upon his son, 'Alī Khan Beg. Subsequently, the latter was appointed *dārūga* of the Khorasan accounts, and went to Mašhad, where he had an epileptic fit and died. His brother, Yādegār Beg, now holds that post.

3. Mīr Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of the *golāms*. He was the son of Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṭanzī, and was appointed vizier of the *golāms* and musketeers in recognition of his father's length of service. He fell ill this year at Qazvin, and on the journey to Māzandarān, the strain of the constant stops and starts precipitated his death. His office was given to Ḥasan Beg the son of Hāšem Beg Ardestānī, the vizier of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū the *dīvānbegī*, but the latter had not officially taken office by performing the ceremony of kissing the Shah's foot when the Shah died.

4. Ḥakīm Šefā'ī Ṣefāhānī, the poet-physician. He came from a medical family at Isfahan. In his youth he followed the usual courses of study and excelled at them all, but he specialized in medicine. He was a free-living, witty fellow who liked poetry and made a name for himself as a composer of poetry, too; indeed, he was the most famous poet of his time. His poetic works included odes, lyrics, *maṣnavīs*, occasional poems, and quatrains. The content of his poems was profound, and his style elegant. He had a biting tongue and was quick to take offense. He delighted in sticking subtle barbs into people, and his quick wit enabled him to satirize his critics. Although satire is generally frowned upon, one must admit that he was a master of the art. He was a favorite of Shah 'Abbas, but because of his dissolute style of life, he rarely accompanied the Shah on his expeditions. Nevertheless, the Shah made him poet-laureate *(malek al-šo'arā)* of Iran, although he sometimes reproved him for his satirical allusions to people. At the end of his life, he felt some contrition for the satires he had written, and wrote an occasional piece expressing his apologies. This year, he died at Isfahan.

Names of Officeholders

I thought I should add, as an appendix to my history of Shah ʿAbbas, a list of the holders of high office during his reign: emirs, *ṣadrs,* and viziers. I shall begin with the emirs, since in this category are men of sound judgment and good counsel, men of military might, men who are the leaves and fruit of the tree of state, men who wield great authority; I shall list them all, khans and sultans alike.

Great Emirs of the time of Shah ʿAbbas

Many of the great emirs died during Shah ʿAbbas's lifetime, either of natural causes or in battle, and these I have already mentioned in the annual obituary notices. The number of emirs still alive at the time of Shah ʿAbbas's death was ninety-two; I shall divide them into two categories: (A) *qezelbāš* emirs, and (B) *ḡolām* emirs.

Category A: Emirs of the Major Qezelbāš Tribes and Tribes Subordinate to Them, Totaling Seventy-three Emirs, Listed by Tribes

Šeykāvand.

(1) ʿĪsā Khan b. Seyyed Beg Ṣafavī b. Maʿṣūm Beg the *vakīl al-salṭana* of Shah Tahmasp, ʿĪsā Khan held the office of *qūrčībāšī,* one of the highest offices of the Safavid state. By virtue of the fact that he was a *seyyed,* and was connected by marriage with Shah ʿAbbas and extremely close to the Shah, he held a place of peculiar distinction above the other emirs.

Šāmlū. I will deal next with the Šāmlūs, because they are the chief of the *qezelbāš* tribes. Seven officers of this tribe held the rank of emir at the time of Shah ʿAbbas's death:

(2) Zeynal Khan Begdīlū, who succeeded ʿAlīqolī Khan Gerāmīllū as *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* and governor of Rayy. His excellent services led the Shah to take him under his wing.

(3) Ḥasan Khan b. Ḥoseyn Khan, of the ʿAbdāllū clan. One of the great emirs, he succeeded his father as *beglerbeg* of Khorasan.

(4) Moḥammad Zamān Sultan, governor of Ḡūr and some parts of Khorasan.

(5) Fażl ʿAlī Sultan, governor of Bālā Morḡāb.

(6) Ḥaqqverdī Sultan 'Arabgīrlū, one of the emirs of Azerbaijan. At this time, the 'Arabgīrlū clan was part of the Šāmlū tribe.

(7) Naqdī Sultan Nelqās,[1] the chief of the Nelqās clan, included in the Šāmlū tribe.

(8) Gūndoğmūš Sultan Begdīlū, who resided with his tribesmen in the Ṭāūq Karkūk district. At the time of Shah 'Abbas's first expedition to Baghdad, he declared his "love of the Shah," was received in audience by the Shah, and granted the rank of sultan and various fiefs in Azerbaijan.

Ostājlū. Three members of this tribe had the status of emir.

(9) Moḥebb 'Alī Sultan b. Bektāš Khan, the governor of Nesā in Khorasan.

(10) Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū, the governor of Naḵčevān.

(11) Abu'l-Qāsem Sultan b. Pīr Ğeyb Khan Šaraflū, the governor of Ḥella in Arab Iraq.

Ẕu'l-Qadar. Of this great tribe, the following held the status of emir.

(12) Emir Khan the *mohrdār* (keeper of the seal), the governor of Kerman. He was the son of Rostam Sultan Söklen.

(13) Ebrahim Sultan Qorūğlū, the governor of Saraḵs in Khorasan.

(14) Dargāhqolī Sultan Qorūğlū, the grandson of Šāhqolī Ḵalīfa the *mohrdār* and also, on his mother's side, the grandson of Nadr Khan the *mohrdār*. He was governor of various districts in Fārs.

(15) Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū, formerly one of the emirs of Qarābāğ and now governor of Āḵesqa.

(16) Ḵalīl Sultan b. Kalb 'Alī Sultan Īmūr, an emir of Qarābāğ.

(17) Mostadām Sultan Ḥājjīlar, the governor of Kabūd Jāma in the province of Astarābād.

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[1] *TM*, p. 16, gives Nelqāz.

Qājār. Two members of this tribe had the status of emir.

(18) Ṭahmāspqolī Khan b. Emir Gūna Khan, who succeeded his father as *beglerbeg* of Čoḵūr-e Sa'd; he was one of the great emirs.

(19) Peykar Khan Īgīrmī-dört, one of the emirs of Qarābāḡ and governor of Barda'.

Afšār. Three members of this tribe held the status of emir.

(20) Kalb 'Alī Sultan, b. Qāsem Khan Īmānlū, the governor of Orūmī.

(21) Ordūḡdī Khan Ālplū, the governor of Farāh and Esfezār in Khorasan.

(22) Emāmqolī Sultan Ūsāllū, the governor of Gāvrūd.

Turkman. Two emirs.

(23) Pīr Būdāq Khan Pornāk b. Šāhbanda Khan, who succeeded his father as governor of Tabriz and *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan.

(24) Ḥasan Sultan Ordaklū, the governor of Qapānāt.

Esperlū.[2] One emir.

(25) Šekārī Sultan, the governor of.Ardabīl and Sarāb.

Rūmlū. One emir.

(26) Ḥeydar Sultan Qūyla-Ḥeṣārlū, the governor of Tonakābon in Gīlān.

Qarādāḡlū. One emir.

(27) Borhān al-Dīn Ḵalīfa b. Elyās Ḵalīfa, the governor of Qarāja-dāḡ.

Bayāt. Three emirs.

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[2] *TM,* p. 16, gives Esperlū. However, Don Juan's *Relaciones,* quoted by *TM,* p. 193, has the form Ispyrrhlu, which seems closer to the Persian *e. s. p. r. h. l. ū.*

(28) Yār 'Alī Sultan, the governor of Qal'a-ye Bāyazīd.

(29) Gedā 'Alī Sultan, the governor of Mākū.

(30) Badr Sultan, the governor of various places in Čokūr-e Sa'd.

Ṭāleš. Two emirs.

(31) Sārū Khan, grandson of Bāyandor Khan and governor of Āstārā.

(32) Badr Khan Sultan, who succeeded Yādegār 'Alī Sultan in the office of *ḵalīfat al-ḵolafā*, and was governor of various places in Ṭāleš.

Alpā'ūt. One emir.

(33) Manṣūr Sultan, who has a fief in Šīrvān.

Jāgīrlū. One emir.

(34) Moḥammad Sultan, governor of Šakkī.

Qazāqlar. One emir.

(35) Šamsī Khan, governor of Dārābjerd and subsequently of Āḵesqa.

Bāybordlū. One emir.

(36) Morād Khan Sultan, governor of Arasbār.

Kurds and Lors. Seventeen emirs with the rank of khan or sultan.

(37) Ḥoseyn Khan 'Abbāsī of Lor-e Feylī,[3] the *beglerbeg* of Lorestān and an emir especially favored by the Shah.

(38) Khan Aḥmad Khan Ardalān b. Holow Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šahrezūr and one of the great emirs.

(39) Ḵalīl Khan b. Jahāngīr Khan, governor of Lor-e Baḵtīārī.

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[3] Formerly Lor-e Kūček; see *TM*, p. 172.

(40) 'Āšūr Khan Čeganī, the governor of Marv-e Šāhījān and a trusted emir.

(41) Aḥmad Sultan Čeganī b. Jāmī Sultan, governor of Sabzavār.

(42) Salmān Khan the *sūbāšī* Donbolī, governor of Čors and Salmās.

(43) Emāmqolī Sultan Sīāh-manṣūr, governor of Esfarā'īn in Khorasan.

(44) Reżāqolī Sultan Sīāh-manṣūr, the governor of the fortress of Bost in Zamīn-dāvar.

(45) Beyrām 'Alī Sultan Ṣūfī, the governor of the Deylamān region of Gīlān; he is an emir of one of the Kurdish tribes.

(46) 'Alī Mardān Khan b. Ganj 'Alī Khan Zīg, one of the great emirs; he succeeded his father as *beglerbeg* of the province of Kandahar.

(47) Maqṣūd Sultan Donbolī, governor of Bargošāṭ.

(48) 'Alī Jān Sultan Šaqāqī, the chief of the Šaqāqī tribe.

(49) Šojā' al-Dīn Sultan Sūrla, one of the emirs of Šīrvān.

(50) Nafas Sultan Garrūs, the governor of the fortress of Lak in the Baghdad region, a dependency of Dar-e Tang.

(51) Gedā'ī Sultan Kūlānī,[4] the governor of Zenjān.

(52) Qalandar Sultan Kala-gīr, chief of that tribe and an emir of Azerbaijan.

(53) Moṣṭafā Sultan Jastānī, nicknamed Abdāl 'Alī, the governor of Jastān, a dependency of Baghdad.

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[4] Possibly the tribe listed by *TM*, p. 16, as Kolyā'ī.

Various Čağatāy Tribes and Chiefs of the Ṣā'en-ḵānī Yaqqa Turkmans and Others Who Are Included in the Category Čağatāy. There are twelve emirs.

(54) Beyrām 'Alī Sultan Qarā-bayāt, the governor of Nishapur, a member of the Bābā Elyās family.

(55) 'Alyār Khan Gerāylī, chief of the Gerāylī tribe and one of the great emirs and chief of the Gerāylī tribe living in the Astarābād region of Khorasan.

(56) Aḥmad Sultan Močakī, governor of Toršīz in Khorasan.

(57) Farīdūn Ḥoseyn Sultan, the grandson of Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan Fīrūzjang, the governor of Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya in Khorasan.

(58) Qalandar Sultan Tükelī, governor of the province of Jām.

(59) Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan b. Moḥammad Sultan Qarā-bayāt, governor of Šūštar and Dezfūl in Ḵūzestān.

(60) Šāhvalī Sultan Jalā'er, governor of Pasākūh in the district of Mašhad.

(61) Šāhqolī Sultan Qamarī, governor of Jahān-Arğīān in Khorasan.

(62) Oğūrlū Sultan Jalā'er.

(63) Raḥmānqolī Sultan Qarābāš.

(64) Mīr Moḥammad Sultan Ğūrī b. Mīr Šādī Sultan, the chief of one of the tribes in the Herat region.

(65) Mīr Ḥeydar Sultan Jamšīdī, the governor of Karoḵ in the district of Herat.

Miscellaneous Non-Qezelbāš Tribes Which Have a Member Enrolled among the Great Emirs. In Azerbaijan, eight emirs.

(66) Aqa Khan Mīr Moqaddam, of the Otūz-īkī federation of tribes in Qarābāğ, governor of Marāğa;

(67) Sārū Khan Sultan Salmāsī, chief of the Lak tribe of Salmās.

(68) Kalb Režā Sultan Zonūzī, one of the Azerbaijan emirs.

From the *Sīl-süpür* tribe, one emir. The Sīl-süpür consisted of scattered tribes living in Ottoman territory whose way of life was plundering and looting; they gave themselves the name Sīl-süpür, meaning "those who make a clean sweep." As I indicated earlier during my account of the Safavid reconquest of Azerbaijan, two thousand families of this tribe came over to the Safavid side, and some of them were enrolled among the *qūrčīs* and placed under the command of Ḵalīl Sultan.

(69) Ḵalīl Sultan.

From the *Turkman* tribes of Šīrvān, one emir.

(70) Nūr al-Dīn Sultan Pāydār; he is subordinate to the governor of Tiflis and carries out various duties at his orders.

In Khorasan, three emirs.

(71) Malek Jalāl al-Dīn b. Malek Maḥmūd, the governor of Sīstān; he is descended from the Ṣaffārids.[5]

(72) Šīr Khan Afḡān, governor of Pūšang (Fūšanj), a dependency of Kandahar.

(73) Maqdūd Sultan Afḡān, subordinate to the governor of Kandahar.

Category B: Ḡolām Emirs Who Held the Rank of Khan or Sultan

A considerable number of persons in this category embraced Islam and became *ḡolāms* during the reign of Shah 'Abbas, and most of them were brought up from boyhood at court, under the supervision of the Shah. Those who showed talent were promoted to the rank of khan or sultan. When a *qezelbāš* emir or a provincial governor died and there was no one in his tribe suitable for promotion to the rank of emir, one of the *ḡolāms* of the royal household who had distinguished himself by his justice, skill, bravery, initiative, and devotion to his benefactor was made emir of that tribe, placed in command of those tribal forces, or made governor of that region. As a result of this policy, by the time of the death of Shah 'Abbas, twenty-one *ğolāms* had been raised to the status of emir with the rank of khan or sultan. Among them were these:

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[5] A local dynasty of extraordinary tenacity (see Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties*, pp. 103-106.

(74) Emāmqolī Khan b. Allāhverdī Khan, who succeeded his father as *beglerbeg* of Fārs, Kūh Gīlūya, Lār, Bahrain, and Jarūn. Since the *beglerbeg* had full authority over the appointment and dismissal of subordinate governors in the areas under his jurisdiction, I have not been able to discover their names. Emāmqolī Khan was succeeded by his son, Ṣafīqolī Sultan.

(75) Ṣafīqolī Sultan, who is also one of the great emirs.

(76) Dā'ūd Khan, the brother of Emāmqolī Khan, was appointed *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ and chief of the Qājār tribe. He succeeded Moḥammadqolī Khan Qājār, who had been dismissed from his position as *amīr al-omarā* of Qarābāğ because of dereliction of duty during operations in Georgia.

(77) Ṣafīqolī Khan Gorjī, who had the sobriquet of Šīr 'Alī, who held the posts of *beglerbeg* of Arab Iraq and commander of the *qūrčīs* and warden of the Shi'ite shrines in Arab Iraq. As already related, he served with great distinction during the siege of Baghdad by Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha and thoroughly deserved the promotion he received.

(78) Ḵosrow Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Astarābād and officer in command of the armed forces there.

(79) Manūčehr Khan b. Qarčaqāy Khan the commander in chief of Iran, who succeeded his father as governor of Mašhad.

(80) Qazāq Khan Čerkes, who replaced Ẕu'l-Faqār Khan and Yūsof Khan as *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān; he was also appointed commander of the Qarāmānlū and Ḵeneslū *qezelbāš* troops.

(81) Farroḵ Sultan, who replaced Yūtam Sultan as governor of Darband and Šābarān in Šīrvān, and was appointed chief of the Bayāt, Rūmlū, and other *ğāzīs*.

(82) Gorgīn Sultan, chief of the Čameš-gezek tribe and governor of Ḵabūšān in Khorasan.

(83) Jamšīd Sultan Gorjī, chief of the Eydelū clan of the Afšār tribe, and governor of Abīvard in Khorasan.

(84) Oḡūrlū Sultan known as Dastkaš (mettlesome), governor of the district of Darūn in Khorasan.

(85) Ūtār Sultan, chief of the Pāzūkī tribe and governor of Ḵār, Semnān, Damāvand, and Fīrūzkūh.

(86) Nowrūz Sultan, chief of the Javānšīr tribe of the Otūz-īkī federation; he was one of the emirs of Qarābāḡ.

(87) Ḵosrow Sultan, governor of Mārūčāq and Morḡāb, and commander of a regiment of Šāmlū *ḡāzīs*.

Ṣadrs, Viziers, and Comptrollers of Finance under Shah ʿAbbas

Although I have noted administrative appointments in the course of my history and may therefore be accused of repetition by mentioning them again, I have decided that it is not inappropriate to do so. I will begin with the *ṣadrs,* of whom seven held office under Shah ʿAbbas:

(1) When Shah ʿAbbas came to the throne, Emir Abu'l-Valī Enjū Šīrāzī was the incumbent in the office of *ṣadr* (I gave some information on him in book I, under the *seyyeds* of the reign of Shah Tahmasp). He had been promoted to the office of *ṣadr* from that of *qāżī-ye ʿaskar* during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, at the time when the pro-Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction was in the ascendant at Qazvin. At the accession of Shah ʿAbbas, he, in common with most other officials appointed by the previous regime, was dismissed from office. However, he was so much more fitted for the office than the other *seyyeds* and scholars of the time that he was reappointed after a short interval and held office as sole *ṣadr* for twenty years.

(2) Qāżī Khan b. Mīrzā Borhān, who was a Seyfī *seyyed* from Qazvin and a descendant of the vizier Qāżī Jahān.

(3) Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ṣalā'ī, who came from the Šahrestān *seyyed* family and was a descendant of Mīr Fażlollāh. He was a learned and capable *seyyed,* and was appointed to the office of *ṣadr,* but was killed at the siege of Šamāḵī in Šīrvān.

(4) Mīrzā Rażī, the nephew of the above, replaced him in the office of *ṣadr.* Mīrzā Rażī was connected by marriage with the Shah himself, and was made warden of the properties held in mortmain by the royal household administration on behalf of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones. In addition to the office of *ṣadr,* he held that of *mohrdārī-ye towqī'āt-e mobāraka-ye ḥażarāt-e 'ālīyāt.*[6] He fell ill and died on a journey to Azerbaijan in 1026/1617. The same year, Qāżī Khan was dismissed from the *ṣadārat* because of his audacity in making certain disbursements from the *owqāf* which the Shah did not approve of. Mīrzā Rażī's post was conferred on his son, Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn Moḥammad, however, was an infant not yet weaned, and so his cousin,

(5) Mīrzā Rafī', was appointed as his deputy to discharge the functions of *ṣadr.* Qāżī Khan's share of the *ṣadārat* was given to

(6) Qāżī Sultan Torbatī Mūsavī, the warden of the Režavī shrine at Mašhad. However, Qāżī Sultan died at Ardabīl a few days after his appointment. After Qāżī Sultan's death,

(7) Mīr Rafī' al-Dīn Moḥammad Ḵalīfa, the son of the late Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd Eṣfahānī, who belonged to the family known at Isfahan as the Māzandarānī *seyyeds,* was appointed *ṣadr* (I had a notice on him earlier); Mīrzā Rafī', also honored by a marriage bond with the royal house, continued to issue orders and documents embellished with his signature, in his own right, as Mīrzā Rażī had before him. In 1034/1624-25, when Mīr Rafī' al-Dīn Moḥammad Ḵalīfa died, Mīrzā Rafī' assumed the office of sole *ṣadr* with full independence, and held this office concurrently with the posts of warden and keeper of the seal of the trust of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones; at the time of writing, he still holds these posts.

Viziers Who Held Office under Shah 'Abbas

The number of viziers who held office under Shah 'Abbas was also seven:

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[6] Not listed in *TM.* It almost certainly refers to the right to affix one's seal to documents relating to the administration of the lands held in mortmain just mentioned.

(1) Mīrzā Šāhvalī b. Mīrzā Aḥmad b. Mīrzā ʿAṭāʾollāh. Mīrzā ʿAṭāʾollāh was appointed vizier by Shah Tahmasp, and I have therefore said something about him already. His son, Mīrzā Aḥmad, was unequaled in the arts of writing the *nastaʿlīq* script and of elegant literary composition. Because of a dispute between him and the vizier, Mīrzā Salmān, Mīrzā ʿAṭāʾollāh elected to go to Khorasan during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and become vizier to Moršedqolī Khan. In Khorasan, he played his part in the pro-ʿAbbas Mīrzā uprising. In the year that Sultan Moḥammad Shah led the army of Iraq to Khorasan to suppress the revolt and laid siege to Moršedqolī Khan at Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya, Mīrzā Aḥmad's nephew, Baḵtam Beg, at the instigation of Mīrzā Salmān, insinuated himself into the fort, murdered his uncle, and got away. In gratitude for Mīrzā Aḥmad's devoted service, Moršedqolī Khan made his as yet infant son, Mīrzā Šāhvalī, his vizier, and the latter accompanied ʿAbbas Mīrzā when he marched west to Iraq to assume the throne. Moršedqolī Khan was instrumental in securing for Mīrzā Šāhvalī the post of vizier of the central administration.

(2) Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī. On his mother's side, he was a Kojojī *seyyed* of Tabriz, and a kinsman of Mīrzā Kebrīā. After the murder of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā (994/1586), he was appointed vizier and *eʿtemād al-dowla* by the emirs of the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction. On the accession of Shah ʿAbbas he was arrested and fined, but subsequently accompanied Shah ʿAbbas on his expedition to Khorasan. He was a party to the conspiracy to murder Moršedqolī Khan, and was in secret communication with Shah ʿAbbas with a view to achieving this end. In return for his services, Shah ʿAbbas promised him the office of vizier. After the murder of Moršedqolī Khan, the Shah kept his promise and appointed Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī vizier. However, the latter was ambitious and self-willed, and guilty of extorting money in a manner which displeased the Shah; further, he had been responsible for the upbringing of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. Six months after he had taken office, he was arrested at the instigation of the great emirs at Dūġābād, a village in the Zāva and Moḥavvalāt region, and put to death a few days later.

(3) Mīrzā Loṭfollāh Šīrāzī, who had been the vizier of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. After the murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā, he had been dismissed and, as already stated, Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī became vizier. On the accession of Shah ʿAbbas, Mīrzā Loṭfollāh was also arrested and fined, and also accompanied the Shah on his expedition

to Khorasan. After the execution of Moršedqolī Khan, Mīrzā Loṭfollāh became the vizier of Zeynab Begom, the Shah's aunt, and through her efforts, became *vazīr-e a'ẓam* and *e'temād al-dowla* after the death of Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī. A governorship was added to this post, and he became possessor of troops, drum, and banner, and held the office of vizier for two years with full independence. At the end of that period he was dismissed from office because his son, Mīrzā Moḥammad Zamān, in the arrogance and ignorance of youth, had been guilty of acts which displeased the Shah.

(4) Ḥātem Beg b. Bahrām Ordūbādī. As a reward for devoted service (one of his brothers, Abū Ṭāleb Beg, who had been sent as an envoy to 'Abdollāh Khan by 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū during the Uzbeg siege of Herat, was blown from the mouth of a cannon), Shah 'Abbas took him under his wing and appointed him comptroller in chief of finance; shortly afterward (999/1591), on the dismissal of Mīrzā Loṭfī, he was appointed *vazīr-e a'ẓam*, a post which he held for about twenty years, until his death before the walls of the fort of Orūmīya, as previously related.

(5) Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, son of the above. I have given some details on Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā at the beginning of book I. He was appointed vizier while still a young man, in recognition of his father's services to the state, and held this office for ten years. He was then dismissed as the result of committing various acts inevitable in a young man and inseparable from the arrogance of office and position, so that he might be refined by the experience of having closer acquaintance with the rough as well as the smooth side of life.

(6) Salmān Khan, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā b. 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājlū. An officer of great talent, he held the office of vizier of the supreme *dīvān* for five years,[7] at the end of which time he fell ill at Isfahan and died.

(7) Sultan al-'Olamā'ī and Dastūr al-Vozarā'ī Ḵalīfa Sultan the son of Mīr Rafī' al-Dīn Moḥammad the *ṣadr*. He assumed the office of vizier with full authority. He was a *seyyed* of high rank and a scholar of fine character. From early youth until his promotion to this high office, he had devoted his life to study and scholarship. He had acquired great competence in accountancy, and his sound judgment enabled him to make great progress in the office of vizier. His

[7] Just possible if one takes the extreme dates of 1620 and 1624.

mastery of accountancy was such that the records kept during his incumbency are free from error. He has brought distinction to the office of vizier, which he still holds. May he live long and continue to enjoy it!

Comptrollers of Finance

The number of comptrollers of finance who held office under Shah 'Abbas was also seven:

(1) Ḵ̌āja Šokrollāh Dīnānī Eṣfahānī, who was in the service of 'Abbas in Khorasan before he became Shah. He accompanied 'Abbas to Iraq and held the post of comptroller of finance for three years. He was a man of austere habit and great integrity, and a skilled accountant. He was fond of all forms of hunting, and especially hunting with dogs. About halfway through the Year of the Tiger (999/1591), he was dismissed and replaced by

(2) Ḥatem Beg Ordūbādī, the vizier of Bektāš Khan. Ḥātem Beg held the office for only six months, before being appointed vizier of the supreme *dīvān* at the beginning of the Year of the Hare (1000/1591-92).

(3) Aqa Shah 'Alī Dowlatābādī Eṣfahānī achieved great distinction in office and was awarded the gold pen, which was not ordinarily awarded to comptrollers of finance. He was a master accountant in bookkeeping and clerical work, and was a skilled and honest accountant. He held office with full authority for six years, until his death in 1006/1597-98. He was succeeded in office by his brother,

(4) Aqa Mīrzā 'Alī, who was awarded the gold pen and inkhorn, was an experienced administrator with an excellent record, sober and honest. The ledger which enabled a check to be made on the total revenue and expenditure of the Safavid empire was completed during his term of office; this ledger had been started by Ḥātem Beg, and is used today by the royal secretariat as its model and canon. He held office for five years, when he was dismissed as the result of accusations made against him by his enemies, who complained of his austere manner, his parsimony, and his excessive powers.

(5) Mo'ezzā Ebrāhīm Šīrāzī, one of those who had made these accusations against Aqa Mīrzā 'Alī, succeeded him in office, but was dismissed after only a year and a half. His extravagance and his

ill treatment of his colleagues and other members of the bureaucracy caused the latter to turn against him and start criticizing him. He, guilty of the sort of negligence and stupidity that arises from the arrogance bred of power in office, allowed a number of errors involving substantial sums due to the *dīvān* to go undetected in the Gīlān accounts. This was reported to the Shah by Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān, who had himself paid in some of the accounts in question.

(6) At the beginning of the Year of the Serpent, Mīrzā Qevām al-Dīn b. Mīrzā Ḥasan Kafrānī Eṣfahānī, the vizier of Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū the *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, who had studied bookkeeping and clerical work under Aqa Shah 'Alī's son, was appointed comptroller of finance. He was a man of fine character who, despite all the power and prestige of his office, remained a person of simple habits. He was charitable and generous, noted for his benefactions to the poor and needy, ascetics and the pious. He died in his sixteenth year of office, and was succeeded by

(7) Mīrzā Sa'īd, the grandson of Ǩāja Qāsem, who held the office of comptroller of finance until the death of Shah 'Abbas and is still in office.

Provincial Viziers during the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

(1) Mīrzā Moḥammad Šafī', vizier of Gīlān, Māzandarān, and Khorasan; he was known as Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān.

(2) Ǩāja Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of Azerbaijan, who had the title of *fadavīyat* (devoted service). There were other notable provincial viziers of Isfahan, Kashan, and elsewhere, all of whom are dead. Of those still in office at the time of the death of Shah 'Abbas, two in particular stand out as deserving of mention:

(3) Mīrzā Taqī, known as Sārū Taqī, the grandson of Ǩāja 'Enāyat who was the vizier of the centurion Ḥasan Beg in the time of Shah Tahmasp. In 1025/1616–17, when Shah 'Abbas was in winter quarters at Dāneqī, Sārū Taqī, who was at that time the vizier of the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, caught his attention, and the Shah appointed him *vazīr-e koll* of the province of Ṭabarestān, comprising Māzandarān and Rostamdār. Sārū Taqī rendered notable service in this office in regard to the erection of buildings, the maintenance of law and order throughout the province, the widening of roads, and so on, and his record caused the Shah to regard him with even greater

favor than before—to such a degree, in fact, that Sārū Taqī became an object of envy among his peers, and particularly among the *moqarrabs* and others close to the Shah. Sārū Taqī retained both this office and the Shah's favor until the Shah's death.

(4) Ḵāja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar Ḡūrīānī, the vizier of Khorasan. He came from a distinguished family of the Ḡūrīān district of Herat. During the Uzbeg occupation of Khorasan, he was charged with being a partisan of the *qezelbāš*, and suffered all sorts of injustices and harassment. After the Safavid reconquest of Khorasan, the Shah rewarded him for his loyalty by putting him in charge of various *dīvān* affairs. He performed these duties so well that he was appointed *vazīr-e koll* of the province of Khorasan, where he was the owner of large estates and properties, both inherited and acquired. He eventually became totally blind, but Shah ʿAbbas, in gratitude for his past services, allowed him to remain in office for a further twelve years—an unparalleled act of humanity and magnanimity on the part of a ruler.

There is no point in my making mention of other provincial viziers.

Peroration

God be praised that I have been permitted to finish this section of the *Tārīḵ-e ʿĀlam-ārā*. It is quite possible that I may have included some extraneous material in this history (which I regard as intrinsic to it) and may be criticized for this by interfering busybodies.

The time has now come to restrain my pen from idle babbling and direct it to a more worthy end, namely, a prayer for the long life of Shah Ṣafī and for the stability of his realm, and I hereby dedicate this work to him. May God grant him many years on the throne of his illustrious grandfather and render him, like his grandfather, triumphant over the enemies of religion and the state. May the trusted officers and *moqarrabs* of the court, nobles and commoners, and all men, enjoy the benefits of his rule. Amen, O Lord of the Worlds!

In the preamble to book I of my history, I indicated that after completing this *Tārīḵ-e ʿĀlam-ārā,* if I were spared and if I had no worries about making a livelihood (an unavoidable necessity for all mortals which takes so much of their precious time), I would compile an anthology of rare and choice anecdotes and strange tales, which would be drawn from the works of both the ancients and the moderns—works such as the *Jāmeʿ al-Ḥekāyāt,* the *ʿAjāʾeb al-Maḵlūqāt,* the *Ḥayāt al-Ḥeyvān,* the *Ketāb-e Faraj baʿd al-Šedda,* the *Golestān,* the *Negārestān,* the *Aḵlāq-e Nāṣerī*[1], the *Aḵlāq-e Moḥsenī,* the *Aḵlāq-e Jalālī,* and so on, each of which is a treasury in itself. I also planned to draw on my own experiences during the course of the seventy years of my life, what I have seen with my own eyes and what I have heard from persons of years and experience. From each source I would pluck some choice fruit until, like the beggars squatting in the streets, my lap would be full.

This anthology was planned as an appendix to this history, and my hope was that, having completed it through the patronage of the Shah, the two volumes might be judged worthy of inclusion in the royal library and would remain as a memorial to your humble servant. However, my preoccupation with the writing of this history has so far given me no opportunity. For the compilation of the anthology I needed a mind free from all other preoccupations and worries, so that I could assemble the necessary materials and set to work. I had also hoped to conclude my history with a few quotations from some of the poets who wrote during the reign of Shah 'Abbas, but by the time I finished writing the history, I had not collected this material either, and so this project too must be postponed until another time. If I have health and strength to carry it out, well and good; if not, my readers will realize how little is produced by a tired brain, and how little water is left in a broken glass, and I beg them to excuse me. "Many a hope lies buried in the earth." The opening verse of one of my poems is not inappropriate here:

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[1] Translated into English under the title *The Nasirean Ethics* by my colleague, G. M. Wickens, and published in 1964 in the *Persian Heritage Series,* No. 2.

> The Beloved made me a hundred promises, and did not keep one of them;
> There was no act of tyranny which that faithless one did not commit against me.

It is my hope that this history will be spared the carping criticism of envious meddlers; it is also my hope that my readers will correct any slips and errors which they come across, and not censure me for them.

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Glossary

ābdārbāšī: keeper of the royal pantry.
aḥdāṣ: night watch; officer under jurisdiction of the *dārūḡa (see TM* 82, 149).
ahl-e eḵteṣāṣ: seven chosen companions who guarded Esma'il I.
amīr āḵorbāšī: master of the royal stables.
amīr-e dīvān: an emir with administrative responsibilities in the central government.
amīr al-omarā:
  (1) commander-in-chief of the *qezelbāš* troops;
  (2) military governor of a frontier province.
andarūn: women's quarters of a house.
'asasbāšī: commander of the watch.
atālīq: tutor, guardian.
avāraja-nevīs: keeper of the registers of individual tax accounts.
bast: a Persian technical term denoting "sanctuary." Various locations were declared to constitute *bast* at various times *(EI,* s.v.), and sanctuary at such places was sought especially by those who had incurred the wrath of the political or religious authorities of the day.
beg: lowest of the three Safavid military ranks.
beglerbeg: military governor-general of a major province.
bokāvol: steward.
čālejībāšī: master of the royal musicians.
čarḵčībāšī: commander of the skirmishers.
čāšnīgīrbāšī: chief taster.
čūpānbegī: levy on flocks.
daftarḵāna: secretariat.
dār al-eslām (Abode of Islam): territory under Muslim rule.
dārūḡa: (1) town governor; (2) a police officer; (3) an official whose functions overlapped those of the *moḥtaseb,* particularly as a superintendent of weights and measures and as guardian of public morals.
davātdār: keeper of the royal inkhorn.
dīvān-e a'lā, dīvān-e 'ālī: the supreme Divan; the chancery.
dīvānbegī: highest civil magistrate; from time of 'Abbas I onward, one of the seven members of the supreme council of emirs.
dīvānḵāna: court of justice.
dowlatḵāna: royal residence.
emir: a Safavid officer of the highest rank.

ešīk-āqāsībāšī (of the Supreme *dīvān):* the holder of this office, called by Kaempfer *supremus aulae Mareschallus,* is first mentioned during the reign of Esma'il II; under 'Abbas I he became one of the six principal officers of the state.

ešīk-āqāsībāšī-ye ḥaram: an officer of lesser rank who was in charge of the various categories of officials whose duties lay at the entrance to, or outside, the *ḥaram.*

e'temād al-dowla (trusted support of the state): a title, not a rank; commonly conferred on viziers from time of Shah Tahmasp onward.

farmān: an order issuable only by the shah.

fatḥnāma: a letter announcing a victory.

fatvā: a legal opinion issued by a *moftī* or other legal expert.

ḡāzī(s): "fighters for the (Islamic) faith" against the (Christian) infidel.

gerek-yarāqān: purveyors.

ḡolām (lit., "slave"): in Safavid times used as a technical term to denote a person of non-Muslim origin who entered either the Safavid military or civil establishment. The *ḡolāms* were mainly Armenians, Georgians, and Circassians.

hama-sāla: a form of draft *(barāt)* permanently assigned on the same source of revenue.

ḥaram: the women's quarters of a house.

Imam (in Sunni usage): leader, especially in prayer; (in Shi'ite usage): a descendant from 'Alī in the male line, endowed with unique characteristics such as infallibility, etc.

imamzada: shrine or mausoleum erected over grave of some local sḥaikh or holy man.

jabbadār: director of the arsenal.

jārčībāšī: chief herald.

jelowdārbāšī: an officer under the orders of the *amīr-aḵ̌orbāšī.*

jenn: genies or spirits, not necessarily malevolent.

ḵādembāšī: comptroller of the attendants of the shrine of Imam Reżā.

ḵaftān: a quilted vest worn under armor.

ḵ̌āja: title of respect accorded to members of the religious classes, men of letters, etc.

kalāntar: mayor.

ḵalīfa(s): 'successor' to the Prophet Moḥammad; (in Sufi usage): 'commissar' for Sufi affairs.

ḵalīfat al-kolafā (in Sufi terminology): 'chief commissar' for Sufi affairs.

ḵāneqāh: Sufi convent.

ḵāṣṣa: belonging to the crown, coming under the jurisdiction of the crown.
ḵaṭīb: the official charged with delivering the *ḵoṭba,* or formal address, on Fridays in the mosque.
ḵerqa: Sufi mantle.
khan: (1) the highest of three regular ranks in the Safavid army; (2) tribal chief.
ḵoṭba: address delivered in mosques on Fridays.
lala: guardian, mentor.
laškar-nevīs: an officer concerned with army records.
madad-e ḵarj: technical term for a specific type of *soyūrḡāl,* immunity from tax or special privilege of a financial nature *(see TM,* p. 183).
majles-nevīs: secretary of state.
mas̱navī: a poem of indefinite length composed in rhyming couplets.
mehmāndār: officer responsible for the care of state visitors, official guests, etc.
meydān: square, piazza.
mīr-šekār: huntsman.
mohrdār: keeper of the seal.
moḥtaseb: an official charged with the supervision of weights and measures, the maintenance of public morals, etc.
moḥtaseb al-mamālek: an official subordinate to the superintendent of the royal workshops.
mojtahed: Shiʿite theologian of the highest rank.
moḵtār al-salṭana: occasionally used as a title of the *vakīl-e dīvān-e ʿālī.*
momayyez: auditor.
monšī: secretary.
monšī al-mamālek: state scribe.
moqarrab: a title of two categories of officials distinguished by their close proximity to the throne. (1) *moqarrab al-ḵāqān,* including palace eunuchs, royal physicians and astrologers, the controller of assay, etc.; (2) *moqarrab al-ḥażrat,* including the *ešīk-āqāsī-ye ḥaram,* the heads of departments of the royal household, court ushers, etc. *(see TM,* pp. 56ff.).
moršed, moršed-e kāmel: spiritual director of Sufis.
mošref-e boyūtāt: overseer of the royal workshops.
mostowfī al-baqāyā: comptroller of the arrears.
mostowfī-ye māl: see żābeṭ-nevīs.
mostowfī al-mamālek: chief accountant, comptroller of finance.
mostowfī-ye qūrčīān: accountant of the household troops.
motaferreqabāšī: commander of the couriers known as *motaferreqa.*

motavallī: warden of a shrine.
naqīb: a municipal official subordinate to the *kalāntar.*
naqīb al-noqabā: chief *naqīb.*
nāẓer: superintendent.
nāẓer-e boyūtāt: superintendent of the royal workshops.
nāẓer-e daftarḵāna-ye homāyūn: superintendent of the royal secretariat.
nešān: letter of appointment.
owtād: "stakes" or "pillars." The five *owtād* and the *abdāl* "substitutes" (their number is variously given as 7, 40, and 300), take the third and fifth places, respectively, in the hierarchy of saints who, "unknown to the masses, participate by means of their powerful influence in the preservation of the order of the universe" (I. Goldziher, ABDĀL in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, 1954, pp. 94–5).
pādešāh: king.
pasha: Ottoman military title borne by officers of high rank.
qabaq-andāzī: the pastime of shooting at a ring or other target placed on top of a pole.
qapūčībāšī (Ottoman: *qapıjıbāšī):* chief doorkeeper.
qāżī-ye aḥdāṣ: the magistrate who adjudicated in litigation arising from the activities of the *aḥdāṣ.*
qāżī-ye mo‘askar, qāżī ‘askar: military chaplain.
qezelbāš (Turkish 'redhead'): pejorative term used by the Ottomans to denote supporters of the Safavid cause, subsequently adopted by the latter as a mark of pride. The term referred to the distinctive scarlet headgear worn by Safavid supporters.
qollar-āqāsī: Safavid usage, commander in chief of the *ḡolāms (qollar);* Ottoman usage, officer in charge of the *qollar* ("slaves") of the Sultan.
qūrčīs: the cream of the *qezelbāš* troops, often used as royal bodyguards.
qūrčībāšī: commander in chief of the *qūrčīs.*
ṣadārat: the office of *ṣadr [q.v.].*
ṣadr: head of the religious institution.
ṣāḥeb-towjīh: keeper of the ledgers, an official in the department of the chief accountant.
šāhī-sevan: those who love the Shah.
šamḵāl: title of local ruler of Tarki near modern Petrovsk.
sanjaq-beys: Ottoman governors-general of the provinces.
sar-kešīk: officer of the watch at the Mašhad shrine.
šarbatdār: official in charge of sherbets, wines, and other drinks.
sārūqčībāšī: head keeper of the royal turban.

sepahsālār: commander in chief of the armed forces of Iran.
šeyḵ al-eslām: a leading authority on the religious law with juridical functions overlapping those of the *qāżī.*
seyyed: a person claiming descent from the Prophet Moḥammad.
sīāda: seyyedship.
šīrajībāšī: master of the wine cellar.
sofračībāšī: chief sewer.
soyūrḡāl, soyūrḡālāt: grant of land or its revenue in lieu of salary or pension.
sūbāšī: Ottoman military title (see H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West,* I/1, Oxford University Press 1950, index under *ṣū-başis).*
ṣūfīgarī: conduct appropriate to a Sufi.
sultan: (1) *qezelbāš* officer of the rank below khan; (2) title of Muslim rulers, especially the Ottoman sultans.
tabarrā'ī: member of a special corps whose duty it was to walk through the streets calling down curses on the "rightly-guided" caliphs and other enemies of the Shi‘ites, and to discipline those who failed to respond.
tāj: the distinctive red hat, with twelve pleats or gores denoting the twelve Shi‘ite Imams, devised by Ḥeydar as the distinguishing badge of the followers of the Safavid House.
teyūl: an assignment on the revenue in lieu of salary.
tovāčībāšī: chief army inspector.
tūpčībāšī: commander in chief of artillery.
Turkman(s): generic name for Turkish tribes.
tūšmālbāšī: superintendent of the royal kitchens.
vakīl: deputy, viceregent.
vakīl al-salṭana (see vakīl-e dīvān-e ‘ālī).
vakīl-e dīvān-e a‘lā (‘ālī): the term usually used to denote the head of the bureaucracy if this official was a *qezelbāš* officer.
vālī: ruler of a frontier province who acknowledged the suzerainty of the Safavid shah but enjoyed a large degree of independence.
vaqf, owqāf: charitable endowments, in cash or in kind, made by a benefactor for the upkeep of mosques, shrines, and the like, and for the support of the staff, both lay and ecclesiastical, of such places.
vazīr-e dīvān-e a‘lā: head of the bureaucracy; vizier.
viziers: *see vazīr-e dīvān-e a‘lā.*
yasāqī: levies providing their own arms and equipment.
yasāvol: aide-de-camp, court usher.
yasāvolān-e majles: ushers.

yasāvolān-e ṣoḥbat: gentlemen-in-waiting.
yasāvolbāšī: chief *yasāvol.*
yenīčerī-āqāsī: Aḡa of the Janissaries.
yūzbāšī: centurion.
żābeṭ-nevīs: an official in the revenue department of the chief accountant's office.
żarbzan: light cannon.
zargarbāšī: head goldsmith.